Nifty-Fifty장세의 도래 가능성과 그 교훈에 대하여 정의석 (02) 3772-1540 Jes @Goodi.Com

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Nifty-Fifty장세의 도래 가능성과 그 교훈에 대하여 정의석 (02) 3772-1540 Jes @Goodi.Com 글로벌 금융위기 1년, 그 이후는? Nifty-Fifty장세의 도래 가능성과 그 교훈에 대하여 정의석 (02) 3772-1540 jes @goodi.com 한범호 (02) 3772-1569 [email protected] Log Scale 로 보는 Dow 공업지수의 Bull Market 과 Bear Market 구분 15 13 16 9+ α 자료인용 : 2008년 신한금융투자 Forum, 손성원 글로벌 금융위기 1년, 그 이후는? Nifty-Fifty 장세의 도래 가능성과 그 교훈에 대하여 머리말 Log Scale 로 볼 때 2000 년 글로벌 금융위기의 광풍이 거세게 휘몰아치고 있었던 지난해 11월, 당사가 개최하였던 연말 이후의 미국 주식시장은 Bear 포럼의 주요 강사 중 한 분이었던 손성원 박사의 Presentation 자료에는 흥미로운 한 장의 그 Market 으로 간주 림이 포함되어 있었다. 그것은 1900년 이후부터 2008년까지의 110년여에 걸친 Dow공업지수 의 흐름을 Log Scale로 표시한 다음에 해당 기간을 강세장(Bull Market)과 약세장(Bear Market)으로 구분해 놓은 도표였다. 그런데 다소 황당하면서도 충격적으로 와닿았던 것은 2000년 이후의 시기를 약세장으로 구분해 놓은 것이었다. IT버블의 붕괴가 전개되었던 2000 년부터 2002년까지야 약세장으로 구분하는 것이 당연하겠지만, 2003년부터 2007년까지 이어 졌던 100%에 가까운 상승장세를 약세장으로 분류하는 것이 과연 타당한가 하는 의문 때문이었 다. 하지만 110년여에 걸쳐 무려 100배(Percentage로는 10,000%)에 이르는 변동성을 보인 시장의 흐름을 기록하고 평가한다는 관점에서 본다면 그런 식의 분류가 그렇게 터무니없는 것 은 아니라는 판단에 이르게 된다. 10배 내외를 넘나드는 장세의 초장기적인 흐름에서 본다면 한 배 남짓(?)의 변동성은 그다지 주목받을 만한 것이 못된다고 볼 수도 있기 때문이다. 특히나 최 근 Dow지수의 1만P회복에 대한 공방을 두고『Dow지수의 잃어버린 10년』이라는 말들이 오가 는 것은, 절대수치가 아니라 등락률로 따지는 Log Scale의 관점을 본다면, 충분히 수긍이 가는 표현이 되는 것이다. 물론 투자자들이야 그러한 한 배 남짓의 변동성에 천당과 지옥을, 그리고 탐욕과 공포의 극한을 오갔겠지만 말이다. 불투명한 미래 : V 字회복이냐 글로벌 금융위기 발생이후 이제 1년 반 정도의 시간이 흘러가고 있다. 글로벌 금융위기의 발 Double Dip 이냐, 엇갈리는 시각 생을 제대로 예측하지 못했던 것처럼 위기발생 이후의 회복도 일반적인 전망과는 다르게 너무 나도 Dramatic하게 전개되고 있다. Dow공업지수는 2009년 3월 이후 꾸준히 상승하면서 3월 의 저점에 비하여 이미 50% 이상의 상승세를 기록하고 있어 분위기상으로는 완연한 대세상승 장의 모습이다. 하지만 미래에 대한 전망은 극명하게 나뉘어지고 있다. 모든 것이 해결되었고 이제는 정상적인 성장의 궤도에 진입하는 것만 남았다는 V字 회복의 시각에서부터, 문제의 본 질은 여전히 해결되지 않았으며 금번의 회복세는 정부의 강력한 시장개입에 따른 결과이기 때 문에 정부의 부양 여력이 소진되면 경제와 주식시장은 다시 위축될 것이라는 W字 회복 내지는 Double Dip 주장에 이르기까지 다양하다. 분명한 사실은 저렴한 주가와 어떠한 전망과 예측이 맞을지는 시간만이 알 수 있을 따름이지만 적어도 한 가지 분명한 사 풍부한 유동성이라는 두 가지 실은 있다. 즉 2008년의 기록적인 폭락세가 아주 예외적이었듯이 2009년의 Dynamic하기 짝 Momentum 은 소진되어 가고 이 없는 폭등세 역시 대단히 특수한 사례에 속하는 것이라는 점이다. 2009년에 나타난 폭등장 있다는 점 세의 근본 동력은 모두가 알고 있다시피 다음과 같은 두 가지였다. 첫 번째는 기록적인 폭락에 대한 시장 자체의 복원력, 즉 주가 차체가 너무도 저렴하였다는 것이었고 두 번째는 물불가리지 않고 있는 대로 갖다 부은 유동성의 힘 때문이었다. 문제는 이 두 가지의 동력이 앞으로도 계속 지속가능하냐는 것이다. 이미 주가는 상당한 수준까지 복원된 상태이고 흘러 넘치는 유동성에 대해서는 금리인상 여부와는 무관하게 이미 조금씩 주워 담기 시작하고 있다. 결론적으로 말해 서 2010년의 시장환경이 주가 자체의 복원 Momentum과 유동성이라는 두 가지 변수에 있어 서만은 2009년에 비해서 훨씬 열악할 것이라는 점은 부인할 수 없는 분명한 사실이다. 2 글로벌 금융위기 1년, 그 이후는? Nifty-Fifty 장세의 도래 가능성과 그 교훈에 대하여 70년대의 Multiple W字형 흐름과 Nifty-Fifty장세 주목하게 되는 1970 년대 이러한 시각에서 본다면, V字형 회복에 대한 지나친 기대감을 앞세우기 보다는, 짧은 기간 동 초중반의 Nifty-Fifty 장세 안에 주식시장의 극심한 부침이 거듭되었던 1970년대의 장세에 보다 눈길이 가게끔 된다. 이 시기는 다음과 같은 점에서 현재의 국면과 공통점을 가지고 있다. 우선 초장기적인 주식시장 호 황 이후에 맞이한 조정국면이었다는 점이고, 그 다음은 Log Scale상 10배의 마디지수대에서 직면한 Bear Market이었다는 점이다. 그런데 1970년대의 미국 주식시장을 이야기할 때 흔히 함께 거론되는 것이 바로 Nifty-Fifty장세다. 당시에 무리를 지어 그들끼리만 잘나갔던 소위 50개 종목에 대한 이야기이다. 【그림 1 】1970 년대 초중반에 걸쳐 전개되었던 Nifty-Fifty 장세의 저점과 고점 (pt) 1,100 고점 : 1,051.69P (73년 1월 11일) 1,000 900 800 Nifty-Fifty장세의 700 영광과 몰락 600 저점 : 631.15P (70년 5월 26일) 신저점 : 627.19P (74년 9월 13일) 500 69년1월 70년1월 71년1월 72년1월 73년1월 74년1월 75년1월 자료 : Bloomberg Nifty-Fifty 장세는 대형성장주들에 흔히 우리 주식시장에서는 Nifty-Fifty가 우량주의 대명사인 것처럼 간주되고 있지만 실상은 대한 기관투자가들의 극단적 다소 다르다. 당시에 잘 나갔던 50개 종목들 중에서 우량주의 대명사로 불리워지는 Dow공업지 쏠림매수의 결과물 수에 현재 내지는 한때나마 편입된 역사가 있는 종목들의 수가【Coca-ColaㆍJohnson and JohnsonㆍMcDonald】등 13개 종목에 이르고 있다는 점에서 볼 때 그런 식의 오해가 발생할 소지가 있기는 하다. 하지만 이들 마저도 그 당시에는 미래의 성장가능성에 주안점이 주어졌었 다는 점과 더불어【Baxter LabsㆍBurroughsㆍPolaroid】와 같은 개념형 성장주들이 적지 않 게 포진되어 있었다는 점에서 볼 때, Nifty-Fifty장세라는 것이 단순히 우량주들의 시세분출 장 세라기 보다는 성장주들에 대한 과열된 투기장세였으며 대형주들을 위주로 한 특정종목들 중심 의 양극화장세라고 정의내리는 것이 보다 타당할 것이다. 그럴 수밖에 없는 것이, 우량주의 첫 번째 조건이 지속적인 생존임을 감안할 때, 당시의 50개 종목들 중 무려 18개 종목들이 상장폐 지, 합병 그리고 사명변경 등을 통해 기업 자체가 없어지거나 실체가 변경되었기 때문이다. 결 론적으로 말해서『Nifty-Fifty장세는 소수의 대형성장주들에 대한 기관들의 극단적인 쏠림매수 가 빚어낸 투기적 양극화장세』였다는 것으로 요약될 수 있을 것이다. 3 글로벌 금융위기 1년, 그 이후는? Nifty-Fifty 장세의 도래 가능성과 그 교훈에 대하여 【표 1 】Nifty-Fifty 의 구성종목들 기업명 심벌 비고 Dow편입여부 American Express Co. AXP ● American Home Products WYE Wyeth 로 사명변경 American Hospital Supply AMP Inc. Anheuser-Bush Inc. BUD Avon Products Inc. AVP Baxter Labs Black & Decker Corp. BDK Bristol-Myers BMY Squibb Corp. 와 합병 Burroughs Co. UIS Unisys Corp. 로 사명변경 Chesebrough Ponds Inc. Unilever 에 흡수합병 Coca-Cola Co. KO ● Digital Equipment Corp. Dow Chemical Co. DOW Eastman Kodak Co. EK ● Emery Air Freight Corp. Consolidated Freight Way 와 합병 First National City Corp. General Electric Co. GE ● Gillette Co. 상장폐지 Halliburton Co. HAL Heublein Inc. International Flavors & Fragrances International Telephone & Telegraph IBM IBM ● Johnson and Johnson JNJ ● Kresge (S.S.) Co. Lilly Eli & Co. LLY Louisiana Land & Exploration 상장폐지 Lubrizol Corp. LZ M.G.I.C. Investment Corp. McDonald ´s Corp. MCD ● Merck & Co. Inc. MRK ● 3M MMM ● Penny J. C. Inc. JCP PepsiCo Inc. PEP Pfizer Inc. PFE ● Philip Morris Cos. Inc. MO Altria Group Inc. 로 사명변경 ● Polaroid Corp. Procter & Gamble Co. PG ● Revlon Inc. REV Schering Corp. SGP Schering-Plough Corp. Schlitz Joe Brewing Co. Stroh Brewing 과 합병 Schlumberger Ltd. SLB Sears Roebuck & Co. SHLD Sears Holdings Corp. 로 변경 Simplicity Patterns MXM Maxxam Group 으로 사명변경 Squibb Corp. Bristol-Myers 에 흡수합병 Texas Instruments Inc. TXN Upjohn Co. Pharmacia & Upjohn 으로 변경 Walt Disney Co. DIS ● Xerox Corp. XRX 자료인용 :『Stock For The Long Run』, Jeremy Siegel 주 : 음영처리된 기업들은 상장폐지 및 합병된 기업들 4 글로벌 금융위기 1년, 그 이후는? Nifty-Fifty 장세의 도래 가능성과 그 교훈에 대하여 Nifty-Fifty장세의 영광과 몰락 화려했던 만큼이나 처참하게 또 하나 우리 주식시장에서 오해하고 있는 것은 Nifty-Fifty장세, 그 이후에 관한 것이다. 즉 몰락했던 Nifty-Fifty 장세 Nifty-Fifty장세의 화려한 영광에만 초점이 맞추어져 있지, 그 이후의 처참한 몰락에 대해서는 거의 거론되지 않는다는 것이다.【그림-1】에서 보는 것처럼 1970년 5월 26일의 저점지수 631.15P에서부터 시작하여 1973년 1월 11일의 고점지수 1,051.69P에 이르기까지 2년 7개 월 동안에 Dow공업지수는 Nifty-Fifty종목들 중심으로 무려【66.6%】라는 놀라운 상승세를 기록하기는 하였다. 하지만 이어 찾아온 제1차 Oil Shock의 충격으로 인하여 폭락세로 돌변한 시장은 1974년 9월 13일의 새로운 저점 627.19P까지 하락하고 만다. 1973년 1월 11일의 고 점대비 하락률은【40.4%】에 달하는 것이었다. 그야말로『오른 만큼 그대로 다 빠져버린 장세 가 소위 Nifty-Fifty장세』다. 물론 장세의 하락을 주도한 종목들은 직전의 상승장에서 상승을 주도하였던 Nifty-Fifty들이었다. 당시【Forbes紙】의 다음과 같은 지적은 아마도 Nifty-Fifty 장세의 본질을 가장 잘 설명해주는 것이라고 판단된다. Nifty-Fifty 상승의 이유는 무엇인가? 오래 전 네덜란드에서 튤립 구근의 가격이 폭등하도록 한 것 과 같은 이유, 즉 만연한 환상과 집단의 광기일 것이다. 여기서 말하는 환상이란, 이들 기업체들은 너 무나 완벽하며 따라서 얼마의 대가를 지불하든 문제가 될 것이 없다. 이들의 끝없는 성장이 결국엔 당 신을 매우 부유하게 만들어 줄 것이기 때문이다. 명백하게 이 당시 상황에서 문제가 되는 것은 기업 자체가 아니다. 대신 잘 포장된 어리석음을 마치 현명한 예지인 것처럼 주장하는 기관 자금매니저들의 일시적인 광기와 관련되어 있다. 규모가 큰 기업 체의 주가가 수익의 50배 이상 되는 것은 결코 가능한 일이 아니라는 것을 너무나 쉽게 잊어버린다. 특정 주식들에 대한 인기와 수정주가의 추적이 가능하였던 30개 종목들의 경우, 상승장세에서 평균 3배 가까이 올랐으며 소외의 반복은 주식시장에서 Dow공업지수에 대비한 초과수익률만 하여도 무려【115.73%】에 달하는 기염을 토하였다. 하 영원히 반복되는 현상 지만 “산이 높으면 골도 깊다.”라는 주식시장의 격언처럼 하락장세에서는 거의 대부분이 주가가 반토막나는 신세를 면치 못하였다. 다음의 표에서 하락장세에서의 초과수익률이【0.61%】로 양 호하게 나오는 이유는 분석의 대상에서 제외된 20개 종목들의 하락률이 포함되지 않았기 때문 이라고 보아야 할 것이다. 즉 상장폐지, 합병 그리고 사명변경 등의 사유가 발생한 종목들이라 면 그렇지 않았던 종목들에 비해 주가의 하락률이 보다 심각했을 개연성이 아주 높고, 따라서 이러한 20개 종목들이 모두 포함된 평균적인 초과수익률은 0.61%보다 훨씬 나쁘게 나올 수밖 에 없다는 점을 감안할 필요가 있다는 것이다.『특정 주식에 대한 인기와 소외의 반복』은 주식 시장의 역사에서 영원히 반복되는 현상이라는 점을 Nifty-Fifty장세의 분석을 통해서도 다시 한번 확인하게끔 된다. 5 글로벌 금융위기 1년, 그 이후는? Nifty-Fifty 장세의 도래 가능성과 그 교훈에 대하여 【표 2 】Nifty-Fifty 종목들 중 기업실체 유지종목들의 절대수익률 및 초과수익률 기업명 70년 저점 73년 고점 절대수익률 초과수익률 74년 저점 절대수익률 초과수익률 American Express Co. 1.043 4.313 313.52 239.99 1.206 -72.04 -26.26 American Home Products Corp. 2.187 5.203 137.91 64.37 3.797 -27.02 18.75 Anheuser-Bush Inc. 1.130 2.179 92.83 19.30 0.900 -58.70 -12.92 Avon Products Inc. 8.039 16.593 106.41 32.87 2.468 -85.13 -39.35 Black & Decker Corp. 12.452 39.000 213.20 139.67 25.500 -34.62 11.16 Bristol-Myers 1.427 2.111 47.93 -25.60 1.112 -47.32 -1.55 Burroughs Co.
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