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CONTENTS

Preface ix

1. The Battle of Stalingrad in Post–Cold War Perspective 1

2. 16th Panzer Division inside Fortress Stalingrad, 19 November 1942–2 February 1943 66

3. “And There Are No Pages That Tell of These Heroic Deeds”: 94th Infantry Division 99

4. Eternal Glory: The End of 76th Berlin-Brandenburg Infantry Division 150

5. K-98 vs. Mosin M 1891/1930: German and Soviet Snipers at Stalingrad and on the Eastern Front 264

6. German Recruitment of Soviet National Minorities, Deserters, and Prisoners on the Eastern Front and in Stalingrad 307

7. Behind the German and Soviet Lines: Espionage and Counterespionage at Stalingrad 340

8. The Aftermath of Defeat: German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Camps 389

9. Return from the House of the Dead: The Arrest, Interrogation, and Repatriation of Oberst Boje (44th Infantry Division) 420

10. Reconciliation 447

Appendix A: Finnish Experience in the Training of Snipers 455

Appendix B: Translation of Chapter 18 (“The Duel”) of Vasilii Zaitsev’s Memoir 461 00-Ellis_front matter 5/2/13 12:19 PM Page viii

Appendix C: Memorandum of the Deputy of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General Lieutenant A. N. Apollonov to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, L. P. Beria, Concerning the Impossibility of Allocating Snipers from NKVD Personnel for Bringing Up to Strength the Sniper Subunits, Units, and Formations of the Red Army 468

Appendix D: Vasilii Grossman, Glazami Chekhova (Through Chekhov’s Eyes), 16 November 1942, Stalingrad Front 469

Appendix E: Combat and Ration Strengths of 24th Panzer Division, 1 January 1943 476

Appendix F: Glossary of German Ranks 478

Notes 479

Bibliography 513

Index 519 00-Ellis_front matter 5/2/13 12:19 PM Page ix

PREFACE

From the moment I started to take an interest in World War II and the war on the Eastern front I was mesmerized by the struggle of German 6th Army to seize the city and the sacrificial efforts of the Red Army to thwart German ambitions on the Volga. I determined that at some stage I would make my own contribution to the body of literature on the subject, following in the footsteps of some very well-known and expert historians, such as John Erickson, Earl Ziemke, Joachim Hoffman, Antony Beevor, Manfred Kehrig, and David Glantz. Due credit must also be paid to the Russian scholars and archivists, among them M. M. Zagorul’ko and Major General V. A. Zolotarev and especially those in the Russian Security Service, the Federal’naia sluzhba bezopasnosti (FSB), who have devoted themselves to the enormous task of sifting and processing hitherto-classified Soviet material and placing it in the public domain, a process that started in 1991 and that still has a long way to go. I owe a huge debt to the many Russian scholars and archivists who have labored long and hard in this area. Without the vast flood of new material, there would have been no point in writing this book. It is not just new material entering the public domain from former Soviet archives that justifies another book on Stalingrad. There is also still a great deal of material in German archives that can yield insights. For example, the German military archives in Freiburg-im-Breisgau have recently acquired six volumes of reports, diaries, and Erlebnisberichte put together by former members of 76th Infantry Division. This material was originally submitted to Jochen Löser when he undertook to write Bittere Pflicht, the divisional history. These supplementary volumes proved to be a valuable source for some of the themes examined in this book. Published German divisional histories are also an exceptionally valuable source, and none of the main ones has been translated into English. Even where they are referred to in English-language works, the references are perfunctory, suggesting only a superficial familiarity with, or interest in, the German text. Another surprise from the past that has only recently come to light is the film diary Mit der Kamera nach Stalingrad: Filmtage- bücher deutschen Soldaten 1941/42 (With the Camera to Stalingrad: Film Diaries of Ger- man Soldiers 1941–42, 2009). The diaries were edited by Michael Kuball and the film taken by Wilhelm Bleitner and Götz Hirt-Reger. The diaries show the 00-Ellis_front matter 5/2/13 12:19 PM Page x

journey taken by 29th Infantry Division (mot.) as the division fights its way across Russia through the first winter, eventually ending up in Stalingrad. It contains remarkable footage and is accompanied by commentary from former members of the division. The whole diary can be viewed on the Internet and is available on DVD. This study is not a detailed operational account of the battle, such as that found in the work of Manfred Kehrig, John Erickson, and, more recently, David Glantz. My study is more tactical and personal, more concerned with some of the lesser-known detail than with the bigger operational picture. In chapter 1 I have put together an overview of the battle dealing with some of the main themes: recent publications on Stalingrad; some recent films and documentaries on the battle; the nature of the terrain and weather; the impact of cold; fighting in the urban and steppe environment; the impact of Stalin’s Or- der № 227 (and related orders); the role of 10th Rifle Division Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD) in the defense of the city; the question of German war crimes with reference to Dulag-205; and capture and captivity. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are my translations of documents: the remnants of German divisional war diaries and recollections of survivors dealing with the participation of 16th Panzer Division, 94th Infantry Division, and 76th In- fantry Division. Where necessary I have added notes to highlight certain points. As far as I am aware, this is the first time these documents have been translated from German into English. It may also be the first time they have been cited in any study of the battle. I have found no references to these diaries in any major or recent scholarly works. Nor do the names of Major Grohe, Hauptmann Krell, Major von Alvensleben, and Lt. Dr. Elsner von Gronow—the officers responsible for compiling these documents—appear in any of the major works on Stalingrad. The lack of any reference to these diaries is a surprising omission. All three are substantial, and all of them yield insights on the nature of the battle after the encirclement: on weather, tactics, weapons, internal disputes, the effects of cold and reduced rations, the high quality of German junior leaders, and an astonishing sense of duty. All these aspects amply justify the inclusion of full translations of these diaries. They make compelling reading. This book is a study of a number of themes that, though not specific to Stalingrad, have their own Stalingrad footprint. Sniping was a specialized form of infantry warfare that was practiced by both sides on the Eastern front. To begin with, training, initiative, and the brutal lessons inflicted by the Finns 00-Ellis_front matter 5/2/13 12:19 PM Page xi

on the Red Army in the Winter War (1939–1940) favored the Soviet defenders after the German invasion. Having, however, encountered the attacks of So- viet snipers in the early part of the war and then in Leningrad and Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht, ever resourceful and adaptable, rediscovered the art that its predecessors had pioneered on the Western front in World War I. By May 1945 the Wehrmacht boasted some outstanding snipers. The sniping theme at Stal- ingrad must deal with the duel that, according to Soviet propaganda, took place between Vasilii Zaitsev and, allegedly, a German sniper, Major Konings. The first four appendixes deal with the sniping theme. Appendix A is a Finnish Army assessment of Soviet snipers that was translated into German on the orders of the German General Staff. As far as I am aware, it has not been published in German and is translated into English for the first time. Ap- pendix B is a translation of chapter 18 of Vasilii Zaitsev’s memoir, Za Volgoi zemli dlia nas ne bylo: Zapiski snaipera (Beyond the Volga There Was No Land for Us: Notes of a Sniper, 1971), in which he deals with the famous duel, invented or otherwise, with Major Konings. Appendix C is a translated internal NKVD memo that reveals the scale of the effort devoted to sniping. Appendix D is a translation of Vasilii Grossman’s Stalingrad sketches based on the author’s time with Anatolii Chekhov, one of the better-known Stalingrad snipers. The study of desertion (chapter 6), specifically Red Army desertion to the Wehrmacht, was pioneered in the work of the German historian Joachim Hoffman. His studies were written during the Cold War and thus were without the recent material to which scholars now have access. That said, Hoff- man correctly perceived the scale of the problem and the deadly threat posed by various nationalist formations, especially Russian, to the survival of the So- viet Union. Hoffmann’s assessments have been confirmed by Soviet documents released since the end of the Cold War. Desertion and spying are related themes on the Eastern front. Material published in the series Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (The Organs of State Security of the USSR in the Great Fatherland War) reveals the huge scale on which both sides recruited and ran agents across the lines. This is the subject of chapter 7. Chapter 8 deals with the fate of German soldiers in Soviet captivity, their exploitation as forced labor after 1945, the purposes of so-called antifascist propaganda and indoctrination, and final repatriation in 1956. German scholars have devoted a great deal of effort to this subject. Even though they were written during the Cold War with no access to Soviet archives, the twenty-two 00-Ellis_front matter 5/2/13 12:19 PM Page xii

volumes of Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges (On the History of German Prisoners of War in the Second World War, 1962–1974), under the editorial control of Professor Erich Maschke, which cover all aspects of this theme, retain enormous value. A later German study is Andreas Hilger’s Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion, 1941–1956: Kriegsgefangenpolitik, Lager- alltag und Erinnerung (German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union, 1941–1956: Pris- oner of War Policy/Politics, Daily Routine, and Memory, 2000). This is a valuable contribution, and the author deals with Stalingrad in chapter 2 of his book. Other exceptionally valuable contributions are to be found in the work of the Russian scholar Alexander Epifanow and the multivolume series Russkii Arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia (Russian Archive: The Great Fatherland War), published under the editorial control of Major General Zolotarev. Especially valuable because of the vast array of declassified documents dealing with German and other Axis prisoners in Stalingrad that are presented for the first time is the study published under the editorial control of Professor M. M. Zagorul’ko, Voennoplennye v Stalingrade 1943–1954: Dokumenty i Materialy, tom 2, Voennoplen- nye v SSSR, 1939–1956 (Prisoners of War in Stalingrad, 1943–1954: Documents and Material, volume 2, Prisoners of War in the USSR, 1939–1956, 2003). I continue the prisoner-of-war theme in chapter 9 with a study of Oberst Arthur Boje’s account of his capture, interrogation, and conviction for war crimes in his book Stalins deutsche Agenten: Ein Kriegsgefangener berichtet (Stalin’s German Agents: A Prisoner of War Reports, 2002). In the final chapter, I explore the theme of reconciliation in the work of two Stalingrad veterans, Kurt Reuber’s Stalingrad Madonna (1942) and Vasilii Grossman’s essay Sikstinskaia Madonna (The Sistine Madonna, 1989). I would like to thank the following people and institutions for their advice and assistance: the truly outstanding German Military Archives in Freiburg- im-Breisgau, whose expert staff and archivists make it one of the finest institutions of its kind anywhere in the world; the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegs- gräberfürsorge for letting me have a copy of its publication Namen für Rossoschka; the German Red Cross search office in Munich; the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin; Professor Dr. med. Wilhelm Mühlenberg for providing me with an unedited copy of the essay dedicated to his father, “Verschollen in Stalin- grad—Ungeklärtes Schicksal des Artzes Dr. Rudolf Mühlenberg” (Missing in Stalingrad—the unknown fate of the medical officer Dr. Rudolf Mühlenberg); and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Transliteration conforms to that used by the Library of Congress, with 00-Ellis_front matter 5/2/13 12:19 PM Page xiii

some exceptions, most notably Alexander instead of Aleksandr. According to the Library of Congress, SMERSh is the correct transliteration. I prefer SMERSH: it looks, appropriately, more sinister. Unless otherwise stated or in- dicated, all translations from all languages are mine. All errors and interpreta- tions contained in this book are mine. Frank Ellis Ampleforth, North Yorkshire, England, 2012 00-Ellis_front matter 5/2/13 12:19 PM Page xiv

The Stalingrad Cauldron 00-Ellis_front matter 5/2/13 12:19 PM Page xvi

1 The Battle of Stalingrad in Post–Cold War Perspective

As 23 August comes to an end, the first German tank drives onto the high west bank overlooking the Volga, close to the suburb of Rynok. The bank rises to about a hundred meters over the 2-kilometer-wide [1.2-mile-wide] current. The water is dark. A chain of tugs and steamers is moving up- and downstream. The Asian steppe shimmers across from the other side: a somber greeting from infinity. —Paul Carell, Stalingrad: Sieg und Untergang der 6. Armee

During the Cold War the battles on the Eastern Front inevitably became em- broiled in the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. So- viet state censorship—formally abolished only in 1990—ensured that most historians, writers, documentary makers, and film directors were obliged to offer a portrayal of the Great Fatherland War that more or less perpetuated the view that the outcome of the war confirmed the strength of the Soviet system. Such was this ideological stranglehold, combined with censorship and lack of access to Soviet archives, that whole areas of the Stalingrad battle remained closed to researchers and historians. In this chapter, I offer an overview of some of the main themes and peculiarities associated with Stalingrad. I con- sider some of the recent literature on the battle, its recent portrayal in film and documentaries, the role of terrain and weather, the nature of the fighting in the urban and steppe environments, the role of the 10th Rifle Division NKVD, and the revelations concerning Dulag-205. Finally I examine the German experience of capture and captivity.

Introduction At about 0340 hours on 23 August 1942, units of 16th Panzer Division crossed the river Don on engineer-built pontoon bridges. Once over the river and disregarding their flanks, they first headed north for about three hours 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 2

and then swung east across the open steppe. In the late afternoon, at 1620 hours, German reconnaissance vehicles reached the high ground overlooking

the Volga.1 They had successfully crossed the land bridge from the Great Don bend to Stalingrad. Men of 9th Company 2nd Panzer Regiment and of Panzer Engineer 16 were the first German soldiers to reach the Volga. The sense of elation as they gazed on Stalin’s showcase city stretching along the banks of the river Volga must have provided some compensation for all the hard fighting of the summer. The moment of final victory in the East was upon them. No other battle in World War II bewitches the historian in the manner of Stalingrad. All other battles—Battles of Britain, Midway, Iwo Jima, Moscow, Kursk, and Normandy—no matter how objectively more important to the outcome of the war some of them may have been, seem to be overshadowed by the six-month battle on the Volga and the area stretching back to the Don. There are a number of reasons for this fascination. First, there is the location. Stalingrad on the Volga marks the end of Europe, the start of Central Asia. In one of Konstantin Simonov’s novels about Stalingrad, Dni i nochi (Days and Nights, 1944), a Russian officer heading to Stalingrad from the east sees it as the edge of the world. The fact of a German army’s merely having penetrated so far is itself a remarkable achievement, a magnificent feat of arms. Second, to begin with, the outcome seems to be beyond any doubt: German 6th Army will capture Stalingrad; another crisis, another devastating blow, will be inflicted on the Red Army; and, who knows, Stalin’s regime will collapse and the German Army will achieve the final knockout blow that eluded it in 1941. Third, the battle increasingly takes on the nature of a personal duel between Hitler and Stalin. Hitler is determined to take the city, and Stalin will pay any price in blood and treasure to thwart these ambitions. A final consideration that accounts for the fascination of the battle is the outcome—not that it is the triumph of good over evil but that the Germans confident of victory are de- feated, that the defeat is so unexpected. It is too the manner in which the Ger- man defeat occurs: death by war, starvation, cold, hopelessness, and despair, yet somehow miraculously enduring for so long with no hope of rescue. In terms of slaughter—the location, scale, and personalities involved—Stalin- grad seems more appropriate to the age of Salamis, Marathon, and Cannae than as a battle in the twentieth century. The outcome at Stalingrad provides brilliant confirmation of the Clausewitzian view that war is the realm of fear, uncertainty, and chance. Doubtless our rational civilization obliges us to see the outcome in terms of tactics, space, time, intelligence, and logistics, but 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 3

Thucydides and his generation might have detected the intervention of other agencies in the brutal peripeteia suffered by the Germans.

Stalingrad and the Volga Founded in 1589 as a military outpost on Russia’s southern marches, the city that eventually became Tsaritsyn, then Stalingrad, and is now known as Volgograd is located on the bank of the lower Volga, about halfway between Saratov and Astrakhan’, just above and before the river starts to head south- east toward Astrakhan’. In the second half of the nineteenth century the city started to develop as an industrial center with the growth of rail and port in- stallations. By the time of the German invasion in 1941, Stalingrad, stretching out for some 70 kilometers (43 miles) on the west bank of the Volga, had become a model Soviet city and a major industrial center. Among the city’s better-known industrial assets and landmarks were the Dzerzhinskii Tractor Factory, the Barricades Gun Factory, the Red October Metal Factory, and the Lazur Chemical Plant located in the northern section of the city. To the south was Mamaev kurgan, the ancient Tartar burial mound and the dominant feature of the city, known as spot height 102. Immediately south of spot height 102 and on the river’s edge were an oil refinery and fuel storage tanks. Farther south was Stalingrad’s main railway station, power stations, and water works. The main assets in the south were a grain silo and a meat-processing plant. Stalingrad south was cut off from the city center by the famous river, the Tsar- itsyn, which emptied into the Volga along a deep ravine. The river El’shanka formed the southern boundary of Stalingrad south. The combination of natural features (gullies and rivers) and the sprawling city infrastructure created severe tactical problems but also opportunities for resourceful commanders on both sides. The story of Stalingrad is also the story of the most famous of Russia’s rivers, its geography and the role it has played in Russian history, because the river imposed restraints on both sides in the various stages of the battle. With a length of about 3,700 kilometers (2,294 miles), the Volga is the longest river in Europe. From its source in the Valdai heights west of Moscow, the river flows east, passing through Kalinin, Rybinsk, and Iaroslavl’ and then on to Gorky. Reaching Kazan’, the river begins its southward journey. It passes through Kuibyshev, Saratov, and Stalingrad, and the long journey ends in As- trakhan’ at the mouth of the Caspian Sea. From northern Russia to the south the Volga passes through various geographical zones characterized by a grad- 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 4

ual loss of trees. Thus, from its source to Kazan’ the river crosses Russia’s forest zone, then passes through forest-steppe zone to Saratov. From there to Stalingrad the terrain is essentially steppe. In the final part of its journey to the sea, the Volga passes through a desert zone. In winter the river is subject to freezing throughout its length. In its upper and middle length the Volga freezes at the end of November; in the lower reaches by the beginning of December. At Stalingrad the river normally freezes on or about 10 December, though this final freeze is preceded by a spell during which large masses of ice, known as salo in Russian, are driven downstream. Floating surface ice makes crossing the river difficult and dangerous, and during the battle it effectively reduced the defenders’ resupply of ammunition, rations, and reinforcements and impeded the evacuation of wounded. Once the river’s surface had frozen and the ice was strong enough to bear the weight of men and resupply columns—typically from the beginning to the middle of Jan- uary—the frozen river worked in favor of the defenders. Near Astrakhan’ the ice starts to break up in the middle of March. In the first ten days of April the breakup of the ice has reached Kamyshin, about halfway between Stalingrad and Saratov. By the middle of April the process has extended to the river’s upper reaches. Overall the Volga remains ice-free for about 200 days of the year, the ice-free period rising to about 260 days near Astrakhan’. Long, navigable rivers possess exceptional economic and military impor- tance, especially in the days before the construction of railways and in a land mass that lacks good roads. Above all they facilitate trade and the mainte- nance and extension of state power. They serve to unite a country, to create a sense of nationhood and a powerful state. In this way, over the centuries, the Volga has become deeply embedded in the Russian national identity as the preeminent river of Mother Russia, as something, indeed, that reflects the very essence of Russia, her national soul (dusha) or spirit (dukh). The Volga mesmerizes onlookers not solely because it is a magnificent natural phenom- enon on a par with a great mountain but also because, like a mountain, it speaks to some part of our souls. A river like the Volga (and the rivers Dnieper and Don) is the symbol and substance of Russia’s history. Thus, I would argue that from a Russian perspective—and it seems to me that this factor is not fully appreciated in the West—the battle is far more than the defense of a valuable industrial asset bearing Stalin’s name, with its rail and river links north and south; it is also the defense of ancient Russia and her sacred river, something that long predates the October Revolution. These manifestations of national identity were under attack as much as the industrial base was. 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 5

A huge river running through a vast expanse of steppe attracts not just no- mads, traders, and adventurers but also soldiers. Those who bear arms will persuade themselves that their primary interest in rivers large or small is driven by considerations of terrain, topography, and strategy, as indeed it is and must be, but they are not immune to the spell of a great river. Vasilii Grossman seems to have grasped something of the effect exercised by the Volga on friend and foe alike when in Za pravoe delo (For a Just Cause, 1952), the forerunner of Zhizn’ i sud’ba (Life and Fate, 1980 and 1988), he gives us the thoughts of a German general pondering the move across the Great Don Bend and then on to Stalingrad: “He perceived the edge of the Russian lands. On the other side of the Volga he saw the beginning of Asia. Were the general a philosopher or psychologist, he probably would have reflected on the fact that this feeling, which for him was so joyful, must inevitably give rise in Russians

to a different feeling, something terrible and powerful.”2 Another German officer, not a fictional one, took a rather different view of his first encounter with Stalingrad and the Volga. Major i. G. Hubert Menzel was the army high command’s liaison officer attached to 6th Army headquarters. On 23 September 1942, on orders of the army’s chief of staff, General- leutnant Arthur Schmidt, Menzel visited various formations of 6th Army in Stalingrad, specifically 71st and 295th Infantry Divisions and Infantry Regi- ment 194 and its forward companies. In his subsequent report he provides a good account of his first impressions of the terrain and the extent to which Stalingrad was somehow out of place in this wilderness of steppe. Moreover, the effects of the German saturation bombing to which the city was subjected on 23 August 1942 by von Richthofen’s VIII Air Corps and which continued for several days thereafter are clearly evident in Menzel’s report:

Barren and desolate steppe stretches from the west right into the city area. The approach road is a wide, dusty country road. The western suburbs resemble a village. There are workers’ dirty houses. Apart from the main highways most of the streets are not laid with tarmac. The terrain falls gently towards the east, to the Volga. The featureless spot height 102 [Mamaev kurgan], which is covered with dry steppe grass, dominates the entire city. The Barrikady factory region is likewise in a dominant position. Steep slopes are to be found immediately to the west of the railway line and right down to the bank of the Volga. On the banks there is about a 60- meter strip of beach with jetty facilities and landing stage. The most important part of the city lies to the east of the railway. Here there are 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 6

high-rise dwellings, which in part are built in an American style. In between there are shabby huts. Here the streets are laid with tarmac. The main station lacks any proper reception building, has no roof, and there is mangled, burned-out material. Much of the city has been destroyed. Only in the suburbs are there still houses that are still partly habitable. The high-rise buildings are totally burned out, but the cellars are generally usable. The streets running east to west are partly under artillery fire from the east bank, whereas the streets running north to south are under small- arms fire from parts of the still occupied city. In many places there are still fires. The oil storage tanks are totally burned out and still burning in places. In view of the fact that here the Volga is divided into many branches,

the river is not particularly impressive.3

A busy staff officer, burdened with all kinds of planning and logistics problems, Major Menzel had no time to be swept away by the Volga’s mysticism and what the Russian soul, if anything, could mean for 6th Army. In late Sep- tember 1942 there still seemed a good chance that the city would fall. How- ever, as staff officers at 6th Army headquarters, his colleagues and he would have been very concerned with terrain analysis and its impact on military operations throughout the summer of 1942.

Terrain and Weather Quite apart from its three major rivers—from west to east the Dnieper, Don, and Volga—southern Russia posed all kinds of other problems for military planners, attackers, and defenders. River valleys, gullies (ovrag singular; ovragi plural), ravines (balka singular; balki plural), and intermediate river plateaus were some of the fundamental relief features that concerned planners. River valleys in this part of Russia are very wide. For example, the valley of the middle Dnieper is about 100 kilometers (62 miles) across. Other terrain features are zapadiny, large, round, flooded depressions often hundreds of meters long and from 1 to 2 meters in depth that are formed by subsidence. They are very common in southern Ukraine. To these can be added landslides and karstovye formy (plateaux formations). Loess and argillaceous soil are primary contributing factors in the causa- tion of gullies and ravines, as are the general lack of substantial tree cover and the large volume of water caused by the spring snow thaw and summer flash flooding. In fact, heavy rain, channeled through narrow gullies, can be lethal. 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 7

Hanns Neidhardt records that on the night of 27–28 June 1942 nine soldiers belonging to 100th Jäger Division drowned in flash floods caused by summer

storms.4 Balki impeded vehicle movement but did offer cover for men, which, in turn, enabled the enemy to approach undetected. The nature of the subsoil has a direct bearing on military operations because heavy rain, flash flooding, and large amounts of water released during a prolonged thaw can render roads, such as they are in this part of Russia, liable to subsidence and severely disrupt movement. In the steppe zone the size of gullies and ravines can vary enormously; some can stretch for 10 to 15 kilometers (6 to 9 miles), giving the appearance of a small river valley; some have springs and running water. However in the south of Russia the balki are dry in summer, creating dry river valleys (sukhodol singular; sukhodoly plural). Topographically and in terms of their hydrodynamic characteristics, sukhodoly have much in common with the gullies and washes found in the desert regions of Nevada and Arizona in the United States and the wadis of the Middle East. Other terrain features that add to the unique nature of this landscape are the many small mounds, kurgany, which are either burial sites or artificial watchtowers created by the early steppe dwellers. Another feature, natural or possibly man-made, is the diva, small towers of rock that stand like sentinels on parts of the Don bank in an area known as the Divnogor’e between the village of Korotoiak and the town of Liski (midway between Voronezh and Pavlovsk). Asymmetry is the striking feature of river valleys in southern Russia. Typi- cally, the right bank (west) is high and steep, and the left bank (east) is gently sloping and long. The steep slope is heavily eroded and cut with gullies and ravines and almost entirely without alluvia. The left bank of Russia’s southern rivers is characterized by a series of terraced water meadows (poima singular; poimy plural) that rise sometimes sharply, then gently toward the watershed plateau. The left bank shows signs of weak erosion. There are rarely any gullies, and the basic strata are hidden under a layer of diluvial loam. In the ma- jority of cases the steep bank has a southern exposure, whereas the left bank faces north. This high west-bank configuration of Russian rivers favored the Germans as attackers and later, as they retreated, favored them as defenders. At Stalin- grad this asymmetry made the possession of Mamaev kurgan, the high bank overlooking the city and the Volga, known as spot height 102, exceptionally important to both sides. On the other hand, the relatively steep west bank did provide some defensive advantages for the Soviet bridgehead. The bank could not be hit in all places by German artillery fire and so provided an ideal 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 8

place—especially in the many gullies—for headquarters, casualty clearing stations, ammunition depots, assembly points for material and men being moved across the Volga by night, and start lines for counterattacks. There were also some offensive opportunities. Industrial-waste pipes made it possi- ble for Soviet assault troops to infiltrate the German rear unseen and strike German troops as they advanced to contact. Supply columns could also be hit

in these surprise raids.5 Lack of available water in the Great Don Bend and east toward Stalingrad was a major supply problem. Bearing in mind that the temperature in high summer could reach 100 degrees Fahrenheit (38 degrees Celsius), heat and the lack of readily available water clearly affected the combat performance of even the toughest troops. In the settlements water was derived from wells that the retreating Red Army poisoned with no regard for abandoned civilians. Other potential sources of water were artificial dams created to provide water for livestock. Glantz’s view that “the barren, almost flat terrain and hot

weather had a mesmerizing effect on both sides during the war”6 certainly comes across in some German veterans’ memoirs. Here, for example, are the observations of Hanns Neidhardt: “The terrain became ever more desolate. So many a Jäger marching along in the intense heat must have thought it resem- bled the moon. It was undulating terrain, here and there cut by gullies. There were no trees, no bushes, only high, dry steppe grass. It was only when we reached the Don or the area near Sukhaia Perekopka that we came across any

settlements. Water here was in very short supply.”7 Although meteorologists and geographers identify different types of steppe terrain with varying seasonal weather patterns and supporting various flora and fauna, the winters in the Don steppe are cold. According to the Köp- pen climate classification, the climate in the area of the Great Don Bend and east to Stalingrad is classified as BSk, where B is the category of terrain and Sk its specific features: cold steppe (S = steppe and k = kalt, or cold). Specific features of the weather from October to February are sharp falls and rises in temperature that can create cold fog. Another feature of the weather is black ice (gololed), which forms between 0° and –4°C (32° and 25°F). Black ice can make tracks and roads almost impassable. Occasionally “black storms” occur in winter when large amounts of fine particles are raised into the air along with snow. The war diary of 76th Infantry Division, which was compiled by Major Grohe, provides a record of weather from 1 October 1942 to 23 January 1943. Although Grohe provides a daily summary of weather conditions, he does not 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 9

always give the daily temperature. However, the weather trend is clear. He records frost at the start of October, snow showers on 19 October 1942, and continuing cold weather. Clear skies, in the absence of temperature data, sug- gest overnight frost. Grohe also records that on 1 November 1942 German clocks are set at Central European Time (CET). It is now dark by 1530 hours. The first real drop in temperature occurs on 7 November 1942, when it falls to –10°C (14°F). A day later it drops to –13°C (9°F). This spell of frost continues until 16 November. On 17 November there is rain, which quickly freezes. On 18 November the temperature rises above freezing, making conditions underfoot very slippery, as there is now a thin layer of water on frozen ground. This is almost certainly an example of gololed. On 20 November, the day after the Soviet counteroffensive, there is light snow accompanied by a slight rise in temperature. On 21 November there is ground fog and light frost. On 22 November the temperature falls to –5°C (23°F). There are freezing conditions on 23 and 24 November, followed by snow on 26 and 27 November. Snow flurries during the night of 28 November are followed by heavy snowfall before 1200 hours on 29 November. There are intermittent snowfalls on 30 November. On 1 December 1942 the temperature falls to –15°C (5°F). There is heavy snow on the 2 December, followed by persistent frost. As the temperature rises there is an onset of fog on 3 December. On 4 and 5 December there is rain. The temperature is back down to freezing on 6 December. More snow follows on 7 December, with a drop of temperature to –10°C (14°F) on 8 De- cember. A sustained cold spell ensues from 10 to 20 December 1942. Over this period the temperature oscillates between –10° and –15°C (14° and 5°F). The exception is 17 December, when the temperature drops to –20°C (–4°F). Be- tween 21 and 23 December there is a milder spell accompanied by light snow and fog. From Christmas Eve to 27 December there is a sharp drop in temperature to –20°C. From 28 December to the end of the year there is a renewed thaw, with temperatures hovering around freezing. The thaw continues for the first two days of 1943. It is then followed by a prolonged spell of very cold weather. On 3 January the temperature falls to –10°C (14°F) (–8°C [18°F] on 4 January), and on 5 January the temperature plummets to –25°C (–13°F). Between 6 January and 11 January the temperature remains in the range of –5° to –10°C. On 12 January the temperature falls to –15 to –20°C, accompanied by a strong northerly wind. The same weather is recorded for 13 and 14 January 1943. The coldest temperatures yet experienced occur from 15 January to 23 January. Minus 20°C is recorded on 15 January, followed by –30°C (–22°F) on 16 January. From 17 to 18 January the temperature 01-Ellis_main matter5/2/131:07PMPage10 Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of thePress. without permission prohibited and distribution Reproduction Table 1.1 Wind-Chill Values

Wind Speed © UniversityPressofKansas.Allrightsreserved. in Kilometers (Miles) per Hour Wind-Chill Factor in Degrees Celsius (Fahrenheit)

0 0 (32) –5 (23) –10 (14) –15 (5) –20 (–4) –25 (–13) –30 (–22) –35 (–31) –40 (–40) 10 (6) –3 (27) –9 (16) –15 (5) –21 (–6) –27 (–17) –33 (–27) –39 (–38) –45 (–49) –51 (–60) 15 (9) –4 (25) –11 (12) –17 (1) –23 (–9) –29 (–20) –35 (–31) –41 (–42) –48 )–54) –54 (–65) 20 (13) –5 (23) –12 (10) –18 (–1) –24 (–11) –31 (–24) –37 (–35) –43 (–45) –49 (–56) –56 (–69) 25 (16) –6 (21) –12 (10) –19 (–2) –25 (–13) –32 (–26) –38 (–36) –45 (–49) –51 (–60) –64 (–83) 30 (19) –7 (19) –13 (9) –20 (–4) –26 (–15) –33 (–27) –39 (–38) –46 (–51) –52 (–62) –59 (–74) 35 (21.7) –7 (19) –14 (7) –20 (–4) –27 (–17) –33 (–27) –40 (–40) –47 (–53) –53 (–63) –60 (–76) 40 (25) –7 (19) –14 (7) –21 (–6) –27 (–17) –34 (–29) –41 (–42) –46 (–51) –54 (–65) –61 (–78) 45 (28) –8 (18) –15 (5) –21 (–6) –28 (–18) –35 (–31) –42 (–44) –48 (–54) –55 (–67) –62 (–80) 50 (31) –8 (18) –15 (5) –22 (–8) –29 (–20) –35 (–31) –42 (–44) –49 (–56) –56 (–69) –63 (–81) 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 11

collapses to –35°C (–31°F). From 19 to 23 January the temperatures rises to

–10°C.8 The effects of very low temperatures and even moderately cold temperatures are exacerbated by wind. This is the wind-chill effect. In Table 1.1, I cite the reduction in temperature caused by wind speeds ranging from 10 to 50 kilometers (6 to 31 miles) per hour when applied to a temperature range from 0° to –40°C. The effects are significant even at fairly low wind speeds. Given that Major Grohe provides some indication of wind strength, wind chill would have been a factor in the many deaths caused by cold. For example, on 5 Janu- ary 1943 Grohe records a storm-force east wind with a temperature of –25°C (–13°F). On the Beaufort scale a storm-force wind is about 100 kilometers (63 miles) per hour. With a temperature of –25°C (13°F), this would create a wind- chill value of –47°C (–53°F). The wind-chill values in Table 1.1 were derived by using the wind-chill calculator provided by the U.S. National Weather Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) at http:// www.nws.noaa.gov. This table shows, for example, that a temperature of –5°C (23°F) with a wind speed of 15 kilometers (9 miles) per hour creates a wind- chill temperature equivalent to –11°C (12°F), and so on. Harsh winter weather alone was not decisive. Rather it was the combina-

tion of combat stress, lack of proper sleep, lack of winter clothing,9 insufficient food, filth, diarrhea, lice infestation, and exposure to cold over a prolonged period that exacted a heavy toll in lives and operational efficiency. Isolated days of cold, or even severe cold preceded and followed by milder weather (above freezing), were not unbearable in themselves. The attritional effect of cold on 6th Army resulted from the factors just noted but also from a long spell of colder weather during which the mean temperature was below freezing. Just how prolonged the cold was over the period from 1 October 1942 to 23 January 1943 can be seen in Table 1.2. Shown here are the days on which temperatures at or below freezing were recorded by Major Grohe in the diary of 76th Infantry Division. Bear in mind that in December and January temperatures below freezing were often way below freezing and made worse by wind chill. Setting in by the end of October, this prolonged period of cold exacerbated the other factors, chief among which was insufficient rations. Furthermore, the consequences of prolonged cold came at the very moment when ration resupply became critical because of 6th Army’s incarceration inside the Kessel. As a soldier’s body mass index (BMI) falls below the normal range, his body’s ability to deal with cold falls as well. Put simply, he is running out of fuel and 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 12

Table 1.2 Days with Frost and Temperatures at or Below Freezing in the Zone of Operations of 76th Infantry Division over the Period 1 October 1942–23 January 1943

Month Days with Temperatures at or below 0˚C (32˚F)

October 1942 11/31 November 1942 23/30 December 1942 29/31 1–23 January 1943 22/23 Total 85/115 (74 percent)

cannot generate sufficient heat to fight the cold or to function as a soldier, especially an infantry soldier. So a temperature that would be moderately un- comfortable for an individual within the normal BMI range, presumably equipped with proper winter clothing, would for an individual below that range amount to extreme discomfort and lead to an inability to discharge normal military tasks in an efficient manner. Basic infantry requirements such as digging, stacking ammunition, moving heavy weapons, skirmishing, marching, and collecting wounded become physically exhausting and in some cases impossible. Even moderate falls of snow make things worse, and strong winds on exposed steppe caused massive drifts. The consequences for operational efficiency were disastrous. Prolonged cold weather with temperatures below freezing causes addi- tional problems. Oil used on weapons freezes unless it is specially adapted for winter conditions. Hot food and drinks cool almost immediately, and the lack of readily available drinking water caused dehydration, constipation, and general lethargy. Defecation and urination, routine functions in the normal range of weather, become serious tasks where there is no protection from cold and the risk of freezing is high. Soldiers who used the shelter provided by bunkers and dugouts for defecation not only lost their dignity but also had to ensure as a matter of the highest priority that human waste was properly disposed of. Human waste, temporarily and generally neutral to human health in cold temperatures, becomes a major health hazard as temperatures start to rise or during intermittent spells of milder weather. If all these afflictions were not enough, bunkers and other temporary accommodations in cold weather were havens of relative warmth and thus concentrations of lice. In any case, the physical and psychological state of 6th Army’s infantry had already started to deteriorate before the onset of the steppe winter. Major Men- 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 13

zel pulls no punches about the condition of the German infantry after his visit to Stalingrad in late September 1942: “The soldiers are exhausted and run- down from the exceptional demands of the house-to-house fighting. Nor do they get any rest at night since every man is deployed and the width of the sec-

tors does not permit any withdrawal of reserves.”10 Major Menzel also records a lot of bitterness from infantrymen that their ration requirements are being neglected. He acknowledges that given the exhausting infantry combat, the ration allocation is woefully inadequate. There is also resentment from the infantry toward the Luftwaffe, whose personnel receive a special ration supplement not available to the infantry. German tank crews also receive better rations than the infantry. Menzel is left in no doubt by his hosts that something must be done: “The infantry commanders hold the view that all the propaganda for the benefit of the infantry is worthless if it does not lead to some-

thing’s being done.”11 On the basis of Menzel’s report, one could argue that the later problems of physical collapse and starvation that did so much to weaken 6th Army’s combat effectiveness were well under way in September 1942. Menzel’s assessment is confirmed by qualified medical opinion. At the start of October, with four months of fighting ahead, there are reports not just of tiredness but of severe physical collapse. On 1 October 1942, for example, following redeployment, a medical officer in 76th Infantry Division reports that he has encountered the first cases of exhaustion. He describes the soldiers as “men reduced to skeletons who could barely stand.” Later he is visited by some officers who are so emaciated that he fails to recognize them. When these men are fed, they vomit and can move about only with assistance. De- spite their condition, the men want to go to the new position. For their own good, the medical officer gives the men a morphine injection and they sleep

for two days.12 In fact, the lack of full and proper rations emerges as a serious matter well before Stalingrad is reached. On 18 September 1942 the divisional com- mander of 305th Infantry Division complains to VIII Corps “about the completely insufficient provision of meat and fat rations and the total absence of any spreads for bread.” He continues:

The situation has been like this for weeks on end. The impact is made all the more perceptible by the fact that no foodstuffs can be gathered up in the region. There is a lack of potatoes and horse fodder. The division’s mobility and its combat strength depend on the horses’ being fed, and in 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 14

the long run, soldiers cannot be fed on dry bread for breakfast, soup without potatoes in the evenings, and no spreads for bread; certainly not the infantryman in his trench, without protection from the cold nights. Adding to this plight is the dreariness of the terrain east of the Don depression, flat, treeless steppe, with scarcity of water. There are no winter

quarters to be found here.13

Complaints about lack of rations—specifically shortages of fats, vegeta- bles, sugar, potatoes and spreads for bread—are also being made by 100th

Jäger Division, as noted by Hanns Neidhardt.14 Lack of proper rations, especially those high in fats to combat the cold, slowly and remorselessly degraded the combat performance of the German infantry. Rationing caused any number of physical problems. Gerhard Dieck- hoff reports an increase in boils and dysentery. He notes that on the night of 16 December 1942 the first soldier dies of exhaustion, and an immediate post-

mortem is carried out.15 The circumstances of the soldier’s death are noted in a report cited by Dieckhoff:

X was part of a listening post. Suddenly he started to throw hand grenades around his position, shooting in all directions and shouting at his comrades, telling them to start firing since the Russians were coming. With great effort two soldiers succeeded in crawling up to his trench and disarmed him. After they had spent some considerable time talking to him and pacifying him, he calmed down and said he wanted to continue in the listening post when he was given the chance to be relieved of his duty. He

sat down quietly in his trench, fell slowly forward, and died.16

Cases of death from starvation, exhaustion, and cold are starting to increase. In the mornings sentries are being found dead in their trenches. Dieck- hoff also records examples of extreme apathy that are immune to any sanctions of military discipline. During a deployment a German rearguard comes across two German soldiers sitting in the cab of a lorry. When asked what they are do- ing, they merely reply, “We don’t know.” All attempts to move them fail, even the warning that the Russians are coming. They are left to their fate. Well-fed soldiers with the opportunity to rest would normally have been able to endure the conditions that obtained at Stalingrad. On the other hand, soldiers, who had already experienced months of hard fighting without always enjoying sufficient rations would eventually reach their physical and psy- 01-Ellis_main matter 5/2/13 1:07 PM Page 15

chological limits. As the end approached for 6th Army, its soldiers were expe- riencing much colder weather at a time when body reserves were nearing exhaustion and food was being severely rationed or in some cases had run out completely. One final point can be made regarding the attritional effects of cold and lack of food on combat performance. Divisional memoirs, war diaries, and 6th Army reports clearly identify a ration problem well before 6th Army reached Stalingrad. The summer campaign and series of forced marches un- dertaken by the infantry had also exacted a heavy toll. Yet it may well be that the harsh winter battles of 1941–1942 in which the infantry divisions of 6th Army took part marked the start of this process of physical and mental exhaustion from which German 6th Army never fully recovered—had no time indeed to recover—and which ended in the Stalingrad Kessel. Here, for example, is an extract from the war diary of Grenadier Regiment 178 (76th Infantry Division) dated 15 February 1942 (1700 hours): “A day of the heaviest defensive battles approaches its end. The soldiers of the division and the formations under command have in spite of ice, snow, and cold stood firm in the face of renewed attacks by seven Russian rifle divisions and two tank brigades

and inflicted heavy losses in men and material on the enemy.”17 This is a typical situation report of the winter fighting. The striking thing that emerges from this diary is just how exhausting these 1941–1942 winter battles were. In many ways they are a precursor of what awaited 6th Army in Stalingrad. Moreover, temperature data cited every day from 17 January to 5 March 1942 show that the cold was more severe and more prolonged than that experienced from October 1942 to the end of January 1943 in Stalingrad. Table 1.3 shows the temperatures for this period. For the thirteen days of January 1942 for which temperatures are cited, the mean temperature is –26.38°C (–15.48°F). Factor in even moderate wind speeds, and the wind chill effect would be considerable. For the twenty-seven days of February 1942 for which temperatures are cited, the mean temperature is –12°C (–10.39°F). One cannot discount the possibility that these exhausting conditions contributed significantly to the physical attrition of German 6th Army. With the onset of spring there was a brief respite, which was all too quickly terminated by the brutal marching and combat schedules demanded by Fall Blau. For example, Jochen Löser notes that during the 1942 summer offensive, 76th Infantry Division had to cover 30 to 40 kilometers (19 to 25 miles) per day in forced marches. By the time the division reached the Don it

had marched over 500 kilometers (311 miles).18