ABSTRACT
DIGGING THE FIELDS: CHINESE MINERS IN CALIFORNIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
by Paul Anthony Ludi
South Africa and the United States of America have often been put together in comparative historical studies, most often when concerned with frontier history, but no comparative work has been done on Chinese mineworkers, despite the fact that they had a profound impact on both nations. This paper aims to fill this void by focussing on Chinese mine laborers in California during the first three decades of the gold rush (1849-1882) culminating in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and during South Africa’s post-South African War period (1902-1910), when Chinese mineworkers were prevalent in both regions. This research shows that California’s experience with the Chinese mine laborers directly influenced how South Africa, two decades later, dealt with their own Chinese miners through the draconian and restrictive Labour Importation Ordinance. Individuals such as Ross Skinner, a mine manager in South Africa, bring this argument to the fore, and with the help of contemporary sources it is shown how comparative history can break down the compartmentalization of national history.
DIGGING THE FIELDS: CHINESE MINERS IN CALIFORNIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of Miami University
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of History
by
Paul Anthony Ludi
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio
2019
Advisor: Andrew Offenburger Reader: Elena Albarran Reader: Yihong Pan
©2019 Paul Anthony Ludi This thesis titled
DIGGING THE FIELDS: CHINESE MINERS IN CALIFORNIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
by
Paul Anthony Ludi
has been approved for publication by
The College of Arts and Sciences and Department of History
Andrew Offenburger
Elena Albarran
Yihong Pan Table of Contents
List of Tables iv
Acknowledgements v
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 8
California: Unwanted but Needed
Chapter 2 33
South Africa: “Compound” Interest
Conclusion 57
Bibliography 60
iii
List of Tables
Table 1 32
iv
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank my two readers who were invited to be so at very short notice. Their input, albeit only at the end, was invaluable to the final product which you see before you.
I must also thank my long-suffering parents who have helped and supported me through this period of development.
Lastly, and most importantly, my undying thanks must go to Dr. Andrew Offenburger, my excellent supervisor who guided me through this long process. When I first arrived, I was completely clueless as to what my thesis would be on, and through his help it has developed into something that I am truly proud of.
v
Introduction
South Africa and the United States of America are often connected to each other within comparative history, especially when concerned with frontier history.1 But to date no work has been completed on Chinese laborers within both nations, more specifically on Chinese miners. The Chinese played an important role in this frontier history, and in the history of both regions in a broader sense, but their voice is lost. The aim of this thesis is to fill this void. This paper explores the notion that the United States, specifically California, through the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, supplied South Africa with a working model to use at its own discretion of how to control and use Chinese miners. Certain limitations, however, have to be included in order to make this study possible. To incorporate the whole of South Africa and the United Sates would be impossible for a study of this length. Other regions of the world could easily be included within this study, most notably Mexico and Australia, but, again, due to length this is impossible. Therefore, I have narrowed my research to focus on two regions and two time periods. For the United States the paper focusses on California during the initial Gold Rush (1849) and its aftermath, which resulted in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. In South Africa’s case I have focussed on the Witwatersrand region during the Chinese labor experiment (1902-1910). Another limitation is that all of the sources used for this paper have been written in English, due to language constraints on behalf of the author. The thesis for this paper is to illustrate that the Californian experience with Chinese miners directly influenced how South Africa dealt with the Chinese two decades later.
The mining techniques in the two regions were slightly different, mainly due to the different periods that the initial gold discoveries took place, but both required large numbers of laborers. In California the gold deposits tended to be found in the mountainous regions on a high plateau.2 Similarly, in South Africa the goldfields of the Witwatersrand (“ridge of white waters”) were found on a ridge of mountains upon a high plateau (the Highveld).3 In both regions the gold
1 Scholars such as George M. Fredrickson, John W. Cell, Anthony Marx, Andrew Offenburger, and Donald Denoon have contributed extensively to this comparative historiography which has created a larger comparative field in the case of South Africa and the United States of America. 2 Rodman Wilson Paul, Mining Frontiers of the Far West: 1848-1880 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 3; Please note that I am only referring to the gold deposits that are of interest to this paper. Therefore, those found during the early years of the Gold Rush. 3 Rodney Davenport & Christopher Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000), 95.
1 deposits were formed millions of years ago when hot liquids below the crust ascended through cracks in the crust and carried mineral constituents that were dropped far below the surface. These “veins” could be inches thick or they could “swell” into large bulges. The nomenclature of a “vein” is most appropriate, as the deposits may split up and meet again, or they may suddenly end or persist for great depths, much like veins in the human body.4 When several veins are close together the deposit is referred to as a “lode.” Often gold is deposited within rocks, but in nearly all cases that gold has been discovered the gold has been eroded out of this encasement, most commonly through the action of water. Gold is heavier than most substances; when it has been eroded out of its encasement by water action, it is dropped sooner during the water’s course. This type of gold deposit is known as alluvial deposits, or “placer gold,” a term of Spanish origin. This form is the easiest to collect, since nature has done the hard work of separating the valuable from the worthless materials.5
In California, at the beginning of the Gold Rush, placer gold mining was most common. Soon after, more elaborate and intensive methods were needed to extract the gold from solid rock. Because of this, individuals during the early days could strike it rich in relatively large numbers without the influence of larger corporations and companies.6 In South Africa, however, due to the fully formed nearby diamond-mining industry, corporations and companies took over the goldfields almost immediately after gold’s initial discovery in the region in 1886.7 These larger corporations allowed for deeper and more intensive mining techniques, which also required access to cheap labor. South African mines were in constant need for the cheapest labor possible because the grade of the gold ore in the Witwatersrand was poorer than California and other regions of the world. This means that the amount of gold returned from a ton of rock is far less than in other regions, such as California, making mining the Witwatersrand far more capital and labor intensive.8
The development of the diamond mining industry in Kimberley before the discovery of gold in South Africa had one other important consequence and difference between the Witwatersrand and California: the creation of the Chamber of Mines in South Africa. On the
4 Wilson Paul, Mining Frontiers of the Far West: 1848-1880, 3. 5 Ibid, 6. 6 Davenport & Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 7. 7 Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 120. 8 Thompson, A History of South Africa, 119.
2
Witwatersrand the individual digger soon disappeared, as capital and large-scale organization was required to extract the gold. By 1888 joint-stock companies were buying out the small claim-holders and the land in the region. Most of these companies were owned by the Kimberley diamond magnates, including men such as Cecil John Rhodes, who brought their capital and expertise over from Kimberley to the Rand. In 1889 the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines was created by the mining magnates to advance their own interests, mainly political in scope. This amalgamation process continued and, by 1899, on the eve of the South African War, 124 companies were divided among nine groups controlled by European finance houses.9 The Chamber of Mines was an immensely powerful political entity, independent of the South African government, and unique in its power and control of the gold mining industry on the Rand.
Because gold was discovered in California so much earlier than in other regions in the world, one of the greatest achievements of the Californian miners was their technological innovation. Techniques, often learned from foreigners, had to be adapted, developed, and improved to meet local needs. By the close of the nineteenth century the Californians proved to be so inventive that their advice, machinery, and services were sought throughout the world.10
The one major underlying similarity, of the utmost importance to this paper, is that large numbers of Chinese laborers, in the form of mineworkers, ended up in both California and South Africa, and in both regions these Chinese miners experienced racial marginalization and exclusion.
Newspapers form the basis of the primary documents for this thesis. For California the California Digital Newspaper Collection provided a large variety of contemporary newspapers. The Daily Alta California and the Sacramento Daily Union were the most useful, although many other newspapers were examined to illustrate how widespread opinions were held. In South Africa’s case only one newspaper was used: the Rand Daily Mail, a publication started by the new South African government in 1902, just after the conclusion of the South African War.
A large number of secondary sources provided much of the background information, but several of them were standouts, as they contributed the bulk of the knowledge. Elizabeth Sinn’s Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong, and Peter
9 Ibid, 120 10 Wilson Paul, Mining Frontiers of the Far West: 1848-1880, 8.
3
Kwong and Dusanka Miscevic’s Chinese America: The Untold Story of America’s Oldest New Community, for example, were ideal for researching the causes and methods of Chinese emigration to California. Yong Chen’s book and articles were also extremely helpful by shedding light on a number of contentious points still under debate with regards to these causes for Chinese emigration. Similarly, R. Scott Baxter’s article on how the Chinese responded to the anti-Chinese movement in America was ideal for illustrating Chinese resistance and for giving the Chinese immigrants a voice.
Elizabeth Sinn’s Pacific Crossing focuses on the Chinese immigration to California specifically from Hong Kong. Her main contribution is the way she places Hong Kong as the major exit port for the Chinese in their migrations across the Pacific, as well as her exploration of the major causes that led to Chinese emigration. She does, however, only focus on the Pacific Ocean. Similarly, Kwong and Miscevic’s Chinese America also provides an introduction to the reasons behind the Chinese migration, as well as what the first Chinese immigrants experienced when they settled in California. This work focuses on the independent experiences of the early Chinese immigrants, which includes miners as well. Broad in its scope, this work includes a wide variety of Chinese immigrants, which does add immensely to the knowledge of Chinese experiences in the United States, but it does lead to a deficit in the experiences of Chinese miners, due to this broad focus. Yong Chen was also invaluable as he provides a different point of view when concerned with the reasons and causes behind the initial Chinese migration. His discussions indicate that there is still much debate as to the causal factors, further proving that this field of history still has much to offer for future research to students and scholars alike.
What is evident from the above is that overall the literature focused on the Chinese in California examines aspects such as the causes for the initial Chinese movement to California, which are still debated, the methods and routes of this transportation and movement, the value of this labor within a Californian context, as well as the experiences of the Chinese as individuals and as a group in California. Even books such as John Soennichsen’s The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, a source primarily focussed on the actual law of 1882, includes sections devoted to the above-mentioned themes.
For the South Africa section J. A. Reeves’ Masters thesis and K. L. Harris’ PhD thesis proved most illuminating and provided a wealth of information pertaining to the conditions of
4 the Chinese laborers, as well as to how the machinery of the Chamber of Mines and its various branches functioned. Harris’ PhD thesis was built on previous works by Reeves and Meyer11 and focused primarily on the laborers personal experiences, an aspect that had previously been generally ignored.12 Reeves based his work on Meyer and he concentrated on the bigger picture by examining the entirety of the process. But his focus is exclusively on South Africa and the British governments involvement, leaving no indication of outside influences. Peter Richardson, possibly the expert of the matter for the South African context, and his work Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, as well as his various articles, allowed for almost encyclopaedic knowledge to be accessed and proved ideal when discussing how the entire business of Chinese indentured labor existed, functioned, and was organized. What was especially helpful with regards to Richardson’s work was how recruitment of the labor in China occurred, as well as how the passage and transportation of this labor to South Africa was carried out. Gary Kynoch and his two articles provided the real backbone when Chinese resistance in South Africa was explored, and his insights and information was invaluable.
The overall themes of the South African sources are one of general overviews. The “business” of the movement, transportation, living and working conditions, and the government involvement (or the Chamber of Mines) in the whole process are the major aspects of all the South African sources regarding the Chinese indentured labor in South Africa. There are some exceptions such as Harris, who includes discussions on the personal experiences of the Chinese miners, as well as Kynoch who’s major interest is how the Chinese resisted the brutal treatment and restrictions imposed on them. What is interesting from the South African perspective is that instead of examining the causes of why the Chinese left China, the historians instead focus on the causes of why South Africa needed Chinese labor. This interesting discrepancy can be seen in one of the preeminent works on the subject. Peter Richardson’s Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal has two chapters on the causes for South Africa’s labor shortage, but none on the push factors for the Chinese to leave their homeland.
A major difference between California and South Africa in the case of the Chinese labor was their status. In California the Chinese laborers and miners were considered “free.” They
11 Meyers work was unfortunately not available. 12 Karen Leigh Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912” (PhD diss., University of South Africa, 1998), 148.
5 could work for whom they chose to and could leave and enter the country when it was financially possible for them to do so. In South Africa, however, all of the Chinese miners were indentured laborers, who were on strict contracts and their freedom was limited. They were assigned jobs and they could not enter or leave the country at their own bidding. Another difference is that initially in California the Chinese were regarded in a positive light, while in South Africa the Chinese were seen negatively from the very beginning.
All of these sources have one major drawback when concerned with my thesis: there is no comparison between the Californian and the South African experience with Chinese labor. It is true that occasionally California is mentioned in some of the South African sources, most notably the Rand Daily Mail. Apart from this there has not been any study comparing these two regions pertaining to the Chinese miners, nor on the possible influence that California might have had on how the South African government and the Chamber of Mines dealt with the Chinese miners that were brought over. Through the compartmentalization of history connections between nations are often lost. In this case, I believe that California’s influence on South Africa is forgotten, despite the fact that contemporary sources seem to acknowledge this influence.
One of the major connections between California and South Africa is Ross Skinner. He highlights the blind spot between the two regions, and although he is mentioned by some historians such as Persia Campbell Crawford,13 the connection he creates between California and South Africa is often ignored or downplayed. Skinner was a South African mine manager who was sent on a fact-finding mission to California and Hong Kong to determine the feasibility and, more importantly, the methods and techniques, to bring over Chinese laborers as mineworkers for the Witwatersrand gold mines. It is this mission, I believe, that led to the creation of the Labour Importation Ordinance which was directly influenced by the earlier Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Therefore, South Africa’s methods of Chinese repatriation and restrictions where directly influenced by the Californian experiences of the previous decades.
Unfortunately gaining access to Skinners full report of his mission has proved impossible. This is due to a number of factors, including the poor state of South Africa’s
13 Persia Crawford Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1971), 171.
6 archives, as well as the reluctance of the Mining Council of South Africa (the modern-day equivalent of the Chamber of Mines) to release these documents. Because of this I have been forced to use secondary sources from previous years that had access to this report.
It should also be noted that the terms used in the contemporary documents are often derogatory due to the racism that was prevalent during this period, specifically in the South African section. Because of this I have tried to use terms that are more politically correct. The term “black African” includes black Africans from the entire southern Africa region, the main source of labor for the mines. Black Africans were often referred to as “Kaffirs,” a highly derogatory term, that is only included on one occasion to indicate what the whites in South Africa thought of the Chinese. The term “whites” includes all white South Africans, generally of British or Afrikaner heritage. An individual who is considered “European” (directly from Europe) is specified.
With a good mix of primary and secondary sources, including articles and books, the information that is put forward in this paper will illustrate, and prove, that California’s experience with Chinese mineworkers directly influenced how South Africa would deal with the Chinese a couple of decades later.
7
Chapter 1 California: Unwanted but Needed
On the 26th of November, 1869, an article was published in the Daily Alta California under the title of “The Latest Anti-Chinese Fulmination.” The article refers to a meeting that had taken place between “sundry persons who are opposed to immigration from China” and that they had created “what they call a declaration” against the “Mongolians.” The declaration sets out twelve reasons why this group of people are against Chinese immigration. The reasons are as follows: 1. The Chinese would not amalgamate with whites and, therefore, isolated themselves; 2. They smell bad and live “like ants, by scores and hundreds, in hives.”; 3. “They are slaves to each other.”; 4. Their religion is indifferent and they have terrible morals; 5. “They are serfs at home” but they would be “noisy politicians here if they had the chance.”; 6. They work for little pay and live on virtually nothing; 7. “Labor is capital and capital is accumulated labor.” Which is repeated for the eighth reason; 9. “They are migratory and build no houses.”; 10. Trade with China is a farce as all that the U. S. receives is opium, “which is poison,”; silk, which “we can raise ourselves,” and tea; 11. “Cheap labor is undesirable.”; 12. “We can stand by the negro (and his once objectionable smell) because he is a native, but the imported Chinaman-‘Never! So help us God! Never!’” The writer of the article does not completely agree with this assessment, as he notes that “they are useful and even indispensable in many departments of labor, [but] they are not welcome parlor companions.”14 This article illustrates the growing resentment towards the Chinese in the region, which culminated in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. But before this the Chinese were seen as industrious and useful citizens in California. What caused this change in opinion?
Some of the above reasons for the anger against the Chinese can immediately answer this question. The first is the competition for labor. Most Chinese worked for cheaper pay than whites did. But many of the other reasons seem to be ideas that have been brought up to drive home this main point. This is an interesting issue, because, as late as 1855, the Chinese were still seen as a boon for the region and the above article even notes the two stances of the white population at the time, as the writer even states that “after all is said that can be said by this most rabid of Anti-Chinese speech-makers, it is all resolvable into the proposition that the Mongolians
14 Daily Alta California, Volume 21, Number 7189, 26 November 1869; Please note that all newspaper references in this chapter come from the California Digital Newspaper Collection: https://cdnc.ucr.edu/
8 are not good material for intelligent voters and fireside acquaintances. All the rest is the merest buncombe.”15 This indicates that as late as 1869 the white population was still split on the “Chinese question.” What caused the majority of the population to shift into an Anti-Chinese sentiment that grew so intense that by 1882 there were adverts in the Daily Alta California specifically directed to Anti-Chinese voters?16
The way the “celestials,” a term commonly used for the Chinese during this period, are introduced is like this: “Here come a bevy of Celestials, with their dark, loose clothing, their irreproachable white stockings and their practical boots and shoes… They guard their pig-tails as they do their honor, and cherish them with the utmost devotion... The Celestials are very useful, quiet, good citizens and are deserving the respect of all.”17 The Chinese were referred to as “celestials” because China was referred to as the “Celestial Empire” during this period. This early article is important for a number of reasons. The first is the blatant generalisations in relation to the Chinese, although these generalisations were most likely correct. Prevailing Manchu custom forced many of the Chinese men who left during this period of Qing Empire decline to grow pigtails for life, a sign of loyalty to the Empire.18 The clothing was also a custom from the homeland. Devotion to families and regions mean that the Chinese came across as very “clannish”. This early article also fails to mention women, which illustrates the gender makeup of the diggings and region in general, essentially a male-dominated region. The most important fact from the article, however, is the positive praise that the Chinese receive. They are described admirably as “useful.” They are also described as “quiet,” which appealed to the locals who did not want rowdiness or trouble in this relatively peaceful backwater of the United States. Most importantly, they are referred to as “good citizens” that deserve the “respect of all.”19 Indeed, the Chinese were good, hardworking citizens and deserving of respect and rights, but this belief only occurred in the early years of Chinese immigration to California, before it suddenly, and in some cases violently, turned sour. But to understand this it is essential to briefly investigate the period before the Gold Rush and understand why the Chinese arrived in California in such numbers.
15 Daily Alta California, Volume 21, Number 7189, 26 November 1869 16 Daily Alta California, Volume 34, Number 11676, 10 April 1882 17 Daily Alta California, Volume 1, Number 59, 8 March 1850 18 William T. Rowe, China's Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 2009), 20 19 Daily Alta California, Volume 1, Number 59, 8 March 1850
9
Before the discovery of gold in California, an article from the California Star in February 1847, refers to a letter received from a “Dr Macgowan,” a Baptist missionary in China. Within the letter, and article, he states that “it is not unreasonable to anticipate that an emigration will take place from China to America equal to, if not greater, than any that has been known from Europe.” Dr Macgowan goes on to add: “I venture to predict that the population of the Pacific States will be composed in no small degree of Chinese.” Macgown calls for the need to convert more Chinese to Christianity before this massive “emigration” from the “over-populated” China occurs.20 This remarkable article anticipates the Chinese immigration into California almost exactly a year before gold was discovered. From Macgowan’s point of view, it seems that a large Chinese population in California was inevitable. But when, and how was gold discovered in California, the major reason behind this mass and worldwide immigration?
Gold was discovered in California on January 24, 1848, by James Wilson Marshall. This, however, was not the first gold discovered in the region. Native Americans had found several small nuggets and flakes of gold that they had showed to Spanish priests who supposedly cautioned them to keep it a secret, in case of an inundation of gold-crazed foreigners. A small lode of gold was found in 1842 by a Spanish ranchero, but this was a shallow lode and only created a purely local rush and did not garner international, or national, attention.21 Marshall’s discovery in 1848 was what ignited the world’s attention.
Marshall’s discovery was very much an accident. He was employed by Johann Augustus Sutter, a Swiss ex-soldier, who owned a timber mill, and a fort, which was essentially an agricultural and trade colony with its own developing community.22 He was sent out to find good accessible timber and a suitable location for the mill. Water was used to turn a water wheel to help provide extra power to the mill, but the channel that was originally dug was too shallow. Therefore, water was diverted from the nearby American River and allowed to run overnight in order to deepen the channel bed.23 One January morning, Marshall went to inspect the channel and discovered two shiny lumps of gold ore in the channel, which he showed to his colleagues and caused a sudden excitement to find more. Soon after this another of Sutter’s laborers found
20 California Star, Volume 1, Number 6, 13 February 1847 21 Andrew F. Rolle, California: A History (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), 207; Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of California: Vol VI 1848-1859 (San Francisco: The History Company, 1888), 36 22 Ibid, 208; Ibid, 26 23 Rolle, California: A History, 208; Bancroft, History of California: Vol VI 1848-1859, 30.
10 more traces of gold along the river banks. This discovery, made by Henry W. Bigler, led to even more people searching for more gold and attracted the attention of the nation, and the world.24
The news of discovered gold was initially kept quiet, most likely for selfish reasons. But soon after the discovery, a merchant in the San Francisco region who had recovered some gold himself, galloped through San Francisco shouting and spreading the news of the gold discovery. This led to a gold rush in the immediate area. Virtually all businesses stopped as nearly every able body man in the region rushed to seek their fortune in the mountains, including soldiers and seamen who rapidly deserted their barracks and ships. The hysteria became such an issue that the first newspaper in California, the Californian, stated that the “majority of our subscribers and many of our advertisers have closed their doors and places of business.”25 This is an example of the hysteria and craze that the discovery of gold caused during this time period and in this region. When the news spread to those places of the world with seething masses of poor who were yearning for a quick way to gain wealth, the hysteria must have been sevenfold. What is also of interest is that the discovery of gold in California came just a week before the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which happened on February 2, 1848, which put the territory of California into United States hands.26 This thesis explores two regions, and not two national histories, therefore, even though California was part of Mexico at the beginning of this research, it is not vital to the main aim of the thesis.
Within the first few months of the rush miners numbered only in the few thousands. But after President Polk mentioned the discovery in his presidential message on December 5, 1848, and the news had enough time to spread over the globe, the numbers increased dramatically. At the beginning of 1849, about 26,000 people lived in California. By the middle of the year this had risen to approximately 50,000, and by the beginning of 1850 the number is estimated to be 115,000. Although nearly 80% of these new arrivals were Americans, foreigners made up a sizable portion, and the Chinese were among the most numerous.27 This was set against the backdrop of increased US-China relations.
24 Ibid, 209; Ibid, 47. 25 Rolle, California: A History, 210. 26 Ibid, 211. 27 Rolle, California: A History, 211.
11
China and the United States had begun more formal relations around 1844 with the opening of Chinese ports to American trade. America’s initial attraction to China was because of the possible wealth to be gained from Chinese trade. This trade turned out to be of such importance that the United States created one of its first consulates in Canton in 1786.28 The news of the gold discovery spread around the Pacific Ocean incredibly quickly. Canton and Hong Kong learned of the discovery in October of 1848, just a few days later than the United States east coast. It is also evident that some of the first people to descend on the region were Chinese. Two Chinese men who had arrived in California in early 1848 as servants of a rich white men quickly deserted him when they heard news of the gold discovery, only a month after Marshall’s initial accidental find. Another enterprising Chinese man, by the name of Chang Ming, was also one of the first pioneers on the scene. He had been in California since 1847 and he became wealthy off his gold diggings. He wrote home to China and explained the possible wealth available in California and her gold. This spread the news of gold even more so and excited many Chinese to cross the ocean.29
Hong Kong was one of the main, if not the main, port of exit for Chinese to immigrate to California. Following the discovery of gold, the number of Chinese leaving Hong Kong for California peaked at approximately 20,000 in 1852, and remained in that region until the late 1870s. The reason for Hong Kong being a major source of Chinese emigration was because it was a “free port”, which meant that Chinese citizens could come and go under far less scrutiny than in a Chinese port.30 Another reason is that Americans had had a presence on the island days after the British acquired it in 1841. Even before gold was found, two American traders in Hong Kong saw the value of Chinese labor in California. In March 1848 Charles Gillespie wrote a letter to another trader in California indicating that a number of skilled Chinese labor was readily available to go to California, that they would make “valuable miners,” and that they were “sober & industrious people.”31 This was written before the knowledge of a gold discovery was known in Hong Kong, therefore, the mention of miners is most interesting. Similarly, Samuel J.
28 Peter Kwong & Dusanka Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community (New York: The New Press, 2005), 29. 29 Kwong & Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community, 6. 30 Elizabeth Sinn, Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013), 11. 31 Sinn, Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong, 38.
12
Hastings, another American trader in Hong Kong, wrote a similar letter in February 1848 in which he stated that the “only thing that will benefit California from China will be the introduction of emigrants for mining purposes etc, for which some of them are well calculated particularly for the placers.”32 Even before gold was discovered and became the major pull factor for immigrants, Americans in Hong Kong had already noted the valuable use that Chinese labor could provide in developing California, most notably as miners. The news of the gold discovery was noted by Dr Benjamin Ball, an American physician who visited Hong Kong and the other surrounding ports in early 1849, and he stated that one would often hear “Kaly-porny” in much of the dialogue amongst the Chinese, an obvious reference to California.33 This indicates how quickly this knowledge disseminated among Chinese society.
It is notoriously difficult to determine the makeup of the thousands of early miners and fortune seekers who travelled to California in the early stages of the Gold Rush. This is mainly due to the sheer numbers of the people who arrived by land and sea, and due to the poor administration in what was not yet a U. S. state in 1848.34 By 1852, however, better techniques and administration was in place and of the 67,000 people who had arrived in that year, 20,000 were Chinese.35 This is a majority of the immigrants and it is evident that the Chinese were a large part of these fortune seekers travelling to this new land of gold. What is also incredible is that in 1850 it is stated that 57,787 people arrived and of these only 500 were Chinese. This indicates a remarkable increase in the number of Chinese who immigrated to California, most likely due to the dispersion of the news of gold and possible wealth throughout China.36 This Chinese population in California slowly increased to 34,933 in 1860, and 49,277 by 1870.37
As mentioned before, Hong Kong became one of the major ports of emigration for the Chinese. One of the main reasons for this was the active seducing of the Chinese population in the region to find their fortune in “Gold Mountain,” as California would become to be known amongst the Chinese population. This “seducing” occurred through shipping merchants who advertised the numerous possibilities available to laborers in California, which resulted in Hong
32 Ibid, 38. 33 Ibid, 41. 34 John Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2011), 8. 35 Ibid, 8. 36 Kwong & Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community, 7. 37 Rolle, California: A History, 374.
13
Kong becoming a major emigration port, not only for California, but later for all parts of the world.38 Hong Kong will feature again later in this study, as it is one of the ports that Ross Skinner, a South African mine manager, visited on his fact-finding mission in 1903.39
It is important to remember that the emigrants arriving in California came from the East as well as the West. Immigrants from the East arrived by land and by sea. Although most of the heroic and tragic stories from the gold rush tend to concern those immigrants who travelled overland, the majority of the Americans and Europeans who arrived in California came by sea.40 These “argonauts of ’49,” as they referred to themselves, came by two routes. The first was via Cape Horn.41 This route had, originally arduous and dangerous, had become the traditional route to the Pacific and had become easier to navigate in recent decades due to improved knowledge of the currents and weather of the region. This route was the most popular during the early years of the gold rush and serviced the major cities of the United States Eastern seaboard. From December 1848 to December 1849 over a thousand vessels bound directly for California left the Eastern seaboard, an enormous amount that facilitated much of the initial migration from the East.42 The second major route, which became the staple soon after the initial rush, was via the Isthmus of Panama. Passengers and fortune-seekers would firstly book a passage to the Caribbean shore of Panama. An arduous journey overland would be followed by, more often than not, a long wait at the port of Panama on the Atlantic side before another vessel could be found to transport you the final distance to California.43 The difficulty of the isthmus crossing led to the development of a railway which was completed in 1855, which facilitated even more immigration.44 This put further pressure on the poor shipping services on the Pacific side, which led to the development of more shipping companies and an even greater increase in immigration from the East.45
38 Sinn, Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong, 45. 39 Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration, 171. 40 James P. Delgado, To California by Sea: A Maritime History of the California Gold Rush (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), x. 41 Ibid, 16. 42 Delgado, To California by Sea: A Maritime History of the California Gold Rush, 19. 43 Ibid, 51. 44 Ibid, 53. 45 Delgado, To California by Sea: A Maritime History of the California Gold Rush, 58.
14
The overland route from the East, however, is far better remembered and romanticised. The reason for this remembrance and romanticizing is because of the incredible hardships and challenges that these immigrants persevered through. An article from the time period notes that only through the “timely and united action of the people of California” will allow for “the great body of the immigration” to be conducted safely across the Sierra Mountains before the coming of the snow.46 But the Sierra Mountains were only the last hurdle in this brutal, overland route. The starting point was on the Missouri River at St. Joseph or Independence, and followed two main routes, the Santa Fé trail, or the more northerly western route which became known as the California trail and/or the Oregon trail.47 The first major obstacle encountered by travellers going this route was the Rocky Mountains, but this route was opened with the discovery of the South Pass in 1812, and the first use of wagons through this pass in 1830.48 Following this was the dry regions of Nevada, before the final obstacle, the Sierra Nevadas.49 All in all, these Californian immigrants travelled nearly 2000 miles and were on the road for up to eight months, an extremely difficult and tedious journey.50 It is estimated that from the 1840s to the 1870s as much as half a million people used the Overland Trail to reach the West.51
One story that makes this journey infamous is the tragedy of the Donner party. Numerous newspaper reports from the months after the tragedy write about the disastrous attempt to cross the mountains, which makes this journey seem far more perilous and well-known than the sea crossing.52 This story made such an impact that the survivors were still mentioned in news articles many years later.53 The reporting of tragedies like this indicate that the Overland Trail has remained the dominant memory of the immigration West, but the immigration East, from China, was just as important for the development of the economic and social landscape of California. Although the numbers were far smaller than the migration West, these migrants
46 Daily Alta California, Volume 1, Number 213, 1 September 1850. 47 Bancroft, History of California Vol VI, 144. 48 John Mack Faragher, Women and Men on the Overland Trail, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1979), 5. 49 Ibid, 10. 50 Ibid, 11. 51 Ibid, 11. 52 California Star, Volume 1, Number 10, 13 March 1847; Volume 1, Number 13, 3 April 1847; Volume 1, Number 20, 22 May 1847; Volume 1, Number 22, 5 June 1847; Californian, Volume 1, Number 32, 27 March 1847. 53 Daily Alta California, Volume 1, Number 207, 26 August 1850; Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 5, Number 739, 6 August 1853; Marysville Daily Herald, Volume VI, Number 33, 20 October 1855; Daily Alta California, Volume 9, Number 101, 31 July 1857.
15 impacted Californian, and American, society just as much, if not more so. The Chinese became a major labor force, as well as a leading minority.54 By being one of the major minorities in the region, by 1860 they were the leading minority, it transformed the social landscape and brought American intolerance and xenophobia to the forefront of politics and social conscience.55
There are several reasons why the Chinese people immigrated to California in such large numbers. One major factor for such an immense immigration was the promotion by American shipowners and labor brokers in Hong Kong and Canton who worked for mining companies.56Another major reason was the recent history of China. Trading connections with the New World had been established as early as the 16th century through the Manilla galleon trade, and these connections strengthened through the centuries.57 China itself was in disarray and under severe pressure from Western powers, most notably the British. The Opium Wars had a psychological effect that was just as important as the military defeat. Because of this defeat, a number of Chinese people began to consider life outside of China, a reversal of centuries of isolationist policies enforced by the government.58 Another cause for this immigration was a massive population explosion within China and several severe droughts and floods which produced several agricultural emergencies and disasters in the 19th century. This further exacerbated the already high levels of poverty and certainly was a major factor for many Chinese to leave their homes and find a new life and new source of income elsewhere in the world.59
The overwhelming majority of the Chinese who went to California were from a small area of eight counties on the west side of the Pearl River Delta to the south and west of the city of Canton. Of these eight counties, forty percent of these immigrants came from just one: Taishan, about 40 percent of them. This county, about half the size of Rhode Island, is in a hilly area that had small farms and was relatively poor. But this was no agrarian backwater. Hong Kong and Macao were only two walking days distant, and Canton was connected to the region by waterways. Such a connection to world trade would have played an important part in their
54 Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850-1943: A Trans-Pacific community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 11. 55 Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850-1943: A Trans-Pacific community, 45. 56 Kwong & Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community, 7; Sinn, Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong, 38. 57 Benson Tong, The Chinese Americans (Boulder, Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 2003), 1. 58 Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 4. 59 Ibid, p 6
16 skills and knowledge in the United States, as well as providing a clue to their knowledge of the gold discovery in California. Canton itself was a major trade port and was the only official trade port to the West, making it a hub of activity.60 California had much contact with Hong Kong, mainly through trade and information of the wider world, which means that Hong Kong, and therefore this region of China, would have been the first in the world to hear of the gold discovery.61
A further influence for Chinese immigration was the news of the discovery of gold in California. More often than not this would take the form of returning Chinese who had luckily struck it big on the mines and this would inspire fellow Chinese to attempt the same thing.62 Migration in Chinese families had been a long-standing tradition before gold was discovered in California. Family property was traditionally divided equally among male siblings. Because of this it was wise to send male children to find another source of wealth for the family in order to keep the family finances solvent. This tradition forced many of the coastal regions of China, especially the Pearl River Delta region, to seek their wealth overseas due to the difficulties of travelling inland.63 This was another major influence for Chinese immigration, and with the knowledge of recently discovered gold across the Pacific, would have driven these young fortune seekers to head to California.
Some scholars believe that the above reasons for Chinese immigration are overstated, if not incomplete.64 Overpopulation and land shortages had been ongoing in the region for decades before the gold rush, and if anyone wanted to flee unbearable conditions did not have to cross the Pacific Ocean to do so. It seems that the vast majority of Chinese who went to California went by choice, not by desperation, which seems to indicate that “pull” factors were more important than “push” factors.65 The “pull” factors in this case are the reasons to go to California, such as
60 Yong Chen, “The Internal Origins of Chinese Emigration to California Reconsidered,” Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1997): 522. 61 Kwong & Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community, 20; Sinn, Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong, 43. 62 Kwong & Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community, 8; Sinn, Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong, 43. 63 Kwong & Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community, 22. 64 Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850-1943: A Trans-Pacific community, 12; Chen, “The Internal Origins of Chinese Emigration to California Reconsidered,” Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1997), 522; Sinn, Pacific Crossing, 47. 65 Chen, “The Internal Origins of Chinese Emigration to California Reconsidered,” Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1997): 522.
17 gold and new trade possibilities. The “push” factors would the reasons to leave China and the Pearl River Delta in the first place, such as poverty and war.
Chen argues that the natural disasters that are cited as a major cause for emigration were not necessarily out of the ordinary and there is no evidence that earthquakes, floods, or famine had any major effect on the region.66 Similarly, the Opium War caused Canton to lose its status as the only open international port, and Shanghai became the major port in this regard. But this transition was gradual and Canton retained its vitality until the 1930s as a major trading hub.67 The Opium War did also cause a rise in land taxes, which in turn increased the number of landless in the region. But this affected not only the Canton region, but far further afield and it from Chinese evidence it seems that many of these new landless people found new and ingenious ways to deal with their misfortunes, as from 1842 (the end of the Opium War) until 1849 the region still retained its economic vibrancy.68
Chen also notes that there were several other destinations for Chinese fortune-seekers to move to, most notably Southeast Asia, a well-known voyage and region amongst the Chinese of the Canton district. Southeast Asia was known for its economic opportunities at the time.69 Chen reiterates the market-orientated approach that was prevalent in the Pearl River Delta area, and that this economic drive meant that, firstly, grain production was always a secondary concern and that the regions wealth meant that they could always import grain from other areas, which dispels the idea of poverty-stricken agrarian types seeking wealth elsewhere. Secondly, this market-orientated approach meant the people from this region were always in search for wealth and profit, and opportunities for more of the same.70 Some of the counties in the area, such as Xinning, were slightly less developed economically, but they provided a ready source of wage- earning laborers, which is why regions such as Xinning and Taishan provided the most of the Californian immigrants, as they readily went to where the money was.71 Most of the immigrants
66 Chen, “The Internal Origins of Chinese Emigration to California Reconsidered,” Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1997): 525. 67 Ibid, 527. 68 Ibid, 528. 69 Chen, “The Internal Origins of Chinese Emigration to California Reconsidered,” Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1997): 529. 70 Ibid, 533. 71 Chen, “The Internal Origins of Chinese Emigration to California Reconsidered,” Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1997): 537.
18 were young men seeking upward social mobility, and they, mostly, were not poor, but active wage-earners seeking further wealth and fortune. Therefore, although all of the reasons for the “push” factors certainly had a role to play in the Chinese emigration to California, it seems that the “pull” factors, the lure of gold and wealth, played a more important role in this process.
Many of the Chinese miners who went to California were initially brought over by mining companies and therefore, under their employ. Soon, however, some of them began to mine on their own.72 As mentioned before the Chinese were initially welcomed to California by the press and the locals, as well as their fellow immigrants. What is most likely the main reason for this initial positive reaction was the need for a dependable supply of laborers. The Chinese, or “celestials” as they were often called, were seen as faithful, hardworking, and adaptable workers, particularly on the mines and railroads. It was also noted that they were seemingly willing to work for meagre wages.73 What is important to remember about these Chinese immigrants is that the vast majority of them did not initially move over to California to seek permanent residence, instead they were seeking to amass as much wealth as quickly as possible and then to return to China.74
Gaining wealth was an important factor for Chinese immigration, and it was a necessity when considering the vast amount of funds that were required to pay for passage to California. The earliest Chinese who went to California did so voluntarily, but the majority of them were poor and therefore, had to borrow the money for passage from family or friends. If this was not possible then they would have to take out a loan from Chinese businesses, some of which actually had branches in California already. Apart from this, the Chinese immigrant would also have to pay for his/her entry papers which often cost more than the entire fee for passage. In the end it would take a Chinese immigrant approximately 6-10 years to repay the various loans, unless he/she was lucky enough to strike it rich on the goldfields.75 It is important to note that these Chinese immigrants came over to California as free-laborers, in stark contrast to the South African experience with regards to Chinese miners.76
72 Kwong & Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community, 7. 73 Rolle, California: A History, 374. 74 Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 8; Roger Daniels, Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 12. 75 Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 8. 76 Tong, The Chinese Americans, 24.
19
Not all of the Chinese who went to America were miners, but by 1855 about two thirds of all the Chinese in America, about 24,000, were working on the gold mines as laborers or miners. More often than not these Chinese miners were working on claims that white miners had abandoned. During the probable peak of Chinese mining in the region in the mid-1860s, about 85% of all Chinese in California were miners. After this period the numbers gradually declined due to a variety of reasons, most notably the Foreign Miners Tax and the numerous outrages perpetrated against them, both of which will be discussed later.77 The vast majority of the Chinese miners worked as placer miners and for themselves, or Chinese owned companies. Some did work for white miners, as well as in joint ventures with whites, but this was a rare occurrence. In general, the Chinese stuck together for their own protection from the violence and greed that was inherent in the gold mining districts.78
Placer mining requires cooperation and hard work, as well as little capital investment, which suited the Chinese. This involves the panning for gold on streams and rivers. Placer mining, however, eventually ran its course by the 1880s and was replaced by more capital- intensive forms of mining, such as hydraulic and shaft mining, the latter being what occurred in South Africa.79 Because of this cooperation and work ethic, the Chinese were able to continue mining in places that whites had abandoned. Their movement into abandoned mining areas effectively slowed population declines, improved business in the regions, and kept up gold production. Because of this, the Chinese miners can actually be seen as complementary to the white miners, and the real source of tension between them was in terms of hired labor.80
Therefore, the Chinese succeeded with mining mainly due to their work ethic, their ability to pool resources and skills together with other Chinese individuals, and their understanding and acceptance to divide labor and responsibilities.81 One example of this is the way that the Chinese miners, who would often be all male groups, would designate male
77 Randall E. Rohe, “After the Gold Rush: Chinese Mining in the Far West, 1850-1890”, Montana: The Magazine of Western History, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982): 6. 78 Randall E. Rohe, “After the Gold Rush: Chinese Mining in the Far West, 1850-1890”, Montana: The Magazine of Western History, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982): 7. 79 Liping Zhu, “No Need to Rush: The Chinese, Placer Mining, and the Western Environment”, Montana: The Magazine of Western History, Vol. 49, No. 3, Special Gold Rush Issue (Autumn, 1999): 48. 80 Randall E. Rohe, “After the Gold Rush: Chinese Mining in the Far West, 1850-1890”, Montana: The Magazine of Western History, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982): 18. 81 Tong, The Chinese Americans, 36.
20 individuals to perform what whites would regard as female work, such as washing, cleaning and cooking. This unsettled white miners as it went against white concepts of manliness and womanliness, and could very well be one of the contributing factors to the anti-Chinese sentiment that eventually emerged.82
The arrival of the Chinese in California caused a serious tension that was always threatening to boil over, race and color. The United States, over the centuries, had developed its own ideals with regards to race and color. Due to the wars and land appropriation against the Native Americans, and the widespread use of slavery for two centuries, the concept of race was considered to be made up of three sets: white, black, and Native American, or essentially white and non-white. The Chinese did not readily fit into any of these groupings, which contributed to the tension. Were they to be “coloreds,” a group of indeterminate people of mixed race, generally white and black? They did not fit into the free black group nor into mulattos. What were their rights to be? Because of this a whole new system of social hierarchy had to be developed, or at the least, adjusted.83
Initially, however, the desire for labor was overriding the ideas of race and color. For this reason, the Chinese were initially welcomed with open arms and seen as desirous citizens in a newly formed state that seriously needed citizens and labor. Nothing can portray the initial welcome than the death of President Zachary Taylor. The Chinese, or “China Boys,” were invited by the mayor of San Francisco, John W. Greary, to join in with the other citizens to mourn his death. A letter written to the Chinese vice-consul, but acquired by the Daily Alta, notes how the Chinese were “proud” and that they would always “endeavour to merit your good opinion and the good opinion of the citizens of their adopted country.”84 This is an illustration of how welcomed the Chinese initially were. The mayor would not invite any group of immigrants and outsiders to join in the mourning of such a national figure as the President. And the honour bestowed on the Chinese does not go unnoticed with them either. What is also interesting is the mention of their “adopted country.” It seems that already at this early stage many Chinese believed that they were in the United States to stay.
82 Tong, The Chinese Americans, 36. 83 Kwong & Miscevic, Chinese America: the untold story of America’s oldest new community, 41. 84 Daily Alta California, Volume 1, Number 213, 1 September 1850.
21
The appreciation of the Chinese continued during these early years in California. In an article from April 1850 the Daily Alta California notes how “some twenty or thirty Chinese gentlemen promenading in double file through Montgomery street.” It goes on to state their “industrious and persevering characters,” as well as the fact that they had arrived from Hong Kong looking “fresh and vigorous.”85 It is important to note that they were referred to as “gentlemen,” this comment indicates a degree of respect for the Chinese during this early period. This respect is directly mentioned in an article, titled “Celestials,” from a few weeks later: “We have a great deal of respect for the Chinese…and are pleased to find them of so quiet, peacable [sic], and industrious dispositions. We know of no class of citizens who conduct themselves more becomingly...”86 These “citizens” were obviously held in high regard.
The Foreign Miners Tax of 1850 caused much resentment amongst the non-white miners in California, especially from the Mexican miners. The tax was introduced to protect white miners’ interests in the region, and as a way to gain extra money for the Californian government.87 The original law set the tax at $20 per month and, as reported by the Daily Alta, led to much violence and crime which the Daily Alta believes was committed mostly by Mexicans, although the newspaper does not explain why this sudden outbreak of violence could be connected with the tax.88 This sudden outbreak of violence seems inexplicable, as only a month before the Sacramento Transcript noted how the commencement of the collecting of the tax began at the beginning of June 1850, and that “there was no difficulty whatever” in collecting the taxes. The Chinese miners are also mentioned in a glowing account: “The Chinese were the first to answer the demand of the collector. They are said to have made no hesitation whatever from the first.”89 It seems reasonable that this outbreak of violence occurred because many of the foreign miners could not afford to pay this enormous tax. Or, many were driven from the mines because of the tax, and they now sought other means of gaining wealth, through robbery and murder if necessary. Whatever the reasons, it surely increased racial tension.
The first Foreign Miners Tax was repealed on March 14, 1851, and this event was celebrated by the Daily Alta as it was a “very unfortunate enactment, violative of private rights,
85 Daily Alta California, Volume 1, Number 96, 20 April 1850. 86 Daily Alta California, Volume 1, Number 114, 11 May 1850. 87 Sacramento Transcript, Volume 2, Number 40, 10 December 1850. 88 Daily Alta California, Volume 1, Number 162, 8 July 1850. 89 Sacramento Transcript, Volume 1, Number 30, 5 June 1850.
22 constitutional guarantees.” The article goes on to welcome all foreign miners to California with the hope that further “unfortunate laws” won’t hamper the growth of California.90 From this it can be seen that many people thought that the Foreign Miners Tax was a disastrous law that inhibited California’s growth with regards to wealth, as well as population. It is, however, important to note that the Chinese were never implicated in any form of violence or crime, and instead were commended for their utmost regard for following the law; being good citizens in other words.
Another Foreign Miners Tax was implemented the following year in April 1852 for a tax of $3 per month. Apart from the lower tax, the law was different in one very important aspect: it was targeted directly at the “Chinamen, South Sea Islanders, &c., and is not intended to apply to Europeans.”91 This new, highly racialized law, is succinctly explained in a Sacramento Daily Union article only a month after the law had passed. The article refers to a previous bill, the “famous Cooley bill”, whereby Chinese laborers would have been brought out “in thousands” to essentially work as indentured labor. From this there was outrage at the possibility of this occurring that caused a massive backlash, which led to “popularity seeking legislators” to go to the other extreme and revamp the tax of 1850 with the mistaken belief that this outrage was shared by the mining communities.92
This editorial article goes on to state that “Our citizens do not ask that the poor Chinamen who have come peaceably among us, should be expelled. They would rather endure whatever inconvenience they may have to endure by the presence of the Chinamen already among them, than to commit an act of cruelty and oppression.” The people did not ask for a tax to be imposed, but rather for the “adoption of practical measures for the restriction and regulation of the Chinese immigration.” Because the legislators had instead focussed on popularity stakes, and they had ignored the real problem, so that now the “citizens” of California would have to submit for “a year longer to the annoyance and injustice of being overrun with Chinese immigrants.” These Chinese would think that they could work on the mines in “equality” with Americans, but this would not be possible as it would be against the “interests of American citizens.” 93 The article
90 Daily Alta California, Volume 2, Number 101, 20 March 1851. 91 Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 114, 24 April 1852. 92 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 3, Number 354, 10 May 1852. 93 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 3, Number 354, 10 May 1852.
23 ends with the statement: “We should be loth to see the sins of the Legislature visited upon the heads of the poor Chinamen, any further than may be necessary for our own protection.94 This article definitely shows how anger, and almost fear, was developing with regards to the Chinese immigration. Although the article never specifically attacks the Chinese as bad people or citizens, it is the shear numbers of them that concerns the author of this article. It is also blatant that the Chinese are not at fault, but that the government is in the wrong. It is also interesting to note that competition between white and Chinese miners seems to be a major reason against Chinese immigration, but the author then notes that if the Chinese mining operations are “not detrimental to the rights of our own people,” then there is no reason for the tax to be imposed.95 To me this seems that there is not much competition between the Chinese and white miners, and if there is then the white miners muscle out the Chinese in that region. So essentially, the tax seems to be a farce, and the real concern for the Californian citizens in general is the regulation of Chinese immigrants. Considering that this article was written as early as 1852, it will be interesting to see if this sentiment was prevalent in other newspapers, and how it developed into a settled anti-Chinese movement.
The Daily Alta also speaks of this new miners’ tax, although it seems to be more neutral in its alignment. Although the article does decry the large amount of Chinese immigration, it does not agree with the Governor’s idea of the country being “overrun by these hordes of Asia.” It also believes that the miners’ tax was a mistake, and that there was no need for a law against Chinese immigration, as “the tide of population flowing from the Atlantic” will soon work its “counter current.”96 In other words, the large number of Europeans arriving in California would eventually mean that whites would remain the supreme majority population in California. It must also be noted that the Chinese are referred to “as industrious, as moral, and as orderly as any other class of our population, and it would therefore be extremely severe doctrine to expel them and them alone.” The article also believes that the whole immigration peril is “greatly exaggerated, after the true Californian fashion.”97
94 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 3, Number 354, 10 May 1852. 95 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 3, Number 354, 10 May 1852. 96 Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 116, 26 April 1852. 97 Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 116, 26 April 1852.
24
This growing anti-Chinese sentiment is indicated in another article which begins with the ominous statement that the “anti-Cooley [sic] work has already commenced in the mines.” It goes on to indicate that the real reason behind this animosity was because of misunderstandings. White diggers would take a break for a day or two and leave their digging half completed. The Chinese would believe that the digging had been abandoned and complete the work, which would obviously anger the white miners immensely. The article finishes by stating that the author believes, “on good authority,” that the Governor was going to attempt to prevail of the Chinese to stop their immigration to California.98 This sentiment is mentioned in an earlier article which states that the “emigration to this country continues with unabated spirit. Hundreds of Chinese arrive in every vessel…and almost instantly on arrival, wend their way to the mines.”99 This increase in Chinese miners caused much anger from white miners in the region. By the middle of May, 1852, it was reported that a number of meetings had occurred and there was a general consensus to expel the “Celestials” from the mines, even though a number of “interesting articles” had been published showing the “benefits” of Chinese immigration.100
There is a number of articles around this time that seem to be in paradox this anti-Chinese immigration feeling. What is, however, evident is the large number of Chinese immigrants that were still arriving almost daily. In a Sacramento Daily Union article of a few months later the author describes a Chinese festival, including fireworks and even compared it to the fourth of July. In the end it is states “Let the Celestials have their fun.”101 This does not seem in the same vein as the previous article pleading for restrictions on Chinese immigration. Similarly, another article notes that 464 Chinese passengers on one vessel gave the captain, Captain Robertson, an inscribed gold ring, as well as a “magnificent silk flag” as a show of thanks.102 Once again there does not seem to be any overtly anti-Chinese sentiment. The worry of Chinese immigration also subsided. By the end of May, 1852, “the excitement prevailing two weeks since in some of the mining districts against the Chinese population, has subsided, and there is no longer any apprehension of trouble.” The reason for this? The numbers of Chinese had been “greatly
98 Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 120, 30 April 1852. 99 Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 108, 18 April 1852. 100 Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 136, 16 May 1852. 101 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 4, Number 473, 28 September 1852. 102 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 3, Number 387, 17 June 1852; Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 163, 12 June 1852.
25 overestimated.” The article does end with the ominous note that the Chinese would soon have to search for jobs in other areas other than mining.103
This statement seems true, as a number of articles in the latter part of 1852 note that several regions in California had expelled Chinese miners. One such article is about an event in Jacksonville where the white miners expelled the Chinese, despite efforts from the local government.104 But once again there seems to be a paradox. In Columbia, another article claimed that there was a “very many Chinese residing in that vicinity, and they are quiet and orderly citizens.”105
This difference in opinions per region seems to be a continuous issue throughout California, and it continued through the coming years with a number of articles indicating Chinese miners being expelled, with an equal number indicating the Chinese being welcomed into an area. An example for the Chinese being welcomed is an article from March, 1853, states that a Chinese “colony” should be founded to allow them to live in peace and in under their own “jurisdiction.”106 In 1855 this dichotomy continued. Two articles from The California Farmer and Journal of Useful Sciences from this year indicate the general desire, and general resignation, with regards to the Chinese population and immigration. The first accepts that Chinese immigration in large numbers is inevitable, but that the nation needs to make sure that “our institutions and our laws must be kept inviolate” as well as teaching the Chinese “obedience” with regards to the laws.107 The second article focusses on the need for labor in large numbers in California, and that the Chinese are the answer to this. The article also stresses that although many may be against Chinese immigration, the need for labor should override this consideration.108
Towards the end of the 1850s and the beginning of the 1860s “the Chinese question” became a more important matter for the white miners and farmers of California. At the end of 1859 an “American miner” wrote a letter to the Sacramento Daily Union which explicitly demands that the Chinese be expelled from all mining activities. The author also refutes the
103 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 3, Number 372, 31 May 1852. 104 Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 317, 16 November 1852. 105 Daily Alta California, Volume 3, Number 316, 15 November 1852. 106 Daily Alta California, Volume 4, Number 81, 23 March 1853. 107 California Farmer and Journal of Useful Sciences, Volume 3, Number 2, 11 January 1855. 108 California Farmer and Journal of Useful Sciences, Volume 3, Number 17, 26 April 1855.
26 claim that the Chinese are “only working the poorest auriferous soils” by pointing out that in the area that he knows the Chinese have the “best ground.”109 Another letter a little later, written this time by an “American farmer”, concurs with the above idea, but this author wants the continuation of Chinese labor, but their banishment from the mines should occur so that the farmers of California would have ample labor, concurring with the above articles by The Californian Farmer.110
In response to these demands, the Californian government decided to raise the Foreign Miners’ Tax to $6 per month until October 1860, then $8 per month until October 1861, $12 until October 1862, $16 until October 1863, and then $20 per month after that.111 This did not deter the Chinese from the mines, as one article notes that a number of Chinese had arrived at a new mining area just a few months later.112 It also did not please the politicians in Washington, as one politician, a Mr. Hoard, pointed out that the Chinese were producing an enormous amount of gold on the mines, the majority of which went into the American economy. More importantly, however, was that a duty tax on the importation of rice, eaten almost exclusively by the Chinese immigrants, brought in a tidy $400,000 and would disappear if all the Chinese were driven out and refused entry.113 So in 1860, the dichotomy continued. It is very important to note that the evidence from the newspapers show that this anti-Chinese sentiment was almost exclusively focused on Chinese miners at the beginning. This eventually expanded to other Chinese laborers working in other industries, but the initial anger was towards the miners. This initial anger towards the Chinese miners was due to competition, but also due to the smaller amount of available, or successful, mining regions.114
Anti-Chinese sentiment continued to grow in the 1870s, and it slowly began to overpower those who had nothing against the Chinese. During the 1870s the term “Celestials” began to be replaced by the term “Mongolians,” even though “Celestials” still remained a firm favourite amongst the newspapers until the 1880s (Table 1). The vast majority of the time the Chinese
109 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 18, Number 2727, 23 December 1859. 110 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 18, Number 2743, 11 January 1860. 111 Daily Alta California, Volume 12, Number 53, 23 February 1860. 112 Daily Alta California, Volume 12, Number 149, 29 May 1860. 113 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 19, Number 2877, 15 June 1860. 114 R. Scott Baxter, “The Response of California's Chinese Populations to the Anti-Chinese Movement,” Historical Archaeology, Vol. 42, No. 3, The Archaeology of Chinese Immigrant and Chinese American Communities, 2008, 30.
27 were referred to as “Chinese” or “Chinamen,” with the term “Celestial” being more endearing than derogatory. The term “Mongolian,” however, came across as far more disrespectful than “Celestial” and refers to the “hordes of Asia” coming into California and taking all of the white man’s jobs. In the early 1850s it was hardly ever used, twice in the first half of the decade, but it rose steadily, much as the anti-Chinese sentiment did. In the 1860s the term “Mongolian” increased to about 250 references, while “Celestial” had risen to 363, from 264 in the early 1850s. By the late 1870s “Celestial” appeared approximately 567 times, while “Mongolian” had increased, and overtaken it, to 595 times. The trend continued as “Mongolian” became the more popular term for the Chinese. There is evidence that there is a direct correlation between the use of the term “Mongolian” and the growing anti-Chinese movement.
One of the major leaders for the anti-Chinese movement during the 1870s and early 1880s was Denis Kearney. Kearney was an Irish immigrant who had only arrived in San Francisco in 1868. By 1877 he had become a U.S. citizen and in the same year he became active in the labor movement.115 Kearney was known for his fiery oratorical style and he soon commanded a large following amongst the white workers in the region. Interestingly, at the beginning of Kearney’s rise amongst the white working class, he was not completely anti- Chinese. In one early speech he urged white workers to be thrifty and industrious like their Chinese counterparts. But by 1878 he would be known for his simple declarative statement that ended each of his speeches: “The Chinese Must Go!”116
The “Chinese Question” dominated Chinese news stories in the 1870s. On the 1st of January, 1870, what seems to be a premonition for the rest of the decade, the Sonoma Democrat puts the issue at the forefront. The article demonstrates how there are two opposing camps in California. On the one side is the California Legislature and its supporters, which the Sonoma Democrat indicates as the vast majority of the population in the Pacific West, and they wanted society to be relieved of the “vast Asiatic hordes,” but they don’t know how to do it. On the other side is Senator Stewart who aimed for the protection of the Chinese and for further immigration
115 Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 51. 116 Ibid, 52.
28 for the labor market. He was even attempting to allow for the Chinese to be allowed naturalization for them to qualify for protection under American law.117
One clue to the anti-Chinese miner sentiment comes from a newspaper article from 1878. Titled “Lucky Chinamen,” the article deals with how a group of Chinese miners had reworked an old digging site, ground that had “been worked over frequently since the early days of California mining.” The Chinese managed to extract $1,500 from the site which many had thought was completely exhausted.118 This is a late example of how the Chinese would rework sites that white miners had abandoned and become successful. I can only imagine that this would frustrate white miners to no end and cause much resentment towards the Chinese. Although this is a late example, it is still relevant as it illustrates a common practice that occurred throughout the mines.
It was during the late 1870s that serious pressure began to be put on government to provide stricter laws against Chinese immigration. In 1879 again, there were calls for “Congress to prohibit the further immigration of Mongolians.”119 This anti-Chinese movement had become so popular that according to one article, in 1879, 161,405 votes were cast at the last general election. Out of these 154,638 were against Chinese immigration, 883 were for it, and 5,885 abstained.120 Even The Californian Farmer and Journal of Useful Sciences, which had generally defended the Chinese, had turned a complete one hundred and eighty degrees by the late 1870s. Initially the newspaper had praised the Chinese work ethic and how “inoffensive” they were as a social class, not to mention the various calls for further Chinese immigration, all as late as 1859.121 By 1876, however, the “Chinese Danger” had become a “gathering ulcer” and they were a “growing evil” that had to be expunged from American society.122
There was Chinese resistance to this growing anti-Chinese movement. As this movement grew in power and anti-Chinese legislation and rhetoric became more prevalent, the Chinese, who are often depicted as being passive and docile, did not take it willingly. They resisted
117 Sonoma Democrat, Volume XIII, Number 13, 1 January 1870. 118 Morning Union, Volume 22, Number 3443, 4 May 1878. 119 Healdsburg Enterprise, Volume IV, Number 30, 28 August 1879. 120 Healdsburg Enterprise, Volume IV, Number 45, 11 December 1879. 121 California Farmer and Journal of Useful Sciences, Volume 10, Number 25, 21 January 1859. 122 California Farmer and Journal of Useful Sciences, Volume 45, Number 1, 23 March 1876.
29 through social organizations, legal manoeuvres, protests, and sometimes, violence.123 With regards to social organizations, many of the Chinese immigrants came from the same region in China. Therefore, they already had a form of social coherence and structure, which eventually developed into a number of associations that became known as the Chinese Six Companies, or the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association. This organization helped protect its members and provided much funding for attacking the various legal restrictions placed upon the Chinese.124 Protest generally took the form of letters written to newspapers in attempts to refute anti-Chinese rhetoric, but these were rare and had little impact.125 Legally the Chinese often relied on sympathetic whites to help them, and this occurred fairly often. One example is that by the late 1870s it was impossible for Chinese miners to own any land in many mining districts. But some white miners bought land for Chinese agents, who then worked it.126 Violence as resistance was a very rare occurrence, but it did happen from time to time. Although there was a huge number of restrictions on Chinese immigrants, owning weapons was not one of them. Occasionally tensions did boil over and the Chinese fought back, such as when M. S. Griswold was killed by his disgruntled Chinese miners in the late 1850s.127
Despite this resistance, in 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed. In January 1882 the Sacramento Daily Union briefly mentions the possibility of new Chinese legislation: “Another long Chinese bill drags its weary length across the continent.” It continues: “This time the Mongolian laborers are to be excluded for twenty-five years, and all manner of barriers are to be built up against them.” But the article warns that legislation against the Chinese had been passed over and over again with little satisfaction. Therefore, “when a bill is passed which results in the stoppage of the immigration, and which will stand the review of Courts, it will be time enough to throw up our caps.”128 In March of the same year the Los Angeles Herald published a
123 R. Scott Baxter, “The Response of California's Chinese Populations to the Anti-Chinese Movement,” Historical Archaeology, Vol. 42, No. 3, The Archaeology of Chinese Immigrant and Chinese American Communities, 2008, 30. 124 R. Scott Baxter, “The Response of California's Chinese Populations to the Anti-Chinese Movement,” Historical Archaeology, Vol. 42, No. 3, The Archaeology of Chinese Immigrant and Chinese American Communities, 2008, 31. 125 Ibid, 32. 126 R. Scott Baxter, “The Response of California's Chinese Populations to the Anti-Chinese Movement,” Historical Archaeology, Vol. 42, No. 3, The Archaeology of Chinese Immigrant and Chinese American Communities, 2008, 33. 127 Ibid, 34. 128 Sacramento Daily Union, Volume 14, Number 136, 27 January 1882.
30 detailed account of what the bill composed. Essentially it banned Chinese immigration for ten years because it “endangers the good order of certain localities” within the United States. It did allow Chinese who had come to America before November 18, 1880, to remain, as well as providing the possibility of Chinese to arrive with passports, although they would have to be accepted by the U. S. government. One amendment of interest is that the term “laborer” was extended to include “skilled laborers and Chinese engaged in mining.”129 The Act also stipulated that the Chinese would be ineligible for U.S. citizenship, and that the wives of the Chinese who were already laborers within the U.S. could not join their husbands. All of the Chinese who were in the U.S. before November 1880 had to carry passports or certificates with them at all times to indicate their status and validity, an eerie similarity to the pass-system used in South Africa later on.130
Hong Kong was dismayed with the passing of the Act, as it lost them an important and lucrative business. In an article published in the Daily Alta, which borrows from a Hong Kong newspaper, it states that the Chinese did not believe that the Act would be “worked with rigor” and that it seemed absurd that the United States would want to keep out “a race that has proved such a signal service in developing the trade and resources of the Western United States.” The Daily Alta, however, did not agree. It proudly announces that no longer will the “coolie” come to California and steal white jobs. The victory of the anti-Chinese movement was complete.131 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 led to ten other pieces of anti-Chinese legislation in the eleven years after its passing. The Scott Act of 1888, for example, denied the entry of all Chinese laborers even if they had re-entry certificates.132 The Geary Act of 1892 forced all Chinese laborers, and only Chinese laborers, to carry a government-issued ID card. Failure to do so would result in immediate imprisonment or deportment.133
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the culmination of three decades of Chinese immigration into the American West, mostly into and through California. Originally the Chinese were welcomed as a boon for a labor hungry state. They were praised as hard workers, as good citizens, as quiet and peaceable people who were inoffensive and caused no trouble. But as more
129 Los Angeles Herald, Volume 17, Number 22, 17 March 1882. 130 Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 131. 131 Daily Alta California, Volume 34, Number 11786, 30 July 1882. 132 Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850-1943: A Trans-Pacific community, 46. 133 Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 136-7.
31 and more white Americans and Europeans arrived in the area the Chinese provided too much competition for jobs, as they worked for cheaper wages, and they seem to have worked harder, especially in the mines. This anger and resentment against the Chinese, which originated in the mines, slowly spread further afield until the vast majority of the white populous were virulently anti-Chinese in sentiment, barring the few sympathizers. The culmination in the Exclusion Act almost seems like the next logical step. This experience in California came to be pivotal in South Africa’s response to its own labor shortage just over two decades later. South Africans came to California to discover how California had experienced, and dealt with, its Chinese immigrant miners and laborers. This information would direct their own methods when Chinese “coolies” were brought to South Africa in 1904.
Table 1:
Dates under consideration Approximate number of Approximate number of times “Celestial” appears in times “Mongolian” is used. newspaper articles. 1850-1854 264 2 1855-1859 247 52 1860-1864 228 168 1865-1869 363 250 1870-1874 535 322 1875-1879 567 595 1880-1884 368 541 134
134 California Digital Newspaper Collection: it is possible to search for a term and to see how often it is mentioned per year and decade. Through this I have made approximations of the numbers.
32
Chapter Two South Africa: “Compound” Interest
The primary reason for British South Africa’s decision to import Chinese labor for the gold mines was because of the South African War (also known as the Second Anglo-Boer War).135 The War began in 1899, under the South African High Commissioner Sir Alfred Milner’s instigation, with Britain and the Witwatersrand mining magnates on the one side against the incumbent Boer governments of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State on the other. The War was fought for a number of reasons, but the most important one for this thesis was the British desire for the Transvaal’s lucrative and massive (the biggest known in the world at the time) gold mines and goldfields. Another major reason was the large population of “uitlanders” (foreigners) in the Transvaal due to the gold mines, who had been denied the right to vote under the Boer administration.136 Apart from the British, Americans made up the majority of the foreigners in the Transvaal due to their skills as miners and engineers, skills that they had learned in places like California. By 1895 thousands of Americans had settled in the Witwatersrand region and a large American community had developed.137
Due to the War, mining operations virtually ceased for its duration until 1902,138 with the defeat of the Boer Republics.139 Much of the cheap black African140 labor that allowed the mines to gain so much wealth before the War went home to the rural areas, exacerbating the need for cheap labor on the mines and in the urban areas.141 A source of cheap labor was vital for the gold mines on the Rand due to the geology of the region and the depth and expense of the mines. The new British run government, under the direction of Sir Alfred Milner, attempted to solve the labor issue through a variety of means. At first the government enforced stricter pass laws to compel the laborers to remain in the mining region, but the workers simply walked off their jobs. The government then tried to use force, but the numbers of workers required did not meet
135 Thompson, A History of South Africa, 144; Davenport & Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 237. 136 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Abacus, 1998), 21. 137 Charles Van Onselen, The Cowboy Capitalist: John Hays Hammond, the American West, and the Jameson Raid in South Africa (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017), xvi & 1. This work indicates the numbers and influence of Americans (mostly from California) in the Transvaal preceding the time period being researched in this thesis. 138 Pakenham, The Boer War, xvi-xvii. 139 Pakenham, The Boer War, 569; Davenport & Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 230 140 The term “black African” includes black Africans from the entire southern Africa region, the main source of labor for the mines. 141 Davenport & Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 237; Thompson, A History of South Africa, 144.
33 expectations. Neighbouring colonial states were also canvassed in an attempt to gain the required number of laborers, to no avail.142
Eventually, Milner and his government turned to Asia out of desperation to restart the lucrative gold mining industry, devastated after the War. Britain as an empire was well established for this, in particular for laborers from India and China. Indian miners, however, were out of the question, since the Indian population in South Africa was already large and caused much racial tension. Cheap Chinese labor seemed like the logical conclusion.143 But from the start there were serious reservations about the use of Chinese, or indeed non-white, labor. In November 1902, only several months after the conclusion of the South African War, the Rand Daily Mail published an advertisement calling for all “European Storekeepers of Johannesburg” to meet at the “Goldfields Hotel” in order to decide what course to pursue to protest the granting of licenses to “Chinese and other Asiatics.”144 This advertisement indicates how the storekeepers and shop owners of South Africa, particularly in Johannesburg, were threatened by the “Chinese and other Asiatics.” In the Transvaal “Asiatics” were always a major concern for the white population.
There was precedent for this in South Africa. The neighbouring British colony of Natal had imported a large number of indentured Indian laborers to work on the sugar plantations during the 1860s and 1870s. Once their contracts were completed the Indian workers were given the choice to remain or to return home, as the British Indian government refused to pay for repatriation. The majority decided to remain, but not as unskilled labor. Instead, much to the consternation of the white population, the Indians turned to shopkeeping and trading, amongst other more skilled occupations. Many of the Indians also refused to remain in Natal, and instead moved to the growing economy of the Transvaal (due to the gold mines) and opened up shops there, in direct competition with white traders.145 This led to a number of racial laws in the Transvaal. These racial tensions were still fresh in the memories of the white population in the Transvaal just after the South African War, whether they were Boer or “uitlanders.”
142 Thompson, A History of South Africa, 144. 143 Davenport & Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 612; Pakenham, The Boer War, 575. 144 Rand Daily Mail, November 19 1902, 10; Please note that for the period under investigation the Rand Daily Mail never identifies the authors of the articles. 145 Davenport & Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 120-121; John Ambrose Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa” (Masters diss., University of Witwatersrand, 1954), 5.
34
One article from the time captured this historical dynamic: black African “labour was unobtainable, white labour was unprofitable, and yellow labour was triumphant…those of them present who had seen the effects of Chinese labour in California and Australia could tell something that the mine owners ought to know. No amount of dividend from a mine run by cheap Chinese labour could compensate for the moral leprosy from such a scourge.”146 While this article illustrates the rabid desire of the majority of white South Africans not to allow Chinese mine labor into the country, it also illustrates that white South Africans had knowledge of previous experiences in California when concerned with Chinese labor, and that these experiences were fresh in their memories. Why, then, did the South African government decide to bring Chinese labor into the country when such virulent hatred for the idea was so prevalent?
Another article the following month further illustrates this point. The author indicates that he has “discovered that some of our leading men are strongly in favour of importing Chinese labor” and that eventually the “townspeople will demand it.” The author, however, does not agree with this statement, arguing that “the townspeople know that the importation of Chinese labor will lead to many troubles.” Prophetically, the author continues, “I doubt whether it would be possible under any scheme of registration or indenture or legislation to restrict the area where the Asiatic would work.”147 This statement points towards the solution the government was looking for, a means to restrict Chinese labor solely upon the mines, and to restrict any form of freedom which could possibly allow the Chinese to enter other job markets.
By February 1903 the mine owners still refuted any possibility of recruiting Chinese labor, but it seems that their need for cheap labor was slowly getting the better of them and secretly they were already interested in Chinese labor before this date. In a speech given by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, the Chairman of the Chamber of Mines, he explicitly states that no Chinese labor will be brought over to South Africa, and if so, it will be an absolute last resort due to “the experience of America and Australia to guide us in the matter.” Fitzpatrick notes that if all else should fail, and the “Chinese proposal” was to be the only solution, then it “is essential that we know all about it beforehand.” He continues: “In order to get this information we have selected a gentleman well known of the Rand, a prominent and successful mine manager, Mr. H. R.
146 Rand Daily Mail, October 6 1902, 8. 147 Rand Daily Mail, 27 November 1902, 5.
35
Skinner…We have commissioned him to proceed to China via the United States. He takes that course for the purpose of finding out and reporting to us the experience of those who have employed Chinese.”148 On the very next page Fitzpatrick then compares South Africa’s current predicament to California’s past. He states that California’s white population was too small to supply the creation of its industries and allow the full exploitation of its resources. Furthermore, the importation of white labor was too expensive. Therefore, the “Chinaman was resorted to, he has served his purpose and his day is past and he is gone. I cannot say if this is so.”149 The last sentence is why Skinner was sent on his mission, and why this mission was to play a pivotal role in South Africa’s Chinese labor experience, and his research in California would define how the Chinese workers would be dealt with in South Africa.
The formation of white skilled labor and non-white unskilled labor in South Africa can trace its roots back to the very beginning of the first white colonists.150 But its institution specifically within the mining industry came about after the discovery of diamonds at Kimberly in 1866. Essentially whites secured the better paid, “skilled” supervisory jobs with a large mass of lower paid non-whites did the “Kaffirwork” (manual labor).151 These lower paid non-whites, generally black African men, were also migratory workers. They would work for several months on a contract and then return home with whatever money they had made to buy whatever goods were required or desired, or to pay whatever taxes the white government had decided to enforce.152 Taxes in particular were a major incentive for the black Africans to work on the mines.153
The most important institution that occurred during this time was the closed compound system. A compound is an enclosure which severely restricts the movements of its inmates, much like a prison or barracks. This system was created on the diamond mines to eliminate theft of diamonds, to prevent drunkenness, and to allow the mine owners, supervisors, and managers (whites) better control over the far more numerous mine laborers (non-whites).154 Gold mines
148 Rand Daily Mail, 27 February 1903, 4. 149 Rand Daily Mail, 27 February 1903, 5. 150 Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 2. 151 “Kaffir” is a highly derogatory term for black Africans in southern Africa. 152 Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 3. 153 Ibid, 4. 154 Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 4.
36 adopted this system on the Rand twenty years later. It was also this compound system that the government used to restrict the movements of the Chinese once they had been imported. It was a solution to “restrict the area where the Asiatic would work.”155
The need for cheap labor was due to a perceived labor shortage. This labor shortage was reported by the Transvaal Labour Commission in 1903 through two reports. The two reports differed in their findings, with one stating that there was a shortage of 129,364 mine workers and of 221,399 of black African, unskilled workers countrywide while the second report put the shortage numbers as much lower, but it did admit that there was a labor shortage which was “temporary.”156 Some believed that this shortage was an overestimate and alarmist. The Commissioner of Mines, in 1903, pointed out that gold production was steadily increasing and that pre-War figures of gold production would be reached if the mines would be patient. Fitzpatrick also noted that the pre-War supply of labor (approximately 96,000 black laborers) was due to twelve years of recruiting throughout southern Africa and would, therefore, also require patience. But, despite all of this, the pre-War gold production was only reached in 1907, possibly vindicating those alarmists who proclaimed a dire labor shortage.157
The labor shortage was seen as short-term, and this created a cycle that led to more troubled labor shortages. The Chinese solution, therefore, was also regarded as short-term.158 The reasons for this short-term labor shortage were numerous, with most whites blaming the black Africans for it, even though the white South Africans indirectly, and directly, influenced this shortage.159 The major cause for this shortage, as noted before, was the South African War. The war meant that the mines stopped all functions, which led to the black African miners to leave their contracts and return home to the rural areas. Apart from this, the war also provided new, well-paid work for black South Africans within the British army as guides, laborers, drivers, and spies.160 Many of these black Africans were also forced laborers for both armies, which would
155 Ibid, 4. 156 Ibid, 13. 157 Ibid, 14. 158 Gary Kynoch, “’Your Petitioners Are in Mortal Terror’: The Violent World of Chinese Mineworkers in South Africa, 1904-1910,” Journal of Southern African Studies 31, no. 3 (September 2005): 534. 159 The term “whites” includes all white South Africans, generally of British or Afrikaner heritage. An individual who is considered “European” (directly from Europe) is specified. 160 Pakenham, The Boer War, xvii, 211, 391, 402, 422, 540; Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 18.
37 also provide an incentive to steer clear of white employers in the future.161 The war also disrupted tax collection, which allowed the black Africans to return to pastoralism. Another important reason for the black African miners to remain at home after the war, was the price increase in livestock and agriculture, which provided the relatively unmolested black African farmers to gain new wealth. All of this resulted in what most whites saw as an unhealthy spirit of independence.162 A further issue amongst the black Africans that made them reconsider a return to the mines was that many of them expected an improvement in the relationship between white and black Africans due to the British victory. But there was no improvement in this department for South Africa, instead the government did its best to return to the previous regime’s racial legislation and norms.163
The process of reconstruction after the war created a huge demand for labor: specifically, cheap black African labor. This demand was for the construction of a variety of projects such as the building of dams and railways. But all of this reconstruction required funding, with the gold mines being the main source.164 This is why the labor shortage on the gold mines was of such immediate importance to the new government of South Africa. Such a need for immediate funding meant that there was a desire for a speedy and comprehensive program for the development of the mines. All of this resulted in an increase in labor demand, which was coupled with a reduction in wages for unskilled labor, another reason for black Africans to steer clear of the Rand. The wages were lowered and this development was to allow the mines to make as much money in the shortest amount of time in order to help the new government “reconstruct” South Africa as soon as possible.165 In order to speed this “reconstruction” process along a myriad of new mines were opened on the Rand, which further exacerbated the labor shortage.166
This continued straining of labor led to a number of attempts to alleviate the shortage. One attempt was the W. N. L. A. (the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association), which was formed as early as December 1901. This organization, controlled by the Chamber of Mines, had the power and means to recruit black African labor from all across southern Africa, but more
161 Pakenham, The Boer War, 547. 162 Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 18. 163 Pakenham, The Boer War, 567; Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 18. 164 Pakenham, The Boer War, 553. 165 Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 19. 166 Peter Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal (Hong Kong: MacMillan, 1982), 17.
38 importantly to control the cost of labor.167 By having one organization control the recruitment of labor, the Chamber of Mines had the ability to keep the cost of labor as low as possible, as no competition between the various mines would exist. With these powers and with the full support of the Chamber of Mines, and, therefore, the government, confidence in the W. N. L. A. to solve any labor shortage issues promptly and successfully was high. By the end of 1902, however, the W. N. L. A. admitted that the organization could not keep up with the demand of labor from the mines.168
There are a number of reasons for the failure of the W. N. L. A. to recruit enough laborers. The recruiters gave no thought to the personal preference of the would-be laborers. Some mines had better press amongst the black African laborers but those that were recruited were sent to whichever mines required the labor.169 This would obviously cause some reservations amongst the would-be laborers before signing up. Another issue was the fixed minimum length of contract of six months, which included a thirty-day working month. This was a major grievance amongst the would-be laborers as it gave them little leeway and they were forced to complete their contracts, no matter the circumstances or treatment.170 The highly efficient pass system, set up by the Crown Colony Government to control labor movement, was also a discouragement to the black African laborers. Finally, the actual conditions on the mines were enough of a deterrent to chase away would-be laborers. These conditions included the living accommodation and the very real dangers of working on the mines, especially underground.171
Another possible solution to the labor crisis was the use of white South African and European unskilled labor. This solution was a major controversy during the period. British Liberal politician Herbert Samuel suggested that the belief that “white men will not work side by side with Kaffirs (sic) at the same employment is true. That white men will not perform unskilled labor in South Africa is untrue.”172 Samuel goes on to point out that a number of whites had been
167 Davenport & Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 612; Thompson, A History of South Africa, 144; Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 21-22; Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 10 168 Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 20. 169 Ibid, 22. 170 Ibid, 22. 171 Ibid, 22. 172 Herbert Samuel, “The Chinese Labour Question,” The Contemporary Review 85 (January/June 1904), 460.
39 employed on the mines as unskilled laborers, and although they had received “much larger pay than the average native,” they had proved to be hard workers and “nearly as economical.”173 Samuel maintains that the reason why the Chamber of Mines and the mining magnates refused this solution was that a large number of white workers on the Rand would lead to trade unionism, “they would simply hold the Government of the country in the hollow of their hand,” a terrifying proposition for the government and the mining magnates.174 But Richardson refutes this point by indicating that the economic ramifications of using white unskilled labor was far more important, and damning. Because the mines on the Rand were focussed on developing low-grade ore and mines the high unit cost, unreliability, and its association with greater mechanisation, meant that white labor would never have been able to function on the mines on the Rand.175 The mines and mining magnates wanted to keep costs down to a minimum, which meant less mechanisation, a reliable and steady supply of cheap labor, and no possible interference from a powerful working class unionism. This essentially meant that white unskilled labor was never going to be a possible solution in the eyes of the Chamber of Mines.
Apart from the mine-owners, the introduction of Chinese labor into the mines, however, was vehemently opposed by the majority of the white population of South Africa. The support for the Chinese solution was purely economical, while the main reason for the opposition was purely racial. In South Africa the Chinese were seen as “dirty, vicious, opium-smoking” vagabonds.176 An article from the same period mentions a newly immigrated Australians perception of the Chinese, which was very similar to white South Africans views at the time: “Mr Carpendale… said the Chinamen…in appearance he was a near approach to the monkey, while in habits he was more like a pig.”177 Samuel, a Liberal, had a very similar viewpoint. Samuel contemplates the differences amongst the various races, noting that the Chinese “can flourish in any latitude” and that Americans “will testify that their uncleanliness, their addiction to gambling…their secret societies…make them a population of highly undesirable immigrants.” Not to mention that “in every temperate country, without exception [including the United States],
173 Ibid, 460-461. 174 Ibid, 463. 175 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 20. 176 Rand Daily Mail, 27 March 1903. 177 Rand Daily Mail, 19 May 1903.
40 to which the Chinese have made their way, has led, after bitter experience and long agitation, to their complete or almost complete exclusion.”178
The unity in the opposition to the importation of Chinese labor can be seen in an article from May 1903. This article lays down the happenings of a preliminary meeting of Anti-Asiatic Agitation, but it includes the opinions of both English and Afrikaans speaking whites. Quite correctly, the article asserts that “the capitalists of the Transvaal Colony were determined to import Chinese labor at all costs, chiefly in order to procure the necessary labor to develop over- capitalised mines and mining propositions.” This illustrates that the layman acknowledged the role the mining magnates had in the importation of Chinese labor. The article goes on to state that “Dutch [Afrikaans] and British alike must unite in opposing one of the greatest curses that ever menaced a country.” The final section of the article indicates that the “Dutch” populace was fully against any form of Chinese importation, illustrating the almost complete unity of whites against this proposition.179
This opposition to the Chinese in South Africa was influenced to a large degree by the experiences in California and Australia, with California being “the closest analogies to the Witwatersrand Reef.”180 This point is further illustrated by sending Skinner to California, and not Australia, indicating that California was seen as South Africa’s closest analogy. The eventual exclusion of the Chinese in California, and the methods and means of this exclusion, directly influenced South Africa’s own process of restriction: exclusion before immigration in order to precede any difficulties that California experienced. This can be seen through Skinner’s fact- finding journey, and the numerous references to the United States by contemporary sources. One similarity and difference between California and South Africa is race. South Africa was, and is, a very racially charged society, and its pervious experiences with Indian and black African labor furthered these racist tendencies and beliefs. Similarly, California’s racial make-up was, and is, diverse. Generally, however, the power structures and those in charge were Anglo-Americans. South Africa, on the other hand, had a myriad of races that competed against one another, and led to racist beliefs and racial tensions, although similar to California, the majority of the power structures were controlled by Anglo individuals, albeit with Afrikaners as well. Therefore, the
178 Samuel, “The Chinese Labour Question,” 458. 179 Rand Daily Mail, 1 May 1903. 180 Samuel, “The Chinese Labour Question,” 460.
41 possibility of yet another large racial group entering the labor arena could only be foreseen as a disaster: further racial competition and tension.
As has been seen in the previous chapter, the influx of the Chinese into California eventually led to the racist Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, almost two decades before South Africa even considered using Chinese labor on the Rand. But once it was decided by the mining magnates and the South African government that the only possible solution for the labor shortage was Chinese labor, then Skinner and Co. were sent to California to develop the methods required to ensure that the Chinese were not incorporated into South African society. This Californian experience, along with the research completed by Skinner, led to the development of Labour Importation Ordinance. While the Ordinance could not outright ban Chinese immigration like the Chinese Exclusion Act due to the need for the labor, it essentially prevented any permanent settlement of the Chinese in South Africa. Under different circumstances these two pieces of legislation are remarkably similar in their goal: the restriction of Chinese immigration and movement into the respective countries.
Some opposition to the importation of the Chinese, although the vast minority, was humanitarian. This group took on the idea of “yellow slavery” and the idea that the restrictions to be imposed on the Chinese would be “unfair” and akin to “slavery.” References to the Indian indentured labor system also occurred, with the note that the British Indian Government would not accept such conditions that were included in the restrictions imposed upon the Chinese laborers.181 Samuel also includes a humanitarian perspective in his opposition, but importantly it is his final point of contention, indicating its own importance to him. His arguments with regards to this includes the lack of liberty and the unfairness of the possible conceived contract imposed on the Chinese.182
Despite this opposition, at home and abroad, the importation of Chinese labor was allowed by the British and South African Governments. The mining industry was the major force in gaining the approval of this measure, as indicated previously, but the political situation in the Transvaal and Britain decided the pace of events and decisions. Within the mining industry the choice for Chinese labor, which had been growing steadily form 1901, had been kept a secret
181 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 129-130. 182 Samuel, “The Chinese Labour Question,” 465.
42 until March 1903, when Sir George Farrar, chairman of the Anglo-French Group, opened a public campaign in favour of Chinese importation. By the time Skinner’s fact-finding mission had returned in September 1903 the government had also publicly declared its support for Chinese labor.183
The mining industry in South Africa had a virtual monopoly of the media and with favourable government opinion, the importation of Chinese labor seemed a forgone conclusion.184 An article from May 1903 states that “all the leaders of the mining industry, the men of brains and capital, are in favour of Asiatic labor and that it is only the ignorant rabble, the loafers and ‘bummers’ and mean whites, who agitate and pass resolutions against the Chinese.”185 Therefore, despite the efforts of those “mean whites” and “ignorant rabble,” the power the mining industry wielded was always going to succeed. The mining industry’s stance was confirmed by a vote in the Chamber of Mines in early December 1903, which requested government support to the immediate introduction of an ordinance allowing the importation of Chinese.186 This Labour Importation Ordinance was to be the backbone around which Chinese labor was to be brought over to South Africa, which also meant it was the main point of contention between those for this importation, and those against it. The power that the mining industry had over the media is evident, as previous articles indicated vehement opposition to the importation of Chinese labor, but more and more articles within the same newspaper, the Rand Daily Mail, suddenly for the importation of Chinese labor, began to appear from the middle of 1903. By the beginning of 1904 articles now appear that express hope that the Chinese will “increase output” and provide “improved conditions.”187
It seems that by this period the opposition to Chinese importation had drifted into the background. But it is important to remember that this opposition was always around. This is illustrated by a “belated Boer protest” which was cabled to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Alfred Lyttelton, on February 10, 1904. This cable, sent by Boer luminaries such as Jan Smuts, Louis Botha, and Johan de la Rey, emphatically states that “the overwhelming majority (of the Boer population) of them are unalterably opposed to the introduction of Asiatic
183 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 22. 184 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 22. 185 Rand Daily Mail, 25 May 1903. 186 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 22. 187 Rand Daily Mail, 11 February 1904, 7.
43 labor.” The cable goes on to state that the “Labour Commission (which eventually decided on Chinese labor for importation) was not an impartial or representative body.”188 This opposition would come back to haunt the mining magnates, as well as the British Government and Lord Milner.
On February 10, 1904, the Labour Importation Ordinance was gazetted and became law on May 19, 1904.189 But because South Africa was now a Crown Colony, the British Government’s support was also required. This support was secured during Milner’s visit to Britain during October and November 1903, when he visited a number of prominent politicians who were swayed to the cause.190 The Ordinance had its beginnings as early as July 1902 and was in its final form by October 1903, indicating that the plan for Chinese labor was long thought of by the Chamber of Mines.191 This means that the Ordinance was very close to its final form, only one month before Ross Skinner had even returned from his trip overseas. One can only come to the conclusion that no matter what opposition occurred, the mining industry, with government support, had decided on Chinese labor as the solution. Skinner’s mission can then be seen as a test of the feasibility of the project. And his report was most likely very influential in the final creation of the Ordinance. Five months before the Ordinance was in its final form, in January 1904, the Rand Daily Mail indicated that a “prominent Rand mining magnate” had stated that “10,000 coolies” were ready to be transported to South Africa from the Chinese Treaty ports.192 But what did the Labour Importation Ordinance really allow and entail?
The Labour Importation Ordinance allowed for the importation of non-European laborers, but the person importing those laborers required a licence from the Lieutenant- Governor. The laborers were required to have a contract, which was to be valid for two years.193 Once the first period of the contract had expired the contract might be renewed for a similar period of time upon mutual agreement. The imported laborer was allowed to work on the Rand mines alone, and only as unskilled labor. He (all of the laborers were men) was not allowed any skilled work, especially any of the fifty-five trades that were already registered in the region. The
188 Rand Daily Mail, 13 February 1904, 7. 189 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 118. 190 Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 102. 191 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 29. 192 Rand Daily Mail, 9 January 1904. 193 Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration, 176.
44 laborer was also not allowed to directly or indirectly acquire any liquor, mining or trading licences, and no property rights. While in South Africa the laborer was to reside on the premises that he was working on, and he was prohibited from leaving said premises without a permit, which was valid for a maximum of forty-eight hours. The Superintendent appointed under the auspices of the Ordinance was given the power to repatriate any laborer convicted of any offence. The laborer was to return to the country of his origin (all of the laborers came from China) as soon as the first or second term of the contract was completed. If the laborer did not, then forced repatriation would take place. The same applied to the wife or children of a laborer who were brought along by the importer. If the laborer died during his contract then his wife and children would be repatriated immediately.194 This was not a major issue as hardly any women or children accompanied the men under contract. An example of this is the final shipment of Chinese laborers that arrived in South Africa on November 26 1906. Of the 2,129 laborers who journeyed to South Africa, three women and four children had joined.195 Before securing a licence, the importer was also supposed to enter into a bond to pay the expenses of repatriation. A few other articles and provisions gave the Superintendent extensive powers, staff positions for administration, as well as providing the extent and amounts of fines and punishment for convicted crimes committed by the laborers. 196
In comparison with the American Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Labour Importation Ordinance of 1904 in South Africa was far more draconian in its stance against Chinese labor and miners. Seventeen of the 35 sections were purely restrictive.197 California, and indeed the whole of the United States, had a larger Chinese population that had increased during the preceding three decades before the Exclusion Act was enforced, while South Africa’s Chinese population was miniscule comparatively.198 The United States could not enforce a system of repatriation on a large and vibrant Chinese population that had been relatively settled in California for such a long period. But South Africa, perhaps learning from California’s experience, could enforce laws to prevent any Chinese settlement at all. It should also be noted
194 Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration, 177. 195 Peter Richardson, “The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour for the South African Gold-Mines, 1903-1908,” The Journal of African History 18, no. 1 (1977), 86. 196 Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration, 177-178. 197 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 134. 198 Rand Daily Mail, 4 January 1903, an article refers to a census which indicates that less than 130 Chinese individuals were resident in the Transvaal.
45 that the various articles added on to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 were, in many cases, just as draconian as the Labour Importation Ordinance. But how exactly, and from where, were these vast numbers of Chinese laborers to be brought over to South Africa?
Interestingly, unlike California, the vast majority of the Chinese laborers brought over to South Africa came from the north of China. Between February 1904 and November 1906 63,695 Chinese laborers brought over to South Africa, and out of that number 62,006, or 97,3 percent, came from the northern territories of China.199 For the majority of this period one company was in overall control of the recruiting and shipping sides of this labor experiment: the Chamber of Mines Labour Importation Agency (CMLIA).200 In total, 34 shipments of recruits came from China. The first shipment, with a total of approximately 1,500 recruits, was the S. S. Tweeddale and it had “splendid accommodation, better, in fact, than the transports used during the Boer War.”201 The racial tension was still high, however: “the first batch of yellow laborers has reached Durban.”202 After problems encountered with Chinese authorities in the southern provinces of China, as well as with the recruits themselves, only the first two shipments came from the south, notably from Hong Kong, while the remaining 32 shipments were all from the northern territories.203
The CMLIA was created as a non-profit organization with the support of all the mining companies on the Rand. The mining companies had to pool their resources to maintain state support, as well as to stop any escalation in recruiting or shipping costs through competition.204 The CMLIA’s head offices were situated in the Chamber of Mines buildings in Johannesburg to make sure that its policy and workings were fully integrated with the demands and needs of the Chamber of Mines. The CMLIA also had a Chinese advisor (a white European recruited directly from China), a few Chinese individuals who acted as interpreters and writers, as well as two other branches situated in Natal (the receiving end of shipments) and in China itself.205 The depot in Natal where the newly disembarked Chinese would remain until all of their papers had been
199 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 152; Richardson, 104. 200 Richardson, “The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour,” 86. 201 Rand Daily Mail, 23 May 1904, 7. 202 Rand Daily Mail, 20 June 1904, 6. 203 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 152. 204 Richardson, “The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour,” 92. 205 Richardson, “The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour,” 94.
46 cleared and secured was, interestingly enough, an old Boer War concentration camp, possibly indicating the increment conditions that the Chinese laborers had unwittingly signed themselves up for.206 It is very important to note that the CMLIA was not directly involved in the shipping or recruiting aspects of the business, but rather acted as a middleman or a contractor.207
The China branch, and more specifically the general manager in China, was key in the importation procedure. The general manager was responsible for procuring the largest possible supply of labor in the least possible time, under the most favourable terms.208 The general manager was based at the agency’s main offices in China in the British Concession in Tientsin City (todays Tianjin), although he also moved regularly to the provinces of Shantung and Chihli, the main regions of emigration.209 It should be noted how in the Californian case the majority of the Chinese came from the southern regions which made Hong Kong the major emigration port, while in the South African case the majority of the Chinese came from the north. Tientsin was not, however, the first choice for the head office, nor was it the major embarkation point. The major embarkation ports were Chefoo (Yantai today) and Chinwangtao (Qinhuangdao), but Tientsin was strategically placed between them with good railway and shipping access. Tientsin had two further bonuses; it was very close to Beijing, the seat of central government; and it had a British Consulate, which further facilitated emigration.210
Hong Kong was initially expected to be the base of operations, but recruiting difficulties made this impossible, and eventually led to the shift from the south to the north.211 This expectation is illustrated by the lack of anyone in the Transvaal administration who could speak the northern Chinese dialects until June 1905. The reason for this expectation was because of the traditional focus of Chinese indentured emigration prior to the Transvaal experiment, which would include the massive emigration to California.212 The CMLIA chose one company in Hong Kong as recruiting agents, Butterfield & Swire, which went against their ideology of protection against monopolistic rates. But the CMLIA was swayed by Butterfield & Swire’s guarantee of
206 Ibid, 94. 207 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 53. 208 Ibid, 50. 209 Ibid, 50. 210 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 51. 211 Ibid, 51. 212 Ibid, 78.
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4,000 laborers per month from the relatively small region surrounding the Pearl River Delta in a smooth working Hong Kong system.213 But the Hong Kong labor market was a highly competitive arena, and soon other recruiting agents began a campaign against the South African scheme, mainly because they feared such a scheme would affect their own businesses, as well as the anger against a perceived monopoly.214
Butterfield & Swire attempted to bypass this opposition through political relationships with the local Chinese and British governments, but this backfired. The local Chinese government clamped down on the South African scheme, while the British government did not want to push the Chinese Government any more than necessary.215 All of this diplomatic wrangling meant that shipments of laborers stalled and the CMLIA, naturally, began seeking labor under easier circumstances in the north of the country. The final nail in the coffin for the southern adventure was the arrival of the second shipment of laborers from the south on the S. S. Lothian. A number of the laborers aboard the ship had contracted beriberi, which caused the Chamber of Mines to regard the southern Chinese as “poor-quality emigrants.”216 Because of these reasons, the CMLIA changed their base of operations to the north of the country.
Skinner had actually emphasised the suitability of the northern Chinese as laborers in his report: “In Northern China the idea of emigration to a far distance has to be brought home to the Coolie, but when this has been done (a process taking time and money) many fine men will be obtained from the north, especially from the province of Shantung.”217 This belief is upheld in a news article from the 3rd of April 1905: “The southern laborers received up to the 31st December, namely, 1,453, do not compare favourably with those from the North either in point of health, physique, or, as far as it is possible to judge at present, in efficiency.”218 The labor market of north China met all the various demands of the mining industry during the period of recruiting between June 1904 and November 1906.219 The CMLIA did not make the same mistake in the north as they did in the south and they used a variety of recruiting agents who encompassed a
213 Ibid, 82. 214 Ibid, 85-86. 215 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 89. 216 Ibid, 95. 217 Ibid, 104. 218 Rand Daily Mail, 3 April 1905, 10. 219 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 105.
48 large area of recruiting.220 The CMLIA would pay Western firms to supply fixed amounts of labor per month at a per capita rate, which was agreed in advance. This form of price fixing was essential to control costs.221 This also meant that the CMLIA would not have to spend any extra money attempting to set up its own agents or contacts for recruitment. Another boon for the CMLIA was that there was not a settled or traditional emigrant labor market in the region, which meant that the South African scheme had the full support of the local Chinese and British governments.222
The recruiting agents in the north seemed to have adopted an indirect method. In a town or village, a recruiting centre would be opened, and would-be recruits would be invited through public criers or other forms of advertisements.223 From here the recruits would be sent to depots, similar to the compounds they would be living in in South Africa, at the embarkation ports. At this point the role of control would switch to the British government, again with the CMLIA on the side-lines.224 All that the CMLIA could do at this point was to ascertain the healthiness of the possible recruits, and then choose the healthiest to continue on the journey.225 The ships were chartered at fixed rates, again to control costs, and the medical officers on board were supplied and paid for by the CMLIA, to ensure the maximum number of laborers survived the journey.226 The journey by sea to Durban from north China would take on average thirty days.227 Once in Durban, the Chinese would be herded into another depot, the old concentration camp mentioned previously. From here, a final medical test would take place, and those who passed would then be transferred to a train journey to the Rand that would take 27 hours on average. Those who failed the medical test would be repatriated.228 From here the CMLIA had no more responsibility, as it now passed into the hands of the individual mines.
The conditions for the Chinese laborers in South Africa varied, but in general they were poor, especially the working conditions. The vast majority of them worked underground, a
220 Ibid, 114. 221 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 114. 222 Ibid, 116. 223 Ibid, 65. 224 Ibid, 136. 225 Ibid, 148. 226 Ibid, 149. 227 Ibid, 157. 228 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 164.
49 dangerous job under any conditions. In 1906, of the just over 50,000 Chinese laborers on the Rand, less than 2,000 worked on the surface as sweepers and cleaners (578), police (532), cooks (404), and in other various capacities.229 The living conditions can only be gauged from European opinion. But each compound had to be approved and inspected before the laborers were allowed to move in. The compounds had to be well ventilated and provided with all sanitary conveniences: steam cooking, hot water in the bathrooms, and electric light. A daily allowance of food was also stipulated in the contracts.230 What is noticeable from the above list, however, is that there is no specification on the size or form of the sleeping quarters. It should be remembered that it was in the interest of the mines to the Chinese laborers healthy and fit.231 Each mine had a small group of white South Africans or Europeans who oversaw the supervision of the Chinese laborers. The compound manager, who was inevitably a white South African or European, and who was supposed to have some degree of proficiency in Chinese dialects, was in direct control of the Chinese, while a few white South African foremen served as supervisors underground.232 Order within the compounds were maintained by indentured Chinese mine police, chosen from the laborers that were brought over. Most of these “mine police” had previously served with the British Army in northern China during the Boxer Rebellion.233 There is a distinct possibility that many of the miners were ex-Boxers, and resentment between the two factions could easily have occurred. There was approximately one policeman for every hundred laborers and the police began their duties on the ships en route to South Africa.234
To add to this was the Foreign Labour Department (FLD), which was created specifically to oversee the Chinese laborers, and, importantly, was independent from the Chamber of Mines. The main function of the FLD was to ensure that living and working conditions for the Chinese were satisfactory, but it also assumed a judicial function in 1905 and it took over the role of South Africa courts to dispense judgement upon Chinese criminals.235 Desertion was a major issue for the FLD,236 as is indicated in the following article: “The S. A. C. (South African
229 Kynoch, “’Your Petitioners Are in Mortal Terror,’” 534. 230 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 163. 231 Reeves, “Chinese Labour in South Africa,” 186. 232 Kynoch, “’Your Petitioners Are in Mortal Terror,’” 534. 233 Gary Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies: Chinese Mineworkers and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa, 1904- 1910,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 36, no. 2 (2003), 312. 234 Kynoch, “’Your Petitioners Are in Mortal Terror,’” 535. 235 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 312. 236 Ibid, 313.
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Constabulary) in the Pretoria region have captured no fewer than 500 coolies who have taken French leave of their employer.”237 In the period between June 1905 and June 1906 the number of recorded offences by the Chinese laborers rose to 11,754, including 1,700 cases of desertion.238 To combat this, the FLD and the Chamber of Mines introduced far stricter measures and tactics. A new permit system was introduced, as well as the employment of a large number of white South Africans to monitor the movements of the Chinese. A combination of coercion, surveillance, and summary punishment lowered the crime rates amongst the Chinese laborers.239
Despite the efforts of the FLD, however, the crime rate amongst the Chinese remained high, but this can be interpreted as indicative of deep-rooted resistance and of unfair and harsh conditions.240 Gambling was the main cause for the crime rate, as it was the most accessible form of recreation in the compounds. Chinese individuals that were ruined by debt from gambling would often resort to escape in order to secure funds to repay the debt. This would inevitably lead to robbery and other forms of theft.241 The FLD received a number of complaints from the Chinese, but none were about the accommodation, and only one was about the working conditions.242 The largest number of complaints arise from physical assault from both white South African and Chinese mine control staff, bribery, extortion, and matters concerning money.243 The lack of complaints could be attributed to language differences, intimidation, and disregard by management.244
The flogging of Chinese laborers as punishment was a massive issue, particularly in Britain. Technically flogging was outlawed in June 1905 after a public outcry in Britain. But this did not stop the practice and many mines continued to use flogging as a form of punishment.245 On the 14th of June 1905, the Rand Daily Mail noted that “several letters” had been received about the mistreatment of Chinese by white South Africans. The article goes on to acknowledge
237 Rand Daily Mail, 25 August 1905, 8. 238 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 313. 239 Ibid, 314. 240 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 176; Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 174. 241 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 177. 242 There is, however, a possibility that these have been misplaced or lost as a limited number of complaints have been preserved: Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa”, 173. 243 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 173. 244 Ibid, 174. 245 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 314.
51 that this mistreatment does happen occasionally because “some miners have placed natives and Chinese more or less on the same plane.”246 This shocking admission indicates firstly how poorly “natives” were thought of, but secondly that the Chinese were, racially, very far down the pecking order. Another article from a month later also admitted that the flogging of Chinese was “a thing of daily occurrence.”247 With all of this abuse another form of resistance emerged, and in many cases this resistance turned violent.
One of the most proactive forms of resistance by the Chinese was mass action. They would react collectively to any issue which they regarded as an infringement of their rights.248 Lord Selbourne wrote to Alfred Lyttleton, the new Governor General of South Africa: Perhaps the most striking difference between the Kaffir labourers and the Chinese is the Kaffirs do not possess, what is particularly characteristic of the Chinese, the idea of concerted action and common responsibility.”249 The Chinese miners first arrived on the Rand in late June, early July 1904, and the first “incident” or “disturbance” occurred as early as July 22, 1904, less than a month after their arrival. After an underground explosion killed two Chinese miners, the next shift refused to work, and stoned the mine officials who attempted to force them to. In October of the same year a number of Chinese miners attacked white miners due to ill-treatment and bullying at the Geduld Proprietary Mines. The South African government and the Chamber of Mines were totally unprepared and not used to such forms of mass action, and the Chinese resistance is an indication of their reaction against the totality of control they were subjected to.250
The best, and most provocative example available from the time was the North Randfontein Chinese miners’ ‘strike’ of 1905. On the 1st of April 1905, a dispute between the Chinese laborers and the mine management erupted into open violence. The dispute was said to be over wages, and in the end the Chamber of Mines backed down and offered the Chinese an improved wage deal.251 What is especially remarkable about this action, is that it occurred less
246 Rand Daily Mail, 14 June 1905, 6. 247 Rand Daily Mail, 18 July 1905, 7. 248 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 179. 249 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 318. 250 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 319. 251 Peter Richardson, “Coolies and the Randlords: The North Randfontein Chinese Miners’ Strike’ of 1905,” The Journal of Southern African Studies 2, no. 2 (April 1976), 151.
52 than a year after the arrival of the Chinese on the mine (August 1904). The North Randfontein mine and this action can also be seen as a microcosm of the bigger picture that was the Rand at the time.252 One slight difference with regards to North Randfontein is that it’s compliment of Chinese laborers was generally larger than other mines, with only 2.4 percent of its workforce made up of black laborers. Therefore, the North Randfontein mine had a compliment of 1,988 Chinese laborers, and 51 black laborers. It is also important to note that all of the Chinese at the mine were from Chihli province, and were likely of urban origin with a good understanding of earning regular wages.253 When the Chinese were recruited “batches” that were sent over to South Africa usually came from the same region, which ensured a certain amount of homogeneity.254
There were intense labor pressures on the miners during this period due to the rigours of low-grade ore gold-mining, but also because of the pressures of reconstruction under the Milner government. Because of this, the intensity of the work was immense.255 Throughout this period (August 1904 - April 1905) the number of miners dropped to around the 1,900 - mark due to this rigorous workload. More importantly, however, the wages remained static. Therefore, the Chinese laborers correctly perceived that they were required to do more work with fewer hands for the same amount of money, which was the real crux of the dispute.256 On the 22nd of March 1905, one hundred and forty days after the arrival of the Chinese contingent, the Chinese petitioned that all of them should receive a minimum monthly wage of fifty shillings. The mine management offered to pay the Chinese laborers an average of fifty shillings amongst the group, as well as a pay rise to the Chinese headmen or “boss boys.”257 This attempt to breakup the Chinese solidarity failed abysmally on the 29th when all of the headmen resigned.258 From the 29th the Chinese refused to work, and if they did it was at such a slow pace as to cause much
252 Ibid, 153. 253 Ibid, 156. 254 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 179. 255 Richardson, “Coolies and the Randlords,” 159. 256 Ibid, 160. 257 Richardson, “Coolies and the Randlords,” 164. 258 Ibid, 165.
53 alarm for the mine managers.259 On April the 1st the situation became critical, as the police arrested 36 of the 53 Chinese headmen.260
In retaliation a large number of the Chinese took a position on top of one of the mine dumps, while others barricaded themselves within the compound.261 The Chinese on the mine dump “armed themselves with pick-handles, iron jumpers, broken bottles, and stones.”262 The Chinese attacked the police, who were attempting to transport their prisoners, which forced them to retreat and give up on any arresting at that time. The Chinese then left the mine, possibly to link up with other Chinese laborers on mines in the vicinity.263 Eventually, after several hours and two violent clashes, the police received enough reinforcements to shepherd the Chinese back into the compound and the disturbance was quelled.264
During the same year another “disturbance” occurred at the Princess Gold Mine. On April 28 Chinese miners rioted in support of two of their colleagues who had been arrested because of their refusal to work. Again, a mounted police force was called in and fighting between the police and the rioters immediately broke out. The incredible collaboration between the miners, and militant aspect of their organization, can be seen through the report of the commanding officer. He states that the police were initially attacked by three parties of Chinese who were hiding in a trench. The Chinese also half-buried drills in the ground so that the points stuck out to hinder any movement of the horses, as well as having scouting parties that would attack the police during intervals. The police retreated before bringing a far larger force on May 2 to “make an example” of the leaders. Several of the Chinese were arrested with one being sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and 25 lashes.265
Several other riots and “disturbances” occurred during the Chinese tenure in South Africa, the last being in January 1909.266 This final confrontation was also the bloodiest.
259 Ibid, 167. 260 Ibid, 170. 261 Ibid, 170. 262 Rand Daily Mail, 3 April 1905, 7. 263 Kynoch “Controlling the Coolies,” 321; Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 171; Rand Daily Mail, 3 April 1905, 7. 264 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 321; Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 171; Rand Daily Mail, 3 April 1905, 7. 265 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 323. 266 Ibid, 328.
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Management at the Village Deep Mine urged their Chinese laborers to forgo the mandatory three-day holiday during Chinese New Year.267 The managements reasoning for this was that the previous year Village Deep had “lost a lot of money” due to the three-day holiday.268 Chinese miners, who were interviewed after the incident, claim that they were ordered to work and had no choice in the matter. The Chinese attempted to negotiate but the mine management attempted to use force through their white guards.269 The Chinese miners retaliated and congregated in the mess hall. The mine manager called the police who attempted to disperse the rioters with the use of firehoses, but the Chinese responded with stones and debris. The police retreated to wait for reinforcements, and when they had arrived, they advanced into the compound and opened fire. Seven Chinese laborers died, with another ten wounded.270 One of the men who lost his life was to leave for China the next day, as his contract had expired.271 But the Chamber of Mines and the government, more often than not, just provided further powers to the mines and the police to brutally subjugate any further disturbances with force. Most of the disturbances were due to increasing coercion from the mines in the attempt to make as much profits as possible, and any resistance was met with deadly force.272
The Liberal Party in Britain, under the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, won the 1906 elections with the main plank of their election manifesto being the discontinuing of Chinese “slavery” and importation in South Africa. Therefore, when the Liberal Party came to power, it was a foregone conclusion that the Chinese would be leaving soon. Coupled with this was the granting of responsible, or self, government to the Transvaal by the same party in 1907.273 The elections in South Africa in 1907 pitted two diametrically opposite parties: the Progressive Party led by mining magnates such as George Farrar and Fitzpatrick who were pro- Chinese labor; and Het Volk led by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, who were virulently anti- Chinese. Het Volk won by a large margin and the fate of the Chinese labor experiment was sealed.274 In 1907, after Het Volk’s victory, further recruitment of the Chinese was prohibited
267 Ibid, 327. 268 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 328. 269 Ibid, 327. 270 Ibid, 327. 271 Kynoch, “Controlling the Coolies,” 328. 272 Ibid, 328. 273 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 143. 274 Harris, “A History of the Chinese in South Africa,” 144.
55 and the renewal of contracts was disallowed. Repatriation began in mid - 1907 and by 1910 all of the Chinese indentured laborers had been returned to China.275
275 Ibid, 199.
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Conclusion
I believe that California’s influence on South Africa’s methods and techniques for allowing and engaging in Chinese laborers to enter the country is clear from the previous two chapters. It is also clear that previous historians do acknowledge this influence, albeit briefly and indirectly. An example of this is Persia Crawford Campbell, who noted that the conditions under which the Chinese laborers were allowed into South Africa were “determined partly by the experience if the U.S.A.”276 The argument put forward in this paper illustrates that the Californian experience played a far greater role than previously thought, and that this experience, as well as the measures included in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and the later additions to it, directly influenced the Labour Importation Ordinance in South Africa. This Ordinance, much like the Chinese Exclusion Act, greatly restricted the movement of the Chinese, and in South Africa’s case, legalized the repatriation of an entire people.
The similarities between the two regions and experiences are evident, as are the differences. In both cases it was almost exclusively male Chinese laborers who entered California and South Africa, and these laborers went to these two regions to seek their fortune and to return home as soon as possible. The differences include the concept of free labor in California’s case and indentured labor in South Africa, although, as has been seen in Chapter One, California did consider the use of Chinese indentured labor. Another is that initially in California the Chinese were welcomed before a dramatic turn of opinion, while in South Africa they were resented from the start, with one influence of this resentment coming from the Californian experience.
Historians have tended to examine Chinese labor in California and South Africa as separate entities. Elizabeth Sinn and others have focussed almost exclusively on the Chinese experience in California, or on the Californian experience with the Chinese. Similarly, historians such as Richardson and Reeves have directed their attention on South Africa’s experience with Chinese labor, as well as the methods of transportation and restriction. None, however, have completed a study whereby a comparison between the two regions and their experiences with Chinese labor. This compartmentalization of history often leads to lost connections between
276 Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration, 171.
57 nations and regions. Such direct studies often mean that new and interesting information is lost or forgotten. Through this comparison new connections have come to light, and the importance of these connections have been elaborated upon to illustrate how influential one nations experience was upon another. What is also interesting is that this comparison has brought to light a major difference in how historians from both perspectives have studied Chinese labor. From a Californian perspective one of the major themes for historians is the causes for the Chinese to immigrate to the region, while South African historians focus on why South Africa needed Chinese labor, not why the Chinese would have wanted to go to the country’s goldfields.
Ross Skinner’s trip to California illustrates this point. As do the contemporary newspapers from the time. The various Rand Daily Mail articles used in this paper show how the layman knew what had happened in California in the previous decades. The white South Africans acknowledged this influence and sought to prevent the same scenario from happening in their own country, despite how abhorrent it is today. California’s slow but eventually violent and racist reaction to the growing Chinese population in the region caused a knee jerk result: the Chinese Exclusion Act. South Africa and its white population were fully aware of this and, through individuals such as Skinner, used the Californian model to create their own form of discrimination against the Chinese: the Labour Importation Ordinance. Through these means, it has been shown that California’s influence on South Africa with regards to Chinese laborers was far larger than previous historians have acknowledged, and this influence had a major impact on future generations in both regions.
Stipulations in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 have many eerie similarities to the South African Labour Importation Ordinance just over two decades later, especially when including the later amendments made to the Chinese Exclusion Act. The 1888 Scott Act permanently banned any immigration or return of Chinese immigrants to the U.S. The Geary Act of 1892 forced all Chinese laborers, and only Chinese laborers, to carry a government-issued ID card. Failure to do so would result in immediate imprisonment or deportment.277 These amendments and stipulations are remarkably similar to South Africa’s pass-system, and the
277 Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 136-7.
58 presence of deportation as a means of control brings to mind the Chinese indentured laborers of the South African mines.
Hopefully this study will influence future historians and researchers to acknowledge and use comparative history to further the understanding of the connections between nations, and to provide further knowledge for future generations, knowledge that would be lost without the useful tool that is comparative history. This thesis touches the tip of the iceberg. The amount of information available to expand the research to include Chinese documents, as well as the further integration of other regions such as Australia and Mexico, means that this is certainly a topic open to future investigation.
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