House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
The Western Balkans
Third Report of Session 2004–05
Volume II
Oral and written evidence
Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 1 February 2005
HC87-II Incorporating HC 1121 i-iii, Session 2003-04 Published on 23 February 2005 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £18.50
The Foreign Affairs Committee
The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated public bodies.
Current membership Rt Hon Donald Anderson MP (Labour, Swansea East) (Chairman) Mr David Chidgey MP (Liberal Democrat, Eastleigh) Mr Fabian Hamilton MP (Labour, Leeds North East) Mr Eric Illsley MP (Labour, Barnsley Central) Rt Hon Andrew Mackay (Conservative, Bracknell) Andrew Mackinlay MP (Labour, Thurrock) Mr John Maples MP (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon) Mr Bill Olner MP (Labour, Nuneaton) Mr Greg Pope MP (Labour, Hyndburn) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley MP (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham Edgbaston)
The following Members were also members of the Committee during the Parliament.
Sir Patrick Cormack MP (Conservative, Staffordshire South) Richard Ottaway (Conservative, Croydon South)
Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee.cfm. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is in the inside covers of this volume.
Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Steve Priestley (Clerk), Sarah Ioannou (Second Clerk), Ann Snow (Committee Specialist), Kit Dawnay (Committee Specialist), Kevin Candy (Committee Assistant), Julia Kalogerides (Secretary), and Chintan Makwana (Senior Office Clerk).
Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerks of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Committee Office, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone numbers for general enquiries are 020 7219 6106/6105/6394; the Committee’s email address is [email protected].
Witnesses
Tuesday 12 October 2004 Page
Mr Gabriel Partos, Balkans Analyst, BBC World Service; Dr Jonathan Eyal, Ev 4 Director of Studies, Royal United Services Institute
Professor James Pettifer, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy Ev 19 and Dr David Chandler, Centre for Study of Democracy, University of Westminster
Tuesday 19 October 2004
Rt Hon Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub Hamdon KBE, High Representative of the Ev 28 International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU Special Representative
Tuesday 26 October 2004
Dr Othon Anastasakis, Director, South East European Studies Programme, St Ev 41 Antony’s College, University of Oxford; Dr Nicholas Whyte, Head, Europe Programme, International Crisis Group
Mr Misha Glenny, former Central and South Eastern Europe Correspondent, BBC Ev 49 World Service
Tuesday 30 November 2004
Mr Denis MacShane MP, Minister of State, Ms Karen Pierce, Head of Eastern Ev 73 Adriatic Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Thursday 13 January 2005
HE Kai Eide, Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO Ev 108
List of written evidence
Mr Gabriel Partos, South-east Europe Analyst, BBC World Service Ev 1 Dr Jonathan Eyal, Director of Studies, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies and Security Studies (RUSI) Ev 3 Professor James Pettifer, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Ev 13 Dr David Chandler, Centre for the Study of Democracy Ev 16 Dr Othon Anastasakis, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford Ev 39 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 57, Ev 94, Ev 98, Ev 100 Sir Peter Ricketts, KCMG UK Permanent Representation to NATO Ev 116 UK Representation to the European Union Ev 120 UK Delegation to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Ev 122 Embassy of Albania Ev 124 Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina Ev 128 Embassy of the Republic of Macedonia Ev 129 Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro Ev 131 Rinna Elina Kullaa, University of Oxford/ University of Maryland Ev 134 Biljana Radonjic, Civilitas Research Ev 138 BBC World Service Ev 141 Amnesty International UK Ev 145 Save the Children Ev 150 Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) Ev 158 Saferworld Ev 160 British Council Ev 164 Bosnian Institute Ev 167 Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge Ev 167
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 1 Oral evidence
Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee
on Tuesday 12 October 2004
Members present:
Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Mr David Chidgey Mr Bill Olner Mr Eric Illsley Mr Greg Pope Mr Andrew Mackay Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay Ms Gisela Stuart Mr John Maples
Written evidence submitted by Gabriel Partos, South-east Europe Analyst, BBC World Service
1. Serbia—Political Uncertainty: 1.1 Since the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003, successive Serbian governments have been lacking a firm sense of direction. The current four-party administration of the moderate nationalist Vojislav Kostunica relies for its majority in parliament on the support of ex-President Slobodan Milosevic’s Socialist MPs. That has proved a serious obstacle in the way of establishing a proper level of co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. The Socialists have threatened to bring down the government if it transfers indicted war crimes suspects—many of them senior oYcials or oYcers from the Milosevic era—to the ICTY’s custody. 1.2 Divisions within the governing coalition add to what many observers see as a drift in policy. Although the centre-right administration should have a considerable measure of ideological coherence, on key issues the various coalition parties disagree. Two examples: on the question of Serbia’s union with Montenegro, the G17 Plus Party of technocrats is out of tune with the rest of the coalition by arguing for separation on the grounds that Montenegro is a financial burden for Serbia. And on the issue of Serb participation in the 23 October Kosovo assembly elections Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic opposed Prime Minister Kostunica’s call for a boycott, noting that it would deprive the remaining Serb population of a say in Kosovo’s aVairs. 1.3 Disunity was one of the reasons for the government’s almost instant loss of popularity. That was underlined by the poor showing of the coalition’s candidate who came fourth in the June 2004 presidential election—less than four months after the Kostunica administration assumed oYce. Victory went to the opposition leader, Boris Tadic, of the pro-Western, pragmatic Democratic Party (DS). He beat the ultra- nationalist Radicals’ candidate into second place. The same pattern was repeated in the race for the influential Belgrade mayor’s post during the nationwide local authority elections, held in September/ October. 1.4 President Tadic has promised that the DS—while continuing to remain in opposition—will contribute to Serbia’s stability by acting as a constructive partner to the government. The DS has already made a remarkable recovery since its disastrous performance in the December 2003 parliamentary elections. However, it needs more time to rebuild; and its leaders appear to believe that they can benefit from helping to keep the Kostunica government in power and, in the process, giving it further opportunities to make mistakes. 1.5 The next electoral test is expected in February 2005 when direct elections to the parliament of the Serbia-Montenegro (SaM) union are due. The union parliament has few powers because authority is largely devolved to the constituent republics. But the SaM elections could prove important, not least by precipitating moves towards early parliamentary elections in Serbia itself if Kostunica’s party and its allies suVered another setback. In any subsequent elections the governing coalition—on current trends—would be likely to be squeezed between the DS and the Radicals. 1.6 Serbia’s failure to co-operate with the ICTY and introduce more wide-ranging reforms has produced strains in its relations with the European Union and the United States. After the fall of the Milosevic regime the West lavished aid on newly-democratising Serbia; but since then the outside perception of the country Ev 2 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
has changed from that of the much reformed “prodigal son” to one that is failing to meet its obligations. As a result, the US Administration has frozen most forms of assistance for Serbia, and the process towards forging closer links between Serbia and the EU has been making little headway.
2. Serbia and Montenegro—The Future of the Union
2.1 The revamping of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the loosely-knit union of SaM in February 2003 has until now put the issue of Montenegrin independence on the backburner. By acting as midwife to the birth of the SaM union, the EU has earned itself a three-year breathing space during which it does not have to deal with the consequences of a possible referendum on Montenegro’s independence. 2.2 The creation of the SaM union has been a success in terms of crisis prevention/postponement. But it has not so far laid the foundations for a stable, long-term union. The failure of Serbia and Montenegro to harmonize many of their customs tariVs finally prompted the EU in September 2004 to shift its position and consider separate trade deals with the two republics as part of a future Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with SaM. 2.3 The EU’s new twin-track approach is a pragmatic device whose purpose is to induce progress in the SAA negotiations with Belgrade. It is not designed to boost the Montenegrin government’s aspirations for independence. However, it may yet become one of the nails in the coYn of the SaM union if the two republics decide to go their separate ways. An early indication of that may come in the elections for the SaM parliament, due in February 2005. A strong showing for Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic’s party and its allies could set in motion moves towards Montenegro’s independence. 2.4 The three-year trial period of the SaM union is not due to run out until February 2006. At present support in Montenegro for independence and the continuation of the SaM union are almost evenly balanced. If the much-delayed progress in the SAA talks with the EU comes as a result of the new twin-track approach, it would help those who argue that Montenegro could integrate with the EU more quickly by going it alone than in partnership with Serbia. Djukanovic may also want to use an independence referendum to rally support at a time when he will have been in power as prime minister or president, without interruption, for 15 years. 2.5 The future of the SaM union is likely to re-emerge as one of the key issues on the regional agenda next year. It has the potential to slow down much-needed political, economic and administrative reforms in both republics as attention focuses once again on whether—or in what shape—the Serbia-Montenegro union should continue.
3. Kosovo—The Status Issue
3.1 The debate on the future of SaM is expected to coincide with—and is likely to be overshadowed by— the negotiations on Kosovo’s long-term status. According to the United Nations’ timetable, Kosovo’s progress under its current UN administration towards establishing the required standards of democracy, the rule of law, inter-ethnic tolerance and the protection of ethnic minorities is to be reviewed in mid-2005. If the assessment is positive, talks on Kosovo’s status might, according to the tentative timetable, begin in early 2006. 3.2 Unless there is a recurrence of the serious inter-ethnic violence of March this year, the expectation is that the mid-2005 review is likely to be broadly positive. One reason is that conditions have already improved considerably: there are democratically-elected multi-ethnic authorities in place which have been taking on an increasing range of competencies from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). However, much still needs to be done to improve security for the Serb minority, most importantly to create conditions that would favour the return of Serb refugees. 3.3 Another reason for pressing on with talks on Kosovo’s future is that there is a growing realisation that Kosovo cannot remain in limbo in the medium to longer-term. By mid-2005 six years will have passed since the Kosovo war: there is increasing frustration among the Kosovar Albanian majority with the continuing UN administration and the current status under which Kosovo formally belongs to the SaM union. The March riots, in which there were widespread attacks on the Serb community, were an expression of that frustration. Nor will much-needed foreign investment flow into Kosovo while its status remains unresolved. 3.4 Kosovo’s Albanians are overwhelmingly in favour of independence. They would like Kosovo’s future to be decided on the basis of self-determination. In the period after the 23 October Kosovo Assembly elections that argument may gain even greater prominence in the political rhetoric of the Kosovar Albanian leadership. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 3
3.5 Serbs (both in Kosovo and in Serbia at large) want Kosovo to remain within the SaM union, or if that union is dissolved, in Serbia itself. But there is an increasing realisation among some Serb oYcials that, whatever the historical links, Kosovo cannot be kept against the will of the vast majority of its inhabitants. However, very few Serb politicians are prepared to declare that in public for fear that it would undermine their support among the electorate. 3.6 One of the key issues during 2005 will revolve around the likely format and duration of any negotiating process that might determine Kosovo’s long-term status. The options include an international peace conference, such as Dayton (Bosnia) or Rambouillet (Kosovo); negotiations among the interested parties with the support of the US and the EU, such as Ohrid (Macedonia); or a form of shuttle diplomacy. 3.7 Kosovar Albanians and Serbs are poles apart on the issue of Kosovo’s future status. There has been little change on either side—at least in terms of public appearances. Until relatively recently the international community felt that opening up this issue would only create greater instability—for example, by undermining the authorities in Serbia. Now there is an increasing awareness that instability is more likely to threaten the region if the current state of uncertainly over Kosovo’s future is allowed to continue for long. Gabriel Partos South-east Europe Analyst BBC World Service 11 October 2004
Written evidence submitted by Dr Jonathan Eyal, Director of Studies, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) Astonishing as it may seem—given the recent history and the remaining problems—Balkans are heading for more stable and prosperous times. Within the last few years, the three major ingredients which fuelled violence in the region for over a decade have been removed. First, it became clear that the age of the old nationalist trouble-makers in both Yugoslavia and Croatia is truly over; not only have they been removed, but the nationalist political infrastructure which sustained their regimes has also evaporated, and cannot be recreated. The potential for further territorial disintegration cannot be ignored, but is containable: no state or splinter nation in the Balkans is now in a position to engage in any prolonged warfare. And, finally, the divisions between the Europeans and the Americans over policy in the region have also evaporated: the US has given up the pretence of having the only correct and “principled” policy in the Balkans, while the Europeans have accepted that, whether they like it or not, the future of this region is ultimately their own responsibility. It is a responsibility which has to be borne, with no choice of how much or how little European armies are engaged in the Balkans. And it is a task which must ultimately mean the Balkans’ full integration into existing European security and economic structures. No nationalist dictators, the sheer exhaustion from prolonged warfare and, at long last, a coherent and united Western policy: these are the pillars of the current Balkan stability. For the first time in the region’s modern history, the Balkans are beginning to be seen as just another poverty-stricken European region which must do better, rather than a continental disease. None of these observations can obscure the fact that security in the Balkans remains a relative concept, a fragile balance which requires Western governments to constantly walk on eggs. Nor is it the case that the West truly understands what motivates the region’s leaders or that, in turn, the nations of the former Yugoslavia now think and act as the rest of peaceful Europe. In at least two fundamental respects, the countries which emerged from the rubble of communist Yugoslavia are still very diVerent. They all suVer from a collective amnesia about what has happened to them and what they caused to happen to others during the last decade of warfare. All the nations in the former Yugoslavia accept that crimes were committed by everyone but, somehow, every nation believes that the crimes committed against itself were particularly heinous, requiring a diVerent form of punishment. And most of the governments in the former Yugoslav space are both formally independent, and utterly dependent on the European Union and NATO for their existence. The key challenges for the former Yugoslav states are as follows: 1. Political stability. This is no longer an issue in Croatia, but it is very much still a problem in Serbia and Montenegro, and in Macedonia, as well as in Bosnia and Kosovo. 2. Final arrangements for Bosnia. In theory, the Dayton Accords concluded in 1995 govern the administration of Bosnia and the country’s future. In practice, all the activities of the international community have been to move away from the Dayton agenda, which was based on the assumption that, before uniting the country, an eVective separation must be accomplished. The last few years have been spent, Ev 4 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
naturally, on reunifying the entities and providing Bosnia with functioning central institutions, while safeguarding the rights of its various communities. Much has been accomplished, but it is diYcult to argue with the conclusion that Bosnia is still a country in its “nursing” stage, rather than an entity able to stand on its own feet. 3. The status of Kosovo. For years, the West’s policy was to proclaim that “standards come before status”, namely that the return of normal life and civilised political discourse have to be accomplished before the question of the territory’s legal status is resolved. After the ethnic riots in March this year, it has become increasingly clear that this position is no longer tenable, that the resolution of Kosovo’s legal status must be part and parcel of addressing the question of standards of government inside the territory. For the moment, neither the majority ethnic Albanian population nor the minorities which still reside in the province consider the arrangements satisfactory. Final status negotiations may not begin until well into 2005, but they cannot be postponed for much longer. 4. Macedonia’s internal stability has been improving in the last few years. Nevertheless, this is now challenged by a proposed referendum initiative which, if ultimately approved, could result in negating the agreement between the majority Macedonian population and the ethnic Albanian minority. 5. The question of Serbia and Montenegro’s final constitutional arrangement remains wide open. The seemingly never-ending dispute between these two entities has not only precluded a wider political solution in the Balkans as a whole, but has also wasted an opportunity to concentrate on economic reconstruction inside Serbia. Violence between the two entities can be excluded. Nevertheless, a resolution to this problem—in one way or another, even if it involves formal separation—is an urgent necessity in order to break up the current legal logjam. 6. Economic cooperation between the countries of the region is in its infancy, and it is diYcult to foresee the mechanism by which it could be improved. In many respects, the countries of the region are competitors, rather than complementary economic partners. They all need to reform their post-communist economies. They all require large inputs of foreign capital and resources, and have a redundant industrial labour force, in search of new employment. And they all produce fairly similar goods. Much can be done to simplify border procedures and ease trade. But, at the end, economic growth is unlikely to be generated from inside the region. 7. Legal responsibility for the crimes perpetrated during the wars of the 1990s is still not accepted. The repeated refusal of the authorities in Belgrade to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague remains the most serious impediment to normalising relations with the world. But, while Serbia’s lack of cooperation is notorious, the slow level of cooperation given to the Tribunal in parts of Bosnia and in Croatia should also not be forgotten. A real opportunity to resolve the issue may come at the end of this year, when the Tribunal’s Prosecutor’s right to indict new suspects expires. This may give the countries of the region an incentive to cooperate, and remove the usual gripe that the Tribunal’s work is never-ending and disrupts local politics. Nevertheless, as long as real progress is not recorded, at least in apprehending some of the key suspect war criminals, relations with the West cannot be normalised. 8. Organised crime of various kinds continues to flourish throughout the region. So does corruption and, although innumerable assistance programmes have been launched, not much will be achieved until the countries of the areas consolidate control over their own territory and improve their own policing methods. 9. The question of a wider political integration for the region as a whole remains wide open. In many respects, the division of the Balkans into a “northern” part, which includes Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia, either members of NATO or the EU or shortly to become members in both organisations, and the “western” Balkans, composed of countries which remain in suspended animation, is an artificial one. The boundaries will need to be broken up pretty quickly, if Europe is not to end up with a clutch of poor, “failed” states on its eastern boundaries. Achieving this integration, inevitably at diVerent speeds but while holding the credible promise of integration for all the region’s states remains Europe’s biggest challenge in the second half of this decade. Dr Jonathan Eyal Director of Studies Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies 12 October 2004
Witnesses: Mr Gabriel Partos, Balkans Analyst, BBC World Service and Dr Jonathan Eyal, Balkans Analyst, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), examined.
Chairman: I welcome to the Committee today first analyst at the Royal United Services Institute, Mr Gabriel Partos, who is the Balkans analyst at the manages RUSI’s European programme and has BBC World Service. Mr Partos is senior Balkans written extensively in the area. Clearly both of you analyst, with extensive experience of the region. have extensive experience and I welcome you to the Secondly, Dr Jonathan Eyal, who is a Balkans first meeting of the Foreign AVairs Committee in Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 5
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal respect of our inquiry into the Western Balkans. I would add to that. One thing we need to bear in mind have a very clear memory that when the Committee is the fact that the position of president in Serbia is met the then Greek foreign minister George not a powerful position in the sense that the Papandreou during the Greek presidency in his government is a parliamentary government. In oYce he had a large map of Europe on the wall and practical terms, executive power is in the hands of he pointed out the Western Balkans and said words Prime Minister Kostunica and his government. Of to the eVect “That gentlemen, is the missing piece of course, the president has a great deal of influence. He the jigsaw”. The Balkans will impact for good or ill can, of course, draw on the fact that he was elected on us in the remaining part of Europe. So we rely on by universal suVrage, by the public, he is a directly you gentlemen to allow us to connect positively to elected president; he also has now the backing in the problems of that region. We value your help and some other ways of that his own election victory we should like to begin. I call on Mr Illsley please to back in June. The success of his Democratic Party in begin the questioning. the local municipal elections held recently in which it captured, among other places, the very important Q1 Mr Illsley: Gentlemen, given the recent problems position of the mayor of Belgrade—that position in Serbia, starting perhaps with the assassination of has gone to the candidate of the Democratic Party— shows that his party is also doing well in general, has the Prime Minister Djindjic, the parliamentary V elections which led to a resurgence of the radical recovered from the disastrous defeat it su ered in party, the slowdown on the Serbian economy and last December’s parliamentary elections. So in that with that the slowdown of the process of reform, is sense, President Tadic can draw on his own personal the election of Boris Tadic, the leader of the authority, he can draw on his influence, on the democratic party, as president likely to speed up success of his own party, but we do need to bear in Serbia’s integration into the West? Is that likely to be mind that he is not there to make policy. Just briefly, a catalyst for a little bit of a step change in Serbia? if I may illustrate that, only the other day when he Dr Eyal: As always, it is very diYcult to predict, called on Serbs, Kosovo Serbs, to take part in the although personalities are of course a crucial element forthcoming elections due on 23 October in Kosovo, of any movement in that region, more perhaps than in other words, he went against the advice of Prime Minister Kostunica who was calling for a boycott on in many other European countries. It is clear that Mr Y Tadic’s triumph in the elections was very good news the grounds that Serbs do not enjoy su cient all round, for at least three reasons. First, because it security and also that his particular plan for was a crucial blockage: the filling of that post proved decentralisation in Kosovo had not been accepted, to be a constant blockage to a constitutional log-jam whilst President Tadic had gone against that advice in Serbia and Montenegro which has lasted, more or and he was saying that the only way Serbs can have less, uninterrupted for two years. Secondly, because a voice after the elections is if they take part, for that, quite frankly, and I shall be undiplomatic here, the he was rapped on the knuckles because he was going alternative was simply too awful, certainly the against the declaration by parliament, by the prime alternative that emerged in the second round of the minister. He was told that he should not have made that statement. So just to illustrate the fact that it is voting. Thirdly, because Mr Tadic proved himself, in Y his previous position as defence minister, as one of adi cult position in which he needs to manoeuvre the more eYcient members of the government in in order to be able to bring forward those policies Belgrade and a person who was determined to reform which you mentioned in your question. what probably was one of the least reformed institutions of the Yugoslav former state, namely the Q3 Mr Illsley: Has the recent local election result military. So, for every one of these reasons, it is an given any prospect for reform? I think you alluded enormous advantage. However, and this is the usual to it there when you said his party’s fortunes are caveat, the constitutional problem still remains, reviving. although there is a level of politeness between Prime Mr Partos: His party did well and that in a sense Minister Kostunica and the president—they have reinforces the argument that, at the very least, the both pledged together—the possibility that the Democratic Party, which is the mainstream party power sharing may not succeed remains relatively devoted to pragmatic pro-European integrationist high. Secondly, the point of both Mr Tadic and of policies, is recovering its position. But of course, at a Prime Minister Kostunica still is that somehow they national level, it is still the rather weak, precariously- can pick and choose what level of cooperation they positioned minority government under Mr want with the West; the question of the handover of Kostunica which is still in power and that is in a war criminals for instance, has been left is abeyance, sense dictating the rhythm as it were, and the rhythm although the government proclaims that it wants to or the tempo is rather slow. It is rather slow for a co-operate with us, and, on a personal note, I must number of reasons which we could go into but say I was rather disappointed that President Tadic perhaps the three or four most important aspects are kept rather quiet in the first few months after his the fact that it is a minority government, it is a elections on this issue where he probably could have government which depends ultimately on the shown some leadership. support of a handful of socialist MPs, who of course represent the party of Mr Milosevic, who is on trial Q2 Chairman: Mr Partos, do you agree with that? in the Hague on war crimes charges. He is dependent Mr Partos: I agree entirely with what Jonathan Eyal on that rather backward-looking group of has just said, and there are one of two things that I politicians in parliament for his survival, and also Ev 6 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal
Mr Kostunica’s own personality is generally because criminals themselves had been encouraged described as being rather hesitant when it comes to to go and fight back in the days of the early 1990s in decision making, he perhaps prefers to spend a great Croatia and in Bosnia on behalf of the Serbian deal of time consulting rather than taking decisions cause. In the following years, the process of UN and of course he has a very strong, firm commitment sanctions also encouraged cross-border crime, to a Serbian nationalist ideal. To that extent I think smuggling, and all this encouraged the development we do need to wait and see to what extent the local of this state-within-a-state or perhaps it might be election result may have a bearing of Serbia’s even better to describe it as a kind of symbiotic integration or change. relationship with elements of the state, the security apparatus and criminal gangs. That survived the fall Q4 Mr Illsley: I referred in my introduction to the of President Milosevic and it produced what appears economy slowing down. The Americans have cut to have been the Djindjic assassination among many their aid to Serbia by $25 million because of non- other activities. I think that the worst of it is now cooperation of the Hague Tribunal. We have seen a perhaps behind us because of the very firm action the recent BBC report where Kostunica has said that he government took back in the spring/early summer of would prefer war criminals to be tried by the Serbian last year. To the extent that organised crime in many court, rather than the Hague. Is there absolutely no ways dominated Serbia, that situation no longer is the case, but clearly it is not something you can chance of Kostunica going along with the Hague V Tribunal? Is there no accommodation there at all? switch on and switch o from one day to the next. Dr Eyal: Theoretically, all the political leadership in Belgrade accepts cooperation with the Hague Q6 Mr Illsley: The status of Kosovo is likely to come Tribunal. What we have seen, however, over the last under discussion within the next few months. What year and a half is essentially a dialogue of the deaf, is likely to be the attitude of Serbia towards the very often suggestions, partly that they do not know Kosovo issue? Are they likely still to maintain a where some of the chief indictees are, partly that it is totally nationalistic attitude that Kosovo remains very tricky to arrest them at this particular moment, within Serbia and there is absolutely no question of partly that it is unjust to treat the Serbs as the pariahs independence? Or could there be some compromises and not to indict other alleged war criminals and, there, bearing in mind what has happened in finally, why can they not be tried before Belgrade Vojvodina? tribunals. Now the reality is that we shall very Dr Eyal: Of course of the Serb government, the new shortly see the first attempt actually to hand over a government, has circulated to Western governments few of the indictees to be tried before tribunals in a proposed solution of the Kosovo problem in Belgrade itself. However, clearly we are nowhere February this year. It has not been discussed in near the stage where this could be done in a routine public, indeed it was not discussed formally between manner. Let us not forget that the international the Western governments and Belgrade, mainly tribunal is well behind time in its own activity, there because the suspicion among many Western is a limit to how far it could continue operating, governments is that actually the plan was eVectively there is pressure from the United States about hinting at a separation, a division of the problems. putting a cut on the actual period that it operates, so OYcially the plan only calls for particular measures there is actually a lot that can be done. However, it to protect ethnic Serbs in the country and technically is also fair to say that at the end of the day, sadly the the Serbs have been proven to be correct by the decision of most of the Serb politicians has been that rather tragic riots that took place just a few weeks cooperating with the tribunal carries a greater after the plan was circulated. So, in many respects political cost to them than not cooperating with this the oYcial Serb position is that they consider the and it is this that has created the frustration of the problems as part of Serbia and Montenegro, which Americans. There is a similar frustration among is the oYcial position of the UN Security Council Europeans including Britain; it is perhaps not resolution as well, but essentially all they want is expressed in the same way as that of the Americans. protection for Serbs. Now, my personal feeling is that there is no-one of any authority in Belgrade who Q5 Mr Illsley: How big an influence does organised believes that the province could return to Serb crime still have in Serbia? Is it still a major threat to sovereignty. What they cannot figure out is how to Serbian stability? accept this de jure without getting what they see as a Mr Partos: Not in the way that it was perhaps up to compensation which they could portray to their own 18 months ago. What happened at the time of the population as being an equitable settlement. assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic in March of last year was that it was followed, as you may recall, Q7 Sir John Stanley: Very briefly, could you both tell by a state of emergency during which thousands us what you consider should be the top British were detained. A number of those regarded as Government foreign policy priorities towards perhaps being the criminal gang bosses were actually Serbia? killed in gun battles with the police and perhaps Dr Eyal: In a word—engagement. We have two eliminating in some way the worst of that kind of things which relate to engagement. The first one is to criminalised elements of the state, the intersection dispel the very deep-seated attitude of all Serbs, in all with the state which had developed in the days of the walks of life, that they are the victims of the West Milosevic era, when the security apparatus often and that regardless of what they do, we will never went hand in hand with organised criminals—partly take them seriously. Now that view is widespread Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 7
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal even among intellectuals, even, if I may say so, successor states of Yugoslavia. The issue does not, I among people who should know better. Sadly, we repeat, arise and it is unlikely in my mind to arise for did miss some tricks: for instance, the riots in a year or so, despite the fact that you will be told by Kosovo were clearly perpetrated largely by ethnic various Montenegrin politicians that they are just Albanians, yet our view was to suggest that it was a poised in a day or so, to declare a referendum on the plague on both houses. This to a certain extent was issue. This is part of their technique to increase their true, but it was perceived in Serbia yet again as our value with both us in the West, in terms of their inability to look at other countries which may be negotiations and quite frankly is part of the breaking the law as well and our determination to be blackmail which goes on daily in Belgrade in the sticklers for protocol when it comes to Serbia and tussle for resources. We have seen it in other not elsewhere. separatist movements. I suspect, to your final point, Mr Partos: I would add to that, perhaps that it is that if Montenegrin independence comes, it will have very important to keep Serbia and the Serbian very little impact on Bosnia where the logic of the authorities to their pledges and promises, to their behaviour of the various ethnic communities is undertakings in terms of their obligations to the completely diVerent. It will, however, on Kosovo, International Criminal Tribunal for the former because it will be very diYcult to say we are not Yugoslavia, The Hague Tribunal, and at the same settling the legal status of Kosovo, but we are time to encourage them and show that by rushing to settle the legal status of Montenegro. cooperating with the tribunal, accepting other undertakings, not having special rules for Serbia to Q9 Chairman: The area which is left is the minorities, have trials of indicted war criminals in Serbia rather the Albanian minority for example, and eVect there than transferring them to the Hague, by accepting and other comments, please? these undertakings and acting on them, that of Mr Partos: Montenegro has perhaps the most course there are various ways in which there are harmonious inter-ethnic relations among Serbs, benefits which they can take advantage of: in terms Montenegrins, Albanians, Muslims, of course, are a of easier access to the European Union; and large community too. I do not see any prospect of accelerating the talks towards a Stability and that being harmed by Montenegro’s independence Association Agreement, which, of course, is because of the way the country has been able to hold something that Serbia will need to conclude with the together under enormous pressure the various ethnic EU in order to qualify later on for full membership. communities, both under the Milosevic regime, when there was pressure from Belgrade, and in the Q8 Mr Mackay: Can I move on to Montenegro? more liberal atmosphere which has taken root since Clearly here, one of the key issues is the potential the fall of the Milosevic regime over the last independence of this country. It does seem to be four years. So that will stay as it is, and any controversial within Montenegro and I would problems which might arise between Serbs, or appreciate your comments on that. Equally, we see those who see themselves as Serbs and want to secessionist diYculties and issues in Bosnia and keep the relationship with Serbia going, and Kosovo. If in the relatively near future Montenegro the Montenegrins or the pro-independence became independent, what knock-on eVect across Montenegrins, is unlikely in my view to lead to any the Western Balkans would that have? I guess the major upheaval because Belgrade itself will agree to final question on this particular point is that we have an amicable divorce. I do not know, Mr Chairman, seen minorities discriminated against elsewhere, to whether you will permit me to comment on the other my knowledge we have not in Montenegro yet, but two aspects of the questions. if it were an independent state, would some diYculties be raised there? Q10 Chairman: The question of minorities is a Dr Eyal: My personal opinion is that we are nowhere further question not yet tackled. near a consensus or even a majority view inside Mr Partos: If I may comment on independence in Montenegro for secession. That is one reason why general, I do not think it is on the agenda yet. What the country’s leadership has not put it to a is going to happen is that the current three-year trial referendum and I suspect that what they are trying arrangement, or trial marriage as it were, or re- to do is to show that the current constitutional marriage between Serbia and Montenegro will come arrangement simply does not work and to persuade to an end early in 2006. At that stage, perhaps the public opinion in Montenegro that independence is government, which has previously mooted a the only alternative. The leadership of the republic referendum on many occasions—a referendum has remains committed to independence, but it dares not always been “just around the corner”—may suggest put it to a vote. Now, if the question does come to a that the time has come. We will have to wait and see vote, it will not result in violence, that we can be until then. The latest opinion polls which I have just almost sure; there is absolutely no-one is Serbia who seen suggest that there is now a considerable will carry out an order to shoot on Montenegrins degree of, not exactly unqualified support for because of the close ethnic and historic proximity of independence, but a gap between the pro- the two nations and there is absolutely no-one in independence and the pro-union views is now about Serbia who will even dream of giving such an order. 12 per cent in favour of those who want So that is not the problem. Now, the problem of independence, though these things can change from mixed-marriages could arise, but I suspect it is time to time. Finally, what precedent might be set for probably less of a diYculty than it was in other Bosnia or Kosovo? I think the impact on Bosnia will Ev 8 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal be marginal, minimal; conditions in Bosnia have reaction of the kind that you would have had in the been moving towards integration within the state case of Bosnia where the media is tightly rather than the other way around. I think that circumscribed when it comes to any ethnic-related process is unlikely to be disturbed. Kosovo? Again propaganda of this kind. The only good thing that there will not be a major impact because Kosovar could be said is that the response of both London Albanians, the majority, have been determined since and Paris, as the main contributing countries in 1990, when they first declared that they want to be military terms, was very good and very satisfactory. independent. To that extent, whether Montenegro is Forces were air-lifted and reinforcements were in part of a union with Serbia or not is irrelevant from place within 36 hours after it became clear that we their perspective; of course they could use were facing a diYcult situation. What was not Montenegro’s independence as a justification satisfactory was the fact that, at least for the first 24 perhaps in some ways in terms of rational arguments hours, it appeared that it was touch and go whether around the world to back their call for NATO was going to lose control of the province independence. But I think that ultimately their altogether. So our intelligence, our preparation, our determination to go for independence will not be early warning systems were all faulty. aVected by Montenegro’s choice. Q12 Mr Chidgey: Mr Partos, do you have anything Q11 Mr Chidgey: May I come back now to more to add to that? detail on the situation in Kosovo, particularly Mr Partos: Very little, because I agree entirely with UNMIK’s1 role there? You referred in passing to the what Dr Eyal has just said, but I would also add that ethnic riots in the spring, in March, and the eVect in terms of presentation, public image, there was a that that has had. Of course the Secretary-General of degree of complacency in the way in which UNMIK the UN commissioned a report on that process and had been running Kosovo; of course that was back its eVect and some of the conclusions were in March and it was already in eVect entering the particularly striking which are worth dwelling on, sixth year of UN administration, or was soon to particularly the comment that after the riot, the enter it at that time. That was a problem; an report said, if there is insuYcient progress, it will be impression was created among the population at a very hard, if not impossible, to repair the damage time when frustrations were building up, precisely caused by the March violence. Then, in regard to the because the issue has been shelved, at least for the international community, the point was made that time being, the issue of Kosovo status and this is why the international community is today seen by those frustrations built up among the Albanians. It Kosovo Albanians as having gone from opening the is ironic, of course, in a sense that the March events, way to now standing in the way and it is seen by the tragic events actually occurred only three the Kosovo Serbs as having gone from securing the months after the UN had started a process, a rather return of so many, to being unable to ensure the tentative process, whereby they outlined a timetable return of so few. That is a rather chilling situation to which will take us in the middle of 2005 to a review be in. The particular question I really want to ask of the achievements of the UN administration and of you on that basis is that given that the UN mission the local elected authorities in terms of democracy has been severely criticised following the March building, the rule of law, inter-ethnic tolerance, riots which left 19 dead and many more injured, security for the minorities and so on a review which where was it that UNMIK fell short of its will then lead on, if it is a positive assessment, obligations? perhaps in early 2006 to the start of discussions Dr Eyal: I think the failure was on almost every about final status. The problem was that to most count and there are some severe lessons to be people on the ground back in March this year, learned. First, there was a political failure: most of because of this air of complacency that I have us turned our eyes away to places like Iraq and already mentioned, because of the lack of visible elsewhere and Kosovo was assumed to have been progress on the ground, there was a sense in which one of the world’s inherently insoluble problems, so they could see no advance, no progress and the why deal with it today. It was a chilling reminder situation then in a sense meant that there was this that it is a very immediate problem and it is now. trigger, this violent incident, or supposedly violent Secondly, there was the assumption that somehow incident against Albanian boys. Then, of course, it we were the victims of our own slogans and the suddenly all erupted and this was a lesson which has famous slogan being “standards before status”—get since been learned. I think there is now a sense in standards of government operating before we which the UN authorities are trying to impress on discuss the status—without realising that one is people that things are moving ahead and, of course, completely intertwined with the other. Thirdly, the it is up to the local authorities and the local rules of engagement of NATO were rather poor, communities to try to work out ways in which they both in terms of the explicit rules of engagement and can ensure that those standards are actually met. in terms of the way that they were executed. Finally, there was almost no early alert system when Albanian controlled media started spewing out Q13 Mr Chidgey: I think we now take it as read that racist news about alleged murders of young the March riot demonstrated the failure of the Albanian children by Serbs. There was almost no concept of standards before status, but how important and how pressing is the status issue in 1 United Nations Mission in Kosovo. Kosovo? Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 9
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal
Mr Partos: I would not say that they demonstrated women for prostitution. There is a view that this is the failure of standards before status: if you do away flourishing because of the fact that Kosovo is in with the standards what are you left with? Are you some sort of legal limbo, but whatever it is, it is a saying that you can just get on and have talks, cause of great concern amongst many people in the irrespective of the situation, for example the security European Union, to the extent that there are many situation, regarding the Serb minority? I think it is who believe that the very stability of the European more a question of focusing on those standards, Union is threatened by this flourishing of organised streamlining them and I think this is something that crime from Kosovo. What shall we do? UNMIK is now trying to do, to make it more Mr Partos: I think that the issue should not be seen comprehensible to people who have not necessarily in isolation. Kosovo may be one of the centres of got the political sophistication to go through the 140 organised crime, but I think that wherever you look pages of standards on this or that area and so on, but in the region, and Serbia already cropped up in that just need to have some headline notions of what context earlier in this discussion, we have problems exactly needs to be done on the ground. My and Albania is another one and Macedonia too and understanding is that the standards issue is still there Bosnia and so on and so forth. It is a regional issue; and it is still very strong, not only because it is a kind organised crime knows no boundaries and in of cliche´ or a slogan, but also because it needs to be fact there has been very good evidence and part of any equitable settlement. documentation of cooperation even during the Bosnian war between the warring sides, as they were Q14 Mr Chidgey: Dr Eyal, would you agree with described, at the level of smuggling, organised crime that? and so on. I think the answer, if there is a simple Dr Eyal: Up to a point. I was one of the school of answer to your question—What do you do?—is first thought that believed that the question of status of all, to tackle this issue not on a regional or really should be ignored, that we should concentrate national level, by region I meant an entity level, but on stabilising the province and that we should do on a broad regional level across the Western Balkans more or less what we have done in Bosnia. Very few as part of a much wider network. Many of those who people believed in the Dayton Accord; everyone are being traded, I mean the white slave trade, in fact implemented it in the hope that one day we would the victims, come from Moldova, for example, or cease to have to implement it. So I have assumed a Ukraine, further to the east and north and end up similar approach. I am beginning to believe now that quite often in Western Europe, in this country or in the issue cannot be held much longer. The diYculty Italy or elsewhere, so it all has to be part of a much we have is, as my colleague was suggesting, how to broader international co-operation. On that issue, tie in the two; the question of timing is of less the British Foreign OYce has taken a lead role, importance to me. I do believe that by 2005 we have along with other EU countries, in terms of to face the question of the status, mainly because for local politicians it has become a justification for not organising cooperation meetings, conferences, doing anything. So the question of the disposition technical know-how, intelligence sharing, all these has to be faced, we are in much calmer water with are important, but ultimately it will be slightly naı¨ve other permanent members of the UN Security to expect any dramatic improvement in the Council, because let us not forget the question of situation, short of two developments. One is what we status implies a change in the UN Security Council saw in Serbia last year, a state of emergency, which resolution of the summer of 1999 at the end of that was of course applicable after the assassination of war. It is not a simple matter, it needs to be decided the prime minister, but you cannot apply that left, by Beijing and Moscow as well as by Paris, London right and centre. Secondly, and this is a much slower and Washington. I suspect that we can reach . . . process, a marked improvement in living standards There is an understanding in Belgrade as well that across the region. While people often have high the status question cannot by postponed ad levels of unemployment, little choice in terms of infinitum. The diYcultly is twofold: first the diYculty employment— of execution. How do you tell people that you are not going to move too fast on status, because if you do, you are basically going to prevent all the Q16 Chairman: Do you agree with that? A brief advances that you can do on standards? You can response, if you would. also give the Albanians the assumption that it was Dr Eyal: The presence of international forces is precisely because of the riots that we are now moving probably the right approach at the moment. I do not to discussing the status. At the same time, the second accept the argument that they may be part of the one is one of form. How do you manage to make it problem: they are part of the solution. Increasing the very clear that status has to come at a price of further level of employment, which is increasing very, very advancement in the institutions? We have failed to slowly, is clearly another element, so is the build-up pass the test. of the local police force. The moves have been rather hesitant; they have been taken but they have been Q15 Mr Chidgey: Finally on Kosovo. An area of rather hesitant. If you wish, it is a classic answer to great concern, not only in this country, but I think why the question of standards has to come up at the throughout the EU, has been the growth of same time as the question of status. Status without organised crime emanating from Kosovo standards would plunge the region into a sort of wild particularly in the traYcking of drugs and young East of Europe. Ev 10 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal
Q17 Andrew Mackinlay: It strikes me that if numbers and I think that is why it is so essential to Montenegro were to take independence, and I can re-double the eVorts which have been made and try understand both the likelihood of it, and I can to encourage Serbs, those who wish to go back, at understand from their point of view the prudence of the very least to reclaim their property and to be it, but if they were to do that, surely that would able, if they want, to stay on and to provide the kind increase the feeling in Serbia, their whole traditional of security which, at the moment, clearly is lacking. feeling of owning Kosovo? At the present time this What I think might be an interesting or potentially fragile federation dilutes that feeling does it not? But unintended result, if there were indeed a successful surely once Montenegro goes, then nationalism, attempt to return Serbs in large numbers to Kosovo, pride, call it what you like, will just increase in might be to settle the issue and tie it in with Kosovo’s relation to the historic feeling that Serbia has for the status. Indeed the Kosovo Albanians, who are so real estate of Kosovo. determined, adamant, that they want independence, Dr Eyal: I am not sure. I think that there will be a might, if they saw the opportunity for independence, much deeper disappointment among Serbs about then become, let us put it like this, more generous to the fact that the state which used to be respected in their Serb neighbours on the grounds that this would Europe, which they regarded as being large and be their land, as they would see it, or their state and influential, has now been reduced to borders last the Serbs would now be a minority, so they might as seen some time during the nineteenth century. There well allow them back and provide a degree of is clearly a sense of defeat there, which is shared even security, especially if that is a condition of Kosovo by educated people in Belgrade and certainly by the becoming independent, whereas in the situation masses, but I am not sure that the two are connected. now, with Kosovo in limbo, it is more diYcult to There is also very strong feeling in Belgrade that the encourage the Albanians to behave in that sort of question of Serbia’s own identity in Europe will way towards the minority. never be properly answered as long as they are encumbered by all these loose federations and associations. There are people in Belgrade who say Q19 Andrew Mackinlay: The thing we have not “You want to go your own way? Goodbye”; there talked about is the aspiration for European Union are people like that as well. I do not think that is membership. It seemed to me, just picking up from anyone connected so much to the question of the example we were talking about, and it is true of Kosovo, which is seen in quite a diVerent light. the other countries, that whatever our views on Where I do think there is a connection is between the European Union, conflict resolution, or Kosovo and the status of the Serb population in minimisation of potential conflict, is by sheer Bosnia where a lot of people would argue privately, mobility, free mobility of labour so people can work or not oYcially, that they could say goodbye to in various places but still have their weekend home Kosovo tomorrow from their perspective, if they back in their communities. This is the thing which is were allowed in return a closer relationship with probably one of the potential blocks to rebuilding Republika Srbska, namely the Serbs of Bosnia. this area and yet it seems to me that the EU are not uttering this to any great extent. There does not seem to be much talk about this carrot of European Union Q18 Andrew Mackinlay: We presumably agree that membership for all these countries or territories. none of us believe that ethnic cleansing should pay Dr Eyal: The carrot is, if you wish, implicit rather or really endure, though certainly in 1945 there was than explicit. It is obvious to a lot of countries that an irreversible shift in the European map. It seems to the progress, very rapid progress, made by Croatia me that the European Union and others would have for instance in the last year on the road to a dilemma: when we come to look at final status, membership is actually an example which needs to there would be the question of the Serbs returning to be followed. It is very painfully felt by the other their farms and properties in Kosovo and the communities of the region and you are right in dilemma is that all you do is re-invent the same saying that the European Union has not been problem as before. Are we not really going to have, explicit with this carrot. The reason is very simple: as a Western community a dilemma, particularly as some of the initial obstacles to a normal discourse probably our long-term objective is to bring those have not been removed and therefore there is no countries into the European Union? How do we deal point, even in discussing these theoretical things. with restitution? The Committee is looking at However, the advances made only in the last few another part of the world, Cyprus, and we know how weeks by Croatia to a status as a candidate country that whole plan has slightly imploded because that are clearly enormously powerful. I have not met could not be satisfied. Is that not really going to be anyone in the region who believes that they can a tremendous hurdle for us? somehow find an existence outside this European Mr Partos: Yes of course is it, and you see that also Union: I have met a lot of people who believe that in the possible impact—which both of us were they will be admitted on their own terms, rather than suggesting would not be a major impact—on Bosnia Brussels’s terms. On the subject of the return of and the Bosnian Serbs. If Montenegro or Kosovo people, free movement of people, I am not sure that were to go independent, would that not encourage even Croats, who are so far advanced from that the Bosnian Serbs to try once again? Yes, I think it region, are actually aware that the ultimate outcome is an issue and I think more directly it would aVect of their membership may be that all the ethnic Serbs the status of Kosovo. You could argue that the Serbs they have kept out of the country would be perfectly have not been able to go back there in any large entitled to return: there have been some comments Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 11
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal on it; but they do not understand it. I find it Dr Eyal: Or fail on a technicality. I agree with you inconceivable, however, that there will be any status however that they would tear up the entire delicate agreement on Kosovo which does not include a balance which has been maintained more than we provision about the right of return for the Serbian expected since the Ohrid deal. minority and I will remind members of this Committee that there is also the open sore in the Q24 Chairman: Mr Partos, do you agree? tragedy of the roma people who were hounded out Mr Partos: I agree on the whole and it is in a sense of the region and on whose behalf nobody speaks. I ironic that when you are almost facing the last step, find it inconceivable that there would not be a right the last piece in the jigsaw as far as Ohrid is of return. It would probably be mitigated in the case concerned, the last major piece in the jigsaw, let us of the Albanians, by a right of compensation instead put it like that, everything else having been taken of return. care of, such as proportional representation for Albanians, building up the police, the security Q20 Chairman: Before I call Sir John to question on forces, public services, language use and so on, all Bosnia Herzegovina, some questions on Macedonia. these having been settled, it would in some ways be We know of the enormous tensions which tragic for Macedonia if this last piece of jigsaw were culminated in the Ohrid framework agreement in not to be put in place. I think that on the whole, even August 2001. We know of the considerable progress if the majority of those who turn up and take part in made there, in part due to the leadership of President the referendum vote against the decentralisation Trajkovski. Now we are at the point of the plans, there will be ways in which Macedonia and referendum, which is to be held on 7 November, the Macedonian Government—and successive relating to the decentralisation portion of the governments have been able to negotiate through framework agreement. Is it your view that the people inter-ethnic coalitions and so on—might go back to of Macedonia recognise the fundamental dangers of the drawing board and come up with some other a “yes” vote in that referendum, which could put in similar arrangement and try to push that through. I question the whole of the framework agreement and think that what is very likely to happen, in one way indeed put a big question mark over both their or another, is that things are going to be slowed NATO and their EU aspirations? down, “things” being, of course, the Ohrid Dr Eyal: My personal impression is that people do agreement being put completely in place, finalised, recognise it. What people, if one can refer to the implemented and, of course, Macedonia’s majority of the population of the republic, do not integration with the EU, which ultimately is seem to agree on is what the Ohrid Agreement essential for the country’s prosperity. actually meant. Did it mean a protection of a minority, an exalted status for a minority within the state, or did it ultimately mean a state for two ethnic Q25 Sir John Stanley: As far as Bosnia Herzegovina groups? Indirectly this is the question which is is concerned, as you know, the absolute top priorities seeking an answer supposedly— for their government, with all three ethnic groups absolutely agreed on this, is NATO membership plus V EU membership. There is nothing implicit about Q21 Chairman: But the direct e ect of the this: this is totally explicit. Indeed in Sarajevo referendum would be to put the reform of a local recently, I was very impressed about the strength of government structure right back to 1995, which the EU organisation there with EU ambassador and everyone agrees is wholly anachronistic, with local staV and so on really trying to help the new communes of 500 or so. government through the early stages of the EU Dr Eyal: Absolutely. membership process and the same was true on the NATO side. However, in both cases, the key Q22 Chairman: It would therefore surely wholly stumbling block is getting agreement of the EU on undermine the framework agreement. the one hand, NATO on the other, to the fact that Dr Eyal: Absolutely, there is no doubt about it and Bosnia Herzegovina is compliant with its that message was put by every government. What I international obligations and of course that centres am not entirely sure about is whether the message most particularly on the International Criminal seeped to the population. Let us not forget, that for Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY. The the majority Macedonian population, there was a question I want to put to you is that it appears that whiV of opposition to the Ohrid Agreement; there the EU and NATO are setting the bar of this was a feeling that this agreement was somehow particular high jump at slightly diVerent levels, pulled out of them by the threat of violence and there possibly significantly diVerent levels. The NATO bar has been resentment over tiny issues like, for appears, under strong American influence, to be set instance, languages used on the cover of a passport. at the point where NATO is saying “You have to get EVectively what they boil down to is whether Mladic and Karadzic in the bag, behind bars and Macedonia is a state for the Macedonian majority then we will think about you getting into the with an Albanian protected minority, or a state of partnership for peace” which of course is the gateway two ethnic groups? We are coming back to that one. through to NATO. The EU, on the other hand, is My guess is that I hope that the referendum will be setting the bar arguably lower by saying “We will rejected. take you into a stabilisation and assistance programme, SAp, on the same basis as we allowed Q23 Chairman: Or not meet the 50%. Croatia in”. In other words, “You get Carla del Ev 12 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal
Ponte to sign up on the paper saying you are apply that in terms of political conditioning is compliant and if it’s good enough for Carla del another matter for the governments to decide. I Ponte, it’s good enough for us”. I want to ask would say that in my view at least an attempt to try whether you think the British Government should be to arrest them, which is seen as a genuine attempt, setting the position for entry for both NATO and the would be essential to speed up the reform process. EU on the basis of getting Mladic and Karadzic Without it, things will take much longer. behind bars, or do you think the British Government’s position should be the EU one, which Q26 Sir John Stanley: Do you think it is fair or is that if Carla del Ponte is willing to sign up that they reasonable to make Bosnia Herzegovina’s entry into are complaint, they should be allowed to go forward? either NATO or the EU dependent on capturing war Dr Eyal: I would say neither, if I may say so. First of criminals, however intensely desirable, who all Mrs del Ponte’s remit ends at the end of this year. themselves may be spending much of the time, or There is a limit to how many more indictments she possibly most of the time out of the country and can issue which expire at the end of this year. Now, therefore not within the grasp of the government that is a good side actually, because it could reassure concerned? all those countries. One of the reasons that a lot of Dr Eyal: No, I do not think that. Clearly the pressure those countries were reticent about cooperating was of all Western governments was towards Belgrade. that it seemed to them to be a never-ending process. There is absolutely no question that the arrest of They delivered, as they saw it, a number of suspects, either Mr Karadzic or Mladic is only going to only to be confronted by yet another list. Now, I happen with the assistance of the military don’t think that Mrs del Ponte, as such, is the critical intelligence of Serbia and with the direct order of element. I think that the British position should be, politicians in Belgrade. I think that Bosnia, quite that there should be considerable progress in frankly, is a bystander to this process. So in a way, handing over the alleged war criminals, which must the Bosnians are right to feel victimised, but one has include at least one of the two names that you have to be more careful about the implications. It is rather mentioned, but that the subsequent cooperation easy to suggest that Bosnia and the treatment of could be left, and indeed strengthened, in increasing Bosnia should be completely separated from that of involvement by us. What I mean is that you should Serbia. It is logical and just to make that suggestion, not stop and say “We are doing nothing until all the but in practice what we are engaged in is a very people on the list are delivered”. There has to be a careful balancing act of reassuring the Serbs of delivery of one of the top people on that list as an Bosnia that they are not completely detached from example of the willingness to cooperate. It is not Serbia and that there is some linkage, even if it is not Bosnia itself that should be a victim. What I wanted oYcial, between the future disposition of Bosnia and to say about Bosnia is that it is a very tight, very the future disposition of Serbia. Any other policy diYcult job to try on the one hand to encourage the will make the management of Bosnia’s internal country and, at the same time, not to hold them up politics ten times worse. I am not pretending that it to blackmail by Republika Srbska, the Serb is a very clever policy: I am merely suggesting that it controlled area, which may refuse to cooperate on is a doable one. one of these issues. I know that the Bosnians were very disappointed by the fact that they had failed in Q27 Ms Stuart: Following on from Sir John’s point, what they were seeking to achieve at the Istanbul I was rather puzzled by Dr Eyal’s almost implication summit of NATO. I would suggest that the that there was choice as to whether you could hand discussion should go much more on technicalities over one or two of these serious criminals and now rather than principles. For instance, the whether that was really the right test. I have a sense Bosnian defence ministry was established about six a lot of activity is going on without achievement. Am to eight months ago; it has yet to function. The I right in assuming that the only people who border police are functioning now and seem to be probably have real political clout are not actually the Y rather e cient, but that is in its infancy. We are at a EU, but the United States? very early stage. I would suggest that talking about Dr Eyal: Not necessarily. Actually the European technicalities is more important than the principles Union has an enormous amount of influence in some and I would not give Mrs del Ponte the ultimate veto particular countries like the United Kingdom. It is of our involvement. not a secret that the United Kingdom is viewed by Mr Partos: What I would add to this is that General many Serbs as being the most recalcitrant in their Mladic and Mr Karadzic are symbols of the utmost eyes, or the most insistent on the handover of all the importance. And for any kind of progress towards people whose names are printed on any of Carla del NATO or EU membership, or indeed the reforms Ponte’s lists. I am not sure that Washington actually, which are part of bringing the diVerent entities of despite the fact that it of course can block almost any Bosnia together to make it into a genuinely path in terms of NATO, or indeed in terms of functioning state to succeed—and to succeed within international organisations’ access to cash, is the the next few years rather than being dragged out for main player as far as Belgrade is concerned. They do another long period with implementation already look upon London as one of the main players and it under way for nine years—it is essential that those is true to say that they assume in Belgrade that Paris symbols of the war in Bosnia, of the divisions and and Berlin are perhaps a bit more, shall we say, the ethnic cleansing are dealt with through the flexible on how many war criminals can be handed mechanisms of international justice. How you can over. I am only giving my impressions about the way Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 13
12 October 2004 Mr Gabriel Partos and Dr Jonathan Eyal things are seen from Belgrade’s perspective. All I am Dr Eyal: Absolutely. At the end of the day, what I saying is that I do not believe for a moment that we am saying is that it would be a package deal which can wait until the entire list of indictees is handed would have to have a large element of handing over over. That is never going to happen. Let me remind those who have now become absolute symbols of the you that has not happened in the case of Croatia horrors of the 1990s. At the same time, I think either. Very often, the diVerence between Croatia everyone accepts, although not publicly, that once and Serbia is that the Croats have made the right this is done, we are in a diVerent world and we can noises, while the Serbs have not even done that. move much faster, even if, sadly, not every name on the list would be ticked oV at the end of the day. Q28 Chairman: The fact is that those noises have Chairman: Gentlemen, we have kept you in the field been suYcient to persuade Carla del Ponte that they for some good time and you have been extremely have used their best endeavours in the case of helpful. May I thank you both on behalf of the Croatia, hence Britain withdrew its objections in Committee? respect of the agreement.
Written evidence submitted by Professor James Pettifer, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Introduction The following observations are submitted concerning the major political, economic and military developments in the southern Balkan region in the recent period, and are focussed on developments in Kosovo, one of my main areas of professional expertise, in particular on the approaching period of political decision concerning the status of Kosovo. The memorandum will be divided into four parts: I. The general situation in the region. II. Kosovo—the key to stability. III. Current developments in Kosovo and Former Yugoslav Macedonia. IV. The role of the international community.
I. The General Situation in the Region After the overthrow of the Milosevic regime in autumn 2000, there was expected to be a period of rapid progress and stabilisation in southeast Europe, and in particular in Yugoslavia itself. Earlier in that year there had been a crackdown on the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, and a tightening of control by the United Nations and NATO through the KFOR forces. It was expected that the democratisation of Serbia would lead to a reduction of tension between Serbia and Kosovo, and a reduction in ethnic and social tensions within Kosovo itself. EVorts to promote a better atmosphere were headed by European Union attempts to persuade Montenegro to drop independence ambitions and a new Federation between Serbia and Montenegro was brokered to replace Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milosevic himself was arrested and sent to the IWCT at the Hague. In reality many of the hopes of the international community associated with this event have proved to be over-optimistic and ill-founded. The short war in Former Yugoslav Macedonia (FYROM) in spring- summer 2001 illustrated the uncertain future of that state and the poor ethnic relations between the Macedonian majority and the 25% Albanian minority. Relations between Serbia and Kosovo remain unchanged. Independence ambitions remain central to the political outlook of the 95% ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, and are also returning to the political agenda in Montenegro, where the three year Federation agreement with Serbia expires in late 2005. The position of the 80,000 Serbian minority in Kosovo remains uncertain outside the Serbian enclave in north Mitrovice and Leposavic opstina, and refugee return has to all intents and purposes stopped after the serious rioting this year in the third week in March. The general situation in the region remains dominated by the aftermath of the wars of the ex-Yugoslav succession, economic crises of varying severity, and the continuance of a number of conflicts in ethnic and national relations where without the presence of the military forces of NATO, further outbreaks of violence would be possible, perhaps likely. The northern republics closest to the European Union have seen the most progress, principally Slovenia and Croatia, while those in the centre and south of the peninsular have seen least. In these conditions of economic crisis and regional stringency, organised crime has been seen as a major problem by the international community and considerable police resources have been given to combating traYcking of people and hard drugs and cigarettes, with varying degrees of success. Ev 14 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
The most positive aspects in this period have been the movement towards the European Union in nearly all states, with varying degrees of progress in diVerent countries, the integration of the majority of local armed forces either into the NATO Partnership for Peace programme, or at least dialogue with NATO where this is not possible, and a degree of demobilisation of excessively large local armed forces and paramilitary organisations. There has been progress towards the implementation of the Ochrid Accords in FYROM, to provide a platform for state reform and democratisation, and extensive privatisation of industry in Serbia and Montenegro. The main negative factors are the very high and often still rising degree of unemployment, economic stagnation, corruption and the all pervasive nature of traditional “Balkan” political cultures based on nationalist extremism of various kinds. The role of the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague remains controversial, and many indicted suspects remain at large. A new negative factor in the aftermath of the events of September 2001 in the United States and subsequent terrorist activity worldwide is the possibility that in the future the numerous and diverse Islamic populations in the region may be infiltrated by outside terrorist organisations. The Balkan Islamic groups are, outside of Bosnia, overwhelmingly concentrated in the south of the peninsular, and to date all follow moderate leaders. A quite small terrorist event could though in some circumstances, in some Balkan nations, act as a trigger for quite disproportionate political eVects.
II. Kosovo—The Key to Stability In the view of most regional observers Kosovo is the main Balkan challenge facing the international community in the short term. The serious rioting and associated population movement in March this year illustrated the potential for violence and inter-ethnic conflict that still exists and highlighted a number of serious failures in the current governance and security structures set up by the international community in 1999. Although the riots took two days to build up, the United Nations UNMIK administration appeared impotent to influence the direction of events, and although opinions on details diVer, there must be considerable concern about the practical capacity of the police and the NATO KFOR force to control the streets of Kosovo in the face of future mass demonstrations by the 95% ethnic Albanian majority. The ethnic Albanians and the Serbs have ample access to small arms, and in any repeat of the riots where the political background was that of KFOR/UNMIK appearing to try to prevent independence there could be heavy loss of life. The refugee return process of Serbs and other minority groups has stopped, in the main, and there are very few non-Serbs living in the northern Mitrovice/Leposavic enclave. The UNMIK minorities policy of 1999–2003 is to all intents and purposes dead apart from small numbers of displaced people from the March riots returning to their homes. The riots took place against a background of political progress in the previous eighteen months, with some refugee return, the improved functioning of the Kosovo Parliament, the opening of new government ministries, improved functioning of the Kosovo Police Service and the Kosovo Protection Corps, and a marked fall in the crime rate, so that, if political assassinations are not included, the murder and serious crime rate in Kosovo is better than in many European Union cities and regions. Although the riots were a very negative landmark for the Albanian majority in terms of international image, they did not slow the transfer of competencies from UNMIK to local hands, and in the view of some observers this process has actually accelerated this summer. In practice more and more government functions are being given up by the United Nations, and there has been a withdrawal of both military and civilian personnel. The timetable for evaluation of the so-called “Standards before Status” policy culminates in summer 2005, in nine months, a time when a series of criteria that the Kosovo Albanians are supposed to meet before political status can be decided runs out. In the main the standards concerned are those of normal European states, in terms of ethnic relations, tolerance and so on. Critics of the standards platform say that very few ex-colonies or new countries formed since 1945 have met all these standards, and that compliance is unrealistic, and in particular they were not met in other Balkan countries such as Croatia and Bosnia that achieved independence. Their defenders claim that in practice many of them are drafted in loose wording and progress towards achieving them can be evaluated in diVerent ways. In Serbia, with the renewal of nationalism over the last year, there has been resistance in the Parliament and government to the prospect of the loss of Kosovo if independence is granted, and the proactive line in international relations from the Putin government in Russia has strengthened the hand of hardliners in Belgrade. It seems extremely diYcult to see any Serbian government agreeing to independence in the present atmosphere and it is an unfortunate aspect of the uncritical support (particularly by the UK) given to post- Milosevic Serbian governments that there are now few “carrots” (in terms of money or readmission to international bodies) available to the international community to trade for agreement to Kosovo independence. The one really significant method to influence hardline Serb nationalists, the abandonment of the activity of the ICTY in the Hague is probably not a political possibility at the moment. The ICTY is seen by Western intelligence services as a main pressure point to control the direction of events in Bosnia and as an agent of conflict resolution giving continued life to the Dayton Accords. The events of the last year have shown that Kosovo is now irreversibly on the path to independence, but there is little sense that the international community has a policy to bring this about. The danger of the current situation is that the time of initial decision is not far away, in 2005, and an unenviable series of political options exists. Anything short of full independence is unacceptable to the vast majority of Kosovo Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 15
Albanians, and if it was openly refused there is a real possibility, perhaps likelihood, that Kosovo would become rapidly ungovernable. It is very likely that the Parliament would declare independence, and although this could be ruled illegal and outside its competencies by the United Nations, such a declaration would be very popular. Another possibility is that an illegal referendum on independence would be organised. Although KFOR and the police would in theory have the technical capacity to stop it taking place, it would be highly divisive and practically very diYcult to do so. The de facto policy followed recently has been to allow the transfer of competencies without antagonising Belgrade unduly, but there are limits to this policy in terms of the status issue. At some point soon the IC is going to have to face the decision issue, and the military and security dimension such as border security, always a key issue in the Balkan region. The Kosovo Albanian political leadership envisage a long-term partnership with NATO to provide functional security structures for Kosovo and its neighbours, but the abolition, in time, of the current KFOR mandate. While this is a responsible policy that should be strongly welcomed, it has the disadvantage that to change the KFOR mandate requires UN Security Council agreement, which given the current policies of Russia and possibly China may be hard to achieve. But in the current climate, the status quo is not an option, either.
III. Current Developments in Kosovo and Former Yugoslav Macedonia At the moment an election campaign for the Kosovo Parliament is in progress. Kosovo elections have been orderly and successful since the first local elections in autumn 2000 and there is no reason to expect diYculties now. It is not clear if the Serbian leadership will endorse participation, but whether they do or not, Serb turnout is likely to be low. Other Kosovo minorities, such as the Turks and some of the Roma are expected to participate fairly fully. Many Serbs feel that the March riots and the vandalism and attacks on their religious buildings and houses were the last straw, and significant numbers south of the Ibar river that divides Mitrovice are hanging on until the political status decision in the hope of financially favourable terms for relocation. Many are consequently not much interested in participating in Kosovo institutions. The main exception to this view is in the majority Serb group north of the Ibar river, much of which is still controlled by “parallel structures” directly influenced and led by hard-line nationalist politicians in Belgrade. The UN and French KFOR has never achieved eVective control of this part of Kosovo since 1999 and there is little reason to expect it to do so now. Thus the question of partition inevitably arises. Partition as a future policy has its supporters within the international community, but its superficial attractions conceal many dangers. The most important objections are those concerned with setting the principle of a change of borders determined by ethnicity, which could easily serve as a precedent for the division of other regional states of which FYROM and Bosnia are the most obvious candidates. The borders of Kosovo have been set for many years and have remained unchanged (except for the Presevo valley under Tito) despite the bitter divisions between Serbs and Albanians about the future of the territory. If partition was made on the basis of the Ibar river, it is very likely that the Albanians would reopen the Presevo valley issue that was subject to violent dispute between 1999 and 2001. It is also possible that the strong separatist tendency in some parts of the Macedonian Albanian community in western FYRoM would seek to split FYRoM. Partition was favoured in some periods by the Milosevic regime as it would enable the Serbs to hold onto the mineral wealth of northern Kosovo. It is also worth noting that partition would never be accepted by at least some, perhaps a large majority of Albanians and there would be a strong likelihood of underground armed resistance to the policy, along the lines of the Free State/Republican division in Ireland in the 1920’s and the birth of the IRA. Thus a contested partition would lead to a new security problem for the IC, of having to police what in practice is a new internal border where significant groups on either side of the ethnic divide do not accept it. It is of course arguable, from the military and security point of view, that this problem will be inevitable in some shape or form because whatever happens there will be a new “border” to police. The great advantage, though, from the military point of view, of a full declaration of independence under existing borders is that whatever diYculties there might be with population movement a new UN mandated international force would be operating in a clear legal climate to maintain an existing border rather than try to force compliance with a new one. KFOR has a structure of installations on the current Kosovo border roads that could easily be reinforced in the inevitably tense period that will accompany the political status decisions. There has been some illegal eVorts by the Albanians to demarcate the border in the many wild and forested areas involved, mainly by tree felling. It is inevitable that this will continue. In Former Yugoslav Macedonia a referendum is being held this autumn called by a section of the Slav- Macedonian Opposition against aspects of the Ochrid Accords, mainly the proposed reorganisation and empowerment of local municipalities. The Slavs see this as giving major advances to the 25% Albanian minority and endangering the influence of the Skopje government in Albanian-dominated western FYRoM localities. The referendum requires a high percentage of population participation and is unlikely to succeed in blocking the implementation of this aspect of the Ochrid Agreement, but the fact that it is being held at all is indicative of the high level of political tension in the state. There are still serious question marks about the long term future of the FYRoM state, which remains open to both internal destabilisation, mainly connected to Kosovo and Presevo, and external pressures from its neighbours. The name issue with Greece remains unresolved. Ev 16 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Elsewhere in the region, the Albanian factor in politics is growing. Albanians continue to agitate against what are seen as human rights abuses in Montenegro and various other diYculties such as World War II property restitution in the Cameria region of Northwest Greece. The former is likely to be subsumed within the wider decision period that is approaching over the future of Montenegro in late 2005 when the current EU-brokered three year agreement on the Serbia-Montenegro Federation runs out, and is not likely to be significant or destabilising. This may not be the case with Cameria. The Cameria problem assumed a central status in Albanian political life in the summer of this year, and although a vote to commit the Albanian government to a forward policy was just defeated in the Tirana Parliament, the intense commitment of sections of the powerful Albanian Diaspora to this issue and the unwillingness of Greece to end the formal state of war that still exists between Greece and Albania and then pay World War II compensation to the Cams under international law is storing up many problems for the future. The Greek tourist industry is very vulnerable to disruption over this issue, particularly on the island of Corfu, where it is the largest single source of revenue.
IV. The Role of the International Community In the last three years, since the Ochrid Accords, the international community has not given the Balkans much priority. The signature of the Ochrid Accords in August 2001 almost exactly coincided with the beginning of the War on Terrorism, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has deprived the region of publicity and many qualified international personnel. The Bush administration has not appointed a top level Balkan envoy, in the role Richard Holbrooke played in the Clinton administration, and many policy decisions devolved to individual Ambassadors. The same process took place in the UK in some aspects, so that, for instance, policy moved in a much more pro-Serb direction in the 2000–03 period, before the realities of the Belgrade events of autumn 2000 began to become more apparent. The period of decision over Kosovo and the warning bell of the March riots this year should give cause for reconsideration of this policy. Without the firm and unequivocal participation of the United States at the right level, any kind of political progress is unlikely and there is a real possibility that some random and quite possibly minor event may, in classic Balkan terms, start a chain of causation that means events move out of control. The United States is the only outside power the ethnic Albanians and Bosnian Muslims trust and without US leadership in the region stability cannot be assured. Despite years of painstaking eVort, the European Union has yet to throw oV the heritage of past political failure and psychological dependence on a model of the Balkans based on centralism with inscribed predominance for Serbia. Professor James Pettifer Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Written evidence submitted by Dr David Chandler, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster
Bosnia:From Dayton to Europe without Democracy Many commentators suggest that the transition to Bosnian ownership has been held back by the Dayton framework, which created a weak central state and a country divided into two separate Entities, the Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation, with 10 cantonal governments, as well as an autonomous region, Brcko. Nine years on, the idea that the post-war transition has been frustrated by a surfeit of Bosnian governing institutions, protected by their Dayton status, could not be further from the truth. Rather, the international powers of administration, under the OYce of the High Representative, have been vastly increased, reducing the Bosnian institutions established by Dayton to administrative shells. There has been a transition away from Dayton, but this has been from the ad hoc regulatory controls of the self-selected “coalition of the willing”, the Peace Implementation Council, towards an expanded framework of European Union regulation, covering all aspects of the post-Dayton process. Dayton has been a “moveable feast”, with external institutions rewriting their mandates and powers. But despite the transformation in post-Dayton mechanisms, it is still too early to talk of any indications of a shift towards Bosnian “ownership”. The Dayton agreement provides little guidance for understanding the extension of international mandates nor the mechanisms of international administration over the new state. This is because the agreement was ostensibly a treaty between the regional parties and not formally a treaty between the international agencies and the government of BiH. The Dayton agreement was rigid where it concerned the limits to BiH self-rule but extremely flexible in relation to the powers which international actors could exercise over this nominally independent state. This flexibility has been exemplified by the extension of the powers of the OYce of the High Representative (OHR). Former High Representative Carlos Westendorp explained this process as one which has no fixed limits: “if you read Dayton very carefully . . . Annex 10 even gives me the possibility to Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 17
interpret my own authorities and powers”. The pattern of ad hoc and arbitrary extensions of international regulatory authority was initially set by the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council itself as it rewrote its own powers and those of the High Representative at successive PIC meetings. By 1999, the PIC and the OHR had accumulated an array of powers unimagined in 1995 when the Dayton agreement was signed. Yet, despite the new mandates and the indefinite extension of the power to impose legislation and to dismiss non-compliant oYcials, the international state-builders appeared to be running out of ideas. The international bureaucracy increasingly appeared to be running the country with little purpose or legitimacy. The war over Kosovo, and the more interventionist approach of the European Union to the region which followed, finally provided the international administrators with a new source of legitimacy. This legitimacy was not to come from any new attempt to involve or engage with the people of BiH, but from the promise of guiding the small and economically impoverished state to the pot of gold that was held to come with EU membership. Prior to 2000, the EU had been closely involved in the work of the OYce of the High Representative, but the EU played a subordinate and supporting role within the PIC Dayton framework rather than dictating its own terms. From 2000 onwards this relationship was to be reversed. The flexibility of the Dayton framework was to be fully revealed as the mechanisms of regulation shifted informally from the PIC to the EU and, without the need for any formal consultation of the people of BiH, Dayton gradually was to become subordinate to the requirements for eventual EU membership. Even more remarkable, the “temporary” powers of international policy-imposition under the OHR were to be transferred to the EU itself, operating on its own behalf. In eVect, the EU would be mandated to negotiate with itself in determining every aspect of policy-making in Bosnia. The transfer of power to the EU more directly can be seen in the OHR’s 2002 reform of the Council of Ministers with the post of Chairman of the Council no longer subject to eight month rotation but held for the whole of the legislative period and becoming a central administrative role, involving responsibility for the work of the Directorate for European Integrations (DEI)—established under the same edict and charged with the task of preparing a strategy of European integration.1 The DEI has, in eVect, become the key executive body of BiH, supported in its operational structuring and institutional linkages by funding directly from the European Commission. The DEI is the main partner to the European Commission in the SAP and has been tasked with “special responsibilities”, including negotiating and supervising the implementation of agreements made with the EU. Based on the centrality of the EU accession process, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (CoM) has been granted a high level of executive authority, becoming the de facto BiH prime minister. The Chairman has the task of coordinating strategies and policies among state institutions and between entity governments and of ensuring the harmonisation of BiH laws with the “acquis communautaire” of the EU. His oYce has the assistance of EU advisors to draft new laws compliant with the acquis and to conduct the compliance check of all BiH proposed legislation. The strengthening of executive power through the new institution of the DEI has been an integral part of the transition to more direct EU involvement, which has necessitated the “re-branding” of the “anomalous” Bonn powers of the High Representative. Interestingly, the use of the Bonn Powers to impose legislation by edict is not necessarily seen as problematic for BiH’s closer integration into the EU. There is a clear danger of “double standards” in the EU turning a blind eye to the lack of democracy in BiH. For this reason, the November 2003 SAP progress report, seeks to downplay the undermining of democratic processes involved in the use of High Representative edicts. The EU suggests that this is often merely a matter of imposing “soft decisions”, alleging that the OHR steps in merely to follow up policies already agreed in advance. Closer informal EU cooperation with the DEI and the Chairman of the CoM means that “agreements” can then be imposed on governments at entity level without this appearing to be a “hard” exercise of coercive power. At the EU Thessalonica summit, in June 2003, additional instruments to enhance EU regulation in BiH were developed. These included a Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue aimed at reinforcing the convergence of positions on foreign policy questions to reach alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).2 The most important EU initiative, however, was the development of a new European Partnership, established to “enrich” and “intensify” the SAP, setting out BiH’s political, economic and other priorities.3 The Partnership priorities are divided into short-term, for one to two years, and medium-term, of three to four years, and include over 50 areas where policy-reforms are required to meet EU demands for “harmonisation”, from the reorganisation of political institutions and public administration to privatisation and sensitive economic programmes to remove “labour rigidities”, “implement bankruptcy legislation” and “lower the ratio between government expenditure and GDP”.
1 Law on the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, OYce of the High Representative, 3 Dec 2002. Available at: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content—id%28609. 2 European Commission, “Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union”, COM(2003) 692 final, Brussels, 18 Nov 2003, B.3.1. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external—relations/see/docs/com03—692—en.pdf. European Commission, “Report from the Commission to the Council” (see n51 above). 3 European Commission, “Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina”, COM(2004) yyy final, Brussels, no date. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external— relations/see/sap/rep3/part—bih.pdf. Ev 18 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
The priorities of the Partnership are based on the EU’s political and strategic priorities in the light of their assessments of the BiH government’s Annual Reports. However, it should be noted that there is no relationship of accountability or Bosnian “ownership” involved in this priority-setting process. The Partnership policy-guidelines only involve “informal consultations” with BiH representatives. The BiH government is then “expected to respond to the European Integration Partnerships by preparing and implementing Action Plans, with a timetable and details of how they intend to address the Partnership’s priorities”. The EU provides security, funds the international assistance, and runs the policy programmes for Bosnia: if this is a “partnership” it is a highly unequal one.
The increased intensity of EU engagement with the BiH policy-making process has necessitated the reinforcement of the meetings of the EU/BiH Consultative Task Force, to assist in the Annual Reports and annual Action Plans. The EU has also established a Coordination Board for Economic Development and EU Integration in order to develop medium- to long-term economic strategy and direct the BiH Council of Ministers in the formulation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in negotiation with the World Bank. In order to ensure that the DEI can cope with the huge amount of directives flying from Brussels to Sarajevo, the EU will be seconding civil servants from EU member states to work as advisers as well as providing targeted technical assistance and institution-building support under CARDS.
While the real transition to European Union ownership has been largely operating at the informal level this has also begun to be reflected in formal changes, such as in the EU Police Mission taking over from the UN Mission to Bosnia at the end of 2002 and the decision that the EU will be responsible for a EUFOR follow-on mission to take over the broader security tasks from the NATO SFOR force in December 2004. The most striking, formal expression of this transition was the naming of Lord Paddy Ashdown as the first European Union Special Representative in BiH in March 2002, taking up his duties when he assumed the position of the High Representative that May. The creation of Ashdown’s “double-hatted” position as both EU and PIC representative marked a clear signal of transitional intent. As far as Paddy Ashdown understood his position, it was clear that he was to be the last High Representative. This move reflects other formal organisational changes. In 2002, the PIC was “streamlined” providing a clearer European co-ordinating role. A Board of Principals was established as the main co-ordinating body, chaired by the EU Special Representative and meeting weekly in Sarajevo. In real terms it would seem that the OYce of the High Representative is already more dependent on the EU than the PIC and in 2003 the EU provided over half of the OHR’s operating budget. The, so far, largely informal process of EU regulation will become a contractual one once BiH signs up to a formal Stabilisation and Association Agreement. By October 2004 the EU was routinely involved in every level of BiH policy preparation and implementation and annual BiH government work plans were being drawn up to meet the comprehensive SAP requirements. There can be little doubt that there has been a transition from the ad hoc, unaccountable, and largely unfocused, rule of the Peace Implementation Council. Yet this transition has not been one towards Bosnian ownership. Even the EU recognises that “BiH ‘ownership’ of reform remains limited” with international initiative, input and pressure guiding the process of transition.4 As far as the engagement of the people of BiH or the elected representatives is concerned, little has changed over the nine years since the Dayton agreement. The BiH public have been excluded from the transition process and while there is general support for EU membership there has been little public discussion of the costs and benefits involved. Rather than state-building, it would appear that nine years of international regulation under the framework established by the Dayton agreement, have done little to either build the capacity of the BiH state or to legitimate it in the eyes of the population. The powers and the authority of the state have been subsumed by external actors, sucking out the life from the elected bodies, which were initially to have taken over government responsibilities following a year’s transitional period. Today, BiH is administered directly through the high-handed and unaccountable powers of the EU Special Representative and policy is made in Brussels and implemented with the assistance of the EU-funded and advised Directorate for European Integrations. The state is weak and disconnected from Bosnian society because it is an externally imposed and supported set of institutions which do not reflect or cohere the interests of Bosnia’s nominal citizens. Those commentators who wish to argue that these weaknesses are due to external administrators being constrained by Dayton or by the actions of local actors could not be further from the truth.
This evidence is drawn from material prepared for the forthcoming special issue of International Peacekeeping (Vol 12, No 3, autumn 2005) and Taylor & Francis book, State-building? The Lessons of Bosnia, edited by Dr David Chandler. Dr David Chandler 12 October 2004
4 European Commission, “Commission StaV Working Paper: Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, SEC(2004) 375, Brussels, no date, 2.3. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external—relations/see/sap/rep3/cr— bih.pdf. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 19
Witnesses: Dr David Chandler, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster and Professor James Pettifer, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy, examined.
Q29 Chairman: Gentlemen, may I welcome you to any substance and reality to it. We see that more the Committee. We have before us Dr David broadly when we look at the whole issue of state Chandler of the Centre for the Study of Democracy building. There seems to be a certain drive to magic in the University of Westminster, expert on the things up in committee rooms outside of the region. international administration in Bosnia and While it may look good on paper “Yes, let us have Professor James Pettifer of the Conflict Studies returns, break with Belgrade, no partition”, that is Research Centre at the UK Defence Academy, not necessarily a political compromise solution. expert in the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Without a settlement which has some consensus in on the formal and informal Albanian military. I the region, you are never going to get away from should like to begin with the status of Kosovo. You people saying “It is a very good settlement but the know the report which Ambassador Kai Eide EU is going to have to police it”. It would probably produced at the behest of the UN Secretary-General be a bit like Bosnia where there is the same status and and the formula which Ambassador Eide put standards situation, where external actors are forward for the future of Kosovo, which is broadly: regulating it, then you have such high so-called no partition of Kosovo, no ethnic divisions, no standards and there is always a focus on the institutional links with Belgrade, greater EU problems that it seems to me it is suspending the involvement and government seen to be from situation of status rather than resolving it. I am not Pristina—not necessarily by Pristina. First, your saying there is an easy alternative solution, but it is general comments, if you would, on the report itself. often the case, when you intervene in a situation Do you believe that it marks the appropriate way without an idea of the consequences, that you are in forward? a bit of a pickle. Professor Pettifer: It is a very welcome initiative. I would endorse the comments made by the speakers Q32 Chairman: Given the history, the international in the previous session. community has a very special responsibility for the future of Kosovo. If there were to be a state which Q30 Chairman: You were present. did not respect its ethnic minorities, it would be a Professor Pettifer: Yes, for part of it: in particular I standing aVront to what the war was about. endorse Dr Eyal’s comments that Kosovo has not Professor Pettifer: That is certainly the case; had the attention it probably should have had in the everybody would endorse that. The problem is that previous two years, otherwise we might not have had these liberal agendas—if I may use the term without the diYculties we had in March this year. Any being pejorative—are not shared by large numbers initiative of this kind is very welcome, but at the of the population on the ground of all ethnic groups same time the content of it is substantially the same whose mindset is still pervaded by ideological as we have had before, particularly the emphasis on nationalism. the standards and the rejection of partition. From the point of view of analysts, the important thing Q33 Chairman: If they reject a liberal and was the emphasis on the partition issue, which has democratic agenda, do they deserve the degree of not normally been raised by international figures in help from outside? the same way before. This is a sign that partition is Professor Pettifer: Obviously liberal with a small in the air as a subject of discussion in the way that it “l”. probably was not 12 months ago.
Q34 Chairman: Surely they would not deserve the Q31 Chairman: But it marks an acceleration of the financial and other help from the international process, a refocusing in terms of the standards, not community, nor would they deserve to move further on the voluminous document, but on certain key along the road to join the international institutions, areas. It does mark a fresh and you say welcome the EU and NATO. initiative. Professor Pettifer: I entirely agree with the second of Professor Pettifer: Yes. As I said in my those points, but the question of sovereignty may be memorandum, which I hope you have seen, it seems diVerent. One can point to many countries in the to me that the standards issue is in some ways world which have achieved independence and in the diYcult because very few ex-colonies or new region Croatia and Bosnia are two paramount countries which have come into existence since 1945 examples where no more than 30 to 40% of the could have met them, or maybe even half of them. As Kosovo standards were in existence and they are still someone said in the recent debate in the House of not in existence in many instances. Representatives, we would not have the United States if the standards document had had to be observed. That is not in any way suggesting that they Q35 Chairman: Croatia has enjoyed a democratic are not very important, but, being realistic, it is not election with a democratic change of government. very likely that some of them will be attained in any That is surely light years away from the situation foreseeable future. in Kosovo. Dr Chandler: There is a problem of looking at it on Professor Pettifer: On the contrary, Chairman. I far too formal a level. How realistic is the focus on think all Kosovo elections have been widely praised standards before status? There is a danger of for their conduct by the International Community, creating a regime on paper which never actually has particularly by people like Lord Robertson. Ev 20 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
12 October 2005 Dr David Chandler and Professor James Pettifer
Dr Chandler: Definitely. I also beg to disagree with of what the problems are in these countries. That is the honourable Chairman. I think there is a why there is such an inflated focus on corruption and fundamental diVerence between a liberal agenda and crime, to which I am sure we will come later. a democratic agenda. A liberal agenda is the focus on outcomes and the standards, the end product: a democratic agenda at least implicitly implies some Q37 Mr Chidgey: I actually found what you said autonomy, some responsibility and some consensus very illuminating if not alarming, but probably very from the people living in the region. Kosovo is a accurate. It would appear from what you have just classic case in point. Every election, from the first said in the last five minutes firstly that the election onwards, has been seen as a democratic involvement of the West in the civil war which broke election, but there is no democracy there. That is the out in the Balkans ten years ago now has made no fundamental problem, that there is a process there, diVerence in terms of resolving the ethnic tensions but an artificial pseudo state is being created. You which existed in that region for many hundreds of may argue that there is an international years and had only previously been contained by a responsibility to bring a liberal agenda and with it larger more powerful external force, which of course democracy, but it is very diYcult, if you start out was Russia through most of the twentieth century. from some paper aspirations rather than from the That is the first point I draw from your conclusions. society which exists. It is the contrast between the Maybe I have got it wrong, but you can explain. The two which creates an unsolvable problem because second thing is that you have made the point very there is no way of getting from one to the other. That strongly and very clearly that democracy does not is what is problematic about the status and necessarily mean that the standards which we in the standards discussion: it is a discussion around West aspire to for our nation states are shared, let sequencing and the technicalities of what to do first alone met. That must beg the question that the without really understanding that you cannot concept, say of Croatia being an applicant country construct a state without a process of engagement to the EU is somewhat premature. and autonomy. If you are saying that you should Professor Pettifer: The point is that people look for have a perfect political system, a perfect civil service, progress. This is frequently said and I think it was a perfect legislation before there is democracy and said by Ambassador Eide too that he was looking for accountability, then that is a limited and progress, not always for final achievement. It is problematic approach and you can see the way that always possible, given the application of enough in consequence recommendations of policy have money and enough outside commitment, to produce changed. First of all it was “Let’s have elections” and a political elite in a small country which will, to a now the sequencing discussion has moved on to large extent, do what you want. What I was referring “Let’s have the rule of law first”. I think it is the same to about residual nationalism and bigotry and so on discussion: you cannot have the rule of law if it is just is in the bottom 50% of the population and, after all, sent from Brussels and Washington. The rule of law even in Britain we cannot say there are no people like has to have a relationship with society. Both of these that here. things have to be seen as intimately connected.
Q38 Mr Chidgey: It is one thing to pass the laws to Q36 Chairman: Of course, but if you accelerate the status without adequate protection for minorities meet the Copenhagen criteria: it is quite another to and so on, are you not abandoning the carrot you implement those laws. have to ensure that the state is, yes, within the Professor Pettifer: The problem we have at the perspective of the Balkans, but a reasonably moment is that the Kosovo Albanian leadership are tolerable state? encouraged by the present setup in UNMIK Dr Chandler: I would not idealise the current towards instinctive irresponsibility because there are situation. There is no protection for minorities now very few rewards for doing what UNMIK wants. under the regulation of UNMIK. There is not even UNMIK are continually berating people for not a valid promise of return as an aspiration. We should achieving numerous things. Again I would echo actually look at the problems which exist in Kosovo what Dr Eyal said: after you have filled in one list now, rather than seeing the situation as good and another list is handed to you. In my view the political asking how we create more autonomy. As an leadership in Pristina, particularly the ex-KLA5 academic I would argue that I would not start from political leadership, is under considerable radical here and that the whole focus is problematic, but as pressure. I would have said in public, although he is a policymaker I would say that it is now time to a person I have some discourse with, that it might admit that it is an impossible situation. The not be easy now for Mr Hasim Thaqi to be elected assumption behind the question starts from our leader of his party automatically. Three years ago responsibilities and us trying to give things to people that would have been an idiotic statement. Very and to solve things, which, with the best will in the radical forces are emerging, some of which we saw world, is not necessarily the starting point. Quite on the street in March and this is another reason why often, the agenda becomes one driven by forces I personally agree that the political status issue outside the region. Bosnia shows that even more should be looked at pretty quickly. One of the very clearly than Iraq and Afghanistan which are very negative factors in the state absence which David similar. There is no real connection between the policy-making side and any rational understanding 5 Kosovo Liberation Army Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 21
12 October 2005 Dr David Chandler and Professor James Pettifer
Chandler describes is that the leaders whom we the EU and Balkan regimes. It is like a millstone regard as the leaders actually have very few levers to around people’s necks in the same way that the pull to influence public behaviour. Milosevic tribunal is: it was useful when it was declared, but now America wants to close it down as soon as possible. So the focus on the ICTY is fairly Q39 Chairman: And the carrots would presumably irrational, although historically you are stuck with involve a greater movement of power to the local it. Then the focus on crime and corruption is a institutions along the lines of the idea of what ...? similar artificial problem created by Western policy, Professor Pettifer: I have said in my memorandum every foreign policy and think tank document that is happening anyway and one of the ironies of focuses on the issue, and there are reams of them, for this summer has been, despite the very bad publicity example the recent launch of a new Transparency the Albanians had, very understandably and International report on Bosnia, supported by the justifiably after March, that the process of handing British Ambassador and funded by DFID, the over competencies has actually speeded up. That can whole thing is pretty spurious from the theoretical be demonstrated by a list. assumptions to the dearth of empirical evidence and Dr Chandler: Again I would like to question the reliance on recycled rumours. The idea that these assumptions implicit in the question—the idea that political parties are nationalist and criminal gangs the West’s involvement did not resolve anything—as and are actually running Bosnia rather than Paddy though there is an innate dynamic towards conflicts Ashdown and the EU and all the other international within the Western Balkans which is in their blood. agencies, puts the world the opposite way round. It Y It is di cult to understand the Balkan conflicts, not is very much a strategy of avoiding political just recently but even historically without responsibility by continuing to invent new hoops understanding the important role of international and by “problematising” micro issues which are in intervention and as Professor Pettifer alludes to, fact, in the real world, probably not the major issues with the radicalisation of the KLA, what side lined to focus on. However, they are easier because you moderate forces behind Ibrahim Rugova was the are targeting Bosnian politicians or Kosovo voters idea that there was going to be external support, for blame, these issues are partly about legitimising American support. You cannot really understand continued external interference and partly about the Bosnian war without equally understanding the deflecting responsibility for the existing situation on promise or threat of external intervention. That then to others. casts a light on how we understand the post-conflict Chairman: Dr Chandler, you have drawn the parallel political situation as well. It is very nice for western between Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina. Sir John, analysts to blame this on ethnic insanity or say the you have been recently in the area. Would you start people of the region do not understand modernity. I on Bosnia? would argue that there is democracy, the people are quite capable of voting for whom they want in Croatia or in Bosnia or Kosovo, but the problem is Q40 Sir John Stanley: In the last session we focused not really with them. Kosovo is a classic example. on Bosnia and Herzegovina externally and I should Why is the international community there? Because now like to come to look at it internally. Apart from they have no political solution. The only thing they the state of the economy, which certainly gives the can do then is to say that Kosovo people are not High Representative a lot of concern, the biggest civilised enough, that their desire for autonomy is single political issue internally is the future evolution now problematic, despite the fact that this is what of the constitution, coupled with the future role of the war was about. In Bosnia equally, every election the High Representative who of course doubles up is like an exercise in the condemnation of the people as the EU Special Representative. Those two are and those whom they vote for, rather than linked. I should like to ask you both what you feel is understood as a reflection of a divided society going to be the longevity of the High Representative/ without any legitimate central authority. This is not EU Special Representative position? Do you think a problem with the people of Bosnia—basically their that position is going to be needed for five or ten votes rationally reflect their reality. Democracy is years? Secondly, though Dayton, against almost all not the problem. However, the way that this the odds, has been a remarkable achievement in Committee has used the idea of democracy is securing the degree of stability it has, everybody I problematic, so examples which have been focused talk to acknowledges the cumbersome nature of it. on are ones like the support for the ICTY and then There are 15 to 20 separate prime ministers, three issues of crime and corruption. To condemn people huge great layers of government, everything triple- in Serbia or Croatia or Bosnia for not supporting the hatted. That was necessary and without that civil ICTY—which even international academics and government would not have returned to Bosnia lawyers would argue is problematic and has more to Herzegovina, but clearly that needs to evolve. So do with politics than law—is a slightly unfair way of could you give us your views on how Bosnia judging people. We saw the political nature of the Herzegovina should be evolving and what are the use of war crimes in the previous session, where it particular constitutional evolutions which you think was raised, the discussion was about how to do a the British Government should be particularly deal, how to encourage Balkan governments to pressing for? speak the right speech and in this way the Professor Pettifer: David Chandler knows a lot international community could avoid the problems more about Bosnia than I do, but my general caused by the issue for disrupting relations between philosophy, particularly having spent an awful lot of Ev 22 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
12 October 2005 Dr David Chandler and Professor James Pettifer time in Kosovo over the last four years, is that things and prior negotiations in that process, the Dayton take a lot longer than we think and that Lord constitution has changed. So the chair of the Council Ashdown’s position should be maintained with the of Ministers has a permanent position rather than a full powers for a long time. Whether those powers rotating position like the presidency and his job is to need exercising or whether some of them can be liaise with the European Union. There is the quietly left to wither away with the growth of better Directorate for European Integrations which goes Bosnian institutions, would be what we should hope through all the laws and works out how to bring for. David should really comment on this and not them in line with the EU acquis even though there is me. no formally signed stabilisation and association Dr Chandler: As usual the whole thing is the reverse process agreement. This very much centralises the of the way it looks. A lot of people have argued that law making process and fairly much undermines the Dayton is so cumbersome that it is really diYcult to Dayton fiction of numerous diVerent realms of transform things, but in fact Dayton was a hugely political authority; all that is fairly much centralised flexible agreement. The only people who signed up in reality. In real terms Dayton has been to it were the neighbouring countries and the transformed, but the transformation has largely Bosnian Government. Everyone else involved, the been informal through the PIC and the international institutions and international transformation towards much more direct EU agencies, all wrote their own mandate and they are regulation; the EU now seconds civil servants to help not bound by Dayton. As you will be aware, in most write the Bosnian laws and to implement them. It is of the Dayton Agreement the OYce of the High very much direct; all the information comes from Representative’s role, when it was initially thought Brussels to Sarajevo rather than through some of, was just for one year and was a co-ordinating convoluted process like a democracy, where there is role. No-one imagined that the role of the OYce of a real system of government. the High Representative would be transformed. No- one imagined that 10 years after Dayton was signed Q41 Sir John Stanley: Could you just focus on the there would be a continual extension of mandates of specific question I put to you at the end? What do international institutions. Dayton has been you think the British Government should be extremely flexible and even though there are 15 to 20 pressing for, both in terms of the continuation or not prime ministers and all these Bosnian government of the High Representative/Special Representative structures, that is in the fictional world. Somewhere and the degree of push you think the British I have a twelve-page document which is just a list of Government should be giving for constitutional the edicts which Lord Ashdown has put into place change? just this year alone. In the real world policy making Dr Chandler: Getting rid of the post of the High is something which is totally owned by the Representative or the EU Special Representative Y international community. It is di cult when we talk would be a good idea, just in terms of practicalities about transformation, because it is the Peace as well as in terms of human decency. Even within Implementation Council (PIC), an ad hoc body, the EU it is problematic, because Bosnia is about to whose legal standing was only confirmed after the sign up in terms of the stabilisation and association event, which basically decides the remit of the High process. For every other country the EU is very keen Representative, although sometimes the High to have democracy, human rights and the rule of Representative argues that he decides his own remit. law, but in Bosnia there is a Special Representative It is the most flexible framework around. The with the power to sack elected oYcials, to take away interesting thing is that the transformation has not been so much with the constitution, or with more say people’s bank accounts, to dismiss them without any for the people of Bosnia, but within the Peace court of appeal and to impose legislation. You can Implementation Council. The shift from this ad hoc see there is a slight element of double standards international body without any clear target, started there. Within the EU there is a bit of a division: the after the Kosovo war, where we have seen a shift Parliament argues that the Special Representative towards a much more centralised EU regulation needs to be abolished, whereas the European within Bosnia. You see that formalised with the Council, where the power is, has argued that he has double-hatted nature of Paddy Ashdown when he special “anomalous” powers and that as long as he assumed the post in 2002. That is when the post of only uses them in a soft way it is okay: this is the European Union Special Representative was expressed as the “pull of Europe” rather than the created. I know from speaking to Lord Ashdown, “push of Dayton”—though in practice the exercise and I am sure he will tell you next week when he is of external power is the same. What has happened is here, that when he took on that post he imagined that his authority has been softened through a load that he would be the last High Representative of the of other ad hoc institutional mechanisms, such as Peace Implementation Council, although I am not establishing special hand-picked commissions. sure that he imagined the real powers would There is a hand-picked commission, say to look at necessarily disappear at the same time, but rather the reorganisation of Mostar, there is some that their format would change and be much more agreement on smaller issues, but there is a large linked to forms of EU regulation. Constitutionally it division on the larger issues between the Croatian is interesting. In the lengthy and drawn out process representatives and Bosniak representatives. Then of EU guidance in preparation for the accession the High Representative brings in an edict to resolve process—the stabilisation and association process this and centralise the administration, but by Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 23
12 October 2005 Dr David Chandler and Professor James Pettifer arguing that there was some agreement anyway and Professor Pettifer: The central danger in the that he was just putting the icing on the cake this is situation which continues, which I tried to point out then hailed as just the use of soft power. There has in my memorandum to you, although obviously in a been experimentation within that and I guess— very limited space, is that the area of Kosovo north though anyone can guess—that the High of the Ibar river, which broadly corresponds to Representative hat will be abolished; the EU Special Leposavic/Opstina and northern Mitrovice/ Representative hat may sustain itself, unless it comes Opstina, which is French KFor, although not all of up as a public issue. Unfortunately, not many other French KFor, has never really been properly under candidate countries are in the position to raise the UN control. This goes back to March 1999. The issue of democracy in Bosnia, because obviously parallel structure problem continued for a very, very they are trying to be nice to the EU rather than long time and it still continues to this day. A critical; they do not really have the freedom of prominent UN oYcial, who is certainly not known discussion. I think it will sustain itself for the middle- for his pro-Albanian leanings, said to me recently term future, but it is only a guess. “You know, our problem is that we have people who Professor Pettifer: As far as the EU is concerned, I have killed 65 or 70 people sitting drinking coVee in personally am a strong Euro-sceptic anyway so shall Mitrovice”. That encapsulates the problem very be accused of being jaundiced, but I think the EU well. The danger in the future which I see and which changes the rules every day on this. I have followed I tried to draw to the Committee’s attention, is that with great care what has been happening with the these forces are still there and our capacity to deal Turkish application and we all know what goes on with them may be improving and some lessons have in Turkey still. Less of it goes on and hopefully there certainly been learned from March, but whether will be much less of it, but the EU has given the they have been learned in a way which gives us the Turks a wide open door with these things still going real capacity is a very diYcult issue to assess. My on which we would all disapprove of. I do not think personal view at the moment is that we do not have that there is one EU position: there are EU positions it, which is why I wrote what I did to you. V for di erent countries. Dr Chandler: It is slightly problematic; I think it Chairman: Sir John, may I invite you to put a avoids the problem. The problem, as was considered question which I think you raised with me yesterday in the earlier session this afternoon, is that of a as to whether the provincial reconstruction team political solution and without that everything is up concept, which I believe was in Bosnia, can be in the air, there is a lot of insecurity, etcetera. developed in Kosovo? However, the problem seems to be deflected. So the idea of the Serbian criminal, tough people toughing Q42 Sir John Stanley: I think that is more it out in Mitrovice and the bridge watchers who are appropriate for the military when we get there, but I intimidating everyone is a myth. I was actually there am very happy to put it on behalf of the Committee. during the second election, in Mitrovice near the Do you consider the very successful structure of bridge. It was a fiction. There was no army of liaison observation teams, and there are lots in toughs. If you ever went to the bridge over the Ibar Bosnia Herzegovina, is capable of being transferred you would see loads of NATO tanks and you could into Kosovo? not get across without people checking you and Professor Pettifer: There are many, many things stuV. It is an easy thing to believe that the problems which need changing with KFOR. One of the things the March events showed was that the structure of caused are internal to the situation rather than what is colloquially known as “capital command” in something to do with international policy. If you do KFOR, where the French commander or the British not have a solution, everything becomes more of a commander speaks to London before deciding what problem. The March events are rather typical. There to do on some issue which the KFOR command was rioting, there was a spark in a situation where a wants him to deal with, does have to be changed. In spark could lead to problems, but that does not all the analysis of the March trouble we saw that mean there was a problem with the specific KFOR was not really capable of acting in a coherent organisation of UNMIK and the army of way with a coherent command structure and of enforcement. Unless you have the army everywhere, mobilising people on the ground quickly to trouble it is going to be very diYcult. Unless you attach a spots. I am not familiar with the details of the soldier to every Serb pensioner who is there, there Bosnian example, but I think any better system are always going to be those sorts of problems. would be well worth looking at. Rather than focus on the bigger picture, as in Bosnia as well, minor problems become exaggerated and Q43 Mr Chidgey: May I come back to Kosovo, that is like a crisis for UNMIK, whereas the crisis is really to try to summarise some of the points which in fact located probably in Western capitals at a have been discussed in various degrees so far so that more fundamental level. the Committee can be clear about your views? We have mentioned, for example, the March riots and put a question mark against the failure of UNMIK Q44 Mr Chidgey: Just to be clear, we are aware of the in that regard. Do you feel that there were failings in arguments that the provisional institutions of self- the administration in Kosovo resulting in UNMIK’s government should take more competencies from problems? If so, what could be done to rectify them, UNMIK. We have touched on this. Do you accept so we can be clear on that? that yourselves, or are you terribly opposed to that? Ev 24 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
12 October 2005 Dr David Chandler and Professor James Pettifer
If you do accept it, what competencies could we provisional institutions make some attempt, some actually specify? What might those be that could be progress in alleviating the problem? Is privatisation taken from UNMIK? of state sector industries a route which can be Professor Pettifer: This is happening; this has been explored? happening actively for at least 18 months. After all, Professor Pettifer: I can give you a pretty quick part of the UN central headquarters moved out of answer to the first question: as in previous Kosovo Pristina well over a year ago and these things are elections, Serb participation will be low, irrespective being handed over. You are also getting a much of what their leaders say. DiVerent leaders will say more self-confident society. People do not, as they diVerent things: whether to participate is part of the did in the summer of 1999, spend time thinking too tennis-ball, ping-pong aspect of politics in Belgrade much about what UNMIK tells them. UNMIK is and for Belgrade politicians to score points as well as rather like the weather: it is there, sometimes it is for Kosovo politicians. The second problem is good, sometimes it is bad, but it is going on in the sky simply one of legality. There is a lot of money somewhere above us. outside Kosovo waiting to be invested. There is a lot of interest in the base metal mines, because these Q45 Mr Chidgey: Is there an initiative starting kinds of metals are sexy again and have an economic at grassroots level to take on board these future. There is some interest in agriculture and responsibilities? there is a great deal of money in the Kosovo Professor Pettifer: Yes. I take the view, which I must Albanian Diaspora, particularly in the United say is not a view all of my colleagues share, that at States. I have met leading businessmen from big the moment the sovereignty issue is primarily about companies, who are Albanian Americans and who two things. It is about the economy, because no-one say “Yes, we’d love to do something, but my board will invest unless they know whether they own won’t accept it until we know what we own”. something or not. It is also about security and Dr Chandler: I agree with what Professor Pettifer borders. At the moment, nobody really knows what said on pretty much all those issues. The final point is going to happen to the main industries of Kosovo. is that everything is temporary, short term, low level The privatisation process was stalled and Count as though there is a vacuum of capacity within LambsdorV was trying to start it again and then it UNMIK, not just on the political status but even on stopped and no big companies are going to invest in the economy. With Kosovo it just concentrates the Kosovo until they know that there is a clear legal problem of state-building which we see in other framework for them to do so. It seems to me that this areas as well. There is a power imbalance in that is the overriding argument for a political decision. international powers are taking responsibility, but Dr Chandler: I think the experimentation with local then the next stage of taking that responsibility just democracy first is probably the worst type of is not there; there is no vision politically, solution. It is not that people in Kosovo do not know economically or socially, which is, in historical how to organise local self-help initiatives; even terms, fairly unique. This is why we are creating under the Serbian authority they did it. The problem these phantom states which are not puppet regimes is a fundamental lack of resources. You cannot doing the will of the international community nor really resolve problems by this focus on locally genuine states relating to the will and needs of the sustainable solutions. There is a big focus and a lot population. It is not like imperialism and, equally, is of international NGOs are trying to do that. Even not like the old UN idea of states and sovereignty. UNMIK has finally thought about economic policy This particular situation is the worst of both worlds: as well, though without a more fundamental no responsibility is taken internationally, but it is transformation—with unemployment over 50%, impossible for local actors to assume responsibility and obviously the statistics are questionable but as well. Kosovo just sums that up and it is a sad most of the grey economy is just sustainable indictment on international pretensions in this area. agriculture—it is going to be diYcult to give people any sense of hope in the future with just the carrot of Q47 Andrew Mackinlay: Picking up that last point, more local control and more local authority presumably we would be correct in assuming that participation. People are expecting a bit more and basically no taxes are being collected in Kosovo those expectations were raised when there was the either for the central government or for local war and when UNMIK took over. They will not be government. satisfied by simply being told “It is up to you to Professor Pettifer: Oh, no, that is not the case. organise community self-help groups” because the About £300 million a year comes in, mostly through resources are not really there. customs. The customs tax has been quite eVective and quite successful: income tax and VAT are much V Q46 Mr Chidgey: Back to the March riots again and less e ective. the concept that they contributed to a sense of disillusionment amongst the Kosovo Serb Q48 Andrew Mackinlay: One of the things I am very population. Is that the case? If so, is there a risk that interested in is the policing side, both in terms of the Serbs might boycott the forthcoming elections or combating organised crime and the international that Albanian extremists might gain more influence nature of crime. The UNMIK police were formed by in the provisional institutions? My last point is this the UN begging various police agencies to whole issue of the high rate of endemic contribute people. The United Kingdom’s unemployment. How can UNMIK or the contribution, a very highly regarded one, was by the Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 25
12 October 2005 Dr David Chandler and Professor James Pettifer police service in Northern Ireland and the chief all the time has caused all sorts of problems constable is now withdrawing that. Can you throw internally. Nowdays, whenever they make arrests in any observations on that? Can I just tell you what people say their human rights are being abused. It I mean? I am horrified that the Foreign OYce has fails in terms of the stated aims of international not been able to find, either with the chief constable advisers and then it fails in a much deeper way even of Northern Ireland and/or other chief constables, a undermining existing levels of capacity. way of providing what I believe is a highly regarded British standard of policing, but we are going to Q50 Andrew Mackinlay: I suppose what I am asking withdraw. I guess the policing is pretty fragile, is it you is: if you were advising the British Government, not? would you advise that it would be prudent to Professor Pettifer: The facts are that the murder rate withdraw British policing? in Pristina now is actually lower than that of Professor Pettifer: No, Kosovo will need all forms of Stockholm and the crime rate as a whole is not bad international help for a long time, of which policing on things like muggings, rapes, all the serious crimes. is only one. Lots of other expertise would be needed This is a real achievement for UNMIK police. The and that is true of lots of other second world and problem is that of political assassinations, which third world countries. The role of the police at times remain frequent. The nature of Kosovo society, both becomes politicised and the problem stemming from Serb and Albanian, is such that until it is changed that is really not the police, who have real out of all recognition it is going to stay that way and achievements to their credit, but the rule of law that is the stain on Kosovo. through the courts and their judiciary and the very poor quality of trials and the very, very politicised Q49 Andrew Mackinlay: Are interface areas dealt nature of some of the international prosecutors. with by the military rather than UNMIK police? Professor Pettifer: As a generalisation, although it is Q51 Ms Stuart: At the end of this we are going to diYcult to say, the military have withdrawn from a publish a report which is supposed to go beyond lot of policing activities in the last two years as the extremely detailed analytical pessimism as to why crime rate has dropped. The mayhem days of nothing is working. At the moment I am getting the 2000–01 are long since over, but economic crime is feeling that no taxes are being collected and there is all-pervasive, for three reasons. It is partly because no relationship between those who govern and are of the very high unemployment. Secondly it is governed and the economy is not working. It is because of where Kosovo lies: as a central point on government by fax from Brussels in a sense and you the transnational route, particularly of heroin, from are saying that the EU is imposing its conditions; the East into Europe and that would apply whoever power struggles rather than democracy because we runs Kosovo and whatever government structure it have not worked out who is top of the pile and until has. Thirdly, there is a very anti-authoritarian we have worked out who is top of the pile we will not political culture in the Kosovo-Albanian world get political parties or any kind of elections which which was built of years of resistance to regimes like are meaningful to us. Within that picture what, in that of Milosevic; cooperation with the police does your view, would be the three key things you would not come easily. say a British Government should do which would Dr Chandler: About two years ago I was at the actually improve things? Kosovo police training college in Vushtri because I Professor Pettifer: There is one thing thought the idea that if you change the police you overwhelmingly which clearly needs to be done, can change the rest of society was quite interesting. because the public discourse in Britain about It appeals to external actors because it is easy to Kosovo is very disappointing: the geo-political change the police because you are paying their wages significance of Kosovo to the United States is never and you can tell them exactly what to do, so discussed and never appears in any considerations. everyone behaves extremely well and everyone is One talks of the EU and the EU doing all sorts of nice to minorities at the college and everyone gets things, but what really matters in Kosovo is what paid. However, in the real world of Kosovo there are Uncle Sam thinks and in particular, within Uncle not many mixed communities and most people who Sam’s orbit, what the Pentagon thinks. work in the field know that it is like a make-believe trained police force, because it has been artificially Q52 Ms Stuart: What do you think the Pentagon created. It is a bit like Iraq: something happens and does think? people take oV their uniforms and run away. That is Professor Pettifer: I think they take a very long-term why, even with the best will in the world and the best view. I am not fit to speak for them, but reading training by police oYcers from Northern Ireland, it analytical material they think that Serbia will always is diYcult to transform the police and expect that to remain partly linked to Russia, culturally and have a knock-on eVect on society. In Bosnia this through the Church and various other geo-strategic whole idea of democratic policing and a lot of the factors. The British view that Serbia could be issues has been even more interesting and research changed as a result of getting rid of Milosevic is seen shows that it has even undermined the police as a as wildly optimistic, so I suppose I reflected what I cohesive unit because the police need to have a think of the dominant view in some parts of the certain amount of autonomy within the institution Pentagon in the first paragraph of my memorandum and trust—unfortunately, all the regulation and to you. This is a view with which I know many political correctness and being polite to everybody people may not agree, but Kosovo would not be Ev 26 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
12 October 2005 Dr David Chandler and Professor James Pettifer where it is now, where you could even discuss also a political aspect to it as well. At the moment, political status, without firm American backing and with uncertainty, you are not going to get quality it is in relation to that one thing that the British people committing themselves to something which is Government needs to work out its position. pseudo. It is not part of a larger sovereign state, but equally there is no real autonomy. Who knows what Q53 Ms Stuart: If I had asked you the same question Kosovo is? I asked the last witnesses, about whether people have real ties to the US, you would have said yes. Q56 Chairman: Mr Chidgey did ask about the Professor Pettifer: Long-term geo-political March riots and the eVects on UNMIK. I should calculations are involved. Camp Bondsteel is one of like to turn to similar eVects on the NATO KFOR. the largest American bases in the world ever built What lessons, if any in your judgment, have been since the Vietnam War. That is not built that way by learned since March? Do you believe that NATO coincidence. failed to read the situation in time? If so, what Dr Chandler: With regard to the three key things for changes have been made to ensure that there would the British government to do. Firstly, it is important be no recurrence? to realise that nothing is going to be changed Professor Pettifer: There has been a lot of riot without economic and social transformation, so training and much more coherent programmes to investment in large-scale industry rather than control public order and I think also that some fairly sustainable, quilt-making, projects would be one V thing. The second thing would be that historically sti reprimands have been handed out. The KFOR Kosovo has only maintained itself through aid and commanders believed that X or Y base could through remittances from abroad and I would let mobilise so many people to within five kilometres in people from Kosovo into the EU to work . . . you half an hour and it turned out in many cases that the did ask. people were not even on base, let alone capable of Professor Pettifer: On a licensed basis in the old way being mobilised with some contingents. The general Italian workers came years ago and people from the problem is one of a wider issue of decision making old Yugoslavia came, on a licence. within NATO; big NATO countries in particular are Dr Chandler: Thirdly, I would open negotiations not willing to modify their command structures with Belgrade in terms of a final political status much, or at all, in international forces. settlement. Q57 Chairman: Are they prepared to modify the Q54 Chairman: Two questions in respect of Kosovo. caveats on the use of their own forces, particularly International institutions are frequently criticised Germany? elsewhere for paying salaries which distort the local Professor Pettifer: They may be, but the problem is salary structures, sucking in too many people of that they are well aware and right to be aware, of the competence and thereby weakening the local capacity of Balkan conflicts to accelerate very administration. Is that a phenomenon you see in rapidly in unpredictable ways, which could raise Kosovo? major force protection issues. That is certainly a big Professor Pettifer: Yes and no. You have to pay issue for the United States contingent. people the going rate and the going rate now is set by Chairman: In our visit we shall be meeting General the big contexts of wars like Iraq, Afghanistan de Kerambon the French commander. reconstruction, where people are paid astronomic sums. If we do not pay reasonable amounts in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, you will not get anybody Q58 Andrew Mackinlay: I want to tease out good at all. something which was music to my ears to a certain extent. Both of you referred to allowing Kosovans, Q55 Chairman: Not just the international experts, under some controlled conditions, to work in the but those within the country, the locals. European Union. I should really like you to amplify Professor Pettifer: Over time the problem sorts itself on that and how you could have it under controlled out. What we need are the very large numbers of conditions. I certainly see, from a domestic MP’s trained people of Kosovan origin abroad who for point of view, all this business of the individual, fit, various reasons have not yet decided to commit able, probably very intelligent, sometimes highly themselves to the new Kosovo. These are people, qualified or having the capacity to get qualified, particularly in Switzerland and Germany, with real young men in particular, playing cat and mouse with top level expertise, particularly in business and in the immigration authorities here and the question of some technologies and they should be given carrots justice and so on, with all the criminality which can to come back. flow from that. I should like you to say how we could Dr Chandler: Firstly, the fact that the international do this and to what extent. I just think there is a administration is the administration undermines the degree of logic there, with the possibility of a cadre local administration and people’s desire to work in returning at some stage. it. Secondly, there is the lack of any idea that people Professor Pettifer: As is quite well known, I am in have a future in Kosovo, that people would work in favour of a much tougher policy. I recently government out of a love of doing something for published a paper on the Migration Watch website. their country. I know it seems strange, though I do not agree with everything about Migration maybe not in this particular audience, but there is Watch, but I do think they promote a very valuable Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 27
12 October 2005 Dr David Chandler and Professor James Pettifer discussion. I think it is time for a new approach to Professor Pettifer: Yes. At the moment I do not Balkan asylum seekers, to reward the hard working, think there is much external migration from but be tougher on the people who are a problem. Kosovo. There is a pretty standard position with a Dr Chandler: The more decriminalisation of the very large number of migrants in places like system, the fewer criminals there would be. Germany who have been there quite a long time. The real problem on that scale is in Germany and Switzerland; as far as I am aware they are not in Q59 Andrew Mackinlay: It is much better for people Britain. to be paying taxes in the United Kingdom than not, Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much indeed. is it not? I am not asking you to agree with me, but You and your colleagues earlier have provided a I presume that is what you are alluding to. very helpful platform for us. Many thanks. Ev 28 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Tuesday 19 October 2004
Members present:
Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Mr David Chidgey Mr John Maples Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr Bill Olner Mr Eric Illsley Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay
Witness: Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, a Member of the House of Lords, International Community High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina and European Union Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, examined.
Q60 Chairman: Lord Ashdown, welcome home. been following an aggressive programme of May I greet you most warmly on the part of the reduction, of down sizing, 25% this year, and I think Committee, as a former colleague, and pay tribute to that has to continue along the lines that have been your distinguished work in Bosnia and Herzegovina mapped out on the journey to PfP. Third, as BiH with your two hats on. Most people are content with evolves—and I hope we might have an opportunity one. As you know, we are conducting an inquiry as to discuss this today if the Committee wishes—the a Committee into the Western Balkans which will role of the High Representatives should evolve too. include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and other As we pass through these next milestone points, BiH areas of tension. Therefore, your evidence to the will change and I think we have to consider very Committee will be of considerable help to us. We carefully how we change the supplies particularly to hope to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina early next the UN Security Council and Chapter 7 and the so- month and unfortunately you will not be there but I called issue of the Bonn Powers. I have already know that you will be very ready to help the refused to use my powers in all areas related to Committee. Before I turn to Sir John Stanley, who accession to the SAA4 process and the European only recently returned from—I must not say “your Union, although I will continue to use them against country”—may I ask you this: clearly, it is important those who operate against the wishes of the ICTY5 for you to liaise with Her Majesty’s Government. or who assist indicted war criminals, or who evade You maintain contacts with them although, as an their international responsibilities. Lastly, on 2 international civil servant. Would you give some December, a very important deadline comes which I indication of the help which you receive and am sure the Committee is very well aware of, which generally comment on whether you are satisfied with is the establishment of the EUFor6, taking over from the policy of HMG to Bosnia and Herzegovina? SFor7. That, in my view, marks a very important Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: It is watershed. The watershed is as Europe takes the lead extremely welcome that you are conducting this of the international coalition, both the military and investigation. I think this is just the right moment to of the peace stabilisation side. At the same time, as do it and I am happy to respond in detail to that you just said, Mr Chairman, I will take on a bigger question. Would you allow me just to make a few role as the EU Special Representative. What this very brief points? means is that, for BiH, Europe not only becomes the instrument to drive the reform process forward; it Q61 Chairman: If they are brief, yes. also becomes the destination. That provides a Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: First of all, synergy of eVort which I will be responsible for my job is to get rid of my job by putting BiH1 developing which will give Europe and the European irreversibly onto the road to statehood and Union process a far greater say over what happens membership of the European community and in Bosnia and Herzegovina and establishes us as the NATO. I think that is a defining moment and I do lead and primary force for pushing this process not think it is far ahead. Our immediate objectives forward. As for the assistance given to me by Her here in BiH are to join PfP2 and to start the Majesty’s Government, it is very considerable. I stabilisation and association process. The first would like to pay tribute at this point to the fact that formal steps towards joining both those the government has provided me with an immense organisations could be taken in the next two to three amount of support, practical and moral. It is fair to months. Secondly, shortly after I became the High say that previous High Representatives may not Representative I established a thing called the necessarily have had the wholehearted support of Mission Implementation Plan which identified the their governments in the way it has been provided to tasks we had to do and, as they were completed, me by this government. I will list for you in a closed down those portions of OHR3 in order to pass moment the total amount of practical, concrete them across to the Bosnian authorities. We have support which costs the taxpayer a not
1 Bosnia Herzegovina. 4 Stability and Association Agreement. 2 Partnership for Peace. 5 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 3 OYce of the High Representative (in Bosnia and 6 EU military mission to Bosnia. Herzegovina). 7 Nato peacekeeping Stabilisation Force. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 29
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon inconsiderable amount. That is less important I one leading to NATO and one leading to the think than the constant, ready supply of help and European Union, of cooperation with the ICTY, it assistance with lobbying and support of all sorts that is not unreasonable to think that you might pass the government gives me. If I have concerns about through those two gates in the first three months of anything, the last thing I have concerns about is the next year. They are probably on track for a positive support I receive from Her Majesty’s Government to conclusion from the Commission to start the SAA do this task. In terms of the actual breakdown, let me process. When that happens, I think that is de facto briefly tell you what HMG provides: a secondee the point of irreversibility. From that point on, it working in my private oYce, a funded contractor seems to me, the magnetic pull of Brussels is more working in the oYce of the High Representative, my important than the push of a High Representative. private oYce, the close protection team, depending There or thereabouts. I would argue that the High on how they want to do it. British soldiers largely Representative in the present form has been from the Royal Military Police but from other arms necessary and remains necessary for a short period as well as the RMP decide who protect me 24 hours ahead of us, but not for too long. It is up to my PIC8 around the clock. That is a considerably expense and masters to decide exactly when and in what form a considerable amount of practical assistance. We that will happen. It will not be the case however that have to think of weapons, of the other techniques the doors are closed and we leave. That would be, in and equipment needed for the protection process. my view, a disaster. We are very close to a point The British Embassy has supported me with where this is going to be the post-war world’s first providing the accoutrements for my wife and I to live successful peace stabilisation mission, but we must in the house that we have. This is from the furniture stick with this process. At that point, I think you are provided to most British diplomats abroad, but they involved in a double transition and the transition is, have aVorded me that as well. Then there is the not as BiH moves further into Europe and NATO, so we inconsiderable matter of the running of a car for use move further out of the internationalist role we for my protection team, which is an armoured car. currently have. The High Representative then For the individual cost of these items the Committee becomes less—capital letters—High Representative; may well want to approach the Foreign OYce. small letters, eusr and more—capital letters— EUSR; small letters high representative. You may Q62 Chairman: It was just a general feel. Basically, want to keep both hats in this process of transition our job is to monitor the Foreign OYce. If there are but it becomes a far more European led process. The any deficiencies, it would be helpful for us to know. key question is what happens to the so-called Bonn Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: There are no Powers. That is a matter which has to be decided by deficiencies and I regard that as being generous or my peace implementation colleagues. Three points: perhaps over-generous. the first is that we are already diminishing the use of those. To use the figures—forgive me if these are ballpark; I do not think they are terribly inaccurate Q63 Sir John Stanley: Lord Ashdown, you said though, within an order of magnitude of plus/minus words to the eVect that your job is to make your job five—when I arrived I used my powers, I think I am redundant. Could you tell us how indispensable is right in saying, on 60-odd occasions in the first year, the High Representative’s/ Special Representative’s 36 of those left behind by my predecessor. In the next post as of now and if it was ended at this particular year, I used them three times. In the last year, I used point what do you think the consequences would be them twice. That shows you the level of decline of the for Bosnia and Herzegovina? use of those powers. Second, I think the use of these Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I do not powers which take a lot of oxygen from the system think anybody is talking, nor should they, of an creates a degree of dependence in the circumstances ending so one day it is there; the next day it is gone. for dependency. I think we should make sure that We lock the doors and walk away leaving an empty that declining use of the powers continues. Whether building and somebody else will take over. I think or not there is a point some time ahead when we you are talking about a transition process. We did a should either end them or put them to one side and calculation not long ago. There are more foreigners take them out of the ready use locker, to use a naval in Prague than there are in Sarajevo but they are not phrase, and put them into the break glass to use in High Representatives, generals and heavyweight emergency locker I do not know. As we move into ambassadors and large embassies. They are the SAA process, a very large chunk of the territory businessmen, tourists and artists. That is what across which those powers are used is already happens when you go down the transition track and removed from us because the SAA process will cover that is where Bosnia is beginning to go. The road all things related to economic reform, justice reform ahead of us is after Dayton and before Brussels. and governance reform. BiH cannot get into Europe That is the watershed we are now approaching. The through the High Representative’s oYce. They have High Representative in this present heavyweight, to do it themselves. I cannot use my powers there. intrusive, interventionist mode has been appropriate There is a point arriving where I think we should be for the Dayton process and remains appropriate. I considering some step change not far ahead. It is up set the task that I wanted to fulfil myself when I went to my colleagues at the PIC to decide when, how and there two years ago as putting BiH irreversibly onto where but I will not hide from the Committee that I the path of statehood and to Europe. Please note: it am in favour of making a step change. is not yet a fully functioning state. If we were to overcome the great elephant across the two tracks, 8 Peace Implementation Council. Ev 30 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
Q64 Sir John Stanley: Can I now turn to the other community will descend like the archangel and grab key element in the political, constitutional jigsaw the Dayton agreement in its claws and fly away to an which is the constitution that Bosnia and air force base 10,000 miles away and rewrite it for the Herzegovina has had for the last nine years, which I Bosnia and Herzegovina people. That is not going to believe you would agree has successfully withstood happen. There is no will to do that. If they are to all the pressures of emerging from that appalling make their state a functional state, it is them that civil war. Do you consider however that that have to do it. You ask when. Not now. I do not want constitution, if Bosnia and Herzegovina is going to to be Augustinian about this but not now because be an eYcient and not too bureaucratically there is one priority for now and that is PfP and operating nation state, is going to have to be SAP9. This is not an SAP requirement, so the other reformed? If so, how do you see that constitutional side of going through those two gates. If we were to reform taking place and in what sort of timescale? tackle that, I have followed a policy of what I call Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: The answer letting 1,000 flowers bloom after Mao Tse-Tung. If to your question, “Does the constitution have to be people want to talk about it and bring forward ideas, reformed?” is self-evidently yes. It must be. You excellent. That is a good thing to prepare for a have a state in which there are far too many layers of debate that has to be had, but I do not want anybody government. You have a state which, depending on distracting attention away from getting through whether you are talking about the Federation or the these two crucial gates for two reasons. First of all, Republic of Srbska, spends somewhere between upon that everything else depends and, secondly, the 70%, some argue, and around 50% of the total moment you are through into the SAA process and taxpayers’ money governing itself and only 30% on PfP, you have an external structure which pulls the its people. If you want to know why pensions are so country forward, which provides a safer structure poor—and they are disastrously, grindingly low—it within which to have a constitutional debate which is because they spend so much money on at present you could not have. government. Why are hospitals so bad? Why are schools so bad? Why can we not pay judges? A state Q65 Mr Chidgey: Can I ask some questions firstly cannot survive on that basis, as you understand, about nationalist politics in BiH? You will be aware especially a state where there is not a loyalty between more than most of us that there has been a recent the citizens and the state. Building up a sense of upsurge of nationalism within the Balkans, loyalty with the state is not an event; it is a process particularly in Bosnia. The latest elections in early and that process arrives through good government October this year saw another illustration of that, and delivering good services to citizens which makes coupled with a much lower turn out which is them then depend on the state first and trust the state something I would like to hear your views on. I think and ultimately love the state. A country that spends it has dropped 20% down to 45%. You have so much money on government cannot provide that previously made clear your willingness to work with bond between the citizen and the state so self- nationalist politicians and the Committee would like evidently this has to happen but, again, three points to know whether these recent electoral results have if I may. First of all, let us recollect that the Dayton changed your perceptions of these politicians that agreement was an agreement to end a war, not build you are working with. How obstructive have they a state. It served that purpose very well. Personally, been, if they have been at all, in working with BiH’s I think all the messy compromises, with perhaps a institutions, bearing in mind that the minority single exception, made in Dayton were necessary groups in BiH have dropped from some 17% in 1991 and our mistake in the past has not been to explore to about 3% today? the room for self-amendment within Dayton. We Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Turn out was have amended the constitution in three crucial ways 47% in local elections. I do not know what it was in by using Dayton to amend Dayton—the famous your constituency. Article 3(5)(a)—in which we amended Dayton to put the power to control the armed forces at the state Q66 Mr Chidgey: It was previously 65%. level, to create a state-wide VAT system and to Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Yes, but let create a state-wide governance and disciplinary us reflect on this: we, the international community, body for the judiciary. Dayton is amendable and has have imposed seven elections on them in nine years. been amended. Secondly, if you asked most people I wonder what turn out in Britain’s municipal in BiH then and perhaps now, they would rightly say elections might be if you had seven elections in nine that Dayton had served us rather well as a basis for years. Low turn outs are an aZiction that strike all building peace. If you asked them then and even now of the developed democracies and it may well be that would they have preferred an untidy peace or a as BiH gets itself more developed as a democracy it continuing war, they would have preferred an untidy is suVering from that aZiction alongside everything peace, but we are now moving to a diVerent point else. We have to remember that a low turn out of where we have to begin to build a functional state. 47% in a municipal election is hardly unlikely in our The last point is let us very clearly say that if this own country. I am not sure we should be very wise to constitution has to be changed it can only be point fingers at BiH for achieving a turn out which, changed by the people of BiH. It cannot be changed judging from my own constituency and local by the international community. It cannot be elections, is a little higher than we sometimes imposed by the High Representative. We should dispense with the idea that the international 9 Stabilisation and Assistance Programme. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 31
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon achieve. We have inflicted seven elections in nine Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Can I come years on Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am not satisfied on to that in just one second? There is one final point. with the turn out. We all want to see that go up but I TheHDZ11,theCroatianNationalistParty,theparty do not think every cause of that was the nationalists. of Tudjman: is it the same as the party of Sanader? Secondly, you say I have expressed my willingness to The HDZ now governs Croatia. The HDZ has taken work with the nationalists. No. I express my Croatia into the European Union or to the willingness to work with who the people elect. Who thresholds of the European Union. They have would you want me to work with? I think you would changed themselves from a nationalist party with a be criticising me pretty heavily in this Committee if nationalist title into a perfectly ordinary, the ballot box at the last election returned by an conventional, centre right European party and led overwhelming majority the nationalist parties and I that country to Europe. I would advise the decided not to work with them. I do not decide to Committee not to judge parties any longer by their work with any political party. My job as a servant of names, but rather by what they do. The 59 we had to Bosnia and Herzegovina is to work with the people get rid of: for nine solid years, Bosnia and that the people elect and those turn out to be, Herzegovina has failed to fulfil not only its regrettably some might argue, the nationalist international obligations to cooperate with the parties. The hard fact is that the reformist, pro- Hague but also one of the primary founding stones European parties did not win the October 2002 of Dayton which is that they must cooperate with election. I do not believe it would be right, as indeed the Hague. It is not the whole of BiH; it is the happened previously, for me to manipulate the Republic of Srbska. For nine solid years, the results of the ballot box. My job is to work with Republic of Srbska has refused to cooperate in any those who the ballot box elects. That is not called way with the ICTY. It is not that they have not favouring the nationalist; it is called democracy, as I caught Karadzic and Mladic; they have not caught am sure you appreciate. Let me articulate an idea to anybody, not a single war criminal, low and mid- you and try and put it in the Balkans context. I think ranking, medium ranking or high ranking. For nine something happens in post-nationalist struggles, years, they have flagrantly and consistently abused whether that struggle is for liberation or an internal their responsibility, ignored their responsibility civil war which is a national struggle in terms, which under international law as a fundamental part of the is that people start oV being nationalists. They call Dayton process. You cannot call for the protections themselves nationalist groupings, nationalist of Dayton if you are not prepared to fulfil the parties, but they are rather more groupings than obligations of Dayton. We warned them and I warned them for six or seven months. If NATO were parties. As politics develops, they break up and to conclude in July last year that, because of their reassemble into their more conventional, political failure, the only peace that Bosnia can have, which forms. You find the same happening in Solidarity in is peace within the PfP and NATO, was going to be Poland and the ANC10 in South Africa. Maybe that denied to the whole country, then I would have to is what is happening in the Balkans too. For take very firm action. I told them time and again but instance, the so-called nationalist parties have regrettably that is what happened. NATO did not nevertheless led the country to the verge of Europe. just do that. At the Istanbul Summit, it said, “The They have brought about the changes that nobody country cannot join PfP giving every BiH citizen the else thought they could bring about, contrary to gift of peace because of ‘a small group of what everybody else believed. It would be obstructionists in the Republic of Srbska’.” I simply impossible, people said, to combine Bosnia’s ethnic could not allow the whole country to be held to armed forces into state control. Wrong. It has ransom by a few people who believe that protecting happened under the nationalist government. It corruption and assisting war criminals to evade would be wrong and impossible to presume that they capture was more important than giving the country could create a single, state-wide VAT system. a future. Yes, I had to take the very diYcult action Wrong. That has happened under a nationalist of cleaning out the system in the Republic of Srbska government. It would be ridiculous to pretend that by making sure that those whom we had evidence they can create a single, over-arching body for the were assisting war criminals were not any longer in judiciary for the state but that has happened. The positions of power. state has been very significantly strengthened. Do they obstruct the process? Yes, they do. My rule of thumb with the Balkans has not been to judge a Q68 Andrew Mackinlay: Do you see a situation party by its name or its label but to judge a party by whereby, although the de jure curtilage of the state what it does. If they do good things, I work with is the Federation and Srbska, the Federation could them. If they seek to obstruct that process, then I go at a variable geometry as it were in respect of the seek to provide them with reasons for not continuing Partnership for Peace or even the European Union? to do so. In a way, whether we like it or not, we have one part of the island of Cyprus going for a considerable amount of variable geometry. It seems from what Q67 Mr Chidgey: What was the prime motivation you have said that you are reasonably content with for, I am sure, the necessary sacking of 60 senior the progress of the Federation. oYcials? 11 Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic 10 African National Congress. Union). Ev 32 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I would not Q70 Andrew Mackinlay: But with a degree of say that I was reasonably content. Each part of symmetry. Bosnia and Herzegovina has its diYculties. The Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Yes, but on Bosniaks have tried—and we have had to resist it the other hand is Switzerland perfect in symmetry? very strongly—to politically influence the judiciary Look at the diVerent size of the cantons. No, it is not. and interfere politically in the conduct of the rule of I often think that symmetry could well be the law. That is the battle I have had to have with the hobgoblin of political scientists when it comes to Bosnians. With the Croats, they have strongly doing things that are practical. Whilst agreeing with resisted adopting European standards of education, you that there is lack of symmetry and that that is a wishing to keep a segregated education system, problem that needs to be addressed, in a state like contrary to the standards of the Council of Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina I think I would be prepared In each part of BiH, there are diVerent kinds of to trade a little of the perfectionist symmetry for problems. The Republic of Srbska is the one which something that will work. However, I think you have has attracted most attention because of the ICTY hit on an extremely important point. Accepting that issue. Is there a case for variable geometry? I do not there are some things we would all agree, if you had want to dodge the question, as I think you will a representative of the Serbs here from the Republic probably realise, but it is not really my choice. It is of Srbska and Croats and Bosniaks, they would up to NATO to decide whether or not they could for agree on these three propositions: one, Bosnia needs instance confer upon the Federation the advantages to be a light level state. It needs a state that is of PfP or some of the advantages of PfP without functional but light level. It needs to deal with only doing it for the whole country. It is up to the those things that are necessary at this stage. Two, we European Union to decide. If I were asked for also know what we want to do at the other end of the advice, I would advise against it. There are enough spectrum. Everybody will agree that you need a viviparous issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, strengthened municipality. At the top and bottom without wishing to divide it more. There is an area of level, I think you will find ready agreement about economic variable geometry. Those of you who have what the new shape of Bosnia and Herzegovina will been to Bosnia and Herzegovina will go to the be. The place where you find disagreement—the Republic of Srbska from the Federation and will see third proposition to put—is what I call the muddle that it is immeasurably poorer because the in the middle. Do you have entities or cantons? That international community has not invested there is the key constitutional question. That is a very big, because of the curse of Karadzic, in many ways. To singular problem about which there will be huge treat the country institutionally diVerently is a political contention, but it is only the one level or, if matter that would require a very great deal of you like, two levels reducing to one that you have to thought. sort out. There are many models for this. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a million miles away from being a functional state qua Great Britain but it is not a Q69 Andrew Mackinlay: Which brings me to the million miles away from being a functional state constitution as we have it at the moment. The way I which Europe allows to exist within its borders like, understand it is you have been reasonably successful for instance, Belgium or Switzerland. and you have described the competences of the state being able to get armed forces to set some oversight for the judiciary and one or two other important Q71 Chairman: And may reflect the realities on the competences; but below that, the way I understand ground. it, Srbska is pretty much a devolved administration. Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Exactly so. Whatever the quality of it is, it is one unit. The Federation is cantonal and there is very little at the Q72 Mr Illsley: Is it economically viable to have the Federation level. It seems to me there is not a 10 cantons and the municipalities? Is there an constitutional symmetry. We do not have a state as argument for perhaps trying to sweep away some of we know it even in an embryonic way and at some the cantons and go straight from the state to the stage we are going to have to address the Federation, municipalities? what happens at that level and what happens at a Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: That is also cantonal level. an alternative solution. It is certainly possible to do Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I agree with that but I would really recommend against the that. We do not have a state as we know it. That is international community sitting in the safety of air true, but I would ask you to put out of your mind the force bases in America or even committee rooms in concept of states as we know them. Will Bosnia and the House of Commons and designing their Herzegovina ever be a state as we in Britain know it, constitution for them. I agree with you a broadly centralised state, although becoming more wholeheartedly that the driver for this will probably decentralised? Will it be like France, for whom you be economic. It may well be that the European could use the same two statements? No. On the other Union when it thinks about stabilisation and hand, that is not the only model of a state in Europe. association agreements will draw up an SAA Belgium is a diVerent kind of state, a state where—I agreement which, if you recall, has three sectors. It do not mean to be rude in any way—you would will have an economic reform sector, a judicial trade a certain element of what we might call reform and a governance reform sector. Who functionality in order to be able to accommodate the knows? The European Union may decide that in diVerent ethnic and religious mix. respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a level of Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 33
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon functionality that it requires and it will lay down 16 conditions—I use the Commission’s words—the some guidelines for that. I would caution against a High Representative’s powers have been used not blueprint. Whether that is true or not, what is true one single time. They could not have been. The is that this is essentially as it touches the citizens an Commission made it clear, quite properly, that BiH economic problem and that is where you are had to do this themselves and I could not do it for exactly right. them. It is also the Commission’s view—again, I defer to their judgment—that provided this progress Q73 Mr Illsley: Is there a tradition of cantons in the continues there is no reason why negotiations for an Federation? SAA should not be commenced in the early months Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: We do quite of about the spring of next year. They are the judge a lot of opinion polls. In descending order, public and jury on this. Mr Chidgey asked what are the confidence lies first with the municipalities; second, issues yet to be resolved. If I were to identify one, it with the cantons; third, with the state and the least was the setting up of a public broadcast system. This admired and respected level is the Federation, the has not yet been completed. There are some, entity. That is broadly the way it plays out time and particularly amongst the Croat side, who appear to again. There are quite serious questions as to want a third language broadcaster. That is directly whether or not the state in its current form in the contrary not just to the SAA process but indeed to longer term is economically viable. I do not have the Dayton agreement. It would be completely answers to those questions. I think your inimical to the process. That is not to say that that is presumption that this process may be economically a European standard. In many European countries driven is probably the right one. This is not the time they do have single language broadcasters but many to deal with it. There is a moment coming when it European countries do not have Bosnia’s history would be right to deal with it. I do not believe it where the single language broadcasters were used as would be right to have any distraction away from the the generators of hate that initiated the war. It is singular premise of getting into the SAA process directly contrary to Dayton to have what the Croats because that creates the structure in which this apparently seek. Then there are some in the debate can be more healthily and more safely Republic of Srbska who are not prepared to create conducted. the central services that a state broadcaster would need in order to provide an over-arching structure within which the entity broadcasters continue. If I Q74 Mr Chidgey: You remarked at the start about were to identify a single block on that front, the 16 the road to accession and the EU, particularly in tasks, it would be PBS but behind and above that regard to the stability and association process. You dominating everything is the failure to cooperate will know that Bosnia underwent a feasibility study with ICTY. That failure, unless it is put right, will just under a year ago in November 2003 as part of block the path not just to NATO but also to the the stability and association process and I am sure European Union and that is the big one. you will also be aware that the eventual feasibility report that came through showed 16 priority areas of action. I think it said that BiH has not yet Q75 Mr Olner: Lord Ashdown, you touched briefly assumed full responsibility for government. “It still on the fact that Bosnia has recently failed to fulfil the needs to show through its own eVorts that the High terms of entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Representative’s Bonn Powers are no longer needed, mainly because of their non-compliance with the particularly in the areas to be covered by an SAA.” Hague. You have told us that progress has been made. It is Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I think pretty too short a time this morning for you to be able to well solely. give us a comment on each of the 16 priority areas. I would hope that we could have that in writing at Q76 Mr Olner: This has been going on for nine some stage but I would like to know how Lord years. A couple of big fish have perhaps been caught Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon feels he has been but how are we going to get this bid of reconciliation able to accelerate the force necessary on the basis of going because if there is no compliance and if their the signposts in this report and what at the moment past history is not faced how are you going to move are the most pressing of these issues that you feel you forward and how are you going to be able to have to overcome. encourage them? Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I could direct Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: There is a you perhaps to the latest Peace Implementation process where past history is being faced. I will not Council public statement at the end in which the go into the details but we have initiated the Commission of course agreed the wording. They Srebrenica Commission at the behest of the Human said that Bosnia and Herzegovina had made real Rights Chamber of the Bosnian Court. That is a progress on the 16 conditions. My Bonn Powers Commission set up by the Republic of Srbska have been used on none of those. They have all been Government in which the vast majority—there is done by the local authorities. That is not to say I only one Bosniak—has uncovered the truth on have not cajoled and encouraged—Mr Chidgey may Srebrenica. The president of the Republic of Srbska remember how one can cajole and encourage from in a very brave statement did not quite go as far as time to time—the BiH authorities to conduct these Willy Brandt on Auschwitz but went a long way but I want to make it clear to the Committee that in down that track and made a very brave statement the, I think, very significant progress made on those acknowledging that this was a crime committed by Ev 34 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon the Serbs. I think that was an act of some moral opposed before. I think there is a mind shift going stature, in addition to which other statements have on. All these things are welcome. All these things can been made. He recently visited President Tadic in the be built on. All these things if they continue could Republic of Srbska and they made a joint statement deliver a change in the relatively near future but together which is very welcome. In addition, there none of them will be worth anything unless they are are certain changes being made to structures that backed by concrete action. It is that we sit and make it better, quicker and perhaps easier to catch wait for. these war criminals, but all of these I fear are in the category of words. After nine years of failure, words Q79 Mr Olner: What in your opinion is the progress will not do. If you wish me to characterise the mood on the defence and intelligence sector reforms? in the Republic of Srbska, it is a growing if still Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I think reluctant acknowledgement that it will be necessary rather good. By the end of this year, the BiH state to face up to what happened in the past. There were will have ticked all the boxes, in all probability, for black deeds committed on all sides. There are things defence reform. It will have met all the NATO PfP that Bosniaks need to own up to and Croats need to criteria, leaving aside the cooperation with the own up to but under the pressure there is a growing ICTY. That is going quite well. The area we have to realisation that acknowledging the past is an pay attention to is when NATO takes over the lead important part of building the future. All of these are Y of the defence reform process there must be no welcome but none of them is su cient unless there is slowing down on the impetus for that. I am confident concrete action and concrete action means catching there will not be. We have worked very hard to some of the war criminals and making sure they end ensure that there will not be. On the intelligence side, up in the Hague. Until that happens, the it is not easy to combine two Communist style international community will in my view quite intelligence services who spend more time spying on properly be unwilling to say that the Republic of their people than spying on outside forces into a Srbska is cooperating. What can we do to help? single, state-wide, European standard intelligence Stand at the side, will them to do it, wish them to do structure accountable to Parliament. Progress here it, pressure them to do it, provide them with the is continuing. Is it going as fast as I would wish? No, resources if necessary to do it but only they can do it. but it is my job to be impatient and I am. I can look on it with a degree of satisfaction. There have been Q77 Mr Olner: Would NATO be involved in your hiccups. It has not been as well led and managed as encouraging words to them to move down this perhaps it might have been in the early stages but I track? think we are on track to combining eVectively these Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Absolutely, two intelligence services together into a state and NATO is. The Commander of SFor and I work intelligence service by the early months of next year. very closely together. He looks after the security side of peace implementation. We are frequently meeting Q80 Mr Hamilton: Last month this Committee with people and frequently discussing these things visited the Hague and while we were there we met with them. NATO too is wanting this to happen but President Meron who is in charge of the we cannot make it happen. Only they can make it International Criminal Tribunal for the former happen. Yugoslavia. What struck many of us was that they are doing a good job but justice is being dispensed a Q78 Mr Olner: You are on the ground and you feel long way from the scene of the crime and I wondered it, touch it and smell it. It has taken nine years to get whether you could tell us what progress is being where we are. How many more years—or now can made, if any, and what eVorts perhaps to bring that we measure it in months?—before this cooperation justice closer to the ground in Bosnia itself. starts with the Hague? Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: We are Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: You ask me setting up a domestic war crimes capacity. That has to make a prediction. Not another nine years. been a very big and expensive project which we Maybe wiser and more sceptical voices than me started this year. The point you make is an excellent would say I was wrong on this but I think we are one. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be a stable potentially quite close to a watershed moment in state and a functional state unless it has the capacity which everybody recognises that this is a job that has to try its own war criminals. I give you a view: I do to be completed. The dark curse of Radovan not think that will ever include the capacity to try Karadzic wandering as he may well be in the somebody like Karadzic or Mladic, not in the mountains around the Zelengora and Montenegro is foreseeable future. That is a job that in my view will now aVecting the lives of ordinary people. If you go have to rest with the Hague for a bit. Some people to Foca you will find this is grindingly poor because argue there are some 7,000, 4,000 or 3,000 war nobody wants to invest in this area. In my best criminals of all sorts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. judgment, there are the beginnings of a serious mind The vast majority of those will have to be tried, in the shift. It is interesting that when we published the first absence of a peace and reconciliation process, which results of the Srebrenica Commission there certainly is not on the cards and nor should it be at President Kadic of Serbia and Montenegro was the moment, in Bosnian courts. We have already speaking to me the other day and he said there was indicted our first war criminal from entirely BiH a very sharp, marked shift in public opinion in resources within the new structures which we have favour of catching Ratko Mladic which had been been setting up over the last two years. It took us six Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 35
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon weeks. It took the Hague two years to do an to this task. NATO it seems to me and the western indictment. That person is almost certainly going to governments are utterly determined it will be be the first trial of domestic war criminal in domestic completed. They are committing resources to it on a procedures and we will have the ability to do that more than adequate scale, I believe. We all from January of next year. recognised this is not going to be finished until it is done. The straight answer to your question do I have Q81 Mr Hamilton: That is very encouraging and I criticisms of either NATO or the intelligence services wish you well with that but how far do you think the is I suppose if you had them there they would not safety of witnesses is in question? That is the big pretend that everything was perfect. How could it question. be? On the other hand, I know of nothing that I Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: These are could recommend that we should be doing that we issues we are wrestling with at the moment. It is the have not already tried to do. What I think we have big question. It is also the very expensive question done in recent years is expand this. We were with a grindingly poor state. Alongside that, there is following the policy in which you shook the tree and a penal institution. We do not have proper you hoped the fruit would fall. Now we are procedures. We do not have a place yet for beginning to attack the tree, its branches and its incarcerating potential war criminals awaiting trial network. I am using my political powers to work or indeed after trial. We are now beginning to build against those who are supporting the war criminal that literally with bricks and mortar so it is very fast support networks, freezing bank accounts, to put that into place. The witness issue is a big issue European Union visa bans, removals from time to which we are seeking to solve as best we can. It is not time. We are not just going after the individuals. We going to be tidy in the first instance. In my view, it are going after the whole support structure is very important that we get this process started of supporting them. I am not a great believer in saying, trying domestic war criminals domestically as early “By Christmas, this will be done and that person will as possible. I hope it will start in January. That is our be in jail.” I have been in this game too long to make target date. Will it be done with perfect grace predictions like that but I think it would be fair to immediately? Probably not but it will be started say that the circle is diminishing in which they are properly and properly as early as possible. able to move. If we set ourselves the target of doing this, I think it is now going to be done sooner rather than later. Q82 Mr Hamilton: Are there frequent operations still on the ground to try to capture Mladic and Karadzic? Q84 Mr Hamilton: Finally, you said something very Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Yes. important earlier, Lord Ashdown. If I remember correctly, you said that public opinion was changing Q83 Mr Hamilton: Why do you think they are not and the people who supported these war criminals yet in custody? I know it is very diYcult and we could were beginning to turn against them because they ask the same question about other war criminals recognised it was in their own economic interest. Do throughout the world but do you think western you think in the end that will be the reason these intelligence services could do more to help? people are captured? Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I chased my Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: That is first terrorist through the mangrove swamps of crucial. Mao Tse-Tung used to say the guerrilla Borneo 40 years ago. His name was Yassim OVendi swims amongst its people like a fish in water and if and we never caught him. I was blown up against a you can change the water in which they swim you wall on the Cromlin Road by the first nail bomb ever make life much more diYcult for them. That thrown. It blew one of my marine’s feet oV. We have precisely is the point but it is, it seems to me, a classic not caught him either. We have not caught every example of how the political action has to back the person who perpetrated outrages in Northern military action. Perhaps that is what we did not do Ireland, though we control every blade of grass that terribly well in the past. We relied on NATO to be moves there, presumably. These guys are wandering able to do the job but unless you deploy your over the wildest mountain vastnesses in south political actions to change the mood of the public, to eastern Europe. I do not know whether Karadzic is close oV the corrupt structures—let us recognise that there but let us presume he might be somewhere these guys are not “hajduks”, the Balkan word for a between the Zelengora and Dornberg, which is ragged, remote figure wandering in the hills. They wildly mountainous. Tito hid 7,000 partisans from are heads of large scale criminal networks. It is the six German divisions. They did not catch them in same criminal networks that smuggle women into that area. This is not an easy military task. If you our cities, that smuggle drugs into our cities, that have somebody moving amongst a population generate the money, that support the corrupt which, wrongly of course, still regards them as a structures of the nationalist part when they exist— national hero, this is not an easy task to do. I would and they do—and that fund the war criminal advise people to recognise how diYcult a military networks. You have to attack the crime networks as task this is. In my view, there is an absolute total well as the war criminal networks. You have to think commitment. That is all I have seen. I have heard all about public opinion and do what you can to change sorts of rumours about what went on before. Since I it which is the importance of the Srebrenica have been there, I can only say I have seen complete Commission. Unless you combine all these factors, commitment on all sides and full resources applied in the end, you are not going to win this battle. Ev 36 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
Q85 Chairman: And recognise that Karadzic is Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I think they one of the main factors preventing economic are watching closely and I think they are right to do development. so. Let us just remember that dreadful period that Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Absolutely. you will remember as I do when we sat aside and 250,000 were killed in this country and half the Q86 Chairman: Turning to the military side, in mid- country were driven with blood and brutality from December, the EU force will take over from SFor. their homes. I think history will deal very, very hard Do you see any potential problems in that indeed with the European nations who sat aside and transition? did so little and in the end relied on Uncle Sam to Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: It is a very come along and bail them out. So, it is hardly big operation. If you had asked me six weeks ago, I surprising that many in BiH, especially Bosnjaks, would have said to you that I thought the on the will regard Americans as the people who saved them ground planning was behind the curve, but I can and Europe as the people who let them down. Now, confidently say to you that I do not think that is the that is not in accordance with the historical facts but case now. There has been a remarkable job done by it is a very understandable position. So, yes, they will the EUFor. watch this with considerable care but I think increasingly, as they have seen the two operations Q87 Chairman: How will the mandate change? How work together, visibly work together, when will SFor’s diVer from EUFor’s? delegations come out from NATO and delegations Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: There will be with the EU are integrated into it, I think they have a slightly expanded mandate, which I greatly been considerably reassured but they will be welcome, so that EUFor can get more easily watching closely to see that this is a success, which is involved in the whole business of organised crime. why my recommendation to Brussels is that when The mandate change, which I hope to see and which this handover take place, try and invest it with as to a certain extent we have, is so that EUFor might little politics as possible and try and invest it with as look muchmore like KFor.12 Itsmandate will include much military reality. It is all about capability and explicitly its IPU, its gendarmerie element will be capacity and if this looks a serious military takeover, raised and it will have a greater capacity to get which it ought to because I think it will be, then I involved in tackling organised crime for the reason think that will go a long way to reassure people. we have just been touching on. There will be a mandate change there. I honestly think that bearing Q90 Chairman: There will be a great temptation to in mind that 90%, I think I am right, in current SFor have fanfares blazing then. troops are from the EU anyway. They will continue Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I think we to conduct their operations insofar as the average should blow raspberries to anybody who says words citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina see them without like, “The hour of Europe has arrived.” We do not much change. want to hear that kind of language again.
Q88 Chairman: That same transition happened in V Q91 Chairman: In terms of cooperation with the Macedonia where e ectively it was EU forces— ICTY, there are some who would express a double Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Absolutely standard. In respect of Croatia, for example, when and I think the average refugee thinking of returning the bar was removed, it was removed when the ICTY to Srebrenica will not see much diVerence; there will V V said they were cooperating in respect of Gotovina. be a di erent shoulder flash and a di erent cap That was cooperation, that was the inprimatur of badge but, beyond that, not. The question is how Carlo del Ponti. In respect of war criminals in this loss together at the top level as between General Bosnia, they are actually saying that they must be Leakey, the British Commander Designate, and handed over which may or may not be within the General Schook, the remaining SFor Commander/ Y capacity of the new Government. Do you feel that NATO Commander for the NATO O ce in BiH . . . there is a legitimate ground for unhappiness on this? There has to be very close liaison but I am very Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: That is well confident that that has happened. These two guys beyond my pay grade, Chairman! get on very well together; they have worked extremely closely together, including with me, so I am pretty confident that this changeover, diYcult Q92 Andrew Mackinlay: In any event, the way I and important though it is, is going to go well. understood your evidence earlier was that you said they have not handed one. Q89 Chairman: The transition is belatedly welcome Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: That is to the US; I guess in part because of overstretch, it correct. is welcome to the European Union because it allows them to walk taller on the military side. Is it welcome Q93 Andrew Mackinlay: Surely the thrust of what to the Bosnians because they presumably will think you are saying is, if we came back to you some time of the UNPROFOR13 1991–95 and the EU position in the future you might have a diVerent view, but at that time. Is there a deep suspicion of what will there has not been a gesture, any genuflection at all. happen? Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I think that is perfectly fair. This is not about Karadzic and 12 Kosovo Peacekeeping Force. Mladic, as Mr Mackinlay says, although let us 13 United Nations Protection Force. remember that the Republic of Srbska authorities Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 37
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon had no cooperation with NATO. If somebody wants move in after a war. The very first thing you need to to understand why SFor has not arrested Karadzic do is tackle the rule of law issue, I mean from hour and Mladic, one of the reasons is that the Republic one after the midnight hour in which peace arrives. If of Srbska has provided zero cooperation. Perhaps necessary, creating martial law. If you do not make it some would argue that this is a job which has to be priority number one, everything else you do will be undertaken by NATO with its military capabilities subverted by the process. You want to hold that local authorities do not have but, if that is a elections, the criminals will get elected. You want to reason, then it is no reason to explain why, as Mr have investment into the country, no one will Mackinlay has said, no war criminals have been provide it. You want to provide international aid, arrested. Twenty war criminals have been arrested huge sums of it in Bosnia and Herzegovina, vast on the Territory Republic of Srbska, all of them by amounts will go straight through the system and into SFor troops, none of them by Republic of Srbska the hands of the criminals, which is exactly what authorities. By the by, some of those SFor troops happened. We took seven years to make rule of law have been injured in the process and I take the priority number one, so it is hardly surprising that V greatest o ence to the idea that our young men and corruption is endemic into the system. It only started women serving in our armed forces have to put to be made priority number one when I arrived here themselves in harm’s way in order to fulfil functions and, since then, we invested vast amounts of money, that the Republic of Srbska Government has failed well and rightly invested, into the police force. There to fulfil. So, I think Mr Mackinlay is right in saying is no point in having a good police force if you have that there is quantum diVerence but, further than a rotten judiciary. You have to look at the rule of law this, I would prefer not to go. synoptically from end to end. So, when we arrived there we made it a first priority to reform the judicial Q94 Mr Chidgey: Staying, if I may, with law and system. So, we have examined and removed large order in a more general sense rather than the specific numbers of corrupt judges, reduced the number of war criminal sense, just a short time after you arrived the judiciary, reduced the number of courts by 30% in BiH, the International Crisis Group said in a and rewritten the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina paper in 2002 when commenting on the rule of law, written by Bosnians in order to create a framework “The law does not yet rule in Bosnia & Herzegovina. of law consistent with European practice and make What prevail instead are nationally defined politics, it easier to capture criminals. We have bought in an inconsistency in the application of law, corrupt and EU mission to deal with the police, we have created incompetent courts, a fragmented judicial space, a State Court in which there are now some half-baked or half-implemented reforms, and sheer international judges enabling us to try some of the negligence.” most high-level corrupt cases in the country. We Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: That is very have just tried successfully the largest human accurate. traYcking case ever tired in BiH and, at this moment, a former president of BiH, a Croat President, Ante Jelavic, is before the court on Q95 Mr Chidgey: “Bosnia is, in short, a land where corruption charges, something nobody thought respect of and confidence in the law and its defenders is weak.” That was some two years ago. It is well would ever happen. So, we are making progress on established that it is one of your priorities; how are this. Is BiH yet a law-abiding state? No, but it is you doing in that regard? getting there. Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: I think somebody else had better comment on how I am doing! I am not very good at that! Can I make two Q96 Mr Chidgey: It is very interesting to hear what brief points to you and I am conscious of the time. you have to say on this. Is it possible to introduce the V The first is corruption, crime and criminality follows rule of law without e ective democratic war like a dark shadow. I often say to people if they accountability within BiH or anywhere else for are coming out to work in Bosnia who ask me, that matter? “What should I do?”, “Read a book and watch a Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: It is possible, film.” The book is Ivo Andric’s great book Bridge on yes, absolutely; I think we have to. I think the more the Drina for which he won the Nobel Prize but the diYcult question is, is it possible to introduce the film is The Third Man.WhyThe Third Man? Because rule of law without falling back on the old it was done in Vienna in 1953. Look at Vienna today communist theory that you can interfere in the and look at Vienna in 1953. Look at the two actions of judges? That is much more diYcult for us, pictures. Look at what Rome looked like for the 10 much more diYcult. Arguably, one of the problems years after the war in terms of criminality and look about Bosnia and Herzegovina is that there was how long it took to get that out of the system. Look never a revolution against communism: (a) at France. Look at our country. Criminality and the communism was Titoism which is slightly diVerent, Black Market were dominant features in the 1950s. communism with a human face, and (b) before the This is what happens after war. It is hardly Tito experiment failed, which everybody realised it surprising that, in a war in which 250,000 were killed was, the war intervened. So, people blame the war, and half the population driven from their homes, they do not blame communism. So, the old socialist criminality should be there. So, second point: this chip in people’s head, unlike in Hungary or Poland, therefore needs to be priority number one when you has not gone through that thought-chance process. Ev 38 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
19 October 2004 Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
It is happening now but it is quite a long process. I Q98 Chairman: There has been smuggling in that am sure you can introduce proper rule of law part of the world for a long time when there was law functions without aVecting democracy providing and order in Vienna. democracy understands well and we have had to Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: Iamsure fight tough battles on this, especially with the that is true. I do not think we should blame Bosnjaks, that it does not really like to interfere with everything on the corrupt nature of the Balkans. I do the judiciary. not think it is any more corrupt than . . . Chairman: Just to have a certain historical Q97 Chairman: Two things: one, perhaps to give a perspective. Secondly, on behalf of the Committee, historical perspective, the problems with the rule of we thank you most warmly for the way in which you law did not begin in the 1990s. have dealt with such a range of questions. It was Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: No. most impressive. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 39
Tuesday 26 October 2004
Members present:
Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Mr David Chidgey Mr John Maples Mr Eric Illsley Mr Bill Olner Mr Andrew Mackay Mr Greg Pope Andrew Mackinlay Ms Gisela Stuart
Written evidence submitted by Dr Othon Anastasakis, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford
The Western Balkans:The Role of the European Union and the Impact of Enlargement
Current situation, both optimistic and pessimistic Since the fall of Milosevic the situation in the Western Balkans has been improving steadily and gradually. There are regular elections at various levels (national, regional, municipal) which take place everywhere in the area; there is a certain economic recovery and increasing interest in direct foreign investment; and there is a process of convergence with the European Union. Despite the advances there are important deficits which obstruct the normalisation of the political and economic life and jeopardise the security of the area. Issues like organised crime, non-cooperation with ICTY or ethnic extremism are still prevalent. On balance, there are both positive as well as negative developments which justify both optimism and pessimism.
The EU as the only game in town The region is struggling between the forces of European-oriented reform and the forces of inward nationalism. International actors agree that there is a need for the consolidation and sustainability of the reform process and support for the modernising and Europeanising forces. The role of the European Union in this is crucial. The EU acts as the normative, political and economic power in the region. With the gradual withdrawal of the US and its attention focused on other areas, the European Union has adopted the major responsibility in the development and integration of the region in Europe; it is also the single largest donor in the region. The European Union has a multiple agenda in the Western Balkan region and a wide-ranging presence. It deals: (a) with hard and soft security issues through military and police missions and the fight against organised crime; (b) reconstruction/cooperation/reconciliation and the restoration of normalcy among neighbouring states and communities; (c) post-communist transition/European integration/adoption of the acquis. The first two points make the EU task more diYcult and in many ways diVerent from the previous Central and East European enlargement experience. From the EU side, there is an enlargement fatigue and the struggle to absorb the big shock from the recent big-bang enlargement; there is still commitment towards Bulgaria and Romania for 2007; and there is a growing debate on the start of accession talks with Turkey; there is also some disillusionment with the slow progress in the Western Balkan area. Despite this discouraging context, the EU has to keep up with its commitment for the Western Balkans and convince regional players about it.
Some limited improvements in the EU policies The Thessaloniki summit in 2003 increased the EU commitment through the establishment of European Partnerships, the enhancement of SAP with elements from the enlargement process and a more explicit roadmap towards potential accession. It oVered a number of pre-accession policies and increased slightly its CARDS budget. Overall there have been some adjustments in the right direction but not radical innovations. The European Partnership (modelled on the Accession Partnerships) oVers the perspective of membership but not a pre-accession status. It introduces new instruments based on the experience of previous enlargement like economic policy dialogue, twinning process, monitoring through annual country reports and tailor-made benchmarks and incentives. Pre-accession aid remains limited and no cohesion or structural Ev 40 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
funds are yet committed for the Western Balkan countries (with the exception of Croatia). Although “partnership” in name, the partners are not working on a commonly agreed agenda but rather on the directives dictated by the EU.
DiVerentiation in the region; single framework but own merits approach Although the EU tries to keep a common and uniform framework for all the Western Balkan countries, it recognizes that each country is to be judged on its own merits and performance. As a result the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) are negotiated with each country separately and the speed of EU integration depends on whether each country is able to implement its own SAA. The Western Balkan region is a striking example of diversity among states and each country is in a diVerent stage of bilateral relations with the European Union. (FYR Macedonia has a SAA in force; Croatia also has one, albeit not yet ratified by all EU members and a positive avis for the start of accession talks; Albania is negotiating a SAA; Bosnia and Herzegovina has adopted a feasibility study for a SAA with 16 points to implement; Serbia & Montenegro is discussing a feasibility study on the basis of a recently adopted twin track approach; Kosovo is on a Stabilisation and Association Tracking Mechanism but which does not include a SAA since Kosovo is not a sovereign entity). Within this state of aVairs it is rather diYcult to see how the European Union will be able to combine its bilateral relations with a regional policy. Having said that, it is acknowledged that a regional policy is needed in order to tackle regional issues and is based on the conviction that what happens in one country also aVects its neighbor. Lately, a positive process is generated by the Croatian and the Macedonian SAAs, the positive avis towards Croatian accession talks, the transferral of responsibilities to DG enlargement with the advent of the new European Commission. But overall the Western Balkans is not a success story for the EU in the way Bulgaria, Romania or Turkey can claim it to be. The EU needs to find ways to address the impasse in Serbia and Montenegro, the low standards of governance in Kosovo, the slow progress in Bosnia & Herzegovina.
Need for more incentives to get the ball rolling There should be more evident incentives to pursue the preparation for candidacy and accession. Simply addressing the priorities in the European Partnerships for the short and medium term, will not as a catalyst for reform. The EU should reconsider its conditionality mix with more carrots than sticks and attach the conditions with short and medium term incentives. There is need for focused aid which should be adequately addressed in the financial provisions for the Western Balkan countries in the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives. There is a need to improve the business climate with clear timetables and benchmarks which will give clear signals and engage more FDI.
Understanding the underlying causes of regional problems and addressing the real concerns The EU has identified the lack of political will as an important deficit in the process towards europeanisation but fails to generate political will through its actions in the region and to produce enough political will of its own. Moreover, its philosophy and policy towards the Western Balkans is still informed by the legacy of the Former Yugoslav conflict and its security questions. Surveys show that socio-economic problems constitute key concerns of the populations in the region, often more important than pure ethnic issues; these are poorly addressed by local actors as well as the international community. Economic underdevelopment, unemployment and macro-economic instability are cited as the main causes of civil unrest and political apathy towards the political elites. The EU should confront such questions which are closely connected with the stability of the political process and the security of the wider region. While policy makers acknowledge the issue, it is not always clear whether they always regard this as a top priority. Their priority instead goes to institution building, trade liberalisation and regional cooperation. The need to increase local ownership has been frequently mentioned but the reality is that the international community does not trust local players and ends up acting in a denigrating way. The protectorate mentality is highly prevalent in that part of Europe. More consultation is needed and sensitivities to local views should be accounted for. The European Union has to improve its ambiguous image in the Western Balkans, through a more eVective public relations exercise and a less patronizing attitude. There is serious skepticism in Serbia-Montenegro, unfavourable feelings in Kosovo and ambivalent attitudes in Bosnia-Herzegovina which generate the lack of consensus needed for the reform process. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 41
In sum, the EU can have great leverage in the region because there is simply no other international option that can act as an anchor to the process of change. EU membership remains a long-term project but should not just be an end in itself. It is what the EU does with the process that matters. In this unusual and quite diYcult regional situation, the EU has to strike the right balance between sticks and carrots, conditions and rewards, maintain a genuine commitment and involvement, and respond to local demands. Dr Othon Anastasakis Director South East European Studies Programme (SEESP) European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford
Witnesses: Dr Othon Anastasakis, Director, South East European Studies Programme, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, and Dr Nicholas Whyte, Head, Europe Programme, International Crisis Group, examined.
Q99 Chairman: The Committee is continuing its failures and try to incorporate the region. I am inquiry into the Western Balkans. Today, for the happy that you are putting forward the question on first group of witnesses, we have Dr Othon the Western Balkans today and that you are showing Anastasakis, Head of the South East Europe interest in this region. Programme at St Antony’s College, Oxford. We also have Mr Nicholas Whyte, who is Head of the Europe Programme in the International Crisis Q100 Chairman: Gentlemen, in all the key hotspots Group. Dr Whyte, we do draw frequently on the of this small but significant area both the United work of your group and find it very relevant indeed States and the European Union are involved. We see in a wide range of areas. Gentlemen, just to give a it particularly dramatically when EUFor will take general setting of the scene, it would be helpful if over in Bosnia in a couple of months’ time. What both of you were to comment on the strategic diVerences of strategic perception are there, in your significance of the Western Balkans, both in itself judgment, between the United States and Europe in and as a source of international contention. It is a this area? relatively small group of countries, containable. Dr Whyte: It is very simple. None of these countries How would you put it its strategic significance? in the Western Balkans is likely to become the 51st Dr Whyte: The two important factors about the through 55th state of the United States—it is going to Western Balkans both stem from the geography of stay pretty much where it is at 50—whereas the the region. First, it is across a main transport route European Union has actually made the promise of by land from Western Europe to the Middle East, future membership to every single one of the and that is something we cannot get away from. All territories in the Western Balkans. From that point of the main roads, the famous Corridor X, of the of view, the quality of engagement is very diVerent. pan-European corridors go through Belgrade, either For the United States, it can only ever be a security south to Thessaloniki or south and east to Istanbul. issue with a certain nod towards economic That is just a plain fact of where it happens to be. stabilisation, but that too is in the security context. The second point from the more political side is that For the European Union it is much more than a the Western Balkans are right inside the enlarged security issue. This is a question of ensuring the European Union, once Bulgaria and Romania join, economic stability as well as the military stability of as they are programmed to do in 2007. Then you a territory that actually borders on the EU itself. have an island of territory completely surrounded by EU Member States with which the EU is going to have to come to significant terms sooner rather than Q101 Chairman: Given the long-term implications later, whose stability is crucial. It now becomes an for Europe of stability or instability in that area, and internal rather than external issue for the perhaps the other pressures on the United States in European Union. terms of over-stretch, do you see, over time, the Dr Anastasakis: Thank you for inviting me here. I commitment of the US to the area diminishing and am very glad that you are so interested in the that of the European Union increasing? Western Balkan region because, as it happens right Dr Anastasakis: I think we are already seeing that. now, international attention, especially EU There has been a decreasing commitment since the attention, is diverting towards Bulgaria and beginning of this new century. We should also Romania where there is a commitment for 2007. consider that during the 1990s there was very There is also a lot of discussion about Turkey now reluctant involvement by the United States, due to which is dominating the picture. There is a risk that the inability of the European Union basically to deal the Western Balkans, which is becoming smaller and with this kind of security question. We realise now smaller as we see now it is minus Croatia, will that this is going to be a big issue for the European become an island of instability. I think it is of great Union. The EU has to prove that it is able to bring strategic significance to the European Union about stability and security in that area and also because, as we know from the 1990s, whatever economic prosperity. In that sense, I think this is the happens in the region aVects directly or indirectly big gamble for the European Union. It has to prove the rest of Europe. In that sense, the EU has to learn to itself and to the region that it has commitment and some of the examples of the 1990s and its own that it can also stabilise the situation. As I write in Ev 42 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2004 Dr Othon Anastasakis and Dr Nicholas Whyte the memorandum which I distributed yesterday, I exactly give a united front towards the Western think that the EU is the only game in town for them Balkans. What can be done to re-engage the and in that sense it is particularly important. European Union in this and take a more immediate and more urgent view of the area? Q102 Chairman: But it is not the only game in town Dr Whyte: The first thing that happened was the because the US is there and the US has a substantial very failure of the EU in the 1990s caused a great commitment of troops. We are told, for example, deal of sober reflection among heads of government. that the US has far great clout in a key area like It is often said that Slobodan Milosevic did more to Kosovo. To what extent is it imperative for us as build the European common foreign security policy Europeans that the US commitment is maintained than any other individual because he demonstrated to that area and at what level? the failures of the previous system. We do now have Dr Anastasakis: To follow up, I think it is important things we did not have in the EU. We do now have that those two co-operate as smoothly as possible in Javier Solana. We have a whole set of structures that region, and I think they have done so. In the within the European Council Secretariat which Western Balkan area, the way the United States and simply did not exist before. Now the EU can actually the EU have worked together has proved that they put several thousand troops on the ground in can do it without any major problems. The region is Bosnia. That was unthinkable even two years ago, very significant for the United States in terms of let alone 10. Things have progressed in the last 10 terrorism and also as a transit route for illegal traYc years. and organised crime. In that sense, I think it is of Dr Anastasakis: I agree that there has been, in the strategic significance for the United States, and it last four years, an increasing and growing will continue to be, but there is commitment on the engagement and commitment on the part of the part of the United States elsewhere in other parts of European Union, but there is also a diYculty in that the globe. In that sense, it is decreasing, and the fact engagement has to be eVective and successful. This that the EU is now becoming the major force in is a real test area for the European Union because it terms of a police mission and military mission, that is engaged in many ways in the Western Balkan proves it has to take the upper hand in that. region. It is engaged in military terms. It is engaged in reconstruction eVorts, in co-operation and V Q103 Chairman: And why we should beware of the reconciliation e orts, and also in transition. This is V precipitated US withdrawal from the area? the major di erence with central and eastern Dr Whyte: As Dr Anastasakis has already said, we European countries, and this is also the major are seeing that to a certain extent; but we will never innovation for the European Union that it has to see it happen completely. At one point the catch deal in multiple ways in that particular part of phrase of the trans-Atlanticists in this debate was Europe. “In together, out together”. There is no out for the European Union in the Western Balkans. There Q106 Mr Illsley: Is the Stability and Association potentially is for the United States, at least in process model working eVectively within the military terms. However, it is impossible to see the Balkans? Does that need to be altered? Does it need United States as a permanent member of the UN to be bolstered? Is there anything the British Security Council, as a member of the Six Nation Government could do to try and encourage our Contact Group, disengage completely. The United European Union partners to improve the SAp States will remain politically engaged, I think, process? whatever happens on 2 November. Certainly it will Dr Whyte: The SAp process works well where you Y remain su ciently politically engaged to be playing have well-functioning states on the other end to the key role in the resolution of the Kosovo final work with, and that clearly applies to Croatia, and I status, which is going to be the big question that would argue that most of the time it applies to comes up in the next 12 months. Macedonia as well. It has run into real problems in Albania, due really to the failure and unwillingness Q104 Chairman: As we have seen in Bosnia, are we of the Albanian Government to undertake the likely to see the US increasingly seeking to necessary reforms. I think it has clearly had a disengage? beneficial eVect in Bosnia along with all the rest of Dr Whyte: Absolutely, and that is my understanding the international eVorts. It has certainly increased from conversations in Washington, that the the credibility of the Bosnian state. But I think it has Pentagon basically has other priorities at the shown almost no tangible results in the case of moment. We can see that by watching the news. Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo because that state There is no great desire in the United States to keep is not really a state, it is three diVerent states, which troops in the Balkans any longer than they feel is happen to be bunched together internationally, and necessary. Who defines what is “necessary” is a the SAp has almost had a negative eVect rather than diVerent question. a positive eVect over the last three or four years there. Q105 Mr Illsley: Following that theme, you Dr Anastasakis: To continue, and I agree with it, the mentioned that the European Union surrounds the EU has been used to dealing with the central Western Balkans. We are looking at Bulgaria and authorities. In that way, that particular area of Romania in terms of accession countries. The Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro is a new territory European Union throughout the Nineties did not for it because of the unclear borders and the non Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 43
26 October 2004 Dr Othon Anastasakis and Dr Nicholas Whyte legitimate authorities basically. The SAp process has Q109 Mr Olner: On the EU accession point, and I been a good step in the right direction. It is just that can understand all the choreography of the dance to the priorities have to be adjusted to the specificities join the EU, I just wonder whether we are going to and the needs of the particular countries. I think that be faced with the same diYculty that we have with has been acknowledged by the EU, especially lately, Cyprus joining the EU where there was a promise of and they are trying to be as specific as possible, an amalgamation and a joining and the reality, at the focusing on the particularities of each country. end of the day, is that they are not joining now. I There is the wider discussion about how technical would hope that the EU is not going to face the same the understanding of the EU is and how technical it problem in the Western Balkans. should be because there are other developmental Dr Anastasakis: This is a very interesting needs in the region that are not adequately addressed comparison. I have been thinking a lot about Cyprus by the European Union through the Stabilisation lately and why the EU, in the end, has not been so Association process in particular. eVective or maybe it has been eVective in some ways Dr Whyte: Could I add two points? You asked for that we do not see and we might see in the future in improvements that could be made and the two that that it is now gradually engaging with the north of I would suggest are, first of all, that the process needs the island. That seems to be an unavoidable pathway to include a better perspective for economic for the north to be integrated into the EU. Maybe development. At the moment, it is aimed very much there are diVerences because the EU did make towards institution-building. It is all very well to mistakes with Cyprus in that it never held out any have a well-functioning parliament built in Sarajevo stick to Cyprus. It only gave the carrot of but it still takes three hours to drive there from membership without using its conditionality. It also anywhere else. If that corridor were to be improved, left the Turkish Cypriots completely outside the then Bosnia would be opened up much better to the process. In that respect, there was a diVerent kind of world. The second thing, and I think this may be a situation there when we compare it with the Balkans bit more controversial, is the question of the visa where all the diVerent parts are really engaged in the policy. The mean spiritedness of Western Europe in process, but in diVerent ways. its approach to the Western Balkans is exemplified best by the restrictive visa policy that exists. The current policy empowers people-traYckers and Q110 Mr Pope: I certainly agree with that analysis penalises honest travellers. If we want to send a real on Cyprus where the Committee is going in a couple signal to these people that they are considered as of weeks. I wanted to ask, though, about the Europeans, we have to allow them to travel here. European Union’s reconstruction and development funds. The EU has allocated over ƒ4 billion to 2006. It struck me that that did not seem a great deal of Q107 Mr Illsley: Is there anything in the idea that money, given the scale of the problem. If economic maybe some countries within the region are looking stability and political stability go hand-in-hand, it at European Union accession and the SAp process seems to me that there is at least a case to be made as the be-all and end-all and that they are for saying that the EU is trying to do this on the representing to their own countries that they have cheap and that it should allocate some more money. done enough because they have got within that I wonder what your view is? process? Dr Whyte: I would agree with that in terms of Dr Whyte: You would have to bracket that also with development. As I said earlier, I think there is a lack NATO accession, which, as we know, on the ground of an economic development aspect to the SAp, is of less dramatic eVect but symbolically is of V indeed to the EU’s whole approach to the region. On equally dramatic e ect. Certainly, in terms of reconstruction, on the other hand, I would give the national goals, I think one could do worse than EU quite good marks for the last few years. The have that. European Agency for Reconstruction has been a good model of how to do it—a decentralised agency Q108 Chairman: On that, would it be fair to say that accountable to Brussels eventually but set up very although all the countries want to join the Euro- much based in the region. I think it has a very good Atlantic structures, NATO would just be seen by rate of disbursement of funds. If you look at ƒ4 them as a first step on the route? billion as a reconstruction budget, that is probably Dr Anastasakis: I think we do tend to put those two about right, considering the absorptive capacity of together but they are very diVerent. The aim of the region, but, on development, you are quite right. NATO is diVerent from the aim of the EU. NATO is Dr Anastasakis: I agree with you that there should a security organisation and in that respect it is much be more money but there is one qualification: what easier for NATO to commit and to engage those do you do with this money? I come from a country, countries within its own ranks. For the EU it is a Greece namely, where there was too much money much more complex organisation and it has its coming from the European Union and basically we economic dimension and also it has a growing did not know how to spend it. The issue about political dimension as well. In that respect, the absorptive capacity is very significant in the Western process which brings those countries closer together Balkan countries. There definitely has to be money is much more complicated. I think there is a directed towards developmental aims but there is diVerentiation between the two and how easily the one problem, I understand, from the regional side in countries can become members of the organisations. that where the money can be spent on projects is Ev 44 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2004 Dr Othon Anastasakis and Dr Nicholas Whyte always decided by the European Union. There is joint exercises with NATO troops. Obviously, the very little consultation with local actors, those really wall has been hit a little bit sooner in that case but I involved in that business. think it is in the same place in both cases. Dr Anastasakis: I agree, and I think everybody agrees, that there has to be a hard line. One also has Q111 Andrew Mackinlay: You mentioned the to be careful, especially in the case of Serbia because meanness of the European Union states with regard the people there really feel that they are to the visa regime. Are you saying there should be a discriminated against on that particular aspect, that relaxation in the visas, and perhaps not a visa there is a lot of punishment addressed to them, that required, or are you saying there should be full everything revolves around that, and that their mobility of labour extended to this region by the sensitivities are not taken so much into account. As European Union before they come in? far as linking feasibility studies, which is a technical Dr Whyte: I think you could certainly look at the process leading towards the start of the Stabilisation latter alternative. I would be very surprised if the Association process, with whether they are sending costs outweighed the benefits. If that is considered a war criminal to the Hague or not does not tell us too radical a move, as I suppose it probably would much about how able they are to adopt and be, let us consider what the consequences of the implement standards. There is this kind of current policies are. Currently, Croatia and Bulgaria discrepancy. It is, of course, part of the political both actually enjoy visa-free access to the EU. It is conditionality but there are other conditions that very easy for most Bosnian citizens also to get have to be looked as well here. Croatian citizenship; this undermines Bosnian statehood. It is very easy for Macedonian citizens to get Bulgarian citizenship; this undermines Q114 Mr Mackay: Are they high profile alleged war Macedonian statehood. The existing policy is criminals, and obviously there are Karadzic and actually making things worse. Mladic? Are they just symbols and are they very important or should it run deeper? Presumably, Mr Whyte, when you are trying somebody fairly Q112 Andrew Mackinlay: As we know from obscure, and this is Beara who was picked up experience, despite what the newspapers have said, recently, and this is a question for both of you: is this the whole of central Europe did not move here on all just symbolic—let us get one or two big fish, and 2 May, did they? then all will be well—or should it run much deeper? Dr Whyte: Certainly I did not see them coming. What is realistic and practical? Dr Whyte: This is a part of the world where nothing Q113 Mr Mackay: Can I move you on to the is just symbolic, where symbols are of extreme International Tribunal? We note and are perhaps importance, and there is an operational security slightly puzzled that the European Union and issue as well in that as long as Karadzic and Mladic NATO seem to set slightly diVerent standards in continue to be at liberty, then we cannot say that the respect of the various Western Balkan states security mission in Bosnia has been completed. That complying with the Tribunal. Would you like to is an operational question but the symbolism is very comment on that and, in commenting, which end of important as well, the symbolism of coming to terms the scale should we be on: the rather more relaxed with what was done in the name of the Serbian view that the EU seems to take or the more stringent people during the entire period of the 1990s. Does it NATO view probably backed by American matter? Yes, I think it does. Whether or not you then pressure? repatriate some of the war crimes trials to Serbia or Dr Whyte: It is perhaps not fair to characterise it in not, that is a decision that is up to the Tribunal and precisely that way. First, I would say the view that it is fairly clear that the Tribunal will increasingly should be taken is the hard line that is taken by the want to repatriate trials to Croatia, to Serbia and to British Government inside both organisations, Bosnia, but it must go through them first. I do not inside both NATO and the EU, and that tough line think there should be a short-cut to that. consisting of full compliance with the internationally Dr Anastasakis: I think that apart from the issue of mandated tribunal is the right one to take. What the punishment, which is a fair thing to do, if done in the EU has done is to promise a feasibility study on right way, the Serbian people have to come to terms whether or not further integration is possible with with their own past and in fact during the 1990s the EU to Serbia and Montenegro. It seems, on many of them were really unaware of what was present form, that that feasibility study will be going on outside their own country. I think that negative because there is no co-operation from process of bringing those people to justice will also Serbia with the War Crimes Tribunal, apart help them in some ways to come to terms with the from cosmetic things like the arrest of somebody past and acknowledge mistakes. from Srebrenica who nobody much had heard of. That simply is cosmetic. Until that happens, Q115 Mr Mackay: Finally, the repatriation of some ultimately the answer from both is gong to be the of these trials is clearly, at least in theory, a good idea same. Of course NATO’s cut-oV point comes a little because the Hague is a very long way away and we bit sooner because of Partnership for Peace have seen elsewhere in the world that it is often better specifically dealing with the army of Serbia and to have such trials on site, so to speak. It seems to me Montenegro, and you cannot have a situation where that there might be very real diYculties about you have indicted war criminals participating in intimidating witnesses and putting pressure on Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 45
26 October 2004 Dr Othon Anastasakis and Dr Nicholas Whyte witnesses actually in Serbia or Kosovo, Bosnia as Dr Whyte: You asked for a glimmer of hope, Mr well, that there would not be at the Hague. Can that Chairman. I think I would like to depress you still be overcome? There is a balance I am trying to further just for a moment. I would say within the weigh, is there not, between keeping it local, which I Albanian community, look at what happened to the am in favour of, and not pressurising and one Albanian politician who had started from a very intimidating witnesses, which obviously I am hard line position and had consistently tried to against, and how should the balance sway? moderate his line, particularly by making overtures Dr Whyte: This of course is why the Tribunal was set towards the Serb community. Hashim Thac¸i, the up in the Hague in the first place because it was leader of the PDK1, saw some of his vote feared that local judicial structures were not up to it. fragmenting oV to the new party led by Veton I think it is a developing process and it should be the Surroi; he saw other parts of his vote splintering oV Tribunal’s call as to whether or not local conditions to the more hard line political realities of President have matured to the point where repatriation of such Rugova. The Kosovo Albanian results were in fact trials is possible. even more depressing than you have portrayed them. My glimmer of hope is that I think this clarifies the issue. We have got two very hard line Q116 Chairman: Gentlemen, I am turning to positions. Yes, the UN was unable, through five Kosovo. We now have the result of the elections of years of enlightened government, to persuade Y last Saturday. It is very di cult to put any positive passions to cool and more moderate alternatives to gloss or spin on them. So far as the Serbs are emerge, but anybody who believed that was going to concerned, there was a massive boycott of those be the case in 1999 was engaging in very wishful elections. Of the 108,000 possible Serb electors, both thinking indeed, given the history of the region, and in Kosovo itself and the refugees in Serbia proper, indeed given the history of UN interventions. If the only just over 500 actually voted. That seemed to be UN was supposed to deliver liberal politicians in a response of the Serb community, as it were, Kosovo, it obviously failed, but I do not think it was denying the legitimacy of the institutions which are ever going to achieve that. I would say that we have currently in Kosovo, and I suppose also responding now got a situation where the Kosovo Albanians to the appeal of Premier Kostunica, ignoring the have supported a very firm and robust line on appeal of the more moderate President, and really independence and where the Kosovo Serbs have V casting a question mark over the e ectiveness of the clearly placed their faith in Belgrade rather than in work of the United Nations over the past four years their local representatives. That is simply the or so in putting a massive block on any move situation we must deal with. It is going to require towards a multi-ethnic community, which is the serious and sustained engagement by the declared aim. Can you give me any glimmer of hope international community to bring about a which arises from the elections last Saturday? settlement. They cannot just get on with it on their Dr Anastasakis: The only glimmer of hope, because own. I do share your pessimism, is that they were done in a peaceful way; there were not any conflicts or riots, or worse than that. I do agree with you that that Q119 Chairman: The policy of Belgrade is clear, that shows us how much Serbia proper is divided on the there was the vote in July in the Serbian Parliament issue when diVerent political factions advise on in favour of this so-called decentralisation proposal, diVerent directions. I would also add to what you rather Bantustan like, of having a list or group of have said the fact that there was a very low turnout dots on the map grouping together the various Serb from the Kosovo Albanian community as well. communities on an ethnic basis. Is this the end of the attempt to form a multiethnic society? Dr Anastasakis: Relating to what you are asking and Q117 Chairman: It was 53% of the total, which is not on the previous comment, I was just wondering to disastrous in Western European terms. We only had what extent the involvement of the international 59% in our last general election in the UK. community is really geared toward creating Dr Anastasakis: If you look at it that way, it is just multiethnic, multicultural societies. This is a over 50%. What I meant to say by that is that the question that can be discussed both politically and legitimacy of those electors in the eyes of the practically. Albanian community is something that has to be looked at, and not just the Kosovo people; this kind of political apathy is a general trend in the Western Q120 Chairman: It is the declared aim. Balkans in general. There are regular elections Dr Anastasakis: It seems to me that the way things everywhere, more elections than anyone can imagine are going is not creating a multicultural or basically, but people fail to go because they are not multiethnic society but rather trying to divide them. interested and there is a certain point of political I definitely think, particularly in Kosovo, it had to apathy in that process. do with the fact that the international community was not able to deal eVectively with the creation of this kind of multiethnic society. That was a very Q118 Chairman: Mr Whyte, does it signal a failure diVerent development. In the end, people turned of the UN eVort over the past four years, in spite of against the international community. all the expenditure of money and a disastrous blow to prospects of a multiethnic community? 1 Democratic Party of Kosovo. Ev 46 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2004 Dr Othon Anastasakis and Dr Nicholas Whyte
Q121 Chairman: Should the result of the election was a key part of the peace agreement. That is the lead to a fundamental re-think by the international best possible result, without which further progress community? Is the plan put forward by the into EU and NATO integration for Macedonia is Secretary-General of the UN Special not possible. It will also, of course, result in a certain Representative, Ambassador Kai Eide, now no increase of internal tensions within Macedonia. longer relevant in the light of these elections? That goes without saying, whatever the result of the Dr Whyte: No, I think it is even more relevant. I referendum. think Ambassador Eide identified very skilfully a number of key problems facing Kosovo at the moment. The fact is that while the final status Q125 Chairman: How significant is it? question remains unresolved, all the other issues are Dr Anastasakis: One aspect is that there will be a lot going to be held hostage to that, including of internal tension, which is something which can go particularly the issue of interethnic relations. to unpredictable levels. The second is that EU Basically, any concession to Serbs as citizens of integration will also be delayed. FYR Macedonia in Kosovo is seen by Albanians as a concession against particular is an interesting case in that it would act their own future independence and vice versa as well. as a model for the other countries where you do have At the moment it is purely a zero sum game. Until two diVerent ethnic communities and there is an you have a credible process that is going to resolve overall consensus as far as the EU goal is concerned. the final status of Kosovo, you cannot expect ethnic In that respect, I think especially the Macedonian tensions to become calmer. case would be particularly critical to what happens with other divided societies in the Western Balkans. Q122 Chairman: The Serbs are just not going to participate in such a process? Q126 Chairman: The US Ambassador in Skopje has Dr Whyte: Which Serbs? warned, and perhaps an interesting intervention in the domestic aVairs of Macedonia, that if there were Q123 Chairman: Only 500 odd people of the total to be a “yes” vote, that would put back the prospects Serb community bothered to vote. Even with of Macedonia joining NATO beyond the next possibly some intimidation, that does suggest a possible opening of the door in 2007, possibly for massive lack of legitimacy of the institutions in the many more years. Is that a message which, in your eyes of the local Serbs? judgment, is getting through to the electorate in Dr Whyte: That is absolutely right but it means, as I Macedonia? read it, that local Serbs have eVectively given the Dr Whyte: As far as I can tell, yes. There is still mandate to Belgrade to negotiate on their behalf another two weeks to go in this campaign but it is rather than to their own locally-elected oYcials. very interesting to follow the comments in the That is how I see it. The Serbs will be involved but it Macedonian press. The Ambassador’s statement I will be Belgrade rather than the local representative. think is absolutely unchallengeable. If Macedonia Dr Anastasakis: What seems clear is that Belgrade is has to wait another year, then they basically miss the guiding the whole game here. As far as discussions window that is currently opening for them, Albania on the status are concerned, as you pointed out, the and Croatia to join NATO. only unhappy thing is that the policy of standards before status is a failure because there is going to be a discussion on status without having made any Q127 Chairman: In 2007? progress on standards basically. In that respect, I Dr Whyte: Precisely, and if they are not ready to join find this even more pessimistic than anything else. by the middle of next year, which they will not be if the referendum passes, then they do miss that Q124 Chairman: Before turning to Mr Illsley and opportunity. It is a straight statement of fact. Bosnia, a few questions in respect of Macedonia: I Dr Anastasakis: I would say yes in principle, but in V concede that because the result of the referendum is reality I would look di erently at this and to what not now known, it is very diYcult to speculate, but extent a factor such as NATO or the EU can be a how significant do you believe is the referendum and gear, not just for people voting in a certain direction the prospect of a “yes” vote, which some claim but also for reform. I think this is much more would undermine the Ohrid framework agreement? complicated, especially when one is inside this kind Dr Whyte: First of all, one lesson that comes out of of society which is going through unemployment this is that when you are writing peace agreements, and poverty. Those issues are really important to the look out for loopholes that can be exploited by other people. NATO and the EU are there as a long-term people, and that is what has happened in this case. goal, and that means prosperity and strength and all It was not foreseen that a referendum could actually that for them, but I think when people are in a overrun minority guarantees that were inserted into referendum frame of kind, that kind of blackmail the Ohrid peace agreements, but that nonetheless is can have an adverse eVect. If you blackmail them what happened. Yes, the referendum is very and say “you are not going to get into the EU or into significant. It is eVectively a poll on one part of the NATO”, that can have the opposite eVect, as the peace agreement rather than the entire package, and case of Cyprus teaches us. this of course is very dangerous. If it is passed, at the Chairman: I think President Mitterrand said the very best it will mean a delay of at least a year in French always answer the wrong question in a implementing the reform of local government, which referendum. That may be the same. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 47
26 October 2004 Dr Othon Anastasakis and Dr Nicholas Whyte
Q128 Mr Illsley: I have a couple of questions relating Q130 Mr Illsley: Are there likely to be diYculties to Bosnia and the hand-over from the NATO within the EU as well between EU members and is stabilisation force to the European Union force in there any likelihood—and this all depends on how December. There is a suggestion that because of the smooth the transition is—of any conflict between situation in 1992–95 the Bosnian perception is that NATO and the EU in terms of the hand-over? the European Union will not act militarily or does Dr Whyte: I think people are bending over not wish to act militarily. What implications does backwards to try and prevent any such conflict, and that have for the hand-over in December? this is why the two main military oYcers in charge of Dr Whyte: The clear implication is that there will be it are British. This is clearly an attempt to finesse the a trial of strength at quite an early date, I would diVerences between the EU and NATO. There were anticipate. Of course, things are very diVerent in problems in Macedonia when a similar situation was Bosnia now from 10 years ago. This is no longer a applied, with a much smaller force, specifically to do country at war. This is a country that has at least a with what exactly the role of the NATO 2 sullen peace for the last nine years. On the other AFSOUTH in Naples was to be within the hand, if the EU does come into it, despite the command structure. I understand that they are improvements that we have both referred to earlier, working on that as we speak in Brussels to make sure with this very unfortunate legacy of failure, we it does not happen again. There will always be can expect that people will be putting it to the test, unforeseen problems. so it has to be ready to face those tests and to pass them. Q131 Mr Illsley: Given that the two forces are likely to have diVerent mandates, would that make it easier for EUFor? Does the fact that the European Union Q129 Mr Illsley: What exactly does it have to do to has development assistance as well as a military face them? force, the carrot and the stick approach, make it any Dr Whyte: What form it takes we cannot precisely easier for EUFor or does it not have that eVect? predict right now but I would have thought that Dr Whyte: Yes, provided that there is joined-up there will certainly be challenges to the EU military thinking, and I think the prospects for joined-up authority of some kind, whether that is through thinking are fairly good in this particular case. As a rioting—rioting is a strong term—or through some general point, I think it is a bit unfortunate to other form, we cannot quite tell yet. separate civilian and military lines of command, as Dr Anastasakis: When the EU takes over militarily has been done in the Bosnian case. In general for any it has to do that with a diVerent frame of mind this intervention, I would have thought it would make time because it is not an immediate post-war more sense to have parallel and converging lines of situation; the security threats are diVerent now from command in a particular country. what they were in the 1990s. It is not just about the ethnic conflict and trying to keep those communities Q132 Chairman: Dr Anastasakis, you made the apart so that they do not slaughter each other; there point that we are in a very diVerent security are also issues of organised crime. There are issues of environment now than we were four years or so ago. security but the agenda is much wider and I think Is it therefore important that the European Union is that the EU will have to adjust to this new type of able to bring together a whole wider range of environment. The other thing that I would also instruments to bear on the problem in Bosnia and suggest is that it is not just for the EU to prove that Herzegovina? Is it appropriate therefore, in terms of it can act militarily in a similarly satisfactory way as its possibilities of the instruments, that the EU is the United States or to prove to itself that it can do there now rather than with a narrower focus of the job; it also has to know what the situation is on NATO? the ground basically and be able to help and act in Dr Anastasakis: Yes, and the EU is involved in a synergy with other organisations involved in Bosnia broader way in Bosnia and Herzegovina through its and Herzegovina. feasibility report and on all the particular points it Dr Whyte: Can I raise a slight technical point on has been advising the government to work on. Of this? I do not know whether this committee has course, the problem with Bosnia is that because of its considered this in the past but the EU force will not protectorate situation, it is diYcult to expect the just be an EU force; it will include at least I think 11 government to act in a very active and passionate other countries that I have seen listed as likely way on the demands by the European Union. I think participants. I am a bit concerned about the lines of it is high time for the EU to act in a much more broad command and control in this case when you have way and deal not just with reconstruction or Moroccan or Canadian or Turkish soldiers under reconciliation, because I would say that has evolved EU command in an operation that is run by the in quite a satisfactory way, but also with Political and Security Committee in Brussels on development issues, which are particularly acute in which there are no Canadian, Moroccan or Turkish that part of the Western Balkans. representatives, but there are indeed representatives Dr Whyte: One specific security issue that we are of Denmark and Luxembourg, two countries which facing in Bosnia in the next few months is the will not be participating. I think there is an issue of question of police reform. You may be aware that accountability there which I hope does not become a political crisis point but I can see that is a possibility. 2 Allied Forces, Southern Europe (NATO). Ev 48 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2004 Dr Othon Anastasakis and Dr Nicholas Whyte
Lord Ashdown has set up a special commission to this kind of competition between the two and end the look at this. I would not be surprised, in fact I would antagonism in trying to approach the standards of welcome it, if his recommendation turns out to be a the EU. We all know of course that in Serbia there kind of nationalising of the Bosnian Police, is still this kind of polarisation and we do have a removing security responsibilities from the entities; more clear distinction between the reform forces on in other words, a greater incentive— the one hand and the more nationalistic forces on the other. There is a real battle going on between those two sides in Serbia. Q133 Chairman: On the precedent of the Ministry of Defence, on a statement? Dr Whyte: Precisely, yes. One does find other Q135 Ms Stuart: We have talked a lot about outside countries where the main police force is national players and whether they have failed or succeeded. rather than local, particularly if, as there is in Something which struck me through the whole Bosnia, there is a problem with local competence, evidence session was that you talk about what the local corruption of the police force that happened to US does, what NATO does and what the EU does. be on the ground. I think that could be a very Is there not an argument made that the people on the interesting development and that could well be the ground need to take a bit more responsibility? There crisis point where we see the EU’s courage being put is another outside player, which no-one has to the test. mentioned so far in particular in relation to Serbia, and it strikes me that could play more of a role and Q134 Ms Stuart: I would like to take you back to that is actually Russia? Serbia and Montenegro in particular and turn to Dr Anastasakis: I agree with you. The international something which you started to address in your factor is always the easiest target to which to address answer earlier to my colleague Mr Illsley and also to criticism and to attack, but, by being critical towards Mr Mackay and that is around the whole Stability local actors, and even sometimes being very critical and Association Agreement and the divergence towards them, one also shows them respect because between the progress the two countries are making. that is how they should be treated. It is definitely the Do you think the new twin-track approach will case, and that is why I tried to indicate this in my actually help that or is there simply just such a big previous remark, that there is this kind of gap to be caught up on that it just leaves them polarisation between the Serbian forces themselves. behind? This is a country with a background and with human Dr Whyte: That is a really good question. I think capital and really able people who can deal with the that the twin-track approach recognised the reality international environment. If the international that the attempts to make Serbia and Montenegro community wants to work with people in Belgrade, integrate with each other before joining the EU they can find people who are really interesting and simply was not working and, in a sense, the EU thus who know their way about. In that sense, the Serbian avoided making one of the several Cyprus mistakes people, yes, and from my contact with them, do have that my colleague referred to earlier. I think you are a strong victim attitude and it is sometimes over- quite right to say that the interests of Serbia and emphasised because that explains for them why their Montenegro remain very divergent. I understand situation is not better. There is definitely a lot of that the Montenegrins now plan to make the best go work that needs to be done within the local actors they can of proving their European credentials themselves. within the framework of the new proposed Dr Whyte: I would just like to make two points in feasibility study, and they hope to be in a position to addition. One of them is that engagement by be able to turn around to their own voters and say, Western political figures with the local actors on a “Look, Serbia is holding us back from our European continued and sustained basis is the only thing that integration”, and that will then be used as an will work. For instance, Mr Chairman, it would be argument for separation. Doubts are sometimes great if this Committee’s report, when it is finalised, expressed about the capacity of the Montenegrin were to be launched in the Western Balkans as well Government to deliver on this strategy but it is as published here. I think it would be very interesting certainly an interesting approach for them to take. for the local media to pick up on that. It would Dr Anastasakis: I also think this is an interesting certainly be a sign that you were taking them development because it shows a genuine attempt by seriously, and they will take you very seriously, Chris Patten and the Commission to understand whatever you say. It will be a sign of respect in the what exactly the problem is. My deep conviction is other direction. My second point on Russia, Ms that the understanding on Serbia is still a bit Stuart: the Russian attitude, I am afraid, is, frankly, underdeveloped. The centrality of Serbia in the irresponsible at the moment. On the one hand, they Western Balkans is really crucial. I think one has call for the United Nations to crack down more really to try and approach this country in the right heavily on Kosovo. On the other hand, they have way in order to be able to have positive side eVects withdrawn their own troops, thus fighting to the last in the other parts also. In that respect, I think maybe drop of somebody else’s blood, in other words. On they recognise that this kind of (Solana) state was a the one hand, the Russians describe the Kosovo kind of failure and they had to make up for it. authorities (dubious as they may be but legitimately Showing this kind of flexibility will definitely create elected under UN mandate and by UN structures) as Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 49
26 October 2004 Dr Othon Anastasakis and Dr Nicholas Whyte terrorists and thugs; on the other hand, Russia Dr Anastasakis: It goes further. Russia is going continues to support separatist regimes which have through an interim period because of its own much less legitimacy, in South Ossetia, Abkhazia problems within its own country. I think the and Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. There is importance of the Balkans for Russia is decreasing a real problem there. It will take sustained attention and will now be seen to be decreasing. from the Kremlin, not from the Russian Foreign Chairman: Gentlemen, you have contributed much Ministry, and at the moment the Kremlin has other to our own study of this fascinating area. We thank things to think about. you both for giving us of your expertise.
Witness: Mr Misha Glenny, Balkans analyst, examined.
Q136 Chairman: Mr Glenny, we welcome you back itself there is a realism that Russia is not somehow as a young, old friend of the Committee! We have going to come to its rescue under any circumstances; read your many commentaries with great interest but also the Serbs do understand that in terms of and we now look forward to hearing from you with Kosovo Russia will not give it away for nothing, if your perspective on the Western Balkans, the subject push comes to shove, on the issue of independence. of our inquiry. Perhaps we can begin, as we began our last session, if you could give some indication of Q138 Mr Maples: You and our previous witnesses the strategic importance which you think the area mentioned in the context of, is this region of strategic has? We will then turn to Mr Maples. importance to us and the United States—and let us Mr Glenny: I have always considered it to have talk about Europe in this context because your view considerable strategic importance, firstly for the is probably similar on the United States, but it is to a reason that Nicholas Whyte mentioned—its degree removed from them—you all mentioned this geography and its position. It is the main overland question of this line of main road surface transport transit route between Western Europe and the links from Europe to the Middle East. I can see that Middle East. I would say that it has another strategic is important, but does it really matter to Western importance, and that is in terms of the European Europe if these problems go on? Are they likely to Union’s identity and the European Union’s capacity spill over to us in an uncontainable way? to deal with a region that is distressed and Mr Glenny: My answer is very clearly yes. What we traumatised but is, as Dr Anastasakis said, soon to are looking at at the moment is a problem in be surrounded by the EU. It is not, in terms of Kosovo, which is extremely severe. If the problem in population, a very large region. To my mind it would Kosovo were to get out of control it would impact actually be quite simple to sort things out in the on the stability of Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Western Balkans, but it requires an imagination Herzegovina, Montenegro and possibly the which I have not yet identified on the part, Republic of Albania as well. We have seen in March regrettably, of the European Union and some of the the capacity for very serious civil unrest in Kosovo. local actors. We have also seen in March the incapacity of KFor to deal with very serious civil unrest in Kosovo. If— Q137 Mr Maples: Inevitably I will cover some of the and as far as I can see that is the trajectory we are same ground that we have covered already, but we heading at the moment, but I may elaborate on that are interested to know your views on some of these later—there were a social explosion, the like of things too. In that context, the role of Russia in the which we saw in March, again in Kosovo, it would West Balkans; what is your view there? Do you think be much harder to contain on this occasion, and at they are troublesome and irresponsible? the moment I am not sure if Western Europe and/or Mr Glenny: I do not think that Russia has political the American states has the military capacity to deal ambitions in south-eastern Europe. It has with something like this. considerable economic ambitions in the region. Just as a pointer, Bulgaria’s single most important Q139 Chairman: You do not think that the military contributor to its revenue earning annually in terms authorities in Kosovo have learnt the lessons in of taxes is Lukoil, and you will find Lukoil and terms of smaller, more deployable, more flexible Gascom with a very significant presence all over the units, so that if a March situation were to recur that region. But in political terms Russia’s only interest they would be better prepared? in the Balkans that I can identify is Kosovo, and that Mr Glenny: The proof of the pudding will be in the pretty much as a bargaining chip which it uses in a eating, regrettably, but I accompanied Denis similar but less intense fashion as it does the regime MacShane to Kosovo just after the March events in Transmistria; and it will continue to hold those and we both saw the video of the Irish Battalion chips, particularly if it feels aggrieved about the making a very good job of trying to contain an United States’ influence in Georgia and places like extremely large and unruly crowd. The Irish that, until it feels it has a political incentive to do battalion, who we spoke to, said very clearly, “We something about it. I have just spent some time in do not have the equipment, we do not have the Russia discussing these issues, amongst others, and capacity for crowd control and riot control and this there is no popular sentiment of any particular is what we are dealing with. We have eVectively been significance in support of Serbia, and inside Serbia deployed here in order to prevent the army of Serbia Ev 50 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2004 Mr Misha Glenny and Montenegro from invading; we have not been Q143 Andrew Mackinlay: Mr Glenny, with Serbia deployed to deal with these types of social and Montenegro, it seems to me, it might be more situations.” They did a very good job. There were sensible for us at least not to be in any way trying to other battalions of KFor who did a lamentable job bolster what I deem to be a wholly artificial in March, and who were actually caught on film federation; that Montenegrin independence not only running away from the mob. As far as I understand, has some justice but also you could oVer advance we have not had a major reorganisation of the membership into the European Union for capacity and the nature of deployment and the Montenegro—it could be absorbed, it is twice the equipping of KFor in the meanwhile. population of the London borough of Wandsworth, and it also might make it easier to deal with an Q140 Mr Maples: If something like what happened independent Serbia and also perhaps even the final in March flared up again, are you saying that you status of Kosovo if this rump of the Yugoslav think that forces from Serbia and Montenegro Federation was broken and you start from scratch. would intervene and, if so, how far would they go? I really wanted to bounce that oV you. Mr Glenny: No, it would depend on how it would Mr Glenny: It is diYcult for me to reply without develop, but I am extremely concerned that the looking at the totality of Serbia, Montenegro and international community, both as it is deployed Kosovo, but essentially my assessment has been for politically and militarily, will find it very hard to deal a long time that there are two regional motors of with a return match of March, and that certainly if growth and stability in the entire region, which are you had large numbers of Serbs being killed then in Croatia and Serbia, and that the dispute between that event there would be tremendous pressure from Serbia and Croatia in the early 90s was what Serbia and Montenegro to respond militarily. provoked the war. In order to reintroduce stability you have to guarantee the stability of those two territories. For Serbia it is more complicated because Q141 Mr Maples: Might they act militarily Croatia was only involved with Bosnia and themselves? Do they have the capability to do so, Herzegovina as another territory. With Serbia there and would that just involve the northern and is the relationship with Montenegro and there is the Mitrovica part? relationship with Kosovo. I feel very strongly that Mr Glenny: I think it would just involve the northern the key relationship for the European Union in this part. One of the things that the Serbs do not fully region now is Serbia; that because Montenegro is so understand, have not taken in about Kosovo—and small that absorbing it into the European Union indeed it needs to be stressed—is that a majority of actually would not make much diVerence. It would the Serbs in Kosovo live south of the Ibar River, ie probably be very easy to do it, although it is still a south of North Mitrovica, and a majority of those pretty highly criminalized state, and so on and so Serbs living south of the Ibar River live in mixed forth, and there are problems in association with it. communities with Albanians. They are actually relatively well integrated, and this is something that is little understood; that there are large areas of Q144 Andrew Mackinlay: Which I accept. Kosovo where Serbs and Albanians are integrating Mr Glenny: Rather than concentrating on a swift rather successfully. The idea of enclaves and also the way to get Montenegro into the EU I would be prospect of the military intervention from Serbia looking very much at what is the quickest way to get and Montenegro would leave these Serbs, in my Serbia moving towards the European Union. So it is opinion, extremely vulnerable to revenge attacks. looking at a diVerent point of view. That may well mean jettisoning the relationship with Montenegro Q142 Chairman: Before I come on to the recent and it might mean jettisoning a relationship with elections, a question about the Russian motives and Kosovo—for Serbia, that is. What Serbia needs in the Russian background. To what extent do you order to do that is a system of incentives and at the think Russian authorities are constrained by public moment there are no incentives. opinion in Russia itself and also of the ramifications of any settlement in Kosovo and Chechnya? Q145 Andrew Mackinlay: You said that the Mr Glenny: The first issue, I do not think that they trajectory which we are now on—and I noticed you are constrained at all by this. Really my sense in said those words—is not going to provide a solution, Russia, talking to politicians, diplomats, journalists and you also said, “I think it could be resolved but I and ordinary folk was that Kosovo is a very far away do not see any players who can resolve it.” It place, of which they know nothing, and in which tantalisingly invites me to pick up from where you they are little interested. The same, incidentally, left oV because I think it would be very useful if you would go for Serbia as well. But in terms of its did see the present precipice we are heading for— strategic importance vis-a`-vis Chechnya, I think you which is probably slightly out of line—but also if you may have a more serious point, that it sets a poor were given a free hand today how you would be precedent for Putin. On the other hand, I do not steering things? think that Putin always sees precedents from other Mr Glenny: I will get to the core of the matter and I parts of the world as necessarily applicable to the will address the Kosovo election issues. First of all, Russian Federation. My strong sense is that Kosovo you have to look at the social reality of Kosovo. is a chip which they may decide to use, they may play With the exception of Transmistria this is the only with, they may not, but they are not desperately territory in Europe at the moment which registers a wedded to it. negative economic growth. The diVerence between Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 51
26 October 2004 Mr Misha Glenny
Transmistria and Kosovo is that Transmistria’s very diYcult situation domestically and there is a economic growth is in consequence of the wide recognition privately amongst the Serbian population having halved over the last 10 years. political elite that they will have to come up with Kosovo has a growing and very young population some pretty dramatic and radical solutions. What and every year 50,000 young people come on to a they need vis-a`-vis Kosovo are the tools to sell this non-existent job market. Another reason why the to their own population, and at the moment we are economic growth is negative is that there is further asking them to do all sorts of tough things but we are pressure from refugees from Western Europe being also not giving them the necessary tools. sent back to Kosovo because they no longer want to be maintained by the host country, and that means Q146 Andrew Mackinlay: The tools being what? a reduction in remittances, which are very, very Mr Glenny: The tools, I would suggest, being a much important in Kosovo’s economy. What happened in clearer vision of how Serbia—and not Macedonia, March was that finally people had had enough. With not Kosovo, not Albania—moves towards the youth unemployment running at 70%, with no European Union. Also, any solution that involves movement on the status issue, but also a government the possibility of independence for Kosovo when it (UNMIK) which, frankly, has been lamentable in its comes to final status, this has to be like the Austrian failure, its economic record is simply unspeakable. I State Treaty of 1955; there is no way under any could go into details but for the moment take that as circumstances that Kosovo’s borders can shift. read. It has alienated the population. The Serbs were the first targets in March because they are very Q147 Chairman: But Tadic urged the minority in identifiable sitting ducks. KFor and UNMIK police Kosovo to vote. Kostunica and the church urged vehicles and personnel were attacked, but also the them not to vote. Surely the result of the vote, this Albanian political elite, from the PDK and the massive boycott, was a disavowal of Tadic? LVK, were actually frightened by the mob because Mr Glenny: No, it is not a disavowal of Tadic, it they knew that they were identified with a means that on certain issues, firstly in Northern government system which had brought the Mitrovica—I would refer you to a quote of Reuters population absolutely nothing. That is at the heart in their news report from two days ago, when a Serb of what we are facing, combined with a political was asked whether he was going to vote and his issue of the Albanian elite having absolutely no idea response was, “Are you kidding, they would knee of what is going on in Belgrade—and I can testify to cap me?”—the local Serbs feel as they do not have that because as soon as I visit Prishtina the political any purchase within the political process or within leaders I meet, all they want to know is what is the Assembly in Prishtina. Tadic spent a lot of happening in Belgrade? At the same time in Belgrade capital asking them to go and vote but essentially there is a complete and utter ignorance of the social they had to make a decision between Tadic and reality of Kosovo. So the only political incentive that Kostunica, and for the moment they went for the elites have is to take a maximalist position Kostunica, but that is partly because they are because they are frightened. The Foreign OYce and dependent, remember, economically on Belgrade, Denis MacShane came up with an idea earlier this Mitrovica in particular. The entire economy is year that when Harri Holkeri would be replaced that financed by Belgrade. there would be a second post inaugurated of an envoy who is mandated solely to Prishtina and Q148 Chairman: I can understand that argument in Belgrade so that there is some form of respect of Mitrovica and the northern border areas, communication. At the moment there is nothing. but you said to the Committee earlier that the Given the social reality in Kosovo, given that the greater part of the population in the south of that— Serbs do not feel as though there is an incentive to and indeed you went further and said that they were vote at the moment—although in local elections you a community of Serbs who were well integrated and V will find it is a very di erent issue—what you are indeed integrating rather successfully. How do you going to have is a further deepening of the crisis square that with individuals feeling that they would which led to an explosion in March. If you want to be kneecapped in this vote? get a short to mid-term solution you have to find a Mr Glenny: Because they are integrated into the way of persuading Serbia to give up Kosovo. So municipalities and the local structures. They serve what are the ways that one might persuade Serbia to on the municipalities as deputy mayors, and so on give up Kosovo? Going there now and telling and so forth, depending on where you go. I run a Serbian politicians that they have to support the idea project called GPKT, which brings together of a final status which is likely to result in municipalities from eastern Kosovo, southern independence of Kosovo is turkeys voting for Serbia and northern Macedonia, which all have Christmas. It is no good asking Serbian politicians minority issues that have been resolved through to do that. And do we want to have another situation integrating the minorities, whether Albanian, Serb where a Prime Minister or President of Serbia is or Macedonian, into the political process. They will pushing through, with the encouragement of come out every time and vote for those local councils Western Europe and the United States, unpopular because they feel they have a stake, and they feel they policies and, eventually, whoever knows which one have absolutely no stake in the political process in it was, is shot as a consequence? Because there are Prishtina as it is currently structured. When Western very few more Zoran Djindics around. Boris Tadic Europe and the United States come in and say, “You happens to be one, but Tadic is dealing with a very, must go out and vote,” their response to that is, Ev 52 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2004 Mr Misha Glenny
“Why? What do we get out of this?” because what territory. The implications for southern Serbia and their immediate memory of the political process the Albanian population there are severe and the inside Kosovo is, is March; that is their immediate implications for Macedonia are severe. memory. They do not see any tangible benefits at the moment through cooperation. Q152 Mr Chidgey: Mr Glenny, I was rather intrigued by your remarks regarding accelerating Q149 Chairman: What would be your advice to the Serbia’s accession to the European Union in the British government and other EU countries in context of Kosovo—and you also mentioned seeking to get over this obstacle? Croatia, I believe. I rather want to know what you Mr Glenny: My first advice would be to accelerate perceive as the outcome of that, why is it such an the dismantling of UNMIK, to give— important issue? Plus, of course, recognising the fact that the acceleration of any applicant state to join Q150 Chairman: A transfer to the EU or local— the EU is something which is a hostage to fortune. Mr Glenny: No, transfer to the Kosovo Assembly Also bearing in mind that we are already having but insisting upon a real transfer of powers from problems with some of the new applicant countries Prishtina to the municipalities and so that there is a because of their continuing appalling record on primitive system of accountability in that political many of the basic principles that any applicant must process. At the same time this would have to be show to be subscribing to before any application can tracked with a vigorous attempt by the international be properly considered. So there is the problem of community to establish a proper dialogue and not, meeting the criteria, and are we supposed to drop the frankly, the excuse for a dialogue that we have at the criteria, reduce them? Are we supposed to change moment, identifying those people in the Serbian and the process? Is it a situation now in which Serbia and the Kosovo elite who are prepared to talk and deal Kosovo are looking for employment opportunities in terms of compromises and move towards serious outside of the country through accession to the EU solutions. The other thing for the Serbs is to get as a way of resolving their economic problems? I do serious about refugee return; there is a lot of pressure not quite see why it is the panacea. inside southern Serbia to move refugees back. This Mr Glenny: I am not suggesting that this be done is one thing that we are doing in Gilan in eastern Kosovo, supporting the local Albanian mayor, who immediately. I would reiterate what you said, that if is appealing for Serbs from the Nish area to come you look at the current enlargement of 10 that there back and integrate into Kosovo. The problem we is barely a country there where we have not lowered have is not political in many of these areas where the the standards of certain criteria. So this is not Serbs are considering returning, the problem is without precedent, the way that we do this. In terms economic because what happens is they return to of political perceptions inside Serbia vis-a`-vis the Y Kosovo and then there are no jobs and they no European Union, the Croatian case is di cult as longer get the support as IDPs3 that they receive in well because of the Gotovina issues. The fact of the southern Serbia. So one of the things that the people matter is Gotovina is not in the Hague. Croatia was I am working with, including local mayors, what we given a clean bill of health by Carla del Ponte, but, are doing is trying to appeal to the international as I understood it from the Foreign OYce, before the community to set up programmes of economic clean bill of health was given the deal was Gotovina sustainability and refugee return, so the Serbs can in the Hague. Positions were then switched—why, I see that something is actually being done to assist do not know. Serbia, it is basically down to Mladic their integration. and the four generals. But what they do is to look at Croatia and they look at the Gotovina issue and they Q151 Chairman: But we have the reality of the say, “Can we not do a deal on Mladic and on Gotovina, and maybe we can deal with the Hague?” election result. How serious a blow, in your V judgment, was that to prospects of progress in a So you have di erent messages going through to multi-ethnic direction? Serbia and the key thing about Gotovina is that the Mr Glenny: It is a serious blow but I cannot see at resolution of that situation allowed EU the moment how the idea of partition or the idea of membership. So Serbia is very sensitive about that. creation of enclaves is going to work, and the reason But the real reason is this issue of incentives. At the for this emerges from the population distribution moment, basically, Serbia is told, “You have to do that I mentioned early on, and to which you referred this, you have to do that, you have to go into a state again, and that is if you want to do that you have to with Montenegro, despite possessing two economic start this operation by moving up to 40,000, 45,000 systems and having real diYculties on trade issues, Serbs physically from disparate parts of Kosovo into vis-a`-vis your relationship with the EU. You have to these enclaves. It is a population transfer which hand over the war criminals and you have to start began in ’23 with the Greek/Turkish Agreement in getting serious about Kosovo and final status. And, Geneva, but which I see as a very poor precedent. by the way, no, you cannot have better visa access We went there in order to support multi-cultural into Schengen.” The issue of labour movement here solutions in Kosovo and south eastern Europe, and is very, very important. One does not have to open we will be presiding over the transfer of population the doors of south eastern Europe to the labour out of the territory where they live into another markets of the European Union. However, there are schemes which would be welcomed in south eastern 3 Internally Displaced Persons. Europe, whereby individual workers can go for six Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 53
26 October 2004 Mr Misha Glenny to nine months, or something, on a sponsored not think one sees NATO accession—well, the workplace system whereby we need the labour in Americans see it as a possibility of getting bases in western Europe, particularly for seasonal work, and Romania and Bulgaria—but NATO accession as far you get remittances back there, you get some level as south eastern Europe is concerned and the of training—it is a very, very fruitful area of Western Balkans is a way of engaging with the West exploration, in my opinion. But at the moment there and de-politicising their Army; ie it has a real impact is none of that and already Serbs can no longer on how the societies are structured and behave. The travel to Romania and Bulgaria unrestricted. process of accession has an enormous impact, but so Macedonians can barely travel anywhere. They are long as it remains a vague, unstructured promise told all the time that they have to do this for Europe, then you are going to get situations like Macedonia. that for Europe, and what do they get out of it?— declining living standards, they cannot go anywhere any more and they are seen as an habitual boil on the Q154 Mr Illsley: Turning to Bosnia and body politic of Europe. With the best will in the Herzegovina, the High Representative of Bosnia, world we have to think of ways of explaining to them Lord Ashdown, came under strong criticism for his that, yes, they are part of Europe and, yes, we do strong-handed approach, although last week in want to assist them, and the CARDS4 programme front of this Committee he defended himself and similar, unfortunately, are not things which reasonably well against allegations of dismissals of generally penetrate the minds of ordinary voters and certain civil servants and his use of the Bonn powers. it is ordinary voters that we have to think of in terms Do you think that he is tackling the job of persuading the political actors. appropriately, or do you think the use of those powers is harming the situation in Bosnia or not? Mr Glenny: I think that Bosnia represents a similar Q153 Mr Chidgey: It is not just about war criminals but not identical problem to that of Kosovo—except though, is it, the deal being done? The most it has been going on for longer—where a culture of important thing, surely, for EU entrance is that you political dependency emerges. The lack of incentive do not just pass the laws that give you the rule of law, for Bosnian politicians to act with any which give you human rights, which give you accountability or responsibility remains very high, in equality and so forth, you actually implement the my opinion. Lord Ashdown has said that his aim is laws so that the population does benefit from the to try to divest himself as soon as he can of the Bonn same society that we cherish and protect, if I may say powers and get out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I so? My concern is that you sign on the dotted line, think that is a very laudable aim. I think he is to some you exchange war criminals but you do not extent caught in the straitjacket of the oYce and the actually—and you cannot actually—change the type way the oYce was established and how it has of society of the applicant country, which in this case developed, and that the Ad Hominem attacks I do is Serbia, which actually does not take you any not think are valuable in any respect at all. I also further in improving the lot of people? think that Lord Ashdown is under certain pressures Mr Glenny: Except that if you look at the impact and from his political seniors, particularly on the issue of the accession on the most recent round of security, which are not always taken into account in enlargement countries, but also on Romania and terms of how he is behaving on the economic and Bulgaria—and also, I would argue, on Ireland, political level. I am concerned when he uses these Portugal, Spain and Greece—the impact has been powers to dismiss either elected oYcials or civil phenomenal in terms of how people behave. You servants without any requirement to explain why, have specific problems in Bulgaria and Romania which in certain positions it is argued that he does associated with corruption and organised crime. not have to explain why he is doing this. I think he Because of their key position, because of the should have to explain why he is doing it, and I engagement of people like the Crown Agents in would encourage everyone to try to ensure that local Bulgaria and the MOD in both countries, drug instances take over powers wherever possible, but at liaison oYcers and so on and so forth, real progress the moment this does not seem to be happening quite is being made there. There are no similar fast enough. In terms of security for Bosnia and programmes of that depth going on in the Western Herzegovina, the keys as to whether there is going to Balkans, where one could argue that they are equally be another war or not lie in Belgrade and Zagreb. If needed. But not only that, once they are on the Belgrade and Zagreb are hands-oV Bosnia and accession process you start to see an increase in Herzegovina there is not going to be a serious investors’ confidence, and this is very, very instability in that area in the eventuality of troops important, that people feel as though once countries withdrawing. If Belgrade and Zagreb are not happy are on the European accession road they are going then there is a very strong chance of there being to shift their behaviour because there is an economic instability when troops withdraw. By “happy” I incentive to do it, and you have seen a real change mean whether they have indicated their intentions to in the behaviour of how Bulgarians and Romanians interfere or not. Zagreb I think has pulled out and I operate since accession became a reality. I think that think one of the reasons why Zagreb has pulled out is the case with NATO accession as well; I do and will not do that is absolutely because of the EU accession process, and it is another reason why I 4 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development would argue that Serbia should be seen as slightly and Stabilisation programme. diVerent from the others. Ev 54 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2004 Mr Misha Glenny
Q155 Mr Illsley: You mentioned incentives on list of people sitting there waiting to be tried in the Bosnia’s politicians. Can you expand on that? Hague. Are people going to continue funding the Would that be moving towards European Union Hague? I do not know, those are issues for the accession? international community to decide in terms of Mr Glenny: No, it means so that they are funding. At the moment there is a huge logjam, there accountable to their electorates for what they do. I is the whole minor farce around the Milosevic case am talking on that level. At the moment there is a and it has had a real blocking eVect on political strong element of Bosnian politics which has most development inside the former Yugoslavia. What successfully got the ear of Lord Ashdown. As long were to happen if Carla del Ponte finally unveils her as so much power is concentrated in the centre they choice of indictees for Kosovo, God only knows. are not having to address the concerns of their electorate, and this is a key problem in Bosnia and a Q158 Andrew Mackinlay: Some time before the key problem in Kosovo, because whatever one says break I want to ask about policing, but when you about Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, all the politicians literally stop there you are saying that we have to there are actually up for election next time and are anticipate this shopping list of indictees coming up held to account for their actions, which is one of the from Kosovo, and you say that is going to be an reasons why you see changes in government so aggravant? dramatically, because there is very little they can do Mr Glenny: Yes. about the economic situation. But it is their responsibility. Q159 Andrew Mackinlay: The other thing I want to ask you about is, Mr Whyte earlier drew attention to Q156 Mr Illsley: Is there anything more the the fact that many of the citizens of Bosnia and international community could do to try and get the Herzegovina will be able to claim Croatian Bosnian entities to hand over people to the War citizenship and if they did do so of course that would Crimes Tribunal? Y diminish from nation building, they would not feel Mr Glenny: That is regrettably very di cult. No. It is Bosnian, and then presumably the people who very diYcult to see how to do that. Karadzic is very V cannot claim Croatian citizenship would say, “You e ectively hidden; nobody knows where he is; they are not Bosnian.” Presumably this is something have come close to getting him a few times. I cannot which we need to take into account, both in terms of see any way of trying to incentivise the local negotiations in accession of Croatia and, again, population; there are already large rewards on these V going back to this whole business of mobility around people’s heads. Serbia and Mladic is a di erent Europe. We exaggerate this business, points which business. I do not know if the President or the Prime both Mr Whyte and you have made, the fact we are Minister in Serbia know where Mladic is, but I am not going to let people into Europe, we are going to sure military intelligence knows where he is. I think return them, and visas and so on. Would you flag Mladic is going to be easier to get, paradoxically, this up fairly high for us to address this, in the sense because he is more powerful than Karadzic. we address the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce? Mr Glenny: When I learnt about Croatian accession Q157 Mr Illsley: Does there come a time when we I immediately anticipated that when this gets nearer have to turn to each other and say, is there any point you will see the first voluntary mass conversion of continuing with this search for these people? religion inside the Balkans for 150 years or so, as a Perhaps more Karadzic than Mladic because of the lot of people become Catholics in a short space of military involvement. Does there come a time when time. I think there will be an element of that; I think the civilian population do not want to give him up, there will be an element of selling Croatian passports he has obviously been able to hide, to conceal inside Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, but the dual himself, there are rewards on his head, yet people do citizenship for Serbia and for Croatia was laid down not take advantage of that, and is it not time to say, in Dayton and that is not going to stop. Whether the “Let us forget it”? EU can come up with a new formulation saying that Mr Glenny: I observed from an article in the only Croats not living in Bosnia and Herzegovina Washington Times that I read this morning, that can get in, I do not know, but it seems to be John Bolton in the United States has made strong unrealistic. As regards access to labour markets and indications that it is time to wind-up the ICTY. moving around Europe, the other thing that I am Under the Bush administration it was fairly obvious doing at the moment is working at a book on trans- earlier on that if the Serbs had handed over Mladic national organised crime, and I can tell you quite and the Bosnians Karadzic then the Americans categorically that keeping people out of the would have withdrawn their support from the ICTY European Union and keeping them in distressed as a whole. And it now looks as if they are looking economic areas is manna from heaven for organised into this again with the transfer of cases to Belgrade crime syndicates. They provide labour, very cheap and to Zagreb and to the local instances. I think that labour. The one cultural specificity you can level at the ICTY has a function but I think that it has the Balkans is that people are good at smuggling become too politicised and I think it has too negative there. I do not think that they are congenitally an impact on local politics. If there is some way of genocidal and I do not think that they are reaching a compromise on this issue in terms of congenitally criminal, but they are good at devolving the court’s powers into local capitals I smuggling because they have been doing it for a very think it should certainly be explored. There is a long long time, and every time the borders of the EU are Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 55
26 October 2004 Mr Misha Glenny raised, the walls go higher, and all you are doing is was pushing towards nation states equals early maximising the profits of organised crime European entry, and of course it was a very bloody syndicates, who have penetrated our capitals 10 experiment. Cyprus does not count because Cyprus years ago. The dam burst on that one a long time had the Greeks threatening to veto the whole of the ago. So for me, particularly with the issue of the enlargement if they did not come in in their unclear ageing population in Western Europe, the fact that unconstitutional arrangement. There is no one who we often cannot fill up the employment places that plays a similar function for the Western Balkans. are there, it seems to me, if I may use the Another reason why I suggest that Serbia and colloquialism, a “no brainer”. We have Croatia are key on this is that Serbia does have a unemployment that leads to instability in south- certain tradition of statehood and a certain eastern Europe, we have under-employment. These coherency. Kosovo is currently a basket case; people have been determined by us as European and Macedonia is not a whole deal better; Bosnia and candidates for the European Union, and it seems to Herzegovina also has real diYculties; and Albania me an obvious place from where we could consider has very serious problems as well. drawing labour. Q161 Ms Stuart: What about Montenegro? Q160 Ms Stuart: Let us take this “no brainer” a little Mr Glenny: It depends what happens. My own bit further. Most of the issues which I wanted to raise feeling is that the Agreement will fall apart after in relation to Serbia and Montenegro you have in three years; that is my sense. Even if Montenegro many ways answered those points in relation to does not become a member of the EU straight away other questions. Let us look at the FCO’s approach it has an economic relationship with parts of the to this. I remember when—it may have been 10 years Italian establishment, of various varieties, which will ago—Timothy Garton Ash developed this theory, ensure that it becomes a sustainable economy—but or was writing an article that he thought a lot of what not a terribly dramatic one. was going on in the former Yugoslavia was settling things that in the rest of Europe were settled in 1945, Q162 Ms Stuart: One final question on nationalist when the populations moved and re-jigged, but feelings, particularly in Serbia. I remember reading somehow that did not happen there. You now have an article by a Serbian journalist where he said, “My the former Yugoslavia, and when you look at the identity is about to be stolen by a blue flag with 12 map of Europe you know that this bit in some way golden stars.” Is he a single voice or is that a problem or another has to come into Europe, and this is the over there? kind of “no brainer”, that, if we do not, in terms of Mr Glenny: If you look at the nationalist vote across crime it is all there. If you go back to the structure of Eastern Europe and south-eastern Europe the the European Union and its balance between large patterns in Serbia are pretty consistent. The radicals countries and small countries, if you really look at have two sources for their electoral strength. One is that whole section and at the end process, and you poverty and economic decline and the other is may look and think that Montenegro may be a nationalism. Personally I think that the economic separate unity to come in, do you realise that you decline is a more significant percentage of that vote completely destabilise the basis and balance of large and the radicals will also suVer reverses in fortunes. and small countries and what comes to countries of It looks as though we may well have early elections membership, your Commissioner, your minimum of in Serbia in the Spring. This is the time when Tadic four or five MEPs, all that kind of stuV? Have you and his party organisation are really on the line and thought about that one? I think this will be an absolutely crucial event. But I Mr Glenny: On that issue, on the issue of think you will see a fairly significant decline in representation in the EU, believe you me you could Kostunica’s vote. No, I do not think the voice that do a deal with this region very, very quickly, for you read in the article is the defining voice of Serbian them to say, “Hell’s teeth, we will have one political consciousness. Commissioner every five years; we do not care. What we want is structure and cohesion first. We want our Q163 Chairman: We have not turned to Macedonia. economies to have the same kind of incentives and May we have some final reflections on what are the inputs and targeted work and data collection, all the bases of the current instability? Is it essentially things that happen in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and economic? I have heard, for example, that in the past Spain, and transformed those countries within the the Macedonians had most of the jobs in the space of 20, 25 years.” That is what they are looking bureaucracy; that those have been reduced. The out for. So on that issue I am sure you can do a deal; they grouped Albanians became more entrepreneurial; are good at making deals, these people, as well. That they travelled; they are bringing in money now, is another cultural specificity. I agree with you that causing certain resentments. How do you describe to it is another thing to swallow, particularly after the us the roots of the instability in Macedonia and the last ten, and the security arrangements are going to prospects, which, since Macedonia appears to be, be diYcult. Where I think Tim was right 10 years ago certainly in respect of NATO, well placed? is what in their murky, hazy, violent way the Serbs Mr Glenny: I think it is partly as you described it and the Croats understood was that the European there, in an extremely succinct, it seems to me, Union on the whole—in fact almost exclusively— summary of one of the ESI papers, arguing exactly takes in coherent nation states, and Yugoslavia was that. That is part of the problem with the not a coherent nation state, so everyone suddenly Macedonians and the Albanians, there is no Ev 56 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 October 2004 Mr Misha Glenny question. The Ochrid Agreement has always had Q164 Chairman: So the roots being economic, social some detractors in the Macedonia population which or ethnic? see it, (a) as selling out to the Albanians, but (b) as Mr Glenny: Consistently before, during and after the having been imposed from the outside. This, given civil war of 2001 opinion polls in both communities the parlous state of the Macedonian economy, has in Macedonia put ethnic relations and ethnic not been helped by the way that the government has tensions down at about fifth and sixth of ordinary handled the whole referendum and the whole citizens’ major concerns, after the issues of decentralisation business. They have acted in a unemployment, health, education and all those shroud of secrecy; they have not bothered to explain other things which we all recognise from our lives. to the population what is going on. But I think one What happens is that when you have a very weak has to also recognise that this is a people, both economy in Macedonia, and what is culturally Albanians and Macedonians, exercising their right undoubtedly quite a divided community, when there to a democratic initiative on what is a very serious are political tensions and failures associated with issue for them. I do not think that it will succeed and I am pleased if it does not succeed. However, I do not that then the economic tensions are very quickly think one wants to be too hectoring, particularly of translated and manipulated into ethnic tensions. On your EU representative, about the need for the the ethnic issue the current Albanian and decentralisation package to go through because Macedonian parties in power have done pretty well, people will respond negatively to it. I think but they are both currently very weak and one Macedonia will get over this, but it does point to a hesitates to guess as to what might come after. serious long-running problem in how the two Chairman: Mr Glenny, as always, you have been communities inter-relate at times of economic most helpful. Thank you very much. distress. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 57
Tuesday 30 November 2004
Members present:
Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr John Maples Mr Andrew Mackay Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay Ms Gisela Stuart
Written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 1. The Foreign and Commonwealth OYce responds to a request from the House of Commons Foreign AVairs Select Committee for a memorandum in connection with the Committee’s inquiry into the United Kingdom’s policy towards the Western Balkans, with a particular focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo) and Macedonia. For the purpose of the Memorandum, “Western Balkans” is defined as Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. 2. The memorandum begins with an overview of the economic and political situation in the region and our overall objectives. It then summarises UK policy in relation to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the role of the European Union and NATO, tackling organised crime in the region and UK policy towards improving the economy and good governance in the Western Balkans. UK policy in the Western Balkans is characterised by a “joined up” approach across Government and other Departments, aside from the FCO, have the lead on some policy issues. The memorandum then sets out the key challenges for the future. There are three annexes: details on policy towards Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia; and summaries of UK bilateral and UK multilateral assistance towards the region. We have not included further details on Albania and Croatia since these countries are outside the focus of the inquiry.
Introduction 3. The Western Balkans continues to occupy a prominent place on the international agenda, following the conflicts that marked the 1990s. Since the Foreign AVairs Committee’s last inquiry into the region in 2001, the Western Balkans has made good progress through political, institutional and economic reform and is moving in the right direction, if not always at great speed. A return to large-scale conflict is now unlikely, although it cannot be ruled out. The problems of extremism and ethnic tensions are receding, but they remain under the surface: the outbreak of violence in March 2004 in Kosovo was a poignant reminder that progress is fragile. 4. The major ramifications of the conflicts (1992–95, 1999, 2001) have been largely overcome, with the exception of Kosovo, whose fledgling self-governing institutions remain fragile. And there are also a number of high profile war crimes indictees still at large. The majority of political extremists are no longer in positions of authority, although they continue to play a distorting role in politics, for example, the Serbian Radical Party. There are largely moderate (if sometimes nationalist), democratically orientated governments in oYce who are committed to reform. But the quality of local leadership and immature political and economic systems frustrates progress. Governments remain vulnerable to coalition pressures and frequent elections, and complex constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) present their own challenges. 5. Legacies of the past continue to impact, particularly in BiH where the issue of co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) further complicates the inter-ethnic governmental structures, and in SaM where policies towards the ICTY and Kosovo dominate politics. A start has been made in redressing population movements from the last decade, particularly in relation to the large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), but significant problems remain across the region. Human and minority rights have vastly improved in the Western Balkans: there is no longer the systematic discrimination that characterised the Milosevic era. However, there is still much that needs to be done to create tolerant, multi-ethnic societies and institutions, above all in Kosovo. (The FCO Annual Report on Human Rights 2003 provides more details on the human rights situation in the Western Balkans and can be found at www.fco.gov.uk. The 2004 Report will be published in the autumn). 6. Reform of military and security structures in the region has, perhaps surprisingly, been a major achievement. The armed forces of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), now SaM, have been reduced and brought under civilian control and many of the security structures from the Milosevic era have been dismantled. The establishment of a state level defence structure in BiH was also an important step towards our objective of a self-sustaining state capable, over time, of integration into NATO and the European Union (EU). Ev 58 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
7. However, some organised criminals and extremists continue to exert undue influence over government structures and institutions, frustrate the reformers, and undermine legitimate economic activity. Accountable law enforcement structures and independent, eVective judicial systems are now a priority in order to bolster national capacities to tackle organised crime and corruption. 8. The Western Balkans economies are largely stable, if weak, but the region is now between post conflict and 1990s Central European style transition. Poverty and high unemployment remains a problem (as with many countries in transition). There will need to be major improvements in the economies of the region if the problems of poverty are to be addressed. Improvements in the standard of living in the Western Balkans will be important to help maintain public support for diYcult reforms and to get the countries to a level where membership of the EU is at all realistic. The countries need to ensure that political as well as economic conditions are in place to attract more foreign direct investment to stimulate development. International partners are playing a key, supporting role in this. 9. UK policy aims to support the establishment of security and stability in the region and make it irreversible, bring prosperity and help the countries move towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, in particular, eventual accession to the EU. This should be underpinned with democratic and accountable government structures, prosperous free market economies, and socially cohesive societies. The UK is working to achieve this by promoting the rule of law, social and economic development, democracy, security sector reform, justice and human rights, co-operation with the ICTY, and refugee return. We work through direct engagement and careful co-ordination and co-operation with the EU, NATO, United Nations, World Bank and other international organisations. 10. The Western Balkan states’ aspiration to join the EU forms the bedrock of our policy. The EU Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 confirmed that the Western Balkans states are potential EU members. Croatia achieved candidate status in June 2004 as a result of her successful reforms and improved co- operation with the ICTY. We want to see other states make tangible progress towards the EU and we support their EU aspirations. Integration is conditional on the consolidation of states based on the rule of law and democratic principles, and the implementation of responsible, reformist policies that will help them achieve economic and social convergence towards EU levels. Further Euro-Atlantic integration is also conditional on full co-operation with the ICTY. 11. It will be important to maintain international engagement in the region for some time to come, although the nature of this engagement is changing. There is likely to be a need for an international military presence in the Balkans for some years, including British armed forces, although this will become smaller scale with more limited mandates. The Western Balkans will continue to be important to the UK: they will ultimately integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures, becoming strategically important partners and allies. And their stability and economic prosperity has a domestic impact in the UK. The whole of the EU is a target market for Balkan organised crime and economic migrants and we must continue to work to maintain stability and security on the borders of Europe. On a more positive note, a prosperous Western Balkans could also provide a market and opportunity for UK business. Given the improvements on the ground since 2001, over the next few years the UK and her international partners will now focus on resolving some key strategic challenges: Kosovo Final Status, the future of the SaM state union and the implementation of peace settlements in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton) and Macedonia (Ohrid Framework Agreement, OFA). But even if we are successful, the very process of dealing with these issues is likely to re-inject turbulence into the region.
UK Policy
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 12. The UK attaches particular importance to all the countries of the region meeting their international obligation of full co-operation with the ICTY. The UK was central to securing United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1503 in August 2003 that formalised the expectation that all states “intensify co-operation and render all necessary assistance to the Tribunal”. The Resolution highlighted in particular the detention and trial of fugitive indictees: Bosnian Serb leaders, Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Croatian general, Ante Gotovina (the “Big Three”). 13. The OYce of the Chief Prosecutor has issued 125 indictments to date, of which 103 indictees have been apprehended or are deceased. Of the 103, 46 indictees were detained by NATO troops. UK forces were involved in 21 of these operations. There are presently 58 accused in detention at the ICTY. A further five have been released pending trial. 15 others have been indicted over the last year and there still 21 at large in the region, including Mladic, Karadzic and Gotovina. We continue to put pressure on the respective Governments, in particular in Zagreb, Belgrade and the Republika Srpska authorities in Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to apprehend and transfer them to The Hague. 14. A further UNSCR (1534) of March 2004 called on the ICTY to meet the deadlines within its Completion Strategy (while emphasising the UN’s commitment to ensure that the Big Three are tried in The Hague), and to ensure that any future indictments concentrated on those considered most senior and responsible. A further amendment to the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure gives the judges a greater role in reviewing whether indictments meet this requirement. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 59
15. The UK is committed to helping countries build domestic capacity for war crimes trials, particularly in BiH, where the UK has pledged £2.6 million over five years to help set up a Bosnian War Crimes Chamber, which should be operational by mid 2005. This should facilitate the transfer of lower level cases to domestic jurisdiction and help the ICTY to achieve the objectives in its Completion Strategy. 16. The ICTY’s most high-profile (and longest running) case is that of former Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic. The trial has now entered its third year and the case for the prosecution closed on 25 February 2004. Lord Bonomy was appointed to the Trial Chamber in June, succeeding the late Judge Richard May, who sadly had to resign due to illness. Milosevic was due to start his defence in early July but concerns about his health (and the Court’s summer recess) have caused further hearings to be postponed. The trial re-started on 31 August. On 2 September the Trial Chamber assigned a defence counsel to ensure the trial is not unduly disrupted by Milosevic’s poor health. 17. We continue to support the ICTY Outreach Unit, and have funded projects to address some of the mis-perceptions about the ICTY in the region and contribute towards a greater willingness to face up to the past and understand the need for reconciliation. We have also maintained our financial and practical support for the ICTY’s Witness Protection Programme and for the Rules of the Road project in BiH, advising the courts on domestic prosecutions of war crimes cases and monitoring the quality and fairness of the prosecutions. In March 2004 we became the tenth state to sign a Sentence Enforcement Agreement with the ICTY, which means convicted ICTY indictees may now serve their sentences in UK prisons. The UK remains the second largest contributor to the ICTY’s extra-budgetary projects.
European Union
Overview 18. The EU’s fundamental aim for the countries of the Western Balkans is EU accession, extending to the region the area of peace, stability, freedom and growing prosperity enjoyed by its existing Member States. The prospect of EU membership has proved to be the single most eVective motivator of reform in the region, including the establishment of rule of law, stable democratic institutions and a free market economy. It is also a driver behind increased regional co-operation, a key building block of increased stability. In keeping with its support for EU Enlargement, the UK supports the Western Balkans’ EU aspirations. 19. The Feira Council of June 2000 agreed that all countries of the Western Balkans (as defined in paragraph 1) were potential candidates for membership. The Council also launched the Stabilisation and Association process (SAp), a framework for the EU’s relationship with the region designed to encourage and support the domestic reform agenda. The process is a step-by-step approach based on aid, trade preferences, political dialogue, technical advice and, ultimately, contractual relations in the form of Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). The SAp aims to guide all these countries through to eventual full integration. When the new European Commission takes oYce on 1 November 2004, the Western Balkans portfolio will be transferred from the Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX) to the Directorate General for Enlargement (DG ELARG). This could have implications for the way the countries of the Western Balkans progress towards EU integration, in terms of financial and technical assistance. 20. The EU is by far the single largest donor to the countries of the Western Balkans primarily through its regional aid programme called CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation), which is designed to support the objectives of the SAp. The programme’s mid-term review of June this year showed it be well-targeted with acceptable delivery rates for a program of its size. Since 1991, the EU has provided a total of more than ƒ6 billion to the region through its various aid programmes. By 2006, that figure will have risen to around ƒ10 billion. The UK has long supported these commitments and contributes about 19% of total CARDS funding. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is planning to increase significantly its credit to the region and will become a major source of external finance. The FCO also supports SAp objectives through its various programme budgets, including the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and the Global Opportunities Fund (GOF). 21. The EU also runs two European Security and Defence Policy operations in the Western Balkans. There are EU Police Missions in both Macedonia (Proxima) and in BiH (EU Police Mission, EUPM). The EU is in the latter stages of planning another operation to provide an EU Force (EUFOR) to replace the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in BiH in December 2004.
Progress update 22. The region’s integration into EU structures depends upon compliance with the same criteria it has applied elsewhere. This ensures the credibility of the SAp and wider enlargement process. Ultimately successful progress along the membership track depends on the willingness of the countries themselves to put in place the necessary reforms. 23. In March 2004, the European Commission published its third Annual Progress Report on the Western Balkans’ progress through the SAp. Overall, while there has been some progress in certain areas, the European Commission gave a sober assessment of the outstanding challenges. The report recommended Ev 60 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
that higher priority be given to creating fully functioning democratic institutions based on the rule of law; administrative capacity should be strengthened and structural economic reforms continued. It also found that the work of the ICTY is being systematically obstructed and organised crime and corruption remain prevalent. The position of each country is: — Croatia concluded an SAA in 2001. However, the UK suspended Parliamentary ratification of the SAA because of concerns about Croatia’s co-operation with the ICTY. Following a statement in April 2004 from the ICTY Chief Prosecutor that there had been a significant improvement in Croatia’s co-operation with the Tribunal, the UK restarted its ratification process, which was completed in September. Also in the wake of the ICTY Chief Prosecutor’s statement, the European Commission issued a positive opinion on Croatia’s application for membership. In June 2004, the European Council declared Croatia an oYcial candidate, recommending that negotiations start in early 2005 on the basis that full co-operation with the ICTY continues. — Macedonia was the first country to sign an SAA, which has been in force since 2004. Macedonia submitted its oYcial EU membership application on 22 March 2004. The European Commission has now been tasked by the Council to give its Opinion on the application. We expect this to issue some time next year. — Albania began negotiations for an SAA in January 2003. However, negotiations continue and the overall pace of reform in the country has so far been disappointing. — In November 2003, the European Commission completed a feasibility study on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s readiness to open negotiations on an SAA with the EU. It identified 16 priority areas where “significant progress” is required—including co-operation with the ICTY—before SAA negotiations can begin. There are some signs of progress and the European Commission will assess later this year. — Serbia and Montenegro’s integration into the EU is currently on hold due in part to lack of co- operation with the ICTY and failure to complete an Action Plan to harmonise the two republics’ economic systems. The European Commission is considering ways to overcome this. There is a parallel Stabilisation and Association process tracking mechanism in place to ensure that Kosovo does not fall behind the rest of the region in EU terms, while its final status remains unresolved.
24. Intra-regional co-operation in the Western Balkans requires further development. For example, the countries could work together to create a genuinely free trade area. Currently the Western Balkans, an area of less than a quarter of million square kilometres, has 6 bilateral free trade agreements, with another 14 in the pipeline, but no regional agreement. The impact of a single free trade area on the lives of individual citizens would be immense, as would visa free travel. Currently, the countries of the Western Balkans place restrictions on the movement of people. The FCO aims to encourage intra-regional co-operation by funding regional projects from our various programme budgets.
25. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted, at the EU’s initiative, at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. The Stability Pact is a mechanism for co-ordinating political reforms and reconstruction in the countries of South East Europe. It complements the SAp and the work of regional bodies such as the South East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP).
26. The European Commission’s third SAp Annual Progress Report was accompanied for the first time by European Partnerships in March 2004. These documents identify and prioritise the immediate reform agenda for each country and will be used to programme EU assistance. The UK played a key role in promoting this initiative and shaping its development. The UK is working to ensure that European Partnerships are used to help to integrate governments’ own development priorities, external assistance and the requirements of the SAp. We are encouraging the SAp countries to draw up Action Plans to implement the European Commission’s recommendations.
Looking forward
27. EU membership remains the main driver of reform in the region. Since this is a distant prospect for most Western Balkan countries, the EU and its member states need to ensure they deliver tangible benefits throughout the integration process and that these are conditional on political and other reform. This should include supporting economic and social development and nurturing a more democratic and European outlook. To avoid disappointment, the EU also needs to help manage the gap between political leaders’ ambitions, the expectations of the public and the likely pace of integration. They should draw on existing national reform strategies and incorporate commitments made with other donors, eVectively bringing together the EU accession processes and wider development priorities and opportunities. By the end of the decade we hope all the countries might be in a position to make a credible application for EU membership. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 61
International Military Engagement 28. Since Dayton, NATO has regularly downsized its military commitment in Bosnia on the basis of six- monthly Periodic Mission Reviews. This has meant a reduction in troops from the original 60,000 of Implementation Force, IFOR, in 1995 down to 32,000 the following year with the launch of Stabilisation Force, SFOR, to some 10,000 at the beginning of 2004. Kosovo Force (KFOR) was launched in June 1999 with an initial strength of 50,000 troops, and is now at 17,500. 29. NATO plans to downsize SFOR in Bosnia from 10,000 to 7,000 troops during 2004 in advance of the deployment of EUFOR. In Kosovo, the plan was to downsize from 17,500 to 10,000 throughout 2004, but following the March violence this will be reviewed after the October elections in Kosovo, and is unlikely to occur this year. We must ensure that our military engagement is suYcient to continue to protect our investment in the region, not least in the run up to possible future events such as Kosovo Final Status discussions, and is based upon requirements on the ground. But our ultimate aim remains to enable the region to ensure its own security whilst keeping partners and allies (particularly the US) engaged on the ground. 30. The March violence highlighted a number of areas where the Kosovo Force (KFOR) could improve. NATO conducted a comprehensive lessons learned exercise. We continue to push for implementation of the findings such as improving contingents’ crowd and riot control capacity and removing national caveats which limit or prohibit involvement in certain circumstances. 31. We need to manage carefully further reductions in military commitments in the region. Refugee returns in BiH are largely complete and there is no longer the same requirement for a large scale and highly visible force. However, the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in BiH and Kosovo still requires an international military presence, and the international community’s ability to keep the reform agenda on track is still underwritten by those troops. 32. We are currently working towards a successful transition to an EU force in Bosnia at the end of 2004. This will operate under Berlin Plus arrangements (having access to NATO assets and planning). The UK will provide the first Force Commander of this robust 7,000 strong force. A continuing but limited NATO presence will focus on defence reform as well as certain operational tasks such as counter terrorism and supporting the ICTY with regard to the detention of indicted war criminals. 33. All Western Balkans countries aspire to join NATO (although the current SaM government has been more circumspect). The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process includes scrutiny of political reforms, democratic development and the rule of law, as well as defence and security sector reforms. Croatia, Albania and Macedonia are all members of PfP and participants in the MAP process, although the pace of reform is variable. However, while the NATO Summit in Istanbul kept open the prospect of membership, it made clear that this was unlikely in the near future. SaM and BiH have yet to obtain PfP membership, largely due to their lack of co-operation with ICTY. The UK Government looks forward to welcoming SaM and BiH into PfP once they have met the established conditions.
Organised Crime 34. Criminals exploited the vacuum created by the conflicts of the 1990s to establish lucrative networks, which reach far into government and retard social and economic development. Organised crime and corruption are obstacles to the rule of law, democratic stability, and sound and accountable institutions. Organised crime now controls enormous resources. It is well armed and financed. It funds political parties, including political extremists. It often works across ethnic divides. It is a regional phenomenon, unconstrained by geography or the new national borders and is able to adapt to overcome market and security obstacles. In addition to its de-stabilising impact within the region, organised crime in the Western Balkans has a direct impact on UK streets. The Western Balkans is a major source and transit route for organised immigration crime (people smuggling and traYcking in human beings) and drugs smuggling. It is estimated that 80% of heroin seized in Western Europe has been smuggled through the Western Balkans.
International Strategy 35. The November 2002 London Conference on Organised Crime placed the problem of organised crime in the Western Balkans firmly on the international agenda. An international strategy was adopted (the London Statement) and countries of the region committed themselves to individual Areas for Priority Action (APAs). The EU-Western Balkans Ministerial Summit on 21 June 2003 took stock of countries’ progress against their APAs, with some making positive advances. In order to maintain momentum, at the inaugural EU-Western Balkan JHA Ministerial on 28 November 2003, each country presented implementation strategies for Specific Action Oriented Measures (SAOMs) to fight organised crime. Progress in implementing the SAOMs is being monitored by the European Commission and the next progress report will take place at this year’s EU-Western Balkan JHA Ministerial in December. The EU has the most significant resources available to assist the Western Balkans in tackling organised crime through assistance programmes and it also has considerable leverage to encourage reform due to the EU membership Ev 62 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
ambitions of all the governments throughout the region. From the ƒ2 billion CARDS funding committed in 2001–03 for the Western Balkans, over ƒ300 million went to the broad area of Justice and Home AVairs (JHA).
UK Strategy and Assistance 36. A UK Strategy for tackling organised crime in the Western Balkans was agreed by all relevant Government departments and agencies in July 2003. The main focus is on encouraging and supporting governments in the region to develop their own responses to organised crime and includes building popular and political support for action against organised crime; improving institutional capacity through more eVective law enforcement and judicial systems; disrupting organised crime structures; and enhancing regional co-operation. 37. As well as supporting EU programmes, the UK provides significant bilateral assistance to the region. From the Western Balkans strand of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) over £2 million has been spent on initiatives in the region. Examples include: — £0.5 million to provide the Kosovo Organised Crime Unit Bureau with surveillance and intercept equipment, which has played a key part in a number of significant drugs seizures. It has also funded the successful Crimewatch television series in Kosovo. — The recently established Special Chamber of Economic and Organised Crime in BiH has completed its first major case. FCO funded British experts helped the State Level Prosecutor to investigate and pursue the case against a prominent criminal for charges relating to human traYcking and prostitution. He received a nine year sentence. 38. There are also a number of other project funds for work in related fields which contribute to the Strategy’s objectives: — The FCO-administered Small Arms and Light Weapons Fund. — The Department for International Development’s (DFID) work to improve JHA policy-making in the region. — Ministry of Defence (MoD) Security Sector Reform programmes. — The FCO’s Drugs and Crime Fund. — Project Reflex, a UK multi-agency initiative chaired by the National Crime Squad, was set up in 2000 to tackle organised immigration crime and has run a number of initiatives in the Western Balkans. Individual agencies make substantial contributions: eg Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise has 25 oYcers seconded to EU customs assistance programmes, and the UK has an extensive network of drugs and immigration liaison oYcers working in the region. — Project “IMMPACT II”, which concluded in SaM in 2003, was a major capacity building and training project for the SaM border services to help them fight cross-border crime. Project IMMPACT II followed on from the highly successful “Project IMMPACT I” in BiH (2001–02) and aims to ensure a consistent regional approach to tackling illegal migration.
Economy and Development 39. Although the macro-economic position of the Western Balkans region has stabilised, overcoming the impact of conflict and the unfinished transition will take some time. Falling levels of international aid will place further serious stress on both public finance and employment. Department for International Development (DFID), together with the FCO, is working with the international community to maximise the eYciency and speed of the transition process, encourage the formation and growth of new enterprises, discourage the emigration of vital skills, attract foreign investment and address the social consequences of transition. But the expectation is that the dividend from these eVorts will not come quickly and it will take some time for the current levels of income growth to bring back the relative prosperity of the 1980s. The economic situation in Kosovo is particularly serious, with declining external financial transfers, unsustainable levels of public expenditure and extremely high and increasing levels of unemployment. We are working to ensure that adequate aid resources are devoted to economic development. This is central not just to the alleviation of extreme poverty but also to achieving other key objectives, in areas such as security and political stability, immigration, organised crime, and Euro-Atlantic integration. 40. DFID is working towards ensuring sustainable and broad based economic growth in all countries of the region. European Partnerships and Poverty Reduction Strategies now form an integral part of the Western Balkans governments’ policy making. DFID is supporting national governments in ensuring that the Action Plans, designed in response to both strategies, are compatible and well coordinated to maximise eVectiveness. DFID is also working to improve the eVectiveness of international assistance to the region by promoting better harmonisation and coordination of assistance from the international donor community. 41. The UK and international partners recognised the importance of economic stability in the Western Balkans as essential to underpinning political stabilisation in the region. In 1999, the High Level Steering Group on the Western Balkans was established to provide a forum for donors (International Financial Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 63
Institutions, IFIs, and bilateral donors) to work together to understand and help resolve economic problems in the region. The IFIs are active in promoting economic stability and building the foundations of sustained growth and poverty reduction throughout the region. Since 1998, the UK has supported International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans to Western Balkans countries totalling around £950 million, through eight programmes, including Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programmes, in which finance is made available at below market interest rates. In addition, the IMF is active in providing technical assistance and policy advice to these countries. The World Bank has also committed over $2.3 billion. International agencies and donors also recognised the need for sustainable solutions to debt problems in the region. As part of a debt treatment by the Paris Club, the UK has rescheduled £5.3 million of debt in BiH, of which £2.95 million was written oV; rescheduled £620 million of debt in SaM, of which £315 million was written oV; and rescheduled £8.4 million of debt in Macedonia. Other members of the Paris Club have done similarly. 42. UK commercial relations with the Western Balkans are minimal. The recent conflicts continue to aVect perceptions of the region by businesses and investors. Interest from UK companies is limited to “one- oV” trade deals or specific niche market opportunities, such as in the tourism or agriculture sectors. Larger UK investments in the region tend to be set up through overseas subsidiaries of UK companies. The UK’s main trade partners in the region are Croatia and SaM. Between 2002–03, UK exports to Croatia increased by 48% to £139.9 million with the main exports being medicinal and pharmaceutical goods, oYce equipment and specialised industrial machinery. UK exports to SaM in the same period increased by 6.5% to £65.6 million with the main exports being specialised industrial machinery, oYce machinery and chemical products. There was a downturn in UK exports to other Western Balkans markets of between 20–48%, although imports (except from Croatia) are on the rise and are predominantly foodstuVs and raw materials.
Key Challenges
Kosovo
43. The single biggest issue facing the Balkans is Kosovo’s future status. The UK’s objective is to work with the UN and other international partners, bilaterally and within the Contact Group (UK, France, Italy, Germany, Russia and the USA), to establish a multi-ethnic, democratic, stable and tolerant Kosovo and to ensure that international partners get the process and the conditions right for determining Kosovo’s future status. There has been growing recognition by the countries involved in the region and international organisations that the uncertainty over the province’s future status is a source of instability in the region and an obstacle to regional development. In December 2003, the UN Security Council endorsed a strategy, supported by the Contact Group, to measure Kosovo’s progress in raising democratic standards, thereby establishing the conditions in which its final status might be addressed. Under this “review mechanism” there will be a formal review by the UN of Kosovo’s progress in mid-2005. A negative assessment would lead to a refining of targets and the setting of a fresh review date. A positive assessment would trigger a status process as laid down in UNSCR 1244. 44. The violence of 17–19 March 2004 highlighted the growing frustrations of the citizens of Kosovo with the current situation, notably poor economic opportunities and lack of certainty about the future. The UN and the Contact Group concluded that while international policy remained right for Kosovo, and that it should not be deterred by extremists, there were lessons it could learn from the March violence to make international agencies’ work more eVective in Kosovo and address its underlying causes. The UN Secretary- General (UNSG) commissioned a report into the UN’s policy on Kosovo by Ambassador Kai Eide, the Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO, and its recommendations are currently under consideration by the UNSG. NATO also conducted a comprehensive lessons learned exercise which highlighted that while reinforcements arrived with commendable speed (particularly the UK-led NATO Operational Reserve), there were a number of areas where KFOR needed to improve its capabilities and that original plans for KFOR to downsize throughout 2004 should be reviewed. 45. UNMIK has responsibility for law and order in Kosovo and works through an international police mission. UNMIK’s International Police OYcers work closely with local oYcers from the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to support KFOR in providing security. The UNMIK Police mission consists of 3,524 international oYcers, to which the UK currently contributes 102 police oYcers. The March violence has stretched resources and UNMIK Department of Justice have requested a further 100 international police investigators to assist them; 73 have arrived so far. Over 350 cases have been filed by local and international prosecutors in relation to the March violence, and more than 270 people have been arrested. 46. On 16 August, Mr Soren Jessen-Petersen (Danish) arrived in Kosovo as the UNSG’s new Special Representative for Kosovo. Petersen has reaYrmed the overall goal of creating the conditions to enable a process to determine Kosovo’s future status. He has stated that his immediate priorities are to establish a safe and multi-ethnic Kosovo, enhance local capacity across the board, reform local government; address economic development and improve international leadership. Ev 64 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Serbia and Montenegro 47. Following the Belgrade Agreement in March 2002, the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia adopted a new, looser federal arrangement between the two republics of Serbia and Montenegro under the SaM Constitutional Charter of 4 February 2003. The EU, particularly Secretary General and High Representative Dr Javier Solana, was instrumental in brokering the new “state union” arrangement. A fully functioning state union is a key condition for SaM’s progress towards EU integration (which is currently on hold). 48. However, progress on implementing the provisions in the Constitutional Charter has been slow, particularly in economic harmonisation of the two republics, whose economies have diverged over the last decade. Domestic support for the state union remains divided, with some political forces within both republics pushing for independence (in particular, the ruling coalition in Montenegro). The Charter allows either republic to determine by referendum whether to withdraw from the state union three years after its adoption. It is possible, therefore, that after March 2006, two independent states will emerge. The EU believes that it is in the interests of both republics to preserve the union and we and EU Partners are actively encouraging the SaM authorities to ensure the union functions. But ultimately this is a matter for the SaM people and it will be important for any separation not to undermine stability in the region.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 49. BiH has come a long way since the conflict of the early 1990s, albeit with enormous assistance from international partners, institutions and agencies. The UK objective is to ensure progress made to date is irreversible, and that BiH continues on the path to closer Euro-Atlantic integration. The challenge is to balance the need to allow BiH’s institutions the freedom to grow, exposing them to normal democratic pressures, whilst maintaining the role of international organisations and partners in guaranteeing BiH’s future and ensuring there is no return to conflict and division. 50. The role of the OYce of the High Representative (OHR) has been central to progress achieved over the last year. In particular, the use of the “Bonn Powers” (which enables the High Representative (HR) to impose legislation and remove obstructionist politicians and oYcials) has enabled the UN to keep extremists in check and ensure BiH has the basic legislative framework required for Euro-Atlantic integration. The current HR, Lord Ashdown, is also the EU’s Special Representative in BiH. As BiH moves closer to the EU, the EU’s role in BiH will become increasingly important.
Macedonia 51. The international community brokered Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) set Macedonia back on a peaceful track following the inter-ethnic conflict of 2001. The challenge is to keep all parties committed to moving forward despite the sensitivities involved. The current diYcult debate over decentralisation and the referendum package are testimony to the continuing inter-ethnic tensions and risk delaying Macedonia’s progress towards Euro-Atlantic structures. The UK continues to believe that the OFA and the multi-ethnic future it guarantees is the best model for Macedonia’s future. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 13 September 2004
Annex A
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Current Situation 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is gradually normalising as a state. But nationalist politics, economic malaise, and the restrictive constitutional structures of the Dayton agreement make reform a diYcult and painful process. Continued distrust between the ethnic communities, combined with political corruption and infighting, make the process of creating a viable, multi-ethnic state all the more complicated. 2. Since general elections in 2002, nationalist parties have been in power at both the state and entity level in BiH. Despite this, the last two years have seen significant progress in delivering some of key the reforms required for Bosnia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The development of a state-level defence structure, and agreement on single intelligence and indirect taxation structures are particularly important examples. But much more remains to be done, and progress still tends to depend on the ability of the UN and international organisations to exert concerted pressure on the parties involved. 3. The OYce of the High Representative (OHR)—headed by the current High Representative, Lord Ashdown—is the main focus of international eVorts in BiH. The UK provides significant financial and practical support to OHR, and works closely with Lord Ashdown to help deliver the OHR Mission Implementation Plan (MIP). The Plan focuses on institutional reform, entrenching the rule of law, Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 65
strengthening state-level structures, and encouraging good governance. The High Representative’s overall objective—which we back—is to put BiH irreversibly on the road to Euro-Atlantic integration. Our shared aim is that Lord Ashdown should leave his post with the Bosnian Government in a position to take greater ownership and responsibility for the reform process. We are working with the OHR and other Peace Implementation Council Steering Board partners to develop an eVective exit strategy—reflecting the need to gradually reduce the UN and international organisations’ roles whilst maintaining the capacity to intervene if necessary. 4. The EU Police Mission to Bosnia (EUPM) took over from the UN’s International Police Task Force at the beginning of 2003. It consists of around 474 police oYcers and 66 international civilians from EU member states and third country contributors. The UK currently contributes 56 police oYcers and 11 civilians. The mission’s aim is to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice. It focuses on police reform through mentoring and monitoring of mid to senior oYcers in the BiH police. It has four strategic objectives: police independence and accountability; the fight against organised crime and corruption; financial viability and sustainability, and institution and capacity building at management level.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
5. Lack of co-operation with the ICTY remains one of the biggest obstacles to Bosnia’s successful integration into the EU and NATO. Two key milestones of that integration process—membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP); and the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU—are within sight, but are likely to remain out of reach until the ICTY issue is resolved. Full co-operation with ICTY is a pre-requisite for integration into both NATO and the EU. The main problem lies with Republika Srpska (RS—the predominantly Bosnian Serb entity), which has failed to arrest a single ICTY indictee since the end of the conflict. 6. The UK continues to be at the forefront of political, diplomatic and operational—through NATO’s SFOR and in due course through the EU-led successor—eVorts to ensure that fugitive indictees Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are transferred to The Hague to face justice. We are also helping the BiH authorities to develop the capacity to try their own, lower-level war crimes cases. The UK is providing £2.6 million of funding over five years towards the establishment of a BiH State War Crimes Chamber. We hope the first trials will begin in mid-2005.
Euro-Atlantic Integration
7. The EU has confirmed that BiH is a potential member, provided it meets the necessary political and technical criteria. The key milestone in the process of further integration is an SAA with the EU. In November 2003, the European Commission concluded that BiH must make significant progress in 16 priority areas before it could recommend the opening of SAA negotiations. The Commission will review progress later this year. The UK fully supports BiH’s EU aspirations. But it is clear that BiH must move from adopting legislation to a greater focus on implementation if it is to fulfil its ambition of opening negotiations in 2005. Full co-operation with ICTY is one of the 16 areas where BiH must make significant progress. 8. BiH also aims to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace, after meeting the established NATO conditions. Despite significant progress made on defence reform in the last 18 months, NATO’s Istanbul Summit declined to invite BiH to join PfP due to concerns about ICTY co-operation. NATO identified obstructionist elements in Republika Srpska (RS) as the main problem.
Bilateral relations and assistance
9. Bilaterally, and through our work with international organisations and NGOs, we continue to provide support for reform that delivers economic, social and institutional development and enhances stability and security. This is in addition to the UK contribution to multilateral funding—in particular through the EU assistance programme—for BiH. The UK has provided over £82m of bilateral assistance to BiH since 1996. Recent examples of projects funded by the UK include retraining for demobilised soldiers, and assistance to NGOs involved in the location and identification of people missing as a result of the conflict. The UK is also a long-standing contributor to de-mining activity in BiH. 10. The UK also maintains a high-level of bilateral contacts with the BiH authorities. Both the Bosnian Defence Minister, Foreign Minister and Prime Minister have all recently visited the UK, and both the UK Minister for Europe and the Minister for the Armed Forces have been to Sarajevo this year. Ev 66 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Serbia and Montenegro
Current Situation 11. Serbia has yet to recover fully from the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, in March 2003. The pro-reform Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition continued in power until December 2003, before being brought down by scandals and unpopularity. Early parliamentary elections in December 2003 left the ultra nationalist Serbian Radical Party with the highest vote (27%) but unable to form a government. This left the second largest party, Kostunica’s conservative Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), to lead negotiations. After months of wrangling, on 3 March 2004, a minority coalition government, led by Kostunica and with outside support from Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia, was formed. 12. This Government is faced with a daunting set of challenges, a small parliamentary majority, lack of public support (the last poll recorded a total of only 20% support for the government), divergent views held by the various parties and little experience. Many analysts predict that the new government may last only a year or less. However, the election of the reformist Boris Tadic in June as Serbian President has created a more positive political atmosphere in Serbia. Despite leading the pro-reform Democratic Party (DS) (Djindjic’s former party) in the opposition, Tadic has pledged to promote stability and to work with the government in constructive co-habitation. The next hurdles are local and provincial elections in September. 13. The Government in Montenegro has been in power since October 2002 and is likely to remain in power at least until the 2006 Montenegrin Parliamentary elections. This continuity may be due more to a fractious opposition (who have been boycotting parliament since May 2003), than wide public support for the Government. A British OYce opened in Podgorica in 2003 and HMA Belgrade makes regular visits. 14. Despite significant progress, especially in terms of legislation and macro-economic reform, both republics need to continue with in-depth reforms on rule of law and institution building as well as to deal with a large and unsustainable state-owned sector. This will help them tackle the problems of organised crime along with corruption and unemployment. SaM’s relationship with her neighbours is improving, but there continues to be the threat of internal instability in South Serbia where an armed revolt by local Albanian extremists in the Presevo Valley in 2001 was peacefully resolved by the Serbian Government working in close co-operation with international partners and organisations.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 15. The ICTY continues to be the most diYcult issue for SaM. There was some, albeit insuYcient, co- operation from the previous DOS government, including a number of arrests and extraditions (most famously Milosevic), but co-operation largely came to a halt in autumn 2003. Despite SaM’s progress towards the EU and NATO being conditional on her co-operation with the ICTY, in May 2004 SaM’s co- operation with the ICTY was described by the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, as “virtually non- existent”. She has reported to the Security Council that General Mladic and other indictees are spending at least part of their time in SaM, including three army and police generals who are still living openly in Belgrade despite having been indicted last September. The recent reconstitution of SaM’s Council for Co- operation with ICTY is a late but encouraging development and, along with positive statements from the new Serbian President and SaM Foreign Minister, has generated hope for some concrete progress in the near future. We continue to urge SaM to meet her international obligations and to promote public awareness of war crimes committed in the region. 16. The EU responded to SaM’s poor ICTY co-operation by holding back SaM’s EU integration (see below). Meanwhile on the 31 March this year, the US suspended the outstanding financial aid due to SaM. Around a quarter of the annual allocation of $100 million was held back due to SaM’s lack of co-operation with the ICTY (the suspension did not apply to that used for humanitarian aid, aid for democratisation and aid for Kosovo and Montenegro). 17. Serbia is working to increase its capacity to carry out domestic war crimes trials. In March 2004 the first trial began in the new special war crimes court, of six Serbians accused of involvement in the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia. We support these eVorts. However, according to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s assessment, the Serbian judiciary lacks the capacity to conduct fair war crimes trials in accordance with international standards. We are urging the Serbian authorities to reform the judiciary and to implement witness protection programmes to ensure the trials are eVective and meet international standards and have oVered assistance in this regard.
Euro-Atlantic Integration 18. A Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, as a first step towards joining the EU, is the key foreign policy priority for SaM and its constituent republics. But SaM’s progress towards the EU is currently stalled. The key stumbling block is non-co-operation with ICTY and the failure of the Serbian and Montenegrin republics to complete the process of harmonising customs tariVs as part of creating a single market. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 67
19. Under the Belgrade Agreement (signed in February 2002) and the Constitutional Charter of March 2003, the Serbian and Montenegrin republics agreed to form a State Union and not to call a referendum on independence for at least three years. The State Union is headed by President Marovic, from Montenegro, and contains five Ministers, for Foreign AVairs, Defence, Human Rights and Internal and External Economic AVairs. However, the pro-independence ruling coalition in Montenegro continues to suggest that the State Union is not working and that Montenegro may call a referendum before 2006 (some prominent Serbian politicians also argue for dissolution of the union). 20. SaM is seeking membership of PfP but will need to meet the established NATO conditions: full co- operation with ICTY (in particular the arrest and transfer of Mladic and Karadzic), the case dropped against eight NATO allies at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and continued improvements in international and regional relations. At the NATO Summit in Istanbul June 2004, NATO Allies pledged to assist SaM by including her in selected PfP activities. But only action against remaining ICTY indictees and dropping the ICJ case will pave the way for rapid movement on PfP. The UK has a significant bilateral defence reform programme with SaM (including a 2 star General advising SaM’s Ministry of Defence).
Bilateral relations and assistance 21. The UK values good bilateral links with SaM, characterised by rich bilateral exchanges and developing economic/trade relations. Among others, the following have visited SaM in recent years: Minister for Europe, Dr Denis MacShane, as part of a regional tour in April 2004; the Attorney General, Lord Peter Goldsmith, in November 2003; the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, in November 2002. We have also hosted visits to the UK by SaM Defence Minister, Boris Tadic, in November 2003; SaM Deputy Foreign Minister, Igor Luksic, in June 2003; FRY Foreign Minister, Goran Svilanovic in October 2002; Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, in April 2002; and FRY President, Vojislav Kostunica, in November 2001. 22. The UK continues to provide support for reform that delivers economic, social and institutional development, and look to maximise the eVectiveness of economic and other assistance. We support the Government’s poverty reduction strategies and also encourage donor harmonisation related to nationally owned reform strategies. We provide assistance both bilaterally (£8 million annually for SaM) and multilaterally. 23. The EU provides technical assistance through its CARDS programme. The CARDS Management Committee approved the 2004 action programme for SaM, amounting to around ƒ230 million (as an EU member state, the UK provides 19% of the overall funding for CARDS). CARDS regulation supports: good governance and institution building; economic recovery; and social development and civil society (including recognition of the need to tackle poverty). The EU has also provided macro financial assistance in 2002 and 2003 (ƒ40 million and ƒ65 million respectively). A further ƒ25 million is likely in 2005.
Kosovo 24. Policy and progress on Kosovo will be covered in more detail in a later memorandum following key international meetings in September, as agreed with the FAC.
Macedonia
Current Situation 25. Macedonia has made significant progress since the inter-ethnic conflict of 2001. Much of the legislation linked to the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), which brought to an end the 2001 violence, has now been passed. However, decentralisation, one of the OFA’s key components, has been highly contentious, particularly in July and August 2004. It sparked demonstrations and the collection of the 150,000 signatures necessary to force a referendum against the parliament approved decentralisation package. The referendum has further delayed the municipal elections planned for autumn 2004. This issue highlights that tensions remain between the ethnic groups. Whether the OFA is perceived to deliver much needed change (for ethnic Albanians) or deliver too much (for the ethnic Macedonians) will continue to aVect stability in Macedonia. Work on equitable representation in the public sector and on language use rights continues. 26. The current government coalition was led by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski until he was elected President, following the untimely death of former President Boris Trajkovski in a plane crash in February 2004. Former Minister of Interior Hari Kostov became the new Prime Minister. The coalition is multi- ethnic—the ethnic Albanian contingent DUI is made up of the former insurgents from 2001. 27. Although inter-ethnic politics dominate the agenda, the principal challenge in Macedonia is the economy. Inflation, government expenditure and external debt are increasingly under control, helped by an IMF programme, but oYcial unemployment stands at more than 35%. Although this is mitigated by the large grey economy, urgent action is required to create jobs. Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) will be key to boosting Macedonia’s economic prospects. A properly functioning judicial system is necessary to Ev 68 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
stimulate the economy, especially for FDI. It should also help to confront organised crime, which, as elsewhere in the region, is a major problem in Macedonia. But further high-level political commitment is required to make progress. This applies equally to tackling the commonplace allegations of corruption. To this end, the UK funds a small project enabling a team of five experts to monitor the judicial process in corruption related cases in order to develop recommendations for legal and institutional reforms. 28. With the withdrawal of the EU’s first military mission, Operation Concordia on 15 December 2003 there are now no international peacekeeping troops in Macedonia. Neither the end of Operation Concordia, nor the publication of the contentious census results in December 2003, nor the March violence in Kosovo triggered significant security incidents. However, the security situation remains fragile. We continue to monitor the situation closely through working in concert with other international actors. 29. The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) was launched on 15 December 2003 with a one year mandate. This followed a request from the late President Trajkovski for EU help in bringing the Macedonian police up to European standards. Proxima’s key role is to mentor, monitor and advise the Macedonian police. Its presence also acts as reassurance for the local population. The UK currently provides seven of the mission’s 200 or so personnel.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 30. The ICTY asserted primacy over five cases in Macedonia relating to the 2001 inter-ethnic conflict. Nobody has yet been indicted by the ICTY for any of these cases.
Euro-Atlantic Integration 31. The Macedonian Government is committed to a future within the EU, demonstrated by Macedonia’s application to join the EU, submitted on 22 March 2004. Macedonia signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in April 2001, which entered into force on 1 April 2004. The first EU-Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Council is scheduled for 14 September 2004. Macedonia also seeks to become a member of NATO joining Partnership for Peace in 1995 and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process in 1999. In order to achieve this, they will need to implement the OFA in full as well as fulfil SAA and MAP conditions. Progress is being made, although significant challenges remain such as further ethnic integration and downsizing of personnel and equipment in the armed forces. The UK fully supports Macedonia’s aspirations to join both the EU and NATO when the relevant criteria are met. We focus our eVorts on helping the Macedonians themselves make quicker progress.
Bilateral relations and assistance 32. Between 2001 and 2003, the EU pledged ƒ131.3 million in CARDS money to Macedonia, of which the UK contributes approximately 19%. Bilaterally, the UK has spent approximately £6.33 million from 2002–03 to 2003–04. In addition to this, at the Donors’ Meeting for Macedonia in March 2002, the UK pledged an additional £3 million for Balance of Payments support. 33. We have a strong bilateral defence relationship including English-language training and staV courses. A British Brigadier heads up NATO’s in-country presence, double hatted as special defence adviser to the Macedonian Government. 34. The Macedonian Speaker is due to visit in the autumn following visits from Deputy Prime Minister Xhaferri, Culture Minister Stefanovski and Foreign Minister Mitreva earlier this year. The Minister for Europe, Dr MacShane, visited Skopje in April as part of a regional tour, following a visit to attend the late President Trajkovski’s funeral in March. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 69 Annex B luded to provide a complete picture. 04. Economic Governance airs; Rule of Grants V Strengthening Democratic and Pool: Prevention Global Conflict Pool: Safety Global Prevention Global Conflict Prevention Global Conflict Global Conflict Democracy and Pool: Tackling Prevention Security and Opportunities Building; Ethnic Crime Justice Law; Institutional SAA/SAp Directorate Inter-ethnic Organised Pool: Security Access to Fund: Reuniting Human Rights Sponsored Chevening Democracy and Inter Organised Reform and Access to A Institution and Democracy Tackling Security Sector Safety, Security Justice and Home Human Rights Educational Implementation of Relations Capacity Building; Programme Budget Relations Crime Sector Reform Justice Europe Programme Project Fund Visits Scholarships UK BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO WESTERN BALKANS IN FINANCIAL YEARS 2002–03 to 2004–05 : otes Function of Budgets SaMTotal 304,744 949,526 272,829 2,561,795 513,847 0 1,755,499 252,950 1,056,307 63,099 N/A N/A 70,954 47,020 33,000 736,020 TBC 131,130 MacedoniaRegional 35,001 163,560 638,150 621,473 10,000 0 209,000 15,187 0 812,765 N/A 37,954 N/A TBC 135,360 0 TBC 0 CroatiaKosovo 37,612 53,000 251,639 421,905 7,985 286,390 133,000 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 TBC 114,210 TBC 88,830 Spend FY 2002–03 AlbaniaBosnia 51,769 303,840 55,000 300,799 209,472 0 1,028,549 132,000 160,067 5,189 N/A N/A 0 0 TBC 131,130 TBC 135,360 Total 1,270,791 2,240,590 1,831,762 4,349,730 3,896,174 546,991 264,845 37,980 740,523 SaM 169,251 47,000 641,660 571,907 912,733 140,849 196,387 9,000 131,130 4. It should be noted that the PDCF is not only about providing “assistance” but is an important public diplomacy tool for posts. The figures have been inc Regional 155,814 410,716 36,727 2,479,115 1,316,383 0 0 0 0 CroatiaKosovoMacedonia 57,476 181,527 32,644 145,740 119,063 762,993 633,904 8,795 0 131,000 309,681 160,723 426,639 38,376 0 69,964 0 0 0 0 68,458 8,000 4,480 5,500 103,830 95,621 143,452 Spend FY 2003–04 AlbaniaBosnia 79,803 594,276 44,353 710,725 510,676 0 653,2233. 44,081 Data on 1,202,043 DfID bilateral spend for 2003–04 are provisional pending the publication of Statistics on International Development at end of September 20 307,225 0 28,953 0 7,000 131,130 0 4,000 134,360 Region-wide (see note 1) 890,000 1,750,000 1,500,000 3,750,000 4,500,000 276,258 46,6062. Serbia and Montenegro were given debt relief of 67,000 £299 million in financial year 2002–03. 745,624 Projected Spend FY 2004–05 N 1. NB Separate country allocations are not yet available Ev 70 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence involving iinternational regional issues Conferences on Drugs and experts/regional ce Public Diplomacy airs Crime Diplomacy intellectuals Y V Home O 0 n/a 0 0 0 N/A 70,000 1,667,798 0 n/a 0 0 0 0 45,000 4,443,755 1,837,000 n/a 0 0 47,300 N/A 0 2,964,952 6,647,0001,605,000 529,033 n/a 0 0 300,000 0 3,700 0 N/A N/A 0 9,613,590 0 2,149,446 2,582,000 n/a 0 0 23,500 N/A 0 2,984,818 8,015,000 n/a 74,947 170,000 10,000 35,000 0 11,124,864 1,447,000 n/a 85,170 0 7,500 4,600 0 2,380,746 1,222,000 n/a 0 0 0 32,000 0 1,829,900 6,575,000 736,873 0 0 32,000 0 0 11,460,171 2,321,000 n/a 225,000 0 0 0 0 2,882,550 Economic Justice and International Public politicians/ Social and 19,580,000 736,873 400,117 170,000 49,500 71,600 70,0001 36,257,476 20,000,000 900,000 263,000 0 13,000 145,268 60,000 34,9906,756 305,271,000317,942,000 529,033 n/a 0 0 300,000 0 322,250 247,750 N/A N/A 70,000 326,807,231 0 306,576,502 Development Home A DfID—Bilateral Assistance: INDIS: Project Drugs and Crime Challenge Fund Wilton Park Total Spend/ Included in SaM n/a 0 0 0 N/A 0 850,125 Included in SaM n/a 15,000 0 0 0 25,000 2,135,490 (see notes 2 and 3) OHR Funding Reflex IMMpact Fund (see note 4) Conferences Projected Spend Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 71 Annex C 6 billion of ƒ ince 1991 over esearcher’s Network Consortium for year). CARDS is by far the largest EC ission run or set-up in the Western tic and is subject to change every six uded. OSCE OSCE UK OSCE UNMIK UNMIK Non- UNMIBH/ EUPM EUFOR EUMM Subscriptions Secondees (/Non- Projects Assessed Costs assessed Costs ITPF Assessed Assessed Assessed Assessed (/Assessed Costs) assessed Costs) (see note 1) (see note 2) (CivPol) Costs Costs Costs Costs UK MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO WESTERN BALKANS IN FINANCIAL YEARS 2002–03 to 2004–05 : otes assistance programme in the region but there are other programmes providing macro-financial and humanitarian aid. Details available on request. CARDS funding has been distributed to the Western Balkans. The figures in the attachment are in euros, and are split by calendar year (and not UK financial the European Commission, June 2004. The UK contributes about 19% of the funding to the CARDS programme of external assistance to the Western Balkans. S SaMTotal 576,928 7,408,925 4,725,645 246,335 476,860 229,896 10,211,917 7,288,128 0 2,985,597 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 months. 3. See attachment for CARDS funding, taken from the Evaluation of the Assistance to Balkans Countries under Regulation 2666/2000 by the Development R Macedonia 1,467,855 1,034,076 128,080 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kosovo 3,217,055 2,083,073 64,586 10,211,917 7,288,128 0 0 0 0 Croatia 702,577 406,221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Spend FY 02/03 AlbaniaBosnia 248,666 1,195,844 185,676 770,264 54,299 0 0 0 0 0 2,985,597 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Balkans this financial year. This figure is the aggregate of the July 2004 rate of 7.43% and the January 2005 rate of 7.38%. The rate of assessment is not sta SaMTotal 603,833 7,390,288 4,106,036 300,830 158,066 104,682 14,928,593 0 793,418 2,892,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Macedonia 1,134,495 733,681 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kosovo 3,126,189 1,622,741 0 14,928,593 5,681,584 0 0 0 0 BosniaCroatia 1,511,835 746,034 860,376 410,415 0 5,384 0 0 0 0 793,418 0 2,892,000 0 0 0 0 0 TotalSpend FY 03/04 Albania 7,606,000 267,902 4,640,000 177,993 157,823 12,157,052 48,000 4,939,338 0 0 0 2,720,000 4,000,000 700,000 0 0 0 0 MacedoniaSaM 1,028,000 725,000 855,000 128,196 455,000 8,198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2. In financial year 2004–05, the UK’s share of Peacekeeping Costs (assessed) is 7.405% Therefore, the UK is obliged to meet 7.405% of the costs of every m Kosovo 3,250,000 1,770,000 21,429 12,157,052 4,939,338 0 0 0 0 AlbaniaBosniaCroatia 280,000 1,523,000 800,000 170,000 990,000 400,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,720,000 4,000,000 0 700,000 0 0 0 0 0 Projected Spend 04/05 N 1. In order to avoid duplication, projects that have been run by the OSCE but funded from budgets listed in the UK bilateral assistance table are not incl Ev 72 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Total Spend/ Development and Projected Spend 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 See attachment 1,053,159 000 105,331,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 See attachment See attachment See attachment 128,195,759 1,108,798 2,687,011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 See attachment 434,342 0 103,584,000 3,582,492 0 808,000 2,037,000 62,060 See attachment 146,023,537 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 See attachment 1,009,345 000 39,921,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 808,000 2,037,000 0 0 62,060 0 0 See attachment See attachment See 4,775,236 attachment 65,280,107 1,161,833 0 63,663,000 3,582,492 0 0 0 0 See attachment 73,303,121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 See attachment 493,895 000 106,000,000 0 0 4,197,700 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,000,000 0 0 2,000,000 350,000 0 350,000 Not available 0 149,467,913 Not available 4,361,196 Not available 1,188,198 00 40,000,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Not available Not available 62,137,819 1,200,000 00 66,000,000 0 4,197,700 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Not available 80,130,700 Not available 450,000 (CivPol) Costs Costs assessed Costs Assessed Costs Assessed Costs Assessed Costs note 3) figures) 2,828,564 186,518,000 1,175,725 57,000 0 0 0 See attachment 223,676,361 2,828,564 81,187,000 1,175,725 0 0 0 0 See attachment 90,197,293 ITPF Non- Support Ops Non- Operation EUPOL EUPOL Stabilisation (not including UNMIBH/ MoD Peace EUPM assessed Costs Non-assessed assessed ESDP Mission Concordia Proxima Proxima Non- (CARDS) (see CARDS Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 73
Witnesses: Mr Denis MacShane a Member of the House, Minister of State for Europe and Ms Karen Pierce, Head of Eastern Adriatic Department, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, examined.
Q165 Chairman: Minister, may I welcome you Q166 Chairman: If it was an accident waiting to again, with Ms Karen Pierce, your colleague. As you happen, if the Foreign OYce had suYcient foresight know, today we are dealing with the Western to recognise that this was going to happen, what did Balkans as part of the continuing inquiry of the the Foreign OYce do about it? Committee. We are looking at the southern area, the Mr MacShane: We did what we have been doing more diYcult area. Perhaps I should say the order in consistently, since the excellent report which you which we propose to take the subjects: Kosovo, produced in 2001, which is to urge the authorities in Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina Belgrade, the authorities in Pristina to have a proper and, finally, Macedonia. Minister, you will recall dialogue, to understand that a new relationship was that in March there were the riots in Kosovo which needed, that is the first point; to urge the UN in New left 19 dead and over 1,000 injured, with many York to have less UNMIK and more Kosovo, as I internally displaced persons. It is said that that came have put it; to urge the Kosovan authorities to as a wake up call to the complacency of the accept their responsibility for the Serb communities international community, and that was followed by in their midst, and to say that KFor has to the report commissioned by the UN Secretary- understand its riot control and police mission and General, and written by Kai Eide, the Norwegian not simply the heavy military mission that it Ambassador to NATO. It made a number of key undertook when NATO arrived in 1999. recommendations. Ambassador Eide said, for example, and I quote: “The international V community is today seen by Kosovo Albanians as Q167 Chairman: Are you saying that those e orts having gone from opening the way to now standing fell totally on deaf ears? in the way. It is seen by Kosovo Serbs as having gone Mr MacShane: Not on deaf ears. I am always close from securing the return of so many to being unable to Oscar Wilde when he said there is only one thing to ensure the return of so few.” Most people worse than advice and that is good advice; but the apparently felt in the area that UNMIK1 was both plain fact is that in both Belgrade and Pristina you remote and arrogant. Can you give some indication have people who think profoundly that they are of the Government’s response to that? Where in right and the other side is wrong, and we have in the your own judgment, and that of the government, did United Nations, in my judgment, insuYcient UNMIK fall short, which precipitated these flexibility and adaptability to see that UNMIK ethnically based riots in March of this year? should be a very temporary mission there and the Mr MacShane: I would say, Mr Chairman, having object should be to transfer authority and visited regularly in Kosovo since being appointed a responsibility locally. Minister in 2001, that those events were an accident waiting to happen; that with 60 to 70% Q168 Chairman: What has happened since March? unemployment amongst the people of Kosovo, if What have we done our best to insist upon, which you look at the photographs of the rioters many of has resulted from these March riots? them still had their sixth form school satchels in their Mr MacShane: KFor’s modus operandi has hands, with UNMIK unable to deliver what the changed; the “caveats”, to use a technical phrase, Kosovans want, which is a country over which they that a lot of the military contingents there used to have some sense of control, with the KFor2 troops have, have now been lifted so KFor soldiers can not adequately prepared at that time for riot operate. When I met the German General OYcer controls. We had examples of some contingents commanding KFor just after the riots he said, having to open with heavy machine gun fire because “Look, I have 18,000 troops under my command, they had no experience, no training, and no planning nominally, and I can put about a tenth of them on for riot control. British and Irish troops behaved the streets if something like this happens,” and I exceptionally well, and we have since altered the thought that was ridiculous. That was because we terms under which troops from Europe and other countries serve in Kosovo so that they can get have some European countries that would not allow involved in riot control situations adequately. I also soldiers to leave the barracks unless there was almost believe that political statements from all the a Cabinet meeting to authorise it. It is not the way politicians in the region were not helpful. I the British Army operates but lots of other countries remember saying, if I could quote a private oYce are profoundly committed to retaining vetoes of conversation with my Private Secretary, that how their troops move and operate and do not want remarks made in the parliament in Belgrade at the their soldiers to be under the command of an beginning of March, to the eVect that Kosovo was international force, like in KFor, but doing what the for ever going to remain under Serb control would General wants, not what the capital of the country be a tremendous provocation. I remember wants. Secondly, we have had the Eide report, which discussing it with colleagues. I have said all this to you have referred to, which has highlighted the Mr Kostunica and Serb politicians, and should I problems of the UNMIK operation bases in issue a statement? And he said, “No, no, stay out Kosovo, and called for a more dynamic policy, of it.” called for a streamlining of UNMIK, and that has been accepted by the Secretary General. I am now 1 UN Mission in Kosovo. dealing with my fourth Special Representative in 2 Kosovo Peacekeeping Force. Kosovo. I thought Ministers were meant to come Ev 74 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce and go and civil servants were permanent, but I am Q173 Ms Stuart: Do not worry using technical terms now dealing with the fourth UN Super Functionary such as national caveats because I think they are in Kosovo. relevant to what you have just said. Our understanding was that the troubles in March were oYcially described as a failure in intelligence, but Q169 Chairman: When you took oYce, whenever it probably were more a failure of troop deployment was? on the ground, and I understand that the German Mr MacShane: Mr Peterseon, yes, came in. Bundestag are having a parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of their own troops and they have been Q170 Chairman: So the fourth since you— changed subsequently. Is there anything that you Mr MacShane: Since I became Minister responsible can say on the record as to how we perceive what has for the Balkans in 2001. So there has not been that happened to those national caveats on the ground, continuity of administration. But I think he is going because they have not all been lifted? in the right direction, he has certainly been well Mr MacShane: Unfortunately there are not really received by colleagues in New York, by the EU and many British troops left in Kosovo because the by capitals in Europe, and the object all along for Ministry of Defence decided to transfer British the British Government is to plead for more soldiers principally up to the Bosnia and responsibility to be given to Kosovan authorities, Herzegovina region for operational reasons. In and we are now seeing the transfer of competences discussion with the military on the ground they which, frankly, I think should have been transferred could not call out their troops; they were not some time ago. equipped with riot shields, water cannons, tear gas, the usual necessities for dealing with an angry, disturbed crowd. I am not sure that Intelligence Q171 Chairman: That leads naturally and finally to could have dealt with that. As I understood it, this the Eide report in July, which suggested eVectively a restructuring of UNMIK, in two stages. First, was in response to the tragic death of three young the streamlining of the administration, more Kosovans further north, in Mitrovica, which transparency of the pillar structure, then a more reported quite erroneously and irresponsibly in the substantial restructuring in 2005. We believe that the Kosovan Press as having happened at the hands of Secretary-General and the Security Council have Serbs. So what was a tragic incident was turned into accepted the Eide report. What comments do you an ethnic cause of the violence by very irresponsible have on what he has recommended? reporting by Kosovan newspapers, which I Mr MacShane: I think the recommendations condemned then and I condemn now. By the time certainly go in the right direction. A lot depends on the crowd started moving on the streets there were so the quality of people sent down there; that we have many scores and thousands of them that the very people prepared to accept responsibility, who are thin blue line which represents the UN in Kosovo living there permanently and who understand that was not able to contain them. Some soldiers were not Kosovo has to become Kosovo and accept that it able to leave the barracks and those that did were has responsibility over as much area of its life as not equipped—did not even have plastic shields, possible under United Nations Security Council they were having to open fire with heavy machine resolutions, and I think next year we will see a lot gun rounds. So a lot of lessons were learnt. We have more of that happening. But there are other players an Army unit in place in Kosovo when what we involved and when a huge part of what UNMIK has probably need is a very good CRS-type police force to do is to deal with a security situation because the or gendarmerie, or an Army trained, for example, political relationship between Belgrade and Pristina like British soldiers and Irish soldiers because of the is not satisfactory, then they cannot get on with just, diYculties in Northern Ireland. as it were, doing themselves out of business. My constant worry, Mr Chairman—and I put it on the record for the Committee—is not so much the occasional flare-up—even the most worrying sort Q174 Ms Stuart: May I just press you more that we saw in March, but a long period, years and specifically because if lessons were learned what years, decades of stagnation. were they? And despite the fact that there were fewer troops there, it would be helpful for the Committee for its report, that there are specifics to say what has Q172 Chairman: Of drift. happened as a result of this in changes on the way Mr MacShane: Of drift, of nobody quite having an that troops are being deployed. answer, nobody prepared to cut “Gordian knots”, if Mr MacShane: NATO has taken this very seriously; you will excuse the cliche´. I have said to friends in it was a wake up call to NATO and as a result a Kosovo and in Serbia that my worry is that in 30 or number of countries have lifted their caveats. That is 40 years’ time there will still be a bit of UN, there will to say, soldiers of the Crown3 now do what their still be a bit of KFor, still be Kosovo not quite being local General OYcer commanding instructs them to Kosovo, still being Belgrade and Serbia—and I am do, and do not phone up their capital cities to get concerned about the plight of Serbs and the Serbian specific permission from ministries. The Danes, the patrimony and cultural history in that area—and we should not allow that to happen. 3 Note by witness: By which is meant soldiers of national Chairman: Thank you. Ms Stuart, please. military forces deployed under NATO. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 75
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
Belgians, the Spanish still have caveats in place4 and community is happy with the notion that it is just I would, through this Committee, ask them to another five years and another five years without withdraw those caveats, so that Danish, Spanish and some resolution. Belgian soldiers can do what soldiers should do, which, when a riot breaks out, is to move into Q176 Ms Stuart: I have heard you several terms use appropriate positions as decided by their oYcers the phrase “Let Kosovo be Kosovo”. How multi- commanding on the ground. The Germans, as has ethnic is that Kosovo, which we would allow it to be? already been indicated, are discussing this in the Mr MacShane: We want a multi-ethnic Kosovo just Bundestag and I hope again that any German as we want all parts of Europe to be multi-ethnic. caveats can be lifted. But bear in mind that Britain does not have many soldiers on the ground5 and so perhaps we are not in the best place now to start Q177 Ms Stuart: I would like to pin you down a little giving advice and instructions to other countries. more. Given the events of last March and given that Ms Pierce would like to say something. debate about standards and status, are some of the Ms Pierce: Just to add one point of detail. Whereas standards which the government may negotiate on a in March ComKFor6 did not have his own reserve bit more negative in relation to multi-ethnicity? that he could call on, so had to ask NATO forces to Mr MacShane: No. It is not fair, perhaps, to read send national troops, thanks largely to Anglo- into the record a map, but you see here this map of French cooperation in NATO pressing for this he Kosovo and the Serbs are everywhere. So multi- now has a dedicated tactical reserve which he can ethnicity, if that means Kosovan Albanians and also use to exercise in non-emergency situations as a Serbs living in the same territory, is unavoidable. I disincentive, as well as crisis ones. have been—and perhaps the Committee has—to villages where the first 400 metres are Serb houses and then exactly the same houses for the next 400 Q175 Ms Stuart: That is helpful for the record. metres are Albanian houses. So the bulk of the Serbs Following on from the Kai Eide report, there is a big in Kosovo live south of the River Ibar and therefore debate about status and standards, and the linking multi-ethnicity is not a slogan, it is the natural future of status with standards, and we picked up on the of Kosovo in which all of its citizens, all of whom are ground that there is a feeling of unease of that very people who are European citizens, have the right to close link between the two. Could the Minister tell us live, go about their business without fear. I do not whether we are now separating the two slightly more expect them necessarily to love each other, and there and moving faster towards status and probably be is no country in Europe where every community prepared to compromise on some of the standards? loves every other community, but we live under one Mr MacShane: What I have said to the Kosovans is rule of law. that whereas a year ago the only watchword was standards before status, the discussion now is Q178 Ms Stuart: Do we have any figures on what standards and status and what I have said to happened to the Serbian population over the last 12 colleagues and friends in Belgrade is that it is their months? Has there been a shift? We can leave that obligation, in my judgment, to start cooperating in for later. a much more positive way, to understand that the Mr MacShane: I am happy to write to the moment has come to say, “Do vidjenja” to Kosovo Committee on that. I have not myself got in my head and Kosovo is not going to be reincorporated fully that great population movement is an issue. There as a part of Serbia and Montenegro and they have has been a modest level of return. I have some figures to allow Kosovo to be Kosovo. What I have said to here but these are returns 2000–04, it is a total of friends in Pristina is that if modern Europe were all some 10,000 of which 5,200 are Serbs. But that is interdependent that they have to show that they can over four years, so I do not think these figures are accept responsibility for looking after the interests of extremely significant. all of the people who live in the area of Kosovo. So what we are seeking to do is to maintain the emphasis on standards. We want all people living in Q179 Chairman: What would be helpful if we had Kosovo to do so without fear, and the issue of status those who are internally displaced and those who undoubtedly is on the discussion table. It is not a had left for Serbia. Whatever figures are available, if negotiating point yet. We want to see the local police those could be sent to us?7 trained up; we want to see everybody complying Mr MacShane: I am happy to do that, Mr fully with the international tribunal in The Hague. Chairman. Equally, I do not think anybody in the international Q180 Sir John Stanley: I am conscious that we are 4 Note by witness: As at 30 November 2004, NATO assessed trying to race round four countries in two hours and that both Belgium and Spain had national caveats applying to their forces in KFor. In the case of Denmark, the only normally we have 30 minutes a country and other National Caveat applied states that Danish forces cannot be colleagues want to get in, so I shall ask some short placed under EU command. questions and hopefully you can do some reasonably 5 Note by witness: KFor currently comprises approximately short replies. Why does Britain not back 17,000 military personnel from over 30 countries (including some 250 troops from the UK) with troops coming from 30 independence of Kosovo now? NATO and Non-NATO nations. 6 Commander, Kosovo Force. 7 Ev 91 Ev 76 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
Mr MacShane: Because there is a UN Security that the only British police oYcers who are in Council resolution under which we are all operating Kosovo are retired police oYcers and we have no and we prefer to operate under the UN Security serving members of the British Police Force in Council resolutions. Kosovo, which seems to be a serious deficiency. In addition there is no modern prosecution service. Is Q181 Sir John Stanley: Is it not the case, as you have this not an area where the British Government might actually hinted, that if we do not at some point make a significantly greater contribution than it is provide an independent Kosovo the alternative is making now? going to be that the international community is Mr MacShane: I do not think you can fault the going to have to take basic responsibility for running Government on its contributions specifically in that that geographical area in perpetuity? There is no area to Kosovo. You are right to say that the oYcers choice—it is either independence or international are retired, Sir John, but without exception they are government in some shape or form, is it not? men with enormous experience and ability and Mr MacShane: As I said to President Rugova, and I everybody I have met has been younger than me— have said on the record in Pristina, in Europe we and I suspect possibly younger than you—and they tend now to talk about interdependence. I find both have been very fit, virile and active because our the language out of some sectors of Belgrade that police oYcers do retire at quite a young age. But Kosovo is still under Serbia tutelage, or the notion there are diYculties; they do not speak Albanian. that there is an ultra nationalist independent You are absolutely right about the judiciary. I see a Kosovo just around the corner, under which all steady progress being made but our objective is to problems will be solved, both of them are rather out- build up the local indigenous capacity, if I can use of-date thinking, if I can put it as diplomatically as that term. We have serving police oYcers in Bosnia that. What we want to see is a status for Kosovo that and in Macedonia, not in Kosovo. But I would say over time transfers as much authority and on the record that four words you do not hear responsibility as possible to elect representatives in enough in Kosovo are “Here comes the Judge” and Kosovo. But equally the international community “I am going to lock you up if you are a bad chap.” has a supreme responsibility, mandated under the Unfortunately it is working the whole international UN, to ensure that any change in the status of community to see things that way. I do not think it Kosovo happens in accordance with international laws, a key one of which is security for all the people is exclusively the United Kingdom that has to find taxpayers’ resources—which are pretty stretched in there, not just one of the principal population V groups. resources—to provide an o -the-shelf Albanian speaking judicial system in Kosovo. But I am very impressed by the dedication of the very experienced Q182 Sir John Stanley: But you would accept the men and the senior police oYcers just retired that I basic proposition that I am putting, almost as a have met down there. statement of the obvious, that the choice is between the international community eVectively ultimately running Kosovo, possibly with more Q184 Sir John Stanley: One last area I shall raise decentralisation, or independence? Those are the with you is that Kosovo, deeply regrettably, is one of only two policy options that are open to us? Y Mr MacShane: There is only one policy option open the worst areas, and indeed centres, of the tra cking to us and that is to keep pressing and arguing and of women. There are two particular questions I working for the arrival of such standards in the daily would like to put to you. First of all, we understood life of all Kosovans, irrespective of their whilst we were in Kosovo that there is a proposal communities, which allows a fundamental shift of before your department for the funding of a shelter Y status towards Kosovo becoming a country in which for tra cked women in Kosovo. I would like to ask the elected Kosovans themselves have as much you first whether you have made a decision on that, autonomy as possible. It is not for me to say what the and if not perhaps we should have a note about what final status is, but our policy is to keep pressing them the decision is of funding that important initiative. to move towards standards that allow a change in The second question I would like to put to you is that the existing UN-defined status and to say to I hope you will give the Committee the assurance colleagues and friends in Belgrade, “You can help that the Foreign OYce is doing all it can to make enormously in this process by entering into an very strong representations through our posts in the active, full-hearted dialogue with the Kosovan countries from whom women being are traYcked authorities to try to arrive at the standards that they into Kosovo, and whilst we were there reference was legitimately want for Serbs living in Kosovo.” made particularly to the Ukraine, Bulgaria and Moldova. I hope, Minister, you can assure us that Q183 Sir John Stanley: Would you agree that one of our posts there are making it as clear as possible to the areas in greatest need of improving standards is the governments in those countries that this the whole criminal justice system, in an area which appalling trade in women must be stopped, and that is rife with criminality in pretty well every shape and we are very, very determined it should be stopped form? We were told when we were in Kosovo by a and we look to the government concerned to try to senior EU oYcial—and I do not think I should name seal up their borders as far as possible to prevent him because it was a private meeting—that the women being basically put into captivity and made, judiciary was the weakest link; and we were also told eVectively, in many cases, sex slaves. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 77
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
Mr MacShane: I agree with you, Sir John. There is Minister up to Belgrade; talk; jaw-jaw; do not just no decision yet to my knowledge on setting up any draw up schemes in Belgrade and say to the kind of women’s refuge. Certainly I am pretty sure Kosovans, ‘This is what we think you should that no paper has come across my desk, and if I had accept.’” So I am not going to make a judgment on been asked to sign it oV it would have stayed in my any particular scheme. I have seen diVerent varieties mind. So I will happily write to the Committee to tell under the heading of decentralisation in recent you what is the state of play on that.8 Certainly it is months. We want to see full participating dialogue a contribution. I have seen great support in Kosovo between Belgrade and Pristina, between the Serbs for the diVerent contributions in rebuilding civil and the Kosovans. We need to have an UNMIK UN society of both British diplomatic staV, the Military approved plan because anything that changes in Police and, above all, the many NGOs, the charities Kosovo has to go through the sieve of the UN that work down there. You are absolutely right, that Security Council. It is not clear that every Kosovan traYcking of women through Kosovo, through the Serb supports the plans from Belgrade because again Western Balkans generally, is one of the focal points I look at this map and on this area here I invite of our work with our hosts in Bulgaria, Romania, anybody—and I lived in Switzerland so I know what Moldova, Ukraine and generally in southeast a canton looks like—to show me any kind of Europe. I think the Foreign OYce now is learning contiguous area. that it will have to re-educate its diplomats in a sense, to do much more forward engagement in policing Q188 Chairman: But at the end of the day you accept and justice and home aVairs’ activities than perhaps that there is no conceivable way in which Serbia has been traditionally the case because all of this would have any residual responsibility for Kosovo? area has really upset everybody, and we have to Mr MacShane: I think that the Serb people expose it and crack down on it. Also, if I may say, collectively in the region have got rights; they have to see what we can do to reduce the demand because the right to have their culture, their language, their these young girls end up here in Britain because there patriotism, their history, their religion fully is an active demand for them. protected and not under any sense of threat or fear. Do I believe that the authorities in Belgrade can Q185 Chairman: Minister, the Serbs clearly have a exercise eVective state competencies in the region of major interest in minority rights in Kosovo. They Kosovo? I find that hard to imagine. have come forward with a somewhat ingenious scheme for decentralisation or cantonisation with Q189 Mr Hamilton: On 23 October, as you will five autonomous cantons within Kosovo, with a very recall, Kosovo’s Serb population boycotted the large range of responsibilities. Is it the view of the elections for the Kosovo Assembly. What do you British Government that this proposal is a runner think are the implications of their decision? and should be on the table with negotiations? Mr MacShane: I regretted that; I said I regretted that Mr MacShane: I have said that we welcome any in Belgrade. I said the leaders who called for that proposal from Belgrade that moves us forward, but boycott were wrong. I think that the elections have I have equally said to colleagues in Belgrade that we now taken place and in discussions there after that do not need West Bank type settlements in election it was clear that both responsible Serb Kosovo—we cannot have people in Kosovo owing a leaders in Kosovo as well as Kosovan Albanians single allegiance to Belgrade, paying taxes under the understood that it was necessary for any system of control of agents paid for directly by Belgrade. governance in Kosovo to be bi-communal. I did not think that called for a boycott had any useful Q186 Chairman: Is this particular scheme put purpose at all and was a regressive step which I forward by the Serbs one which you would rule out? condemned in Belgrade and I am happy to condemn Mr MacShane: There is not one particular scheme. again today. There is one set of proposals in March; they are Ms Pierce: May I add something, Minister? It does reformed and changed as time goes on and diVerent not mean that there cannot be Kosovo Serb political groups even within the Serb government representation in the government; they can be come up with their own approaches and ideas, and appointed. we are in active conversation with all of them. Q190 Mr Hamilton: Even though they boycotted Q187 Chairman: There is one scheme, as I the election? understand it, which has been endorsed by the Serb Ms Pierce: Yes. parliament. Mr MacShane: Yes. I met Mr Ivanovic, a Kosovo Mr MacShane: There was one scheme in March, and Serb leader—and perhaps the Committee members I think that was not fully acceptable but there have did—in the main government building in Pristina. been other schemes since then. What I have said to So responsible Serbs will play a role in the Belgrade is that Britain is not going to say, “Oh, yes, governance of Kosovo. we think a scheme for Belgrade is a good idea for Kosovo,” what I have said to them is, “Talk to Q191 Mr Hamilton: I think fewer than 1% took part Pristina, appoint high level emissaries, go there in the election; is that right? yourself, invite Rugova and the Kosovan Prime Mr MacShane: Yes. I regret that. I really think that boycotts serve no purpose and told us what we in a 8 Ev 92 sense did not really need to know again, that Ev 78 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
Belgrade considers it can give orders to the Serbs in need to have more Kosovans in the diaspora, those Kosovo when what Belgrade should be doing who fled into exile because of the brutality of the is entering into dialogue with the elected Milosovic years, going home, and that is certainly representatives of the Kosovans in Pristina. the active view of other European countries. The Home OYce of course is in discussion with Q192 Mr Hamilton: Minister, as we know, the UNMIK. I am not going to pre-judge individuals. Democratic League of Kosovo won the large number of seats in the Kosovo Assembly and has Q195 Andrew Mackinlay: Minister, I think that you formed an alliance with the AAK9. The leader of the are confusing two issues. Of course you want the AAK, Ramush Haradinaj, has become the Prime skills and the expertise and energies of people to Minister, but we understand that he is under return to Kosovo and build up the economy but you investigation by the Hague Tribunal for war crimes. do not want them arriving all at once, and the thing Will our government deal with a Prime Minister who which is driving the returnees is forcible repatriation is under investigation by The Hague, and do you by Western European countries, the United think the indictment could make the international Kingdom, at a time when many of those families are, community more unpopular than ever in Kosovo? rightfully or wrongly, legally or illegally, returning Mr MacShane: I think that we deal with anybody on remittances to keep their families functioning in the basis that everyone is innocent until, as it were, Kosovo. It was put to us, not just by observers but indicted or accused of serious crimes. Ramush by—and I will not name them—members of the Haradinaj has made it clear that if indicted he will international community, indeed people who have surrender to the Hague. I consider that he is the mandates for Kosovo, asking that the pressure is appointed Prime Minister10 on the basis of those taken oV. So it seems to me that your evidence was election results and we will continue to deal with that you have not discussed this, and I wondered if him. you could or would look into that. Mr MacShane: In all my visits to Kosovo I have Q193 Andrew Mackinlay: We have evidence from never come across a single complaint or problem that table and also a point repeatedly made to us raised by anybody in the international community, whilst we were in Kosovo, that it is disastrous for amongst Kosovans, amongst people in the streets, Western European governments—and clearly one of that this is in any way a problem. Clearly anybody those is the United Kingdom—to be returning who is illegally in the UK has not and should not Kosovan refugees, asylum seekers, call them what have any money to send back as a remittance. you like, back to Kosovo. Indeed the view was that in light of the very high unemployment to which you Q196 Andrew Mackinlay: The evidence was that we referred—60 to 70%—it is essential that to take the should in fact make it lawful and let them have a pressure oV is we allow people to live and work in the scheme so that people actually pay taxes, which is West because their remittances to Kosovo are not unhelpful actually anyway. essential for keeping people warm in the winter and Mr MacShane: That is a debate to be had with the well fed. I took that evidence very powerfully and, as Home OYce. I say, it was unsolicited, it came from private sources. Have you had discussions with Messrs Q197 Andrew Mackinlay: Precisely. Blunkett or Browne about this issue and, if not, Mr MacShane: All I can report, Mr Chairman, is why not? that the only discussion I have had with elected Mr MacShane: I assume you mean my old friend Kosovan representatives, Roma, Kosovan and Des Browne MP, not the Chancellor of the Serbs, is an appeal which I think was on the Foreign Exchequer? OYce website, “Kosovans come home, we want your talents and energies back here.” Q194 Andrew Mackinlay: Yes. Chairman: Before you continue, Mr Mackinlay, Mr Mr MacShane: No, not in terms because one of the Hamilton wants to ask something on that. pleasures of my job was to host a meeting of Kosovan Serb and Roma the representatives from Kosovo, headed by Mr Rexhepi, their Prime Q198 Mr Hamilton: I think you made a very Minister and the Chairman of the Assembly, who important point, Mr Mackinlay. Minister, I would issued an appeal to every Kosovan in Britain to really like to take this on slightly further. I have, as return home. They wanted talented, industrious many of us do, have a number of Kosovan families people, some of whom had fled before 1999, to come who, by all means, should return because they have alottooVer to Kosovo, but they are absolutely back to Kosovo and help rebuild it. Again, one of V my pleasures in just a few individual cases, with petrified because of the experience that they su ered. Y I urge you, talk to your colleagues in the Home Foreign O ce help, was to organise for Kosovans to Y go back to Kosovo from the United Kingdom, O ce to allow those who are too frightened to go ensuring the transit of their cars because they like to back to remain here until such as they feel they can go back with cars full of goods they have bought go back and make a contribution to their original here. I would say absolutely the contrary, that we country, because many of them are quite integrated into society. I have families in Leeds, in my own 9 Alliance for the Future of Kosovo. constituency, that have integrated very, very well, 10 Mr Haradinaj was oYcially appointed Prime Minister on and are really, really scared of returning, and they 3 December. have nothing to return to because their property has Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 79
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce been destroyed. We should have some humanity what is happening here. You are not facing up to the here and allow them the chance to stay here until responsibility. You are not being told what is the they are ready to go back. situation there on meetings which matter. Mr MacShane: Mr Chairman, were we talking Mr MacShane: Mr Chairman, with respect, I about a Serb who had left Kosovo and was wonder if I could oVer an alternative perspective, frightened to go home I might understand that which is that obviously this is a matter for the Home language but the plain fact is that Kosovan OYce. There are many meetings all over Europe Albanians now do rule and run their own country, concerning many government Ministries and under so the fear that quite rightly drove them into exile in British parliamentary rules our Ministers are not the late 1990s no longer exists. There are many free five days a week to travel and attend every Kosovan Albanians in the UK—and I had a very meeting. But I will send a full list of participants. nice Sunday dinner at a Kosovan Albanian restaurant in Chiswick, in which the proprietors got Q204 Chairman: Minister, you have given an plenty of two-way traYc with Kosovo. Surely the undertaking to give us the background of who economic priority is to reduce dependence on attended and why no Minister attended. remittances? I have been in discussion with Mr MacShane: I am happy to do that. colleagues because Switzerland where the biggest Kosovan Albanian diaspora is to be found, to say Q205 Andrew Mackinlay: The question of the Police what can we do to get that economic energy and Service. The PSNI11 were highly regarded and money from the Swiss back involved. Certainly I valued. There have been, I think, Ministry of cannot—and I never have to anybody coming into Defence police oYcers in both Kosovo and other my surgery—say that if you are judged to be found parts of the Balkans that we are going to address. here illegally you can just stay. But why has not the Foreign OYce done a deal with chief constables, allowing the professional police Q199 Andrew Mackinlay: We went to the Balkans oYcer, as a police oYcer, to be maintained in on 8th November and in the next seven days there Kosovo? As you know, the Chief Constable of was a ministerial conference held in Pristina on the Northern Ireland felt that he had to withdraw for whole questions of returnees. The United Kingdom reasons which one could fully understand, but government was not represented by a Minister; basically it was absence of sitting down and doing a why not? deal, was it not? Mr MacShane: I certainly did not have that in front Mr MacShane: Not at all. The invitation, the request of me. Returnees from the rest of the Western was sent out to all police forces and we were very Balkans or the UK? grateful that the Northern Ireland Police Service was able to respond so quickly. At the time also—I am not sure, not being a police expert, if that is still true Q200 Andrew Mackinlay: Precisely the issue I have today—they were more used to wearing side arms as been talking about, about Kosovans being returned a norm and all had regular arms training, which was from the United Kingdom and other Western not the case for every serving police oYcer in the European countries such as Germany. mainland British police services. But we are in the Mr MacShane: Forgive me, Mr Chairman, this is hands of chief constables; I cannot oblige them. way beyond my competence. I hate to duck an issue. Obviously the Home OYce, as a responsible Q206 Andrew Mackinlay: They have to be funded, Minister, was invited. do they not? I put it to you that that is where the Andrew Mackinlay: We have a joined-up Foreign OYce has shirked its responsibilities, unless government. you can go to Chief Constables and oVer a reasonable deal, like people who are about to retire Q201 Chairman: Can you give Mr Mackinlay a they extend their service. note? Mr MacShane: The deal was on oVer; we oVered to Mr MacShane: An oYcial attended. No, a Minister fund it. They were not having to pay this out of their did not. own taxpayers’ or Home OYce Grant. The plain fact was that there were not oYcers for the funding. Q202 Andrew Mackinlay: I chose my words deliberately and with precision—it was a Q207 Andrew Mackinlay: Could we have a note on Ministerial meeting. that? Mr MacShane: I will find out a list of all the Ms Pierce: May I interject on that? We do go out to attendees there. the chief constables and there is a scheme run by one particular part of the Foreign OYce—though not mine—that deals with this. The problem is that chief Q203 Andrew Mackinlay: And why I ask you, constables would like to help in principle, but find Minister, is this: it is wilful ignorance. You have their own resources very stretched in terms of indicated that what I have put to you is the first time manpower. So, as the Minister said, it is more a you have heard it, et cetera. If you, as a politician, as manpower issue rather than a funding one, which is a Minister, or Des Browne, somebody of that ilk, are why we do have retired oYcers in those places. not going to these meetings, you are going to be insulated from the naked truth, are you not? That is 11 Police Service of Northern Ireland. Ev 80 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
Mr MacShane: I am happy to send a note.12 Mr MacShane: I do not think that it is where anybody wants to be, and the EU in particular does Q208 Andrew Mackinlay: But in that note will you not want to be there because although obviously explain why you cannot have a deal where people Kosovo is part of European soil, the European who are about to retired, you extend their service so continent, this is an international responsibility, we that there is no loss to the Chief Constable? On the are there under UN law. Other countries have a final status you ducked and dived with all my stake and involvement. The United States troops are colleagues’ questions. The fact is that you rightly based in Kosovo, for example; there is a said that you wanted to see more competences given longstanding Serb/Russia connection, so I think we to the Kosovan government and to the legislature, need to keep this with the UN. and everyone will agree with that. But you and others in Western Europe do not seem to be able to Q210 Sir John Stanley: Minister, I want to raise one spell out to Belgrade—and this is what came over to very key point of policy of the international us when we were there—that the naked truth is that community and of Britain, and that is the policy there is not going to be Kosovo ever again as part of towards the KPC, the Kosovo Protection Corps, the state of Serbia. We—certainly myself—felt which of course is the renamed disarmed KLA13.The profoundly worried that very intelligent people, not point that was put to us by, again, somebody to a million miles from the Prime Minister of Serbia whom we were speaking privately, but somebody of and the Foreign Minister for the rump federation, real weight, substance and authority and knowledge seemed to still believe that there was never going to in this area, is that the international community in be a challenge to the ownership, the sovereignty of the UK were basically wrong in the policy they were Kosovo by Serbia. What I came back with, and I put following towards the KPC, the present policy of it to you, is that there are occasions when you have sidelining the KPC, neutralising it, almost to tell friends things that which they do not want to pretending that it does not exist. It was put to us that hear. You would not bring yourself to say, “I think the danger of this policy is that this could well there will have to be an independent sovereign at encourage members of the KPC to covertly start re- some stage down the road,” and it just seems to me arming, and was likely to encourage increased wholly unrealistic and also a mistake not to start militancy within the ranks of the KPC with potential addressing that fact. serious destabilisation or worse within Kosovo. It Mr MacShane: Mr Chairman, even on occasion one was put to us that an alternative policy would be has to tell distinguished friends that sit in House of very, very much more in the interests of the Commons Committees what they do not want to international community and indeed the Kosovans hear, but I am happy to say that all the press themselves, which is the policy of recognising the cuttings—if I can find them—and all the interviews reality which is that the KPC is the bedrock or I have done on Belgrade Serbian TV and radio, certainly the first building block of the new Kosovan making exactly the points that my honourable friend defence force/Army, and that the right thing was to has just made. I have said again and again in recognise this, to take a grip on the KPC and to Belgrade, that Kosovo is not going to fall under their adopt positive policies towards it, cleanse it of sovereignty and will return to be Kosovo. The undesirables, start to train it properly, training it not language I use usually is that there is no return to least in modern democratic attitudes towards 1999, “let Kosovo be Kosovo”. I cannot say to handling the civilian population, and, indeed, trying you—because it is a UN decision, we are operating to do what we are assisting the Iraqis to do in Iraq, under a UN Security Council resolution—what the which is to create a modern, responsible armed force end status will be, and I do not use that word for that country. How do you respond to the “independence” because I prefer the word argument that was put very persuasively to us that “interdependence”. So on the contrary, I think instead of the present policy, of the kind that we have probably of all European Ministers, I expect—and I spoken, we should be adopting quite a diVerent do not control what every one of my colleagues policy, one of a positive policy of building up the says—I have been the most explicit and upfront face- KPC as a modern defence force with proper to-face, in private and in public saying people have democratic attitudes? to work out a new status for Kosovo and I think the Mr MacShane: I think that is the approach now best people to work that out are the Kosovans and certainly of the Secretary-General’s Special the Serbs themselves. Representative, Mr Petersen. There is a review of how to provide security for all Kosovans, Albanians Q209 Chairman: Minister, I am going to ask Sir John and Serbs alike, after the March events. We want to Stanley to ask the last question in this section and see what the security review proposes. Certainly the then, Sir John, if you would, to move into Serbia and Kosovo Protection Corps, in my judgment, should Montenegro as well. Just one question from me on be part of that review. It is rather large and it is very this. At the moment, Minister, Kosovo could be hierarchal and it certainly does not have adequate characterised as a UN protectorate, under a UN funds. We want to see it become more professional; Security Council resolution. Is it the vision of the we certainly want to see it develop its ethnic base, Foreign OYce that we move step by step to an EU and the Kosovo Police Service has a better record in protectorate? this regard. Mr Peterson adopts that point of view
12 Ev 93 13 Kosovo Liberation Army. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 81
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce and so does the Commander of KFor. Some of our hotel or wherever and sat down with General other partners there do not, and one of the Pavkovic and General Lazarevic and taken coVee diYculties I have to put to the Committee is that this with them when these men are indicted war is a not British-led or British-controlled operation; criminals. I do not think in post-war Germany I we have to get agreement in New York, we obviously could have taken schnapps with Eichmann. I am not have to get agreement from our partners in Europe making any comparison directly but I find it and we have to bear in mind the position in Belgrade. oVensive in the extreme that indicted war But the general thrust of the points you are making, criminals—they are accused, they are not found Sir John, are ones that I would not dissent from. guilty, I stress that point, innocent until proved guilty—are walking free in the streets of a European Q211 Sir John Stanley: Before moving on to Serbia capital city. Yes, I completely endorse what Carla and Montenegro I would just make the point that of del Ponte said. course I accept that this is not a sole British responsibility and it is not chain of policy that could Q213 Sir John Stanley: Thank you. That policy is be adopted solely by the UK, but I would just make significantly worse than, for example, the policy the point that you do happen to have in post at the which is expressed in the Republika Srpska, when we moment a British General who is the KPC come to Bosnia and Herzegovina later, where, coordinator, and in a very significant role, and with though the record is a record so far within the the excellent and outstanding capabilities that we Republika Srpska of nil arrests of those indicted for have within the British Army, at all levels, we have a war crimes, at least there Government ministers say unique ability to start bringing about the sort of quite clearly, “Our policy is to try and find indicted change that I have been referring to. war criminals and bring them to arrest.” So the situation in Serbia is very much more serious and Mr MacShane: I have had very pleasant very much more worrying. The question I must put conversations with Major General Freer both in my to you, given the extreme seriousness of this, the oYce and in Pristina. He is a superb professional. As deplorable failure of the governments in Serbia even I say, we would like to see the Kosovo Protection to accept a policy of making eVorts to try and arrest Corps assume responsibility for more of its security those responsible and indicted for war crimes, why is problems inside the country, and in due course the British Government not taking sterner measures become a fully professional military unit. That is our against the Serbian Government in order to bring desire, but I would respectfully say to the Committee home to the Government of Serbia that this policy is that we would have to bring other allies and partners intolerable, unacceptable, and if adhered to holds along with it, and I cannot simply click my fingers out absolutely zero prospect of Serbia ever making and see something happening just because of progress towards international acceptance and Britain’s interest and involvement. acceptance within international organisations? Chairman: Now we will turn to Serbia. Mr MacShane: Again, Sir John, and I do not want to quote you what I have said on the record in much Q212 Sir John Stanley: Turning to Serbia and of the Serb media, these are the points I have been Montenegro as they are at the moment, I want to making consistently for three years. I entirely agree start with what was a very, very frank and disturbing with you. I say it out en clair not just in private report by Carla del Ponte, the Prosecutor of the discussions in Serbia. The Serbs say they want to International Criminal Tribunal for the former enter the Partnership for Peace, the waiting room, if Yugoslavia and what she said in her address to the you like, for joining NATO and of course they see United Nations Security Council a few days ago on themselves, and rightly so, as a great European 23 November. Talking about those indicted for war nation. Belgrade undoubtedly, with a brilliant crimes in this region she said to the UN Security population and a clever, educated people, has the Council, “The vast majority of them, probably more potential to be one of the great capital cities of South than a dozen, live freely in Serbia. Prime Minister Eastern Europe, but this wilful refusal to comply Kostunica has made it clear that he is not willing to with international law and the obligations of the arrest fugitives but only to try to convince them to Tribunal in The Hague represents an absolute surrender voluntarily.” I have to say that was not the concrete wall between them and their very policy which was expressed to us when we saw Prime reasonable EU ambitions. Just as similarly in Minister Kostunica ourselves, but first of all just for Croatia we have the other alleged war criminal the record, do you agree with Carla del Ponte that is Gotovina also accused—and I stress accused—of indeed Mr Kostunica’s policy, that he has explicitly very serious illegal activities not connected with the stated that he is not willing to arrest those who have military fighting period who is at large. I have been been indicted for war crimes and he is only prepared told again and again by top level Croatian to try to get them to give themselves up voluntarily? politicians in this Government and the previous one, Do you agree that is a fair statement of his policy? “We are on the point of getting him, we will try and Mr MacShane: I think that is a fair statement of the get him”, yet nothing ever happens. Even in Croatia general approach in Belgrade. I found it almost there is not a clear, express announcement that he is unbelievable to be in Belgrade a few weeks ago a wanted man, “We will arrest him, we are sending where I had a cup of coVee or something to eat with our best people to find him” and that order goes the Presidents and Prime Ministers I met and, had I right through the military and intelligence and chosen to, I could have taken a car and gone into a security apparatus. As Carla del Ponte said to the Ev 82 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
United Nations a couple of weeks ago, there are there must come a point when we review our policy networks linked to the Government in Croatia and decide talking is not going to get us anywhere protecting Gotovina. That too is unacceptable. We and consider whether there is any kind of incentive are nine months from the tenth anniversary of which would help this compliance? For the Srebrenica, 8,000 European citizens killed in cold Committee, and given we have to write a report blood because they were the wrong religion; far which analyses the UK Government policy and not worse than the numbers killed in the slaughters in give an historical narrative of what is going on out Lidici in Czechoslovakia or Oradour-sur-Glane in there—we have done all that—what can be done France, nearly as many killed in Khatyn, crimes that other than more hand-wringing and doing it every European knows about, and yet those accused collectively? of having some connection or responsibility for Mr MacShane: I do not think we hand-wring. I was those crimes are not being hunted down by the asked what my position was on compliance with The authorities, not being given up for arrest by those Hague and I had to give the Committee my best and supporting them. In the case of Croatia with most honest answer. I would report to the Gotovina, of course he is not involved in the Muslim Committee, I see in Serbia, and with the election of massacres but if we do not say, “Gotovina must be the current generation of leadership, certainly, a V in The Hague” we take the pressure o Croatia, and much more outward looking and a more European- if we ignore Gotovina naturally the Serbs in Serbia orientated leadership collectively. I think the mood will say, “You let Gotovina go, don’t talk to us is changing in certain political circles in Serbia. about finding Karadzic and Mladic”, and that will Equally, there are always those who want to return mean the entire Muslim world saying, “Europe does to the past, but the contacts I have with Serbian not give a damn about the mass slaughter of interlocutors is more positive. I used to knock on Muslims if it is carried out by Christian generals”. I doors, go in and see people three years ago, frankly, find that wholly unacceptable and something the just to be received with stony faces and I assume deaf British Government I hope will never ever easily ears. Now, people understand there is a problem. countenance. They are not quite sure how to get to it and there are quite strong divisions—as you probably know from Q214 Chairman: Minister, how do you explain the your visits—between diVerent elected leaders apparent contradiction between what Carla del holding ministerial oYce there. That is precisely why Ponte says about Croatia and the level of co- we are seeking to oVer incentives. It is carrot as well operation in this report to the UN and what she said as stick. earlier in respect of the degree of co-operation which led to the UK lifting its veto on the progress of Croatia in the European Union? Q216 Ms Stuart: What are those incentives? Mr MacShane: I express the view we are guided by Mr MacShane: Clearly, the most important ones what the ICTY Tribunal says. This is also the view remain agreements with the EU that allow the Serb the European Union agreed at its council statement economy to develop. We have had a British army in June. I am not setting up the British Government oYcer working in the Serb Ministry of Defence, to position, and what I said earlier about Srebrenica try and say: “Look, this is the way you can get closer and massacres was a strongly-held personal view. to Partnership for Peace” and to encourage our very What I assume, and it is not for me to discuss these high level of contact. I can report to the Committee, matters with the Prosecutor, Mrs del Ponte, is that, for what it is worth, I have spent far more time in like me, she talked to the newly elected government Western Balkan capitals than I have in most other in Croatia and accepted their assurances they were capitals of European Union Member States. As doing everything they could to find Gotovina. Those Minister for Europe, Belgrade and Pristina have assurances, by the way, were on the record and were seen a lot more of me than Lisbon or Helsinki, public, so I am not accusing anybody of bad faith. whether that is good or bad I do not know, but we Since she made that statement in the spring the have been very active, hands-on, trying to work our momentum seems to have stopped, there have been way through this. Now we are focusing on the key reports of Mr Gotovina being seen in Croatia in the indictees. We are not saying every sergeant or summer, there is one town in the country, Zadar, lieutenant accused of some bad behaviour needs to which openly walks around with his picture on their be in The Hague, those can be dealt with locally. We t-shirts and so on, and I think Mrs del Ponte has have considerably narrowed down, in the three years exactly the same disappointment I have. I have been Minister, what we are asking of the Serbs, but I think there is an irreducible minimum on Q215 Ms Stuart: Minister, you give a very good the question of the indictees and it is the principal analytical, pessimistic view of the world out there blockage at the moment. It is felt very strongly in but this is the British Government. If you have been other European capitals. It is not just London, it is on record for three years saying it is unacceptable felt very strongly in Washington, at the UN and in and Serbia is falling increasingly behind in both the New York. SA14 Agreement and Partnership for Peace—and incidentally also Milosevic is playing the stage which makes Serbia feel even more of a victim—surely Q217 Ms Stuart: Is there anything you can say specifically on this Stabilisation and Association 14 Stabilisation and Association Agreement. progress, where they have fallen behind and where Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 83
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce we can give some positive support to allow them to Ms Pierce: 2009. go on their journey? I still do not understand what it Mr MacShane: That is what they are hoping for and is we are doing. I think they can achieve that. I am saying that by the Mr MacShane: We are seeking to negotiate end of this decade, if Serbia were to comply fully agreements, protocols on trade, customs and other with ICTY and help us solve Kosovo, I see no reason sectorial policies particularly to allow Serbia and why Serbia should not be knocking on the door of Montenegro to grow together. Do not forget the both NATO and the EU by the end of this decade. relationship that Serbia and Montenegro have is a It needs a diVerent approach from Belgrade and product of very strong EU engagement down there. there is not one thing that London, Brussels or The European Union has put in about 10 million Washington can do, that needs to happen from euros-worth of EU funds from CARDS15 funding16. within the countries themselves. We have given them a preferential trading Chairman: That is important. agreement on sugar, which is sensitive in bits of the sugar producing industry elsewhere in Europe. We, V Q221 Andrew Mackinlay: I can only speak for as the British Government, are funding di erent myself because I have not discussed it with other projects. We are helping out with the independent colleagues, but the impression I got was that the media. The British Council is extremely active in Federation of Serbia-Montenegro was a wholly Belgrade and I pay tribute to their work. Believe me, artificial rump state. To a large extent it was a fiction. I have hunted high and low in the toolbox that I have The reality is that for many years the United for something that unlocks this because I want this Kingdom and other Western countries gave a de part of Europe to grow to its economic potential, facto recognition to Montenegro and the then and certainly the full rights as European citizens we President Djukanovic. They have an economy based all enjoy for very a clever, highly educated and, I upon the euro and they have an audience, probably think, profoundly constructive and peaceful people. rightly, in London and elsewhere because you have to deal with them as they are de facto a government. Q218 Ms Stuart: It is helpful to have that on the This struck me—I think you portrayed it a few record. moments ago when you almost proudly said: “What a wonderful thing we have done to hold Serbia and Mr MacShane: We still have these terrible political Montenegro together”—as being crazy. One thing is blockages there and I am afraid with the best will almost a racing certainty that in two years time and a lot of energy and, frankly, probably more Montenegro is going to be independent. I want to presence from a British Minister in the last three conclude on this. In fact, that could be the unlocking years than any minister from any other European mechanism for a lot of these things because it could capital, we cannot get those blockages simply be that country could be fast-tracked into the removed from the piping, so that the good Serbia European Union. It is small to absorb and has an and the good Croatia—and I believe the leaders I economy comparable to Malta or potential Malta meet want the good Croatia and the good Serbia— and so on. Also, that would mean it would probably can start to flow freely in the direction of European be easier to unlock Kosovo from Serbia and do integration. Serbia a favour by indicating the carrot of the Ms Pierce: Chairman, if I may add one point to that. European Union membership. That seems to me to I think, picking up on the Minister’s irreducible dissolve the final rump of Yugoslavia and probably minimum, once that irreducible minimum is past— would be beneficial to all three. You commended our and it is chiefly Karadzic, Mladic and a constructive previous report and in our previous report we regional approach—we, as the British Government, expressed concern about—I am not sure what words would be prepared to try and fast-track Serbia we used—the fact that there was no diplomatic through some of the EU and NATO mechanisms. representation in Podgorica, and again, I think my Mr MacShane: I can see Serbia and Croatia in the colleagues were horrified that although there was a EU by the end of this decade. highly professional, dedicated and talented locally- engaged member of staV in Podgorica there was no full-time diplomat. It seemed to us that was Q219 Chairman: Croatia will come in anyway. foolhardy in the extreme. It meant we were not Mr MacShane: Croatia is waiting for a date to start building up credits with what is probably highly negotiations which is linked to ICTY. Even if likely to be an independent Montenegro in a little negotiations on Croatia were to start soonish, it still while. It contrasted with other European major requires the normal negotiating period. players and, also, in terms of a listening post and the traditional job of a diplomat it could not be done Q220 Chairman: Croatia is rather hoping to be a adequately from Belgrade. What say you? member by 2008. Mr MacShane: If you go back to your report, Mr Mackinlay, which I do not have quite by heart, so I 15 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development have it here to refresh my memory, you say that the and Stability. United Kingdom Government and press on 16 Note by witness: Between 1991 and 2006 the EU will have Montenegro and Serbia say that isolation is not an provided nearly ƒ10 billion to the whole of the Western Balkans through CARDS funding. Of this, the EU provided option and European integration would depend approximately ƒ230 million to Serbia and Montenegro in on neighbourly co-operation and integration. I 2004. think Mr Solana, who principally brokered the Ev 84 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, took no longer far away places of which we know nothing, heart from those recommendations. I fully accept and the classic diplomatic post is not necessarily the that there are voices in Montenegro that call for a only way in which to stay in touch with a country. split. One thing I have really learned in the three On the issue of Serbia and Montenegro being a years of dealing with the Western Balkans fiction, that may be of interest to the new ministerially is that there are no racing certainties ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro who has except that next year there will be a lot of problems taken up the post here who is a Montenegrin. On the that have not been solved. I am not quite sure I issue of saying they are coming into the EU would say that a split and a diVerent state of tomorrow, I have to say as delicately as I can that Montenegro was that fast around the corner but if there is a huge crime problem in Montenegro. If you they vote for it, that is their business. We opened a talk to Italian colleagues you will find that concerns British oYce in Podgorica last year, we have a very, them greatly, so the notion that Montenegro is a very good person down there and our ambassador little Switzerland or a little Luxembourg which can travels regularly, and we have very good links. I have join the EU tomorrow is not something which to say that no one in three years of visiting the region anybody in the rest of Europe would accept. So it has said to me they want somehow a sub-embassy or does not unlock all of the other problems. It is not more than we have in Montenegro. for me to pre-judge what the Montenegrins decide to do with Montenegro over the coming years, but we Q222 Chairman: Before Mr Mackinlay comes back have worked as hard as we can as Britain and as on this, why is there no person UK-based in Europe and the international community to make Podgorica. the most and best sense of that relationship. Mr MacShane: It is simply a question of resources. Chairman: Before we go on to Bosnia, Sir John has We have a locally-engaged person and sometimes I a question. find our locally-engaged staV are completely loyal to HMG— Q225 Sir John Stanley: If Montenegro in 2006 votes for independence in the referendum, will the British Q223 Chairman: There is no doubt about their Government accept the result? loyalty. Mr MacShane: Yes. I do not see that we are going to Mr MacShane:—speak the language fluently— do anything other than accept that result. The terms of that independence will have to be defined in Q224 Andrew Mackinlay: That is not an issue, relation to Serbia but I cannot imagine the British Minister. I could not have commended her more Government as it were saying that Montenegro highly, so that is agreed ground, but there is a world cannot have its independence, and there will be of diVerence. It does not matter if she was the UN questions to answer. It depends what its Archangel Gabriel, she is not a British diplomat and constitutional arrangements are, whether it respects there does need to be someone there. Our colleagues European norms and values. I do not want to say in the European Union do have diplomatic independence on any terms, declared by any faction representation there and also, you have avoided this, which can get a majority vote in the plebiscite. There our report—and I am not saying you have to accept are a lot of qualifiers to it but there is nobody in our report but you commended it—pointed out Britain saying, “Under all circumstances, under all to you four years ago that there should be conceivable future scenarios, the only future state we representation there. We are saying to you that it is will accept is a merged Serbia Montenegro.” There madness them not being there. I hear what you say is nobody in Belgrade who argues that and nobody about the future but it is frankly highly likely that in Montenegro who argues that, it will depend on Montenegro will be de jure independent but de facto developments. it is independent. The thin tissue which holds Serbia Montenegro together is a fiction—never mind what Q226 Sir John Stanley: Minister, at one of our the great Mr Solana says—it really does not exist. meetings in Belgrade, one of our senior meetings, the The Foreign Minister of the Federation can say view was put to us that there was a rising tide of what he likes but it does not commit Prime Minister Milosevic sympathisers within the police and the Djukanovic, it is independent. So why not face the armed forces. Is that the perception of the British facts and also look upon it as an unlocking Government? mechanism? Mr MacShane: Not speaking Serbian, not talking to Mr MacShane: To answer the three or four separate every level of the hierarchy in the country, I points there, the Committee’s report in 2001 said genuinely cannot say. I am not ducking the question. that we should have a permanent post in I have not had that report directed to me. Clearly, Montenegro and we have established that, I accept Mr Milosevic plays on a lot of nationalist sympathy not with an English-born diplomat, but this is a and sentiment in Serbia. I see the Serbs trapped serious question of resources and perhaps the almost in a triple victimhood—a victim of the old Foreign AVairs Committee will be taking evidence Communist regime, a victim of Milosevic, a victim about the problems of resourcing the FCO at the as they see it of the NATO intervention—and now moment. I am personally happy that I get all the perhaps a fourth victim, a victim of the appeals Mr reporting I need as a minister on what is happening Milosevic makes on television from the ICTY in Montenegro from our people down there. A lot of Tribunal. Our job I think is to invite our friends in Montenegrins come through London and these are Serbia to release themselves from that straitjacket Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 85
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce and conceive of a better and diVerent future. I can Q232 Chairman: We have Bosnia and Herzegovina only make that appeal and again everything I say to to deal with. First on Bosnia, the Committee took the Committee I assure you I have said on the record oral evidence in public from Lord Ashdown, and I and in private regularly in Belgrade. I just wish every must say there was widespread commendation of the other European government—and I do not mean to work of Lord Ashdown when we were in Bosnia, criticise any of our partners—and every other that he and others see the process as a reduction of European parliament was engaged as solidly as this his powers, do you accept this? How should this Committee is, and I hope the Foreign OYce is under reduction be brought about? Jack Straw and the work I carry out. Mr MacShane: Lord Ashdown has always said he wants to be the last High Representative and Secretary to the UN and the EU Special Q227 Ms Stuart: I am very happy to have a written Representative. We certainly would like to see that answer to this because it may be slightly technical. happen. I have now been able to meet Bosnia Given the current constitutional arrangements and and Herzegovinian defence ministers—a defence if the European constitution were to be accepted, minister certainly could not have existed before presumably there would be a new position on the Lord Ashdown arrived there—and we want to see as acknowledgement of independence following a much state administration in place as possible. referendum. Would the UK Government still be Ms Pierce: May I add to that on the Bonn Powers actually able on its own to accept the independence particularly? They exist in two respects, one in or would it be bound by a European Union decision? respect of allowing Lord Ashdown to remove Mr MacShane: No, the Treaty which is now on the obstructionist oYcials and ministers— table, as you know, the relevant CFSP clause, says that no foreign policy position can be adopted save on the basis of unanimity. Q233 Chairman: The Berlin Accord? Ms Pierce: Yes.—and one in respect of imposing legislation. Over the past couple of years Lord Q228 Ms Stuart: No, the overall policy is by Ashdown has reduced to virtually nil the amount of unanimity and then the precise decisions will be by legislation he imposed. You know that following the QMV17. Take my word for it. decision in June that Bosnia was not ready for PfP19, Mr MacShane: With respect— he exercised his Bonn Powers to remove 59 RS Ms Stuart: I really would like this in writing. obstructionist oYcials. In our view, the removal powers are likely to be necessary for quite a while, Q229 Chairman: Minister, do write to us on that. not least because that is a guarantee, if you like, that Mr MacShane: You do not have a CFSP18 position Bosnia can keep making progress moving forward. unless it is agreed with unanimity. The Notwithstanding that, there may be some implementation of it could be carried out on QMV circumstances about to arise in which the only way but since any state has bilateral state relationships by to get certain legislation through Parliament might definition—unless the EU of 25 agrees they will be imposition, particularly in respect of some of the recognise Montenegro or recognise State X or Y if economic legislation, but Lord Ashdown will use it an island pops up in the middle of the Pacific—then sparingly and we would support that split between Britain has its own bilateral diplomatic relations. removals and imposition.
Q234 Chairman: Thank you for that clarification. Q230 Ms Stuart: Because the obverse of that would Minister, the Dayton Agreement imposed on Bosnia be that Greece could scupper the acknowledgement what must be one of the most complicated structures of, say, Macedonian independence in a recognition which any country could suVer. How do you see that by the EU, could it not? being changed, although it may, I concede, reflect Mr MacShane: Mr Chairman, I do not know if my the ethnic realities on the ground? hon. friend was here last week when we had the Mr MacShane: I come to this from a slightly evidence on Cyprus, but it seemed to cause outrage diVerent perspective, Mr Chairman, perhaps derived to certain members that the European Union could from having lived and worked for many years in not impose its collective view and allow direct flights Switzerland where you have nearly two dozen prime to Cyprus, and I made the point that certain ministers, two dozen diVerent police systems, members of the Committee were those who were the education systems, other ministers all proclaiming most strenuous in upholding national vetoes. What pretty autonomous rights and a certain amount of is a national veto for Britain is a national veto for power seceded to the Swiss Confederal level. I am Greece or anywhere else. also nervous of the notion that somehow the fewer elected and accountable people there are the better. Q231 Ms Stuart: I really would appreciate having I am not in favour of just one or two elected that in writing. Not on the current situation but on politicians and the rest of them are all bureaucrats. the text of the— Dayton was very complicated but let us also Mr MacShane: On the current Treaty? acknowledge that under Dayton Bosnia Ms Stuart: Yes. Herzegovina has been able to come to an increasing modus vivendi where, certainly under Lord 17 Qualified Majority Voting. 18 Common Foreign and Security Policy. 19 Partnership for Peace. Ev 86 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
Ashdown’s leadership, we have seen a lot of Q238 Andrew Mackinlay: I accept that. progress. The killings are not happening, there is Mr MacShane: That has happened in the last couple greater integration between the communities— of years. I can foresee progress in other areas. I do much more with the Bosnia Croat community I not want to go into other countries. I have just accept than with the Serb community—and if there finished reading Robert Carey’s biography of is political will in Bosnia Herzegovina right through Lyndon Johnson in the Senate and the speeches the three communities then I think quite swift strides about states’ rights and that no federal authority can be made. I was just one personal witness of the would tell the state of Alabama or Georgia what it transformation of Sarajevo in three years, which was could do inside its own state area were quite Bosnian quite remarkable. It was a very shabby, shell- in their intensity in the 1950s, but things move on. marked, bullet hole-pocked, rather run-down city in 2001, and it has become a lot neater, has a lot more new buildings, is looking a lot brighter in 2004. Q239 Andrew Mackinlay: Let us move on to the problems. Clearly, the fact is that the Republika Srpska is not complying or collaborating with Q235 Chairman: I understand in this relatively small ICTY. Is that going to be an impediment for the country there are about 1,400 ministers. I am sure whole of the rest of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina Switzerland does not quite run to that. On the next and perhaps its aspirations to join the European area, you have described the complicated structure; Union and other international institutions? You do you think that structure in itself would be a cannot have Srpska holding back the rest, can you? barrier to eventual EU entry? Mr MacShane: I think Lord Ashdown is moving Mr MacShane: I do not think the present forward to get police reform through on the basis of constitution is as EU friendly or compatible as one the constitutional settlement under Dayton. This should wish. Also, we have got to be careful to say complicated cantonal federalistic system was the that the EU has got a model constitution which price for walking out of Dayton and stopping the countries have to adopt. fighting and I think it was a price worth paying. Certainly, you are right to say that one of the Big Q236 Chairman: Belgium. Three of the wanted ICTY indictees, Karadzic, is Mr MacShane: I was trying to do the sums in my not being adequately chased, hunted down and head, but I am afraid I failed that 1898 entrance test sought for by the Republika Srpska authorities. into King Edward’s school that was in the papers the What we have said, very clearly, and this is accepted, other day. There is one elected oYcial for every 300 is that we will only deal with one state level US citizens, so I was desperately trying to work out authority. The fact that a bit of Bosnia-Herzegovina what 300 into 250 million was. I think that is scores or a region or an area or one community has not got of thousands of elected oYcials. the problems with ICTY that those Serbs protecting Chairman: Point made. Karadzic, have does not mean they get to join PfPor get onto an EU track. Clearly, we have said, and that is the position of the entire international community Q237 Andrew Mackinlay: The point is not accepted irrespective of what positions people started from or by me because, as both of you have raised Belgium where they are today, that there is one country, one and the United States, one thing you have is sovereign UN recognised Republika called Bosnia- constitutional symmetry. In this particular Bosnia- Herzegovina and that is what we would deal with. It Herzegovina you have not got that. You have got is the responsibility of all the people there, no matter the state which is deemed with broad foreign policy what their religion or ethnic background is, to accept aVairs, probably are not working well; see the the responsibilities of producing what the European United Nations. Then you have the semi- Union and the international community wants. autonomous Republika Srbska which has domestic functions that we are familiar with around the world, in states, provinces and even in Scotland. But Q240 Andrew Mackinlay: It is perverse, is it not? The when you come to the rest of the state, you have state level may have a policy, as the Croatian these numerous cantons—a bit of a misnomer—and Government has got, of saying: “We wish to comply the federation level. That cannot possible endure, with ICTY”. The rest of the country, that is at the can it? It cannot be conducive to state building, it federation level—for what it is worth—and all the cannot be conducive to commerce, it cannot be cantons say: “Hear, hear”, but they cannot deliver conducive to mobility of labour and freedom of compliance by Srpska. Therefore, are you movement, all of which are essential ingredients to suggesting that forever and a day the rest should be the European Union. I understand the necessity and held back? arguably it has worked rather well. It has brought Mr MacShane: This is the argument. You some peace, but in terms of progress the constitution mentioned Croatia and those who say, “Just because is going to mean that things could just stand still we cannot establish authority over all state and fossilise. structures, the EU should not worry about this”. I Mr MacShane: I do not entirely agree with that. I do reject that. I think if, as Carla Del Ponte said, cite the example of defence where a state ministry government-linked networks are supporting an and an integrated military structure are coming ICTY indicted gentleman, then the government as a into being. whole has to ensure its authority runs, not just from Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 87
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce prime ministers and foreign ministers talking to Q243 Ms Stuart: Again, for the record. Are there ministers in other European capitals, but right down any practical steps the United Kingdom could take to the lowest level of state authority. to help Bosnia-Herzegovina in their desire to join NATO and the EU in terms of providing a carrot to Q241 Andrew Mackinlay: As in Cyprus. Could you comply with them and what are practical vetoes you not have some situation where you recognise or think the Committee should take into account for encourage the acquis to be applied where it can? I am our report? I am very happy to take that in writing not talking about full membership of the European to give us more time to move on to Macedonia. Union, but at least there should be some advance for Mr MacShane: We will provide you with a note on geographical, ethnic and multi-ethnic areas that that. wish to collaborate for advancement in terms of Europe. Q244 Sir John Stanley: Minister, there is a great deal Mr MacShane: We are focusing on creating state of comment about the inadequacy and ineVectual structures and Lord Ashdown has made a big nature of international interventions. Indeed, in contribution to that. Clearly, within that there is certain places some argue they have been positively leeway on whether it is economic relations, trade, damaging and resulted in worse states than were travel or financial support in which there is more found. Would you agree that as far as Bosnia- carrot than there is stick. Also, we think that the Herzegovina is concerned the nine years’ worth of Federation could do more to create a climate within international interventions, since the civil war has which the Republika Srpska understands its duties finally been brought to a halt, has been a truly to do more to help meet ICTY obligations. I do not remarkable achievement in a country where, if you want to give any indication that there is any thought translated the deaths into British terms, it would be by the British Government of a kind of repartition of the equivalent of six to seven million people in this Bosnia-Herzegovina by separating the country into country being massacred in a civil war? Here we are those that are EU compliant and those that are not. nine years on in which the three communities are It is a state as a whole and the state must also accept living peacefully together and working co- its responsibilities. operatively in a wholly recognisable democratic state. Given that achievement, do you agree or not Q242 Andrew Mackinlay: Generally, it is unclear that it would be very dangerous and possibly at risk what carrots there can be for the Republika Srpska of throwing everything away if the international to collaborate because purely in terms of community and possibly the British in particular, administration it is a successful political unit in having played such a very significant role in Bosnia- terms of delivering domestic services, health, Herzegovina, left too prematurely? housing, education, et cetera. I think that is not Mr MacShane: Very much so. There is a desire, as I disputed, but there is no incentive for them to said, to “de-UNMIKise” Kosovo and to “de- collaborate with ICTY and to recognise its EUFORise” Bosnia. Certainly, Paddy Ashdown responsibility to the wider state of Bosnia- said he would like to be the last High Representative Herzegovina. and Special Representative, but I think those Mr MacShane: I do not agree with you, and I do not ambitions stated the commitment to stay the course think many people living in the Republika Srpska with our partners and it is very clear and very firm. feel that in economic terms, social advance, travel, trade and inward investment, they are living in a Q245 Chairman: Minister, we visited Macedonia particularly satisfactory part of Europe. The and we were there shortly after the referendum and incentive is the same as with their Serb neighbours in shortly after the United States had assisted in the Serbia or with their fellow BiH citizens, which is vote in the referendum by deciding to call Europe’s door just waiting to be opened, as is Macedonia “Macedonia”. When we were there it NATO’s, on the condition that they accept the was put to us that there is no precedent of one state obligations that we all do of fully accepting not being allowed to call itself what it wants. What international law. That is why Lord Ashdown has is the best case you can make to the Committee for been so active in removing extremists and trying to continuing to call Macedonia “the Former Yugoslav ensure that the old militaristic structures, which Republic of Macedonia”? certainly deliver a certain minimum level of services, Mr MacShane: I do not and I do not think anybody are civilianised and democratised. It is uphill work. does. We all call it Macedonia, but as you know, the Again, I have to say on the record, I do not want to Greek Government has a very strong view that does give any encouragement to people, whether in not accept this name. I suspect it is a question you Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar or any of the main would have to put to representatives of the Greek cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that there is even a Government. scintilla of possibility of thought in the British Government’s mind or any Government’s mind—to my knowledge—of any kind of diVerentiation in Q246 Chairman: With respect, I put the question to terms of access to the EU between the diVerent you. Slovenia, for example, within the EU, calls it elements of the state for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Macedonia. Greece has impaled itself and has set Chairman: I would like to move on. I know Ms itself for over 10 years on this. What is the best case Stuart and Sir John have questions again on Bosnia- you can say for not proceeding to call Macedonia Herzegovina. “Macedonia”? Ev 88 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
Mr MacShane: Exactly the same problem—not Q249 Chairman: Of course, Greece is a friend, but problem—that we have in saying that in they have impaled themselves on this absurdity. international treaty law in the EU and in NATO Why can we not, together with other key members, each country has a de facto veto. In those France and Germany, call it an absurdity? international fora Greece can say: “The only terms Mr MacShane: Chairman, perhaps unimpaling under which we will accept the participation or people is something of a Transylvanain pastime. I presence of Macedonia is if it is under the title of am not good at it. As I say, very serious diplomats, FYROM”. At the meeting I was at last Monday in and this is true of the PASOK20 Socialist Brussels, the Macedonian Foreign Minister was Government, it is true now of the new democracy, there and I had a very useful discussion with her. I the Conservative Government under Mr am sure in discussing Macedonia with any one of my Karamanolis and the authorities of Skopje, are colleagues I refer to Macedonia. When she sat down talking in a UN framework. I can think of nothing with a little label in front of her it said FYROM. more likely to derail that process than any unilateral That would be true for the United States when they statement from the United Kingdom beyond what I sit down in NATO, it will be under FYROM, and have said. Our Americans friends, when they sit when the United States sits down at the United down with Macedonia in the context of the UN, Nations, it will be under FYROM. On a recent visit NATO or if it is a joint meeting with the EU, will find to Skopje I was very pleased to get the reports. There that the name badge for the country is that which were discussions under the UN auspices between our Greek partners insist on for the time being. Athens, Skopje and New York on trying to find a Chairman: For the time being, as long as there is a way out of this problem, but there are profound term. passions in Greece and I would not underestimate them. I think it is too easy to sit here in London, click your fingers and say: “This position should be Q250 Ms Stuart: When the Chairman moved on to accepted” or “That position should be accepted”. As Macedonia, he made reference to the dramatic far as I am concerned, and certainly, when I write a American intervention to swing the referendum. Of letter, I talk about Macedonia or the Republic of course there are some of us who like the alternative Macedonia, but at international gatherings where version, it was your visit and a demonstration of the the Greek Government is represented, and was there watch that really swung the Macedonian vote. We before Macedonia arrived, Macedonia sits with its talk about EU membership and my colleague, Mr partners as FYROM. Mackinlay, made reference to this. We will hold the EU Presidency at a time when very crucial negotiations for Macedonia’s EU membership will come in, and similarly, its aspiration to join NATO. Again, are there any practical steps which the United Q247 Andrew Mackinlay: During the British Kingdom is taking to facilitate the speedy process of European Presidency, in a year’s time, when you are both EU and NATO membership? the host and you are in the driving seat, how will you Mr MacShane: The British Government is flag it up? financially supporting the European Integration Mr MacShane: I would treat the rules on that the OYce of the Macedonian Government. Also, we are same as in NATO and the UN. Certainly, I am not providing a series of public administration reform going to go unilaterally against the United Nations, aides in the area of the general secretariat and the NATO or the rest of my Union partners. public administration reform unit in the civil servants’ agency. Via NATO, we have a senior adviser in place to advise a defence reform of future NATO integration. Obviously, Macedonia’s very Q248 Chairman: Even if the UK was not to proceed positive ambition to aim for the EU is something unilaterally, what argument do you see against, for that Britain supports and welcomes. I would say that example, the EU Three braving these passions, the referendum result there was a very positive and which you have mentioned, by going ahead and mature signal from the citizens of Macedonia and deciding to call Macedonia “Macedonia”? that that is where there own aspirations are, but of Mr MacShane: As I say, Chairman, every time I read course, full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria a paper, have a conversation or hear an interview in is necessary for Macedonia, as for any other Germany, France or any other European country, country. We want to see the full implementation of Macedonia is called “Macedonia”. Not speaking the Ohrid Framework Agreement. That referendum Greek, I am not sure what the usage is there. Can we process, as we know, was designed to derail it, but it express a hope, as I do, that very serious and mature is an example of how Ohrid has not yet fully diplomats in Athens and Skopje can find a solution embedded itself in the hearts and minds of all of to this problem. We are not going to go against a Macedonia’s political class. We want to see more powerful EU partner like Greece. I am sorry, Britain progress on the SAA, the Stabilisation Association is not unilaterally going to say that if this is that Agreement, and in particular on opening up the important to Greece, even if we do not agree with it, economy, judicial reform, corruption and organised we know better and the Greeks have got no rights in crime and these remain serious areas. I am this regard. It is a passionate problem in Greece and cautiously optimistic about Macedonia because I we have to have some respect for our Greek colleagues, partners and friends as well. 20 Panhellenic Socialist Movement. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 89
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce think the two communities there, Macedonia and others, that each nation state member of the EU has Albania—despite the tensions that we know got certain rights, one of which is to express a veto about—have repeatedly walked back from the brink on this particular nomenclature. It is not really for and, also, are witness to the international me, and certainly it is not helpful for me, to be community’s involvement there since the first disobliging about Greek colleagues. As I say, I hope President Bush mandated troops under the UN back the solution can be found, whether it is through in 1990, I think. We travel and deal regularly with spelling or pronunciation. There is another row leaders and have very positive relationships with bubbling up on whether the euro can be spelt with a them. They have suVered terrible blows with the loss “v” in some Slavonic countries, which Mr Trichet of of their president in that ghastly plane crash in the European Central Bank is very exercised with. Mostar in the winter of this year. I attended the Perhaps that is evidence from the Treasury Minister funeral and I was very struck at the maturity of all that you need on that problem. I have to say the communities there. In a funny way, of all the Macedonia by any other name would smell as sweet. countries in the regions it does not have an ICTY What is in a name? It is of great importance for two problem, thank goodness. I hope, with the help of countries that we have good relations with. You the very able diplomatic brilliance of Greece and want me to be a Solomon and come down just on one good will all round, perhaps the main problem could side? As I said, I would be very happy with that be solved and they can move forward in the other position. It is the same position de facto despite areas with a lot of encouragement and help from, announcements that have been made by the United certainly, the Government in London and the EU to States. We call it Macedonia in correspondence and fulfil their ambitions before too long. in discussions. If I have an interview on television or if I am in Macedonia or Greece I refer to Macedonia Q251 Ms Stuart: As they do not have the war crime or the Republic of Macedonia, but in international problem, they may be well ahead. If I could just leave institutions the name FYROM or the Former you with a thought, as we are leaving this, one of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is still used by thoughts for solving the problem of the name was Russia, the United States and any other country in that a solution on the spelling could be found. the international community. Mr MacShane: I have heard solutions about the pronunciation. I am trying to work out whether I Q253 Sir John Stanley: Can I turn to the other issue want to see the new film with Alexander the Great. I which is a feature of national sovereignty, which is would not add any other qualification to him, that a state should have clearly defined borders. Is whether there is guidance for us all out of the British Government able to help with what Hollywood! appears from the outside to be a pretty ludicrous dispute which we understand relates to just Q252 Sir John Stanley: Minister, I must just return approximately 200 hectares of uncertainty of border to this issue of the name because this is of such key between Macedonia and Kosovo? Can the British importance to these two countries, Macedonia and Government make a contribution to resolving that Greece. As of today, we now have three members of issue and getting that out of the way? the Security Council, the US, Russia and China, all Mr MacShane: A very good point. It is about 2,500 of whom, we understand, have recognised hectares with hardly anybody living on it. When I Macedonia as the correct constitutional name for have been down there I have asked to see the detailed that country. Surely it is the case that if the British maps. The dispute is not entirely clear to me, but I Government accepts that a sovereign country is think, as a nation that remembers some of these entitled to determine its own name, it must be the issues in curves and lines and the border between case that the British Government should be what then became Pakistan and India et cetera, becoming the forth member of the Security Council perhaps it is not something Britain should pile on to recognise Macedonia by its constitutional name. too much. What we have got is a working I have not heard an answer from you which gives any commission that UNMIK set up between degree of cogent reason as to why the British representatives from Macedonia, Pristina and Government should not make that move other than Belgrade. Of course, the original delineation was the unseen, unheard, unspoken one, which is that we between Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia must do nothing that could take us out of line with without any involvement by the Kosovans. There our fellow EU member countries. Is that what is are one or two Kosovan locals who say that the determining British policy on this point? border is not quite drawn right. Mr MacShane: Not at all, Chairman. We are at one with Russia, China and the United States. I must confess to the Committee, I did not know that Q254 Andrew Mackinlay: You used the word Russia and China had decided this policy and, Belgrade, is Belgrade the Federal Republic of certainly, I will check up on that with Greek and Serbia-Montenegro or just Serbia? other colleagues. At the UN they will sit down with Mr MacShane: The delineational border was Macedonia and they will have a label in front of between Serbia and Montenegro on one side—I use them called FYROM, ditto, NATO. We call it Belgrade de facto as a capital of the two—and Macedonia in correspondence and conversation, Macedonia, the authorities from Skopje. Since then but, yes, in the EU it is one of the rules, it may be Kosovan authorities have objected and we have a uncomfortable for some and very important for problem, but I would be very reluctant to say there Ev 90 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce is any problem in that part of world, which is minor international community and the UK were on top of and technical because goodness knows what could this in doing what they could to facilitate a more happen in the future. beneficial programme of privatisation. I am happy for that to be left to a written note. Q255 Andrew Mackinlay: I think the answer is yes. Mr MacShane: I am happy to send the Committee a Your colleague has said yes. detailed note on the economics of privatisation and Ms Pierce: I think they are state union oYcials, but what the UK involvement is there.22 What I would we will check. say is that of course Macedonia needs to send out enduring signals of stability. The one thing the Q256 Andrew Mackinlay: You see the point of me international investment community is frightened of asking because it goes to the heart of my earlier is being frightened and when the news out of question to the Minister? Macedonia is of conflict or referendums then they Ms Pierce: It was a FRY delineation, so it was run away. I should correct myself, Chairman, if you definitely a countrywide one. will let me put it on the record. I said that Macedonia was not involved with ICTY. Of course that is true in terms of the big ICTY area of operation on the Q257 Sir John Stanley: Just on the figure, maybe this wars of the 1990s, but there are five cases ICTY has went wrong in the translation or in my notes, but, shown an interest in relating to the crisis of 2001. very firmly, I have got down from the Macedonian You remember the summer of 2001 with the killings Foreign Minister a figure of merely 200 hectares, of ethnic Albanians in one or two countries, the but, Minister, we will take your figure as being kidnap and torture of civilian road workers and, of correct. If it is not correct would you let us know, course, the tragic death of a British solider there. otherwise, we are totally oV course? ICTY has still got an interest in those cases, but there Mr MacShane: Of course. I will have to write to you are no indictments as yet and I do not think you on this.21 could put Macedonia in the same category as the other countries. Q258 Andrew Mackinlay: The only other thing I Ms Pierce: May I add on privatisation and want to ask you is what we are doing to help judicial investment? Another problem, as well as stability, is reform in Macedonia? I imagine it is probably a lack that none of the Balkan countries have the sort of of agencies, presumably it is DFID or the laws that enable companies to protect their own V Department for Constitutional A airs, is it not? assets and that is something we encourage them to They were crying out for assistance and seemingly pass quickly. there was no one available to help? Andrew Mackinlay: Absolutely. I am grateful to Ms Mr MacShane: As I said earlier, generally we have Pierce for raising that. If you felt able to amplify on help from the Government, but certainly paid for that and not just on Macedonia, that would be out of the DFID budget on reform in public something you could also put in writing.23 administration. Also, we are helping the Macedonia Government to decide a new counter-insurgency Q260 Chairman: Minister, we have kept you in the public order unit because, as you can imagine, that field for a long time, but I have one final question on is quite a pressing law and order issue down there. NATO, if I may. Certainly, there seems to be a great We are supporting judicial reform because that is ground swell of support within NATO for both important in Macedonia and we are doing it through Macedonia and its two colleagues, Croatia and the OSCE. We have helped to organise seminars on Albania, in the Adriatic Three. In your judgment is alternative dispute resolution and, of course, DFID this support suYcient for there to be a realistic Y with the Foreign O ce, with the Ministry of prospect of the door to full NATO membership Defence, are all working collectively with other opening? I believe 2007 is the next possibility. international donors like US Aid to help Mr MacShane: I do not see membership on the Macedonia. immediate horizon.
Q259 Andrew Mackinlay: In fairness to the Minister, Q261 Chairman: Not in 2007? perhaps we could have a note from him on that. On Mr MacShane: Everything is possible. I think we the other side of the coin, similarly, privatisation had need a great deal of reforms from all the countries been somewhat botched. It would appear that there you have mentioned. We have not discussed Albania had been, not necessarily with any malevolence, in this hearing, but I think Albania has got a long privatisations to existing workers, laudable in intent, way to go. That is a matter for NATO authorities to as it were, but which did not attract foreign discuss, so I will not commit to a date today, but I investment. Again, I wonder if you could give us a really think we want to see a lot of reforms. You note as to a position statement on privatisation and mentioned Croatia, and I will end as I began, by how the United Kingdom-EU might be able to saying that we need to see Croatia as an authority improve on that? The evidence we had was that this over all levels of its military, security, political, had been a missed opportunity to the extent that the economic and civil society under the rule of law in privatisation had gone ahead, and I am making the the question of a gentleman, Mr Gotovina, accused assumption it was not exhausted, but it was not of very serious war crimes. attracting foreign investment, whether or not the 22 Ev 103 21 Ev 102 23 Ev 103 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 91
30 November 2004 Mr Denis MacShane MP and Ms Karen Pierce
Q262 Chairman: Minister, we have asked you for a ambition is there, they have got an excellent large number of notes, but on the question of NATO European integration oYce, as indeed they have in membership, perhaps there could be some indication Croatia. “Make my day, make the grade” is my of when the prospect of NATO membership is next message. discussed and, therefore, when there could be a Ms Pierce: May I just add, Chairman. At the possibility for Macedonia or the other two moment it is NATO policy not to set a target date for countries? the next wave of enlargement which, obviously, Mr MacShane: My colleagues in Macedonia encompasses the Adriatic Three. It is not just a continually ask to be considered and they have question of meeting the defence reform criteria, submitted an EU membership application earlier political conditionality is key which is one of the this year. Mr Prodi, the then President Prodi, reasons why targets dates are not being set. referred to it in the funeral oration he delivered over Chairman: Minister, Ms Pierce, thank you very the dead President. My view in every bit of the much indeed on behalf of the Committee. conversations is: “Yes, please do your best”. The
Supplementary written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce You asked for further information about what UNMIK, HMG and other international organisations are doing to combat human traYcking in Kosovo. 1. In recent years the turmoil in the Western Balkans and in Kosovo in particular, has provided a breeding ground for serious crime such as human traYcking. The countries of the Western Balkans have become both significant transit and source countries for illegal immigration into the EU. The UK is committed to combating human traYcking in the Balkan region and globally.
Human TraYcking: Overall UK Strategy 2. HMG strategy encompasses a wide range of actions, including prevention in source and transit countries, co-operation with international partners, strengthening UK domestic law, tackling criminals through intelligence and enforcement operations, clamping down on illegal working and supporting the victims of traYcking. 3. In 2000, Project Reflex, a practical multi-agency task force was established in the UK to tackle all forms of organised immigration crime. Led by the National Crime Squad, Reflex brings together all the key government agencies which are involved in this work, including the Immigration Service, the Home OYce, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, major police forces, the security and intelligence agencies and the FCO. Reflex quickly set up a network of over twenty Immigration Liaison OYcers, mainly in Europe, to work with other governments and authorities to disrupt and dismantle smuggling and traYcking gangs. Joint operational units have also been set up at Heathrow and Gatwick where Immigration Service oYcers work alongside police oYcers. 4. The FCO contributes to the work of Reflex by raising awareness abroad of the dangers of traYcking among potential victims and host country authorities, and by reporting on local trends. The UK has funded a range of projects in the Western Balkans which have helped to raise the capacity of local authorities to combat traYcking as well as to support its victims. These include: — an anti-traYcking witness protection and support project in Albania and a study on the role of women in the Albania Police Force; — provision of equipment for the Anti-Human TraYcking and Sexual OVences Unit in Bosnia; — provision of funding to enable selected Serbian police oYcers to attend an OSCE conference on human traYcking in Vienna.
International Conventions 5. The UK has ratified the key instruments that outlaw slavery—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Slavery Convention and the International Labour Organisation Conventions 29 and 105 on Forced Labour. We continue to promote their widest possible ratification and implementation. 6. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime came into force in September 2003. Two of the three Protocols designed to improve co`operation in the fight against migrant smuggling and traYcking in human beings associated with it have also come into force. While the UK has signed the Convention and its Protocols, there still remains some primary legislation to be put in place before the UK can go ahead with ratification. This will be done as soon as Parliamentary time allows. Ev 92 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
International Organisations 7. The UK also works to combat organised immigration crime through international organisations such as the EU, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations OYce for Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Many of these organisations also fund their own projects on human traYcking and smuggling. 8. Through the European Council’s Framework Decision on Combating TraYcking in Human Beings in 2002, the EU called on governments across the world to take concrete measures and to intensify co- operation aimed at prevention of people traYcking through to victim assistance.
Human TraYcking in Kosovo 9. In the past five years, Kosovo has become a major destination and transit country for traYcked women and girls forced into prostitution. The majority of these victims are traYcked from elsewhere in South East Europe, particularly Moldova and Romania. Passage into Kosovo is achieved primarily from Serbia as well as from Macedonia (from the UNMIK report: “Combating Human TraYcking in Kosovo—Strategy and Commitment”, May 2004)
UNMIK 10. In October 2000 IJNMIK established a TraYcking and Prostitution Investigation Unit (TPIU). The TPIU has regionally deployed Units, but is controlled centrally at the UNMIK Police Main Headquarters. Central control has facilitated the integration of the TPIU into the overall anti-organised crime establishment of UNMIK Police that incorporates other specialised units. The sharing of intelligence with the Central Intelligence Unit (CIU) and the Kosovo Organised Crime Bureau (KOCB) has enhanced the ability to track the movement of key organised crime operators and has enabled joint regional operations and other investigations by the specialised units in Kosovo. The Unit also works with UNMIK Border Police to intercept human traYckers and their victims at the various crossing points along the international border and administrative boundary line. 11. The TPIU’s responsibilities include intelligence gathering, assistance to victims of traYcking, and the identification of both traYckers and the establishments where illegal traYcking/prostitution activities are occurring. In addition, the Unit is responsible for the collation of evidence and full support for the prosecution services to close down the illegal establishments and bring the traYckers to justice. A further key role of the Unit is to maintain and update the UNMIK “OV Limits List” of businesses suspected of indulging in prostitution which is produced at the end of each month and is distributed to UNMIK and OSCE staV. 12. The TPIU currently has a strength of 26 international staV and 21 Kosovo police service staV. Although this is a large increase since the unit was established in October 2000 with 22 staV, HMG believes the resource provided to the unit is not suYcient and we are working closely with the UN to secure an increase. 13. UNMIK is taking steps to protect the victims of traYcking and seeks to ensure that proper assistance and rehabilitation is provided. At the beginning of 2002 the Department of Justice created a specialised “Victims Advocacy and Assistance Unit” (VAAU). The VAAU in collaboration with the TPIU aims to protect the victims of traYcking from further exploitation, as well as providing interpretation, psychological, medical and shelter support, regardless of any charges of prostitution or of illegal entry that may be pending against them. The VAAU maintains a database of potentially vulnerable foreign women working in a variety of businesses across Kosovo, to monitor and assist potential victims of traYcking. By the end of April 2004, 1261 names had been registered on the database.
NATO (KFOR) 14. For the first time in its history, NATO adopted a policy on Combating TraYcking in Human Beings at the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004. A key part of this policy is to ensure that all personnel taking part in NATO-led operations receive appropriate training to make them aware of the problem of traYcking, how it impacts on human rights, stability and security. The training also informs them of their own responsibilities in the field. NATO has an agreed implementation plan and is actively working to implement fully its policy. 15. NATO has a supporting role in tackling all forms of organised crime in both Bosnia and Kosovo, although this assistance must be consistent with its mandate and the means and capabilities of its forces. KFOR provides assistance to civil organisations responsible for tackling organised crime, such as the UNMIK TPIU, by the sharing of intelligence. Within this, the UK has been at the forefront of this support, as other nations’ constraints on the use of their forces do not allow military participation. The UK contribution to KFOR is a specialised unit, able to operate KFOR-wide and ideally placed to provide this assistance. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 93
Regional Co-operation 16. UNMIK have worked with a number of organisations to integrate its activities within wider regional initiatives. 17. In December 2003, the UK was heavily involved in putting in place an OSCE Action Plan to Combat TraYcking in Human Beings. The comprehensive Plan aims to address traYcking through prevention, prosecution of criminals, international assistance and protection of victims. A Special Representative, Helga Konrad, was appointed on 13 May 2004 to head a special unit within the OSCE. The OSCE runs projects in South Eastern Europe aimed at building legal and technical capacity and raising awareness of the problem whilst co-operating with other international organisations and domestic groups. 18. UNMIK have worked closely with the Stability Pact Task Force on TraYcking in Human Beings (SPTF). The SPTF is an instrument of co-ordination to encourage and strengthen the co-operation among the countries of South Eastern Europe. Although established in 2000, since May 2004 the task force has come under the auspices of the OSCE. 19. UNMIK have also established contact with the South East European Co-operation Initiative (SECI) Crime Centre in Bucharest. The SECI centre aims to serve as a co-ordinating hub for the transmission of information on crimes and criminals from one signatory state to another. The TPIU has initiated direct contact with police from the participating SECI states to share intelligence. UNMIK have also signed police co-operation agreements with all its neighbours.
UK Assistance 20. The UK currently has over 100 police oYcers in Kosovo, many of whom are attached to UNMIK’s specialist crime units. UK OYcers are trained in diversity and bound to a standard code of conduct. We are currently working on strengthening awareness of traYcking and gender issues on pre-deployment training courses. 21. The UK played a leading role in establishing the CIU in Kosovo and continues to provide a high proportion of its personnel (currently 12). The CIU was established within UNMIK Police and has been operational since April 2001. The CIU is staVed by 40 international intelligence specialists. The CIU develops intelligence based target packs and shares information with KFOR and Interpol. It has developed a detailed intelligence database on those individuals who head or play a major role in organised crime within Kosovo. 22. The UK has also invested more than half a million pounds to provide the Kosovo Organised Crime Bureau with surveillance and intercept equipment, which has played a key part in disrupting a number of criminal operations. The KOCB was created at the end of 2001 to serve as the operational arm of the CIU and develops intelligence into evidence for criminal proceedings.
Amnesty International Report 23. The Amnesty International Report of 6 May 2004 on human traYcking in Kosovo (“‘So does that mean I have rights’: Protecting the human rights of women and girls traYcked for forced prostitution in Kosovo”) was critical of UNMIK and KFOR’s eVorts to combat the problem. The report made a number of recommendations which the UK welcomes, though the majority of these reflect work already being planned or carried out by the UK, the EU, the UN and NATO. 24. UNMIK and KFOR have both emphasised that the report is based heavily on evidence from 1999–2001 and concentrates less on recent progress. According to UNMIK figures, in 2003 the TPIU conducted 2,047 raids, operations and bar checks directed at premises where traYcking in persons and/or prostitution activities were suspected. As a result of these raids 57 establishments were closed down and 60 people were charged for traYcking (as of May 04, of those charged, 16 had been convicted, 18 released and 26 were awaiting trial).
What more can be done? 25. Despite this progress more needs to be done. UNMIK recognise this and have identified a number of strategic activities for future anti-traYcking eVorts for the immediate and foreseeable future (these are set out in the UNMIK report “Combating Human TraYcking in Kosovo—Strategy and Commitment” published in May 2004). These measures include enhanced intelligence gathering and surveillance, public awareness campaigns, a whistle-blowing hotline, mandatory training for prosecutors and judges, as well as a greater emphasis on enhancing regional co-operation. The Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) with the close co-operation of UNMIK are currently developing an action plan to combat human traYcking which will clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved and will incorporate a monitoring mechanism for its implementation. Ev 94 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
26. The UK welcomes these measures and will continue fully to support the work of UNMIK and KFOR in tackling these abhorrent crimes. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 6 October 2004
Supplementary written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Current Situation 1. In June 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244) placed Kosovo under interim UN administration (provided by the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)), pending a process to determine its future status. UNMIK’s role since then has been to establish a secure environment with the assistance of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and build democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo. The goal is to build the conditions as set out in UNSCR 1244 within which Kosovo’s future status can be addressed. 2. UNSCR 1244 successive Special Representatives for the Secretary General set out that Kosovo must meet certain standards before its future status can be addressed in the so-called “standards before status” policy. Over the past 12 months, many in the region, the UN and wider international actors have come to see this policy as too static. There has been growing recognition within the international community that the status question cannot be left indefinitely. The violence this year (see below) further highlights that the uncertainty over Kosovo’s future status is a source of instability in Kosovo, and potentially throughout the region. In 2003, the UK was instrumental in drawing up a Contact Group initiative which sets a framework and timetable within which Kosovo could work to reach these “standards”. Endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as the Standards Review Mechanism in December 2003, this initiative provides for a formal review of Kosovo’s progress around mid-2005 (after the 2004 Kosovo Assembly elections). If suYcient progress has been made, then a process will begin to determine its final status in accordance with UNSCR 1244. If the review is negative, another date will be set for a further formal review. In the run up to mid-2005, reviews of Kosovo’s progress against the standards will be conducted by UNMIK in consultation with the Contact Group and other relevant parties on the ground, and reported to the UNSC by the UN Secretary-General in his quarterly reports on Kosovo. 3. On 17 March 2004, the worst violence since 1999 broke out in Kosovo after three Kosovo Albanian children were drowned after allegedly being chased into a river by Kosovo Serbs with dogs. Violent clashes in Mitrovica (North Kosovo) between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs triggered inter-ethnic violence elsewhere in Kosovo resulting in 20 fatalities (including both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs) and approximately 954 injured. Violence was also directed at UNMIK and, for the first time, KFOR. Our assessment is that the violence was not part of a wide pre-meditated strategy to target minorities or the international presence. Rather, extremists exploited an opportunity to mobilise people involved in demonstrations over the deaths of the children to co-ordinate further attacks across Kosovo. 4. The violence highlighted the growing frustrations of the citizens of Kosovo with the current situation, notably poor economic opportunities and lack of certainty about the future. As a result, the UN and the Contact Group concluded that while the international community should not be deflected by extremists from the policy of making a better society based around core standards, there were lessons it could learn to make international agencies’ work more eVective in Kosovo and address the violence’s underlying causes. Following consultations with the UN, the Contact Group now meets every six to eight weeks in Pristina to help maintain momentum on the ground in addressing the causes of the March violence and improving everyday life in Kosovo for all its citizens. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan commissioned a report into the violence and into the UN’s policy on Kosovo as set out in paragraph 11. 5. In September 2004, the Contact Group, in close consultation with the UN, issued a public statement re-aYrming the mid-2005 review date and the importance of standards implementation, particularly relating to minority security and representation [Annex A]. Furthermore it stated that the basis of any future settlement must include the promotion of security and stability in the Balkans where all people are free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger regardless of ethnic background, race or religion. The Contact Group also stated for the first time that a Kosovo built upon these foundations would not return to the situation prevailing before March 1999. The Contact Group will now hold consultations with the UN on the modalities of the Review.
Internal Politics 6. Under UNSCR 1244, the responsibility for governing Kosovo is shared between Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG, consisting of the President, the Assembly, the Government, and municipalities) and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) for Kosovo, currently Mr Soren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark). Under the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 95
of 15 May 2001 the areas listed under Chapter 8 (including foreign aVairs, security and protection of minorities) are reserved for the SRSG and the areas under Chapter 5 (including health, education, environment, spatial planning) are transferred to the Kosovo PISG. The SRSG “retains the authority to intervene” in Chapter 5 issues, for example by dismissing the Assembly if the rights of communities are not being fully protected. 7. The PISG is a grand coalition containing Ministers from the three main Kosovo`Albanian parties, the main Kosovo-Serb political coalition, and from other minority communities. Dr Ibrahim Rugova (Democratic League of Kosovo—LDK) is President of Kosovo; Dr Bajram Rexhepi (Democratic Party of Kosovo—PDK) is Prime Minister; and Professor Nexhat Daci (LDK) is Assembly Speaker. The three main Kosovo Albanian parties are the LDK (headed by Mr Ibrahim Rugova), PDK (headed by Mr Hashim Thaci) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK—headed by Mr Ramush Llaradinaj). All share the same principal goal of attaining independence for Kosovo. The main Kosovo-Serb political entity is Coalition Povratak (KP, headed by Dragisa Krstovic), which attempts to draw together the diVerent Kosovo-Serb interests and has strong links to Belgrade. 8. In the Kosovo-wide Assembly elections in November 2001, the LDK obtained 45.65% of the votes; PDK 25.7%; AAK 7.83% and KP 11.3%. Of its 120 seats, 10 are reserved for representatives of the Serb community and a further 10 for other non-Kosovo-Albanian communities. However the reserved seats do not prevent such communities from gaining extra seats (in 2001 Coalition Povratak won a total of 22). The next Assembly elections will be held on 23 October 2004. 9. Key challenges facing Kosovo and the international community include building confidence and reconciliation between the diVerent ethnic communities and creating the conditions for a multi-ethnic and tolerant Kosovo. The violence in March demonstrates that much work remains to be done. Establishing more representative and eVective local government to ensure that all Kosovo’s citizens participate in decision-making at diVerent levels and have equal access to essential services, is key. UNMIK has established a “Working Group of Local Government Reform”, which it co-heads with the PISG, and which has produced a Framework Document for the reform of Local Self-Government. The Contact Group, in close co-ordination with UNMIK, has oVered to support discussion between Belgrade and Pristina to take this forward. As part of this process, the Contact Group met with representatives from Belgrade in Vienna on 28 September 2004. Local government reform and security for Kosovo’s minorities was discussed with UNMIK, the Council of Europe and representatives of the PISG, who agreed to take Belgrade’s concerns into account. The Contact Group urged Belgrade to contribute to the Working Group on Local Government Reform which is continuing in Pristina. 10. In terms of Kosovo’s services, promising progress has been made in establishing a multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service (KPS) where 15.5% of oYcers represent minority communities. Progress has been slower on the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC—civilian emergency organisation) which has around only 4% minority representation (and few of these are Serbs).
International Engagement 11. UNMIK, headed by SRSG Jessen-Petersen who arrived on 16 August 2004, is the primary focus of the international civilian presence in Kosovo. Following the March violence, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) commissioned a report into the UN’s policy on Kosovo by Ambassador Kai Eide, the Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO. The report highlighted that the UN needed to pursue a more dynamic policy in Kosovo, in particular to address the Kosovo population’s frustrations over the economy and lack of PISG powers, and address the situation relating to minority representation, rights and security. The UNSG is currently considering its recommendations but both Ambassador Eide and SRSG Jessen-Petersen have highlighted these as priorities. The SRSG has stated his intention to make Kosovo’s institutions more eVective by transferring increased responsibility to the PISG alongside an intense local capacity building programme. The Contact Group supported these priorities in their public statement of 22 September 2004 and stated that it will put special focus on these areas in future reviews of Kosovo’s progress. 12. UNMIK retains the lead responsibility for law and order in Kosovo. An international police mission works closely with local oYcers from the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to support KFOR in providing security. Over 350 cases have been filed by local and international prosecutors in relation to the March violence. More than 270 people have been arrested and are being processed by the local judiciary. 80 have already been convicted of minor oVences. International Prosecutors are also handling 52 cases related to serious crimes, including judicial investigations into the 20 deaths. 13. KFOR is the international force responsible for establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo. Following the March violence, which highlighted weaknesses in KFOR’s response, NATO conducted a comprehensive lessons learned exercise. This highlighted that while reinforcements arrived with commendable speed and that this had a significant eVect in ending the violence, there were a number of areas where KFOR needed to improve its capabilities. We continue to push for implementation of these findings and some progress has been made in improving KFOR’s ability to respond to events similar to the March violence, such as removing national caveats on crowd and riot control. We must ensure that our military engagement is suYcient to continue to build on our past investment in the region, not least in the run up to possible future events such as Kosovo Final Status discussions, and is based upon requirements on the Ev 96 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
ground. Original plans were for KFOR to downsize from 17,500 to 10,000 during 2004, but following the March violence this will be reviewed after the October elections, and is unlikely to occur this year. Our ultimate aim remains to enable the region to ensure its own security whilst keeping partners and allies (particularly the US) engaged on the ground for as long as necessary.
Bilateral Engagement/Assistance 14. Bilaterally, and through our work with the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and other international organisations and NGOs, we continue to support eVorts to build a democratic, tolerant and stable Kosovo. In financial year 2002–03 the UK provided over £128 million of multilateral assistance to Kosovo and £2.9 million bilateral assistance. The EU funds change and reconstruction in Kosovo primarily through its regional aid programme CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation), which is designed to support the objectives of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAp). Between 2001 and 2003 the EU committed more than 336 million Euro through CARDS. The UK has long supported these commitments and contributes about 19% of total CARDS funding. 15. To help underpin security, the UK currently provides around 200 troops to KFOR deployed on specific tasks relating to extremists and organised crime. We also have over 100 police deployed in the UNMIK police mission in Kosovo, the majority of whom are performing an executive policing function. UK oYcers are also deployed in a training, mentoring and intelligence role. UNMIK’s ultimate aim is to train the Kosovo Police Service to a level where they can replace UNMIK in their current duties and meet European and international policing standards. Following the widespread civil unrest in March we are addressing the lessons learned to assist UNMIK Police and the KPS to respond more eVectively to public disorder. 16. High-level visits to Kosovo in recent years have included: Minister for Europe Dr Denis MacShane, as part of a regional tour in April 2004; the Commons Defence Select Committee in February 2004 and HRH the Princess Royal in February 2003. We have also hosted visits to the UK by Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning, Ethem Ceku in March 2004, the then SRSG Harm Holkeri in February 2004 and Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi in October 2003.
Annex A
Contact Group Political Directors’ statement following a meeting in the margins of UNGA on 22 September “The Political Directors of the Contact Group—Germany, France, Italy, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States of America, and representatives of the European Union—met the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Soren Jessen-Petersen, on 22nd September 2004 in New York to assess the situation in Kosovo and the way towards determining Kosovo’s future status as outlined in UNSC Resolution 1244. The Contact Group paid tribute to the Secretary-General’s initiative in commissioning the comprehensive Kosovo Report prepared by Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway and looked forward to the Secretary-General’s further consultations, which he initiated in his 20 September meetings. Welcoming the Eide Report, the Contact Group agreed with the Secretary-General that it provided an integrated and comprehensive strategy for Kosovo. The Contact Group discussed some principal goals which govern the further political process. Kosovo’s future, like that of the entire region, is as part of Europe. The basis of any settlement must include the promotion of security and stability in the Balkans. As the “Standards for Kosovo” document states, the future for Kosovo must be one in which all people, “regardless of ethnic background, race or religion, are free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger, and where there is tolerance, justice and peace for everyone”. The Contact Group’s attitude towards the future of Kosovo will depend heavily on the extent to which this statement matches the reality on the ground in Kosovo, particularly in regard to Kosovo’s Serb and other non-Albanian communities. The emergence of such a Kosovo will contribute to moving the Western Balkan region towards European integration. These indicators mean that Kosovo would not return to the situation prevailing there before March 1999. The Contact Group expects concrete progress on decentralisation in Kosovo. In this context, the Contact Group supports the Framework Document for the Reform of Local Self-Government in Kosovo of 19 July. It also supports UNMIK and the PISG in elaborating Kosovo’s decentralisation concept, taking into account issues such as the protection of minority community rights and security and the need to ensure better living conditions for all inhabitants in Kosovo. The Contact Group looked forward to the implementation of pilot projects by the PISG and UNMIK, and called on the representatives of the Kosovo Serb community to join the Pristina based “Working Group of Local Government Reform” co-headed by UNMIK and the PISG. Without prejudice to any eventual status settlement, the Contact Group emphasised the importance of eVective institutional mechanisms to ensure the protection of minority communities. Recognising Belgrade’s interest in decentralisation, the Contact Group reaYrmed its support for constructive engagement with Belgrade. In this context, elements of the Belgrade Plan could enrich the UNMIK-led process. The Contact Group expressed its readiness to support discussion between Belgrade Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 97
and Pristina, including the PISG and representatives of the Kosovo Serb community, and UNMIK, at a mutually acceptable time and place. Ultimately, any solution to these issues must be agreed by and benefit all communities within Kosovo. The Contact Group expects to see the transfer to the PISG, in accordance with UNSCR 1244 and in full respect of the Constitutional Framework, of all responsibilities which do not prejudge Kosovo’s future status. The Contact Group expects the PISG to discharge increasingly these new functions in a spirit of responsibility, eVectiveness and co-operation. It further supports the SRSG’s intention to reinforce the accountability of the PISG through exercise of robust oversight. The Contact Group recalled the statement by the President of the Security Council of 12 December 2003 which noted that a first opportunity for a comprehensive review of the PISG’s progress in meeting the standards would occur around mid-2005 and stresses that advancement towards a process to determine future status of Kosovo in accordance with resolution 1244 will depend on the positive outcome of this comprehensive review. The regular review process to measure Kosovo’s progress towards Standards is under way. The Contact Group urges the PISG and all Kosovo “s leaders to implement the standards constructively and in good faith. Failure to do so, or eVorts by any quarter to undermine the standards implementation process, could have consequences for the Comprehensive Review. The Contact Group supports the SRSG’s intention, after the March violence, to put special emphasis on security, minority protection, returns, decentralisation, freedom of movement, and the economy. The Contact Group welcomes the intention of UNMIK to devote particular attention to international co- ordination on the economy in close co-operation with the EU Commission and other key players. The Contact Group will focus in future reviews on the areas below: — Rule of Law: Welcome progress has been made in bringing to justice those responsible for the violence in March. The Contact Group calls for a policy of “zero tolerance” towards those who propagate hatred and violence against ethnic minorities. It is imperative to protect witnesses and to instil tolerance and mutual respect. The Contact Group welcomes the growing professional conduct of the Kosovo Police Service and looks forward to constructive engagement by the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with its mandate as a civilian emergency organisation. — Sustainable Returns, Reconstruction, Reintegration: The Contact Group notes the significant work done by the PISG in reconstruction since the March events and urges that this work be completed without delay, including rebuilding churches and other religious sites. It welcomes the eVorts of the Council of Europe, the European Commission and the UNESCO to assess and find funding for the restoration of religious and cultural sites. The Contact Group also calls on the Provisional Institutions to increase their eVorts to create the conditions for safe and sustainable returns, and on UNMIK to implement the measures outlined in the 14 July statement, notably the creation of a Ministry of Returns. The Contact Group looks forward to close co-operation with Belgrade authorities and UNHCR in carrying out a re-registration of IDP’s. — Freedom of Movement, Security: Movement by members of minority communities continues to require military or police escort. Kosovo institutions at all levels, especially the municipal presidents and the KPS, must do their part to ensure that minorities, particularly Kosovo Serbs, can live and move around freely, that all persons displaced from their homes have the opportunity to return, and are free to build a safe future for their families. — Functioning Democratic Institutions: The Contact Group expects all political leaders and parties to ensure free and fair Assembly elections in Kosovo, based on the rule of law. The Contact Group reiterates the importance of Kosovo Serbs’ participation in these elections, this being the best and only way for them to address their legitimate concerns. The Contact Group calls on all communities in Kosovo to participate in the elections, and in particular for the registration of all candidates by 1 October. The Political Directors will continue to closely follow the process of implementing the Kosovo standards and requested their representatives to continue their regular meetings in Pristina.” Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 6 October 2004
Further supplementary written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Minister for Europe,Dr MacShane’s Visit to the Balkans on 25–26 October 2004 The United Kingdom would like to share with Partners a report of the visit made by the United Kingdom’s Minister for Europe, Dr MacShane, to Belgrade, Skopje and Pristina on 25 and 26 October 2004. In Belgrade Dr MacShane saw President Marovic of Serbia and Montenegro; Foreign Minister Draskovic of Serbia and Montenegro; Prime Minister Kostunica of Serbia; and President Tadic of Serbia. Ev 98 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Discussion focused on Kosovo. Dr MacShane expressed his disappointment at the low turn out of Kosovo-Serbs at the Kosovo elections. Kostunica said it was expected given Kosovo-Serbs’ living conditions. Dr MacShane made clear to all four interlocutors that now that the elections were over, the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue must begin afresh without preconditions. Tadic and Draskovic agreed. Kostuncia said he would re-assess the situation after decentralisation was completed in Kosovo and that there needed to be a new arrangement that combined the UNMIK and Belgrade plans on decentralisation. Dr Mac Shane responded that while elements of the Belgrade plan could enrich the UNMIK plan, the latter was the only basis. On co-operation with the ICTY, Dr MacShane said that it was double standards for Belgrade to expect human rights and international law protection in Kosovo while at the same time disregarding international law themselves by not co-operating with The Hague. Marovic said that Belgrade believed that arresting the four Generals would be destabilising, when in fact failing to arrest them was more destabilising. Dr MacShane underlined that the UK wanted Serbia and Montenegro in the EU and NATO. In Pristina, meetings were held with the SRSG; President Rugova, Prime Minister Rexhepi; Thaqi (PDK); Haradinaj (AAK); Surroi (ORA); and Ivanovic (Serb list for Kosovo and Metohija). Dr MacShane underlined the importance of forming a new Government quickly to allow time to make progress in key areas in advance of the standards review in mid-2005. His interlocutors did not think a government would take long to form, but were cautious about the diVerent options. Jessen-Petersen hoped that the new Government could be formed without any overt international role. He said that the priority after its formation should be agreement on decentralisation and implementation of pilot projects. This would give more legitimacy to the Kosovo Serb representatives than the turn-out in the elections might otherwise provide. Dr MacShane and Jessen-Petersen discussed Kosovo’s economy. In Skopje, Dr MacShane called on President Crvenkovski; Deputy Prime Minister Sekerinska; Deputy Foreign Minister Hasanovich; the leader of the ethnic Macedonian opposition (VMRO-DPMNE), Gruevski; and leading ethnic Albanian DUI MP, Arifi. The agenda was dominated by the referendum on local government reorganisation. Dr MacShane told his interlocutors that while the opportunity to hold the referendum was provided for in the constitution, it represented a direct challenge to the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and so to the country’s applications to join the EU and NATO. This was a matter of grave concern. President Crvenkovski said that he thought the referendum result would be close, although the turnout was likely to be low. Deputy PM Sekerinska highlighted that the coalition would be campaigning in public over the next fortnight against the referendum. Gruevski said that if the referendum succeeded, experts should work closely with the international community in working out a new territorial reorganisation package. Dr MacShane made clear that the Ohrid Agreement was the only framework. Arifi confirmed she would promote a restrained and constructive approach amongst ethnic Albanians. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Further supplementary written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Serbia and Montenegro Country Report 2003–04
D. FCO Summary
Important Achievements: — New British Council—British Embassy oYce in Podgorica. — Joint public diplomacy “British Days” emulated by EU colleagues. — Ground-breaking multimedia project “Narratives of the Unseen” reported in leading UK design magazine “Blueprint”. — British Council receives Education Award from Serbian Ministry of Education for its contribution to the education reform agenda. — Joint National Theatre, Belgrade and Royal National Theatre, London project recognised as one of 10 outstanding projects from a field of over two thousand theatre projects in Europe. — Successful launch of regional project: UK-SE Europe Forum. — Positive feedback on British Council activity from our target audiences: Long Term Evaluation (!1.4), Spotlight Review and ECO questionnaire (Overall rating 7). — Target audience numbers engaged with the British Council continue to increase. It has been another highly successful year building on the achievements made in 2002–03. The British Council continues to work closely with the Embassy. In November 2003, the new Ambassador, David Gowan was able to open our new joint oYce in Podgorica clearly demonstrating UK commitment to Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 99
Montenegro. We have successfully re-positioned our activities there so that we are now in a position to fully support the reform agenda in Montenegro and are concentrating our activities in Education particularly English Language teaching, Culture and the development of a civil society through youth and high school associations. The re-positioning of our activities and the new joint oYce have been well received by all stakeholders. The new oYce also reflects contemporary UK being located in a new business district of the city.
The Embassy and the British Council continue to work together on British Days. This year these were held in four regional centres. These are opportunities to showcase our products and services, make new contacts and engage with those that we are already in partnership. They receive widespread media coverage both locally and nationally. The concept has been taken up by our EU colleagues, who with our advice and participation began a series of EU days throughout Serbia and Montenegro to promote the benefits of SaM’s accession to the EU.
The Belgrade oYce has technically one of the most advanced oYces in Europe. It is using its Knowledge and Learning Centre (multimedia approach) to support and enhance its project work with great success. In May 2003 we launched Narratives of the Unseen between students in Glasgow and Belgrade. It involved students working together using internet-based technologies as well as videoconferencing. An article on the project was written in “Blueprint” magazine in the UK as well as receiving good media coverage in SaM. We have continued to develop this approach through the development of a science portal to reflect our first regional science workshop on bio-diversity, working with our strategic partner the World Bank and its GDLN network to deliver courses on a wide range of subjects from SME development to a Young Leader series as well as initiating our own regional projects: Teachers of English Associations in the region working together on professional issues, inclusivity of ethnic minorities, and initiating sector team discussions across the region “Getting to Know You” and a series on EU accession with Charles Grant—Board member and Director of a leading think tank on Europe.
In November 2003 the Serbian Minister of Education and Sport presented us with an award for our overall contribution to the education reform agenda. We have had significant impact in the following areas: introduction of English Language teaching from Grade One (seven years old), development of curriculum, development of quality assurance systems within primary and secondary education leading to a cadre of new education inspectors. We estimate that over one thousand schoolteachers have experienced our training and expertise during the year. We also supported our work through regional conferences on education standards with the Council of Europe and Goethe Institute. We initiated a new regional ELT conference, which was opened jointly by the Minister of Education and HMA. A highlight of the year was the visit by 10 UK primary Head Teachers to Belgrade. A reciprocal visit is planned in November this year. Finally the Serbian Ministry of Education is a strategic partner in the Education Gateway project launched by Secretary of State, Charles Clarke and 27 schools are now registered to participate in the link-up with schools in the UK.
We are expanding our joint project between the National Theatre and the Royal National Theatre for the development of theatre directors and new writers to include Serbs working outside Belgrade. In October last year this project was voted as one of the 10 most significant projects by the International & European Theatre Network for East—West cultural exchanges and voted 3rd best project by the Council’s Visual Arts, Film and Literature department from a field of over two thousand projects.
In March 2004, we launched the UK-SE Europe Forum when we brought together young political leaders from all of SE Europe to meet and work with their counterparts from the UK. The initial conference went well and we are expecting these groups to be working together on a variety of projects over the coming two years. In 2004, we will also launch the culture and youth strands to this important project realising through mutuality a strong and concrete engagement between the region and the UK.
During the year we conducted several evaluations of our operation. The spotlight review focussed on re- churning of resources and the investment in a Knowledge and Learning Centre. The review was positive. Equally we conducted an in-depth long-term evaluation of our impact through interviews of our leading clients. Our score was !1.4 (on a scale from "2.0 to !2.0) indicating strong impact with our key clients. We were also pleased with the strong support from the Embassy in the FCO questionnaire, with an overall rating of seven, the highest possible rating.
Through our public diplomacy programme and extending our project work, we have been able to engage with and influence far greater numbers of people than in the previous years. The number of visitors to our oYces has increased from 50,000 to 65,000. The number of people using our e-centre has increased to 1,400 per month. Our electronic newsletter is now distributed to 1,000 people per month. We have exceeded our target for candidates for UK qualifications by 21% and in the reporting year had 2,870 candidates. We have also doubled the number of people visiting our web site to 3.200 per month and have increased our oVer through the use of the “Athens” password system, information literacy and study skills toolkit plus Global Enquiries and KnowledgeUK site. Ev 100 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
We are also currently working with over 200 journalists in SaM and had over 700 press mentions during the reporting year emphasising the importance of the media in getting our messages and appreciation of UK involvement in SaM across to as wide a number of people as possible. We will build on this platform over the coming year. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from Bill Rammell MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, 30 November 2004
ICTY—Budgetary Situation Following the Foreign AVairs Committee’s visit to The Hague in September this year the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce’s Parliamentary Relations & Devolution Department forwarded to you a note on the budgetary situations of various international courts including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). At that time the FAC and the FCO were concerned at the level of payments and the arrears due which, at US$57 million, represented some 33% of the total ICTY budget for 2004. Because of our concerns, we carried out a lobbying campaign to persuade the principal debtors to pay their dues. I am pleased to be able to report that since then the two largest debtors, the US and Japan, have announced that they are in the process of clearing their arrears. Combined with payment from Mexico, promised for the end of the year, and one or two other states, this would bring total arrears down to some US$15 million or 9.5% of the 2004 budget. We will continue to press partners to pay their dues in the hope of avoiding similar situations in the future. Bill Rammell MP Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Foreign and Commonwealth OYce 30 November 2004
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, 20 December 2004
FAC Inquiry into UK Policy Towards the Western Balkans During my appearance in front of the Foreign AVairs Committee on 30 November I agreed to provide further information on a number of points raised by members. These are set out below and in the attached annexes. I hope the Committee finds this supplementary information useful and I look forward to reading your report in due course.
Kosovo Serb Population Movements in Kosovo in 2004 The UN Secretary General’s report of 17 November 2004 reported that more minority community members have been displaced in 2004 than have successfully returned to their homes. As at 10 December 2004, 1,951 people (of whom 1,628 are Serbs) who had been displaced in the March violence had not yet returned to their homes. The oYce in Kosovo of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has told us that the number of returns to Kosovo from internal and external displacement so far in 2004 is 2,165, of which 733 are Serb, 361 Roma, 501 Ashkalia/Egypt, 429 Bosniak, 133 Gorani and eight Albanian. A full breakdown of the figures as at 30 November is attached at Annex A5. I would, however, draw your attention to the caveats given by UNHCR, which include the following: All presented figures are based on the information collected monthly from the field, received from various and credible sources. Information is updated accordingly. Due to the complexity of information gathering, this set of information does not necessarily reflect all return movements at the time of reporting. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has stated that there is no mechanism in place to monitor departures from Kosovo, in part due to the complexities inherent in doing so, for example identifying those who had left for good, or those who had left on holiday or for schooling.
5 Please refer to the UNHCR website—Table 2—Minority Returns by Municipality of Return. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 101
What is the UK doing to raise the issue of human traYcking with the Governments of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania and does the FCO intend to support the proposal of a shelter for traYcked women in Kosovo? We have already provided information on the UK Government’s eVorts to tackle organised crime in the Western Balkans, and in particular, human traYcking in Kosovo. The attachment at Annex B answers the Committee’s specific queries.
Which UK oYcials attended the conference in Kosovo on 16 November and why was there no UK Minister present? The meeting to which the Committee refers was held by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr Soren-Jessen Petersen, with the aim of forming a constructive dialogue with European countries on the issue of forced returns to Kosovo. The UK delegation was led by senior oYcials from the Home OYce. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland were also represented at oYcial level. As the meeting had been timed to coincide with a visit that the Swedish and Norwegian Ministers were making, their Ministers were able to attend.
Why has the UK contribution to policing in Kosovo been reduced, what is the current UK contribution to policing in Kosovo and what is the policy on deploying retired oYcers in Kosovo? The UK continues to contribute a substantial number of police oYcers in Kosovo, meeting in full its requirement as requested by UNMIK. Of the 15 EU members deploying police to the mission, the UK is the third largest contributor. Currently the UK has 80 serving and 20 retired police oYcers in Kosovo. These include: — 64 serving (62 from Ministry of Defence Police and two from other UK forces) and 20 retired oYcers are with UNMIK Civpol. — Eight serving oYcers from other UK forces serve in the Kosovo Central Intelligence Unit (CIU), — Two serving and two retired oYcers are posted to the OSCE-run Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) UK oYcers occupy key positions in the mission, including Deputy Commissioner of Police Crime Pillar in UNMIK Civpol, the Head of the Kosovo Central Intelligence Unit, Directors in all three (Operations, Administration and Crime) pillars of UNMIK Civpol Headquarters, Head of various operational and special units, and Commanders, or Deputy Commanders, across the five Regions. Overall, UK police occupy 55% of the identified key posts in UNMIK Civpol. At the Kosovo Police Service School, British oYcers occupy two of the four senior management posts. The UK currently has retired oYcers serving in Kosovo, Macedonia, Jordan and Iraq. Retired oYcers can often provide specialised skills and experience of high value to missions as well as increasing the pool of potential secondees above that which can be sourced from serving oYcers alone. The FCO has a special unit responsible for placing UK oYcers to police missions overseas, called the International Policing and Civilian Placements Team. They recruit both oYcers who are already retired, and oYcers who are due to retire imminently from active service. They do not recruit oYcers who have been retired for such a period of time as would make the skills and experience out-dated. Serving oYcers are seconded to the FCO during their deployment to a mission and the FCO reimburses forces for each oYcer’s salary and other deployment costs (for example, accommodation allowances). Retired oYcers are contracted to the FCO for their deployment and the FCO pays their salaries direct.
Would the current draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty allow the UK to recognise Montenegro independence unilaterally if such a situation arose in the future? The situation under the Constitutional Treaty would be the same as under the current Treaties. Recognition of a third state remains the prerogative of national governments. However, for wider political reasons, EU member states may wish to do so in unison ie through adoption of a common policy. But the UK or any other Member State could prevent the adoption of a common policy which had the eVect of recognising the independence of a third country, because we have retained our veto for primary policy decisions in foreign policy. The Constitutional Treaty introduces only one new area of decision making by Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). (In addition to implementing measures and the appointment of Special Representatives, where the Council is acting on a proposal from the EU Foreign Minister, which he has made on the specific request of the European Council, which acts by consensus). A decision on recognition of a third country would not fall into any of the categories listed for QMV in Article III-300 in the Constitutional Treaty. So there could be no question of the EU position over-riding the UK’s position. This would not prevent other EU Member States bilaterally recognising the third state if they so wished. If the UK wished to recognise Montenegro, we could still do so without an EU common policy. Ev 102 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
What further practical steps could the UK Government take to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession? Many of the most important elements of practical support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) integration with the EU necessarily are provided by multilateral and international organisations, given the scale of reform. The British Ambassador in Sarajevo, UK Government Ministers and oYcials support the eVorts of the Commission and the OYce of the High Representative and lobby the BiH authorities on their behalf. The UK Government also provides substantial support for the reform processes in BiH through a range of activities. We continue to look for further opportunities to contribute to this process where our resources allow. The UK already provides significant financial (over £750,000 in the financial year 2003–04) and other support to the High Representative in BiH, whose Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) closely reflects the 16 priority areas for action identified in the EU Feasibility Study published in November 2003. The MIP focuses on entrenching the rule of law, reforming the economy, and strengthening the capacity of BiH’s governing institutions, especially at State level, which are all key to helping BiH meet the conditions for the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. The UK also contributes 19% of the EU’s CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programme in the Western Balkans, including in BiH. CARDS provided ƒ65 million to projects in BiH in 2004. In addition to these multilateral and international funds and initiatives, the UK also funds a number of bilateral projects designed to deliver reform in areas key for progress towards EU standards—in particular Civil Service and public broadcasting reform. The UK also contributes to the EU Police Mission working on police reform, another initiative that is helping the BiH authorities to meet EU norms in key areas.
Kosovo-Macedonia border delineation issue The delineation of the border between Macedonia and then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), now Serbia and Montenegro (SaM), was agreed in February 2001. The agreement meant an area of land was transferred to Macedonia from SaM (including Kosovo) of about 2,500 hectares, with the aim that the administrative arrangements would better reflect the geography on the ground, ie the border would follow a river. Although this was accepted by the UN and the EU, the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) in Kosovo did and does not accept the validity of the 2001 delineation agreement. Locals (mainly on the Kosovo side of the border) involved in agriculture and wood cutting have objected to this at a local level. And the various people involved in or aVected by this issue talk about diVerent areas of land in dispute. For example, a group of Kosovar (Albanian) farmers in August 2004 said that the land that they owned and wanted back from Macedonia was about 150 hectares. There are many other references to an area of land of about 500 hectares and one claim that it is 2,700 hectares. It is diYcult to establish what the Kosovo side think is the amount of land in dispute as there is no Kosovo body with locus to make a formal claim. However, we understand from the constitutional framework, that the SRSG should lead on this. In November 2004, UNMIK agreed to set up a working Commission, which representatives from Macedonia, Pristina and Belgrade (Serbia and Montenegro) have agreed to attend. This is welcome progress on this sensitive issue.
How is the UK is supporting judicial reform in Macedonia? Judicial reform is a major priority for the international community in Macedonia. A year ago the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) produced a matrix highlighting areas of judicial reform which need to be tackled, with a list of possible projects for donors to consider. The major donors such as the EU (CARDS), OSCE (to which the UK contributes funds) and USAID tend to take on the larger projects. On a bilateral basis, individual countries tackle smaller issues. The UK, through the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe, has contributed through the organisation of a series of seminars on Alternative Dispute Resolution. Working with a local NGO, Polio Plus, the UK has also successfully lobbied for a change in laws ensuring better rights for the disabled. We also supported a project monitoring corruption in criminal cases.
When will Macedonia (and Albania and Croatia) join NATO? There is no clear date for accession for Macedonia, Albania or Croatia. NATO considers membership only when Allies assess that aspirant countries have made suYcient progress in implementing the reforms covered by NATO’s Membership Action Plan. Membership for these countries depends on further progress across all areas of reform, including political and defence reform, regional cooperation, and fully co- operating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 103
How is the UK supporting privatisation in Macedonia and the Western Balkans more widely, and the protection of assets?
Notes are attached at Annexes C and D, using information provided by the FCO and the Department for International Development. Denis MacShane Minister for Europe 20 December 2004
Annex B
Human Trafficking in South Eastern Europe
The UK is committed to fighting the serious crime of traYcking in human beings, particularly in the key area of South Eastern Europe. The FCO is a member of Reflex, the multi-agency taskforce set up in 2000 to tackle organised immigration crime. Through Reflex we have established a network of Immigration Liaison OYcers (ILOs) covering 22 key source and transit countries in Europe, including Bulgaria, Romania (also covering Moldova) and Ukraine. Their role is to work with host governments and their law enforcement agencies to disrupt and dismantle criminal groups involved in traYcking in human beings. Examples of this work include Reflex Romania and Reflex Bulgaria. The aim of these projects was to establish central intelligence units to focus on organised immigration crime originating in and transiting through Romania and Bulgaria. The UK provided specialist intelligence training and equipment as well as attaching senior UK police and immigration oYcers in an advisory capacity. Reflex has also funded projects to provide specialised immigration training and advice to border guards in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. Tackling traYcking in human beings is a key part of the FCO’s Strategic Priority 2. As such, our Posts throughout the world, and in South Eastern Europe in particular, engage regularly with host governments on these issues. We also provide practical assistance to help address this problem. For example, in November 2004, the Balkans Global Conflict Prevention Fund (GCPP) agreed to fund a Save the Children Fund project which aims to build capacity to fight child traYcking in Serbia and Montenegro. This work is due to start in January 2005. Sir John Stanley asked about a project to fund a shelter for traYcked women in Kosovo. The shelter is being funded by the Swedish government. We are, however, in consultation with the organisation that runs the shelter about funding an awareness raising project in Kosovo. We hope to receive their project proposal soon. We are also involved in the region on a multilateral level. This includes through the OSCE whose Ministerial Council endorsed an Action Plan on TraYcking in Human Beings in December 2003. To implement the Action Plan, the OSCE appointed Helga Konrad, as its Special Representative on the Prevention of TraYcking in Human Beings, in spring 2004. She is a former Austrian Minister for Womens’ AVairs. Helga Konrad heads the “Alliance Against TraYcking in Persons” formed by the OSCE on 23 July 2004. Her remit covers the whole OSCE area, covering countries of origin, transit and destination. We also work closely with our EU partners, NATO, international organisations such as the United Nations OYce on Drugs and Crime, and NGOs such as the International Organisation for Migration.
Annex C
Privatisation in the Western Balkans
This note provides information on the present situation regarding privatisation in selected countries of the Western Balkans. It demonstrates, by country, the work being done by the UK Government in supporting the privatisation eVort. Principally, this has been via the Department for International Development (DFID), although they have only been directly involved in the privatisation process in Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The UK has also provided support to the privatisation process through selected lobbying activity and indirectly in each country through the activities of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Ev 104 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Overview
The EBRD assesses the progress with privatisation across the Western Balkans annually6. Figure 1 shows the aggregate progress each country has made in comparison with selected Eastern European countries at diVerent stages of transition. Whilst Croatia and Macedonia have relatively advanced privatisation eVorts, particularly for the less politically sensitive “small-scale privatisations”, SaM and BiH are have clearly made less significant progress. Figure 2 suggests some of the consequences of this. Compared with the more advanced transition countries, the private sector contributes relatively little to GDP in BiH and SaM.
Fig. 1 EBRD Indices of Privatisation Fig. 2 Private sector share of GDP
5 90 80 4 70 60 3 50 Not available % 2 40 N o t
30 ava 1
20 il a bl
0 10 e SaM BiH Croatia Macedonia Kosovo Bulgaria Romania Hungary Republic Czech 0 SaM BiH Croatia Macedonia Kosovo Bulgaria Romania Hungary Republic Czech
Source: EBRD Transition Report Small scale privatisation Large scale privatisation Source: EBRD Transition Report
This diVerential performance reflects several factors. Firstly, BiH and SaM embarked upon privatisation later than most other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so it is not surprising that they are behind. Secondly, the Former Yugoslavia had a large “socially-owned” sector in addition to the state-owned sector. Whilst nominally owned by the firms’ employees, in practice, establishing the precise ownership of these firms was an additional complication in the privatisation process.
Serbia &Montenegro (SaM)
Although some privatisation was attempted in the early 1990s, the sale of socially-owned and state assets on a large scale only started when the liberal Serbian administration was elected in late 2000. DFID was in at the earliest stages of this, advising the authorities on strategy, the status of the many socially and state- owned enterprises, the required legislation, and the establishment of the institutions required to progress the various components of the nation’s privatisation strategy. These inputs were closely co-ordinated with a range of multilateral and bilateral donors.
For two and a half years dramatic progress was achieved, particularly in the privatisation of “attractive enterprises”. However, political instability during 2004 and the new government’s decision to revise their predecessors’ privatisations (abandoned later in the year), significantly reduced the pace of privatisation and the appetite of potential investors. However, momentum seems to be growing again and recent changes to the law, including the facility to write-oV firms’ state debts in advance of privatisation, will help. The Government hopes to realise some value from privatisation to contribute to its 2005 budget.
DFID has supported the Serbia Privatisation Agency since April 2002 with a targeted package of technical assistance. The support to the Privatisation Agency came in two forms: a small project to recruit appropriately qualified local staV and remunerate them for an initial period to get the institution oV the ground, and assistance provided through a DFID-funded consultancy contract with Deloitte & Touche. The total value of support to date is around £1.4 million.
The Deloitte & Touche advisers funded by DFID focused on activities not covered by other donors and included: — A part time strategic privatisation policy adviser for the Minister. — A full time expert working within the Restructuring Department of the Agency. — Part time advisers working on the restructuring of enterprises selected as a priority for restructuring.
DFID’s current package of support will continue until the end of 2004. It is envisaged that further advice to the Privatisation Agency will then be provided by the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) through the CARDS programme.
6 EBRD Transition Report 2004. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 105
Kosovo The privatisation process in Kosovo has been contentious and, as a result, slow. In late 2000, a process of “commercialisation” for the socially owned enterprises (SOEs) was started as an interim measure before a privatisation strategy could be agreed. This involved the leasing of companies for a fixed period. In mid- 2002, a privatisation strategy was agreed which, amongst other rules, stipulated that a fee of 20% of the sales price would be distributed to current workers and that all privatisation proceeds would be held in trust pending resolution of Kosovo’s final status. The Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) was established in June 2002 to manage the privatisation process. It adopted a “spin-oV” model whereby the shares of new corporations would be sold oV and the proceeds held in trust. A Special Chamber of the Supreme Court was established to process claims from the former owners. Initial waves of privatisation were successful, with the first and second rounds raising ƒ29 million. However, the third wave was cancelled in October 2003 to consider legal questions associated with the process. One aspect of this was the legal risk to the managers of the KTA. After long delays, the process was relaunched in July 2004 with the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) beginning a third wave of tenders. This round was successful, raising over ƒ16 million. In October 2004, a fourth wave was launched. DFID have not been involved in Kosovo’s privatisation process. Initially, USAID had a large influence, but more recently the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) has been most heavily involved. However, throughout this process, HMG has remained engaged, lobbying for the privatisation momentum to continue. The British OYce in Pristina has been lobbying Pillar IV (the EU led reconstruction and economic development component of UNMIK activity in Kosovo) and UNMIK (including the SRSG), encouraging them to press ahead with privatisation. This has been supplemented by discussions with UNMIK to clarify the legal issues related to privatisation and through liaison with local stakeholders (including the Government and Trade Unions) to explain the benefits of privatisation and encourage compromise. Additional lobbying has also taken place in New York (to the UN) and Brussels (to the European Union) to push the process forward.
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Both the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation (FBiH) privatise in accordance with their Entity laws. To date, the privatisation of small, former state-owned companies has been relatively successful. Some 74% have been sold in the FBiH and 51% in the RS by the end of 2003. These have been bought mainly by private investment funds or management/employee buy-outs. Nevertheless, neither have they created appreciable cash in the longer term nor have they produced any notable new markets. There is a need for restructuring PIFs to have a positive impact on strengthening corporate governance in privatised enterprises. But progress in privatising the large, state-owned companies (companies with assets of over £180 k or employing more than 50 staV) has been patchy. Only a quarter of the companies in the FBiH have been fully privatised and only about one third of those in the RS. And whilst voucher privatisation has taken place in both Entities, this had little impact on the economy as a whole. Indeed there have been a number of notable past privatisation failures, particularly in the RS such as Banja Luka Brewery and the Fruktona fruit juice company. The paucity of privatisation experience, the unwillingness on the part of politicians and the inflexible existing legislation have all contributed to such failures. From 1998 to 2001, DFID was involved in providing some technical advice to BiH on privatisation. However, the voucher privatisation that has been implemented has not been successful and the attempts by a range of donors to sell over 50 “strategic” enterprises by tender to individual investors has to date been highly unsuccessful. Over the last year DFID has been working with a range of donors, in particular the World Bank, to agree a range of corporate restructuring initiatives to help complete a privatisation programme, and, more importantly, rehabilitate or close down the many voucher-privatised companies which struggle to survive.
Macedonia After independence in the early 1990s the first round of Macedonian “privatisations” took place whereby workers were granted shares of the companies they worked for according to their years of service. The former managers often returned to their previous positions and poor corporate governance as well as limited access to capital meant that few such firms became profitable. As a result, the shares were frequently used to settle debts (for example to utilities companies), and in many companies, the Government returned to its position as majority shareholder, which meant a further round of privatisation. However, few of the previous share transactions were registered, generating uncertainties over legal ownership during the subsequent privatisation process. The UK has provided indirect support to this process, through the World Bank’s programme. When the World Bank stepped in to advise on selling oV the remaining 22 ex-state owned industries in 2002, UK consultants were appointed to advise on the second round of privatisations on a highest price bid basis only. Eventually all 22 were sold to the highest bidders, with no strings attached. Ev 106 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Privatisation in Macedonia is now largely considered complete. The Agency for Privatisation will be oYcially closed on 31 March 2005 (it was supposed to close at the end of this year). Since the process began 10 years ago, 1,687 state owned companies have been privatised and ƒ2.2 billion realised, whilst only 79 companies are considered as not privatised. However, some large “strategic” Public Enterprises and Utilities (eg the Water Companies, ESM (Electric Power), the Railway, MK Forest) remain in state hands. A new law on the Transformation of Public Enterprises should be adopted next year and this will clarify the future of these enterprises. The near-completion of the privatisation process means that a significant drain on the Government’s budget has been eliminated. However, in mid-2004, the IMF noted7 that the boost to eYciency and foreign investment from privatisation had been smaller than hoped. Their report concluded that the mechanism chosen for privatisation, combined with inconsistent application of International Accounting Standards and continued indirect subsidy from the Government, generated poor incentives to restructure and invest in the newly privatised companies.
Croatia Croatia is probably the most advanced amongst those considered here in terms of its progress with privatisation. The Croatian Privatisation Fund (CPF) anticipates that small-scale privatisation will be completed by June 2005. This ambitious privatisation programme is proving diYcult to meet, hampered by slow progress, lower than expected revenues and lawsuits. Some large-scale privatisation has now taken place, including most of Croatia Telecom and part of Ina (Croatia’s oil company), but the expected privatisation of HEP (Croatia’s power company) continues to be delayed. The Government is being urged by the IMF to step up the privatisation process through the CPF and to accelerate the privatisation of habitually insolvent companies ı particularly the shipyards and steel companies, which do not form part of the CPF portfolio. Whilst the CPF complains that no international bidders are coming forward and that they have diYculty packaging deals which the market will accept, a lack of transparency explains some of this diYculty. Potential investors from the UK and elsewhere are frequently put oV by the time and money involved in conducting due diligence and in producing bids which are rejected on minor technicalities, or the entire process is voided, amid allegations of corruption or mishandling, and a new tender issued. Investors are also deterred by a lack of confidence in the judicial system and the land registry. The UK is not directly assisting Croatia’s privatisation, although various consultants have worked with the government at times on preparations for the privatisation of large state companies. Additionally, the UK has supported World Bank projects aimed at enterprise restructuring.
Annex D
Protection of Assets
Summary The ability of a company to protect its assets depends on several factors. Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA—part of the World Bank Group) can provide foreign investors with some protection, but domestic investment is aVected by the domestic legislation. Where domestic legislation exists to a suYcient standard, its implementation, and a company’s ability to enforce it through legal proceedings can vary widely. Investment (both domestic and foreign) would likely be deterred by the absence of legislation, but a more serious deterrent in the Western Balkans is the slow or biased application of legislation.
IPPAs The UK has IPPAs with some of the countries of the Western Balkans. These bilateral treaties are designed to encourage investment between States by giving investors confidence that their investments will not be subject to unfair treatment or discrimination by the government in the other country. The IPPA provides a legal framework for the investor to seek redress from the foreign government for alleged discrimination. The IPPA also provides a de-politicised dispute resolution process without the need for Governments to become directly involved.
Macedonia The English text of the UK/Macedonia Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA) was agreed in October 1999. Since then there have been further negotiations with the Macedonian Government over the Macedonian translation of the IPPA. We are currently finalising some amendments to the text and hope to be able to conclude the Agreement shortly.
7 SM/04/263:FYROM—Ex Post Assessment of Longer-Term Programme Engagement, 22 July 2004. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 107
Bosnia and Herzegovina An IPPA was signed in October 2002 and came into force in July 2003.
Croatia An IPPA was signed in March 1997 and came into force in April 1998.
Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo) No negotiations for an IPPA have been instigated.
MIGA MIGA provides insurance services to private investors in order to promote foreign direct investment into developing countries. Part of the World Bank Group, it pays particular attention to post-conflict and extremely poor countries, applying strict social, environmental and governance standards to the investments it works with. The insurance is provided on non-commercial insurance to foreign investors. This provides protection against the risks of, inter alia, expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract. MIGA also provides technical assistance to developing countries and operates an arbitration process in the event of dispute between investors and host governments. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia & Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia are all members of MIGA, and foreign investors considering investing in these countries are therefore eligible to apply for MIGA insurance.
Domestic Legislation Although many countries of the region possess legislation regarding the protection of assets, the ability to enforce these laws through the courts is often diYcult. A slightly diVerent, but nonetheless relevant, measure of this is the ability to enforce contracts. The World Bank “Doing Business Report”8 gives information on the costs associated with enforcing a contractual agreement in countries of the Western Balkans. The table below shows this with comparison to selected Central and Eastern European transition countries:
Data from 2004 Survey Enforcing Contracts Number of Time (days) Cost procedures (% of debt) Serbia and Montenegro 36 1,028 23 Bosnia and Herzegovina 36 330 19.6 Croatia 22 415 10 Macedonia 27 509 32.8 Bulgaria 34 440 14 Romania 43 335 12.4 Hungary 21 365 8.1 Czech Republic 22 300 9.6
Whereas the number of procedures and time taken (with the exception of SaM) is broadly similar to the selected Eastern European countries, the significant diVerence is in the cost involved in enforcing the contract. Whilst Croatia is comparable, Macedonia, SaM and BiH all involve costs of enforcement which are significantly higher than comparative countries. Although the countries of the Western Balkans often do have laws on asset protection, there are some for which better legislation is needed, all where better implementation is needed (and programmes for judicial reform are underway in many countries), and some which deter foreign companies from markets. Where necessary, we are lobbying for the necessary changes to be made. For instance, in Croatia, the UK, together with the US, France and the European Commission has lobbied intensely for a change in the Drugs Law, enacted in July 2003, which would remove the poor protection of intellectual property rights which act as a deterrent to foreign pharmaceutical companies. Legislative amendments are currently before the Croatian parliament.
8 http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/ Ev 108 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Thursday 13 January 2005
Members present:
Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Mr David Chidgey Andrew Mackinlay Mr Eric Illsley Mr Bill Olner Mr Andrew Mackay Sir John Stanley
Witness: His Excellency Kai Eide, Norwegian Ambassador to NATO, examined.
Q263 Chairman: Ambassador Eide, may I welcome that there is that backing present. At the same time you most warmly to the Committee and thank you I do think that they also look at the situation with for coming specially to us at our invitation. You are regard to what is happening in the key areas that a distinguished Norwegian diplomat. You currently aVect them, such as reconstruction, decentralisation, are your country’s Ambassador to NATO. Your etc I think it is regrettable that they have not chosen career has focused mainly on international to re-enter the political process and we try to say to organisations. After the riots in Kosovo last year them all the time, and I was able to say that to the you were appointed by the Secretary-General to leaders in Belgrade only a few weeks ago, that there look specifically into the future of Kosovo. You is no other way than for them to re-engage; the produced your report in July. The Secretary- process as such in Kosovo is not going to stop General has said in terms that he accepts the key because they stay out of the process and therefore recommendations which you made, and I think it is the only way of protecting the interests of the fair to say that other governments too have warmly Kosovo Serbs and their own interests in the commended the work you did at that time. Just to processes that will follow is to re-engage. prepare the ground before other colleagues come in, can I ask have you been able to keep in touch with developments in Kosovo since your intensive period Q265 Chairman: That said, you made a number of in the summer of last year? recommendations both in terms of managing the HE Eide: Mr Chairman, first of all, thank you very interim and also the longer-term future. Do you still much for inviting me to come and have this meeting hold, as you did last July, to those same with you. I am very honoured to be here. Of course, recommendations or do you wish to refine any of I do have another job. As you said, I am now them? Norway’s Permanent Representative to NATO, so I HE Eide: I hold to those recommendations. I believe had to return to that after my few weeks in June-July that what I tried to do was to develop what I saw as May on this particular assignment. As you will a comprehensive strategy leading from what are the understand, the last few months have been taken up immediate steps that need to be taken and a strategy by Afghanistan, Iraq and other issues related to that would include the question of the future status. NATO. I am somebody who has been for many That kind of strategy is still required and I do also years interested in the Balkans and have tried to believe that the Special Representative on the follow developments as much as possible. I have also ground of the United Nations, Soren Jessen- tried to keep track of what is going on in Kosovo, Petersen, is really basing himself and his work on but, of course, not at the same intense level as during that kind of strategy. those weeks. Q266 Sir John Stanley: Ambassador, would you Q264 Chairman: You clearly have kept in touch agree as far as final status is concerned that with developments. You made a series of ultimately there can only be one of two options: recommendations last July. I notice, for example, either Kosovo is going to have to remain under some that one of the points you made was, “The Serbs form of ultimate international government or it will understand that they cannot and should not remain have to be an independent nation state? Do you outside the political process”. Alas, following that agree that in the long term there is an inescapable the Serb community in Kosovo boycotted the choice between those two options? election. Has that development or any other caused HE Eide: I believe that is fair to say. I have said also you to amend any of the conclusions you reached in in the report that it is unthinkable that Belgrade will the recommendations you made? in the future have authority over Kosovo and that HE Eide: Let me put it this way. I do think that many Kosovo will be governed, I did not say by Pristina Kosovo Serb leaders also were deeply disappointed but from Pristina, with the EU in the lead that there was not a unanimous recommendation international role, and I believe that to be the case. from Belgrade in favour of participating in the elections. Why have they not re-entered the political structures and the political process? I think it is very Q267 Sir John Stanley: Do you agree or not that the hard for the Kosovo Serbs to do that without feeling likelihood of the international community, whether that they have Belgrade behind them. I feel that they through the EU or the UN, wanting on a permanent hesitate when it comes to doing that without feeling basis to have responsibility for Kosovo is really Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 109
13 January 2005 His Excellency Kai Eide almost inconceivable? They will not want to have Q271 Chairman: The five years mentioned by Sir that as a permanent responsibility. Do you agree John? that is correct? HE Eide: Yes. I think that would not be HE Eide: I agree absolutely. unreasonable. Much longer than that would be diYcult. What does that mean? I think the Q268 Sir John Stanley: Therefore, that being the international community would have to prepare case, it would indicate that the only viable long-term itself to stay and be present in Kosovo for a period answer to the status problem must be that Kosovo much beyond that, but now I am talking about the sooner or later, in whatever timescale, does emerge intermediate period before the date when the final as an independent nation state? powers, so to speak, are transferred to Kosovo HE Eide: I cannot see any other option in the long authorities. run, the long run not being that long. Q272 Mr Chidgey: Ambassador, if I can carry on to Q269 Sir John Stanley: You just anticipated my next a degree with that theme and particularly question. Could you give us your view, if that is what concentrate on standards before status, which you all the logic points to and you have confirmed it, that highlight in your report, I want to draw attention to is that the ultimate final status will be Kosovo as an your contention that the current process has proved independent nation state, as to the timescale in ineVective. If I may quote from your report, you say which this needs to be achieved, bearing in mind the that there is a growing recognition that the very crucial point you made in your report that “seen standards before status approach is untenable in its from internal Kosovo perspective, the longer we present form and must be replaced by a broader wait the more would the frustration in the Kosovo policy where standards implementation takes majority population increase”? Kosovo in an orderly way from the present through HE Eide: I still believe that to be true, of course, that future status discussions and into a wider regional the frustration will increase. There will, of course, be and European integration process. I have two a mid-year review next year with regard to standards particular questions and then a general one. In your and how to proceed from there. I really do hope that report you argue for a broader standards policy. Is there will be an outcome from that which will be there a risk that this policy shift could leave the suYcient for us to say, “Yes, we have now to initiate minorities unprotected and result in Kosovo’s a process of identifying the status”, not saying, independence before the achievement of decent “Now we start the status negotiations”, but the standards? process of identifying the status. How long that HE Eide: Here is the original standards process will be and what shape it will take will, of implementation, 119 pages. When looking through course, be a matter which the international this there is a great number of details and small community will have to look at when we reach points that will have to be implemented no doubt at mid-2005. one stage, but what I felt was that this process, which is so crucial, was developing into a bureaucratic process and not a political process, and that Q270 Sir John Stanley: Given the rising tide of therefore we had to say to ourselves, “What are the frustration (and that was brought home to us when priorities at this stage in order to move Kosovo we as a committee visited Kosovo) and potential for forward?”. I therefore argued for a prioritised instability that that could create, do you think that standards process before and after status, which for the whole process to achieve an independent means certain standards have to be fulfilled before nation statehood for Kosovo five years is a final status can be given and then we will have to reasonable timescale? Do you think 10 years? What continue with the standards implementation until would be your own personal view with your Kosovo then is integrated into a wider European background of having explored it with your report? framework. HE Eide: Sir John, I think we are here talking about two or three issues. There is the process of identifying status and then the implementation. I Q273 Mr Chidgey: That begs the question, think the process of discussing and negotiating the Ambassador, which standards will be the priorities? final status will have to be rather shorter, which HE Eide: From my point of view it was obvious that could pass through several phases, which would then following the events of March those standards I believe culminate in some kind of conference like relating to the safety and security of the minorities the one we had in Dayton or Rambouillet. Before were the key standards. We have to try and that there will of course have to be a process of concentrate (and there are some elements of that in preparing for such a conference. When that has been all standards) on those aspects that relate to that and done I believe that there will have to be a transition that the Kosovo Albanians must understand that period where Kosovo is not given full powers as a without this, and this is what I saw as the immediate nation state from the very outset but that the challenge, it will be very hard to proceed. international community will have to decide about the duration of a transition period. During that Q274 Mr Chidgey: Thank you, Ambassador. That is transition period, of course, certain powers would very helpful. My general question relates to the have to be vested in the international community. I experiences that I certainly discovered on our return believe that if you say five years that would not be an to the Western Balkans recently. It seemed there was unreasonable timetable. a general concept, and I would call it a sort of Ev 110 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
13 January 2005 His Excellency Kai Eide collective clutching at straws, in the attitudes of are prospects, that there is hope. Because when you many of the people that we met in the sense that they see today a population where 55% are under 30 years seemed to have a concept in their minds that old and 60% are unemployed then you are facing membership of the EU would solve all these serious trouble. The longer we wait with regard to problems—the economy, the security issues, the doing something more vigorous the greater the development, the identity if you like, of Kosovo burden will be along the road that we will all have to within the international scene, but at the same time carry. I would appeal strongly for a more robust, less there was no recognition of the requirement to ad-hocish and less sporadic engagement from some satisfy the Copenhagen criteria which we apply to of these international organisations and I think the every applicant’s status sometimes more eVectively EU obviously is the big magnet in this respect, but than others, you might argue. There seemed to be a not exclusively the EU. complete lack of any recognition of the rigour of that process going from an aspiration to being accepted Q276 Mr Chidgey: You feel that the politicians and as a potential applicant to going through the acquis, the administrators in Kosovo would be prepared to to becoming a member. I have to say that this is like accept that more rigorous intervention by foreign trying to wave a magic wand or whatever. There was organisations? no reality in their political appreciation. What is HE Eide: I think they would understand that they your perspective on this? have to accept it. They have to accept that with HE Eide: I agree completely with you. I think there greater engagement comes more responsibility and is, not only there but across the Balkans, an that if there is to be a bigger carrot there also has to impression that EU membership and NATO be an acceptance that they have to be helped along membership will solve things for them and if we can the road. We have to get away from this client only get there that is it. There is less enthusiasm for atmosphere that we so often have found to a state the nitty-gritty and the work that has to be done in where politicians understand that they really have to order to move forward. It does not surprise me. I do shape up and take the responsibility. Unfortunately, not think they have been exposed to the the March events and the first few couple of months requirements; they do not understand what the after that showed that they were not able or willing requirements are, and therefore I believe also that to do that, and that is very sad. much more of a dialogue between the European Union and Kosovo and Belgrade and others is also Q277 Mr Illsley: Ambassador, on the question of required in order to create a better understanding of final status in response to Sir John Stanley you said what the process really is and the fact that this is not that eventually the idea of some form of going to solve everything, that they have to take independence for Kosovo would probably be their share of the job. Also, I must say, much of the inevitable in the longer term. Given that last year the solution lies in the regional integration and regional Serbian minorities within Kosovo boycotted co-operation. Much of the economic progress that absolutely the elections and assuming that they they need has to be fostered from within the region, would look upon a final status of Kosovan not only from links to the wider Europe. independence as something that they would not wish to see and perhaps not like to live under, is there a Q275 Mr Chidgey: How do you feel that we in the danger that by accelerating the process towards a EU can initiate the beginning of that understanding final status we could see an exodus of the Serbian of acceptance of responsibility? minorities heading back towards Belgrade, back HE Eide: I am of the view that unfortunately several into Serbia or out of Kosovo altogether? international organisations have not played their HE Eide: There is a risk of that occurring but do you role to the full yet both with regard to Kosovo and not also believe that if we do the opposite, if we wait to other parts of the Western Balkans. I do think in and wait and wait, the frustration that exists and particular with regard to Kosovo that the approach that will grow could push the Serbs in exactly the of the EU, and the OSCE for that matter, has been same direction? That is why when I made my a little bit sporadic, that there is a lack of what I recommendations I said that while raising the would see as a clear strategy, perhaps also a question of the status has so far been seen as too hesitation with regard to moving more vigorously dangerous, I think it is now too dangerous to leave into the job, which I can understand. Of course, also, aside. However, it has to combine with what are the the mechanisms that we have in place within the EU, priority standards, and that is seeing to it that we do which you know much better than I, for obvious everything we can in order to enhance security for reasons, not coming from an EU Member State, are the minorities and carry out a sensible process of such that they are naturally developed with regard to establishing local and central government, seeing to sovereign states and not an area like Kosovo without it that return and reconstruction take place. I think any status. I do believe that some more imagination we are moving along that road but without that needs to be produced and that a more robust and work taking place now then of course a discussion of constant EU engagement is required to bring future status will entail more risk. We are faced with Kosovo forward. With that I am thinking of two situations which may both potentially lead to concrete projects but I am also thinking of assistance the same result. with regard to capacity building, putting in advisers where that is possible, engaging more and also seeing Q278 Mr Illsley: We are damned if we do and to it that the population in Kosovo can see that there damned if we do not? Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 111
13 January 2005 His Excellency Kai Eide
HE Eide: Exactly. There is no good moment for Mr Chidgey: It was from but not in. raising the status issue. Q284 Chairman: The formula was what? Q279 Chairman: Can you help on this? The HE Eide: I said that it should be governed from Secretary-General welcomed your recommendations. Pristina with EU in the leading international role, How have the Russians responded, particularly which does not say, of course, how important should because of their link with Serbia? that role be. Where is the emphasis? Obviously, as HE Eide: Chairman, there has been more of a we discussed, there will be a transition period where reluctance perhaps on the Russian side with regard after a while “from” will become “by”. to accepting moving into the process of the future status of Kosovo than there has been among the others. There has been more insistence that all Q285 Chairman: In that transition period, rather like standards have to be fully implemented before we the bucket and the well principle, the UN role would can go into that. There has been a diVerent approach decrease and the EU role would increase? taken by the Russians than by the other members of HE Eide: I would find that a sound way of the Security Council. proceeding, yes.
Q280 Chairman: Is that approach such that there Q286 Chairman: But not excluding other might be a danger of Russia obstructing mid-year organisations like, for example, the OSCE? discussions on the future? HE Eide: Chairman, I think the OSCE would have HE Eide: I do not dare to speculate on that. We will a very useful role to play in Kosovo for a number of have to see how positions evolve in light of the years also after the end of the future status process. progress that we can manage to make in Kosovo. I Here I come back to what I said about the European do not dare to speculate on what the future Russian Union. I do believe, unfortunately, that the whole position may be in that particular area. process, for instance, of capacity building, where the OSCE plays an important role, the Council of Q281 Chairman: And Washington? Europe and others, is an area where the HE Eide: In Washington I feel that there has been international community has not come far enough in general support for the recommendations that I developing what I would say is a robust, lasting made. There has been, I must say, a strong policy. We see so many weekend courses, seminars, underlining of the fact that what I called a prioritised conferences, where representatives of Ministries and standards process must not lead to us putting less politicians and bureaucrats are invited to attend in a emphasis on the standards, not scrapping the number of countries. I believe that we need more of standards policy; that was certainly never my what, for instance, we see in the Kosovo Police intention. School, which is an institution that has been established by the OSCE outside Pristina, which has Q282 Chairman: I want to clarify one or two matters carried out a constant series of training courses for before I call Sir John. In your recommendations you the police and has built up a very good police service. rule out partition, you rule out any continuing That police service is an example of what we should relationship with Serbia, and that would mean, for do in other areas. It is diYcult but it is doing good example, rejecting the proposals by the Serbian and it is necessary. Government for a decentralised local government structure bringing together the Serb communities within Kosovo? Q287 Chairman: Is it your view that the European HE Eide: If the Serb plan means bringing together Union is prepared to accept this enhanced role, all these areas in one contiguous region then I would particularly in the field of capacity building? How certainly do that. has Brussels responded to your package of recommendations? HE Eide: Chairman, the meeting rooms that I Q283 Chairman: Not contiguous but having groups normally attend in Brussels are in another which are responsible for key elements and, I organisation, as you know. What happens in the suspect, therefore looking towards Belgrade. corridors of the EU is hard for me to judge but I HE Eide: I think the process that is now under way, would be very pleased if I could see evidence on the which means to identify certain pilot projects, like ground of a firmer long-term strategy. I do not see municipalities where the Serbs have more control that today. over their own fate and their own situation, is the right way to go. There are many good things to say about the Serb plans, the concerns we share, and Q288 Chairman: You do not see that? certain aspects of it also I do not find diYcult to HE Eide: I do not see that today. I think there is a accept. However, I do believe that the process that is significant amount of hesitation and perhaps also under way now with regard to identifying pilot confusion about how to move forward with regard projects such as Gracanica and others is the right to Kosovo. It is not easy because it is not a sovereign way to go. state. It is something else, something still undefined, Chairman: In response to Mr Chidgey you referred where it is very diYcult to engage with the to government in Pristina or from Pristina but not mechanisms that have been established for by Pristina. sovereign states. Ev 112 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
13 January 2005 His Excellency Kai Eide
Q289 Sir John Stanley: March last year and more eYciently to situations of that kind should demonstrated that the security situation in Kosovo they occur again. The next question you ask is much more fragile and potentially more explosive probably relates to the KPS. than I think a lot of people thought. I think it spells possibly a growing degree of complacency about the Q291 Sir John Stanley: I was going to do that, yes, security of the position in Kosovo. I would just like so please continue. What about KPS and to go through the three main security components improvements there? with you. Could we start with KFor? Could you tell HE Eide: There I must say I believe improvements us what you think should take place within KFor by have taken place and are constantly taking place. way of improvements dealing with the security There were, as I have indicated in my report, plans position in Kosovo? worked out by the Director of the Kosovo Police HE Eide: Sir John, since this is an area that I know Service School to establish riot control units in the better than most other areas. I think we have gone KPS quite some time ago. The oVers were there for through a comprehensive process of identifying training, the oVers were there for equipment but, for where the shortfalls were. They had to do with reasons of priority probably, little had been done in national caveats put on national contingents. I have order to bring that forward. What is happening been positively surprised to see how much of that has today is that we are moving forward on that and been removed and the fact that today I think we are three special police units have been established with better equipped to handle that kind of situation than the specific purpose of being able to handle riot we were before, not only with regard to national control situations. That is ultimately where we have caveats but also in the way we operate on the ground to go and where KFor should push the KPS to go. with mobile observation teams patrolling It cannot be a KFor role forever to do riot control constantly, trying to get closer in touch with the and policing operations, nor can it be the task of an community, which is what you really need. It is not international police force consisting of more than 40 only a question of technical intelligence; it is also a diVerent nations. It has to be the responsibility of the question of contact with the communities. I think Kosovo Police Service. We have made progress in that has improved significantly. I think also the that area over the last few months. relationship between KFor1,KPS2 and UNMIK3 has improved significantly since that happened. Q292 Sir John Stanley: How successful do you feel Finally, we have postponed a previously planned the eVorts have been to try and ensure the KPS is restructuring of KFor because there is a general multi-ethnic force with some degree of Serbian understanding, which was also confirmed at the representation? Ministerial meeting which took place in December, HE Eide: I cannot recall precisely how big they are, that we cannot at this stage restructure or reduce our I think it is around 15%, but please take that with a presence on the ground and cannot do that for pinch of salt. Should it be more? Yes, it should be some time. more. What is important is that they engage. I believe it is developing as a rather eYcient multi- Q290 Sir John Stanley: Thank you. That is very ethnic police force. I think the situation has changed rather a lot since I was there as Chairman of the encouraging. The national caveat issue is one that we OSCE Council in 1999–2000. At the final ceremony very much pursued when we were in Kosovo and our of one of the police school classes there was booing colleague, Ms Gisela Stuart, was particularly from parents and friends of Kosovo Albanian following that whilst we were there. Can I now turn policemen every time a Serb policeman’s name was to the police, starting with the UNMIK civilian listed by the director of the school. I think we have police? Can you tell us what improvements you moved beyond that. I would like to applaud the would like to see as far as they are concerned when eVorts that have been made by Steve Bennett, the they are dealing with their security responsibilities? director of the school who came in and built this up. HE Eide: The UNMIK police consists of more than He really took charge of the whole thing. He was a 40 nations. Having been myself head of the UN man who said, “I’m going to stay the course. I’m operation in Bosnia in 1997 and the beginning of going to be here until I can say that this is a police 1998, which was basically a police operation with Y force that can handle the situation.” That is the kind 2,000 police o cers from more than 30 states, I can of attitude and approach we need in other areas. assure you that that is not an easy operation to lead. V Chairman: Mr Mackinlay is a member of the OSCE The di erences in culture, in the way of performing Parliamentary Assembly and so I suspect that will be on the ground, are significant. That also makes it music to his ears. very diYcult to train and supervise and monitor and teach the local police on the ground in a uniform way how to proceed. I am not, I must say, aware of Q293 Andrew Mackinlay: I am concerned about the specific steps within UNMIK with regard to the impact of the United Kingdom and other Western improvement of their performance but they have, of European governments forcibly repatriating many course, also established much tighter links with refugees back to Kosovo. We have had some KFor and with KPS in order to react more quickly evidence to suggest that the remittances of people who are in the West are important to the families in 1 Kosovo Peacekeeping Force. Kosovo. I think we were told in broad-brush 2 Kosovo Police Service. terms that there is something like 80% male 3 United Nations Mission in Kosovo. unemployment, although it is diYcult to gauge Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 113
13 January 2005 His Excellency Kai Eide precisely what unemployment there is in Kosovo. HE Eide: I believe that is still the situation, although What do you think about that? Do you think that I am not following this day to day, that we are not the Western European countries, including my own, moving ahead with regard to the reconstruction should perhaps have a more accommodating of churches, monasteries and other religious position on allowing people to live here and have monuments that were damaged during the March legitimate employment? violence. I think that is a great pity because these are HE Eide: Mr Mackinlay, this is a debate that takes also buildings that represent the identity of the place in a number of Western European countries, people who we want to live there. including my own. I am not quite sure if it falls within my remit to pronounce on issues that I believe Q296 Andrew Mackinlay: Has it been their choice in my country and other countries are issues of not to proceed? One has to ask whose fault it is. I internal political controversy. would not want that to be said in evidence against Kosovo Albanians if it is the case of there being Q294 Andrew Mackinlay: I understand. In four international money available but the conditions years’ time it is highly probable that there will be a being unacceptable to the international community. “velvet divorce” between Serbia and Montenegro. HE Eide: It seems the money is available but the Serb Orthodox Church has stalled the What impact will that have on the political situation Y vis-a`-vis the way forward on Kosovo bearing in reconstruction. I think it is always very di cult to make judgments on this because when you are on the mind it is an integral part of Serbia? I do not think ground you find out that there are layers after layers many of us here consider it will ever be in the same of reasons and arguments. I do not want to make political unit outside of the European Union with simplistic judgments but I do think it is a great pity Serbia, but that is the position. Does a “velvet that we have not been able to move forward. We divorce” with Montenegro aggravate the situation, have been able to move forward on the is it neutral or does it help? reconstruction of houses to a significant extent, I HE Eide: This whole question of Serbia and may say. Montenegro adds to the political burden in the political landscape in Belgrade and complicates the situation further there. That is also why I have said Q297 Chairman: Is that for the same reasons, Mr it is so important that we spend more time having a Eide? constant political dialogue with Belgrade and being HE Eide: We have made progress. in touch with their leaders. They do have a Chairman: You have made progress. significant number of challenges ahead of them. I believe it is important in this situation that the Q298 Andrew Mackinlay: One final question. Last dialogue we have with Belgrade is solid and week there was a cause of anxiety because there was constant. I believe that there has been a tendency to an incident which had all the chemistry, it would pay insuYcient attention to that dialogue and I think seem, for the same kind of situation which triggered that is wrong. It is not helpful on Kosovo issues or the March riots. From what you have said, but I other issues that may occur over the next few years. wanted to confirm this, although there was that I would strongly appeal to all to try to see to it that incident last week that caused some concern that has the trust and confidence that is required to move into been successfully contained, as it were? Would that diYcult processes vis-a`-vis Belgrade are there and be correct? that Belgrade also feels that the incentives that may HE Eide: There was a very tragic situation when a be available to others are also available to Belgrade. young boy was shot dead and, as you said, it was There is the diYcult question of the Hague tribunal. contained. I think there is greater awareness today in The Hague Tribunal is there and it is there with Kosovo and in the region that one should do what regard to NATO, it is there with regard to the EU, can be done in order to avoid new turbulence but I believe that even within the framework of that occurring. I think there is also on the Kosovo conditionality there is much we can do in order to Albanian side a certain nervousness with regard to bring Belgrade into more of a dialogue with us. what the consequences of new turbulence could be. We have to keep the pressure on, I must say, in order to see to it that they stay on the right course and that Q295 Andrew Mackinlay: When we met your deputy they try to do whatever they can do to prevent new in the region I can remember raising with him and violence from occurring and also do what they can his colleagues an incident where the Serb Orthodox do in order to make progress on the reconstruction, Church had declined European Union monies to return, etcetera. I raise that because I am not quite restore buildings which had been damaged because convinced that it is the case today. I think within the they were laying down who the re-builders should be Kosovo Albanian leadership also there are diVerent and saying that it should not be Kosovo Albanians views. I do not think that everybody is equally and that was a cause of considerable concern to us. convinced that we have to move forward, for Has that attitude changed or is it one which is instance, on the decentralisation and the endemic in these areas where there are Serb development of local government which gives the communities within Kosovo? Are they shunning Serbs what they need to have in order to have a help to restore that which has been destroyed or sustained presence in Kosovo. I am not sure that laying down conditions which would be even among the leading politicians that that is a view unacceptable? deeply held and we can only see to it that this Ev 114 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
13 January 2005 His Excellency Kai Eide happens if we keep the pressure on. What worries me of creating political structures which are so as the months go by is that pressure will slowly unsatisfactory in their basis and also may be too disappear and we will return to the situation that we small? The other thing which worries me terribly were in earlier where the push for progress when you talk about police forces and compliance disappeared. with the rule of law is you have got residual ethnic Andrew Mackinlay: I apologise I was a little bit late groupings together and I am seriously beginning to but have we asked or are we going to ask about the wonder if we are not dealing with sizes of structures Prime Minister of Kosovo? which in the long term are not sustainable and Chairman: No, by all means raise that. therefore all our worries with Kosovo are much more fundamental problems than just saying we Q299 Andrew Mackinlay: The new Prime Minister need more capacity building and we need more of of Kosovo is seen by Belgrade as a war criminal. these kind of courses. These bits of the jigsaw just There is talk about an indictment. Do you have an have not played themselves out. That may be a indication as to the timetable of when that terribly pessimistic view. uncertainty will be resolved or indeed what the HE Eide: Ms Stuart, I struggle with much of the impact would be on the body politic of Kosovo? We same in my own thinking on the region, although I cannot wish this away. There is this thing hanging must say when it comes to Kosovo I cannot see any over us and we are not going to see you again for a other way out than what we are describing. We can little while, I guess, so I wonder, to the extent you are go through all possible other options and I cannot able, if you would just take us around that particular find any. You touched upon sustainability. If you go issue which is a cause for some concern. I realise I am back to the 1980s, if I am not completely mistaken, asking you to crystal-ball gaze to an extent. there was also 40 or 50% unemployment in Kosovo HE Eide: First of all, I think it is very unfortunate while there was in Slovenia almost full employment, that we are in a situation where week after week where Kosovo survived on resources being month after month we are talking about whether this transferred from Slovenia and Croatia, so the person will be indicted or not. It is a rather unusual outlook is not particularly encouraging, That is why situation and an unfortunate situation. Of course it I also like to emphasise when we have this situation prolongs an atmosphere of political uncertainty in a developing with a number of rather smaller situation where we need something completely countries that it is so important to make them diVerent. It has created a situation where there is understand that much of their economic prospects more political confusion in Pristina than we need depend on their ability to deal with each other. That and there is more political confusion in Belgrade is their most important market. That is where they than we need for the moment, and that complicates have to inter-act economically and politically. Of the whole process of moving things forward. I will course, that is going to be a tremendous challenge not be able to look into the crystal ball and say when only a few years after the wars we have been through this matter will be brought out of the way but we all in the region. There is simply no other way and that hope that period will be as short as possible before is why I also think that it is important to say that, clarity is established. May I also say that I do believe yes, integration into Europe must be our objective, that in the situation we are in now, clearly the best but integration of countries and states where the situation would be to see to it that there is political borders between them are as low as possible and unanimity among the Kosovo Albanian leaders as where we do our utmost in order to try to stimulate they move closer to a process of status definition. economic and other interaction and co-operation . It How that can be done will be up to the special is going to be very very hard but I cannot see any representative on the ground, but I think that we other way of moving out of it. have to keep that in mind, that the more clarity and the more unanimity we can have among the leaders Q301 Ms Stuart: I do not want to put words in your in Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanian leaders today, mouth but I think I am almost detecting an answer the better it will certainly be for the status process to the question you declined to give to Mr that will lie ahead of us. Mackinlay because if the argument and the way it reaches agreement is an awareness that you need to Q300 Ms Stuart: Over the weekend I went back to economically co-operate within the home territory, reading some stuV which was said about the former then a significant ex-patriot population that simply Yugoslavia five years ago and then 10 years ago, and sends remits back home may continue a kind of it was quite striking that predictions were made ethnic diversion but on foreign soil and therefore about the fragility of the structure in Macedonia but become entrenched and will not move forward, now it is actually much more stable than we no which would not be very helpful in the long run. So doubt thought. I am just beginning to get terribly in the long run the solution has to be found on home concerned that if you look at this whole territory? geographical area which with the fall of Tito fell HE Eide: Absolutely. A solution has to be found on apart, we end up with Kosovo almost being the bit the home territory. If you look at the situation over which is the least resolved. All the other bits of the the last few years, there can be no doubt that the jigsaw are falling into place but this one is not. I was assistance given by the government to Kosovo is very interested when you said that we require going down, the money sent home by the diaspora is unanimous political will on the part of the Serbian going down. All the sources are not drying up but and Albanian leaderships but are we not in danger there is less coming from those other sources. If we Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 115
13 January 2005 His Excellency Kai Eide do not spend more money and eVort on this area just merely on the security side with the military what is the result going to be with the kind of deployments we have made there and the police unemployment that I mentioned of young people? contribution we have made, but also in wider We are not going to see fewer coming to our economic aid and government capacity building. countries, we are going to see more in one way or For example, we found out, which I did not know another. The question is what kind of policy do you until we went there, that a very, very senior and want to implement here? I think the answer is quite expert oYcial from our Customs & Excise clear. The more we can try to do now in that region department here has actually created a customs the more problems we will be able to avoid in the service for Kosovo. If you were having this meeting future not only in that region but also in our own this morning with Mr Blair or Mr Straw, what would countries. The more we can manage to create a you be urging them to do as far as the British police service in Kosovo that can handle organised contribution in the future in Kosovo is concerned? crime and corruption there the more we will HE Eide: I would urge them, just as I would urge certainly help ourselves also. leaders of other European Union and OSCE countries for that matter, to ensure that what they Q302 Ms Stuart: This next question is to do with do is well co-ordinated and that it is sustained. I something which we picked up anecdotally when we consider the UK’s contribution to be an outstanding were there and it was to do with money going into one. I have seen that from my work for the OSCE the area and the trail of accountability when outside and NATO. There is no doubt that the role that your money is being spent by outside institutions. Do you troops have played both in Bosnia and Kosovo is really first-class. They have managed better than feel there is more that could be done, that there is an Y accountability trail and therefore we will not become anybody to do the job e ciently and to get the a source of indigenous corruption? confidence of the population in a way that others HE Eide: More can always be done, there is no have not managed to do. I think the British doubt about that. I think this is a problem that we contribution has been an example to many of us. I think we are also doing better now. It is interesting have been aware of for quite some time and where to see that operations are not called “NATO” I believe that governments and institutions, anymore, they are “NATO-led”. The Swedes have organisations, try to follow their money and what made a great contribution. I think many of us have happens to it as best they can. Do they always spend learned from your way of operating on the ground. it sensibly or in an optimal fashion? There is a You played a great role in the policing part. When I question mark there. I would refer you to the was in Bosnia I had a British police commissioner capacity building. Many governments today spend at the end of my time there who went on to work millions and millions on seminars and conferences in Kosovo and in many other places around the and weekend courses and travelling back and forth. globe and he made an absolutely outstanding Does it all make sense? I have been working on this contribution. I applaud the contribution that you for years, Chairman. I think we have come quite a make. long way when it comes to co-operation between various international organisations and nations, but Q304 Chairman: Ambassador, you have immense V it is still too fragmented and serious e ort should be personal experience in the region. You have helped made by the international community to co-ordinate us with your accumulative wisdom on it. Perhaps for V its e ort and get the most out of the money that is me the challenge was that if we as the West, as spent. OECD, as the EU, as NATO, do not go to Kosovo and go soon and work with the local people there, Q303 Sir John Stanley: Our Committee is they are liable to come to us in all sorts of unwelcome particularly charged to focus on the policy of the ways. May I thank you very much indeed, on behalf British Government and we are aware that the UK of the Committee, for your evidence. has played a very wide-ranging role in Kosovo, not HE Eide: Thank you very much. Ev 116 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Written evidence
Letter to HE Sir Peter Ricketts KCMG, UK Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), from the Chairman of the Committee, 7 September 2004 I write to inform you that the Foreign AVairs Committee has launched an inquiry into the situation in the Balkans. The inquiry will examine aspects of recent economic and political development in the Balkans and the current threats to the region’s stability. The inquiry will look in particular at the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and the autonomous region of Kosovo. As a contribution to their inquiry, the Committee would greatly appreciate a short submission to the inquiry, outlining your analysis of NATO policy and its implementation in the Balkans. The Committee would be greatly assisted if we were to receive any such memorandum by 11 October 2004. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact the Committee Secretariat on 0207 219 4082. Rt Hon Donald Anderson MP Chairman of the Committee 7 September 2004
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from Sir Peter Ricketts KCMG, United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 15 September 2004 Many thanks for your letter of 7 September. I would be delighted to contribute a paper setting out NATO policy and activity in the Balkans, as a supplement to the fuller FCO memorandum which the Committee has already received. We will set to work on this straightaway and make sure you have it before 11 October. I will myself be back in London on Wednesday 29 September for meetings in the afternoon. If you and any members of the Committee were available during the morning, I would be happy to come over and discuss NATO issues with you, both in relation to the Balkans and more widely if you wished. Perhaps the Committee Secretary could let my oYce know if that would be feasible. Sir Peter Ricketts KCMG UK Permanent Representative to NATO 15 September 2004
Written evidence submitted by the UK Delegation to NATO
Introduction 1. At the request of the Foreign AVairs Committee, the UK Delegation to NATO submits the following memorandum as a contribution to the Committee’s inquiry into the situation in the Western Balkans. The Foreign and Commonwealth OYce has already submitted a memorandum providing a comprehensive overview of UK policy towards the Western Balkans. This memorandum provides more detail on certain aspects of NATO’s policy and activities in the region. Attached at Annex A are relevant extracts from the Communique´ issued by Heads of State and Government at the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, which include the most recent high level NATO statement of policy in the region. For the purposes of this Memorandum, “Western Balkans” is defined as Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. 2. NATO’s involvement in the Western Balkans encompasses NATO-led military operations and outreach programmes which promote cooperation and reform in the region. The UK is a strong supporter of and contributor to NATO’s activities in both these areas. Through both forms of engagement, NATO’s aim is to foster peace, security and stability for the countries of the region, based on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and to assist their integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.
NATO-Led Operations 3. Since 1995, when NATO military action and the deployment of IFOR helped to secure a peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), NATO-led Operations have played a crucial role in safeguarding security and building stability in the Western Balkans, as part of a wider engagement by the International Community. The FCO Memorandum to the Committee gave detailed information about the evolution of NATO’s operations in the region. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 117
4. In BiH, the progress made since IFOR was deployed in December 1995 has been remarkable. The NATO Spring 2004 Periodic Mission Review (PMR) for the Balkans assessed that SFOR (currently over 850 personnel) should be able to successfully complete its mission by the end of the year, handing over to a new and distinct EU mission based on the Berlin Plus arrangements. NATO’s long term political commitment to BiH will continue, in the form of a NATO Headquarters, which will primarily give advice on defence reform, as well as carry out operational tasks such as counter-terrorism, force protection, supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in detaining persons indicted for war crimes, and intelligence sharing with the EU. NATO and the EU have agreed an outline delineation of tasks between the NATO HQ and the future EUFOR. We are confident that the two Commanders will establish a close working relationship. 5. This year’s Spring PMR was shared with the EU, to ensure full transparency. There are regular staV contacts between NATO and the EU, and BiH is also discussed by senior representatives of the NATO and EU nations in regular joint meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the EU’s Political and Security Committee. 6. NATO also contributes to the work of the Contact Group on Kosovo, represented by Deputy Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Robert Serry. 7. Following the outbreak of violence in Kosovo in March this year, it was decided that further planned reductions in KFOR numbers (currently around 200) and the transition of MNB(C) to a task force structure should be put on hold and that the disposition of forces and structures should be reviewed in the Autumn PMR. 8. Although KFOR reacted quickly to the March violence, a “Lessons Learned” exercise carried out by NATO highlighted several areas where changes were needed in order to enhance KFOR’s ability to react more eVectively in the event of further outbreaks. The UK attaches particular importance to the work currently in hand to reduce restrictive national caveats on the use of forces serving with KFOR, particularly in crowd and riot control and to fill the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). 9. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, Heads of State and Government agreed a new NATO policy on Combating TraYcking in Human Beings. The UK is actively supporting NATO’s implementation of this policy. 10. Several Western Balkans countries have themselves contributed to NATO-led Operations. Albania currently has around 70 troops serving in SFOR, and 20 in ISAF. Croatia currently has about 45 troops in ISAF, while Macedonia has around 25 troops in ISAF.
NATO’s Outreach Programmes 11. NATO’s mission in the Western Balkans extends beyond military operations. The Alliance is also working to promote longer-term stability, security, and reform through its outreach programmes, particularly the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). 12. Croatia, Albania and Macedonia are all members of PfP and participants in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. Through the MAP, the Alliance assesses, evaluates and provides feedback on the reforms required to join NATO, including scrutiny of political reforms, democratic development and the rule of law, and defence and security sector reforms. 13. Albania joined the PfP in 1994 and has participated in the MAP since 1999. Albania also hosts a NATO Senior Military Representative and NATO Headquarters, whose functions include monitoring lines of Communications for KFOR, advising the Albanian authorities on border security and smuggling interdiction, and contributing to NATO PfP programmes in Albania. Albania has made progress under the MAP, including in carrying out a defence review, beginning defence restructuring and playing a positive role in regional cooperation. Allies continue to urge Albania to accelerate reforms, particularly in building a responsible democratic political culture, fighting organised crime, traYcking and corruption, implementing judicial, electoral and administrative reforms, and maintaining focus and funding for defence reform. The UK’s defence cooperation programme with Albania contributes directly to the MAP process, covering issues such as English-language training, staV courses and courses in defence management. We have also supported small arms destruction through bilateral assistance and through a NATO Trust Fund. 14. Croatia joined the PfP in 2000 and has participated in the MAP since 2002. Croatia has made progress in a number of areas, including by demonstrating democratic political stability. Through the MAP, Allies have pressed Croatia to maintain full cooperation with the ICTY, including by making greater eVorts to apprehend former General Ante Gotovina. Allies have also urged Croatia to make further progress across the reform agenda, including on judicial reform, rights of minorities, returning refugees, and implementing defence restructuring and downsizing. The UK supports Croatia’s MAP reforms through the bilateral defence cooperation programme, including through provision of a special defence advisor to the Croatian Ministry of Defence. Ev 118 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
15. Macedonia joined the PfP in 1995 and the MAP process in 1999. NATO has played a key role in fostering security in Macedonia since the inter-ethnic conflict of 2001, and the subsequent deployment of NATO forces in Macedonia until the end of 2002. The historic handover of NATO’s Operation Amber Fox to the EU’s Operation Concordia in 2002 marked the first use of the Berlin Plus arrangements. NATO continues actively to work for stability in Macedonia, including through a NATO Headquarters in Skopje. The functions of the Headquarters include advising on defence reform aspects of the MAP, advice on border security reform, support to KFOR and co-ordination with the EU presence in the country. A British Brigadier is the Commander of NATO HQ Skopje and is double hatted as the NATO Senior Military Representative to Macedonia. There is no longer a NATO Civilian Representative in Macedonia, the last having departed in 2004. 16. Since embarking on MAP, Macedonia has made encouraging progress on defence reform and restructuring, including a Strategic Defence Review carried out with UK support. Under the MAP, Allies have urged Macedonia to make continued progress and for rapid, eVective implementation of reforms, including fully implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement which ended the 2001 crisis, developing democratic political stability, harmonious relations between ethnic groups, security and rule of law, and implementation of defence reform. The NATO Secretary General gave press interviews on 4 October where he re-iterated that the proposed referendum on the territorial division of local self-government was a matter for Macedonia, highlighted the importance that the International Community place upon the Ohrid agreement and need to respect territorial integrity.
17. The three countries’ participation in the MAP has created opportunities for additional regional cooperation. For example, on 2 May 2003, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and the USA signed a Charter for Partnership (“Adriatic Charter”), which set as a shared goal the full integration of the three countries into European and transatlantic political, economic, security and defence institutions. With UK support, this has been followed up with cooperation between the three countries, including an action plan covering exchange of information, consultations and defence cooperation. The three countries are currently considering forming a combined military unit to be deployed in NATO-led operations. 18. The NATO Summit in Istanbul kept open the prospect of NATO membership for all three countries, but made clear that this was unlikely in the near future. While underlining Allies’ wish to see all three countries succeed, and committing Allies to continue to assist in the Aspirants’ reform eVorts, the summit also made clear that further eVorts were needed and that NATO would continue to assess each country’s candidacy based on progress towards reform goals under the MAP. 19. Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) and BiH have yet to obtain PfP membership, largely due to their lack of co-operation with ICTY. The UK Government looks forward to welcoming SaM and BiH into PfP once they have met the established conditions. In preparation for their eventual accession to PfP, NATO has undertaken outreach with both countries to support reform and build confidence. 20. Since 1996 NATO has conducted a Security Co-operation Programme with BiH to promote cooperation between the armed forces of the entities in BiH, contribute to stability in BiH and the region, and to assist in preparing BiH for eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The Programme has become a significant contributor to security sector reform in BiH and has contributed to the work of the Defence Reform Commission, through activities such as workshops and expert visits to BiH, and BiH participation in selected PfP activities, mainly NATO courses. The NATO headquarters, which will be established in Sarajevo when SFOR completes its mission, will play a key role in implementing the cooperation programme. 21. NATO initiated a tailored co-operation programme with SaM in 2003 covering defence and security sector reform, civil emergency planning, base conversion and social re-integration of redundant oYcers. Activities under the programme included seminars, expert team missions and SaM oYcers attending selected PfP activities. The programme has made a valuable contribution to encouraging defence reform and building confidence with the SaM defence establishment. As NATO’s designated Contact Point Embassy from 2002 to September 2004, the British Embassy in Belgrade was able to play an active role in helping to develop and implement the NATO programme.
22. The UK has been active in wider NATO outreach in the Western Balkans. For example, the UK was instrumental in organising a series of EAPC workshops on border security in the region, the most recent in Tirana in January 2003. The UK has also been an active contributor to NATO’s South East Europe Initiative (SEEI), aimed at promoting regional cooperation and long-term stability in the Balkans. Launched at the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit, SEEI includes countries in the region who are not members of EAPC and PfP—namely BiH and SaM. Examples of projects undertaken under the initiative include a web-based document database for the region, and a UK-sponsored study of the Defence policies of countries in the region. UK Delegation to NATO 5 October 2004 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 119
Annex A Relevant extracts from the Istanbul Summit Communiqu„ dealing with the Western Balkans as issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 2004 (. . .) Today, we have: (. . .) agreed to conclude the Alliance’s successful SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and welcomed the readiness of the European Union to deploy a new and distinct UN-mandated Chapter VII mission in the country, based on the Berlin! arrangements agreed between our two organisations; confirmed that a robust KFOR presence remains essential to further enhance security and promote the political process in Kosovo; (. . .) reaYrmed that NATO’s door remains open to new members, and encouraged Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue the reforms necessary to progress towards NATO membership; (. . .) The security environment in the strategically important region of the Balkans is stable but remains fragile. The Alliance remains committed to peace and stability in the Balkans, and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the region. We will remain committed until peace and security are firmly established and the progressive integration of all Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic structures is achieved. All the countries of the region must assume ownership of, and implement, pressing reforms. Closer cooperation in their own region will help to promote stability and prosperity. While welcoming improvement in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), where it has occurred, we stress that all countries concerned must cooperate fully with the ICTY, in particular bringing to justice all those who are indicted by the Tribunal, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, as well as Ante Gotovina, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1503 and 1534. As the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has evolved positively, we have decided to conclude the Alliance’s successful SFOR operation by the end of this year. We welcome the readiness of the European Union to deploy a new and distinct UN-mandated robust Chapter VII mission in the country, based on the Berlin! arrangements agreed between our two organisations, and look forward to continued close cooperation. NATO’s long-term political commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina remains unchanged and the establishment of a NATO headquarters will constitute NATO’s residual military presence in the country. NATO HQ Sarajevo, which has the principal task of providing advice on defence reform, will also undertake certain operational supporting tasks, such as counter-terrorism whilst ensuring force protection; supporting the ICTY, within means and capabilities, with regard to the detention of persons indicted for war crimes; and intelligence sharing with the EU. The Dayton/Paris Accords remain in force as the basis for peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo, a robust KFOR presence remains essential to further enhance security and promote the political process. We reaYrm our commitment to a secure, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo, on the basis of full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the agreed Standards before Status Policy and the Standards Review Mechanism. We strongly condemn the outbreak of violence resulting in the loss of lives and the destruction of religious and cultural heritage sites in March 2004, and will not tolerate any such actions intended to undermine the political process. We call on all parties to speed up the reconstruction and to create conditions for the safe return of displaced persons. We urge all communities to work constructively towards meeting the internationally endorsed standards, to engage in dialogue at all levels, and to participate in local civic institutions. We also call on them to conduct, and participate in, the upcoming October elections in a fair and peaceful manner. We welcome the appointment by the UN Secretary General of Mr Soren Jessen-Petersen as his Special Representative in Kosovo. To further progress, NATO will continue to work with the UN, the EU, the OSCE and other international organisations, as well as the Contact Group, including, as appropriate, attendance at its meetings. (. . .) We celebrate the success of NATO’s Open Door policy, and reaYrm today that our seven new members will not be the last. The door to membership remains open. We welcome the progress made by Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in implementing their Annual National Programmes under the Membership Action Plan, and encourage them to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to progress towards NATO membership. We also commend their contribution to regional stability and cooperation. We want all three countries to succeed and will continue to assist them in their reform eVorts. NATO will continue to assess each country’s candidacy individually, based on the progress made towards reform goals pursued through the Membership Action Plan, which will remain the vehicle to keep the readiness of each aspirant for membership under review. We direct that NATO Foreign Ministers Ev 120 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
keep the enlargement process, including the implementation of the Membership Action Plan, under continual review and report to us. We will review at the next Summit progress by aspirants towards membership based on that report. The recent enlargements of NATO and the European Union are a major step towards a Europe whole and free, and a strong confirmation that our organisations share common values and strategic interests. We are pleased with the progress made in developing the NATO-EU strategic partnership on the basis of and since the conclusion of the Berlin! arrangements. NATO and the EU continue to cooperate eVectively in the Western Balkans, and are committed to assist the countries of the region in their further integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO-EU relations now cover a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency planning. We are determined to work together to further develop the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organisations, in a spirit of transparency, and respecting the autonomy of our two organisations. (. . .) We look forward to welcoming Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro into the Partnership for Peace once they have met the established NATO conditions. We want them to succeed in joining the Euro-Atlantic partnership and will assist them in this endeavour. We are prepared to assist the countries by including them in selected PfP activities. Each country will be judged on its own merits on the road to PfP. We welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina’s significant progress in defence reform, a key condition for PfP membership. We urge continued progress towards achieving a single military force. We have agreed to designate a Contact Point Embassy in Sarajevo to increase understanding of NATO. We are concerned that Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly obstructionist elements in the Republika Srpska entity, has failed to live up to its obligation to cooperate fully with ICTY, including the arrest and transfer to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of war crimes indictees, a fundamental requirement for the country to join PfP. We also look for systemic changes necessary to develop eVective security and law enforcement structures. Serbia and Montenegro has also shown progress in defence reform, and the government has played a constructive regional role, improving relations with its neighbours. We look forward to further progress in these areas, in particular in relation to the government’s engagement on Kosovo-related issues. At the same time, the International Court of Justice cases against several of the Allies still stand. We call on the government to fulfil its international obligations, in particular to cooperate with ICTY and render all necessary assistance to secure the arrest and transfer to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of war crimes indictees. (. . .) Note: The full text of the NATO Istanbul Communique is available on the NATO Website at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm
Written evidence submitted by the UK Representation to the EU
EU Policy towards the Western Balkans 1. At the request of the Foreign AVairs Committee, the UK Representation to the EU submits the following memorandum providing an overview of the EU’s policy towards the region. It is intended to complement the material contained in the FCO’s memorandum to the Committee. 2. The EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans has deepened significantly in recent years. The EU is now perceived as the leading international player in the Western Balkans in political, trade and financial terms. It is also playing an increasing role in the region’s security. The EU’s overall aim is to spread peace, stability and prosperity to the region, making unthinkable a return to the military conflicts that characterised the 1990s. 3. The EU—Western Balkans Summit at Thessaloniki in June 2003 reconfirmed that the countries of the Western Balkans are potential candidates for eventual EU membership. It strengthened the EU’s political dialogue and cooperation with the region, and extended to the Western Balkans in a number of practical ways the “toolbox” of instruments that the EU used successfully to prepare for its most recent enlargement. But the Summit also stressed that the speed of the Western Balkans’ integration into the EU depends ultimately on the countries’ own success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and the specific requirements of the EU’s Stabilisation & Association (SA) process for the region. 4. The EU’s relationship with the countries of the region is governed by the SA process, which aims to encourage vital reforms as well as regional cooperation and development. SA Agreements (SAAs) are a key element of this process. An SAA is the formal contractual framework governing the EU’s political and economic cooperation with a country of the Western Balkans, lasting right up until its eventual accession. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 121
5. So far, Croatia and Macedonia have concluded SAAs, and both have since formally applied to join the EU. Croatia was accorded candidate country status in June 2004, while the Commission’s opinion on Macedonia’s application is expected sometime in 2005. Albania is in the process of negotiating its SAA. The opening of SAA negotiations with Bosnia and Serbia & Montenegro depends on their progress in implementing basic reforms and meeting key conditionalities. 6. The Commission publishes every year SA reports on the progress of each of the countries of the region. The last set was published in March 2004 and was accompanied for the first time by forward-looking European Partnerships to help each country to identify and prioritise the key reforms necessary for EU integration. These Partnerships will be updated annually. 7. The EU’s financial assistance to the region is currently running at around 600 million euro a year. (This figure does not include the cost of the EU’s military and civilian operations in the region.) A large proportion of this funding takes the form of grants devoted to project-related technical assistance for strengthening key public institutions, promoting economic reform and meeting basic EU norms. The EU also helps meet the running costs of the OYce of the High Representative in Bosnia and the economic development pillar of the UN administration in Kosovo. Although the profile of EU assistance is now on a slightly declining trend, this reflects the deliberate front-loading of aid over the period 2000-2006 in response to the Kosovo crisis. The Western Balkans nonetheless enjoy one of the highest levels of EU assistance per capita of any region in the world. 8. The EU is by far the most important export market for the Western Balkans. The vast majority of products from the region now enjoy exceptional duty-free and unlimited access to EU markets. These arrangements are asymmetric (in the sense that EU products do not necessarily enjoy the same access to Western Balkan markets) and are even more generous than those that were enjoyed by the then candidate countries of central and eastern Europe. A priority for the future is to create a genuine free trade area within the region itself. 9. In November 2004, responsibility for the Western Balkans will transfer from the Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations to its Directorate-General for Enlargement. The Commission has also proposed that from 2007 its existing financial instruments for candidate and potential candidate countries should be replaced by a unified pre-accession instrument. Both developments send a further signal of the region’s ultimate EU perspective and should allow the lessons of the latest enlargement to be applied more systematically to the Western Balkans. 10. The EU has supplemented its traditional instruments of advice, financial assistance and trade concessions with the deployment of a range of second pillar (CFSP and ESDP) instruments in the Western Balkans. 11. EU Foreign Ministers regularly discuss and adopt formal Conclusions on the Western Balkans at the monthly meetings of the General AVairs and External Relations Council. From time to time, the EU issues other public declarations and makes collective demarches in the region, such as on Albania in September 2004 for example. 12. High Representative Javier Solana has intervened personally at numerous decisive moments when events have threatened to destabilise the region. The EU’s resident special representatives in Bosnia (who is also High Representative in Bosnia under the Dayton Peace Agreement) and Macedonia have played a prominent role in promoting reform and ensuring stability. 13. The EU runs ESDP police assistance missions in Bosnia and Macedonia that seek to establish sustainable policing arrangements under local ownership in accordance with best European and international practice. 14. The nine-month ESDP military operation in Macedonia in 2003 was the first of its kind. It followed a NATO operation and contributed to ensuring stable and secure environment for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The EU is currently preparing its most ambitious ESDP operation to date, to follow on from NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia. The aim is to deploy by the end of this year a robust force, starting at the same force levels as SFOR, to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton Agreement and contribute to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia. The operation will be part of a coherent overall approach that adds significantly to the EU’s political engagement, assistance programmes and ongoing police and monitoring missions, with a view to helping Bosnia make further progress towards European integration in the context of the SA process. 15. Although the EU plays an essentially supporting role to the United Nations and NATO in Kosovo, it recently strengthened its presence in Pristina. Both Javier Solana and the European Commission now have resident representatives there. EU member states provide the lion’s share of NATO troops in Kosovo. 16. The EU has supported the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by adopting an asset freeze on fugitive indictees and a travel ban on individuals supporting these indictees. The EU has also helped underpin the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia by adopting a travel ban on extremists opposed to its implementation. 17. The UK has played a full part in shaping EU policy towards the region. We initiated the concept of European Partnerships and helped place the problem of organised crime firmly on the EU agenda. We are playing a leading role in the design and planning of the new ESDP operation in Bosnia and ensuring its full Ev 122 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
and transparent cooperation with NATO. We will provide the mission’s first Force Commander. We have ensured that the EU continues to insist that the countries of the region cooperate fully with the ICTY. More generally, we have underlined the importance of maintaining a continued broad coalition of international community support for policy in the Western Balkans, even though the EU is in practice taking an increasingly leading operational role. UK Representation to the EU October 2004
Written evidence submitted by the UK Delegation to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Thank you for your letter of 16 November 2004 and for inviting me to provide evidence to the Foreign AVairs Committee on the Western Balkans at a meeting on Wednesday 12 January. I attach an unclassified memorandum which provides an overview of the OSCE’s role in the Western Balkans region. I would be pleased to provide additional viewpoints on the OSCE role when we meet later this week. Colin Munro CMG Head of UK Delegation to the OSCE
Memorandum
Introduction 1. At the request of the Foreign AVairs Committee, the UK Delegation to the OSCE submits the following memorandum as a contribution to the Committee’s inquiry into the situation in the Western Balkans. The Foreign and Commonwealth OYce has already submitted a memorandum providing a comprehensive overview of UK policy towards the Western Balkans. This memorandum provides more detail on the role of the OSCE in the region. Attached at Annex A and B are details of the costs and mandates of the OSCE’s Missions in the Western Balkans. 2. Since 1989 all international organizations involved in Eastern Europe have encouraged the development of democracy, good governance and the protection of human rights. The commitments in the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 1990 Copenhagen Conference Document are comprehensive in this respect, and explicit that these are matters of legitimate international concern. But, Yugoslavia responded to suspension in 1993 from the CSCE (for “gross uncorrected” breaches of these commitments) by expelling the CSCE Preventive Diplomacy Missions from Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. The CSCE/OSCE remained on the sidelines in the Balkan conflicts until the end of 1995 when the Dayton/Paris Agreement established a role for the OSCE in civilian implementation of the peace settlement, including “supervision of the preparation and conduct” of post war elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The OSCE Mission in BiH is still its third most expensive (Euro 18.2m), after Kosovo (Euro 39.2 million) and Georgia (Euro 21.3 million which includes provision for monitoring part of Georgia’s mountainous border with Russia). The OSCE is part of a substantial international presence in the region that also includes the UN (the OSCE is a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter), the Council of Europe (CoE), the EU, NATO and the International Financial Institutions. It is helping states in the region to fulfil their commitments, eg under the Copenhagen Document, and thus achieve the strategic objective that they all have in common—integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. This is a high priority in 2005 for the Slovenian Chairmanship of the OSCE and the UK as incoming EU Presidency.
Missions 3. The OSCE has missions in all the Western Balkans countries. The mandates (details with costs attached) provide for Missions to assist hosts in meeting their OSCE commitments, on democratisation, good governance, free and fair elections, free media, and the rule of law including administration of justice, police education and development. The Kosovo mission (Pillar III of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo—UNMIK) for example, runs the police training school, and has already trained over six thousand policemen and women. The OSCE also played a major role in establishing the multi-ethnic police force in South Serbia and continues to train and develop the organisation. The missions (with the exception of Albania) have a role in the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons. In BiH and Kosovo the High Representative and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General have respectively assigned them responsibilities for capacity building in education. The BiH Mission also has responsibilities for sub regional arms control and defence reform—creating one army out of three (although the lead role in this will increasingly be played by NATO). Heads of Mission report regularly to the Permanent Council (PC) in Vienna where mandates are reviewed and budgets decided. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 123
Institutions 4. The Missions work closely with the OSCE institutions, the Secretariat and other international organizations, especially the EU. The mandates of the OYce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFM), the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), the Special Representative on TraYcking in Human Beings, and the Economic and Environmental Coordinator (OCEEA) are focused on post conflict rehabilitation, the development of plural civil society, and early warning of possible future conflict. For example, the HCNM’s mandate allows its High Commissioner Rolf Ekeus to use his judgement to identify situations involving minorities with conflict potential, and provide confidential advice to governments and minority representatives, on possible remedies. At present the RFM is working with UNMIK and others to create a free and responsible media in Kosovo. ODIHR has an important role in election observation throughout the region. The recent referendum on decentralization in Macedonia is an example.
OSCE’s Comparative Advantages 5. These are: — comprehensive membership including the countries of the region, the US and Russia. The missions and institutions belong to countries such as Serbia and Montenegro (SaM). They have an equal say in their cost, activities and deployment. — comprehensive concept of security including politico military matters, the economy, environment and human rights. The OSCE can focus on where the need is greatest, and fill niches not covered by other organisations; — top priority accorded to conflict prevention by OSCE Institutions such as the HCNM. The Budapest summit in 1994 established the OSCE as a primary instrument for conflict prevention, management and resolution; — expertise in standards for free and fair elections and for observation. ODIHR, established in 1990 as the OYce for Free Elections, is an acknowledged leader. The OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly has also developed its capabilities in this field, especially during Bruce George’s tenure of oYce as its President; — field presence throughout the region not replicated by any other international organization. OSCE missions can also carry out projects on behalf of other organisations such as the European Commission and UNHCR. They have detailed knowledge of conditions aVecting human rights at the local level; — well developed cooperation with NGOs. This applies both to institutions such as ODIHR and to field missions; — ability to work with other organisations to promote good neighbourly relations including through the link between OSCE commitments and EU accession. The Croatian government for example, wishes its OSCE mission to continue to provide assistance during its accession negotiations;
Trafficking in Human Beings 6. A pertinent example of these advantages in practice: the Netherlands OSCE Chairmanship (2003) identified human traYcking as an issue where the OSCE, had the potential to add value to the work of other international organizations and national governments. Helga Konrad’s ( who took up her duties as Special Representative last year) action plan is based on prevention, prosecution and protection. She has particular expertise on the Balkans as former South East Europe Stability Pact anti TraYcking Coordinator. There will be opportunities for the UK to work closely with her, especially during our EU Presidency.
Conclusion 7. The role of the OSCE in the Western Balkans is declining as the EU steps up its eVort. But it still makes an important contribution, for example through the police training school in Kosovo, and in dealing with contemporary threats to security and prosperity such as traYcking in human beings and the all-pervasive corruption that is the antithesis of good governance. The UK’s total annual OSCE expenditure of £21 million in 2004–05 (roughly 10% of the total cost of the OSCE, the greater part of which is still allocated to the Western Balkans), is an investment in both an eVective EU in a secure neighbourhood, and in eVective multilateralism, part of the EU’s own security strategy. Ev 124 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Written evidence submitted by the Embassy of the Republic of Albania
The Albanian Stand Toward NATO The Republic of Albania, the Albanian Government and all Albanian Political spectrum, appreciate as inalienable, the role of North Atlantic Alliance towards the strengthening of the security, peace and stability in the region. This realistic approach is based as well on the radical change of security situation in B-H, as a result of NATO presence, and stopping the genocide in Kosova, thanks to the NATO military intervention in 1999. The Albanian stand for the indefeasible role of NATO in the region is confirmed to the highest forums of the Alliance, as recently at the EAPC countries Summit of Istanbul. It is also manifested with the support given to the Istanbul Communique of the Heads of States and Governments of NATO countries. The Albanian stand is clearly and firmly expressed in the annual documents of Albanian MAP towards NATO. The above mentioned political Support is materialised also with the active participation of our country in the forums and mechanisms that NATO has incited to strengthen the security and stability of the region. Washington Summit, 23–24 April 1999, gave a clear evidence on showing how important are for NATO, the developments in the region of SEE and particularly in Kosova, as well as further commitment of NATO, supporting SEE Countries in their eVorts towards the democratic societies, peace and stability in the region. Reflecting to the new developments and challenges, the Washington Summit, inspired and set up the foundations for many institutions, initiatives and instruments, helping the countries of the region to join the European trend. After the establishment of NATO initiative for SEE, which included a wide range of programmes and initiatives for the regional cooperation and long-term stability in Balkan, Albania, has been one of the first countries as member of SEEGROUP (derivate of SEEI), steering actually this forum during 2004. The value of SEEGROUP, consists not only on the strengthening of cooperation and leadership of the countries in the region, but also on the inclusion of Serbia & Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina (as members of this group without being partner countries to North Atlantic Alliance) in common programmes. The continuity of NATO presence in the region may be treated as well in a bilateral corner-sight from out- in and vice-versa. The contribution of NATO presence in the countries mentioned by the British Commons Foreign Committee, despite the respective specifics, will stimulate and speed up the materialization of reforms and the fulfilment of necessary obligations by each country that aims to be a NATO member or partner. The materialization of reforms and obligations fulfilment creates a more stable framework, allow the implementation of essential political processes and strengthening of the institutions and open the road towards membership. The eVect of NATO presence in the region, is related to the fact that the trust of the people to NATO troops for the security and stability, is much higher than the presence of other International Organisations (the previous experiences support this fact). Further more, a NATO presence in the region is a key factor for the foreign investments, which bring in the same time an increase of economic prosperity of a country. The speed of materialisation of these respective aims in this reciprocal relation state-NATO, is mainly conditioned by the achievement of obligations by each country, the success of democratic standards, and the accomplishment of reforms, not only in the defence field. Keeping in mind that this is a long term process, the role and the presence of NATO in the region remain of a very high importance.
The Role of the EU, Including the Impact of Enlargement European integration is today the main strategic objective of Albania society. This objective has on its basis the full support of the social and political forces, aiming at tying Albania to the European values and developing Albanian society according to democratic principles, rule of law and market economy. Having clearly expressed its will to join the European family, Albania has been working with determination and passion since the early 1990s to turn this aspiration into reality, although through periods of progress and regress. A new impetus to the whole process of getting closer to the EU was given in 1999, when after the violent conflicts in our region over the past decade, the EU established a new political and strategic vision for the five countries of South Eastern Europe, including Albania: the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). This process will remain the framework of our European Course, the way to our future accession. During this five-year dialogue with the European Union, set up firstly with the EU-Albania HLSG and later with Joint Consultative Task Force, Albania has been committed to carrying out the reforms required by the process of moving closer to the EU. Since 31st January 2003 Albania has been negotiating with the Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 125
European Commission the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which will be the framework for the deepening of the relationship between Albania and EU. Through a series of political and technical rounds of negotiations, the first reading of the text of the agreement has been completed, thus approaching the conclusion of the negotiations and paving the way for the implementation of the agreement. Meanwhile, it has become ever clearer to us that the most suitable strategy for a sustainable development of Albania and the entire region should be based on two main pillars: European integration end regional integration. In the framework of its policy of regional cooperation, Albania, and the other countries of western Balkans, elaborated and presented a coordinated position at the Thessalonica Summit, which marked the beginning of a permanent political dialogue between the European Union and the SAP countries. The Thessalonica Summit aimed at enriching the SAP with new elements from enlargement experience. Albania welcomed this message of support; in particular adoption of elements of the pre-accession strategy to the Western Balkan countries, such as the European Integration Partnerships, the opening of the community programs, enhanced cooperation in the areas of political dialogue and CFSP, etc. The oVering of a more clear European prospect acts as a stimulus for progress in the required reforms. The successful process of the recent enlargement with 10 new member States contributed to the consolidation of peace, stability and democracy in Europe. We are aware that substantial progress of reforms determines Albania’s progress in the SAP. We are convinced that these reforms, as well as European integration itself, are in the first place in our own interest, as they contribute to the country’s economic and political development. The clear perspective that the EU has opened to Albania is a considerable contribution to keeping the peace of reforms undertaken by the Albanian Government in the political and economic aspect. The integration process and required reforms in this framework are necessary for the overall development of the country, not least for its integration into European structures. The identification of these short and medium-term reforms is the main purpose of the EU’s European partnership and the Albanian Government’s Actions Plan, recently adopted. In the framework of the cooperation with EU, Albania would ask for the support of the UK, as a member state, in restructuring the CARDS Program. An increase in the financial support to the SAP countries, within the 2007–13 Financial Perspective, would be a clear message of the European future of these countries. A message of this sort is the inclusion of SAP countries in DG Enlargement of the new Commission. A review of CARDS Program should aim at striking the right balance between financial assistance for institutional reforms and for the needs of economic and social development. It is vital for the development of the region as a whole the improvement in the infrastructure sector. We also think it is necessary to advance in concrete terms the issue of the progressive liberalization of the EU’s visa regime for the SAP countries through the submission by the EU of a list of concrete steps to be taken, so as to have a positive response from the union. The liberalization of the visa regime is the point of the Thessalonica Agenda where no progress has been made. Since January 2004, Albania aligns itself with positions of the European Union in Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is an expression of Albania’s willingness to cooperate closely with the EU in all areas including CFSP, in compliance with the Thessalonica Agenda for the Western Balkans. In the framework of our cooperation in the area of security, the Albanian Government has expressed its willingness and readiness to participate in the military mission “ALTHEA” of the EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Albanian Assessment for Kosovo and its Future Prospects
The relations between Albania and Kosovo Relations with Kosovo are characterized by a constructive spirit of cooperation, in compliance with the UN Resolution 1244 and Constitutional Framework of Kosovo. Albania has already intensified its economic, social and cultural relations with Kosovo and to facilitate the free movement of people, goods and capitals. For this purpose: — During this year, 33 high level visits have been paid, especially the visits of President H.E. Mr. Alfred Moisiu and Prime Minister H.E. Mr. Fatos Nano in Kosovo and the visits of UN Special Representative Mr. Holker and the Speaker of Kosovo’s Parliament Mr. Daci in Tirana. These political contacts have been of a very special importance for the coordination of the stands and actions on behalf of the stability in Kosovo and in the region as well. — A visit of Kosovo’s President Rugova, took place this summer and Minister of Foreign AVairs H.E. Mr. Kastriot Islami will visit Kosovo as well. Ev 126 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
— About 12 bilateral Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding have been signed referring the Free Trade Agreement and boosting the cooperation in diVerent fields, especially education, health, transport, trade, sports, etc We foresee that in the near future to sign the Agreement for the Elimination of Double Taxation between our country and Kosovo and three other Memorandums of Understanding. — To intensify the cooperation against cross-border crime and smuggling, the General Police Director of Albania has already visited Kosovo and is on going process an agreement related to the cooperation between the Police Forces of Albania and UNMIK. Five border crossing points exist between Albania and Kosovo and another is expected soon. These are serving to the intensification of the economic cooperation and exchanges between two countries and will prevent the illegal border crossings. We have started the proceedings for a normal function of the customs services at the actual cross-border points. In January 2004 the Albanian Government made the decision to open a new cross-border point.
The Albanian Assessment for Developments in Kosovo
The transfer of competences and responsibilities While appreciating the important role and support given by International Administration in Kosovo, we support the reorganization of UNMIK structure. If we really wish to have progress and to create responsible and eVective governance in Kosovo, is the right time to give more power and responsibilities to local institutions and authorities and better involvement of these institutions to the reserved competencies. Taking these measures is the proper action to progress. The Government of Kosovo does not posses actually the proper means and the necessary information to act eVectively.
Standards and status We reconfirm our help and support towards the implementation of the policy of standards and the plan for their implementation as a main base for the future of Kosovo, which will contribute to further increase the stability and the security in the Western Balkans region, and to intensify the spirit of cooperation and mutual integration. We believe that the discussions for the status of Kosovo parallel to the standards that means following a policy “standards with status” will bring a real progress not only to the political process of Kosovo but also a further normalization of the situation in the region.
International Commitment Albania appreciates the commitment of EU and NATO for the general security situation and for the progress of political process in Kosovo. We congratulate the creation of the Support Group for Kosovo as an important step to intensify the cooperation among Western Governments-EU-NATO-UNMIK- Kosovo’s Government, especially in this moment when the need to speed up the implementation of the standards is emergent. We wish and believe a real contribution of this group for the implementation of the standards. We think that a better coordination of international factors would help to further improve the progress of political and economic processes in Kosovo.
Decentralization In principle, we support the eVorts made for the decentralization of local authority in Kosovo which must not consist and not bee understood as an ethnic territorial division. We emphasized that: — The implementation of this plan should be materialized in due time. — This should be done in accordance with the vision for a multinational and multiethnic Kosovo and not to allow any kind of disintegration or partition on ethnic basis. — To consist on the agreement of understanding between institutions of Kosovo and diVerent ethnicities, especially between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo (not out if it). We are for the decentralization but we think that discussions about this process should not avoid or derail the joint commitment of international and local institutions towards the fulfillment of standards.
Dialogue We express our commitment to encourage the leaders of Kosovo for an intra-dialogue within communities, keeping in mind that the March events have considerably damaged the inter-ethnic confidence in Kosovo. We support the dialogue at political and technical level between Prishtina and Belgrade as well. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 127
Albania is for good relations and constructive dialogue with its neighbors where Albanians are present. This dialogue and cooperation plays a good role in the actual stability of the neighboring Macedonia. The statement of Macedonian oYcials that Kosovo does not poses a threat for Macedonian stability and their commitment to open a Liaison OYce in Prishtina is welcomed. Albania is also committed to develop the progress and dialogue with Serbia in order to create a good and constructive climate between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and in the region, because this will also serve to the regional integration.
Integration We think that Kosovo should be included as integral part of the common aspiration towards regional and European integration, as it was supported by the international community and materialized at the EU Thessalonica Summit.
Serbian plan The Serbian Government Plan is prepared for internal political eVects and its aim is to export the crises situation from Serbia to Kosovo. It is more of a political character than of a practical one. This way of the decentralization based on ethnic grounds, will create more problems rather than generating democracy and harmony. That means “division” of two main ethnic groups of Kosovo, deepening the disagreements between them, which are against the principles of multiethnic coexistence and the European integration. It seems a paradox the fact that even in the Resolution 1244 Kosovo is quoted as a part of former Yugoslavia, which now means the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the plan has been approved only by Serbian Parliament and has not yet passed for approval to the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro.
New Administrator We believe that the assignment of Mr Soren Jessen Petersen, as the new Special Representative of UN in Kosovo, will positively aVect the progress of political and economic processes there. In accordance with the actual circumstances, the reorganization of the UNMIK administration is indispensable, and a permanent unified support and a clear orientation from the international community is adequate.
Albanian commitment Albania remains committed to positively influence the Albanian political factor and other political factors as well, to encourage the democratic and integration processes in Kosovo. We fully support the close cooperation with UNMIK, KFOR and international community for the implementation of standards and the consolidation of comprehensive institutions, the creation of a multiethnic society, the encouragement of political dialogue with Belgrade, strengthening of a stable market economy, the prevailing of the rule of law and the openness toward regional cooperation.
The events of 17–18 March We reconfirm our decisive stand against violence and violent acts, despite the motives which incite them. We have condemned the distraction of the religion and cultural objects expressing that such actions are against the progress that has been achieved towards the strengthening of the peaceful coexistence between diVerent ethnicities, the development of further dialog, the consolidation of institutions and the fulfillment of the standards. We welcomed the measures taken by the Government of Kosovo to repair the damage and to bring before the justice the culprits. We fully supported the Special Representative of UN in Kosovo and KFOR and have requested from political leaders and from the people of Kosovo to restrain and act in a mature way, to cooperate with legal local and international authorities to restore the order. We have appreciated the immediate intervention against the violence of the important international factors, especially UN, EU and NATO, which influenced to calm down the situation. We express our confidence that the recent events, even they were diYcult; will not interrupt the progress of democratic processes, which is good for a multiethnic Kosovo with its place in Europe. Embassy of the Republic of Albania Ev 128 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Written evidence submitted by the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Excerptions of the General Directions and Priorities for Implementation of Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina — Full and consistent implementation of the General Peace Agreement (GPA); — Activities focused on B&H inclusion into European integration processes are the priorities of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; — Program of Activities for the implementation of priorities in 2004, which addresses recommendations from the Feasibility Study has been adopted. Further approaching and institutionalization of the relations with European Union, in accordance with Stabilization and Accession Process, are very important for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Coming to an agreement on stabilization and accession to EU, than its full implementation should significantly contribute to B&H inclusion into European integration flows (in this regard B&H seeks UK support to the further enlargement of the EU in order to, after meeting all criteria, become a full member and achieve its ambitious goal of joining the EU in 2009); — Activities relating to the Euro-Atlantic security structures, with the utmost aim of institutionalizing the relations with North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be, first of all, directed to B&H inclusion into the Partnership for Peace; — Full cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY); — Commitment to a continuous fight against terrorism and other types of organized crime (National Plan of fighting against organized crime has been adopted as well as set of laws, as a basis for structural reforms of police forces. Strengthening of the Ministry of Security is ongoing and permanent premises for State Information and Protection Agency are ensured. The Parliamentary Assembly of B&H adopted the Law on Indirect Tax System and other reforms in customs and tax system have been undertaken as well; Setting up the Regional Centre for the fighting against corruption, in the framework of the Stability Pact, is very important. In this regard UK is expected to be interested in its work by giving technical and financial support. — Participation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in multilateral activities, in particular, as part of the system of the United Nations (UN)—Coalition forces in Iraq; — Bosnia and Herzegovina with its geo-strategic position, composition of state and its multi- ethnicity represents the basis for stability of whole region. Speed up of economic development and sustainable economy is the key for stability for all countries in Region. Measures regarding revitalization of economy and greater business cooperation are to be undertaken. Therefore, synchronized and simultaneous foreign investments in the countries in Region would be of the greatest eVect. In that context, it is necessary to develop further regional integration and projects that stimulate lifting restrictions and trade barriers, in order to accept the standards of EU countries. All countries in Region signed the free trade agreements and therefore represent the respectable market of trade and workforce (high percentage of highly educated workforce). For this reason, there is the need for two aspects of engagement-political and economical; — B&H recognizes the role of OYce of High Representative in post-war period and welcomes the announcement for replacing it with the representative of the EU, that will contribute to the faster joining to the EU; — Participation in realization and further promotion of bilateral relations through interstate agreements between B&H and UK in the field of economy and investments. (B&H expects UK firms to be more present by investing in B&H-by way of successful example of investing in steel industry in Zenica), Development Strategy, done with assistance of World Bank, has been adopted and by the economic reforms that will be implemented B&H is going to achieve its economic sustainability by 2007; — Promoting relations in the field, of culture, science and art, with focus on adequate regional projects, is of vital importance for the stability of Region. Regarding projects, mentioned above, the role of British Council and BBC World Service could be of a great importance; — Promotion of cooperation with neighbouring countries—Republic Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, on the basis of common interest and principles of equality, mutual respect and respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, represent priority of Bosnia and Herzegovina foreign policy; — Bosnia and Herzegovina is developing bilateral relations, in particular with the member countries of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, with the USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China and other member countries of the Security Council, member countries of the EU, countries in the Region, member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference and with other countries which significantly contribute to reconstruction and development of B&H. Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 129
Written evidence submitted by the Embassy of the Republic of Macedonia The Republic of Macedonia considers that the UK presence (political and military) in the Balkans is very important and has a key role in the processes of preventing the conflicts, stabilizing the Region and encouraging the commitments of these countries for their NATO and EU integration. The Republic of Macedonia is forging ahead with reforms necessary to make Euro-Atlantic integration a reality. The stability and prosperity of Macedonia on a crossroad in South East Europe are of great significance not only for the Region but for the whole Europe. The Republic of Macedonia expresses satisfaction with the traditionally good bilateral relations with the United Kingdom and their positive development.
EU-integration Process The EU-membership is an idea that unites and inspires everybody in Macedonia—the Government, all political parties and all citizens. The Republic of Macedonia was the first state in the Region to conclude a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2001. It entered into force on 1 April 2004, and, again, it was the first Agreement of this kind to enter into force. In September, the Government adopted a National Strategy for European Integration of the Republic of Macedonia. This Strategy sets out the fundamental aims, policies and priorities in the process of acquiring membership of the European Union. On 1 October 2004 the European Commission President Mr. Romano Prodi handed over to the Government a Questionnaire which is a part of the dialogue with the Union after the submission of the Application for membership in March 2004 in Dublin. At the moment, Macedonia is preparing replies to an impressive number of questions on political, economic and technical issues, which will allow the Commission to formulate its Opinion if the country is ready to undertake the rights and obligations of the membership. In this regard, for Macedonia, the support of the United Kingdom will be very important in the eYcient implementation of the procedure and in the process of answering the Questionnaire, as well as in the entire process until the final integration in the EU. This support will have an immense significance especially during the British EU-Presidency (second half of 2005) when the European Commission will be finalising the Opinion. The European Council in Feira expressed its clear position that the future of the countries in the Region is in the EU. The Thessalonica Agenda “Western Balkans: moving towards European Integration” of 2003 confirmed the European perspective on the Western Balkan countries and enriched the stabilisation and association process with new instruments: the European Partnerships, and access to Community programmes, TAIEX and Twining. With its proactive approach and programmed identification of priorities, the Republic of Macedonia will benefit from these instruments in the EU integration process. This approach will be used to prepare for the membership negotiations. British support in this context will be very useful. Macedonia expects that the real political commitment of the EU for the integration of Macedonia and the other SAP-countries will be implemented in the new financial framework of EU for the period 2007–13 which will be on the agenda for negotiations during the Dutch and the British EU-Presidency.
NATO—Integration The Republic of Macedonia has clear and strong commitment to be a part of the North Atlantic Alliance and together with all member states of the Alliance to advance and guarantee its own stability. There is overall political and civic consensus in the country concerning this strategic goal. For only two years, Macedonia has achieved what for many seemed impossible: from consumer of the Euro-Atlantic military security, Macedonia has begun to contribute to the advancement of the regional and global security. Today, the Republic of Macedonia today is a part of global anti-terrorist coalition. Macedonian soldiers, together with the coalition forces, take an active part in securing the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nine years ago, the Republic of Macedonia did sign up for the Partnership for Peace program of NATO and took an active part in the program’s initiatives, and recently, through the Adriatic partnership, did achieve excellent regional cooperation. In this year’s Summit of NATO in Istanbul within the Final communique of the Summit, the members of the Alliance noted: “We celebrate the success of NATO’s Open Door policy, and reaYrm today that our seven new members will not be the last. The door to membership remains open. We welcome the progress made by Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in implementing their Annual National Programmes under the Membership Action Plan, and encourage them to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to progress towards NATO membership. We also commend their contribution to regional stability and cooperation. We want all three countries to succeed and will continue to assist them in their reform eVorts. NATO will Ev 130 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
continue to assess each country’s candidacy individually, based on the progress made towards reform goals pursued through the Membership Action Plan, which will remain the vehicle to keep the readiness of each aspirant for membership under review.” It is an extraordinary success for the Republic of Macedonia and represented an additional motivation to continue energetically on its way towards NATO expecting to receive an invitation for membership in the next round of NATO enlargement. The United Kingdom had a leading role in the NATO-military missions in the Region (IFOR, SFOR and KFOR). The missions were and they are very important for the prevention of conflicts and stabilization of the Region. The United Kingdom had a Brigade Headquarters in the NATO’s first mission in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001 with “Operation Essential Harvest” which the main aim was to collect voluntarily surrendered weapons from insurgent ethnic Albanian rebels. In January 2004, Brigadier Dennis Blease assumed the appointment of Commander NATO Headquarters Skopje and NATO Senior Military Representative in the Republic of Macedonia. He directs the NATO Advisory Team. Its main purpose is to provide support and assistance to the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) General StaV with the military aspects of their NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. From the 1 September 2004, British Embassy in Skopje assumed the role of NATO Contact Point Embassy in Macedonia for a period of two years. Through the annual bilateral programme, the UK also provides assistance in areas such as English language training and defence management. Macedonia appreciates very much all support (bilateral and in the framework of NATO) from the United Kingdom concerning the preparations for the membership into NATO and hopes that it will continue in the future.
Implementation of the Framework Agreement The Framework Agreement is a prime political priority for the Republic of Macedonia and it is being implemented in accordance with the Framework Agreement Implementation plan adopted in 2003. This Agreement was the source for the introduction of significant changes in the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia in 2001 which focused on a higher level of inclusiveness of citizens who are members of the non-majority communities, particularly of the Albanians, as a non-majority community of over 20% of the population in the country. The forthcoming decentralization process which is a part of the implementation of the Framework Agreement requires fundamental reforms in the management of local aVairs. At a local level, this means strengthening local capacities in the planning and management of local resources, whereas on a central level it means strengthening the role of the state in strategic planning and national resources, whereas on a central level it means strengthening the role of the state in strategic planning and national resource management, as well as strengthening the monitoring function regarding the application of laws.
Visa regime for the Macedonian citizens A particularly important interest of the Republic of Macedonia is to see the EU visa regime for its citizen liberalised and than in the near future abolished. The measures that the Republic of Macedonia needs to undertake in order to make progress on this issue go beyond the special measures in the area of visa policy and relate to the overall policies in the sphere of justice and home aVairs, the harmonisation of national legislation with that of the EU and its practical application. The project on new Macedonian passports aligned with the EU standards will be implemented in parallel with these measures.
The Name of the Country—Republic of Macedonia The Republic of Macedonia has an interest to resolve the question about the overcoming the diVerences with Greece about the constitutional name—the Republic of Macedonia. The talks between the representatives of the two Governments are going on in New York under auspices of the UN. Despite this issue, Macedonia and Greece have excellent bilateral relations particularly in the economic field. The position of the Government is using the constitutional name by all countries and international community, and the right of Greece to use a name which will be acceptable for both countries. The Republic of Macedonia appreciates the fact that the United Kingdom uses the constitutional name of the country—the Republic of Macedonia in bilateral relations.
Regional Co-operation Macedonia is committed to openness, cooperation and the establishment of links with neighbouring countries, as well as with the countries in the closer and wider region. Actually, the Republic of Macedonia is the most prominent advocate of regional cooperation in Southeast Europe. This means that Macedonia is active in regional trade liberalization, the establishment of a regional power supply market, the Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 131
intensification of the common fight against organized crime and corruption and the establishment of the regional migration and asylum forum. The Government considers regional cooperation to be a genuine need of the countries in the Region and a complementary factor on its way towards Europe.
Kosovo The principled position of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia is that the rule of law, the respect of human rights, the return of the refugees to their homes and especially the rights of minorities and the strengthening of civil society should be established in Kosovo. The basis of all discussions on Kosovo remains to be the Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the UN. The Republic of Macedonia gives its full support to the international community in the implementation of the set standards, which will enable the rule of law and the normalization of the situation. The Agreement on Demarcation and Delineation of the State Border between the Republic of Macedonia and than the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) signed in February 2001 has entered in force in June 2001. The Government position is that the demarcation of the northern border in the section towards Kosovo was to be completed prior to the start of the talks on the final status of Kosovo. Embassy of the Republic of Macedonia 12 October 2004
Written evidence submitted by HE Dr Vladeta Jankovic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro Four years after the democratic opposition’s election victory in Serbia and the dramatic turn of events which put an end to the wretched 13-year period of Milosˇevic´ rule, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is replaced by the state union of Serbia and Montenegro; the changes which have taken place are however deeper and more far-reaching than just a change of name would suggest. The most important factor here is the irreversible nature of this change, in the sense that any return to a crypto-communist dictatorship and the aggressive nationalism which characterised the Milosˇevic´ era is now unthinkable. There remain, however, many diYculties, not of fundamental significance but nevertheless obstacles, which are impeding and slowing down progress for the country as a whole and are, for the man in the street, reflected in the poor standard of living. These hardships are, primarily the consequence of the wars and of sanctions, but are in part also typical for any society in post-communist transition. Serbia & Montenegro, as a state union, has proved its determination to follow the path of reform and Euro-Atlantic integration and this applies equally to each of the two member-states. It does not mean however that such elements as oppose this trend do not exist or that they do not have some electoral support (sometimes even as much as 25%–30%) but their influence remains limited. Even the desperate attempt to foil development with the assassination of the energetic and dynamic Premier Dindic´ failed to achieve that desired result—the country continued, even after this tragic event, to move in the direction of reform. Here is a short summary of the results so far achieved and of the stumbling blocks, which still have to be overcome. 1. Relations between Serbia and Montenegro have, after a lengthy hiatus, been constructed afresh on new foundations and, insofar as important institutions are concerned (such as the Army, Parliament and the Council of Ministers), have actually started to function. In February 2006 at the latest it is anticipated that a referendum will be conducted whereby the citizens of both member republics will decide whether to continue to live together in a single state. The diYculties which existed regarding the divergencies in economic, trade and customs systems have recently been overcome by the EU decision to advance towards European integrations on the principle of a twin-track system. In practice this means that the unbridgeable diVerences in the economic systems of the two republics have been recognised while, in their aspirations to join Europe, they remain politically united. In other words, when the time comes to sign the Stabilisation Association Agreement, there will be the one contract with two separate economic annexes. International opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of the survival of the State Union, the general view being that it is both possible to achieve and desirable from the standpoint of stability in the Balkans and that, therefore, every eVort should be made to give it a fair chance. But ultimately, the will of the people (as expressed through a referendum) will prevail and should be respected. Whatever the final outcome, one can say with confidence that there is no danger of violence erupting over this, least of all the kind that accompanied the break up of the former Yugoslavia. 2. The situation in Kosovo and Metohija is far from promising. Five years after the arrival of KFOR and UNMIK, the Serbian and other non-Albanian population has been deprived of all basic human rights, starting with elementary physical security. There is no freedom of movement, the return of the displaced population has been totally abandoned, while the eruption of violence from 17 March this year has seen the systematic destruction of Serbian religious monuments, houses and property, which has put any proclaimed principle of multi-ethnicity of Kosovo in jeopardy. The Serbian Government has, with the unanimous approval of Parliament, put forward a plan for the safeguarding of institutional guarantees and of local self governing bodies for the non-Albanian populations, without any mention of a division of Kosovo or territorial autonomy for the Serbs. The plan is in total accord with the Security Council Resolution 1244 and intended merely as a talking ground, where every idea is open to discussion and change. The Albanian Ev 132 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
side, however, rejects this initiative in its entirety, as it rejects every suggestion to serious debate with Belgrade, but insists exclusively on independence. If such independent status were to come about before democratic standards had been fulfilled and the elementary human rights criteria secured for minorities, it would lead to an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo, with dire and far reaching destabilising consequences for the whole region. 3. Cooperation with the ICTY in the Hague has for years been the chief condition (and has, at the same time, represented the chief obstacle) for the advancement of Serbia and Montenegro towards the Euro- Atlantic integrations. Although, in addition to Milosˇevic´ practically the whole of the political and military summit of his regime has been delivered to the International Court, there is still continuing insistence on the extradition of Mladic´, Karadzic´, the group of four generals, as well as of 10 or so minor inductees. In spite of there being real risk of internal destabilisation (because about 75% of the population declares its opposition to the extraditions), the Government is doing all it can to prove that Mladic´ and Karadzic´ are not within their reach. It has also allowed open access to its state archives, and has provided the witnesses which ICTY has requested. Fully aware of the seriousness of the situation, the Government has undertaken to fulfil, in the shortest possible time, all the demands which the Hague and the International Community have placed upon it, wherever it is physically possible and even at the expence of jeopardising the internal democratic reforms. It would, however, be of inestimable value if in this extremely risky undertaking they were to receive some support, by allowing for at least some of the less important cases to be dealt with by the local courts. 4. When speaking of the state of the economy in Serbia and Montenegro, we must keep in mind that the economic systems of the two republics, independently of their potential, significantly diVer. Amongst other things: there are two central banks; two diVerent currencies are in use; the systems of privatisation are diVerent, so are foreign trade, protection and custom and excise systems, as is general taxation (so, for instance, VAT has already been introduced in Montenegro, while in Serbia it comes into eVect from 1 January.) Following unsuccessful attempts to harmonise these diverging systems, the EU has recently accepted the twin-track approach in economic matters. In the political sphere, of course, the State Union is obliged to act together. — While in Montenegro the currency is the Euro, in Serbia the Dinar is a stable currency and depends on supply and demand. Currency reserves are constantly on the rise and, according to latest data from Serbia, amount to a total of around 4.5 billion dollars. — Inflation has been under control for the past four years and, in 2004 is planned to stand at 8.5%, with smaller variations depending on a possible rise in the price of oil on the world markets. — The growth of GDP in Serbia this year will be double the projected 4.3%. This upward trend is mainly due to the remarkable increase in agricultural production (12%), general trade (10.5%) and the building trade (between 10 and 15%). In Montenegro, industrial output for the first half of this year, relative to the same period last year, was higher by 14.4%. — Privatisation has, up to date, comprised around 55% of the total capital in Montenegro and slightly less in Serbia, which has benefited the country as a whole by some 570 million Euro. Both governments are firmly commited to the path of privatisation, which is the most eVective tool for transformation into a market economy. — Serbia and Montenegro have already concluded agreements with the IMF, the World Bank and EBRD, who are assisting the projects for reform in the country. — The fundamental problems of the country’s economy are a traditionally high deficit in the exchange of trade, a high degree of unemployment (31.9%) and still a very high percentage of “grey economy”. 5. The state of human rights and the position of minorities in Serbia & Montenegro have, up until now, received favourable assessment/evaluation from the competent European bodies. The recent rise in tension over an incident involving the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina seems to be resolved to universal satisfaction and had most likely been provoked and caused for propaganda-based partisan reasons on both sides of the border. 6. Serious reforms of the judicial system are in train and it is there among other things, that the roots of corruption are to be found. This process (particularly complicated, as in all other post-communist societies) has already started to bring results, which will undoubtedly create a favourable climate for privatisation and encourage the flow of foreign investment into the country. 7. Frequent election cycles, particularly in Serbia, are basically a reflection of a steady stabilisation of democratic institutions. The ratio of power in Parliament is 2:1 in favour of the democratic and reformist parties, while the main opposition is constituted by the ultra-nationalist Radical party. Relations between the leading democratic parties, once venomous, are recently much improved, owing to the growing awareness that only together can they restrain and control the isolationist and even irredentist opposition. The present government of Vojislav Kosˇtunica is a somewhat loose coalition, which has for the last eight months been functioning well and, all things considered, producing quite impressive results: Parliament is carrying out its business in a much more conducive atmosphere than before, after two years of futile attempts a President has been elected, important new reform legislation is being implemented and a new Constitution may well be in place in a few months time (to supplant the still current Constitution from Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 133
Milosˇevic´’s time). There are no scandals and the rule of law is increasingly felt to be in force. Corruption is on the decrease and the general economic output is showing marked improvement. If, in spite of all this, the present government were to fall owing to the pressures from aforementioned problems relating to Kosovo and the Hague, it would mean holding new elections. However, the eventual hand-over of power would be conducted according to the highest democratic standards. Renewed upheavals or crises of a serious nature need not be anticipated. 8. This holds true even more because the country’s foreign policy and its priorities are widely accepted by the political factors and the population alike. Over 80% of the population has declared itself in favour of joining the EU (the number of those in favour of joining NATO is significantly smaller—only about 30%), relations with neighbouring countries have improved substantially, particularly those between the former Yugoslav republics, and the general inclination is towards a better balanced relationship with the great powers. Immediate goals include the signing of the SAA and the joining of the Partnership for Peace. With internal conditions now unquestionably stabilising, the economy continuing to recover and outside pressures from the international community (sometimes unjustifiable and excessive, particularly with regard to ICTY and Kosovo) easing a little, Serbia and Montenegro could very shortly find itself promoted from the lower end of the table to be in the front ranks of candidates for joining the European Union. HE Dr Vladeta Jankovic Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro 30 September 2004
Further written evidence submitted by the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro The conclusion of the emergency session of the Government of the Republic of Serbia of 4 December 2004, concerning the election of Ramush Haradinaj for Prime Minister of Kosovo and Metohija, is supported by the President of Serbia Mr Boris Tadic, the President of the Assembly of Serbia Mr Predrag Markovic, the representatives of Serbia in the Council of Ministers of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro: Minister of Foreign AVairs Mr Vuk Draskovic, Minister of Defense Mr Prvoslav Davinic as well as the President of the Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija, Mr NebojsaCovic. The Conclusion was elaborated by the Prime Minister of Serbia, Mr Vojislav Kostunica. The Conclusion of the Government of Serbia is the following:
Conclusion
I. 1. The authorities of Serbia, together with the authorities of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and before them also those of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have since October 2000 followed a policy of resolving the problems which exist in Kosovo and Metohija in a peaceful, consensual and sustainable manner. Their contribution to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244 is reflected in numerous initiatives, documents and processes which are all based on a policy of applying universal international standards of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the concrete conditions of Kosovo and Metohija, all with the aim of preserving and further developing the multi-ethnic character of the Province. Such an approach was adhered to fully in the process of drafting the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo and Metohija, the adoption of the Common Document with UNMIK on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244, as well as the adoption of the Plan for resolving the current situation in Kosovo and Metohija immediately after the violent events of March this year. 2. The Government of the Republic of Serbia must conclude with regret that the representatives of the civilian presence (UNMIK) in Kosovo and Metohija have not shown suYcient interest in or understanding for the constructive proposals put forward by our authorities. They have mainly made allowances for the exclusionary demands made by the ethnic Albanian side in Kosovo and Metohija. The actual result of such a policy was to create the necessary conditions for the altered ethnic image of the Province formed by the mass expulsion and forced emigration of the Serbs to be presented as an unchangeable reality in Kosovo and Metohija. The organised pogrom committed by ethnic Albanian extremists against the Serbs on 17 and 18 March this year could not be concealed from the eyes of the democratic world. It was not just the culmination of the behaviour of ethnic Albanian extremists in the Province towards the Serb community seen up that date, but part and parcel of a constant pattern in that respect. 3. It is unacceptable for the Government of the Republic of Serbia that the parliament of Kosovo and Metohija elected as the prime minister Ramush Haradina, a person with a criminal past acquired and maintained in the pre-war period, during the war and after it. A total of 108 criminal complaints have so far been filed against him. An investigation into his involvement in war crimes against the civilian population is being conducted by the War Crimes Panel of the District Court in Belgrade, which has ordered his arrest and issued a warrant to that eVect. This person is also under investigation by the Hague Tribunal. We can Ev 134 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
ask with full justification what kind of message his election is sending to the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, to the Republic of Serbia and the State Union, the region and the rest of the world, and in particular what kind of message is being sent to the international administration in Kosovo and Metohija? 4. In spite of the fact that the highest representatives of the international community in Kosovo and Metohija have turned a blind a eye to this development of the situation in the province, the authorities of Serbia are firmly convinced that the election of such a person for the Prime Minister of Kosovo and Metohija cannot be justified by platitudes about democracy or formal procedures. Taking into account the aforementioned, the Government of the Republic of Serbia condemns the election of Ramush Ilaradina as the Prime Minister of Kosovo and Metohija, as that action of the parliament of the Province represents a most direct threat to the process of finding common solutions for the problems which exist in the Province.
II. Proceeding from this, the Government of the Republic of Serbia demands: 1. that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, on the basis of his powers defined by UNSC Resolution 1244, invalidate this provocative and risk-inducing act; 2. the immediate initiation of a substantial political process involving dialogue on decentralisation and on other essential political issues of Kosovo and Metohija, with the participation of representatives of UNMIK, the provisional institutions and the Kosovo Serbs, and representatives of Republic of Serbia and the State-Union; 3. that those talks be monitored and guided intensively by the Contract Group; 4. that the UN Security Council, with regard to the aims and values of the United Nations and their responsibility for the exercise of human rights and maintenance of peace in the world, monitor and control the realisation of UNSC 1244 with the utmost responsibility; 5. that the organisations which are present in Kosovo and Metohija whose mandate and objectives cover the development of democracy, rule of law and exercise of human rights, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, present a clear position on the election of Ramush Haradina as the Prime Minister of Kosovo and Metohija; 6. that the European Union once again re-assesses the realisation of the Province’s European perspective, in the light of the fact that the holder of the highest executive oYce has been accused of extremely serious crimes.
III. The Government and all state organs of authority of the Republic of Serbia will continue to provide their full contribution to the resolution of the problems in Kosovo and Metohija towards preservation of the multi-ethnic character of the province and its peaceful and democratic future.
IV. This Conclusion shall be forwarded to the National Assembly, the President of the Republic, the Co- Ordinating Centre for Kosovo and Metohija and all ministries and self-standing agencies of the Republic of Serbia 05 No.02-8118/2004 Belgrade; 4 December2004 GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA Prime Minister Vojislay Kostunica Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro
Written evidence submitted by Rinna Elina Kullaa, University of Oxford, UK/University of Maryland, USA 1.1.1 Brief introduction to the author: Born on 28 May 1977 in Helsinki, I remain a Finnish citizen. I am currently a DPhil candidate at the University of Maryland in Washington DC, United States. The topic of my doctorate is the foreign policy of the Former Yugoslavia following the Second World War. Professor John Lampe, formerly of the United States Embassy in Belgrade, is my supervisor. My study of Serbian politics began in 1999. Since then I have travelled to Serbia each year to conduct interviews and independent research toward my BA and MPhil degrees. I completed an undergraduate senior thesis on topic of “Opposition to Milosˇevic´ in Serbia in the 1990s” at Columbia University, New York City, May 2001. The Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 135
topic of my MPhil thesis (completed in June 2004 at the University of Oxford under the supervision of Professor Richard Crampton) is “Democratisation in Serbia after Milosˇevic´ and the Split between Zoran Djindjic´ and Vojislav Kosˇtunica.” Other academic experience includes lecturing at the University of Helsinki. I am the author of several articles and essays on Serbian politics in the 1990s and after the fall of Milosˇevic´. I served as an advisor to the Ambassador of Cyprus at the United Nations in New York during 1999 and 2000. I currently have no aYliation with any governmental or political actor. I am an independent researcher, author and doctoral student.
Issues Addressed in the Memoranda with Special Reference to Serbia and Montenegro (2) The prospect of economic and political growth in the near future. (3) Implications of continuing instability in the Western Balkans for the wider region, and Europe as a whole.
The Prospect of Economic and Political Growth in the Near Future 2.1.1 Political growth in Serbia and Montenegro was hindered by infighting amongst leaders of the former democratic coalition DOS, which defeated Milosˇevic´ in October 2000. The feud between the Democratic Party (DS), under the leadership of Prime Minister Djindjic´, and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), led by Federal President Vojislav Kosˇtunica, dominated debate on most political issues between December 2000 and March 2003. Since 2003 Political groupings have evolved to include additional centres of power, but pivotal control remains centred around the DS and the DSS. 2.1.2 Between 2000 and 2003, political decisions on important issue were made almost entirely along these party lines. Topics of contention included volatile issues such as Serbia’s future cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, future policy towards Kosovo, and questions of economic renewal and democratisation of the Serbian political space. 2.1.3 Amassing of support around Djindjic´ and Kosˇtunica, immediately after the ousting of the Milosˇevic´ regime encouraged the continuation of partnerships between political parties, organized crime and the security forces of the Milosˇevic´ regime. 2.1.4 Dismantling the power structures of the Milosˇevic´ regime was a formidable task in 2000. Over the course of a decade, the Milosˇevic´ government had built strong connections with internal security and armed forces supported by an economic system based on illegal sale of goods such as arms, narcotics, tobacco and alcohol. This vast, exploitative domestic grey economy severely obstructed the creation of a functioning market economy. 2.1.5 Networks constructed under Milosˇevic´ were able to survive after 2000 and remain intact to this day for three reasons. Firstly, economic profits made by various actors on the ground and regimes involved in the Yugoslav conflicts in the 1990s were far more significant than most literature on the Yugoslav conflicts suggests. The strength of the surviving profit-making networks from the Yugoslav wars and attitudes toward them of the democratic leadership remains a key factor in Serbia’s democratisation processes today. 2.1.6 Secondly, the DS-DSS dispute led to the protection of some of the most powerful existing networks. As a consequence of their strong rivalry and relatively equal power positions, both sides felt they needed selected criminal/security elements at their disposal to create support and to prevent the other side from gaining the advantage. Djindjic´, as Prime Minister of Serbia, utilised the Serbian internal security forces to obtain files containing compromising information regarding Kosˇtunica and his supporters. Djindjic´’s authority made it also possible for him to personally orchestrate the deportation of Milosˇevic´ to the ICTY, in a much-lauded eVort that ensured continued international support for Serbia and Montenegro. However, this authority also made it possible for Djindjic´ to gain other advantages over his opponents with the aid of the previous regime’s internal security structures. Djindjic´ used his position of influence over existing media structures to promote media personalities. It was not uncommon for the DS leadership to feed nightly news directly to the main television networks in an eVort to compromise political opponents, thus hindering progress toward the development of independent media. There is even evidence to suggest that these eVorts may have led to the murder of General Gavrilov, who allegedly shared information with Kosˇtunica concerning Djindjic´’s use of said security structures. Moreover, Djindjic´’s overwhelming authority enabled him to remove the DSS from government in the spring of 2002 with measures that did not adhere to parliamentary rules and procedure. This removal of democratic political opponents through the manipulation of political power compromised the integrity of the Djindjic´ government and the entire democratisation process in Serbia. Mirroring this behaviour, Kosˇtunica attempted to utilize federal armed forces and approached some wealthy owners of compromised business and media interests for political gain. Most importantly, he often acted against positive steps such as the deportation of Milosˇevic´ and the dissolution of old state industries seemingly merely because these initiatives had been proposed by Djindjic´ and the DS. 2.1.7 Thirdly, policy choices of both Djindjic´ and Kosˇtunica discouraged the obliteration of organized crime. Djindjic´, a practical entrepreneur, chose to use and attempt to control existing criminal networks rather than combating them to build new industry. He attempted to transform organised crime units into Ev 136 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
legitimate commercial actors under his personal supervision. His highly personalised political style gave credibility to this legally questionable approach, despite the fact that he represented Serbia internationally as head of such collective bodies as the Democratic Party and the Serbian government. Kosˇtunica also failed to remove corrupted domestic elements. Kosˇtunica preserved the authority of leaders of the federal armed forces, perhaps fearing the consequences of dismantling these forces. However, his puzzling decision to retain the military leadership of the previous regime was explained publicly as an act of loyalty and gratefulness to these forces that had refrained from harming the Serbian public and opposition during the stand oV with Milosˇevic´ following his defeat. According to this logic, actors formerly loyal to the Milosˇevic´ regime now “deserved” their posts, having acted with the people and the DOS leadership in 2000. 2.1.8 The creation of opposed poles within the democratic coalition after the exchange of power in 2000 discouraged economic renewal in Serbia, despite immediate international support at the outset of 2001. Dissolution of state-owned companies and privatisation in general were delayed by the manipulation of economic renewal issues as pawns in the feud between the DS and the DSS in the Parliament as well as in the press. 2.1.9 The approximately paralleled electoral support for the DSS and measure of Djindjic´ personal influence (not electoral support) led to successive elections in Serbia with no clear political direction. Inconclusive election cycles disappointed the electorate. 2.1.10 By early 2003 it had become clear to Djindjic´ and his closest associates that he was unable to control and transform many of the security/organised crime networks. Protection of these illegitimate economic elements had stifled the reconstruction of the economy. Frustrated by failed attempts to legitimise the illegal elements through his personal influence, Djindjic´ attempted to eliminate some of these illegitimate actors. This led directly to the Prime Minister’s assassination in March 2002. 2.1.11 To its credit, Serbian political leadership was able to survive the assassination of its undisputed leader. The leadership even dismantled some of the existing criminal networks in the year following Djindjic´’s assassination. However, contrary to many reports, some networks survive today. Evidence of their power and public notoriety includes apparel with a criminal network’s insignia worn by clan members during the assassination trial this year. As long as these networks exist, the birth of a lawful society, placement of the military and the police under civilian control and a healthy market economy for Serbia remain wishful thinking. 2.1.12 The existence of criminal/security networks in Serbia was prolonged by the approach adopted by most international actors towards the Djindjic´-Kosˇtunica feud. The international community found it easy to embrace Djindjic´ but tended to disregard Kosˇtunica. Since 2001, Djindjic´ and the DS were characterised as Europe-friendly, progressive, cooperative players. Kosˇtunica, portrayed as his polar opposite, was viewed as anti-Western, nationalist, and uncooperative. These characterisations were based heavily on the politicians’ communication with international actors and had little to do with domestic policies. Such views are not surprising considering the undeniable intellectual capacity and formidable personal charm of Djindjic´.Kosˇtunica on the other hand is known for his slowness in political decision-making and inability to distinguish between domestic and international audiences. 2.1.13 The characterisation of Djindjic´ as a desirable partner and of Kosˇtunica as his antithesis led to an overall lack of critical analysis of the Serbian political scene within the international community. Once Djindjic´ had been identified as the international community’s partner, it became diYcult to chastise his personal dealings with organised crime leagues and other actions that were not conducive to the birth of democratic politics in Serbia. Instead, his criminal connections were dismissed on many occasions. 2.1.14 Recommendations for actions the committee should consider: Events between 2001 and 2003 demonstrate that while the British interests are well-served by support of democratic forces in Serbia, the post-Milosˇevic´ political spectrum does not oVer infallible Serbian partners. In the past, simplistic analysis identified Djindjic´ as a politician with a singularly ambitious democratisation and reform program aimed at destroying former structures. This view failed to recognise the extent to which Serbian democratic leadership was willing to employ criminal networks (used out of necessity during the transfer of power) for political gain during the democratisation period. Choosing a preferred partner and imbuing him with all the qualities desired from him led to erroneous political analysis and failure to react against his less favourable policies. 2.1.15 The post-Djindjic´ period has revealed opportunities for better power-sharing between major political actors in Serbia. After Djindjic´’s leadership was inherited confidently by Boris Tadic´ in the spring of 2004, co-operation between the DS and the DSS has improved. Kosˇtunica enjoys a markedly better working relationship with Tadic´ than he did with Djindjic´ because their personalities are better suited for co- operation and because Tadic´ defeated a coalition of Djindjic´’s closest allies in the DS leadership (including Zoran Zivkovic´ and C´ edomir Jovanovic´). Political conflict has not disappeared from the Serbian political stage after the assassination of Djindjic´, but new centres of political power have gained influence. The economic elite non-governmental organisation G17 was established as a significant political party. Vuk Draskovic´ has returned to politics. The Radical Party has experienced an alarming increase in support. These changes have forced both the DS and the DSS to share power and consider more cautious political alignments. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 137
2.1.16 Moreover, the political year 2004 contains strong signs that the Serbian political space continues to be very fluid. As an example, the first round of Presidential elections in June 2004 demonstrated the ability of owners of several conglomerates in Serbia—the Karic´ family—to set up a political candidate a few months prior to elections and gain 19.3% of the popular vote. Support for the Radicals, though significantly higher in the past year, has also not solidified. Their carefully orchestrated eVorts to destabilise Belgrade during the Kosovo unrest in Spring of 2004 did not inspire the larger public. Under these volatile conditions, the international community must carefully observe the situation in Serbia. Due to the United States’ preoccupation with its own domestic agenda and the great anxiety felt by the Serbian democratic leadership over the possible return of some of the political actors of the U.S. Democratic Party (most importantly Richard Holbrooke), the United Kingdom should take this task even more seriously. The threat of the Radical group if other forces choose to align with it is real. The temptation for the democratic parties towards an alignment with the Radicals will increase in the next year. The Radicals will be able to oVer a significant part of the electorate if one of the democratic parties becomes desperate for a partner. Moreover, the Radicals are likely to mainstream their message, probably in the context of their position on Europe. While the Radicals should be unilaterally resisted, organised criminal networks and security structures will be best dismantled by U.K. eVorts to engage a wide spectrum of democratic parties. Domestic problems in Serbia can only be solved when no Serbian political force feels that it gains from engagement with organised crime networks and when all security forces have been made responsive to a democratic political system. 2.1.17 In an electorate as fluid as Serbia’s, actions should be taken carefully to ensure that no currently broadly democratic party becomes desperate for allies and engages the Radicals as their partners. Broad engagement by the international community also prevents the ability of one domestic political force in Serbia to present itself as “the West’s choice” and cease political cooperation.
Implications of Continuing Instability in the Western Balkans for the Wider Region, and Europe as a Whole 3.1.1 Instability among political forces in Serbia complicates the work of the ICTY, stands in the way of solving of the question of final status of Kosovo and complicates discussion over the future of the union between Serbia and Montenegro. 3.1.2 The work of the ICTY is costly to the international community. The actions of the Prosecutors’ OYce during the past four years often impeded democratic parties’ attempts to resist the Radicals in Serbia. The Prosecutors’ OYce’s statements and actions are often antagonistic and create outrage within the Serbian public. The hard line taken by the Prosecutors’ OYce in demanding cooperation from the Serbian political forces is understandable and perhaps desirable. However, the antagonistic tone and seemingly endless demands of the oYce (not satisfied by deportation of Milosˇevic´ and several other indicted persons) represents the disfavour of the international community in the eyes of the Serbian public. This attitude has been successfully exploited by the Radical Party to increase support for its anti-Western rhetoric. The Radicals have successfully been able to present an imagined connection between Serbian democratic parties, economic hardships and western disfavour. If this impression of Western disrespect toward Serbian eVorts were lessened, it is likely that the democratic forces would be able to present more pro-Western ideas without fearing loss of public support. Much of the Radical Party’s appeal would be neutralised. 3.1.3 The solution of the final status of Kosovo is fundamentally tied to the current conflict in the FYR of Macedonia as well as to economic and political problems in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The political developments in Kosovo since October 2000, directed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, have distanced the area’s political future from the future of Serbia. The necessary development of a separate administrative system, including a judiciary and a semi-legislature, although coordinated by an international body, has resulted in the creation of a system of governance completely separate from that of Serbia and Montenegro. Unification of the administrations of Serbia and in Kosovo has become increasingly unlikely. In the words of one analyst, these two eggs cannot be joined to make one egg. 3.1.4 If the International Community seeks an independent Kosovo, these developments have been very successful. An independent Kosovo, though helpful in ending the conflict between Serbian leadership and the Kosovar Albanian population, raises far-reaching security concerns for the rest of the Southern Balkans. Views of the Serbian electorate in 2004 hint that separation of Kosovo could through great eVorts be made acceptable to the majority of Serbs in Serbia. However, as unrest in Kosovo in Spring 2004 proved, the Serbian and Roma minorities would assuredly face discrimination and violence in an independent Kosovo. The level of organised violence suggests a future in which these minorities would not be allowed to remain in an independent Kosovo at all. Moreover, according to studies of popular sentiment amongst Kosovar Albanians, as many as eighty percent expect the unification of parts of the FYR of Macedonia populated by Albanians with an independent Kosovo. Such a division of the FYR of Macedonia would alarm Bulgaria and Greece and could involve these nations in a conflict capable of spreading to Turkey and southern Montenegro, where there is an Albanian minority. 3.1.5 An independent Kosovo would influence Albania as well. Unification of these two domains would immediately become under consideration, but might lead to conflict. The Kosovar Albanian leadership remains distinct from that of Albania, and a struggle for control of the larger state would likely ensue. Ev 138 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
3.1.6 The creation of a Greater Albanian state would also seriously jeopardise the continued existence of Bosnia and Hercegovina. This state, currently fragile due to ethnic fragmentation and economic weakness, would likely face revolt based on the argument that the Bosnian Serbs could not be expected to remain separated from Serbs in Serbia while Albanians are allowed to create a unified nation-state. Recommendations for actions the committee should consider: 3.1.7 The basic challenge is to resolve the future status of Kosovo without creating a Greater Albania, as this will lead to major unrest in the Balkans and I would be likely to draw in several states of the European Union. 3.1.8 The International Community’s policy in Kosovo should be reconsidered in light of the broader security concerns described above. The situation does not oVer any clear solutions for future advancement for Kosovo and preservation of peace in the area. The implications of an independent Kosovo for security should be carefully weighed against the price of stagnation in the area caused by its currently unsettled status. I am available to appear as a witness at any time. Rinna Elina Kullaa University of Oxford, UK/University of Maryland, USA 14 September 2004
Written evidence submitted by Biljana Radonjic, Assistant Director, Civilitas Research The implications of continuing instability in the Western Balkans for the wider region and Europe as a whole.
Summary As the latest surge of ethic violence against Kosovo’s non-Albanian minorities in March 2004 showed, Kosovo retains the potential to destabilize the Western Balkans. However, following the inter-ethnic clashes, the international community has now started to shift its attention away from the current “standards before status” policy, based on achieving basic democratic standards before deciding Kosovo’s future, and is now focused on final status negotiations. This is premature, self-defeating and potentially damaging. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) should continue to maintain the “standards before status” policy. In the meantime, an attempt should be made to create a special status for the Serb and other non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo. This would be best achieved through decentralization. A model for such a process is the Ohrid Peace Agreement, which ended inter-ethnic fighting in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
The “Standards before Status”Policy There are eight benchmarks of the “standards before status” policy set in April 2002 by Michael Steiner, the UNMIK Head at the time, and which cover all the major problem areas in Kosovo: — Functioning democratic institutions — Rule of law — Freedom of movement — Return and re-integrations of refugees — Economic progress — Respect for property rights — Dialogue with Belgrade — Police reform
The UN is Questioning the Policy Since the policy was first put in place there has been only limited movement towards achieving the desired outcomes in any of these areas. The main reasons for this lies with the lack of political will of both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs to cooperate with the international community and with each other. Uncertainty over the future of province also complicates matters. On this issue, the two main communities remain as far apart as ever. The Albanians want unfettered independence. The Serbs wish to see the province remain an integral part of Serbia. The failure to resolve the province’s status is certainly a major contributing factor to continued instability in the province. Indeed, it may be seen as one of the key underlying reasons behind the upsurge in ethnic violence that erupted in March 2004, when ethnically motivated violence against the Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities left 19 people dead and thousands homeless. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 139
In the aftermath of the clashes UNMIK and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) came in for heavy criticism by various international and non-governmental organisations. The incident also revealed to the international public that, five years since NATO military intervention ended the Kosovo conflict; the province is still unstable and marred by ethnic hatred. Naturally, there are fears that they may be further similar incidents in the future, which may not be controlled. Indeed, such were the fears that further ethnic violence may occur that it appears as if the UN has altered its whole approach towards the province. The latest Head of the UNMIK, Soren Jessen-Petersen, has announced that a full evaluation of Kosovo’s democratic standards would take place within the next seven to eight months to determine the readiness of Kosovo for status talks starting in mid-2005. This would appear to be an unrealistically optimistic timetable. Thus far the democratic standards in the province have been appallingly low. The economy is in the doldrums, organized crime is flourishing, witness intimidation ruins criminal court cases and the dialogue with Belgrade is stalemate. Moreover, many improvements made over the past five years were set back by the ethnic violence in March. No matter how much time and eVort the UNMIK devotes to promoting democracy and human rights in the coming months, Kosovo will not be able to meet even most basic standards in less than a year.
Start of Status Talks will not buy Time If the UN strategy is to buy time—start the talks and then string them out while progress is made to improve the situation on the ground—this is not the way to achieve that. The approach is both unrealistic and potentially dangerous. For a start, opening talks will be read as a sign that independence is inevitable, even if Kosovo fails to reach democratic standards. This could inflame those in the region who seek violent solutions and lead to further hostility in Kosovo, and to renewed combating in Southern Serbia and Macedonia. Also, there will be little room to draw the discussions out indefinitely. Unless rapid progress is made, the frustrations will grow again among the Kosovo Albanians. This raises the prospect of further ethnic violence and regional instability. The respite of opening talks will be short-lived. Additionally, most political analysts and many diplomats believe that resolving the status question is a prerequisite to peace and stability in Kosovo and wider region. This is true as long as “peace and stability” do not include respect for minority rights and other democratic standards in a multiethnic society in Kosovo. It should be recognised that unless it happens now, when Kosovo is under international control, it will be substantially more diYcult to encourage democratisation in the future. At the moment, the international community continues to control if, when and how independence—the Kosovo Albanians’ foremost aspiration—will come about. If UNMIK is not capable of persuading Kosovo Albanian leadership to work at achieving democratic standards at this stage, it is hard to conceive how it will bring about such improvements once the main incentive for cooperation vanishes.
Continue to Support the “Standards before Status”Policy The current “standards before status” policy is based on inherently good democratic principles. The fact that they are diYcult to achieve is not a reason good enough to abandon the policy. Irrespective of the final status it is beneficial for the Kosovo society to strive towards achieving these democratic standards. Also, although regional stability is extremely valuable and it cannot happen without on-the-ground security on Kosovo, it is ill-advised for the UNMIK to shift its concentration away from long-term democratisation and towards the maintenance of short-term security through pushing for immediate status talks. This especially should not happen due to the blackmail of further ethnic violence. However, supporting the policy in principle is not the same as arguing for the policy to remain unchanged. Due to obvious problems with its implementation it is clear that the policy has to be reassessed and modified. But it should not be abandoned. A recent report by Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide to the UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan suggests further transfer of governing competences to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), which would increase their responsibility and accountability. Also, the UNMIK should embark on the prioritisation of the democratic standards, namely the concentration on minority rights protection and economic development. Genuine commitment beyond rhetoric by the international community, including the financial pledge, would be extremely beneficial as well. However, it is not feasible to discuss any complex modifications in the scope of this memorandum.
Part II—A Special Status for the Kosovo Minorities The treatment of national minorities is one of the most pressing issues facing the international community in Kosovo. The Kosovo Constitutional Framework Document for Provisional Self-Government, adopted in May 2001, contains a number of internationally accepted provisions for minority rights protection. These include fair and appropriate representation of minorities in state institutions; the use of languages of minorities in parliament, courts and in communication between citizens and government; state-funded education in the languages of minorities on all levels, etc Ev 140 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
However, despite these legislations the level of minority rights protection in Kosovo remains extremely unsatisfactory, according to all recent reports. The minorities still do not enjoy the freedom of movement and continue to be underrepresented, property rights are unresolved and refugee return is negligible. After the war in 1999, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 200,000 people, including Serbs and other minorities, were forced out of their homes. Of these, the UNHCR says roughly 7,000 people—including 4,000 Serbs—have subsequently returned home. After violence in mid- March this year, up to 4,000 Serbs were forced to leave their properties. Therefore, it is obvious that the rights of Serbs and other non-Albanians cannot be adequately protected merely by means of passing various, albeit progressive, legislations.
This memorandum is suggesting a model of decentralisation on the lines of the one reached in the Ohrid Peace Agreement which ensures the high level of local self-governance. Adopted in August 2001, the Ohrid Agreement is aimed at enhancing legal and political status of ethnic Albanians in FYROM while maintaining territorial integrity of the unitary state at the insistence of Macedonian Slavs. Given that a similar situation, and similar concerns, exist in Kosovo, it seems logical that Kosovo minorities should be treated in the analogous way as ethnic Albanians in FYROM. The memorandum does not endorse Belgrade’s proposal on cantonisation of Kosovo, which is antagonistic towards Kosovo’s territorial integrity and unacceptable for the Kosovo Albanians.
Decentralisation—drawing up new municipal boundaries and the financing of local authorities to strengthen local self-government—is the main pillar of Ohrid Peace Agreement. Local authorities are expected to have enhanced competencies in the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare and health care. If this is applied in Kosovo, municipal authorities would be in charge of citizens’ most pressing concerns and everyday aVairs. Decentralisation would be based on the principle of subsidiary which is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as eVectively as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen. The reform of local self-government and public administration should draw extensively on the recommendations made by the Council of Europe (“the Civiletti report”) from November 2003. Also, in order to acknowledge the genuine concerns of Kosovo Serbs for their safety as well as avoid any resistance, Belgrade-sponsored parallel administrative structures that presently exist in Northern Kosovo, should not be dismantled but only modified and used as a basis for a decentralised local government. PISG and/or UNMIK should take responsibility for financing Serb local administration as a replacement for the money currently coming from Belgrade.
Police forces in Macedonia are not in the direct jurisdiction of local but central authorities according to the Ohrid Agreement. However, local government oYcials have a say in appointing police chiefs in their municipalities. Minority representation in police forces is directly proportional with the percentage of Albanians in Macedonia which is 22%. Kosovo, on the other hand, requires an element of positive discrimination for minority representation in Kosovo Police Services (KPS) to be fair. The participation of non-Albanian minorities in KPS should be about 20% which is twice their current share of population, but also slightly larger that 15%—a representation target established by the UNMIK. Similarly, minority participation in Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian emergency organisation, should be larger that 10%.
Kosovo Serbs should be relatively easily persuaded to accept this policy. The key to this strategy is to remind them that the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have managed to secure extremely high standards of minority rights protection as a result of the agreement. On a similar note, the policy should also strike a chord with the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians by the logic of equal minority rights in the region. Also, this pattern could be potentially utilised in future with regards to Muslim minority, including the Albanians, in South Serbia. Moreover, as part of some future minority rights protection blueprint in the Western Balkans, led by the international community, it would seem advisable openly and actively to associate these diVerent cases of ethnic minority status with each other. Apart from showing an integrated and consistent international policy, this attempt to unify positions will help to stave oV claims that the international is adopting “double standards”. These claims tend to aggravate the local population and feed resentment and hostility.
Additionally, it may appear that recent strong opposition among Macedonian Slav majority regarding the redrawing of municipal borders casts a shadow on the proposed model for minority rights protection in Kosovo or any other standardised minority protection model in the Western Balkans. It is partly true. Borders are certainly an extremely sensitive issue in the region. However, while ethic Albanians in Macedonia are concentrated in the Western part of the country, which could serve as a basis for future separatism, Kosovo Serbs are mainly scattered around the province with a strong presence only in Northern Kosovo. For that reason, Serbian government proposal for cantonisation, which includes the resettlement of the Serbs in order to form a clearly defined territory, is undoubtedly out of question. However, because it is proving extremely diYcult and expensive to protect small and isolated minority settlements some European oYcials suggest “more consolidated” enclaves. This approach would make a lot of sense. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 141
Ensuring the Success of the Policy Obviously, this, or any other minority protection model, will only succeed if a number of other factors are satisfied. First of all, Belgrade should be persuaded to pressure Kosovo Serbs to cooperate with the UNMIK and the Kosovo authorities. Secondly, Kosovo Albanians should be convinced that there can be no alternative to the minority rights protection. Their hopes that the province can be turned into an exclusively Albanian region should be rejected in exactly the same way that the international community has rejected ethnic cleansing in other areas of the Balkans. Also, the international community should provide some guarantees that current borders cannot be violated. This is vital if moves to make Kosovo independent are not to lead to further fracturing and conflict in the Balkans. Neither Kosovo Serbs nor Albanians from Macedonia or South Serbia should have a right to self-determination and succession. Finally, the international community should continue to show a genuine commitment to improve substantially the situation in Kosovo based on democratisation, the rule of law and the protection of minority rights. Biljana Radonjic Civilitas Research 15 September 2004
Written evidence submitted by BBC World Service
Regional Overview — In the Balkans there is an increased need for informed analysis of the impact of change—political, economic and social—covering both international and domestic news, particularly in countries where the media is still comparatively tightly controlled by the state. — The BBC World Service’s role remains largely, but not solely, that of a “trusted guide”, not just to global events but also to the politics of this complex area. — The BBC seeks to reach its audience through English programmes on radio, television and the Internet. However in countries where use of English is not yet high, the audience is reached primarily through the radio oVer in the vernacular languages. — The BBC World Service provides programmes in English, Albanian, Croatian, Macedonian and Serbian to the Balkans. — Radio content is based on a core of news and current aVairs programmes, enhanced by strong regional journalism delivering expertise and analysis. A major theme of the output is reporting and explaining wider European issues, such as migration, economic development and harmonisation of laws within EU regulations, and setting them in a global context. — The region aims to get closer to its audiences. Some European languages are spoken in a number of countries. Each community has diVerent needs. The World Service responds by providing special programming. — We actively target opinion formers and decision makers, both for English and vernacular languages, and amongst those groups we are performing better than our international radio competitors. — The aim is to provide the key audience of cosmopolitan and aspirant audience with authoritative and reliable news and current aVairs coverage of the region, and the wider European and international agenda. — None of the countries to which the services are broadcast had a press rated as free by the 2004 Freedom House Press Freedom rankings, all are ranked as partly free. Public broadcasting in Albania and Serbia Montenegro remains state run. — Domestic media in the region is not able to provide in-depth coverage of international and European events, that BBC World Service access to the BBC range of newsgathering correspondents worldwide allows it to do. — In the past year the World Service in all its languages has provided its audience with extensive coverage of events in Iraq and the EU accession and constitution debate. — The World Service’s European analysts are widely used to explain, clarify and demystify European issues: Gabriel Partos for coverage of the Balkans and Jan Repa on Central Europe. And the complex issues of the EU have been explained to listeners by Oana Lungescu, the dedicated Regional Correspondent in Brussels. — All of countries served by the language services, except for Serbia Montenegro, have forces serving in either Iraq of Afghanistan. Croatia is fully engaged in the process of joining the EU and Macedonia has formally applied for membership. Ev 142 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
— This year promises to be a significant one for the region with local elections in both Kosovo and Serbia, and possible a general election in the latter and a referendum on the decentralisation bill in Macedonia. The services plan extensive coverage of these events as well as key broader European issues eg the continued trials at The Hague and the decision over Turkish membership of the EU. — On the international agenda as well as News and Current AVairs coverage for the US Elections in English the Albanian, Croatian and Serbian Services will all be reporting from Washington and elsewhere in the US.
Media Context — During times of conflict in the Balkans, domestic media were used as propaganda tools by authorities; however some countries are now beginning to experience a period of relative freedom from political censorship. The media market in the Balkans has generally developed, although at varying rates. — There have been some positive developments towards the advancement of a fair media environment. In some places, bias and censorship appear to be decreasing and the media is freer than in the past. In places such as Serbia and Albania a large number of pirate radio and TV stations have emerged; often oVering entertainment programming. However this creates very variable standards of news reporting, as well as regulatory chaos. This in turn can create an environment in which it is diYcult for the BBC to acquire licences for its own FM frequencies. — Radio listening throughout the Balkan region is generally very high, with a mix of state and commercial radio. Music stations are popular, although many broadcast no news. Traditionally, demand for international news was very weak prior to the regional ethnic crises in the 1990s, although international events led broadcasters to increase their output in this region. Nevertheless, direct international radio listening remains a niche activity. — The internet is not highly developed in this region, mainly due to low in-home PC/telephone line access, and has been developing more slowly than expected, although many young people have access via schools, universities and Internet cafes. Mobile telephony is growing fast as a potential medium.
BBC Offer — Throughout Europe, the BBC’s radio output is complemented by a strong online oVer. All language sections run online sites: some, including Albanian, are regularly updated with news whereas others concentrate on background, analysis and special programmes. The English pages (at bbcnews.com/europe) are highly developed, with a range of in-depth information and analysis with significant input from the regional teams. — In some areas, such as Kosovo and Albania, whose populations are among the youngest in Europe, we aim to attract the younger listener as part of our audience mix—the aspirant who seeks information to be connected with the latest developments in international politics, finance, arts and sciences. — For instance, the Albanian Service targets audiences in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia; while all programmes cover three countries and beyond, each is tilted towards the needs of a specific audience: the dawn programme focuses mainly on Albania (with a live link to Tirana) and the lunch programme targets mainly Kosovo/Macedonia (with live links to Pristina/Skopje).
Hours of Output: BBC and Competitors — Recent activities of many international broadcasters in Europe have been characterised by budget cuts and subsequent reductions in language services.
Language Weekly hours of output BBC DW VoA RFE English 168 168 168 Albanian 13 10.5 17.5 3.5 (TV 3.5) (TV 3.5) Macedonian 5 7.5 6.25 6.5 Serbian 14.75 14 14 88 (TV 3.5) (TV 7.5) (S. Slavic)* * Mixed language programming Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 143
— In terms of hours broadcast, the World Service has a strong and competitive oVer against its international competitors. — In an increasingly competitive market, all World Service languages focus on a strong oVer at key listening times, morning and evening drive time. — In addition to the languages above, VoA, DW and RFE all carry programming in Bosnian. BBC World Service closed its programmes for Bosnia (2 x 15 mins daily) as they had little impact. — VoA has daily television programmes in both Albanian and Serbian. DW has a weekly EU- orientated magazine programme in Serbian, and broadcasts special television programmes on European issues through a co-operation with Albanian TV.
Bosnia The media market continues to be fragmented along ethnic lines. There is a plethora of outlets with over 180 TV and radio stations serving a population of 5 million. Most independent outlets concentrate on music and light entertainment. The US-supported international broadcasters and Deutsche Welle broadcast in the Bosnian language on both radio and television and they are all reasonably successful. The BBC has never broadcast in the Bosnian language. In 2003, the BBC also took the decision to stop producing programmes in Croatian specifically targeted at a Bosnian audience. At that time, the BBC Croatian Service produced 2x15 minutes daily aimed at Bosnia; the weekly reach of those programmes was around 1%. BBC Serbian and general Croatian programmes are available through a network of re-broadcasters in Bosnia.
BBC World Service:New Media — All language sections run online sites bringing background information and audio. Some have a limited news service. — The European Online team and Specialist Unit work with language sections to produce in-house specials, to adapt News Online features for European pages and to produce online picture galleries. Stories have included the Serbian elections. — We have also increased interactivity—all languages run interactive forums. — Our English audio is also available streamed via Yahoo!, and dozens of public radio stations link directly to the site.
BBC World Service Trust and Training — Working closely with the World Service Trust in the Balkans, we have an active role in providing programming in the vernacular languages which help bringing Europe closer to countries which are not on the EU Accession first wave list, eg Albania, Macedonia. — We will continue to develop journalist training programmes to assist strengthening of media organisations, thus helping to develop civic society.
Performance and Delivery — The World Service targets opinion formers and decision makers across Europe, and we are performing strongly against our main international competitors in the region. — In many of these areas—we have a significant overall reach of more than 5%.
Albania — In Albania we reach 8% weekly via Tirana 103.9 FM. We are rebroadcast via over 20 stations including Regional Public Radio. — The Albanian Service has reached an entirely new audience through its programme Auditorium— a version of Question Time, which has not only been broadcast on Radio but also on Television by the country’s top commercial channel Top TV. The programme was recorded in six cities across the country. It’s the first time Albanian politicians have participated in such a format taking questions of which they did not have prior notice. Ev 144 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Kosovo — In Kosovo we have a healthy reach of over 12% via Prishtina 98.6 FM and rebroadcasting agreements via two national networks and local stations in the Albanian language and via a station in Mitrovica in the Serbian language. — The language services have had considerable success in the past year in reaching out to new audiences, the Croatian and Serbian services have secured FM distribution in Zagreb and Belgrade.
Croatia — In the Croatian case this is via Otvotreni radio the country’s largest commercial national network with over 12 stations.
Serbia — In the Serbian case it is via a new programme oVer, particularly a new drivetime programme, on a rented FM frequency in Belgrade. Its morning current aVairs programme is broadcast by the capital’s leading independent radio station B92 and its network of 40 stations. — The reach in Serbia at just under 5% is a respectable performance given the fragmentation of the market and the ferocity of international competition.
Macedonia — Strong partnerships in Macedonia have been maintained. In Macedonian with the National Radio and 20 local radio stations which gains a reach of 12%. In Albanian via National radio and Radio Tetovo which claims a reach of 9%. And in English via Classic FM in Skopje for a small but important number of English speaking listeners.
BBC World — As well as the BBC’s radio and online oVers, BBC World television is broadcast throughout the region via satellite, and can be accessed by around 60.5 million homes. — Although timely and relevant content is key to retaining audiences, the delivery mix is also of major importance. A strong FM and medium wave presence is vital, and developing partnerships with local broadcasters is a key component of our delivery strategy. — We are strengthening our business development expertise to enable us to take full advantage of opportunities as they arise, especially those which occur as a result of relationships which BBC World television has established. — The new BBC World Service and Global News Division has given us the opportunity to focus closely on achieving a complementary radio, television and online oVer throughout the region.
Competitive Developments
Deutsche Welle — In 2001, DW made eVorts to improve its radio presence in the Balkans. The German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, in conjunction with the Stability Pact for South- eastern Europe provided the Macedonian government with ƒ750,000 to refurbish the country’s most important medium wave broadcasting service, which transmits DW radio programmes in exchange. — DW’s Macedonian service expanded to two hours daily in March 2001. DW also launched transmissions in Kosovo in October of the same year, on its own VHF relay.
Radio Free Europe — RFE/RL announced budget cuts in February 2003 which will eventually lead to closure of a number of European language services including Croatian, but not any other Balkan languages. — RFE/RL started broadcasting in Macedonian in September 2001. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 145
Issues — The need to maintain a good range of distribution methods both through re-broadcasters and through a network of our own FM frequencies. The media market in the Balkans is very fragmented. — The challenges posed by Government intervention and oYcial regulation For example, under political pressure, Macedonian National Radio dropped the BBC for a time three years ago at the height of the inter-communal conflict. However, BBC programmes were later re-instated and this must be seen as a testament to their popularity, balance and objectivity. — The role of television may play in undermining radio audiences. In markets where our competitors have developed a television oVer in the vernacular languages (for example VoA in Albanian and Serbian) they are performing particularly strongly. — The speed of new media development. The World Service invested new funds to the region in 2000 and is confident that that investment will safeguard our current strong position. We have no plans to make any significant changes. BBC World Service
Written evidence submitted by Amnesty International UK Please find enclosed a copy of a submission by Amnesty International UK to the House of Commons Foreign AVairs Committee inquiry on the Western Balkans; many apologies for its late arrival and we hope that its contents can still be considered. We also enclose copies of the two reports cited in the submission, “So does that mean I have rights?” Protecting the human rights of women and girls traYcked for forced prostitution in Kosovo, and Enhancing the Protection of the Rights of TraYcked Persons: Amnesty International and Anti-Slavery International’s Recommendations to strengthen provisions of the July 2004 draft European Convention against TraYcking in Human Beings.9 With many thanks for your assistance. Miranda Kazantzis Policy Adviser Amnesty International UK 20 September 2004
Memorandum
Amnesty International 1. Amnesty International is a worldwide membership movement. Our vision is of a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We promote all human rights and undertake research and action focussed on preventing grave abuses of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression and freedom from discrimination.
Introduction 2. In July 2004, the Foreign AVairs Committee invited written submissions to assist its inquiry into UK policy regarding the Western Balkans. This submission sets out a key concern of Amnesty International UK with respect to Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, that of traYcking of women and girls for forced prostitution. It is Amnesty International UK’s view that this practice contributes significantly to continuing instability in the region. 3. The UK Government’s responsibility towards this issue lies in its role as participant in military operations in the region, the presence of which, it is alleged has contributed to the rise in traYcking in the past. It also has responsibility in its role as a member of the UN and NATO that is charged with the protection and promotion of human rights and the rule of law in both Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, it has significant political and economic influence on the region as a whole, unilaterally in its own capacity; as a member of the Council of Europe; and as a member of the European Union. 4. It is also beholden upon the UK to play its part in the development of a new treaty on traYcking to be known as the European Convention on Action against TraYcking in Human Beings (European Convention against TraYcking). This is an important development in the fight against traYcking, in that its purpose is to focus on the human rights of the victims of traYcking. Thus, its aim is to provide a comprehensive
9 Not printed. Ev 146 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
framework for the protection and assistance of traYcked persons and witnesses, as well as for the eVective prevention, investigation and prosecution of traYcking and those responsible for traYcking and on international co-operation in the field. 5. It should not be assumed, because this submission focuses on traYcking, that Amnesty International UK does not have a range of concerns in the region. The accountability of KFOR and SFOR forces, torture and ill-treatment and the situation of minorities are all issues mentioned in relevant entries of the Amnesty International Annual Report 2004. However, we have concentrated on traYcking in the interest of brevity and to highlight a problem that is sometimes overlooked.
What is Trafficking? 6. TraYcking in people is a global problem that aVects countries in every continent. In 2004, the United States Government estimated that between 600,000–800,000 women, children and men are traYcked across borders each year. Of these, an estimated 120,000–300,000 women and girls are traYcked within Europe. 7. The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish TraYcking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, November 2002 defines traYcking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery or servitude or the removal of organs.” 8. The UN definition makes it clear that traYcking is not limited to sexual exploitation and also takes place for other forms of labour exploitation. This means that people who migrate for work in areas like agriculture, catering, construction or domestic work, but then find themselves coerced into working in exploitative conditions are also traYcked persons. The Protocol also states that any child transported for exploitative work is considered to be a traYcking victim—whether or not they have been coerced or deceived. This is partly because, in these circumstances, it is considered impossible for children to give informed consent. 9. TraYcking is not only an abuse of human rights in itself, but is also made up of a series of abuses including torture, ill-treatment, deprivation of liberty, denial of the right to health and denial of access to justice, redress and reparations. Thus, those traYcking women and girls for forced prostitution are also abusing human rights set out in a number of international human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 10. According to the UN Protocol, States have a responsibility to prevent, investigate and punish those traYcking others, whether such traYcking is perpetrated by the state or a private person.
Trafficking in the Western Balkans 11. There has been a marked growth of the traYcking of women and girls for forced sexual services throughout the world. The Western Balkans generally are known to be both transit countries as well as destinations used by traYckers of women and girls. Most of the victims come from Eastern Europe—it is estimated that some 60% of traYcked women and girls come from Moldova, one of Europe’s poorest countries, whilst others come from Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine. Many victims are lured by promises of work in Western Europe as waitresses or similar but are forced into sexual slavery. Many are broken mentally and physically by rape and extreme brutality. The victims are frequently repeatedly sold and moved to diVerent locations, with prices ranging from 50 to 3,500 Euros.
Kosovo 12. Kosovo is a major destination country, as well as increasingly a source country, for women and girls traYcked into forced prostitution. As well as women and girls being traYcked into and through Kosovo from outside, increasing numbers of Kosovar Albanians—the majority believed to be minors—are being traYcked internally. NGOs in EU countries report that some Kosovar Albanian women and girls are now being traYcked into EU countries. 13. In its recent report “So does that mean I have rights?” Protecting the human rights of women and girls traYcked for forced prostitution in Kosovo10, Amnesty International documents abuses against women and girls in the country, which include abduction, deprivation of liberty and denial of freedom of movement, often combined with other restrictions, including the withdrawal of travel or identity documents. The organisation also finds that women and girls have been subjected to torture and ill-treatment, including psychological threats, beatings and rape. In 2002, it was reported that 36% of traYcked women and girls in
10 AI Index: EUR 70/010/2004 www.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur700102004. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 147
Kosovo were denied any medical care, while only 10% were provided with regular health care; the majority of traYcked women were forced to have unprotected sex. Amnesty International is particularly concerned that girls under 18 make up between 15 and 20% of those working in bars and suspects that they have been traYcked for forced prostitution. 14. The report continues that even after women and girls have escaped their traYckers or have been “rescued” by police, many are subsequently vulnerable to violations by law-enforcement, criminal justice and immigration agencies. Some may have been themselves arrested and imprisoned for prostitution, or status oVences, and are denied access to the basic rights of detainees. Those who are recognised as victims of traYcking may have been denied access to their rights to reparation and redress for the abuses they had suVered, and may not have been aVorded adequate protection, support and services. Others find that they have little or no protection from their traYckers if they choose to testify in court. 15. Amnesty International notes the repeated remarks of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women on the association between the growth of traYcking of women and children and post-war militarisation, complicity by peace-keeping forces, the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators, and the necessity for means of ensuring the accountability of such forces. The development of this industry was observed by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women in her address to the UN Human Rights Commission in April 2001, where she referred to reports of a “vast increase in traYcking activity” in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 16. Indeed, following the arrival of KFOR (Kosovo peace-keeping mission) in July 1999, significant concentrations of organised prostitution were identified close to KFOR troops locations, with the military making up the majority of the clients, some of whom were allegedly also involved in the traYcking process. KFOR and UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) were publicly identified in early 2000 as a causal factor by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The number of premises where traYcked women were thought to work increased from around 75 in January 2001, to over 200 by the end of 2003. Although the percentage of international clientele has declined, still around 20% of those using the services of traYcked women are thought to be members of the international community. According to the UK Government, no UK personnel in Kosovo have been implicated in oVences relating to traYcking, but three Royal Marines were found to have visited an out-of-bounds bar in 2000 and have been disciplined and an Army Lieutenant Colonel found in a brothel, also in 2000, was returned to the UK and subsequently court-martialled. 17. Under UN Resolution 1244/99, UNMIK has a responsibility to protect and promote human rights. Furthermore, UN Resolution 1325/2000 addresses violence against women in post-conflict societies, identifying the responsibilities of both peace-keeping forces and civilian administrations with regard to the prevention of post-conflict violence against women. However, the authorities have been slow to respond to the situation and prosecutions for traYckers are rare. Although the UNMIK Police TraYcking and Prostitution Unit was formed in October 2000 and in January 2001 an UNMIK Regulation on TraYcking, which criminalised both traYckers and those knowingly using the services of traYcked women was promulgated, UNMIK has failed to bring any prosecutions. The regulation also made provision for the protection and assistance of traYcked women, but a directive implementing these provisions have yet to come into force. 18. Impunity for traYckers and a failure to protect the rights of traYcked women in Kosovo has been, in part, allowed to continue because of the failure of the international community and the Kosovo authorities (Provisional Institutions of Self-Government—PISG) to work eVectively with each other—or the relevant international and domestic NGOs—to co-ordinate responses, often appearing to compete with each other for resources and control. This failure has resulted in a failure to protect the rights of traYcked women, and provide them with redress for the violations and abuses that they have suVered. In October 2003, a conference in Kosovo initiated the conception and implementation of a Kosovo Action Plan on TraYcking, under the guidance of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPEEE). Amnesty International seeks to ensure that measures to protect the human rights of women and girls are fully implemented throughout this action plan. 19. In addition, UNMIK police and other UNMIK personnel, KFOR personnel and contractors enjoy a general immunity from prosecution, granted under UNMIK Regulation 2000/47. Civilians, including UNMIK police, may therefore only be prosecuted if a waiver is granted by the UN Secretary-General, or in the case of NATO, by their respective national commanders. 20. In March 2004, recognising that “Peacekeepers have come to be seen as part of the problem in traYcking rather than the solution”, the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) published a policy paper, which aimed to “establish a system to monitor, prevent, minimise, investigate and punish involvement of peacekeeping personnel inhuman traYcking and other sexual exploitation and abuse”. This initiative is welcomed by Amnesty International, although it is regretted that it has come at such a late stage in the development of peace-keeping operations in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 21. In 2003, NATO announced that it would be developing a policy on peace-keeping and traYcking. Amnesty International welcomes NATO’s adoption of a policy on Combatting TraYcking in Human Beings in June 2004, endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. However, the organisation considers that the policy falls short of the organisation’s recommendations and Ev 148 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
in particular, fails to address, in any detail, measures to ensure the accountability—including the enforcement of disciplinary proceedings or criminal prosecution—of NATO personnel reasonably suspected of involvement in traYcking, or in the knowing use of the services of traYcked women. 22. In the absence of appropriate action by UNMIK, KFOR and the PISG, support and assistance for those who have been traYcked is provided by the IOM and local non-governmental organisations. In the meantime, traYcking for forced prostitution remains widespread and allegations of oYcial complicity continue.
Serbia and Montenegro 23. Serbia and Montenegro remain a source, transit and destination country for women and girls traYcked for forced prostitution. In cases where those involved in traYcking have been brought to justice, the courts impose lenient sentences. On 5 March, Belgrade District Court found Milovoje Zarubica and 12 others guilty of involvement in traYcking women and girls from Moldova. They received sentences ranging from five months to three and a half years imprisonment on charges which included rape, mediation in prostitution, forgery, illegal deprivation of liberty and illegal border crossing; the defendants were released from custody pending appeal. 24. In June the US State Department in its annual report of traYcking noted that in Serbia; “OYcial corruption is a continuing problem; oV-duty police oYcers were caught providing security at venues where traYcking victims were located. Most of these individuals received only administrative sanctions, but one oYcer was charged with a criminal oVence”. For Montenegro, the report noted that “of the 15 cases submitted to the prosecution since 2002, there have been no convictions. OYcial corruption remains a problem; victims named police and government oYcials who were among their clients but the government did not take legal action.” 25. In May 2003, a high profile trial of the Montenegrin deputy state prosecutor and three other men for involvement in sex slavery collapsed. The authorities agreed to an investigation by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE), which in September submitted a report highly critical of the authorities handling of the case.
Bosnia-Herzegovina 26. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, by contrast, some positive developments have been noted in the prosecution of those responsible for serious human rights abuses against women and girls in the context of traYcking and forced prostitution. However, the OYce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bosnia- Herzegovina issued a report which found that the State Commission, a special law enforcement body charged with implementation of a National Action Plan against traYcking, and law enforcement agencies were not given adequate support by the state government and that there were severe shortcomings in the provision of shelter to vulnerable victims. These concerns were shared by local human rights and women’s organisations. In addition, gaps and ambiguities in the domestic legal framework hampered eVective prosecutions. For example, the delayed adoption of the new Law on Asylum and amendments to the Law on the Movement and Stay of Foreigners further restricted the prevention of traYcking and protection for victims who continued to be treated largely as illegal migrants. 27. Amnesty International is further concerned that a new EU military operation (to be known as “ALTHEA”) will take over from the NATO-led SFOR (Bosnia peace-keeping force) in December 2004 and warns that it must not be allowed to repeat the mistakes of SFOR in its role in promoting the development of traYcking in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Macedonia 28. In Macedonia, changes in the Criminal Code came into eVect in April, and the minimum prison sentences for human traYcking was raised from five years to eight years. The US State Department in its annual report on TraYcking of 14 June noted that “institutional deficiencies in the judiciary hindered greater progress in combating traYcking”. Tetovo crime police statistics for 2003 published by the daily Vreme showed that in the Tetovo region 80 police raids on suspected brothels with traYcked women found 95 people “without regulated residence in Macedonia” resulting in 38 charges being brought against owners of the relevant premises, but only one conviction. The newspaper noted that the Tetovo prosecution had diYculties finding relevant evidence and that witnesses were often afraid to testify and sometimes the subject of death threats. The daily Fakti on 8 June reported that in Dabile village between Delchevo and Strumica near the Macedonia-Bulgaria-Greece border there was a public market where girls from the Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Belarus, Moldavia and other countries were being sold and bought for US$1,000–3,000 dollars by traYckers from a number of places in Macedonia. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 149
Draft European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 29. Within the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers has mandated the Ad Hoc Committee on Action against TraYcking in Human Beings (CAHTEH) to draft a European Convention against TraYcking in Human Beings by December 2004. The Committee of Ministers specifically requested the CAHTEH to focus “on the human rights of victims of traYcking” as well as focussing on prevention, investigation, prosecution and international cooperation and to “design a comprehensive framework for the protection and assistance of traYcked persons and witnesses”. 30. The Committee of Ministers has instructed CAHTEH to take into account existing international and regional standards dealing with traYcking, with a view to developing these standards so as to improve the protection aVorded by them to traYcked persons. 31. Amnesty International warmly welcomes the Committee of Ministers mandate to the CAHTEH. It feels however, that some of the provisions made in the July 2004 draft of the Convention require further strengthening, particularly with regard to the definition of the victim; support, assistance and protection measures; access to medical care and education; vocational training and work; compensation and legal redress; identification, recovery and reflection periods; residency and repatriation; non-punishment and protection in judicial proceedings; and with regard to criminalisation, jurisdiction and monitoring. Further details regarding the concerns of Amnesty International with regard to this draft can be found in its joint paper with Anti-Slavery International Enhancing the Protection of the Human Rights of TraYcked Persons: Amnesty International and Anti-Slavery International’s Recommendations to strengthen provisions of the July 2004 draft European Convention against TraYcking in Human Beings11.
Recommendations 32. In identifying traYcking within and from the Western Balkans as a series of human rights violations and abuses under international law, Amnesty International UK calls on the UK Government—under its international obligations—to show due diligence in preventing, investigating and prosecuting these abuses where they take place involving women and children from the region in the UK. It also has a duty to provide eVective legal remedies, redress and reparation to victims of such violations and abuses, where they have been traYcked from this region into the UK, and should bring pressure to bear upon the relevant authorities to ensure the same within the region itself;
Regional Missions 33. That the UK Government ensures that there is no impunity for its international personnel operating within UNMIK, KFOR, OYce of the High Representative (OHR) or SFOR missions in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it brings pressure to bear upon its partners within the above missions in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina to ensure that international and national personnel operating within their missions reasonably suspected of abuses of human rights and criminal oVences in connection with traYcking, including the knowing use of the services of traYcked women and girls, are brought to justice; 34. And that it brings pressure to bear on fellow member states in the above missions to agree that to ensure consistency the decision to waive immunity for military personnel is taken by the UN Secretary General rather than by the commanders of the respective national contingents; 35. Furthermore, that the UK government works with its partners in the European Union to ensure that the future ALTHEA mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina adopts a zero-tolerance policy towards any form of sexual exploitation, including prohibiting through disciplinary and criminal sanctions, the use of women and girls traYcked into forced prostitution.
NATO and UN Policy 36. That the UK government plays its part within the development of NATO policy towards traYcking to ensure that all NATO personnel involved in peace-keeping or other deployments are, during training, made aware of the range of human rights abuses to which traYcked women and girls are subjected, and the criminal nature of these abuses; that personnel reasonably suspected of involvement in traYcking or of knowingly using the services of traYcked women and girls are (in addition to any disciplinary procedures) brought to the attention of the prosecuting authorities; and that any immunity granted to such personnel under the UN Convention or the relevant Status of Forces Agreement is waived so that they may be subject to prosecution by the domestic authorities; 37. That the UK Government brings pressure to bear upon the UN DPKO to ensure the eVective enforcement of all relevant codes of conduct on personnel operating in the region; that any personnel reasonably suspected of a criminal oVence will be subject to investigation and prosecution in criminal proceedings; and that the UN establish an eVective system of follow-up and reporting on the results of such investigations.
11 AI INDEX: IOR 61/016/2004 www.amnesty.org/library/index/engior610162004. Ev 150 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Protection for the Rights of Trafficked Women and Girls 38. That the UK Government, as a contributor of personnel and funds to UNMIK, brings pressure to bear upon the organisation to ensure the implementation of applicable law in relation to traYcking in Kosovo; and that measures to protect the rights of traYcked women, as recommended by Amnesty International in its report “So does that mean I have rights?” Protecting the human rights of women and girls traYcked for forced prostitution in Kosovo12, and including the prevention of traYcking and addressing demand, as well as recommendations for reparation and compensation, access to justice and assistance and support are incorporated into the Kosovo Action Plan on TraYcking and other appropriate regional actions plans, policies and directives; 39. That the UK Government use its influence politically and economically with regard to policy towards Serbia and Montenegro to engage in a dialogue directly and through the EU and Council of Europe regarding its concerns about traYcking; and specifically that charges of oYcial corruption within police and public authorities is hindering its eVective prosecution; 40. That the UK Government bring its influence to bear upon OHR and the Bosnian authorities to support the State Commission and the National Action Plan against traYcking with regard to law enforcement and address gaps and ambiguities within the domestic legal framework which hamper eVective prosecutions; 41. That the UK Government support the development of an eVective system of investigation, prosecution and trial of traYcking oVences in Macedonia, including regarding witness protection, by providing legal and other expertise and training to the police and judiciary.
Draft European Convention on Action Against Trafficking 42. That the UK Government in its capacity as a member of the CoE ensure that amendments are made to the provisions of the July 2004 draft of the European Convention against TraYcking to ensure that it becomes a comprehensive, gender and child-sensitive framework for the protection and assistance of traYcked persons and witnesses, as well as to prevent traYcking and to investigate and prosecute those responsible for traYcking and related oVences; 43. Furthermore, Amnesty International UK calls on the UK Government as a member of the Council of Europe to widely disseminate the drafts of the text of the European Convention against TraYcking with a view to holding consultations with members of civil society, including NGOs and other experts who work with and on behalf of traYcked persons, throughout the drafting process; 44. Finally, it requests that the UK Government adopts and promotes the suggestions of Amnesty International and Anti-Slavery International in their joint report Enhancing the Protection of the Human Rights of TraYcked Persons: Amnesty International and Anti-Slavery International’s Recommendations to strengthen provisions of the July 2004 draft European Convention against TraYcking in Human Beings13.
Written evidence submitted by Save the Children UK Save the Children UK is pleased to submit evidence to this inquiry on UK policy in relation to the following topics referred to in the announcement of the inquiry: — the prospects for the region’s economic growth in the near future; — the role of the European Union, including the impact of enlargement. Save the Children will be happy to provide additional evidence upon request. Moreover, our Country Programme Directors in the region have already expressed their willingness to arrange relevant meetings in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo if Committee members are visiting the region. In case Committee Members would be interested in referring to more detailed work by Save the Children, we attach for reference purposes (rather than evidence) three of our research documents: — Contributing to Change for Children and Families. Towards developing a medium Term Strategy for the Care and Protection of Children in Serbia, Save the Children, 2004. — Diminishing Returns: Macroeconomics, Poverty and Children’s Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Save the Children, 2004.
12 EUR 70/010/2004 op.cit. 13 EUR 61/016/2004 op.cit. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 151
— Social Indicators for the Western Balkans. Tools for Assessing and Promoting Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion. Maja Gerovska and Paul Stubbs, Save the Children 2004, unpublished. The name of the contact person for the memorandum is Stefan Stoyanov, s.stoyanovwsavethechildren.org.uk, telephone: 0207 012 6709. Pram Unia LACME/Balkans Regional Director Save the Children UK
Summary Save the Children UK has been operational in the Western Balkans for 10 years. We have separate country programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, and we participate in a programme led by Save the Children Noiway in Albania.
Save the Children UK’s main conclusions are:
1. Economic growth must be accompanied by poverty reduction and social welfare policies which protects vulnerable children (a) The UK should use its influence in the EU—to begin to apply the EU Lisbon Strategy to social policy in the Western Balkans within one to three years. (b) The UK should use its influence to ensure that within the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy plans for Serbia, Montenegro & Kosovo, childhood poverty receive concerted attention and suYcient financial sponsorship. (c) The UK should also maintain its investment role as a bilateral donor pursuing pro-poor policy and social justice (including an emphasis on children) in the Western Balkan countries, which continue to be heavily indebted with inadequate investment in social welfare provision.
2. The EU Stabilisation and Association processes present opportunities for promoting child rights in the Western Balkans through the human rights monitoring process
(a) The UK should use its influence in the context of EU Stabilisation & Association processes to ensure that children are treated as a distinct section of society with specific rights. These should be specifically monitored as identified under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; it is inadequate to monitor child rights simply within the context of minority rights (eg Roma people), although this is also relevant.
1. Introduction
1.1 Save the Children UK in the Western Balkans Save the Children UK is the UK’s leading international children’s charity with programmes in 70 countries world-wide. It is one of the most influential INGOs in the Western Balkans, and has been operational there for 10 years. We have focused on improving the rights of vulnerable children in relation to emergency response, access to basic services, child protection and childhood poverty alleviation. Of primary importance to our work in the region is the fulfilment of the rights of the child. The governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and they have signed the Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Special Session for children (“A World Fit for Children 2002”).14 We support local communities, non-governmental organisations and governments to work together to set out the policies and the mechanisms to bring about the conditions for fulfilling the rights of all children in the region. The UNCRC places responsibility on governments to alleviate child poverty. Article 27 stipulates that: “States Parties recognise the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development”.
14 Since Kosovo does not have the status of an independent state, it is not a party to the UNCRC, but its Provisional Institutions of Self-Government have embraced child rights and have set up an Inter-Ministerial children’s committee under the oYce of the Prime Minister (UNICEF, 2004). Ev 152 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
1.2 International commitment to child rights The commitment made by the UK Government and other State Parties in the document “A World Fit for Children” (the outcome of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session for Children 2002) acknowledges that “Implementation of the present Plan of Action will require the allocation of significant additional human, financial and material resources, nationally and internationally, within the framework of an enabllng international environment and enhanced international co-operation, including North-South and South-South co-operation, to contribute to economic and social development” (2002). This engagement should be seen in the context of the UNCRC which sets the basis for international co-operation for the realisation of the rights of the child: “States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation” (Article. 4, UNCRC).
1.3 UN Definition of Poverty Save the Children’s conceptual approach to child poverty in the Western Balkans takes as its starting point the definition of “Overall Poverty” agreed at the World Summit on Social Development in 1995. This expanded the definition beyond income poverty, to include aspects such as lack of access to basic services, social discrimination and exclusion. “Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also characterised by a lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural life.” (UN, 1995) This definition is consistent with the UK Government’s approach to poverty and social inclusion in the UK, which in turn is mirrored in the EU Lisbon Strategy.
1.4 Save the Children’s comments In the context of 1.1–1.3 above, we urge the UK Government (both independently and in conjunction with its EU partners) to actively and systematically support the Western Balkan governments in their eVorts to: — Prioritise childhood poverty reduction, and develop social protection and social inclusion mechanisms as a complement to economic growth; and — Adopt policies to protect and promote the rights of the child. This will demand both political and diplomatic leverage, as well as funding for these priority areas. A suYcient level of political and financial involvement and support should be maintained until post-conflict stabilisation is fully achieved and Transition completed. Save the Children’s contribution to the Inquiry will cover developments in the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), and Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) including Kosovo. Specifically, they will relate to the following items of the Committee’s inquiry: — the prospects for the region’s economic growth in the near future, including the role of the UK; and — the role of the European Union, including the impact of enlargement. The following is a discussion of how these issues could be addressed and where they stand within the framework of this inquiry.
2. The Prospects for the Region’s Economic Growth in the Near Future
2.1 Economic Growth and the incidence of poverty The European Commission report “The Western Balkans in Transition” states that: “The Western Balkans achieved another year of good economic performance in 2003, with GDP growth estimated slightly above 4% and inflation below 5%. Public finances maintained a positive trend of fiscal consolidation, recording an estimated average regional deficit of around 4% of GDP” (European Commission, 2004). Despite recent growth, economic performance is still well below that of the Communist era. Only Albania has exceeded its 1989 GDP level, whilst Serbia is at 50% of its 1989 level (DfiD Regional Assistance Plan for the Western Balkans, December 2003). Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 153
Since the early 1990s a high level of indebtedness has developed and, indeed, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania are regarded by the World Bank as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. At the same time, the incidence of poverty is very high and growing. As DfID acknowledges there is significant poverty in all Western Balkan countries except Croatia. Nearly a quarter of the population is classified as poor, and roughly 500,000 refugees and IDPs are “in extreme poverty, unable to meet their basic nutritional needs” (2003). To take the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH): “The social and economic rights of BiH citizens remain limited by continuing economic debility. OYcially, up to 40% of the population is unemployed. Around 20% live below the poverty threshold, with a further 30% close to it. In part this reflects a failure of (admittedly rudimentary) social security systems to address the needs of the economically most deprived” (European Commission, 2003). In its Country Assistance Strategy for BiH (2000), the World Bank recognises that “children and the elderly are more at risk of poverty, as are single female (often widowed) heads of households”. The progress report on the above strategy (2002) notes that “Around a third of the poor are below 18 years old and two thirds of the poor live in households with children” and recognises that “there is a strong link between poverty and education, with the majority (60%) of the poor living in families where the household head has only a primary education or less” (World Bank, 2002), which leads to a self-perpetuating cycle of poverty. In Serbia, children aged 7–14 comprise 12.71% of the poor, and children between 15 and 18 comprise another 10.72% of the poor population. (Annex 1 of the Serbia PRSP, 2004)
2.2 Poverty linked to other child rights violations Save the Children’s experience in the region and world-wide, points to the link between income (& resource) poverty and the violation of a wide range of child rights. For example: — Poverty is a major contributor to the numbers of children in care. Faced with an inability to adequately feed, clothe and educate their children, combined with a lack of community based family support services and readily available spaces in institutions throughout the region, parents temporarily or permanently leave their children to the care of the state, often believing that their decision to do so is in the best interests of their child. — Poverty in its extreme forms can lead to the drop-out from school of large numbers of children: “In Sarajevo’s municipality llidza, for example, approximately 300 Romani children were unable to attend schools due to extremely poor living conditions, lack of proper clothing and the inability to purchase the necessary schoolbooks” (Country report on BiH, US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2004). Over the past decade poverty has also brought about increases in child traYcking, with thousands of children being bought and sold for commercial sexual exploitation, forced labour, begging, petty crime, pornography and illegal adoption. Post-communist Transition, compounded by armed conflict in the 1990s, has led to other contributory factors including disintegration of social structures and support networks, institutional weaknesses, increased migration flows, an exacerbation of gender-based discrimination and violence, weakened rule of law, rampant corruption, and a surge in organised crime. Poverty, however, remains the underlying cause of these problems.
2.3 Children are a low priority Child poverty is often seen as a low priority compared with other aspects of social protection. Whilst there is a problem stemming from the lack of available resources, the main issue seems to be one of political will, as can be seen from the fact that “social welfare and child protection expenditures in BiH are the lowest in South East Europe, while veterans benefit expenditures at 3.5–4% of GDP are extremely high by any country’s standards” (World Bank, 2002) Similar examples can be found elsewhere in the region. In Kosovo, at 16% of total government spending, the Social Welfare sector has the largest budget share. However, of the total ƒ82.6 million approved for social assistance, most is allocated to the basic pension15 and social assistance schemes16, leaving little funding for children in need of support and protection. Across the region public financing of education is rather poor: on average 3 to 4% GDP, sometimes even below 3%. Chronic under funding erodes the quality of education, especially in education systems that were clearly designed for a much higher level of public financing (OECD, 2002). Currently Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and Albania are involved in applying Poverty Reduction Strategies. Save the Children has been involved in lobbying for a more explicit focus on children in these strategies and their implementation. Save the Children with other child-focused civil society groups
15 A total of 43.3 million was provided for pensions (monthly payment of 35 for 107.000 recipients—persons above 65 years old). 16 Around 51,000 families were assisted during 2003. Ev 154 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
has had some success in advocating for specific actions to address childhood poverty as part of the PRSP mechanism in the Western Balkans, such as a establishing a database for monitoring the beneficiaries of child protection in BiH, in line with the European standards, with constant monitoring of the vulnerability of families and children. However, a much more explicit focus could be developed. Save the Children recommends that DflD develop an explicit emphasis on child poverty in the Regional Assistance Plan for the Western Balkans, and use its influence to persuade other donors to do the same.
2.3 Donor Funding
Donor funding has been critical in promoting economic growth. Reconstruction and infrastructure development has been a high priority, and indeed continues to be one. This is clearly the case with the EU CARDS programme.17 DfID however, notes the poor co-ordination of donors “driven by divergent and external agendas” (DfID 2003).18 Currently the EC does not emphasise poverty reduction or social protection. The government of BiH however recognised in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2004) the need for comprehensive reforms in social policy and increased social protection expenditure. The EU is nevertheless not addressing the issue in the short-term priorities for BiH outlined in the European Partnership. The EU Commission, in the European Partnership for BiH—2004, urges the government to “Ensure macro-economic stability” and “Improve the business environment”, but does not insist on any measures on social protection. Poverty reduction and social protection have been relatively neglected, despite the fact that poverty is rising significantly and social protection has also considerably declined following the transition from the previous regime and the disruptions caused by conflict.19 Continued economic growth without social protection and social inclusion is likely to lead to a widening gap between the rich and poor. Although investment in poverty reduction and social protection has been boosted by the current implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies, there remains a shortage of donor funding for the implementation of the plans. For example, in Serbia “The process of analysing the full cost implications of the long-term measures identified in the PRSP has just begun. At present, there is concern about the potential gap between the fiscal resources required to implement the whole PRSP programme of policy measures (long-term) and the funds available in the short- and medium-term” (Serbia PRSP, 2004). The implementation of PRSPS has however coincided with a fall in donor funding to the region. At the height of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction aimed at promoting economic growth and political stability, overall annual assistance averaged ƒ3.3 billions, but is expected to fall to ƒ2.6 billions by 2005. There are therefore questions about the sustainability of current economic growth if investment declines. DfID intends to make a major reduction in its investments in the Westem Balkans from £20 millions in 2004–05 to £13.7 millions in 2005–06 (DfID 2003). Whilst this amount may appear negligible in the overall context, DfID’s important contribution in targeted interventions to reduce poverty, and its importance in leveraging policy change, needs to be protected. During the implementation of PRSPs it is all the more important that investment is maintained until EC funding dedicated to targeting poverty reduction and social inclusion comes on stream (see section 3). DfID notes that new donors will need to be found, but even if this is possible it cannot be assumed that they will give the same priority to poverty reduction. DfID intends to assert its influence through activities such as co-ordination and technical assistance, but Save the Children fears this may be unrealistic.20 Finally, it is worth noting that the flow of investment aimed at the development of inclusive social policies into the Western Balkans is primarily in the form of re-payable loans, inevitably restricting the extent of
17 CARDS—Community Assistance for Reconstruction and Development—is the main source of EU grant funding for the Western Balkans. The CARDS programme is a vitally important source of grant funding to the Western Balkans, though Save the Children and the Platform of European Social NGOs would wish to see its scope widened. 18 Save the Children has noted the diverse outcome frameworks and indicators used by international agencies (Gerovska & Stubbs, 2004). 19 The EC is not yet investing in poverty reduction in the Western Balkans. Because its investment priorities are informed by the Stabilisation and Association process, it will not do so until poverty reduction and social inclusion are included in the priorities of the SAp process (this will be expanded in Section 3). As DfID notes “While the requirements of EU accession are generally compatible with development and poverty reduction, the two processes are not well co-ordinated” (2003). 20 Our concern stems from our experience in the Balkan region as a whole. We are wary of the fact that the influence capacity of any international agency often is not a function of its technical expertise and authority, but of its actual expenditure dedicated to the reforms in the region. This is the case when it comes to influencing other donors and even more so when it comes to influencing the governments themselves. Technical assistance in transitional contexts often comes in abundance, and diVerent donors exert diverging reform influences. This is why its absorption by the governments is proportionate to the scale of the assistance provided by the same donor. Often, the technical assistance unmatched with other types of development assistance, is overlooked and, ultimately, without any long term eVect. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 155
investment the Western Balkans can aVord to take up, and therefore limiting expenditure on social protection and inclusion.21 If in the in future debt-repayment becomes a problem, it is likely that social protection will be one of the main areas to be cut, as experience from other parts of the World demonstrates. Save the Children urges DfID to maintain a high level of direct investment in the Western Balkans particularly focused on child poverty reduction. Overall recommendations related to section 2. The UK should use its influence to ensure that within the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy plans for Serbia, Montenegro & Kosovo, childhood poverty receives concerted attention and suYcient financial sponsorship. The UK should also maintain its investment role as a bilateral donor pursuing pro-poor policy and social justice (including an emphasis on children) in the Western Balkans, which continue to be heavily indebted countries with inadequate investment in social welfare provision.
3. The Role of the European Union,Including the Impact of Enlargement
3.1 Commitment of the EU to the Western Balkan countries The Western Balkan Stabilisation and Association process has already been highlighted in the Multi- annual Strategic Programme of the European Council 2004–06 prepared by the six presidencies (Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Austria and Finland): “The Union will continue its strong commitment to the region of the Western Balkans. Support for reform will remain a high priority in the context of achieving the shared goal of integrating the region into European structures, on the basis of full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and with international obligations. The Stabilisation and Association Process . . . will constitute the overall framework for the European course of the Western Balkans countries. EVorts towards concluding Stabilisation and Association Agreements with those countries which do not yet have one will continue.”
3.2 UK Presidency In the next round of European Partnerships for the Western Balkans, Save the Children urges the UK Presidency to secure a commitment on the part of governments in the Western Balkans to develop strategies to enforce child rights and take action to combat child poverty, social exclusion and discrimination. This can be achieved in two ways: — By giving child rights equal priority in human rights monitoring; and — by reducing the gap between the Lisbon Strategy and social policies for the Western Balkans. This should go hand in hand with a renewed commitment to the Lisbon Strategy by EU member states.22
3.3 Giving Child Rights equal priority in human rights monitoring As a child rights organisation, Save the Children welcomes the inclusion of, and reference to, the Rights of the Child in the body of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. We see it as a premise for streamlining child rights issues within the EU and would therefore support any eVorts aimed at increasing the public awareness of the draft Constitution and its ratification. The EU is already committed to human rights monitoring as part of the Stabilisation and Association process, however children are subsumed within the monitoring of social groups such as Roma. Unfortunately, such an approach fails to identify abuses which may be specific to children, or which may have a specific manifestation. For example, the treatment of children deprived of parental care is a specific child rights issue. Action to prohibit discrimination is more likely to be applied to employment than to the school system.
21 Outside the PRS process an illuminating example is provided by the Decade of Roma Inclusion. Supported by the World Bank, the EC, the council of Europe, the OSI and the ODIHR, with eight participating countries, this is a high public policy priority. Yet, it appears that for Serbia & Montenegro, new investment will be repayable loans, with the exception of grants from the Roma Education Fund originating from OSI (the EU Member States will receive grant funding through structural funds). 22 The arguments for this come from various bodies: — The (Irish) Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European council (25 and 26 March 2004) has already inserted that: “A high level of social cohesion is central to the Lisbon Agenda. Strategies which make a decisive impact on social exclusion and on the eradication of poverty must be reinforced”. — The Social Platform of NOOs has asked “to re-boost the Lisbon process” and to emphasise “the role of fundamental rights, non-discrimination and social protection in achieving the Lisbon goals”. — The EAPN’s position paper on the review of the Lisbon Strategy is also concerned with the risk that social inclusion objectives are not given equal consideration. Ev 156 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
There are existing mechanisms for monitoring child rights which could be used as a starting point, such as the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reporting mechanism. Specific evidence may have to be collected (by the Council of Europe, OSCE and civil society) because of a dearth of oYcial data in the region, particularly concerning minority groups. The under-registration of births of Roma children, itself a breach of the UNCRC, is one such problem. Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, has not had a reliable census since 1981, and estimates of the current population vary widely (Gerovska and Stubbs, Save the Children 2004, unpublished). Save the Children urges the UK Government to use its influence both as a Member State of the EU and in the context of the UK Presidency of the EU to fulfil its international commitments to child rights, and to improve the situation of children living in the region. We believe a lot can be achieved through the Stabilisation & Association process. The Enlargement framework has presented the European Union with a unique opportunity to motivate political reform in applicant countries by placing conditionalities on membership (in terms of both harmonised legislation and implementation capacity). Save the Children would favour adding membership requirements related to child rights, particularly in the sector of social protection.
3.4 Reducing the gap between the Lisbon Strategy and the social policies for the Western Balkan countries The Report of the High Level Group on the future of social policy in an enlarged European Union (May 2004), published by the European Commission, recognises the gap between “the broad and integrated approach to social policies in the Lisbon Strategy and the somewhat narrowly defined understanding of social policies in the accession process.” This gap is even more notable in the Stabilisation and Association Process. The same report also raises concerns about the gap between “the character of social policies as a core of Union policies in the Amsterdam/Lisbon approach and the trend to a liberal neglect of social policies in some new Member States in the recent past.” Again, this applies with even greater severity in the Western Balkans. The competing agendas of the EU and major donors, such as the IME and to some extent the World Bank and DfID, lead governments to confusion and could be used as a justification for inaction. The Report of the High Level Group also suggests that “(t)he merits of the European Social Model should be presented in the framework of technical co-operation focused on the promotion of good governance in the social field”, a point which is to be considered both with a view to the SAp in general, and with a view to the funding priorities of the CARDS programme.23
3.5 The first steps towards development and implementation of a comprehensive social policy for the Western Balkan countries should be a short term priority The development and implementation of comprehensive social policy for the SAp countries is currently only a mid term priority (ie three to five years according to the European partnerships). Save the Children would argue however that the work on its development has to start in the short term (ie within one to three years). Furthermore, we would argue that the debate on these issues within the Western Balkans has to take place now. The current placing of economic goals in the short-term priorities of the European Partnerships as opposed to the placing of social policy development in the mid-term goals is inconsistent with the Lisbon Strategy. As already noted, funding for social development will be contingent on its inclusion in the SAp priorities. The policy of the European Commission seems to be to take a gradual approach to the introduction of new priorities to the Western Balkans. Pragmatically, Save the Children could support a gradual approach, as has been the approach to other policy areas prioritised in the European Partnerships. For example, in the area of public administration the short-term priority for Serbia in the Partnership is to “adopt a comprehensive strategy on public administration reform including a precise calendar of actions, in particular address civil service pay system reforms and related human resource development measures; establish and maintain the relevant institutions and allocate the necessary resources; prepare the legislation on government and civil service.” A similar gradual approach should be taken for social policy development24. Nonetheless, we would argue that the starting point needs to be included in the short-term priorities in the next revision of the European Partnerships. — One important means of achieving this will be the inclusion of the Western Balkan countries into the EU’s open method of co-ordination (OMC). The OMC is a mechanism set up for member and candidate states to exchange information on practice and policy with respect to social policy. However, in order for the OMC to be eVectively utilised, the involvement of civil society is crucial. This means that further investment has to be made in the development of civil society. This requirement needs to be accompanied by relevant funding through the EU programmes.
23 CARDS—Community Assistance for Reconstruction and Development—is the main source of EU funding for the Western Balkans. 24 Recent experience in Serbia has demonstrated how social reform processes can be de-stabilised by a change of government and how some reforms may be deemed to symbolise “pro-western” policies which cannot be supported by all political tendencies. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 157
— Another means of achieving this is to increase the staYng of the EU Commission Delegations experts in social policy, particularly with respect to poverty and social exclusion.
3.6 Ensuring that the EU budget for the next period is not set at a lower level than the current budget A serious concern is the possibility that the next EU budget for the period 2007–13 will be set at a level lower than the current budget. This concern has already been expressed by the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN), as well as by Mr Jose Manuel Barroso, the incoming president of the European Commission: “You cannot have more Europe for less money, especially if we want a similar level of solidarity towards the new member states as we have shown to the less developed regions in the past.”25 Enlargement is an exercise leading to “more Europe” in terms of widening. If expenditure involving the new Member States becomes restricted, it is all the more likely that the new phase of financial stringency will operate to the detriment of the post-2004 wave of applicant and aspirant countries, including the Western Balkans. In recent weeks, the UK Chancellor has been speaking publicly of the need to restrict EU expenditure. We urge the Chancellor to ensure that these restrictions do not lead to the undermining of much needed poverty reduction and social reform strategies for the Western Balkans. Such strategies will underpin the future prosperity and political stability of the region, and are essential building-blocks to the realisation of child rights.
Overall recommendations linked to Section 3 The UK should use its influence in the context of EU Stabilisation & Association processes to ensure that children are treated as a distinct section of society with specific rights. These should be specifically monitored as identified under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is inadequate to monitor child rights simply within the context of minority rights (eg Roma people), although this is also relevant. The UK should use its influence in the EU to begin to apply the EU Lisbon Strategy to social policy in the Western Balkans within one to three years.
List of References 1. Social Indicators for the Western Balkans. Tools for Assessing and Promoting Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion. Ma]a Gerovska and Paul Stubbs, Save the Children 2004, unpublished 2. Contributing to Change for Children and Families. Towards developing a medium Term Strategy for the Care and Protection of Children in Serbia, Save the Children, 2004 3. Diminishing Returns: Macroeconomics, Poverty and Children’s Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Save the Children, 2004 4. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 5. The Western Balkans in Transition, European Commission, 2004 6. Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Kosovo, UNICEF, 2004 7. Serbia PRSP, 2004 8. Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Special Session for children (A World Fit for Children 2002) 9. Report of the High Level Group on the future of social policy in an enlarged European Union, European Commission, 2004 10. Multi-annual Strategic Programme of the European Council 2004–06, 2004 11. European Partnership 2004, European Commission 12. Draft DfID assistance strategy for the Western Balkans, 2003 13. Country report on BiH, US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2004 14. Country Assistance Strategy for BiH, the World Bank, 2000 Save the Children UK 3 October 2004
25 Quoted in “Paymasters threaten EU budget chaos”, By George Parker, Financial Times, 30 July 2004. Ev 158 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Written evidence submitted by Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) The Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) is an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to promoting peace and development through the transfer of former military resources and assets to alternative, civilian purposes. Established in 1994 in Bonn, Germany, BICC provides specialized research and consultancy services in the fields of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, as well as conflict prevention, conflict management and peace-building. BICC’s international staV have been active in the region of the Western Balkans, specifically Albania and the former Yugoslavia, through the publication of research reports, organization of conferences, and providing consultancy services to national governments, the international community and local non- governmental organizations. Since the fall of Milosevic, the nations of the region have progressed towards stability and development. Across the region, the possibilities of inclusion in the European Union and NATO have acted as catalysts for positive steps in democratization, border reform, and security sector reform. Furthermore, the direct engagement of the international community in the region has prevented the re-emergence of conflict in the region. Despite progress towards regional stability, the region remains awash in military weapons as a result of the conflicts associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia. The small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation problem is exacerbated by the problems of corruption, organized crime, smuggling and potential political instability. While political stability has increased, Kosovo remains the most likely flashpoint for further conflict and therefore is the linchpin that will determine the continued stability of the region. BICC’s research in the Western Balkans has focused on disarmament and demobilization in the region. This research in the region shows that the region’s problem with SALW proliferation, both the supply and demand for SALW, are directly linked to potential political instability and influenced by the associated problems of corruption, organized crime, and smuggling.
Over-supply of Weapons in the Region The supply of weapons in the region, including illegal weapons in the hands of civilians and oYcial military stockpiles, is in surplus to the needs of the citizens and governments of the region. Recent surveys of small arms and light weapons in the region indicate that there is an over-supply of weaponry in the region.26 — Macedonia: estimated 100,000 to 450,000 illegal firearms in the country.27 — Bosnia-Herzegovina: estimated between 140,000 and 490,000 illegal SALW in country.28 — Kosovo: estimated between 280,000 and 460,000 SALW remain in the hands of civilians, organized criminals and political factions.29 — Montenegro: Civilians in Montenegro own an estimated 111,000 to 160,000 small arms and light weapons, of which 86,000 are legally owned and registered weapons.30 While a positive step towards political stability, demobilization and defence reform have also aVected the supply of weaponry in the region. As armies downsize their forces, hundreds of thousands of weapons are earmarked as surplus to the needs of the reformed military forces. The example of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) presents one such case: — In June of 2004 Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina announced a total number of 370,010 surplus small arms and light weapons under the control of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina that are in excess to the requirements of a future military with some 12,000 active soldiers and 60,000 reservists. The destruction of theses surpluses will be a major challenge to BiH authorities and the international community in the future. In addition to the weapons there are up to 65,000 tons of ammunition in storage, out of which at least 35,000 tons are surplus to requirements, which need to be destroyed soon given there unstable condition.31 More worrying are the remaining weapon stockpiles of non-state actors, such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the National Liberation Army (NLA), which have been demobilized. In Kosovo, the KLA surrendered ca 10,000 weapons to NATO troops, a small number considering the 18,000 to 20,000 fighters the KLA fielded in their struggle.32 In Macedonia, the NLA surrendered ca 3,000 weapons to NATO
26 At the time of writing, a comprehensive survey of SALW issues in Serbia is not yet available although such a project is ongoing. 27 Grillot et al. “A Fragile Peace: Guns and Security in Post-conflict Macedonia.” Small Arms Survey/BICC Special Report commissioned by the UNDP, Geneva: June, 2004. 28 Paes, et al. “Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey Bosnia and Herzegovina” BICC/UNDP, Sarajevo: July 2004. 29 Khakee and Florquin. “Kosovo and the Gun: a baseline assessment of small arms and light weapons in Kosovo.” Small Arms Survey/UNDP, Geneva: April 2003. 30 The same report claims that “gun ownership is most likely to be about one gun per household; this places Montenegro as one of the most heavily armed territories in the region.” Florquin and O’Neill-Stoneman. “Republic of Montenegro—SALW Survey” Small Arms Survey/SEESAC APD 23, Belgrade: 2003. 31 Paes, et al. “Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey Bosnia and Herzegovina” BICC/UNDP, Sarajevo: July 2004. 32 Heinemann-Gruder and Paes. “Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army.” BICC Brief 20, Bonn: 2001. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 159
troops although their arsenal has been estimated at 8,000 to 20,000 weapons.33 Weapons left in the hands of former insurgents are now either hidden in caches ready for the next conflict or have since entered the black market. In addition to the problem of surplus weapons as a result of downsized military forces, demobilization is also resulting in reduced need for full-time and reserve soldiers. Former soldiers will attempt to return to civilian life in societies facing depressed economies and already large unemployment rates.34 It is crucial for security to ensure that individuals with military experience are successfully re-integrated into society, in order to prevent their recruitment into criminal organizations, radical politics, or involvement in the black market as form of subsistence. Several of the reports mentioned in this document recommend reintegration programs for former combatants as a means of maintaining stability and conflict prevention in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
Smuggling and the Demand for Weapons The Western Balkans is a major traYcking route to Western Europe for illegal contraband such as drugs, guns and humans. Inside the region, networks of smuggling routes exist to carry items in demand. Smuggling in the region is rampant and the criminals smuggling contraband are often aided by corrupt oYcials. Demand for weapons in the region has always been driven by conflict. As peace and stability have taken root in the region, the demand for weapons has diminished resulting also in a lower price for weapons. This lower price has meant that smugglers now focus their eVorts on goods that fetch more profits such as illegal cigarettes and drugs. The result is that while the demand for weapons has decreased leading to less traYcking in weapons, the routes and carriers capable of delivering such items still remain. If there were to be another outbreak of conflict in the region resulting in increased demand and higher prices for weapons, the smugglers would again be ready to provide the commodity in demand. In the meantime, while the demand for weapons inside the region remains low, the oversupply of weapons makes the low price of weapons attractive to international criminals and terrorists. Therefore, as long as the price remains low and surplus weapons remain, the region will likely remain an attractive source of weaponry for organized criminals or terrorists.
The Final Status of Kosovo:AFlashpoint for Future Conflict The best way of addressing demand for small arms and light weapons in the region is through support for economic development and political stability in order to prevent the re-emergence of conflict. Today, the lynchpin to stability in the region is resolving the future status of Kosovo. Until then, Kosovo is the most likely flashpoint for further conflict in the region. Kosovar Albanians will continue to be motivated to keep weapons as long as they fear a return to Serbian rule from Belgrade. Likewise, the Serbian minority in Kosovo will continue to hold arms as long as they continue to feel threatened by their ethnic Albanian neighbours. Ultimately events in Kosovo may also impact events in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Southern Serbia, the Muslim Sandjak of Serbia, as well as influencing the Republika Srpska in BiH. Depending on how final status is determined, events could either encourage or discourage ethnic minority communities in neighbouring regions to support attempts at succession or joining with ethnic kin across neighbouring borders. For example, if Kosovo is to become independent, whether the Serbian communities of Northern Mitrovica remain a part of a multi-ethnic Kosovo or part of Serbia, would influence the prospects of Bosnian Serbs in the Republika Srpska, who aspire to join Serbia. Any change to borders in the region is likely to open a Pandora’s Box with the possibility of renewed fears for security and possible conflict in turn fuelling higher demand for SALW leading to an increase in weapons traYcking.
Conclusion In order to address the problem of SALW proliferation and the associated problems in the Western Balkans, it is important that the international community remain focused on the region. There are four areas where the international community’s support and engagement will help. — Democratization: The support for democratization in the region will increase political stability. Programs for good governance and transparency will also help fight corruption. — Security Sector Reform: The completion of security sector reform is vital in the fight against smuggling. Border reform and anti-traYcking projects will result in tighter border controls making it tougher for criminals to transport contraband across borders. Demobilization and reintegration programs for former military personal are also important for crime prevention and conflict prevention.
33 Grillot et al. “A Fragile Peace: Guns and Security in Post-conflict Macedonia.” Small Arms Survey/BICC Special Report commissioned by the UNDP, Geneva: June, 2004. 34 For a detailed look at one example of the demobilization and reintegration process in the Western Balkans see: Heinemann- Grder and Pietz. “Turning Soldiers into a Workforce: Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BICC Brief 27, Bonn: September 2003. Ev 160 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
— Disarmament: In order to address the over-supply of weapons in the region eVorts should continue at weapons collection, control and destruction. Voluntary weapons collection programs throughout the region should continue in order to collect military weapons from civilian possession. The destruction of surplus military stockpiles of weapons and ammunitions should be encouraged, while attempts at the resale of surplus stocks should be discouraged. The states of the region face an enormous task to deal with surplus stocks and are in need of financial and technical support for destruction programs. — Stability: Kosovo as the lynchpin. It is important that the demand for weapons in the region remains low. The best way to achieve this is by providing security and preventing future conflicts. Peacefully determining the final status of Kosovo will be central to maintaining stability and preventing the re-emergence of conflict. For further information on the Western Balkans, please see the following reports: (available online at www.bicc.de) Paes, et al. “Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BICC/UNDP, Sarajevo: July 2004. Grillot et al. “A Fragile Peace: Guns and Security in Post-conflict Macedonia.” Small Arms Survey/BICC Special Report commissioned by the UNDP, Geneva: June 2004. Matveeva and Paes. “The Kosovo Serbs: an ethnic minority between collaboration and defiance.” BICC/ Saferworld/Friedrich Naumann joint publication, London: April 2003. Faltas and Paes. “You Have Removed the Devil from Our Door: an assessment of the UNDP SALW Control Project in Albania.” BICC/SEESAC APD 20, Belgrade: October 2003. Matveeva, et al. “Macedonia: Guns, policing and ethnic division.” Saferworld/BICC co-publication, London: October 2003 Heinemann-Grder and Pietz. “Turning Soldiers into a Workforce: Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BICC Brief 27, Bonn: September 2003. King, et al. “An Unprecedented Experiment: Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Saferworld/BICC co-publication, London: September 2002. Heinemann-Grder and Paes. “Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army.” BICC Brief 20, Bonn: 2001. Hans Risser Associate Researcher BICC October 2004
Written evidence submitted by Saferworld
Introduction 1. The Western Balkans35 is slowly recovering from the conflicts of the 1990s and the instability and state collapse that ensued. The result today is politically weak states often characterised by lack of central control, low public confidence, poor investment and rising crime rates. 2. A consequence of this weakness is the increasingly powerful role played by organised criminal groups. State security services are unable to suYciently combat these groups that traYc arms, drugs and people across the region and into the EU and that pose significant threats to stability, democratisation and development. 3. This submission focuses primarily on the small arms problems faced by Albania and the states of the former Yugoslavia. There are many related problems and challenges, however, including the need for eVective security sector reform (covering both military and police) as well as reform of the criminal justice sector and the process of legislative development and parliamentary scrutiny and oversight. 4. One of the greatest barriers to the region’s economic and political growth is the widespread availability and misuse of small arms. Large numbers of weapons remain in civilian hands and demand remains high because of unresolved political issues and a government failure to provide security. 5. The exact nature and extent of the small arms problem in each country is relatively unknown due to the lack of comprehensive national assessments. In some cases this problem is now being addressed, however, via comprehensive surveys being conducted by Saferworld in Serbia and Bulgaria, and by others in Bosnia and Macedonia.
35 For the purposes of this submission this submission covers: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 161
6. When addressing small arms and security challenges, there is also a lack of coordination within national governments, between national governments (and in some cases between republic and state governments) and local civil society, and between international organizations such as the EU, OSCE, NATO and UN. 7. This lack of coordination not only exists on small arms control issues, there is also a wider and much more complex problem relating to the lack of co-ordination between donors, between donors and governments, and more widely on a range of small arms, security reform and justice reform issues. This has led to confusion, duplication and inevitably to frustration and to a lack of eVective support in some key areas. 8. Existing support needs to be better co-ordinated and more eVectively targeted, and much clearer and incremental exit strategies for donors are required. 9. The EU, including the UK, has a crucial role to play in supporting the development of stability and security in the western Balkans. The desire to be part of the EU is a prime motivator for change in all countries and this opportunity to lever significant change should not be underestimated. 10. Saferworld’s Western Balkans programme focuses on the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania and works with governments and civil society to combat the proliferation of small arms and reduce armed violence. The governments in the region have signed up to the Stability Pact’s Regional Implementation Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Saferworld works to help support its implementation. This submission provides an overview of the small arms and security situation in each of the Western Balkans countries and puts forward some recommendations as to what the UK and EU can do to help address it.
Albania
Contemporary context 11. The ethnic conflict that aVected so much of South Eastern Europe is largely absent in Albania, though the tentative nature of state control is an obvious obstacle to the consolidation of democracy and stability. 12. On an institutional level the lack of capacity amongst the police is a major problem. Large sections of the country are outside the control of the regular police (who are poorly paid and resourced) and judicial authority competes with traditional forms of justice. 13. The economic situation in Albania mirrors that of many other transitional countries and the lack of available economic opportunities encourages many young people into lives of criminal activity. The grey market in Albania is also large, depriving the state of much-needed resources. It’s estimated that there are now more people living outside Albania who have left over recent years to find work than live in the country. 14. Albania is fortunate not to have any significant ethnic conflicts in the country, which provides the necessary social stability for advancing personal and state security.
Major Security Challenges 15. Weapon Possession: Albania is believed to have the strongest gun culture in southeast Europe and traditional norms of gun use are not significantly curbed by police control or safety education, particularly in the north of the country. Estimates suggest that at least 550,000 weapons were stolen from government stockpiles in 1997. Of these, authorities estimate that 200,000 weapons were collected and 150,000 were traYcked out of Albania, with some 200,000 remaining in civilian and criminal hands. 16. Weapons destruction has been supported by various bi-lateral donors, the UN and NATO, but far more remains to be done as poor stockpile security poses serious threats for continued traYcking. Funding for this work appears to have started to dry up, but the problem is still very much alive with hundreds of thousands of tonnes of ammunition, explosives and other weaponry still held in poorly managed stockpiles that are dangerous and which represent easy pickings for organised criminal groups. 17. To date, there has been no serious attempt to survey the extent of the small arms and security problem in Albania. A thorough mapping of the problem is urgently required, followed by the development of an eVective national plan driven by a small arms commission responsible for implementing it. 18. Organised Crime: The problems of organised crime and traYcking in Albania are acute and far- reaching with powerful Albanian criminal networks controlling substantial interests and assets throughout southeast Europe and the EU. Although assistance programmes are improving the situation, Albanian state services and border guards do not have control over their borders. Smugglers and illegal immigrants regularly use the long coastline to access Italy, and traYckers between Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro use the northern border with little risk of being apprehended. 19. The Italian government is trying hard to combat smuggling from Albania and is working with the Albanian coast guard and port authorities. Armed groups are predominantly mafia or criminal gangs, with some paramilitary activity associated with Kosovo. Despite the assistance of the international community and regional initiatives such as the SECI Regional Centre for Combating Organised Crime, which has Ev 162 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
established a small arms task force (supported by Saferworld and the UK government through the National Criminal Intelligence Service), police eVorts have been hampered by a lack of funding, political will and ineYciency. 20. Inadequate law enforcement: The nature of the security challenges in Albania means that an eVective police force is vital for the country’s move towards greater security and development, and in realising its stated objectives of joining the EU and NATO. Various programmes have been supported to build the capacity of the police force including community policing and membership in the SECI Regional Centre for Combating Organised Crime. However, as with many areas of governance and security in Albania, much remains to be done. 21. From a donor perspective, Albania is a country where much better coordination is needed. On a recent visit to the country, for example, Saferworld staV met an EU Project Manager who had never met his counterpart in the OSCE.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Contemporary Context 22. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) underwent a traumatic birth, following the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia and—as one of the major theatres of the war—was saturated with weapons for personal protection, criminal activity and in order to further ethnic claims of territory. The situation remains tense and a high level of weapons possession exacerbates this situation. 23. The cantons and entities that emerged out of the Dayton Accords constitute the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the inter-ethnic boundary line between two entities that roughly divides the Serbs in the Republika Srpska from the Muslims and Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina remains stark. Almost 10 years after the end of the war, the political climate remains dominated by ethnicity, which pervades state structures and local institutions alike.
Major Security Challenges 24. Weapon production and stockpiles: BiH used to be a major producer of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and its manufacturing base remains active, if reduced. Following substantial international support, legislation on arms production and exports has recently been reformed and improved, incorporating international standards and establishing a control system at the state level. As always, however, concerns about implementation prevail due to inadequately functioning regulatory procedures and a lack of operational capacity. 25. It is clear that the military industry in BiH still needs to be brought under tighter control in order to prevent illegal arms exports. There are currently 169 weapon stockpiles in the country, which makes guarding them expensive and diYcult, and provides criminals with a number of potential targets. Reducing this number is an important means of stabilising the situation. 26. Possession and collection: Anecdotal testimony from discussions with government oYcials suggests that there are around four weapons for every 10 people in BiH. Weapons collection initiatives—organised by NATO—have been ongoing since 1998, with approximately 22,000 SALW collected so far and large caches still being discovered on a fairly regular basis. 27. As NATO prepares to reduce its presence, a greater role in SALW collection is likely to be played by the CPA, a body that can loosely be described as the police reserve. It is unlikely that the EU force that will succeed SFOR (in early 2005) will have a mandate for weapons collection, as it will be monitoring rather than implementing the Dayton Accords.
Macedonia
Contemporary context 28. The new Macedonian government of President Branko Crvenkovski promises to build on the level of stability the country has achieved since ending open conflict between the two dominant ethnic populations in the country. The signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August 2001 brought to an end two years of low-intensity conflict and facilitated a de-mobilisation of ethnic-Albanian guerrilla fighters. The active participation of the Macedonian Government in international discourse on arms control, its public statements and its action at the national level—including recent development of a new draft law on civilian possession, indicate that SALW control is a high priority for the country. 29. The problem of small arms in Macedonia is a question of both politics and policing, resulting from internal challenges and the country’s vulnerability to influence from its neighbours. The fighting in 2001 clearly had an impact on increasing the number of weapons in the country, as did the looting of stockpiles Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 163
in Albania in 1997. Yet, possession had risen significantly throughout the 1990s, particularly following independence when police noted a dramatic increase in illicit SALW traYcking, even before violence erupted. 30. Since the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, progress has been made in collecting weapons. There have been two main collection initiatives. The first—“Operation Essential Harvest”—was undertaken in 2001 by NATO’s Task Force Harvest. Its mission was to collect the arms and ammunition voluntarily surrendered by the ethnic Albanian armed groups involved in the peace negotiations. A total of 3,875 weapons were collected. The second, facilitated by UNDP in late 2003, was deemed a success by government and national observers alike. Despite the short period allocated for public awareness raising and for the amnesty, over 6,000 weapons were surrendered in the space of a month.
Major Security Challenges 31. Implementing the Ohrid Accords: The major components of the agreement were to institute a process of decentralization, recognise Albanian language educational institutions and establish proportional representation in government. The implementation of the Agreement is progressing slowly and with diYculty. It is incumbent on bilateral and multilateral donors to assist those involved in this process, as it is the key factor in Macedonia’s tentative stability. 32. Inadequate law enforcement: Although, to a large degree, insurgency activity has subsided, population transfers continue and if Macedonia is to remain a non-segregated, multi-ethnic state then an eVective multi-ethnic police force is central. Since its deployment, the multi-ethnic police (MEP) force has presided over a marked improvement in the levels of violence and intimidation. Nevertheless, borders, especially those between Albania/Macedonia/Kosovo/southern Serbia, are poorly controlled with the mountainous terrain oVering cover to smugglers. 33. The Government apportions much of the blame for Macedonia’s problems on Albania and Kosovo, and in the past the Macedonian Government has been reluctant to co-operate on cross-border control. Although there are now joint UN-Macedonia patrols of the Kosovo-Macedonia frontier, the capacity of the police to act against cross-border crime is extremely poor and there is little capacity for intelligence processing and exchange. The situation is further complicated by the variety of diVerent institutions and forces involved in border management and security. The EU is funding the reform and strengthening of border controls and integrated border management.
Serbia-Montenegro
Contemporary Context 34. A number of impediments stand in the way of Serbia-Montenegro’s moves towards political and social stability and economic health. 35. On a political level these include Serbia’s relationship with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the unresolved status of Kosovo where poor ethnic relations continue to undermine democratisation eVorts, and the increasingly unmanageable state-union relationship between Serbia and Montenegro 36. On an institutional level the lack of capacity amongst the police and judiciary causes serious credibility problems and creates a distance between the public and these institutions. The army enjoys relatively more respect but is under resourced and in need of wide reaching reform. 37. Living standards in Serbia-Montenegro are still some six years away from returning to the levels enjoyed in 1990. The legacy of hyper-inflation and sanctions continues to be felt by a population who have turned—in increasing numbers—to the grey and black economies, often as a matter of survival. 38. While the state is no longer host to active ethnic conflicts, tension remains in southern parts where the minority Albanian population lives, problematically, next to Serbs, and in the north in Vojvodina where ethnic Hungarians and Serbs have recently clashed. Overall, however, the picture in Serbia and Montenegro is one that shows signs of improvement, helped significantly by the election of President Tadic in June.
Major Security Challenges 39. Weapons Possession: There are over 1.25 million registered weapons amongst the country’s 8 million people. Laws on civilian possession are weak, with insuYcient checks made on applicants, and a lack of willingness of the police and judiciary to prosecute breaches in the law. 40. Private Security Firms: In Serbia, around 45,000 licenses have been granted to private security firms that are often involved in criminal activity. Licensees may carry high calibre weapons publicly and there is evidence that political parties are in control of their own armed security firms—eVectively, militias. This is an area of major concern and one that needs new legislation to combat the threat of well-armed civilian militias. Ev 164 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
41. Exports: Serbia produces and exports small arms and has, in the past, been involved in highly questionable exports to many countries, some of which have been subject to EU or UN arms embargos, such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Iraq. The capacity of competent ministries to license exports in line with international best practice has increased, however, there remains a lot of secrecy and very limited transparency surrounding the issue. 42. A new export law, written with the help of EU members, will greatly increase eVective oversight of export decisions, but its passage through parliament is currently undermined by a lack of political will. Adoption of the principles underpinning the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports would greatly improve the situation, although for this to be eVective it would need to be supported significantly—financially and technically—by the EU and its member states. 43. Organised Crime: Indigenous entrenched and organised criminals are a major source of instability in the country, in southeast Europe and in the EU. In certain parts of the country they exert more influence over the public than the state, and provide benefactors with enormous wealth that fosters more crime, deprives the state of revenue and fuels conflict. 44. In order for the state to close these criminal networks, law enforcement agencies must be provided with the means to tackle these powerful groups through trans-national mechanisms such as the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Centre and EUROPOL. Political will is also needed to distance the interests of conservative political elites from organised crime.
Recommendations 45. Outlined below are a series of priorities for the UK government and the EU to support eVective arms control in the western Balkans. Saferworld will provide a detailed iteration of each of these priorities on request: Support the establishment of National Commissions in the Western Balkans that bring together all relevant government departments to coordinate action to tackle the spread of small arms. These bodies should also coordinate action with civil society organisations, donors and international organisations. This is a requirement of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms. Encourage comprehensive national assessments of the small arms problem and the development of National Action Plans. The lack of detailed information about the nature and extent of the small arms problem hampers eVective responses and encourages piecemeal action. Comprehensive national strategies are needed that address all issues—from strengthening legislation, to combating illicit traYcking and reducing the demand for weapons. Build the capacity of law enforcement oYcers to enforce controls on illicit traYcking and organised crime. The work of the SECI taskforce on small arms should be supported in this regard. There should be increased cooperation between EU and Western Balkan law enforcement oYcers. Engage Western Balkans governments in a dialogue on strengthening arms export controls. The objective should be to encourage them to endorse the principles underpinning the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and then help build their capacity to implement them. Integrate action to tackle small arms proliferation into existing police reform, governance and justice reform programmes and improve their coordination. International actors are supporting a myriad of programmes but these are often poorly coordinated and initiatives to reduce the proliferation of small arms are rarely integrated into them. Saferworld 12 October 2004
Written evidence submitted by the British Council
Overview The British Council plays a key role in the Western Balkans building long-term relationships for the UK, and encouraging the development of positive perceptions of the UK’s ideas, values and achievements. It also works with partners in the region to encourage the reform agenda, reconciliation and mutual understanding, and the growth of stability and democratic institutions and civil society. Our objectives are achieved through a strong focus on work with younger people. Key activities include support for English language learning, providing access to UK information, and encouraging creativity and networking in order to build understanding and reconciliation. In addition, the British Council is involved in education and public administration reform, leadership development and support for civil society. Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 165
The British Council has operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo). Key themes include: 1. Raising the UK’s profile amongst younger and wider audiences. 2. Supporting skills development through English Language. 3. Teaching, exams, access to information and strengthening civil society. 4. Working in close cooperation with the foreign missions of HMG to support the UK’s overall objectives in the region. 5. Strengthening regional networks of young leaders throughout South East Europe.
Bosnia and Herzegovina The main British Council oYce in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in Sarajevo. The British Council aligns its work to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s eVorts towards EU and NATO accession and HMG’s overall objective of ensuring a stable, functioning and self-sustainable Bosnia and Herzegovina on the path to EU- Atlantic integration. Planning is closely linked to that of the Embassy. The British Council has worked to raise its profile significantly to reach a wider, younger group, to increase the number of young Bosnians who have first-hand involvement with the UK, through education, culture and the English language, and to raise its profile across the country beyond Sarajevo. The Military English Support Project is widely viewed in the region as the strongest military English Language Teaching (ELT) operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As well as supporting defence reform, it has pioneered innovative learning techniques. Learning from this experience the British Council will pilot its Blended English Language Learning approach in October 2004. This pilot programme blends taught English in the classroom with computer- assisted learning, using multi-media study as its central feature, and will be part of an integration of services in a Learning and Information Centre. Other services provided will be examinations, library and information services, a new multi-language website and the use of the mobile networks. We work in cultural heritage to assist in the reconstruction of communities. Following a study earlier in the year we will be launching a project to look at a Cultural Heritage Trail for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a multi-disciplinary activity including cultural heritage preservation, local community involvement and tourism development. The British Council continues to work with festivals such as the Sarajevo International Film Festival and the JazzFest. We integrate our work in this field with education, development and governance. We also involve networks of young people in Bosnia and Herzogovina in the British Council’s Connecting Futures programme, a global initiative to build mutual understanding, learning and respect between young people with diVerent cultural backgrounds in the UK and other countries. In Bosnia and Herzegovina we are actively engaging in issues of faith and identity, launching a regional approach to explore the nature of European identity and its relationship with the main religious and political traditions, to bridge misunderstanding and to explore how this process might inform wider networks in the UK and beyond.
Macedonia The British Council’s oYce at Skopje includes a library, cyber cafe´ and information centre. The British Council’s work supports the aims of the UK to encourage the reform process that will assist Macedonia become a stable and successful European state and create lasting, positive relationships with the UK, particularly amongst young people. The British Council in Macedonia is creating an interactive network called Blue Sky consisting of students and young professionals who look to the UK as their source of knowledge and inspiration. Under this initiative, we run workshops, small projects and an annual summer school focused on creativity and citizenship. Blue Sky-related projects include the launch of the European Youth Parliament in Macedonia and the development of a range of projects to revive links between the twinned cities of Bradford and Skopje, focusing on the interests and aspirations of their young people. Arts events remain the most eVective means for the British Council in Macedonia to highlight key messages on diversity, innovation and the UK’s commitment to the republic. Foreign languages are a compulsory part of the school curriculum from mid-primary level. The British Council is working with the Ministry of Education, the English Department of Skopje University, the South East Europe University and the English teachers’ association (ELTAM) to bring about changes in policy and practice and influence the wider reform agenda in education. The successful Peacekeeping English Project continues, with additional activity having begun with the Ministry of the Interior. The British Council will work closely with the British Embassy and DFID to develop further ideas in this sector and will continue to work closely with the British Embassy on public diplomacy in general. Ev 166 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Serbia and Montenegro The British Council has oYces in Belgrade, Podgorica and Prishtina and is playing a leading role in Serbia and Montenegro’s transition to becoming a full member of the European Union and the development of a stable and democratic society with strong links to the UK and its neighbours in South East Europe. In supporting wider UK objectives, operational priorities have been Governance, Education and English Language Teaching to support the reform agenda. The British Council in Serbia and Montenegro works very closely with HM Embassy to co-ordinate and complement activities in public diplomacy. In 2002, Belgrade became the second of the British Council’s new IT-based Knowledge and Learning Centres, providing technologically the most advanced facility for a cultural centre in Europe. It uses a multimedia approach to reach younger and larger audiences. In 2003 British Council moved into new oYces in Podgorica, shared with the HMG mission, which has assisted the Embassy to have a full-time member of staV based in Montenegro. These changes have increased British Council’s profile in Serbia and Montenegro significantly. Through the use of a multimedia approach, videoconferencing, the Internet and the Cybercentre at the Knowledge and Learning Centre in Belgrade, the British Council is achieving a step change in engagement with target audiences and their perceptions of the UK. Support for the Republican Governments of Serbia and Montenegro’s reform agenda includes capacity building through the provision of training to the Ministry of Education and the Agency of Public Administration and Development. We are supporting the Federal Government and the Republican Governments of Serbia and Montenegro in managing the transition to a stable democracy with respect for the rule of law and the development of the economy. This includes support for the decentralisation of decision-making to the regions with events and project work taking place outside the principal cities of Belgrade and Podgorica. A Peacekeeping English Project was established in Serbia and Montenegro in September 2002. Increasing knowledge of English assists users meet regional and multinational obligations and facilitates international contact amongst senior personnel. This contributes to the improved professionalism, standards and capabilities of the Armed Forces and public security agencies, with particular regard to their respect for human rights, the rule of law and the primacy of a democratically elected executive. The UK is perceived now as the Armed Forces’ leading partner in its reform process. The British Council has been working with the Ministry of Education and Sport in Serbia and Montenegro to provide training in English Language Teaching. We have also introduced a project under the British Council’s Dreams ! Teams sports initiative. This develops leadership and cross-cultural awareness amongst young people through sport and international educational links. “Football in the community” projects at Red Star FC are linked with those at Manchester United through web projects and video- conferencing. Support for the arts includes an award-winning project between the National Theatre, Belgrade and the Royal National Theatre, London as well as the ground-breaking project Narratives of the Unseen between the Universities of Glasgow and Belgrade. In science, the focus is the environment and linking young researchers and school children with the UK and other countries in South East Europe.
Kosovo The British Council has been working in Kosovo since September 1999, with an oYce and library in Pristina. The operation focuses on education and the arts, with young professionals as our main target audience. In the first five years of operation, we have given basic training support to English teachers; assisted the Ministry of Education with curriculum reform in foreign language teaching; introduced British qualifications in English as well as UK distance learning packages; supported the development of the public administration and media studies departments of Pristina University (funded by DFES); and raised the UK’s profile through a series of partnerships in the arts. We also manage the Chevening Scholarship programme on behalf of FCO.
South East Europe Forum The UK-South East Europe Forum (www.uksee.net) is a new British Council regional programme run jointly by our oYces in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. The Forum aims to build alliances between the next generation of leaders from the UK and the countries in South East Europe (SEE), and within South East Europe itself, creating future advocates for the UK and for the countries of South East Europe. The Forum has three parallel strands, focusing on People and Politics, Youth Action and Creative Industries. A conference to launch the “People and Politics” strand of the Forum took place in Croatia in March 2004 and involved 100 young political and civil society leaders from the UK and SE Europe. The first meeting of participants in Youth Action, 130 people from the UK and 10 countries in South East Europe including Greece and Turkey, will take place in Macedonia in September 2004. The first activity under the Creative Industries strand took place in September 2004 when a group of South East European Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 167
young cultural leaders met UK counterparts in a study visit coinciding with the World Creative Forum in London. The aim of these three strands is to create long term partnerships through joint projects and programmes which will initially run for a two year period.
The British Council would be pleased to provide any further information on its work in the Western Balkans and would be delighted to welcome the members of the Foreign AVairs Committee to our oYces, or to see projects and meet participants if and when they visit the region as part of this inquiry. British Council 12 October 2004
Written evidence submitted by The Bosnian Institute
Here is a small selection of texts36 from recent issues of Bosnia Report, for the most part translated from Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin or Serbian authors, that we think might be useful to the members of the Committee as they conduct their new inquiry. I shall send them both by e-mail and as hard copy, and would be grateful if you would let me know if there is any technical problem with the e-mail transmission (most of the texts were written in WordPerfect, but all have been saved in Word format).
The texts are chosen to provide arguments that seem to me convincing on a small number of key themes: the importance of moving beyond “Dayton” structures if Bosnia-Herzegovina is to become a normal, democratic country on the road to Europe; the need to address the issues of independence for Kosova and potential independence for Montenegro without further delay and without prejudice; the necessity of strict “conditionality” if Serbia is to be helped to advance in a democratic direction; the link between democracy and regional stability (which is not served by merely seeking to preserve the status quo). I hope they will be found useful. Quintin Hoare, Director The Bosnian Institute 10 October 2004
Written evidence submitted by Per M Norheim-Martinsen, Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge
Operation EUFOR in BiH: Europe’s Backyard Reclaimed
On 12 July 2004, the Council of the European Union decided to launch a military operation (EUFOR) in Bosnia in Herzegovina (BiH). With this operation, code-named “Althea”, the EU is set to take over the responsibilities of the NATO-led SFOR after a transition period, starting on 2 December. The symbolic value of the take-over is striking. It was the events that followed the break-up of the former Yugoslavia which so painfully revealed the shortcomings in Europe’s military capabilities. Now, EUFOR will provide the first real test case for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the process towards which was spurred by these very events. Europe is about to reclaim its backyard, at the same time, signalling that the EU intends to look after its own neighbourhood in the future. Trust, however, is something you earn and the minor operations in Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo were not enough to erase the memories of Europe’s poor military track record. The two operations, code-named “Concordia” and “Artemis”, involved 400 and 1,800 troops respectively. The upcoming EUFOR mission, on the other hand, involving a robust force of 7,000 to 9,000 troops, will provide a proper test case for the ESDP not only in terms of the sheer size of the operation, but also in terms of the challenges posed by the need to co-ordinate the activities of a plethora of actors on the ground. First of all, the EU will have to co-ordinate its own approach, the process towards which was initiated by the adoption of a comprehensive EU policy towards BiH, by the General AVairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on 14 June 2004. Secondly, other actors, most importantly NATO and the OSCE, will retain a strong presence, leaving Lord Ashdown with the unforgiving task of co-ordinating all activities. Ashdown is the EU’s Special Representative to BiH (EUSR) and head of the OYce of the High Representative (OHR), which was established after the 1995 Dayton/Paris Peace Accord. This memorandum examines challenges to internal EU co-ordination, before addressing some issues arising from EU cooperation with other international actors in BiH.
36 Not printed. Ev 168 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
Internal Co-ordination of EU Activities The decision to launch EUFOR follows the implementation of the EU Police Mission in BiH (EUPM), replacing the UN-led police force, earlier this year. Yet another in a line of ESDP “debuts”, EUFOR represents the Union’s first joint civil-military crisis management operation, hence also the first practical display of the integrated approach, of which EU leaders speak so warmly. The question is how integrated civilian and military elements really are. The two operations report to separate chains of command and are formally subject to co-ordination in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This reflects a general feature of the ESDP framework, namely the lack of a clear hierarchy of military and civilian sub-units that correspond to each other and interact at lower levels. To alleviate this situation, Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, has made it clear that Lord Ashdown, as EUSR, is to be the de facto person in charge of all ESDP operations in BiH, aiming also to co-ordinate these with Commission activities. This means, in practice, that the EUSR will meet regularly with the EU Force Commander, the Head of the Commission Delegation and other EU representatives, ensuring that his political advice and directives are taken into consideration. However, in case of disagreement between the Force Commander and the EUSR—as could be the case, for example, regarding the role of the military in the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) process—the matter will have to be solved in the PSC. As has generally been the case so far, the coherence and eYciency of the ESDP are heavily dependent, thus, on informal channels of interaction, pragmatism and interpersonal skills. In the same way that the inter-pillar divide in matters of foreign and security policy could hardly have been bridged so eVectively over the last years without the charismatic personalities of Javier Solana and Chris Patten, the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Lord Ashdown’s personal qualities and already influential role in Bosnia may hopefully counter some of the institutional barriers to cooperation on the operative level. Another matter is the potential divergence between the strategic priorities of the Commission and of the Council. The former has been involved in BiH for several years already, working towards reconstruction of the state within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP), on which it has spent 4.6 billion euros. The Council, on the other hand, and according to the EUSR’s Mission Implementation Plan (MIP), will have to concentrate on maintaining a secure and stable environment for the implementation of the Dayton/Paris Peace Accord—a task which shall prove challenging enough, given the continued undercurrent of instability in the country. In sum, objectives and roles appear to be complementary; the Commission concentrates, through the SAP, on long-term institution building and political and economical development, while the Council, through the EUSR predominantly, concentrates on keeping the peace. If only it was that simple. Although one has sought to streamline an overall EU policy on paper, the traditional inter-pillar rivalry is likely to ensue, as the lines between conflict prevention, generally the Commission’s domain, and crisis management, falling under the ESDP, remains fuzzy. One example is the EU’s police related work in BiH, branches of which embody diVerent approaches, time spans, decision making structures, mandates, structures etc The EUPM, which answers to the Council, has a small mentoring and advisory role, but no executive powers. The responsibility for executive police work is generally in the hands of the Bosnians. However, EUFOR may engage in gendarmerie type operations. Complicating the situation further, Bosnian police forces receive advice and guidance also from 10 police and justice experts, employed by the Commission under the SAP. In addition, come operations under the external dimension of Justice and Home AVairs (JHA)—also the responsibility of the Commission—which target issues such as corruption, organised crime and border control. As long as the pillar structure remains, both the Commission and the Council will guard their responsibilities carefully, especially those falling in the grey-zone between crisis management and conflict prevention. Herein can also be observed a fundamental struggle over which approach is the better—thus, who is to have the leading hand when objectives are adjusted to fit each other. Some resentment on behalf of the Commission, for which the SAP has been a prestige project, can be traced in the words of a Commission representative, interviewed last year, who said there is a lack of awareness and understanding of the Commission’s long-term commitment in the Western Balkans now that the Council wants to play an active part in the region. Such sentiments will not make Lord Ashdown’s job any easier and, as an appointee of Mr Solana, he shall struggle hard to gain the trust of the Commission delegation, such that he can fulfil the seemingly lofty objective of speaking on behalf of all of the Union in BiH.
The Role of NATO NATO remains the EU’s most important working partner in BiH, due to EUFOR’s reliance on NATO capabilities, the recourse to which was ensured by the Berlin Plus agreement. Paving the way for the long overdue operation “Concordia” in Macedonia last year—after Turkish opposition put the operation oV for months—EUFOR will provide a first proper test case for whether the mechanisms will work in practice. Reflecting the strong strategic ties between the organisations, General John Reith, currently Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), has been appointed EU Operation Commander, while Major General David Leakey is the EU Force Commander. The EU Operation Headquarters has been located at NATO SHAPE, following a welcome display of flexibility on behalf of the French, who initially opposed such an arrangement. Non-EU NATO members, such as Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, as well Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 169
as other third countries, including Canada, Chile, Argentina and Morocco, are expected to participate in the operation. Third countries, in accordance with their contributions respectively, will have co-decision making powers on an operative level, while strategic direction is in the hands of the PSC and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). In practical terms, little more than a change of badge on the soldiers’ uniforms is to be expected, which is also in line with the short-term objective of a “seamless transition” from SFOR to EUFOR. Whether important elements of the Berlin Plus arrangements do work, will be revealed first in case of a crisis on the ground, when availability of resources and the speed with which they are provided will represent the yardsticks. Although SFOR has been terminated, NATO will undertake counter-terrorism tasks and remain in charge of defence reform under its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, thus keeping a separate and independent oYce in Sarajevo. In this regard, one of the most important objectives of the reforms is to end the ethnic division of Bosnian armed forces. The EU Force Commander will have a seat on the Defence Reform Commission, which is jointly chaired by NATO and the Bosnian Ministry of Defence, aiming to ensure compliance with Dayton. One may wonder, however, whether such a division of labour is a sensible one, given the EU’s heavy involvement in institution-building and democratic reform in all other aspects of the state. This said, all parties have made it clear that NATO and EUFOR are not in competition. On a general note, EUFOR may be seen to represent another step down the path towards what some have referred to as the “Europeanization” of Balkan peacekeeping, a notion implying, on the one hand, continued American detachment from the region. This trend has spurred some concern, not least among Bosnian Muslims, who may have felt safer with the Americans around. Others are worried about the potential implications of the American focus on threats outside Europe, and the accompanying strains on its military forces, on the access to crucial NATO capabilities—that is American capabilities predominantly—in case of a crisis. The process of “Europeanization” may, on the other hand, be seen to reflect also a move towards a specific European way of projecting force—ie more integrated with other foreign policy instruments and focusing on core European strengths, such as peacekeeping, nation-building and counter-insurgency, as suggested, for example, in a recent publication by the London-based Centre for European Reform.37 Nevertheless, the EU will remain reliant on NATO for years to come, although transatlantic divergence over how, when and where to apply military force is likely to put some strains on relations in the future.
The Role of Other International Actors in BiH With regard to other international actors operating in BiH, structures for co-operation, as well as a rough division of labour, exist already in accordance with Dayton. The principal body—since procedures for co-operation were streamlined in 2002—is the Board of Principals, which meets every week in Sarajevo. Permanent members, before the implementation of EUFOR, included OHR, SFOR, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM and the European Commission. With the merger of the positions of head of the OHR and EUSR, as well as an even stronger EU presence, it is to be expected that procedures and tasks to a larger degree will be dictated by the Union hopefully with better co-operation as the result. The aim is to avoid duplication and ensure coherence when tasks are overlapping, which applies especially to the area of conflict prevention. However, the need for co-ordination of resources applies also to access to EUFOR military capabilities when, for example, human rights breaches are reported—an area on which the OSCE focuses heavily. Quick and decisive action in such cases is a matter of accountability, but limits to co-operation are inherent in the fact that half of the OSCE member states are not members of the EU. Moreover, the OSCE and other organisations have a treaty given right to perform the tasks assigned to them by Dayton. This will have to be taken into consideration by the EU now that its involvement in BiH is strengthened. Finally, several UN branches are involved in BiH, most importantly the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the lead agency, as established by Dayton, in accommodating the return of Bosnian refugees and internally displaced persons. This process is reliant on a safe and stable environment, which makes eVective co-operation between EUFOR and the UNHCR particularly important.
Extending the Zone of Security around Europe Since its birth at St-Malo in 1998, the ESDP seems to have suVered from a “big words but little action”— syndrome. The ceremonious speeches at the 2001 Laeken summit, when the ESDP was declared operational for “some crisis management operations”, did not seem to quite reflect actual accomplishments with regard to, for example, the increase in capabilities. The same goes for the EU’s military debut in Macedonia, which was not exactly a dashing display of force. In retrospect, however, the ESDP process can be seen to have been one of steady growth to meet the challenges at hand. As such, EUFOR is not only a timely venture— next year it will be 10 years since NATO intervened in BiH—but also a bold one, since another European failure in the Balkans would probably bury the EU’s military aspirations for good. On a strategic note, EUFOR restates the EU’s commitments in the Balkans, as set out in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), and reflects the overall strategic objective of creating stability in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.38 The focus, prior to the deployment, on streamlining EU policies—with particular
37 Everts, S, L Freedman, C Grant, F Heisbourg, D Keohane, M O’Hanlon (2004) A European Way of War, London: Centre for European Reform. Ev 170 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
emphasis on the SAP as the overall framework for the European course in BiH—reflects also a turn towards a more comprehensive approach than NATO has been capable of, providing it perhaps with better a better chance of success. Depending on how well the EU performs in BiH, one might—perhaps sooner rather than later—expect a take-over of NATO-operation KFOR in Kosovo as well. This would revoke the somewhat arbitrary impression of ESDP operations so far, while heeding the aspirations of the ESS of “extending the zone of security around Europe”. As tempting as this may be, however, the EU should be careful not to bite oV more than it can chew. Reclaiming its backyard is perhaps yet a bit premature. M Norheim-Martinsen
38 Solana, J (2003) “A Secure Europe in a Better World—European Security Strategy”, (15895/03, PESC787).
Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery OYce Limited 2/2005 993989 19585