ORIGINAL
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, G.R. No. _____ -versus- For: Prohibition
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AS MEMBERS OF THE ANTI- TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL GILBERT GAPAY and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF GENERAL CAMILO PANCRATIUS PASCUA CASCOLAN, Respondents. x------x
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A STATUS QUO ORDER
Petitioner PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC. ("PBA"), respectfully states: Preliminary Statement
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 ("Anti-Terrorism Act") is an excessive and invalid exercise by the state of its Police Power. Its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive provisions, not to mention their repugnance to the Constitution, do not only provide opportunity for abuse. They are certainly bound, wittingly or unwittingly, to be abused by law enforcers. Consequently, the law intensifies the fear and tension that is now gripping this nation. The people's liberties and their right to security - "to be free from fear"1 - are under siege. Hence, the need for a principled stand.
In the midst of this pandemic which has forced all of us to shelter in place, we are confronted with elite commandos clad in full battle gear complete with deadly high-powered weapons of war accompanied by armored personnel carriers. They roam our streets purportedly implementing law and health protocols.2 In Cebu City, hundreds of Special Action Forces commandos3 were sent from Camp Crame to the city to enforce strict quarantine measures, while military tanks paraded the streets purportedly for the same purpose.4 Meanwhile, eight activists who protested what was then the Anti Terrorism Bill were arrested at their school campus.5 In Quezon City, a law enforcer guns down in cold blood an unarmed citizen purportedly for violating health protocols and for getting into an argument with him. 6 In Bulacan, eleven law enforcers kidnapped
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, 7 October 2008, 568 SCRA 1. In the present context, one's fear is not limited only to one's liberty and life and property, it too embraces the fear that the people might eventually learn to distrust their government and bring this country to perdition. 2 Caliwan, Christopher Lloyd, Philippines News Agency, PNP deploys SAF troops in NCR areas with high ECQ violations, accessed at https:/ jwww.pna.gov.phj articles/1100486 (last accessed on 14 August 2020); Caliwan, Christopher Lloyd, Philippines News Agency, SAF troops to help enforce ECQ in Cebu Citt;, accessed at https:/ j www.pna.gov.ph/ articles/1106957 (last accessed 14 August 2020). 3 Semilla, Nestle, Inquirer.net, Police commandos pull out from Cebu Citt;, 6 August 2020, accessed at https:/ j newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 1317355 I police-commandos-pull-out-from cebu, (last accessed 14 August 2020). 4 Gonzales, Cathrine, Inquirer .net, "No harm" in presence of military tanks during pandemic - Cebu Citt; mayor, 2 July 2020, accessed at https:/ / newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 1300818/ no-harm in-presence-of-military-tanks-during- pandemic-says-cebu - city-mayor, accessed on 14 August 2020. s Mayol, Ador Vincent, and Semilla, Nestle, Inquirer.net, Terror bill protests: Cebu cops arrest 8 inside UP campus, 6 June 2020, accessed at https: j j news info .inquirer.n et/ 1287133/ terror-bill-protests-cebu-cops-arrest-8-on-u p campus#ixzz6V4R6cW15, (last accessed 14 August 2020). 6 Ferreras, Vince, and Cahiles, Gerg, CNN Philippines, Retired soldier shot dead by police at checkpoint in Quezon City, accessed at https:/ j cnnphilippines.comj news/ 2020/ 4/ 22/ Retired-soldier-shot-dead-by-police-html (last accessed 28 August 2020).
2 f>
and executed six (6) innocent citizens.7 In another town in Bulacan, law enforcers confiscated thousands of supposedly "illegal" magazines of a progressive organization, as it "teaches people to fight the government,''8 and arrested several individuals who were at the place of the raid without warrant.9 In Malaybalay, law enforcers deemed protests to the closure of media company ABS-CBN as support for terrorism. They posted on social media the following: "Malalaman mong sila ay para sa terorismo. Papatulan lahat ng isyu, basta laban sa gobyerno (You know they support terrorism when they protest on all issues against the government). No to rebellion. No to terrorism."10 Recently, here in Metro Manila, an activist and National Democratic Front of the Philippines peace consultant, Randall "Randy" Echanis was killed when his house was raided apparently by law enforcers while he was undergoing medical treatment. He was unarmed.11 The law enforcers seized and took custody of his remains.t2
On top of all this forbidding events, the President, the Commander-in-Chief himself, dared medical workers and frontliners to stage a revolution against him as this will give him a free ticket to stage a counter-revolution.13 Not to be outdone, the newly-stalled AFP Chief of Staff proposed to regulate the use of social media to curb radicalism through the Anti-Terrorism Act.14 Ironically, law
7 Please see August 13, 2020 issue, Philippine Daily Inquirer. See also Pazzibugan, Dona Z., Inquirer.net, NBI tags 11 Bulacan cops for killing 6 in fabricated' drug bust, accessed at https://newsinfo. inquirer.net/1320916/nbi-tags-11 -bulacan-cops-for-killing-6-in-fabricated-drug bust (last accessed 4 September 2020). 8 Recuenco, Aaron, Manila Bulletin, Police confis cates thousands of'subversive weekly magazine in Bulacan", accessed at https:/ / mb.com.ph/ 2020/07/ 27 jpolice-confiscate-thousands-of subversive-weekly-magazine-in-bulacan/, (last accessed 14 August 2020). 9 Talabong , Rambo, Rappler, PNP confiscates progressive magazine after Anti-Terror Law takes effect, 26 July 2020, accessed at https:/ / rappler.comj nationjpnp-confiscates-progressive magazine-after-anti-terror-law-takes-effect, (last accessed 14 August 2020). 10 Lagsa, Bobby, Rappler, Malaybalay police under fire for social media post equating protest to terron·sm, 18 July 2020, accessed at https:/ / rappler.comjnation/ mindanao/malaybalay police-under-fire-social-media-post-equating-protest-terrorism, (last accessed 14 August 2020). 11 Tiangco, Minka & Antonio, Raymund, Manila Bulletin, NDFP peace consultant Randy Echanis killed in QC, 10 August 2020, accessed at https:/ / mb.com.ph/ 2020/ 08/ 10/ ndfp peace-consultant-randy-echanis-killed-in-qc/ (last accessed on 14 August 2020). A couple of weeks ago, an organized group invoking the name of the President has publicly announced this aim to establish a revolutionary government in defiance of the Constitution. 12 Ramos, Mariejo S., Inquirer.net, Slain peace talks adviser's kin, PNP in tug of war for body, Inquirer, 12 August 2020, accessed at https:/ / newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 1320291/ slain peace-talks-advisers-kin-pnp-in-tug-of-war-for-body (last accessed on 14 August 2020). 13 Ranada, Pia, Rappler, Piqued Duterte taunts doctors to mount 'revolution' against him, 3 August 2020, accessed at https:/ / rappler.com/ nation/ piqued-duterte-taunts-doctors-to mount-revolution-against-him (last accessed on 14 August 2020). 14 CNN Philippines Staff, CNN Philippines, New AFP Chief to propose social media regulation under the Anti-Terrorism Act, accessible at
3 enforcers themselves have been actively and habitually spreading "false claims and misleading content that incite hate against activists and critics" through their social media accounts.l5
These incidents are not isolated. We can go on and fill these pages with a catalogue of similar violations and threats to the people's liberties and right of security by law enforcers themselves. These particular events, however, would suffice to demonstrate that the Filipino people face great uncertainty and live in a climate of constant fear with the rampant threat of civil and political liberties' violations. The Anti-Terrorism Act, which was passed during an extraordinary time of pandemic, heightens the fear of the people, who now experience this fear on a full scale.
In this kind of environment, the people are only too aware of the mischief resulting in the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act. In fact, a record of twenty-nine (29) Petitions16 from various sectors have been filed before this Honorable Court assailing the law.
The people truly have no other recourse but to take refuge before this Honorable Supreme Court. This Petition respectfully calls upon the Judiciary to assert its shared role and responsibility in the proper ordering of society to restore to the people and secure them their rights under a society free from any fear where liberty is the norm and not the exception.17
Nature of the Petition
1. This is a Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying for the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition commanding the Respondents to desist from implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 11479 otherwise known as the Anti Terrorism Act of 2020 ("Anti-Terrorism Act") on the ground that the said law is unconstitutional.
https:l I cnnphilippines.coml newsl2020I Bl 41 Anti-Terrorism-Act-social-media regulation-AFP-Gapay.html (last accessed on 14 August 2020). 1s Rappler Research Team, Rappler, With anti-terror law, police-sponsored hate and disinfonnation even more dangerous, 14 August 2020, accessed at https: I I rappler.coml newsbr eakI investigative/ anti-terror-law-state-sponsored-hate disinformation-more-dangerous (last accessed 14 August 2020). 16 As of 2 September 2020, per this Honorable Court's Judicial Records Office. 17 See Rep. Act No. 11479, § 4, last par. The authorities try to allay the fear of the public - that those who merely exercise their constitutional freedom need not fear the law. They simply miss the point. Fear lies not in the enemies of the state but in the hearts of peace loving citizens who, given the signs of the times are threatened with the possibility of being arrested and detained for exercising their rights.
4 2. This Petition is proper as in numerous instances this Honorable Court has recognized that a Petition for Prohibition is a proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation. IS
The Parties
3. Petitioner PBA is the oldest voluntary national professional organization of lawyers in the Philippines. It may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at Unit 347, Valero Plaza, 124 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City.
4. Respondents Executive Secretary, National Security Adviser, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of National Defense, Secretary of Interior and Local Government, Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Information and Communications Technology, Anti-Money Laundering Council Executive Director, are impleaded herein as members of the Anti-Terrorism Council (" ATC")19 including the AFP Chief of Staff, and the PNP Chief, all of whom are tasked to implement the Anti-Terrorism Act.
a. Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, the Chairperson of the ATC, may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the Office of the President of the Philippines, Malacafian Palace, Manila.
b. National Security Adviser Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., the Vice-Chairperson of the Anti-Terrorism Council, may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the NICA Compound, NIC Building, 5 V. Luna Road corner East A venue, Quezon City.
c. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr. may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court
18 Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, 25 April 2017, 824 SCRA 164 citing Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 147571, 5 May 2001, 357 SCRA 496; Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013, 710 SCRA 1. 19 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 45.
5 at the 11th Floor, DFA Home Office, 2330 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.
d. Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the DND Building, Segundo Avenue, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
e. Secretary of Interior and Local Government Eduardo M. Afio may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the DILG NAPOLCOM Center EDSA corner Quezon Avenue, Diliman Quezon City.
f. Secretary of Finance Carlos G. Dominguez may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the DOF Building, BSP Complex, Roxas Boulevard Pasay City.
g. Secretary of Justice Menardo I. Guevarra may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the Department of Justice, Padre Faura Street, Ermita, Manila.
h. Secretary of Information and Communications Technology Gregorio B. Honasan, II may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at C.P. Garcia Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City.
i. Anti-Money Laundering Council Executive Director Mel Georgie B. Racela may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the 5th Floor, EDPC Building, BSP Complex, Mabini corner Vito Cruz Street, Malate, Manila.
5. Respondents Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Lt. General Gilbert Gapay, and Philippine National Police Chief General Camilo Pancratius Pascua Cascolan are impleaded herein as head of the support agencies of the Anti-Terrorism Council.20
20 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 45.
6 a. Lt. General Gilbert Gapay may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the AFP Headquarters, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
b. Police General Archie Francisco F. Gamboa may be served with pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders, and other processes and papers of this Honorable Court at the PNP Headquarters, Camp Rafael Crame, Cubao, Quezon City.
Preliminary Consideration
6. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, empowers this Honorable Court to declare~ law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional.21 This Petition respectfully prays that this Honorable Court exercise such power -- the Power of Judicial Review - to check on the excesses of the other branches of the government.
7. This is ~ proper case for this Honorable Court to exercise its Power of Judicial Review.
8. This Honorable Court, in the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,22 restated the requisites for the exercise of the powers of judicial review, namely: (a) "the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (b) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (c) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case."
9. First. There is present here an actual case and controversy. The Anti-Terrorism Act took effect on 21 July 2020. The government, through Respondents, are now poised in implementing the Anti-Terrorism Act. DOJ Secretary Menardo Guevarra, speaking for the government, has said that certain provisions of the Anti Terrorism Act are "self-executing" and now in force and in effect,23
21 PHIL. CoNsr., Art. VIII, § 5(2)(a) & 5(b). See Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 337 (2011 ed.) [hereinafter, Bernas, Commentary]. 22 G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226816, 226117, 226120 and 226294, 8 November 2016, 807 SCRA 223. 23 Torres-Tupas, Tetch, Inquirer.net, Anti-terror law takes effect this midnight, 17 July 2020, accessed at https:jI newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 1308359/ anti-terror-law-takes-effect rnidnight-of-july-18, (last accessed 14 August 2020).
7 and may be implemented at any time without waiting for any implementing rule or regulation. 24 In the case of Ople v. Torres et al.2s this Honorable Court said that the "ripeness for adjudication xxx is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules have yet to be promulgated xxx."
10. The PBA and its lawyer-members are bound under the Lawyer's Oath to support the "Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities" of the Republic of the Philippines. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, the PBA and its lawyer-members must uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and its legal processes.26 PBA maintains that the Anti-Terrorism Act is unconstitutional while the Respondents are compelled to uphold its constitutionality and are ready to implement the same at anytime. On the other hand, the PBA cannot truly comply with its oath to uphold the Constitution and the rule of law without asserting the public right to life, liberty and property against the Respondents. For the PBA, any violation of such public right directly affects its lawyer-members who are entitled to such right as much as any citizen.
11. The government's announcement that the law may now be enforced at any time presents an imminent and threatened impairment to the PBA' s objectives which is based on its responsibility to preserve the rule of la\v. There is, therefore, an antagonistic assertion of claims between the parties - a contrariety of legal rights and obligations that call for adjudication. The conflict, therefore, between the parties is real and actual and is ripe for adjudication.
12. Significantly, this Honorable Court itself, in the case of Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima,27 said that the people should not wait for actual enforcement of the law and for "evil to befall on them" before they could question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. In the words of this Honorable Court:
"[In the case of Pimentel Jr. v. Han. Aguirre], we dismissed the novel theory that people should wait for the implementing evil to befall on them before they could
24 Ibid. 25 G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998. 26 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1. 27 G .R. No. 212719, 25 June 2019.
8 question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional, and held that '[by] the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act."'
13. Second. Petitioner PBA has locus standi to question the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act. The PBA's existence is founded on the responsibility to assist in and improve the administration of justice. As lawyers, the PBA and its lawyer members act as guardians to the Rule of Law. This requires a vigilant attention to the preservation of the rule of law, and, therefore, the elimination of any government act that is inimical to this objective. The Anti-Terrorism Act is one such act of the government.
14. The PBA's interest in the issue of the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act is a direct and personal one. Its members are citizens who are engaged in the active practice of law with the obligation to uphold first and foremost the Constitution and the rule of law.2s They cannot effectively discharge their duties in the administration of justice if they entertain doubts or had lost their faith in the Rule of Law by the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, which has far-reaching implications not only in the practice of law, but also in their conduct as citizens of this country.
15. The PBA and/ or its members may at any time be called upon to provide legal services to persons affected by the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, specially where a public right is involved. To be true to its oath and existence, the PBA and its members need not wait for a live case where such public right is imperilled. It is PBA' s duty to assert, here and now, that public right against the Anti-Terrorism Act. PBA's interest in the issue and resolution of the law's constitutionality is thus not only in common with the general public or an incidental interest but a direct and a personal one.
16. Moreover, this Honorable Court has repeatedly acknowledged that "[i]t is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied."29
28 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1; RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, § 17. 29 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G .R. No. 192935, 7 December 2010, 637 SCRA 78; David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
9 Considering the overreaching significance of the ilnplementation and enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism Act in the people's constitutional rights, the PBA has an adequate interest in the outcome of the instant controversy.
17. In the case of De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Counci[,30 where PBA was one of the petitioners, this Honorable Court ruled that the petitioners demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy to vest them with the requisite locus standi:
"xxx the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication gf a public right.
xxx"
18. Third. The constitutionality of Anti-Terrorism Act is raised before this Honorable Court at the first and earliest instance by way of the prohibition jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.
19. Fourth. The constitutionality of Anti-Terrorism Act is the very lis mota of this case, as there can be no final decision herein without passing upon such issue of constitutionality.
20. In any event, these requirements are matters of technical procedure which will not hinder this Honorable Court from exercising its Power of Judicial Review especially considering that this Petition involves an issue which is of transcendental importance.
21. In the same case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora3t this Honorable Court assured the public that where the issues raised are of transcendental significance or are of paramount importance to the public, the Honorable Court will "brush aside technicalities of procedure." In that particular case, where IBP assailed the presence of military troops in Metro Manila, this
30 G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010, 615 SCRA 666. 31 Ibid.
10 Honorable Court took cognizance of the IBP Petition explaining that 11 a reading of the Petition shows that IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents x x x". In the case of De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, this Honorable Court said that:
11 xxx In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the requirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we pointed out: 'Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.' But even it strictly speaking, the petitioners 'are not covered .Qy the definition, it is still within -the wide discretion --of the- Court -to waive -the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."'32
22. The issue of the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act is of transcendental importance. The effects of the law on the constitutional rights of the citizen is pernicious and has far reaching consequences to our constitutional democracy. The law is an abomination to the social order. It threatens and assaults the basic rights of the people. This case is thus a matter of great importance and concern to the public. The record number of Petitions filed with this Honorable Court as of today assailing the constitutional validity of the law would attest to this.
32 G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010, 615 SCRA 666; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
11 23. In the case of Aguinaldo v. Aquino III,33 this Honorable Court accorded the IBP legal standing by reason of the transcendental importance of the constitutional issue raised therein. According to this Honorable Court:
"xxx
"Given that the constitutional issue in the Petition at bar is of transcendental importance and of public interest, and for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court shall accord petitioners the legal standing to sue."34
24. In the latter case of Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,35 this Honorable Court has "taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved," thus:
"Indeed, where those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act."
25. In the light of these jurisprudence, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court recognize the legal standing of the PBA and proceed to exercise its power of judicial review.
Grounds in support of the Petition
I.
THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT IS AN EXCESSIVE AND INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. ITS PROVISIONS ARE UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE IN VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE CONSTITUTION.
33 G.R. No. 224302, 29 November 2016, 818 SCRA 310. 34 Ibid. 35 G .R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017, 835 SCRA 350.
12 A. SECTION 16 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT IS UNREASONABLE AS IT DISREGARDS THE RIGHTS OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES AND BY-STANDERS.
1. Section 16 Allows Law Enforcers To Secretly Access Communication And Information From Innocent Third Parties Or By-Standers.
2. Section 16 Of The Anti-Terrorism Act Is Unreasonable As It Allows Law Enforcers To Trespass And Violate The Sanctity Of Inviolable Places And The Dignity Of Persons Who Are Not Terrorist Suspects.
II.
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 29 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT IS UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
A. THE ARREST OF A CITIZEN BASED ON THE UNBRIDLED DISCRETION OF THE ANTI TERRORISM COUNCIL IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE.
B. THE ARREST OF A CITIZEN ON THE MERE AUTHORITY OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL IS UNREASONABLE.
C. THE ARREST OF A MERE SUSPECT IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE.
D. . THE PROLONGED DETENTION OF A SUSPECT FOR A PERIOD OF FOURTEEN (14) DAYS EXTENDIBLE TO TWENTY-FOUR (24) DAYS IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE.
E. SECTION 29 VIOLATES SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
1. 3 III.
SECTION 25 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS OR OTHERWISE VIOLATES ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS AS IT ALLOWS DESIGNATION ON MERE PROBABLE CAUSE.
A. THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL'S POWER OF DESIGNATION IS AN EXECUTIVE ENCROACHMENT ON THE POWERS OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
B. IN ANY EVENT, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL'S POWER OF DESIGNATION IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER AND SECTION 25 DOES NOT CONFORM WITH ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS.
IV.
THE OBSCURE AND BROAD DEFINITION OF TERRORISM IN SECTION 4 RENDERS THE IMPLEMENTION OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE. v.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI- TERRORISM ACT IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE BECAUSE ITS PROVISIONS RENDER IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT OR VINDICATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.
VI.
THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL OR THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CANNOT VALIDLY CURE THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTI TERRORISM ACT BY ANY IMPLEMENTING RULE OR REGULATION.
14 Discussion
I. THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT IS AN EXCESSIVE AND INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. ITS PROVISIONS ARE UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE IN VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE CONSTITUTION.
26. The people acknowledge that their rights are not unlimited. They concede that their rights are subject to regulation by the state for the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest - through the latter's exercise of its inherent power - the police power. On the other hand, the state's police power is neither unlimited nor absolute. It is subject to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." In short, as held by this Honorable Court in the classic case of Rubi v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro,36 "[n]one of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law."
27. Undeniably, the Anti-Terrorism Act was enacted pursuant to the state's exercise of "police power."37 The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is inherent in the sovereign power of the State to maintain social order as an aspect of police power.3S
28. However, while police power may generally interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare,39 it must be exercised in conformity with substantive due process.40
29. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law.41 It requires that "the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just."42
36 G.R. No. L-14078, 7 March 1919, 39 Phil 660. 37 See Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957, 101 Phil. 1155. 38 People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, 18 September 2009, 600 SCRA 476. 39 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 386. 40 Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642,10 September 2019. 41 Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. (ALFI) v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, G.R. No 221866, 26 April2017, 801 SCRA 453. 42 Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines and Manila Pilots Association, G.R. No. 111953, 12 December 1997, 283 SCRA 31.
15 Substantive due process asks whether the government has adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property.43 While the State's intrusion is not absolutely proscribed, due process requires that the intrusion on an individual's right to life, liberty, and property is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.44 As held in Ichong v. Hernandez :45
//The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied."
30. According to this Honorable Court in the case of !chong, "the test or standard, always, is reason."46
31. While the government's objectives in enacting the Anti Terrorism Act may indeed be laudable, the means by which such objectives are intended to be attained are grossly oppressive and intrusive of private rights. As will be shown below, various provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act unreasonably encroach on, and even disregard, constitutionally guaranteed and protected rights.
A. SECTION 16 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT IS UNREASONABLE AS IT DISREGARDS THE RIGHTS OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES AND BY-STANDERS.
1. Section 16 Allows Law Enforcers To Secretly Access Communication and Infonnation
43 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, 12 April2005, 455 SCRA 308. 44 Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, 10 September 2019. 45 G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957, 101 Phil. 1155. 46 Ibid; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
16 From Innocent Third Parties or By-Standers.
32. Under Section 16 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, members of a judicially-declared and outlawed terrorist organization or any person charged with or suspected of terrorism may, upon an ex parte written order of the Court of Appeals, be subjected to a secret interception of his communications, carried out through various means.47 Section 16 of the Anti-Terrorism Act provides:
"Section 16. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. - The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the 'Anti Wire Tapping Law' to the contrary notwithstanding, a law enforcement agent or military personnel may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals secretly wiretap, overhear, and listen to, intercept, screen, read, surveil, record or collect, with the use of any mode, form, kind or~ of electronic, mechanical, or other equipment or device or technology now known or may hereafter be known to science or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for the above purposes, any private communications conversation, discussionis, data, information, messages in whatever form, kind or nature, spoken or written words (a) between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, as provided in Section 26 of this Act; (b) between members of a designated person as defined in Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 10168; or (c) any person charged with or suspected of committing any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act; Provided, That, surveillance, interception, and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists, and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized. xxx"48
33. Section 16 cannot be implemented without violating substantive due process and the citizens' right to privacy because it allows the secret interception, hearing, and eavesdropping of communications or conversations between innocent third parties or
47 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 16. 48 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
17 by-standers and a person charged with or suspected of committing the crimes prescribed by the Anti-Terrorism Act. Unless the latter is engaged in a monologue or in perpetual isolation - this provision cannot be enforced without violating the right of the other party to the communication or conversation. One can easily imagine the resulting mischief of a listening device secretly implanted in a telephone, computer, and similar devices, not to mention those secretly installed in the homes and residences, vehicles, and offices of suspects. Innocent parties and innocent conversations would be exposed and readily accessed by the government. Moreover, these innocent parties are not only confined to those who are in direct communication or conversation with a terrorist suspect. They include everyone who are within the effective listening radius of such electronic devices or those within the neighborhood of such terrorist suspects. The advanced state of technology makes this possible. Section 16 thus allows excessive intrusion in the private life of the citizens. The means to achieve the purpose of the law lacks reasonableness and is marred by arbitrariness. It ignores, if not tramples, upon the right of innocent parties. It violates substantive due process, the standard of which in the words of this Honorable Court quoting Justice Holmes "is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice x x x and the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."49
34. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution emphasizes the requirement of reasonableness, thus:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue, except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."so
35. This provision dictates that every search, seizure, or arrest must be reasonable. In the case of eavesdropping or
49 Ermita - Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. et al. v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, 31 July 1967,20 SCRA 849. so Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
18 ~
interception of communications, the requirement of reasonability should even be more strict. These acts are equally, if not more, intrusive than a mere search and seizure. The acts sanctioned by Section 16 of the Anti-Terrorism Act should therefore be carried out reasonably - which means it should not interfere with the rights of innocent third parties. There is nothing, however, in Section 16 which safeguards the privacy rights of innocent persons. It does not also guarantee the non-inclusion of privileged and confidential communication or correspondences. Indeed, it is impossible for law enforcers to determine in advance communications which fall under authorized or unauthorized surveillance, interception, and recording. By merely focusing on the suspects and ignoring the rights of third parties, it would seem that the Anti-Terrorism Act was not intended to aid law enforcers with reasonable means for effective law enforcement but to sidestep the Constitution merely for their convenience in discharging their functions.
36. Even as there is a need for effective law enforcement and crime prevention - the State through its Legislative and Executive Departments must perform their functions with unquestioned loyalty to the Constitution. The right to privacy of every person, particularly in relation to the Anti-Terrorism Act, where innocent parties and by standers are inevitably involved - cannot be taken lightly in the context of a constitutional democracy. The intrusion into the privacy of these innocent parties or by standers cannot be seen merely as collateral or incidental. Such intrusions are direct and fundamental violations of their rights. The compelling state interest to prevent terrorism cannot overshadow the compelling interest of the state to protect and uphold constitutional rights of the citizens. Always the state must act reasonably in this regard. In other words, it must act in accordance with substantive due process. In his concurring opinion in the case of Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Jnc. s1 the learned jurist J. Jardeleza said that, "(L)iberty is a right enshrined in the Constitution. However, as a testament to the impossibility of determining what it truly means to be free, neither the Constitution nor our jurisprudence has attempted to define its metes and bounds. This case challenges this Court to ascertain the extent of the protection of the right to liberty." J. Jardeleza went on to site jurisprudence - that the constitutional right to liberty includes the concept of the right to privacy. This Honorable Court said so in the case of Morfe v. Mutuc quoting from American Jurisprudence:
st G.R. No. 187417, 24 February 2016.
19 "xxx Liberty on the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful government restraint, it must include privacy as well if it is to be a respecting of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom. xxx this right to be left alone is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men xxx. The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect."
It is important to emphasize that the right to privacy is a component of the right to liberty because the Constitution has no express and specific provision on the right to privacy unlike the right to life, liberty, and property, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and religious freedom. The right to privacy, however, is recognized in several provisions of the Constitution. In the case of Ople v. Torres 52 this Honorable Court said that the right to privacy finds recognition the following provisions of the Constitution: Section 1, Article III on the Due Process Clause; in Section 3(1) regarding the privacy of communication and correspondence; Section 2, on the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures; Section 6 on the liberty of abode; Section 8, on the right to form union or associations; Section 17, on the right against self-incrimination. According to this Honorable Court there are other zones of privacy which are recognized and protected in different laws, i.e., civil laws and penal laws, anti wiretapping law, bank secrecy laws and intellectual property not to mention the Rules of Court on privileged communications. All these laws will be set at naught by the Anti-Terrorism Act. Of particular significance in respect of Section 16 of the law is one's right against self-incrimination and to the protection of privilege communication. Section 16 indeed allows the secret eaves-dropping, overhearing or intercepting of any communication or conversation including self incriminating statements and communications that are privilege. This should not be allowed. Section 16 is a violation of due process, the right to privacy, the right to liberty and the Constitution.
2. Section 16 Of The Anti-Terrorism Act Is Unreasonable As It Allows Law Enforcers To Trespass And Violate The Sanctity of Inviolable s2 G.R. No. 127605, 23 July 1998.
20 Places And The Dignity of Persons Who Are Not Terrorist Suspects.
37. Section 16 authorizes law enforcers to secretly plant in any place, listening or intercepting or eavesdropping devices or video electronic surveillance equipment or any other suitable means to overhear, listen to, interrupt, screen, read, surveil, record, or collect any private communication, conversation, discussions, data, information, messages in whatever form, kind or nature, spoken or written words. Thus, Section 16 allows law enforcers to tap or "bug" telephones, mobile phones, computers, etcetera, and install listening devices and video cameras in any place including homes, vehicles, offices, bags, boxes, packages, and even lunch boxes or any place that allows them to accomplish their secret sleuthing. The possibilities are endless. With advanced technology, the listening, intercepting, or recording devices may be planted not only in a suspect's home or in any place where he may be found. The "bug" may be planted anywhere where law enforcers are able to secretly listen to or overhear or intercept his communications or conversations. It could be planted in a neighbor's house or in any place where law enforcers may conveniently and effectively execute their surreptitious prying. Under the circumstance, houses and places of innocent citizens are inevitably involved. Section 16 offers no protection to the public and to these innocent citizens. It is submitted that this is an unreasonable intrusion to and an unreasonable invasion of one's person, house, and effects. It unreasonably allows law enforces to trespass and violate the sanctity of homes and such other inviolable places, sites, or locations. It unreasonably allows law enforcers to violate the dignity of iru1ocent persons.
38. In the same case of Marje v. Mutwft3 this Honorable Court, realizing the forces of technological age said that the right to privacy should be accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itselt it is fully serving of Constitutional protection. This Honorable Court, quoting from an eminent professor, said that a system of limited government safeguards the protection of a private sector as distinguished from the public sector which the state can control:
"xxx Protection of the private sector- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual - has become increasingly important as modern society
53 G.R. No. L-20387, 31 January 1968.
21 has developed; All the forces of technological age - industrialization, urbanization and organization- operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian state."
Morfe was decided in 1968 or more than half a century ago. Today is now the age of ultratechnology. The area of privacy has become more narrow and limited if not circumscribed by the advance state of technology. The state, should, therefore, be more vigilant in protecting the citizens right to privacy. The Anti-Terrorism Act, however, does the opposite. It makes it easier for the state to intrude into the privacy of the citizens through the unbridled use of technology. This Honorable Court should not allow this. Reason revolts against it. It violates substantive due process.
II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 29 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT IS UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
39. This Honorable Court should not waste a second in striking out Section 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act as unconstitutional. On its face alone, it is a perversion of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. No further elaboration or explanation is necessary. For ready reference, we respectfully quote anew Section 2:
"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."54
40. Granting that Section 29 is a measure of Police Power it is unreasonable and a violation of substantive due process.
54 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
22 A. THE ARREST OF A CITIZEN BASED ON THE UNBRIDLED DISCRETION OF THE ANTI TERRORISM COUNCIL IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE.
41. Section 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act allows the arrest of a citizen when such arrest is "authorized in writing by the ATC." Section 29, however, does not have explicit legislative standards to rein in such authority. The authority granted to the Anti-Terrorism Council (" ATC") has no boundaries. It confers to the ATC unbridled and unlimited discretion to authorize the arrest of any person with the requisite being only that the person to be arrested is a u suspect". This is problematic because the Anti-Terrorism Act does not define nor clarify the meaning of a "suspect". The ATC, with its unbridled discretion, can point to anyone as a suspect according to its own definition of the word. Worse, Section 29 dispenses with the safeguards provided in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution to ensure that the arrest is not unreasonable. Section 29 does not require the ATC to determine the existence of a "probable cause" to justify its issuance of an "authority to arrest." In short, Section 29 gives superior power to the ATC much greater than that of a Judge who, in issuing a warrant of arrest, is bound by strict requirements to protect the constitutional rights of the citizens. The silence of Section 29 regarding the requirement of "probable cause" is deliberate and not a mere inadvertence. This is shown by a comparison between Section 29 and the other provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act particularly, Section 17 (1), (2), and Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act. These provisions, unlike Section 29, expressly state the requirement of a "probable cause."ss
42. To conform with reason and substantive due process, laws, particularly penal statutes and those that interfere with the liberties of the people, must, to be fair as they exact obedience to the people, sufficiently inform and advise the people of its provisions by definite, clear, and well-defined terms so as not to leave them guessing and acting with the use of discretion on what to do, or what not to do, or what to avoid, or what not to avoid, in order to comply with the law. Secondly, intertwined with that requirement, the law must provide limits or standards to eliminate or minimize the use of
55 Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 11479 is explicit that the "ATC may designate an individual, groups of persons, organizations, or association, whether domestic or foreign, upon ~ finding of probable cause that the individual x x x cannot, or attempt to consult, or conspire in the commission of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act."
23 discretion by the government and law enforcers. Otherwise, obedience to and enforcement of the law would be reduced to a matter of discretion and guesswork. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution should serve as a guide. In case of searches and seizures, Section 2 commands that the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized must be particularly described. This constitutional requirement is aimed to eliminate the use of discretion by law enforcers. Without such particular description they would have a field day searching places and seizing things at their own discretion. In the case of Uy v. Burea of Internal Revenue,56 this Honorable Court, quoting American jurisprudence, said that "[t]he evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the thing to be seized x x x - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles shall be seized, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made - that abuses may not be committed." Section 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act is afflicted with this incurable vice. It leaves unlimited discretion to the ATC and law enforcers. Without a clear definition of the word "suspect" and without the standard of probable cause - the ATC and the law enforcers will have a field day arresting citizens as terrorist suspects left and right.
43. Moreover, the ATC, for sure, is not just an investigative body. As discussed later in this Petition in relation to Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the ATC is clothed with quasi-judicial powers, hence, it must not be vested with unbridled discretion but with judicial discretion to conform with due process.
B. THE ARREST OF A CITIZEN ON THE MERE AUTHORITY OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL IS UNREASONABLE.
44. It is argued that an arrest authorized by the ATC under the Anti-Terrorism Act is equivalent to a warrantless arrest by a law enforcer or by a citizen - which is called a "citizen's arrest" under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. This argument holds no water. The rationale of warrantless arrests which is allowed under Section 5 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is its conformity to reason and its understood compliance with the requirement of "probable cause". Under the present rule, a law enforcer or even a private citizen may effect an arrest without warrant in three situations: (a) In Flagrante Delicto; (b) Hot Pursuit, and (c) When the person to be
56 G.R. No. 129651, 20 October 2000, 334 SCRA 36.
24 arrested is a Fugitive. These situations are based on undisputed facts and any decision to make an arrest based thereon does not require a determination of the existence of a probable cause as required by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Thus, when a law enforcer witnesses the commission of a crime or that a crime is about to be committed or has just been committed, he need not use his discretion to effect the arrest. The same is true with Hot Pursuit. The rule allows him to make the arrest in hot pursuit if he has personal knowledge that a crime has just been committed. Lastly, a fugitive may be arrested at any time. These warrantless arrests are not "unreasonable" under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution because the existence of a "probable cause" 57 which justifies the arrest is implied, if not provided, by the undisputed facts witnessed by the arresting officer or citizen.
45. On the other hand, the arrest of a suspect without a warrant, based merely on the unbridled discretion of the ATC without even requiring ATC to find a probable cause, is completely different from the warrantless arrests allowed by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The latter is based on undisputed facts constituting probable cause, while the former is based on mere allegations of fact and the unlimited discretion of ATC regardless of whether probable cause exists or not.
46. Without need of further elaboration and argument, we respectfully submit that the unbridled discretion of the ATC authorizing the arrest of a citizen without the safeguards mandated by the Constitution is unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, and even capricious in violation of substantive due process.
C. THE ARREST OF A MERE SUSPECT IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE.
47. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not define a "suspect" nor clarify what it means. If we go by the common understanding of what a suspect is, it could be anyone or any 11 person of interest" or anyone found to have a connection to an offense - no matter how farfetched or remote that connection is. In authorizing the arrest of a 11 suspect", the ATC is not limited to any standard or requirement. As
57 It is defined as such facts and circumstances which to a reasonable man engenders a belief that a crime has been committed and that the subject of the arrest has committed the same. See People v. Sy Juco, G. R No. 41957, 28 August 1937, 64 Phil. 667.
25 earlier said, the ATC is not even required to determine the existence of a probable cause - which require the existence of facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereo£.58 Based on the definitions of probable cause, which demands more than bare suspicion,s9 the arrest of a mere suspect, without probable cause, has no reasonable basis at all, hence, it is arbitrary and oppressive. This Honorable Court said, in the case of Bagalihog v. Fernandez,60 that "the zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors." Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, anyone therefore can be a suspect and can be arrested without probable cause and without any valid justification. In the case of Webb v. De Leon,61 this Honorable Court stressed that: " [T]he need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature ... ' An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. x x x" Hence, Section 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act which authorizes the arrest of suspects without probable cause is an unreasonable arrest in violation of due process.
D. THE PROLONGED DETENTION OF A SUSPECT FOR A PERIOD OF FOURTEEN (14) DAYS EXTENDIBLE TO TWENTY-FOUR (24) DAYS IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE.
48. It is condemnable enough that a citizen who is a mere suspect is arrested without a warrant. It is even worse that said person has to suffer a fourteen (14) - day detention which may extend to twenty-four (24) days without any case being filed against him.
49. According to Section 29, an arrested suspect can be detained for as long as fourteen (14) days without any reason for such prolonged detention. This number of days of detention has no reasonable basis and is arbitrary. It appears to have been plucked out ss People v. Sy Juco, G.R No. 41957, 28 August 1937, 64 Phil. 667; Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. 45358, 29 January 1937, 64 Phil. 33. 59 Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, G.R. No. 11567, 20 March 2013,694 SCRA 185. 60 G.R. No. 96356, 27 June 1991, 198 SCRA 614. 6t G.R. Nos. 121234, 121245 and 121297,23 August 1995,247 SCRA 652.
26 of thin air or inspired perhaps by the 14-day period of quarantine in this era of pandemic. Worse, this unreasonable period of detention may be extended to twenty-four (24) days at the discretion of the authorities if: (a) further detention of the person is necessary to preserve evidence or to complete the investigation; (b) to prevent the commission of another terrorism; and (c) that the investigation is being conducted properly and without delay. We humbly submit that the detention of a person for such a prolonged period is unjustifiable. It is unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive. Section 29 does not even attempt to give a reason for the detention and delay in the delivery of the suspect to the proper judicial authorities. Such prolonged detention depends on the discretion of law enforcers. The extension of the period of detention to another ten (10) days makes it more unreasonable and arbitrary. The reasons given are lame excuses. We cannot see how depriving a suspect of his liberty will 11 preserve evidence" or allow the investigation to be completed or 11 prevent the commission of another terrorism." These purposes can be achieved without violating the Constitution. There is nothing to stop law enforcers from a 24/7 vigilance in their surveillance of the suspect once the latter is released from detention. Since the released suspect is a marked man, it should be easy for the law enforcers to prevent him from "committing another terrorism" or to conceal or destroy evidence or to stand in the way to the completion of the investigation. After all, preventing these contingencies is the role and responsibility of law enforcers. We respectfully reiterate that the Constitution should not be sacrificed merely for the convenience of law enforcers.
50. Further, the arbitrariness of the prolonged period of detention is shown by its inexplicable difference from the period prescribed by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution in the very extraordinary case of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus which allows law enforcers only three (3) days within which to charge the detainee in court from the time of arrest, otherwise he shall be released. In effect, the prolonged detention of a suspect without a judicial warrant of arrest is tantamount to a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without the requisite conditions provided in the Constitution. Section 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act denies the suspect any remedy to question his detention which precisely is the state of law obtaining under a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
27 51. In the case of Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima,62 this Honorable Court said that the right to liberty cannot be taken lightly and that an extended period of detention or one that is beyond the period allowed by law violates a person's right to liberty:
II An extended period of detention or one that is beyond the period allowed by law violates the accused person's right to liberty. Hence, we shunt the rigidity of the rules of procedure so as not to deprive such birthright. The Court zealously guards against the curtailment of a person's basic constitutional and natural right to liberty. The right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot he lightly taken away. At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to liberty that cannot be taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes provided by law."
E. SECTION 29 VIOLATES SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
52. The written authority of the ATC authorizing the arrest of a suspected terrorist is similar to an Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order 11 ( ASSO") during the Marcos martial law era. The then Secretary of National Defense was authorized to order arrest, detention, searches, and seizures through the ASSO.
53. The ASSO was justified under the regime of martial law and by the 1973 Constitution which authorizes the issuance of a warrant not only by a judge but by 11 such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." The latter was deliberately deleted in the present Constitution. Hence, under Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution a search or arrest warrant may be issued only by a judge upon probable cause personally determined by him. The language of Section 2 definitely and absolutely excludes any other government official or entity from exercising such authority. On that score alone, Section 29 is unquestionably unconstitutional.
III. SECTION 25 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS OR OTHERWISE VIOLATES ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS AS IT
62 G.R. No. 212719, 25 June 2019.
28 ALLOWS DESIGNATION ON MERE PROBABLE CAUSE.
A. THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL'S POWER OF DESIGNATION IS AN EXECUTIVE ENCROACHMENT ON THE POWERS OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
54. Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act provides:
"Section 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual, Groups of Persons, Organizations or Associations. -...
The A TC may designate an individual, groups of persons, organization, or association, whether domestic or foreign, upon finding of probable cause that the individual, groups of persons, organization, or association commit, or attempt to commit, or conspire in the commission of the acts defined and penalized under Sections ~ ~ ~ Z & ~ 10, 11 and 12 of this Act.
The assets of designated individual, group of persons, organizations or association above mentioned shows be subject the authority of the Anti-Monetary Laundering Council (AMLC) to freeze pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 10168.
The designation shall be without prejudice to the proscription of terrorist organizations, associations, or groups of persons under Section 26 of this Act."63
55. Designation is controversial and litigious. It is a declaration or a decision or a ruling on the status of a person or an entity. In fact, it requires a "finding" that such a person or entity "commit or attempt to commit or conspire in the commission of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12" of the law. Designation exacts punishment on the designated person or entity. It automatically subjects such person(s) or members of such entity to a warrantless arrest in addition to the freezing of their assets. The intended consequence is to deprive a designated person or entity or a member thereof the exercise of his freedom in a significant way. Designation, therefore, requires more than an
63 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
29 administrative investigation. It requires adjudication or the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." This is the elementary and traditional concept of Judicial Power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. The demandable and enforceable right involved in Section 25 is one's right to life, liberty and property. Such right is threatened or violated by the "designation" under Section 25. This is a controversy which must therefore be settled by the Judiciary exercising its judicial power. Such judicial power cannot be conferred upon the Executive Department without violating the doctrine of separation of powers. According to the Honorable Court in the case of Belgica et al. v. Hon. Executive Secretary et al.:64
"xxx there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another xxx the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, one branch may interfere with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function and alternatively the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes function that more properly is entrusted to another.-In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/ or (b) assumption of another department's function."
B. IN ANY EVENT, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL'S POWER OF DESIGNATION IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER AND SECTION 25 DOES NOT CONFORM WITH ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS.
56. Granting for the sake of argument that Section 25 does not require judicial intervention, it is respectfully submitted that ATC's power of Designation is a quasi-judicial power. Such power involves the power "to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.65 To designate a person, group of persons, organization, or association as a terrorist or terrorist group, organization, or association, the ATC must necessarily receive evidence and arrive at
64 G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013. 65 Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 152063, 12 August 2003, 408 SCRA 678.
30 factual conclusions and apply the law (i.e., the Anti-Terrorism Act) to said factual conclusions and render a decision or ruling based thereon. This is the essence of adjudication or quasi-adjudication for that matter. More specifically, quasi-judicial power is defined as:
11 xxx the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them or basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in ~ judicial nature."6667
57. The designation of a person, group of persons, organization or association by the ATC as terrorist cannot be accomplished in a vacuum or out of thin air. The ATC must ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for said designation. There can be no doubt therefore that the A TC is a quasi-judicial body and, therefore, it must exercise its discretion in a judicial manner.
58. Under Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, ATC's power to make a designation appears to be unrestricted by any legislative or judicial standard. It is limited only by the requirement of a II probable cause." This is a violation of due process. This Honorable Court early on, in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union Inc.,6s set out the guidelines which quasi-judicial bodies must follow in compliance with administrative due process. In that case, this Honorable Court said that "the fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidly of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can ignore disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process
66 Emphasis and underscoring supplied. 67 Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, 3 November 2006, 509 SCRA 332. 68 G.R. No. 46496, 27 February 1940, 69 Phil. 635.
31 in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be observed even in proceedings of this character. xxx"69 This Honorable Court then set forth the requirements of administrative due process: (a) right to a hearing and opportunity to present evidence; (b) the administrative tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (c) the decision must have something to support it; (d) [N]ot only must the evidence to support ~ finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial; (e) the decisions must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or contained in the records and disclosed to the parties; (f) the administrative body or any of its judges must act on its own or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy; and (g) the decision must be in such manner that the parties can know the issues involved, and the reason for the decision.7o
59. We cannot anticipate how the ATC will proceed in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power. However, for purposes of Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorist Act, we focus attention to the fourth (4th) requirement- that the evidence to support an administrative decision must be substantial. According to this Honorable Court in Ang Tibay, "substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable man might accept to support a conclusion." The decision must be based on "evidence having a rational probative force." In other words, to comply with due process, the evidence which the ATC must consider in its designation must be "substantial" with a rational probative force. Evidence of a "probable cause" required only by Section 25 for purposes of designation falls short of such a fundamental requirement. Probable cause is based merely on common sense. In the case of Webb v. De Leon,n this Honorable Court explained:
"It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies --on the calculus -of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance."
69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 G.R. Nos. 121234,121245 and 121297,23 August 1995,247 SCRA 652.
32 60. Similarly, in the case of United Laboratories Inc. v. Isip,n this Honorable Court said that: "Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard."
61. As held in the Ang Tibay case, probable cause is far different from 11 substantial evidence". The latter is not merely based on common sense but is based on judicial standards.
62. It is constitutionally imperative therefore that in exercising its power of designation, the ATC as a quasi-judicial body, must observe the Ang Tibay guidelines, particularly with respect to the requirement of substantial evidence. Section 25, however, merely requires II probable cause" which falls short of substantial evidence. In this respect Section 25 does not comply with due process.
63. The need for ATC to comply with due process in its designation of a person, or a group of persons, organization or association as a terrorist is mandated by the legal consequences of a "designation". Designation amounts to deprivation of liberty and property, considering that a designated person is automatically subjected to a warrantless arrest by law enforcers under Section 29, which authorizes the arrest of a mere suspect.
64. Secondly, the designation by the ATC automatically subjects the assets and bank accounts to the authority of the Anti Monetary Laundering Council (11 AMLC") which can impose freeze orders under Section 11 of RA 10168 or the Anti-Terrorism Financing Act73 Section 25 provides:
72 G.R. No. 163858, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 574. 73 Rep. Act No. 10186, § 11 reads:
"Section. 11. Authority to Freeze. - The AMLC, either upon its own initiative or at the request of the ATC, is hereby authorized to issue an ex parte order to freeze without delay: (a) property or funds that are in any way related to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism; or (b) property or funds of any person, believe that they are committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or facilitating the commission of financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as defined herein.
The freeze order shall be effective for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days. Upon a petition filed by the AMLC before the expiration of the period, the effectivity of the freeze order may be extended up to a period not exceeding six (6) months upon order of the Court of Appeals: Provided, That the twenty-day perio4 shall be tolled upon filing of a petition to extend the effectivity of the freeze order. .. "
33 "The assets of the designated individual, groups of persons, organization or association above-mentioned shall be subject to the authority of the Anti-Money Laundering Council to freeze pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 10168."
65. Moreover, such designation automatically deprives the concerned individual, group of persons, organization or association their freedom to exercise their Constitutional rights. The Constitution says that when there is a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, due process must be observed. According to this Honorable Court in the case of Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines74 which started as an administrative case, in order to fall within the due process clause of the Constitution, two conditions must concur, namely, there is deprivation and such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. Thus, we respectfully submit that the "designation" merely on "probable cause" as authorized by Section 25 violates administrative due process and therefore renders Section 25 unconstitutional.
IV. THE OBSCURE AND BROAD DEFINITION OF TERRORISM IN SECTION 4 RENDERS THE IMPLEMENTION OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE.
66. The definition of Terrorism under Section 4 of the Anti Terrorism Act gives unbridled discretion to the Executive and law enforcers in its implementation. It does not only allow the possibility of abuse. The Executive branch and law enforcers are bound, wittingly or unwittingly, to abuse its implementation. This is problematic and disturbing because of the irreversible damage and injury inflicted upon a person who happens to be considered by the ATC as a mere suspected terrorist.
67. Section 4 reads:
"Section 4. Terrorism. - Subject to Section 49 of this Act, terrorism is committed !!y any person who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of execution:
74 G.R. No. 111953,12 December 1997,283 SCRA 31.
34 (a) Engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a person's life;
(b) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to a government or public facility, public place or private property;
(c) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with damage or destruction to critical infrastructure;
(d) Develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or uses weapons, explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons; and
(e) Release of dangerous substances, or causing fire, floods, or explosions;
when the purpose of such act, !!y its nature and context, is to intimidate the general public or ~ segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread ~ message of fear, to provoke or influence !!y intimidation the government or any international organization, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country, or create~ public emergency or seriously undermine public safety, shall be guilty of committing terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592, otherwise known as 'An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98, and 99 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code': Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety."75
68. To conform with reason and the requirements of substantive due process we respectfully reiterate that laws,
75 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
35 particularly penal laws and those that suppress the people's liberties, - must have clear and well-defined provisions to give fair notice and afford understanding to every citizen who are compelled to obey the law. It is only fair therefore that the law must clearly and adequately guide them to know what to do or what not to do or to know what to avoid or what not to avoid. Otherwise, they cannot be reasonably expected to correctly comply with the law.
69. Section 4, like Sections 16, 25, and 29 of the Anti Terrorism Act, is afflicted with the vice of indefinite and obscure terms and unrestricted grant of discretion to the ATC and law enforcers. Citizens are made to guess on how they can correctly comply with the provisions thereof especially in the exercise of their civil and political rights.
70. Section 4's definition of terrorism under its Proviso includes uadvocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights" intended x x x to ucreate ~ serious risk to public safety. Section 4 does not, however, define or clarify what u serious risk to public safety means. This is significant because by their u nature and context" - which is another amorphous phrase in Section 4 - these activities, particularly mass actions against the government have always been characterized by law enforcers as u serious risk to public safety" entailing elaborate precautions from the government. Since the element of u serious risk to public safety" is undefined, the conditions thereof are left to the unlimited discretion of the ATC and law enforcers. To be sure, what constitute a 11 serious risk to public safety" wholly depends on the personal and subjective perception of the ATC and law enforcers.
71. Section 4 is undemocratic and unreasonable. Obviously, it was cunningly crafted to ensnare the exercise of civil and political rights into the dragnet of prohibited conduct. Given the indefinite terms of the law and the unbridled discretion of the ATC and law enforcers, those engaged in mass action against the government in exercise of their civil and political rights always face the peril of arrest. This situation is not unlikely considering the context of the times - when law enforcers characterize mass actions as creating a "serious risk to public safety", when law enforcers themselves consider repeated criticisms against the government as terrorism, and when the President, the Commander In Chief himself, considers the public complainants of medical and health practitioners amidst this pandemic as a 11 threat of revolution". In short, Section 4 of the Anti-
36 Terrorism Act with its obscure terms such as 11 any stage of execution", //nature and context", and "serious risk to public safety", and its grant to the A TC and law enforcers the unrestricted discretion to attribute their own meaning ·and understanding to those terms has the total effect of unreasonably scaring the people from exercising their civil and political rights including expressing publicly on tv, radio, or in mass and social media their views critical to the government. With their unbridled discretion, it is not improbable for the ATC and law enforcers, to consider such activity an intention II to create a serious risk to public safety."
72. Moreover, Section 4 prescribes two elements for terrorism: first, the commission of any of the predicate acts enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (e); and second, the presence of any of the purposes enumerated in the last paragraph. Thus, there is terrorism when the predicate acts enumerated in paragraphs .{ru to .(rl are committed in furtherance of any of the following particular intentions or purposes: (a) //to intimidate the general public or a segment thereof"; (b) //create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear"; (c) "to provoke or influence by intimidation the government or any international organization"; (d) 11 seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country"; or (e) 11 create a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety."76
73. Notably, the two elements of terrorism are based on vague, subjective, and very flexible standards, i.e., intent (to achieve certain consequences) and purpose (behind the execution of the act), 77 II regardless of the stage of the [act's] execution." Worse, the purpose may be determined based on the act's //nature and context", which is clearly very abstract.
74. Otherwise put, based on Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, specific intent is the essential element of terrorism. Thus, under the law, terrorism is a special intent crime.
75. Intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind; thus, the accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and external overt acts,78 or those acts which have direct connection
76 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 4; emphasis and underscoring supplied. 77 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 4. 78 See Wacoy v. People, G.R. No. 213792, 22 June 2015, 760 SCRA 259.
37 with the crime intended.79 In People v. Delim,so this Honorable Court expounded on the meaning of specific intent, to wit:
"Specific intent is used to describe ~ state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate --that --an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired~ specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent involves ~ state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved !!y the state in ~ prosecution for~ crime requiring specific intent...
Specific intent may be proved !!y direct evidence or !!y circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established !!y the evidence on record.
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same."Bt
76. Applying the foregoing standards, it becomes clear that Section 4 is problematic because the essential elements of the crime, i.e., intent (to achieve certain consequences) and purpose (behind the execution of the act), are broad and encompassing. The two elements lack determinable standards and are therefore wholly dependent on executive interpretation. Indeed, nowhere in the Anti-Terrorism Act were these specific intents and purposes further defined.
77. Absent a clear definition of the desired criminal consequences, law enforcers and even the ATC can unilaterally and flexibly determine the intention behind certain acts. The only difference between an innocent act and a criminal act is a subjective interpretation of the suspect's intention.
78. To emphasize the lack of concrete parameters for the definition of terrorism under Section 4, the repealed definition under
79 See Fantastico v. Malicse, G.R. No. 190912, 12 January 2015, 745 SCRA 126. 80 G.R. No. 142773,28 January 2003,396 SCRA 386. 81 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
38 RA 9372, otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007" ("Human Security Act") is instructive, thus:
"Section 3. Terrorism. -Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d'Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under:
(1) Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
(2) Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Control Act of 1990);
(3) Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
(4) Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
(5) Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and
(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Law s on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
39 thereby sowing and creating ~ condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."82
79. Terrorism, as defined in the repealed provision of the Human Security Act, also has two elements, namely, (a) the commission of the predicate crimes and (b) the specific intent that qualifies the same. Assuming without conceding its validity,83 the Human Security Act is more definite, both as to the nature of the covered predicate acts (i.e., paragraphs [a] to [e], Section 3) and their qualifying element (i.e., sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand). Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Act discarded these parameters and substituted them with elements that wholly rely on executive determination.
80. While the Human Security Act refers to the RPC and special penal laws for its predicate crimes (which crimes are already defined specifically), paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 4 of the Anti Terrorism Act does not refer to specific crimes but rather to certain acts that tend to produce certain effects, which tendency is left to the determination solely of the ATC. As such, much is left to the enforcers of the law, whose own interpretation is sufficient to trigger the operation of the rest of the law. Even ambiguous acts may be construed by law enforcers as acts of terrorism. Such unilateral determination will then allow the unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive operation of the other provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act.
81. As to the other elements which qualify the predicate crimes under the Human Security Act, executive determination of acts that create a u condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
82 Emphasis and underscoring supplied. 83 See Republic v. Roque, G.R. No. 204603, 25 September 2013, 206 SCRA 273, 282. "[T]the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was improper; (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi; and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or controversy. Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion."
40 and panic" is further limited by the requirement that the same must be "in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand."B4 By contrast, the specific intents in Section 4 of the Anti Terrorism Act are not subject to any limiting conditions. This effectively relinquishes the determination of terrorism in its entirety to enforcers of the law.
82. Consequently, by failing to sufficiently define terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Act fails to proscribe socially harmful conduct; rather, it frustrates compelling State and societal interests by subjecting individuals to violation of constitutional rights through the unbridled power granted to the Executive Branch. This is not the in terrorem effect intended of penal statutes.
83. Having a determinate definition of terrorism is critical, considering that several other acts penalized by the Anti-Terrorism Act under Sections 5 to 12 are made to depend on the existence of terrorism, thus:
a. Threat to Commit Terrorism;ss
b. Planning, Training, Preparing, and Facilitating the Commission of Terrorism; 86
c. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism;B7
d . Proposal to Commit Terrorism;ss
e. Inciting to Commit Terrorism;B9
f. Recruitment to and Membership in a Terrorist Organization; 9o
g. Foreign Terrorist;91 and
h. Providing Material Support to Terrorists.92
84 Rep. Act No. 9372, § 3. 85 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 5. 86 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 6. 87 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 7. 88 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 8. s9 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 9. 9o Rep. Act No. 11479, § 10. 91 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 11.
41 84. Absent legislative qualifications on the intents and purposes which shall make the predicate acts punishable as terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Act essentially vests on the Executive Branch the determination of prohibited acts, which determination properly rests in the Legislature. Simply put, it is this unconstitutional determination of specific intent which triggers the application of the constitutionally infirm Anti-Terrorism Act.
85. Under the circumstances, the Anti-Terrorism Act is not only open a possible abuse by law enforcers. With its broad and all encompassing definition of terrorism, which makes the line between innocent and wrongful conduct also a matter of guesswork-- the law is bound to be abused. This indefiniteness runs afoul of substantive due process which requires that the public must be given fair notice and understanding of what the law is through clear and well-defined provisions and that the discretion of law enforcers, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, be limited by explicit legislative standards.
86. Considering that the initial determination .Qy the ATC and law enforcers of suspected violators of the law would result in irreversible damages and injury to the latter, it would be unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive to implement the law as it is now written.
87. Section ----4 of the Anti-Terrorism ------Act is the core and anchor of the Anti-Terrorism Act =this law cannot stand alone without Section -4. --The Anti-Terrorism --Act should therefore be declared unconstitutional in its entirety.
V. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI TERRORISM ACT IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND OPPRESSIVE BECAUSE ITS PROVISIONS RENDER IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT OR VINDICATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.
88. Reading the Anti-Terrorism Act as a whole, and understanding it in its entirety, would show that it is improbable, if not impossible, to prevent or vindicate possible human rights violations. Furthermore, the continued effectivity of the Anti-
92 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 12.
42 Terrorism Act would be in violation of the right of any person to an effective remedy against possible abuses by the government.
89. Basic human rights are considered erga omnes obligations, i.e., an obligation towards the international community as a whole.93 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") enumerates the human rights that States are bound to respect, including the prohibition against torture and arbitrary arrest or detention.94 The UDHR is, in effect, the codification of the customary international law on human rights,95 which is binding on all nations, including the Philippines.
90. Together with the duty to uphold these rights, the State likewise has the duty to provide a remedy in case of a violation of these protected rights,96 "ubi ius ibi remedium -where there is a right, there is a remedy."97
91. Furthermore, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposes the obligation to State-parties to provide an effective remedy, to wit: "[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) [t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."98
92. The right to an effective remedy has two dimensions: procedural and substantive;99 the procedural dimension referring to
93 Dissenting Opinion, J. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116,226117, 226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016,807 SCRA 223, citing Case concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd (Second Phase, Belgium v. Spain), I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32. 94 Dissenting Opinion, J. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016, 807 SCRA 223, citing UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (Til), Art. 4, 5 and 9. 95 Dissenting Opinion, ]. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016, 807 SCRA 223, citing Hurst, Hannum, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in The Essentials of Human Rights 351 (Rhona K.M. Smith and Christian van den Anker eds., 2005). 96 Dissenting Opinion, J. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016, 807 SCRA 223. 97 Ibid., citing Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparation Programmes, at 7, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XIV.3 (2008); and Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 15 (1999 ed.) 98 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2(3)(a); emphasis and underscoring supplied. 99 Dissenting Opinion, J. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 2262948, November 2016, 807 SCRA 223, citing Diana
43 legal means by which alleged human rights violations are addressed by an impartial authority, while the substantive dimension deals with nprompt and effective reparation."Ioo
93. Under General Comment No. 31, the central component of the obligation to provide an effective remedy is the grant of holistic reparations to an individual,101 which is likewise guaranteed under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment referring to equivalent right in the form of redress and compensation.1o2
94. This holistic reparation, while it includes financial compensation, also requires recognition, acknowledgment of violations, and state responsibility.I03 Holistic reparation also seeks to address broader issues like n democracy, good governance, and building an inclusive community," through the prevention of future human rights violations.I04
95. Reading the Anti-Terrorism Act in its entirety would show that, not only is there no procedural remedy by which a party subjected to violation of his/her human rights may rely on, the so called n safeguards" for abuses in the entire law are meaningless and useless, rendering it almost impossible to hold those responsible for human rights violations to seek prompt and effective redress. While there is an attempt to put n safeguards", without the necessary verification mechanism, it is almost impossible to prosecute any erring law enforcement agent or military personnel under the Anti Terrorism Act.
Contreras-Garduno, Defining Beneficiaries of Collective Reparations: the Experience of the IACtHR, 4 Amsterdam Law Forum, 43 (2012). 100 Ibid. 101 Dissenting Opinion, J. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016, 807 SCRA 223, citing UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31,26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ Add.13. 1o2 Dissenting Opinion, J. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016, 807 SCRA 223, citing Jeremy Sarkin, Providing reparations in Uganda: Substantive recommendations for implementing reparations in the aftermath of the conflicts that occurred over the last few decades, 14 AHRLJ 526, 534-535 (2014) . 103 Dissenting Opinion, J. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016, 807 SCRA 223, citing UN General Assembly, Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1465, p. 85. t04 Ibid.
44 96. In fact, several rights are susceptible of being violated and restricted by the Anti-Terrorism Act without recourse. First, as discussed, the Anti-Terrorism Act leads to unwarranted deprivation of liberty as it permits the arrest of persons without need of judicial warrantJOS Second, designation is a potent means to unlawfully deprive property in the form of freeze orders on the bank accounts of suspected terroristsJ06 To make matters worse, the Anti-Terrorism Act includes a Safe Harbor provision in the implementation of this financial sanction.to7 Aside from designation, law enforcement agents and the military may also unduly invade the privacy of innocent persons, a right enshrined under the Constitution. lOB
97. The state's failure to provide an adequate remedy for potential violations renders the duty to respect the rights of the Filipino people "meaningless and illusory."to9
VI. THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL OR THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CANNOT VALIDLY CURE THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTI TERRORISM ACT BY ANY IMPLEMENTING RULE OR REGULATION.
98. The Executive Department or any of its agencies including the ATC, cannot correct or amend a law. While they have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a law - such authority cannot go beyond mere filling of gaps or details of the lawno or beyond determining existence of facts or state of things that trigger the enforcement of the law.111 They have no authority to alter or change or amend the law.
99. An implementing rule, as an issuance emanating from the executive branch, cannot repeal a law to ensure its compliance with the mandates of our Constitution. Simply put, no law can be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
1os Rep. Act No. 11479, § 25. 1o6 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 35. 101 Rep. Act No. 11479, § 38. 10s PHIL. CONST., Art. III, § 2. t09 Dissenting Opinion, J. Sereno, Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016, 807 SCRA 223, citing Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 61 (2015 ed.). no Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 124360 and 127867, 5 November 1997,281 SCRA 330. m Ibid.
45 implementation.n2 A flawed and unconstitutional law can, therefore, not be cured by any intended amendment or clarification by any implementing rules and regulations. The apparent and inherent unconstitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act is beyond cavil. No subsequent act of the Executive Branch can bring life to a law that patently contravenes the Constitution. The proper and remaining recourse is for this Honorable Court to fulfill its mandate to declare such law as null, void, and inoperative, and for the Legislature to enact a law that addresses terrorism by upholding, rather than defeating, the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the highest law of the land.
100. The power to enact, amend, or repeal laws in lodged exclusively in Congress.n3
101. Given the constitutional infirmities of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the only effective remedy is to declare the law unconstitutional and prevent its implementation.
Allegations in support of the Urgent Application for the Issuance of~ Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Status QH;Q Order
102. Petitioner respectfully repleads the allegations set forth above in support of its urgent application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") and/ or Writ of Preliminary Injunction ("WPI") and/ or a Status Quo Order.
103. In Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia Batangas Province, 114 this Honorable Court enumerated the requirements to the issuance of either a TRO, or a WPI, thus:
"A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. xxx
Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and
112 Ibid. 113 Purisima v. Lazatin, G.R. No. 210588, 29 November 2016, 811 SCRA 205. n 4 G. R. No. 183367, 14 March 2012, 668 SCRA 253.
46 irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard." ns
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that_ffi there exists ~ clear and unmistakable right to be protected; ill this right is directly threatened .Qy an act sought to be enjoined;.@} the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and ffi there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage."116
104. All these requisites are present in the case at bar.
A. THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT DIRECTLY THREATENS AND INVADES CLEAR, UNMISTAKABLE, MATERIAL, AND SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS PROTECTED BY NO LESS THAN THE CONSTITUTION.
105. As discussed in detail above, the enforcement and implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act renders it impossible not to violate rights guaranteed and protected by no less than the fundamental law of the land. The right of security and the right to be safe and protected from unreasonable acts from the State is essential in the conduct of every Filipino citizen's daily life. There can be no question that the invasion of such right, which is sought to be protected on this Petition, is material and substantial.
106. The Anti-Terrorism Act tramples upon the people's right to be free from fear117 and the supposed "safeguards" for abuses provided therein are meaningless and useless as they render it almost impossible to hold those responsible for human rights violations to seeks prompt and effective redress. The enforcement and implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act undoubtedly leads to an
us Ibid. at 261; emphasis and underscoring supplied. 116 Ibid. at 261; emphasis and underscoring supplied. 117 Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, 7 October 2008, 568 SCRA 1.
47 unwarranted deprivation of liberty, unlawful deprivation of property, and undue invasion of privacy of persons.
107. Thus, there exists a clear and legal right on the part of the PBA, whose members are law-abiding citizens and lawyers with the ultimate goal of protecting the Filipino people from the apparent, if not patent, invalidity and damaging consequences of the law.
108. The implementation of the law in its entirety is violative of due process and the Bill of Rights. It is clear legal and public right of the PBA and every citizen to safeguard and uphold the Constitution which embodies the guarantees of due process and the Bill of Rights.
109. To borrow. this Honorable Court's words in the recent case of People v. Sapla, 118 "[t]he Bill of rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of the rule of men dislodges the rule of law."
B. THERE IS AN URGENT AND PARAMOUNT NECESSITY FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT TO ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER, AS THERE IS NO OTHER ORDINARY, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY TO PREVENT THE IRREPARABLE AND GRAVE INJURY BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI TERRORISM ACT.
110. Considering that the Anti-Terrorism Act took effect last 22 July 2020, and the government has said that certain provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act are "self-executing" and now in force and in effect,n9 and may be implemented at any time without waiting for any implementing rule or regulation, 120 there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy that would prevent the irreparable and grave injury sought to be guarded against in the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act. us G.R. No. 244045, 16 June 2020, citing People v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 241254, 8 July 2019. 119 Torres-Tupas, Tetch, Inquirer.net, Anti-terror law takes effect this midnight, 17 July 2020, accessed at https:/ I newsinfo.inquirer.netl1308359 I anti-terror-law-takes-effect- midnight-of-july-18, (last accessed 14 August 2020). 12o Ibid.
48 111. With the immediate implementation of the Anti Terrorism Act citizens considered as suspects will suffer grave and irreparable damage and injury. Without a TRO, WPI and/ or a status quo order, a person who is a suspect or charged with Anti-Terrorism Act would be helpless since it would take time for a case to reach this Honorable Court. By the time this Honorable Court makes a ruling on the Constitutionality of the law, irreversible damage or injury would have already been inflected upon such person(s).
112. Only a TRO, WPI, and/ or a status quo order will be able to speedily and adequately prevent the unquantifiable injustice which will occur if the Anti-Terrorism Act is implemented notwithstanding its clear unconstitutionality.
113. In Filipino Metals Corp. v. Secretary of the DTJ,t2t this Honorable Court ruled:
"xxx Note, however, that a writ of preliminary injunction is issued merely to preserve the status quo ante.t Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. It is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be disposed of.
XXX
Obviously, ! law need not be declared unconstitutional first before ! preliminary injunction against its enforcement may be granted. Needless to stress, the moment ! law is nullified for being unconstitutional, it ceases to exist. Thus, ! writ of injunction would then become superfluous."t22
114. In Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank,t23 this Honorable Court explained that injunctive relief is "usually granted when it is made to appear that there is ! substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause
t21 G.R. No. 157498, 15 July 2005, 463 SCRA 616. 122 Ibid. 123 G.R. No. 159370, 3 October 2012, 682 SCRA 194; citing Avila v. Tapucar, G.R. No. L-45947, 27 August 1997, 200 SCRA 148, and Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96825, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 144.
49 irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case."t24
115. In the interest of justice, it is imperative that this Honorable Court enjoin Respondents and any and all of their agents and representatives, from enforcing or implementing in any manner the Anti-Terrorism Act, as this would cause irreparable and serious damage and injury to, as well as substantive rights and interest of, every Filipino citizen who may be suspected of being a terrorist under the law.
116. We respectfully submit that it is the Judiciary's duty to take a more proactive stance against any and all encroachments to the democratic freedoms of the Filipino citizens, especially in this instance where the unconstitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act is not only apparent but manifestly clear and unquestionable.
Closing Statement
Petitioner, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition of arguments and avoid wasting the precious time of this Honorable Court in the interest of orderly administration of justice, respectfully begs leave of this Honorable Court to incorporate herein by reference the relevant arguments raised in the other similar Petitions filed with this Honorable Court assailing the Anti-Terrorism Act.
The Anti-Terrorism Act belittles the freedoms guaranteed in our Constitution and deems these constitutional rights subordinate to the law. The said Act is cluttered with provisions which all contravene the constitutional guarantees and safeguards, deeming the whole law a pandora's box of constitutional infractions if and when implemented. As it stands, the guarantees of our Constitution are re-classified as the exception rather than the general rule.
There is no doubt that the implementation of the Anti Terrorism Act will cause irreversible damage and injury to citizens even before it reaches the scrutiny of the courts, especially in cases where information is not publicized such as the list of those designated as terrorists. The danger which the Anti-Terrorism Act imposes on all citizens is already present, existing, and persistent. The ATC and the law enforcers should immediately be restrained from implementing the Anti-Terrorism Act before they wreak havoc
124 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
50 on the lives of the Filipinos citizen. This Honorable Court must restore some sense of order in this society by declaring the Anti Terrorism --Act as unconstitutional because ---it is an excessive and unjustified exercise of police power.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Philippine Bar Association respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:
1. Upon the filing of this Petition, ISSUE AN APPROPRIATE RESTRAINING ORDER OR ORDER OF INJUNCTION OR A STATUS QUO ORDER to restrain the Respondents and any official or person acting in their behalf from implementing the Anti-Terrorism Act while this Petition is being heard;
2. SET this Petition for oral arguments;
3. After due hearing and considerations of the parties arguments and submissions, RENDER JUDGMENT:
a. GRANTING the Petition and ORDERING the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition commanding the Respondents to desist from implementing the Anti Terrorism Act;
b. MAKING the Restraining Order/Order of Injunction/Status Quo Order PERMANENT; and
c. DECLARING the Anti-Terrorism Act as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioner likewise prays for other reliefs deemed just and equitable under the premises.
Taguig for Manila, 7 September 2020.
51 Z,JR. C~oner Philippine Bar Association PTRNo. A-4764397; 01 / 04/2020; Taguig City IBP No. 102609; 01/ 06/ 2020; Isabela Roll No. 25483 MCLE Compliance No. VI-0004033; 11/ 16/ 2017 22nd Floor, ACCRA LAW Tower 2nd Avenue corner 30th Street, Crescent Park West Bonifacio Global City, 1635 Taguig, Metro Manila Telephone No. (632) 830-8000 Facsimile Nos. (632) 403-7007 and (632) 403-7009 [email protected]
REY Co-Counsel for Petitioner f/?}Jilippine Bar Association PTR No. A-4764416; 01 / 04/ 2020; Taguig City IBP No: 102624; 01/ 06/ 2020; Pampanga Roll No: 66654 MCLE Compliance No. VI-0002368; 05/ 16/ 17
....
Co-Counsel for Pet;ti)>fter Philippine Bar Association PTR No. A-4764'41.9; 01/ 04/ 2020; Taguig City IBP No. 102627; 01/06/ 2020; Makati City Roll No. 65804 I\:fCLE Compliance No. VI-0005333; 01/ 10/ 18
CHARL~~P.1 CHAVEZ Co-Counsel for PetiH;:rE~pine Bar Association PTR No. A-4764420; 01/04/ 2020; Taguig City IBP No: 102628; 01/ 06/ 2020; Makati City Roll No: 65817 MCLE Compliance No. VI- 0005768; 01/15/ 18
Verification/Certification Follows ...
52 Copy Furnished:
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA Executive Secretary Office of the President of the Philippines Malacafian Palace, Manila
HON. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON National Security Adviser NICA Compound, NIC Building 5 V. Luna Road comer East Avenue Quezon City
HON. TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR. Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs 11th Floor, DFA Home Office 2330 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City
HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA Secretary, Department of National Defense DND Building, Segundo Avenue Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo Quezon City
HON. EDUARDO M. ANO Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government DILG NAPOLCOM Center, EDSA corner Quezon Avenue Diliman Quezon City
HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ Secretary, Department of Finance DOF Building, BSP Complex, Roxas Boulevard Pasay City
HON. MENARDO I. GUEV ARRA Secretary, Department ofJustice Department of Justice, Padre Faura Street Ermita, Manila
HON. GREGORIO B. HONASAN, II Secretary, Department of Information and Communications Technology C.P. Garcia Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
53 HON. MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA Executive Director, Anti-Money Laundering Council 5th Floor, EDPC Building, BSP Complex Mabini corner Vito Cruz Street, Malate Manila
LT. GENERAL GILBERT GAPAY Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines AFP Headquarters, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City
GEN. CAMILO PANCRATIUS PASCUA CASCOLAN Chief, Philippine National Police PNP Headquarters, Camp Rafael Crame Cubao, Quezon City
EXPLANATION FOR SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL
In compliance with Section 5, Rule 13 of the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, counsel respectfully manifests that the foregoing PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A STATUS QUO ORDER will be served by registered mail, due to time and distance constraints and the limited number of office messengers, which render personal service impracticable.
54 ' (<
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
And
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER and/or WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or STATUS QUO ORDER
I, JOSE PERPETUO M. LOTILLA, Filipino, of legal age, with office address at Unit 347, Valero Plaza, 124 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that: 1. I am the President and the authorized representative of Petitioner Philippine Bar Association ("PBA").1
2. I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing Petition for Prohibition with Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Order ("Petition").
3. I have read the Petition, and the allegations therein are true and correct based on my personal knowledge and/or authentic documents.
4. The PBA has not heretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency.
5. Should I hereafter learn that other same or similar action, claim or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, the trial courts, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to promptly inform this Honorable Court, and the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) calendar days therefrom.
6. The PBA has been monitoring developments on the Anti- Terrorism Act of 2020 or Republic Act No. 11479 ("Anti-Terrorism Act").
7. To protect the people, including PBA members, from being in constant fear that their rights to life, liberty and security may
A copy of the Secretary's Certificate dated 8 September 2020 issued by Petitioner in favor of Jose Perpetuo M. Lotilla is attached to this Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping . be violated at any moment in the guise of State implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the members of the PBA, deem it proper to pray that the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act be enjoined.
8. First. The PBA, its members, and the Filipino people have rights which are protected by the Constitution. The PBA, its members, and the Filipino people have the right to life and liberty, and cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law.
9. The PBA, its members, and the Filipino people, in general, also have clear, unmistakable, legal and inviolable right over the security of their persons, and their implements, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.
10. Second. As can be seen from recent news articles, the interpretation of the Anti-Terrorism Act is already vague enough to allow government actions replete with violations of these constitutional rights.
a. Just recently, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP"), Lt. Gen. Gilbert Gapay, proposed that the regulation of social media be included in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Anti Terrorism Act. This was immediately addressed by Senate Minority Leader Franklin Drilon, as "illegal" and "unconstitutional", further stating that there is nothing in the law which allows law enforcers to regulate or control social media.
b. In a statement last 3 August 2020, President Rodrigo Duterte himself, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, dared medical workers and societies to stage a revolution against him as this will give him a free ticket to stage a counter-revolution. This characterization of the acts of medical professionals as an act of revolution raises more doubts on the characterization of the Executive Branch of acts constituting terrorism.
11. All of these are brought about by the broad definition of the term terrorism in the law itself. These doubts in the implementation of the law pose great danger to the rights protected under the Bill of Rights, thus causing material and substantial invasion of the right of the Filipino people to be free from fear. The Anti-Terrorism Act will only justify atrocities, until and unless the law is struck down.
2 12. Third. To allow the implementation of the law now despite its blatant vagueness and unconstitutionality would cause repeated and continuing injury that cannot be remedied by any form of pecuniary award as the damage directly relates to ones' life, liberty and security. One can never put a monetary price on a person's life, liberty or security. It thus produces hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement. Any form of damage or injury, should the law continue to be implemented, would be grave and irreparable.
13. Lastly, with the effectivity of the Jaw on 22 July 2020, the PBA, its members and the Filipino people are exposed to the continuing threat of violations under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
14. Thus, the PBA, its members and the Filipino people suffer in constant fear that their rights to life, liberty and security under the Bill of Rights will be violated.
15. This may be remedied only with the timely and speedy intervention of the Judiciary to allow the injunctive relief and enjoin the implementation and enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism Law.
~~~ - e)lSEJPERPETUO M. LOTILLA Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this q'tt\ day of September 2020 in 1~1t·~ City, with the affiant exhibiting to me the following:
Affiant Competent Evidence of Identity Type of 10 10 No. & Expiry Date JOSE (if applicable PERPETUO M. 1 LOTILLA 1 \\,\_\ ffn·\. ~O.S1~~ ~ t~\ \.lQ~ · \ 'i \)~ \"l>.u\ 1 2 ~\\~~ 0-W\\W N\r~-~: 1::8>\ ·\ ~:~-1.-1\l~\o)
3 "
__, ...... ,, ,,
Doc. No. qg ~~·~"~:~ .~FAYE...... ~~ l" '''' c 't ATTY. F~~CORDOVA :!2 ~ ••• ··.0 •• Notary Public for Taguig City Page No. _ 2.:...... 1 _ . ; ....._ •• •./f!.. I UutiJ December 31,2020 ,_....._.""' . .. •(?. '~,.. P'f R No. A-4764416; JanUATY 4, 2020 - Taguig Citj Book No. ___[ ,~-.: t )'' . ,. .,, ~l ''"'LIC ~o 1.. ;f/-: \:\ '' !'.JD :<:~ ffiP N I 02f' n. January 6, 2020 - Makati City Series of 2020. ~ ~: R0'; ' ~-:~ ·; '0'265 ;> ~ Appomunt:!.l · ·~e,unis~;on No. 74 (201 9-2020) I, * . LL I "·' · I •• , P_,,IJ No. 70265 I...... -\"• .. , ' ..:Jgan1Ab.: 1.1o Con.:.ep.. it•o Regal a & Cruz La'l't Offices 'j ....-? • • /''!'> , f' T/' "• .~-" 22/F ACCRALA W Tower f C'u. ••• ··f<.~,: 2nd Avt'nue com,.r 30th St., Crescent Park West, .,, )Icc····· ·· ·· · ·\\>~ : B..> rutac1o Global City, 163 5 Taguig, Metro Manila ''',,,,, ITY, ?..._'\\..... --- ' -- MGU: Coruplianc.e No. Vl-0005759; JdJluary 15, 2018
4 \PUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) .\•
• I fYOFPASIG ) S.S. " SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE
I, ATTY. IAN RAY P. MALILONG, Filipino, of legal age, being the Corporate Secretary of the PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC. ("PBA"), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with address at Suite 347, Valero Plaza Condominium, Salcedo Village, 124 Valero, Makati, 1227 Metro Manila, hereby certify that at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of PBA held on 07 September 2020, during which a quorum was present and acting throughout, the following Resolutions were duly approved:
"RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the Board authorize PBA to institute the necessary legal action/ s questioning Republic Act No. 11479 or the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2020;
"RESOLVED, further, that ATTY. JOSE PERPETUO M. LOTILLA be authorized to do all things necessary and proper to institute an action questioning Republic Act No. 11479 or the Anti Terrorism Law of 2020 with full and special power and authority to do and perform on behalf of PBA whatever act necessary to carry out the foregoing authority, including but not limited to, causing the preparation and filing of the appropriate pleadings, papers, or documents in any officer, court or agency, including appeals or original actions in higher courts, verifying the allegations therein, executing, signing and delivering affidavit/ s, certification/ s against forum shopping, and any all other papers and documents, and otherwise doing and performing all acts requisite and necessary under the premises which PBA could legally do and perform in order to protect its interest.
"RESOLVED FURTHER, that ATTY. JOSE PERPETUO M. LOTILLA is hereby named, constituted and appointed as Attorney in-Fact of PBA and as such to conclude and execute all documents required therefor with full and special power and authority to do and perform, among others, the following:
1. to prepare, execute and file the necessary petition;
2. to execute documents and do acts necessary to pursue the institution and litigation of the petition;
3. to amend the pleadings;
4. to undertake a reference of the case and/ or issues to a commissioner or panel of experts; , I ~
5. to agree on the schedule of the hearing dates; and
6. to do and agree on such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
"RESOLVED FURTHER that the Board authorize and grant ATTY. JOSE PERPETUO M. LOTILLA full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorney(s)-in-fact shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents."
I likewise hereby certify that the above resolutions have not been modified or revoked and are still in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand this 8 th day of September 2020 in Pasig City, Philippines.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 8th day of September 2020 in Pasig City, Philippines, affiant exhibiting to me the following:
Competent Evidence of Identity Community Tax Certificate AFFIANT ID Number Type ofiD Date/ and Expiry Number ·Place Date (if Issued applicable) 1 D.L. ID No. 02/19/22 N03-05- 396454
2 Unified IANRAYP. Multi- MALILONG Purpose ID No. CRN- 0111- 0424960-2
--- -
Doc. No . ..J--n; · Page No. I"! ; Book No. lJ- ; Series of 2020. l!iMis. {J!L~ Appointment No. 253 (20 19-2020) Notary Public for Pasig City Until December 31, 2(120 11 /F PSE Centc1, East Tower Exchange Road, Orrigas Center, Pasig City S.C. RoU of Attorney No. 73045 PTR No. 6439543/01.03.2020/Pasig IBP No. 089298/0 1.02.2020/Makati MCLE No. Exempt-Admitted to the Bar on 06.1 8.20 I 9 .., ORIGINAL
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) City ofTaguig ) S.S.
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I, TELESPORO S. BACULNA, with office address at the 22nd Floor ACCRALAW ·Tower, Second Avenue cor. 30th Street, Crescent Park West, Bonifacio Global City, 1635 Taguig, Metro Manila, after being duly sworn, depose and say:
That on 9 September 2020, I served copies of the PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A STATUS QUO ORDER in the case entitled "PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATiONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AS MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF('~ C 'T' ." T"!T"! T PT' C'T',TT"'"" · .y l ~yy -~- - -.- . - ... GAPAY and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL PC · .... . ,( , • • •. 'I'.-! 't ~ l .• : ' RE~·C!~~y Rc:CCJPT ~ .. . ( ~. !X ~-... . ., ' ~ PANCRATIUS PASCUA CASCOLAN" d . RE 298 1142 213ZZ - ··-·, Supreme Court, Manila, pursuant to Sectic Po~t JUi ll --.. IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIJIIIIIIIJIIIIJIIJ f Rules of Court as follows: Lett /Pat age No. a ·~ IH.lfl----'---'--"-r-__:.- , I • Post d on' 20 ----11-'--~ Bv Registered Mail to: P~es rv~· th i s redei ·to , re- case of i qui: ·' M:'_ KA~ ;·r· :o )'' . 1 2~1~'M·ft~ HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA ' ~ ...... ~ ' - . . Executive Secretary ·,·1 -- Office of the President of the Philippines ' 'RE'G·IS'l RE 2981142 200ZZ Malacafian Palace, Manila P~s~ - ffice _ .. Ill IIll II lllllllllllllllllllllllllll!l ~1-.-111 __ I HON. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON Post d .on · ~.t;t' ~~~o · ' National Security Adviser Pr~s rve lb~~;BrffQW:r~f.e of . quiry NICA Compound, NIC Building · 1200 MAKATI C[TI·PHILIPPINES 5 V. Luna Road corner East Avenue PostMa&te~Uer · · Quezon City -~ --- f R~:G1P "' ~~e .... 1.. ~ •• _ --: ~-• - :{
I RE 2981142 1911ZZ HON. TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR. Past ptttce . DIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIUU Ill !Rll '\ Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs . N'c,-; ' ' ; . 11th Floor, DFA Home Office Lette~Packa{Je s§t iO~O I ., 2330 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City
HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA · Postmasterfrell~r St!__£Yetary , Department of N ationa[ Defense ,.. DND Building, Segundo A venue Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo - ·~ RE 296 1142 187 ZZ Quezon City Post -. . ~ lll l l l lll ~ ll~lll l lllllllllll l!!ll~~ll~~!~ -- Letterj,ack~ge ,No. COUNTER - . " f, on - L9 SEP~.if I e this rec~ipf _for reference in case of in uiry - MAKATt CENT1WJ?p5TGf:RCE. . ' . 12W tW'fli"Ji~ . ' 1 ·.: :·- ~ -----~~------~~----~'~·~·--
.. Post, dlon . · %. ~EP a.oi'b ·.r' PreserJe ~his rece!bt r re erence ro~case of inr HON. EDUARDO M. ANO '- Secretary, Department ofInterior and Local Gave DILG NAPOLCOM Center, EDSA corner Quezon A venue Diliman Quezon City
HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ Post d' on 20 . Secretary, Department of Finance · Pr~ Ne tll.is redei~: fo·~~\t erase ot:i qui;y , ~ DOF Building, BSP Complex, ;. t _,: I . r ' , :· ~e e, :J1 . • · • Roxas Boulevard Pasay City 12QO ; ~'lf8ln;~?lNI:S . ' I '-.....-~- --. ·-~ ...... ' ~::- HON.MENARDOI.GUEVARRA _._ _,__,_ RE 296 642 166ZZ Secretary, Department ofJustice 1111 Ill II II \IIIII \Ill llI I 1111111 Ill II Ill Ill Department of Justice, Padre Faura Street ·· Post Office . . . . El= ~·..,..· ....,_.. r, ..: --&n-m1l:~ff ·Mh~~GEi'JA~ . . · Ermita, Manila . ' ' .' . ~. __ :. ...- -~- . .· ~ :·.~=~·-. -·: • RE 296 642 1 2 zz 1111 IIIII I .. ' . HON. GREGORIO B. HONASAN, II . ~!~! Of!~!- 'F:_. ~~ lll~~~JIIIII!I~IIIIII !!!!~-- Secretary, Department of Informatio . · .. _ - ~ ? = • , • Commumcations. . Technology ..• .' . r - --· -·RE 11 298 642 139 C.P. Garcia Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City p,..,. nu; A Ill 1/I/1111111111/IIIIJ/Illlllflillllllllll
HON. MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA Executive Director, Anti-Money Laundering Cou. 5th Floor, EDPC Building, BSP Complex Mabi Vito Cruz Street, Malate ,.' Manila - !_ ,. "*T" _..,;... - L-, , - I \
LT. GENERAL GILBERT GAPA Y ' . RE 298 642 125ZZ ., . ..:..__:___, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippin( -Pnst..citru:"'~~ ~~~!!J.!!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII/11111 ~ . 4 AFP Headquarters, Camp General Emilio A ;-! . .. " ' ,.._ · ' ' - NC£ C · Quezon City 1 • ' ,., __:, RE 298 542 111zz .· llll/1111111111111111111 111111111 IIIII Ill GEN. CAMILO PANCRATIUS PASCUA C :· . Letter/P c~age No. C_QUNT:i;R . · Chief, Philippine National Police . .: / Poste~ n ,_. 9 SEP·d PNP Headquarters, Camp Rafael Crame , Preserv this receipt for·referie · u-----1-.- . · . nee In case.of inq 1ry Cub ao, Quezon Ctty , , MAI(ATJ~POSTOFFICE .. · l®lfl~ll~RtiiUW~s · . _{
by depositing copies thereof of 9 September 2020 in the post office at Makati City in a sealed envelope plainly addressed to him, with postage fully prepaid, as evidenced by Registry Receipt Nos. ____, ____, ____, ____, ____, ____, ____, ____, ____, __ and __ attached hereto after the names of the addressee, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered.
'-.:.._
Affiant
2 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of September 2020 at Taguig City Philippines, affiant who is personally known to me, exhibiting to me the following:
Community Tax Certificate Competent Evidence of Identity Date/Place Number Type Details ! Issued SSSID No. 09-1332518-6 TELESPORO S. 9 March 2020/ 07560371 HDMF BACULNA Manila Transaction No.0003212338-08 Card - L_
"-"'' .... ~.. '\, __.. :--~FAYE;.\\'' Doc. No. /!J..O ; ···-··•• <--. AT"fll. CORDOVA -~\\ ~... .. \...... ~ t,~,, F~~. Page ~"<-- .•• ··.0 ,, Nota.')' Public for Taguig City No. ~ .... .· ·.:e, ,, Until De.·.-:rnber 31, 2020 Book No. ..][__; ...... :::.._· .. ~'--"' ' PTil No. A-·r6-~- ~ •. J , •v '' 2•;20 - Taguig City ;,.__! 1\lrJT•\ r_Jy rY '"'IC ~0 ~ ' I)}. , City Series of 2020. ; 1--- • ! 'H _, h,, , . \ . . t:'i l. • < i'. nw ~'"~·- ~llb.ri D()i I \JQ. 7 t. AI'P< • int 'l ~<.'": • · , , ~· · i 9-20L0) ~
3 ORIGI"ll\.L
DECLARATION
I, ENRIQUE F. NITURA, hereby declare that the PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A STATUS QUO ORDER submitted electronically in accordance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule is a complete and true copy of the PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A STATUS QUO ORDER.
______,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of September 2020 at Taguig City, affiant personally appeared before me and exhibiting to me the following:
Competent Evidence of Identity Mfiant ID Number and Expiry Date Type ofiD (if applicable) No. NOl-06-019119 ENRIQUE F. Drivers License Valid until 25 March 2023 NITURA IBP Roll No. 65804
'-''''"'"-\ ~~A' 'II IL 1 ----~~FAY£ c-'''' ATTY. FA~~~XORi)ovA --:\\~ ·····- ·····~.C '•t Notary Public for Taguig City Doc. No. /Q / ; ~~ •• •• ··~ #' Until December31, 2020 ~::..._· / \0 ~ PTR No. A-47M·P6; J:uw.ary 4, 2020- T~tguig City PageNo. 2~ ; fJ--.iNO' T ,\R'( D'JBLir ~ q ~ IBPNo.Jt:/.>':1' ' - · .-, :.7J ~'"-MakatiC i ty 1f ~~- : II' I ~ ,_ :"-'1.. AppolllllT '·Il. .· f. '.' .:!1';19-2020) Book No. ; ~ -;:! ROLL 1'40. 70265 :-:;; ~ Series of 2020. ~ ...... -\ ·. ... v, J.ngara A~:l,, '. . . ..:.. ( rud.aw Offices - I1 -.z:_ ••• •"./;!:'"" 2. " . '· . L.'I.'. I.Jwer t.. C'u_ •... ..·"\'<"'-' £ 2nd AvCJ ;:Ie .:-omer _;, ,-.n ~:1 , Cresa.ut Park West, tt ~-'CCi.;..:_:•r;,·; \\)~ .: Boui facio G!obal City, 1635 T'J g11ig, Metro Manila ''\, I r , ' ''---- MGLECompliam:cNo. Vl-O