Materialist Philosophy in Ancient India – Part II

Subrata Gouri ∗

The System been very old. It was declared by the itself to be eternal. Garbe and The Samkhya ideas were very old and their H.P. Sastri argue that it must have been influence quite extensive. It is believed before Buddha [2,3]. But it is doubtful to be as old as the , may be even how far the philosophy was preserved in older than them. The epic Mahabharata, its original form in the Samkhya- and the medical treatise -, the even in Samkhya karika. In the Samkhya- law-book and the mythological Sutra as Garbe rightly points out, ‘The , in so far as they touched upon Samkhya doctrine no longer appeared in philosophical topics at all, were as Garbe its original unadulterated form; for they says, ‘saturated with the doctrines of the (i.e., the ) seek to explain away the Samkhya’ [1]. Like Lokayata the original discrepancy between themselves on the one treatise of the Adi Samkhya is believed to be hand and the teachings of and lost. For example, a certain ancient treatise the Vedanta on the other.’ [4] The writers on the system called the Sasthitantra is be- of the later period made it an idealist lieved to have once existed. We have found philosophy. reference of this treatise in Isvarkrisna’s Samkhya Karika. But it is lost to us. But deeper study of the fragmentary Tradition attributed it to Kapila, but materials available on Samkhya and the made the case quite confounding by also at- information brought out from ‘Purvapak- tributing to him a wide range of conflicting sha’ by other schools of philosophy clearly myths. Nevertheless this system is often showed that originally it was a consistently termed as Kapila’s darsana. As I have materialist philosophy. already mentioned, the older version of it is We may begin with some idea of the phi- not available now. What we are concretely losophy. It not only rejected the left with are only two treatises claiming to (the consciousness), the only valid truth expound the Samkhya views. These are according to the Vedanta, but emphatically the Samkhya Karika and Samkhya Sutra. denied the existence of God. The method The former was attributed to a certain Is- of study was quite rationalistic. As the varkrishna who Garbe thinks probably lived karika said, the cause of the world was to around 500 AD. The latter was spuriously be inferred from the nature of the effect. Ac- attributed to Kapila himself, because the cordingly an effort was made to understand actual date of this work is considered to the nature of causality and make it the be somewhere around AD 1400. Yet the starting point of the philosophy. This view Samkhya as we have just said must have of causality was called the Satkarya-vada

∗ or Parinama-vada i.e., the doctrine that the The author is a member of the all-India Secretariat of Breakthrough Science Society and one of the Vice- effect was only a modification of the cause. Presidents of the West Bengal Chapter. What was found in the effect was contained

12 Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 Series Article in the cause. Such a view of causality was tence had been inferred. In the Samkhya argued evidently on the basis of everyday view everything in the material world was observations. If the effect was something an unstable composition of three kinds of entirely new and not what was already substances or reals, technically called the contained in the cause, then anything could gunas, though in the composition of the be produced from anything—e.g., the Sali different objects of the world, one or other crop could be produced from the Vrihi- of the gunas predominated. These three seeds and the Vrihi-crops from the Sali- were called (1) Sattva, exhibiting qualities seeds. But since the Sali seeds can produce of lightness, illumination and joy, (2) rajas, only the Sali crops it had to be admitted exhibiting qualities of movement, excitation that these were already contained in the and pain and (3) , exhibiting qualities Sali seeds. Besides if the effect was really of heaviness, obstruction and sloth. The non-existent before being produced, then primeval matter was accordingly conceived it could never have arisen at all, for how as composed of these three constituents. could the non-existent ever come to being? This conception of three gunas may not Of course, as pre-existing in the cause, the definitely conform to our modern ideas. effect was only potential, nevertheless the This much is certain, however, that as two were essentially the same in the sense constituents of primeval matter these were of being the implicit and explicit states of essentially material. Sattva was that aspect the same thing. of the primeval matter which contained It followed therefore that the essential the potential for intelligence, rajas for en- character of the effect contained the clue ergy and tamas for mass or inertia. In to the essential character of the cause. the state of the Prakriti, these What then was the essential character of formed a stable equilibrium. A loss of the world, whose cause was sought to be this equilibrium was somehow conceived as established? Since, argued the Samkhya the starting point of the evolution of the philosophers, the world was essentially ma- world from the avyakta; but it is not quite terial, its cause too must have been so. The clear how exactly the cause of this loss of cause thus inferred was called Prakriti or equilibrium was conceived. As a result of , the primeval matter. It was not disturbance of this condition of equilibrium matter in its gross or explicit forms, i.e., the material universe is evolved. We had, the form in which the world was perceived. at any rate, in the Samkhya a systematic But it was matter in its subtle and potential effort to understand this process of evo- form which, because of its subtlety, could lution. ‘This system’, says the eminent not be directly perceived, but the essential 18th century scholar Brajendra Seal, materiality of which was clearly inferred. ‘possesses a unique interest in the history The Samkhya terminology for this primeval of thought as embodying the earliest clear matter in its original state, i.e., in the and comprehensive account of the process state prior to its being evolved into the of cosmic evolution.’ [5] visible material world, was avyakta or the In the Samkhya terminology the process un-manifest, conceived as formless and of evolution was as follows: From the undifferentiated, limitless and ubiquitous. disturbed equilibrium of the avyakta first How was the composition of this primeval arose the mahat or buddhi. Mahat meant matter to be understood? The Samkhya the great, buddhi, the intelligence. From answer was that it was to be understood that, the mahatahamkara—the sense of exactly in the manner in which its exis- the ego. From arose (1) the

Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 13 Series Article manas or mind, (2) the five jnanendriyas ous potential for a materialistic philosophy. or sense organs, (3) the five karmendriyas It was no wonder therefore that Samkara, or motor-organs, and (4) the five one of the main proponents of idealism in or subtle elements which, in the Samkhya our country, persistently characterized it view, were conceived as ultimately giving as but achetankarana-vada, the doctrine rise to the five well known gross elements of unconscious first cause; and looked or mahabhutas, namely earth, water, fire, upon it as his main philosophical rival, the air, and akasa or the empty space. pradhana-malla. The detailed description of the process of At the same time, there is a difficulty evolution had created some confusion and related to this philosophy. At least from the controversies. It appears to be particularly Samkhya-karika onwards, the philosophy odd that ahamkara, ordinarily understood admitted over and above the Prakriti, a mul- as the ego-consciousness, should be given tiplicity or what were called the purusas, such a position in this scheme of evolution. generally understood as the souls. This One naturally feels like asking, did it ac- made it vulnerable to easy criticism, i.e., tually mean the same thing in the original here lies a scope for slipping to idealism. Samkhya as it does today? Some of the But a critical study of the earlier version modern scholars give us the impression of of this philosophy shows that this concept quietly accepting the entire scheme without was incorporated at a later period. Not raising any question about the details; oth- only that the concept of Purusas, as it ers discover in the details outstanding con- is understood today clearly shows that its tributions to scientific thought. Whatever role is secondary, i.e., apradhana. The may be the decisive importance of Samkhya main (i.e., pradhana) cause is Prakriti. So was the conception of matter in eternal mo- the -Sutra understood Samkhya as tion. Upholding the materialist explanation pradhana-vada or as pradhana-karan-vada of evolution by Samkhya, the famous Rus- i.e., the doctrine of the principal matter sian Indologist Stcherbatsky said, “the idea being the first cause. Many writers believe of an eternal Matter which is never at rest, that the concept of Purusas was not present always evolving from one form to another, is in the ancient version of Samkhya. As a very strong point of the system and it does Prof. Dasgupta pointed out the concept credit to the philosophers of that school, of Samkhya present in Charaka-Samhita that they at so early a date in the history represents the older version, which tells of human thought so clearly formulated an that the Purusas were originated from the idea of eternal Matter which is never at prakriti itself i.e., the conscious matter rest.” [6] “This Matter”, says Stcherbarsky, originated from the unconscious matter. [7] “embraces not only the human body, but Lastly, let us see how did idealists view all our mental state as well, they are given Samkhya. There is no doubt that the a materialistic origin and essence.” [6] The earliest of our idealists viewed the Samkhya Samkhya also made sattva or the intelli- as being the strongest of their philosophical gence potential as one of the constituents rivals and they did this clearly because they of the prakriti and conceived buddhi, manas were apprehensive of its materialist impli- and the ahamkara as the products of this cations. The first systematic expression of primeval matter. Here we have found a this was made in the Brahma-sutras. No concept, which makes matter primary and less than sixty aphorisms in it were clearly spirit secondary. Understood from this designed to refute the Samkhya, whereas point of view, the Samkhya contained seri- forty three in all were directed against the

14 Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 Series Article other rival philosophies. After elaborately The Nyaya-Vaisesika refuting the Samkhya doctrine, the au- thor claimed that therefore all other rival From their earliest phases, the Nyaya and theories were virtually refuted. Shankara Vaisesika systems were closely related and explained it thus: ‘that by the conquest in course of time the two were actually of the most dangerous adversary (Prad- amalgamated. Hence the two are usually hanamalla, literally, the chief opposing treated under the joint name of Nyaya- wrestler) the conquest of the minor enemies Vaisesika. is already virtually accomplished.’ But The source books of these systems, viz. why did the Brahma-sutra look upon the the Nyaya-Sutra and the Vaisesika-Sutra Samkhya as the most important challenge were attributed to Gotama (Goutama) and to the Vedanta? The answer is clear. It respectively. Nothing historical is understood the Samkhya as Pradhan-vada known of either and the periods of writing or pradhana-karan-vada, i.e., the doctrine of these Sutras are conjectural. Accord- of the primeval matter being the first cause, ing to the Indologist Jacobi, these could while the Vedanta was brahma-vada or have been redacted between 200 A.D. and brahma-karan-vada i.e., the doctrine of 400 A.D. But unlike the Samkhya and Brahman, as something essentially con- Mimamsa, the actual origin of these two scious, being the first cause. It was thus, philosophies need not be traced to any above all, a controversy between acetana- great antiquity, for there is no tradition karan-vada and Cetan-karan-vada i.e., be- like that. On the contrary, the distinctive tween the doctrine of the first cause being features of these two systems were quite the unconscious matter and the doctrine new in the Indian philosophical tradition of the first cause being the unconscious and presumably both took shape sometime matter and the doctrine of the first cause around 300 or 200 B.C. being spirit or consciousness. That was The system starts with the postulate that why, after explaining in the first four su- all knowledge by its very nature points to tras certain fundamental points about the an object beyond it and independent of nature of the Brahman and that of the it. In defence of this position the Nyaya- Vedanta texts, the author of the Brahma- Vaisesikas, beginning with Gotama, had to sutra immediately hastened to explain in wage a relentless war against philosophical course of the next seven sutras that this idealism. Moreover, since, the idealist’s Brahman was a principle of consciousness position amounted to the assertion that or an intelligent principle and as such all knowledge—or at any rate, all empir- was to be clearly distinguished from the ical knowledge—was inherently false, the pradhana of the Samkhya, which, being Nyaya-Vaisesikas, along with the Mimam- unconscious or material, could not be the sakas had to take a determined stand cause of the world. against this position. Already, the Nyaya- Judging from the evidences cited above Sutra refuted the view that valid knowl- can there be any doubt of the materialist edge (prama) was an impossibility and the leaning of the older version of Samkhya? later exponents of the system took up the However, under the influence of the Vedan- task of building up a positive theory of tic Philosophy, the Vedantic commentators validity and invalidity of knowledge. They of the Samkhya like Goudapada and Vacas- developed the theory of extrinsic validity pati Misra had tried to make it spiritualistic and extrinsic invalidity (paratahpramanya in the later period. and paratahapramanya). According to this,

Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 15 Series Article knowledge by itself is neither true or false; modern scientific idea of practice being the both its validity and invalidity depend upon criterion of truth. and are determined by conditions different With their fundamental postulate of the from those that produced the knowledge essentially objective and real existence of itself. Thus, a knowledge became valid not the world, the Nyaya-Vaisesikas proceeded because of the conditions that produced the to develop a rational explanation of it. This knowledge itself, but because of the addi- led them to their theory of padarthas.A tional condition called ‘excellence’ or gunas. padartha was defined as a knowable or Similarly, it could be invalid because of the valid and cognizable thing. The scheme additional condition called defect or dosha. of the padarthas thus represented an ef- How far these positions could be main- fort to arrive at a satisfactory classifica- tained with regard to all forms of knowledge tion of all knowable and namable things. was of course a different question. With Kanada himself mentioned six padarthas regard to the knowledge derived from verbal or broad categories under which everything testimony the position was quiet clear, known could be classified. These were (1) because the validity of such a knowledge substance (dravya), (2) quality (guna), (3) could be dependent upon the additional activity (karma), (4) universal (samanya), factor called the trustworthiness of such (5) particularity (visesa), (6) the relation of a person. But that the same was not so inherence (samavaya). Later the Nyaya- obviously true with regard to the perceptual Vaisesikas, however, added a seventh to and inferential knowledge could not be so this list and called it , or non- easily pointed out. In spite of this difficulty, existence. however, there is no doubt that the Nyaya- Of these the most important was sub- Vaisesikas developed a really revolutionary stance or dravya. Substances were con- theory with regard to the question of the ceived as nine in number, viz. (1) earth assertion, i.e., the criterion of determining (prithvi), (2) water (ap), (3) fire (teja), (4) the truth or falsity of a knowledge. air (vayu), (5) sky (akasa), (6) time (kala), How was one to get knowledge? How was (7) space (dik), (8) self (), (9) mind one to know that a particular knowledge (manas). The first five were called bhutas, was true or false? What was the test of i.e., substances having some specific qual- the truth? The Nyaya-Vaisesikas answered ity that could be perceived by one or other that there was only one such test and of the external senses. These sensory that was practice. A knowledge could be qualities were odour, flavour, colour, touch ascertained to be true or false only after and sound. It was further maintained putting it to the test of practical life. If in that of these qualities the earth possessed practice it led to a successful result, it was the first four, water the second, third and to be accepted as true. If, on the other fourth; fire the third and fourth; air the hand, it failed to lead a practical success, fourth only; akasa only the fifth. But the it was to be discarded as false. Thus, first four of these bhutas differed from the e.g., the knowledge of water in a mirage fifth in an important respect. We may was false because it could not lead one to understand this better if we begin with the quench thirst; the knowledge of water in a conception of akasa. It was arrived at by pool was true because it could actually lead trying to solve the problem of sound. Sound to the quenching of thirst. This was one is neither a substance nor an action. As of the most significant ideas developed in such it was a quality. But if it was a our philosophy and it closely resembled the quality, it had to be the quality of some

16 Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 Series Article substance. This substance was akasa. It rooms for their alternate conjunctions and was partless and all pervasive. But the first disjunctions. The atoms variously heavy, four bhutas i.e., earth etc., were conceived and afloat in empty space, impinge on in two varieties, called eternal and non- each other. There arises thus a wider and eternal. By the eternal variety of earth wider expanding movement throughout the etc. was meant their atoms while by the general mass and in consequence of this non-eternal variety the products of these movement, there takes place the various atoms. Thus in the Nyaya-Vaisesika view all complexions, like shaped atoms grouping the atoms were not homogenous in quality: themselves with like shaped. These com- the earth atoms were qualitatively different plexions, however, by very nature, always from water atom, etc., the water atom from resolve themselves again; and hence the earth atoms, etc., and so on. transitoriness of worldly things. But this Thus the Nyaya-Vaisesikas believed in explanation of the formation of the world the theory of atomism. Concretely, the explains in effect nothing: it exhibits only conception was as follows. The mote in the quite abstract idea of an infinite causal the sunbeam, i.e., the smallest among the series, but no sufficient ground for all the perceptible-sized particles was called the phenomena of becoming and mutation. As tryanuka, i.e., the triad. It was so called be- the last ground there remained only abso- cause it was conceived to be made of three lute predestination or necessity (ananke), parts, each of which was called a dvanuka which is in contrast to the final causes of or dyad. The dvanuka were conceived as Anexagoras, who is said to have named it two and each of these called a paramanu tyche, chance. or atom. But a dvanuka itself was not It is true that this conception of ananke perceptible; therefore its component parts, had a mythological pre-history. In the i.e., the paramanus, were not conceived as system of Democritus, however, ‘The idea made of parts. of ananke has shaken off its mythical Somehow or other, the Nyaya-Vaisesikas associations and became an abstract idea understood the production of an effect only like the modern scientific concept of natural in terms of the combination of parts. There- law.’ [8] fore, the paramanus which were not made The atomism of Democritus led him to a of parts could not be produced. Again, only deterministic view of the universe in which things that were produced were conceived there was no place for the God or the to have an end. But the paramanus, which Creator or Destroyer. He had completely were not produced, did not have any end. relied upon the combination of atoms for In short, the atoms were eternal, i.e., both production of everything. The Nyaya- beginningless and endless. Vaisesika atomism, however developed in a Here, we should mention the differ- somewhat opposite direction. ence between the atomism of the Nyaya- The fatal weakness of the Nyaya- Vaisesikas and that of Democritus. The Vaisesika atomism was its failure to con- most serious of this was connected with the ceive the atoms as either anti-dynamic or movement of the atoms. What was reason being moved by the natural laws. Although for the atoms to take on the multiform Kanada himself did not mention God, and combinations and produce the wealth of the in all presumption he was an atheist, organic and the inorganic worlds? Dem- the later philosophers of the system not ocritus finds it in the nature of the atoms only believed in god, but even became the themselves, to which the vacuum affords foremost advocates of the proofs for his

Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 17 Series Article existence. Why did atomism fall to this to alter this process of development. So he peculiar fate in this philosophy? Due to had tried to take refuge in the class-less the inherent weakness mentioned above society. But it was not possible to create it suffered this setback. The production such a situation in the then existing soci- of the composite objects was conceived as ety. So he developed the Sanghas on the essentially a matter of joining; then there basis of the principles of classless society. must be a joiner. This was how God came He asked people to take the prabbajja and into the system to fill up the gap of the upasampada ordinations, i.e., to ‘go out’ of atomistic hypothesis. the actual society and ‘to arrive at’ the life of the sanghas, or the order of the monks. For Buddhism within the sanghas, things were different. Modelled consciously on the recollections Buddha himself saw all the miseries of his of tribal society—without private property time, which was the result of the trans- and with full equality among the brethren— formation of pre-class society into class- these alone could offer the real scope to society. But what was to be done? He practice the ‘simple moral grandeur or the was too realistic to believe in God, prayers ancient gentile society’, [10] for which Bud- and sacrifices which could not, he knew, dha was really pleading. Thus the sanghas, bring any effective remedy to the miseries as classless societies within the bosom of he saw all around. He did not ask the class-society, could become the heart of people to pray and sacrifice. He asked a heartless world, the spirit of a spiritless his disciples to turn away from ‘opinions situation. concerning the beginning and hereafter of In search of the cause of the suffering, things.’ [9] For it was no use behaving early Buddhism started with a general like a fool who, with an arrow plunged theory of natural causation, known as the into his flank, wasted time speculating doctrine of Pratitya-samutpada. It meant, on the origin, maker etc., of the arrow ‘that being present, this becomes’, from instead pulling it off outright. Therefore, the arising of that, this arises. Physical when asked metaphysical questions that he corollaries of real importance were drawn considered being unprofitable, he simply in early Buddhism from this doctrine of remained silent. In short, the problem pratitya-samutpada. These were the doc- that oppressed him most was essentially a trines of universal impermanence and of practical one. It was the bewildering mass the denial of the soul as a substance. The of sufferings he saw around. And he wanted exact reason with which these corollaries to have an essentially practical solution for were drawn from the doctrine of pratitya- this. But how, under the condition in which samutpada is not quite clear. But it is clear he lived, such a solution could at all be the doctrines of universal impermanence evolved? and of the denial of the permanent soul There was no question, of course, of were somehow or other connected in early really removing the real miseries from this Buddhism with the doctrine of pratitya- world. That meant skipping over stages samutpada and there is no doubt that of historical development. This is because these doctrines were of real philosophical the transformation from pre-class society significance. to class society, which resulted in miseries Both these doctrines arose as reactions and blood-shed, was a natural historical against the Upanishadic thought according process. It was not possible for anybody to which the soul was a pure substance

18 Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 Series Article that transcended all changes. This soul of everything having its being only in an being the ultimate reality, all the concrete eternal flux was by far the most significant mental states were after all unreal. With contribution of early Buddhism and it is not early Buddhism it was just the reverse. The a little surprising to note that precisely the transient sensations and thoughts, along same view, along with the same illustration with the physical frame with which these of the fire, was proclaimed about a couple were associated, are real and the idea of of generations later by Heraclitus in ancient any soul over and above these was just Greece, and further, is being reinstated, a superstition. The personality was thus though of course with an incomparably viewed as just an aggregate (samghata) of richer content, by modern science. the mental states and the body. What Heraclitus or early Greek Philoso- ‘The aggregate is sometimes described phy did was also done by the Buddhists or as nama-rupa, utilizing an old Upanisadic early Indian Philosophy. It was all the more phrase, though its meaning is here very significant that this conception of change much modified. By the first term nama, of becoming was presumably arrived at by is meant not ‘name’ as in the upanisads, synthesis of the conceptions of being and but the physical factors constituting the non-being. ‘This world’, said the Buddha, aggregate, and by the second, rupa, the ‘generally proceeds on a duality, of the ‘it physical body so that the compound signi- is’ and ‘it is not’. [11] We had here perhaps fies the psycho-physical organism and may the first instance of dialectical thinking in be taken as roughly equivalent to ‘mind and Indian Philosophy. body’. That is, Buddha took as the reality the very things that were explained away as Later Schools of Buddhism not ultimate in the Upanishad and denied the substratum which alone according to The later schools of Buddhism, however, them is truly real. reflected an extravagant world-denying ide- A more detailed description of the per- alist outlook that proved inimical to science sonality in early Buddhism was that it con- and sympathetic only to sundry supersti- sisted of five skandhas or factors, vizrupa, tions. In the context of Buddha’s own vijnana, vedana, sainjna and samaskaras, opinion against metaphysical speculations of which the rupaskandha meant the phys- and his pronounced atheism, this line of ical the other skandhas being psychical. subsequent development of the Buddhist Material things, too, like the self, were philosophy may appear somewhat strange. considered as just aggregates of the quality However the clue to it is to be found in perceived, and according to early Bud- the withdrawal of the philosophical-monks dhism, none of the aggregates could persist from the labour of production. Subsisting even in two successive moments. wholly on the gifts of the merchants and ‘Two symbols are generally used to illus- kings, they were of course relieved of the trate this conception—the stream of water worries of their own material existence. and ‘the self producing and self consuming’ This created conditions for a kind of flame. It will be seen thus that everyone of philosophical specialization—the possibil- our so called things is only a series (vithi)—a ity of being exclusively concerned with succession of similar things or happenings, learning and thinking, the discourse and and the notions of fixity which we have of debate—the conditions, in short for raising them is wholly fictitious’. Indian philosophy to a new level of devel- Philosophically speaking, this conception opment. This explains the positive aspects

Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 19 Series Article of their contribution to philosophy. At the However, some kind of resistance to the same time, their exclusive concern for the- codes of conduct was not long to grow ory or mental labour—i.e., their aloofness among the monks. We hear that after from material or manual labour—deprived about a century a Second Council had them of a living contact with the world and to be convened at Vaisali specifically to the spirit of interrogating nature to gain consider the question. A large number a better insight into natural laws. This of monks regarded some of the orthodox gradually led to the development of a sense codes of conduct to be no more useful and of delusional omnipotence of thought itself, demanded their relaxation. This happened so much so, that it came to be believed due to the impact of the society which was that thought dictated terms to reality and built on the basis of the private property. as such was the only reality. The physical Although Buddha had tried to build up world, consequently, became only a phan- his Sanghas in seclusion and in strict tom of imagination, dream or a fabrication pursuance of the ethics of classless society, of ignorance. In short, the development of the situation had gradually changed after idealism among the later Buddhists was no his death. However, the Second Council more a mystery than the birth of idealism. decided against any such relaxation as was Outside Buddhism among the Upan- demanded by a section of monks. But ishadic or Vedantic philosophers, basically these monks refused to surrender. So the same process of development took place they were thrown out or expelled. These and they were led to evolve substantially monks convened a separate Council of their the same idealistic outlook. As such, there own, in which ten thousand were said to is little to wonder at the free exchange of have congregated. ‘Indeed, it was a great philosophical ideas between the Vedantists congregation of monks (maha-samgiti) from and the later Buddhists, notwithstanding which they were called the Mahasanghikas, all their mutual religious animosities. as distinguished from the orthodox monks, With this background in mind, we may the Thera-vadins (Sthavira-vadins). now turn to the history of later schools The Mahasamghikas modified the rules of of the Buddhist philosophy. It is perhaps conduct, redrafted the canonical literature best introduced with the story of Buddhist and introduced certain ideological inno- councils. Immediately after the death of vations into the Buddhistic standpoints. Buddha, a council of the Buddhist monks Two of these innovations deserve special was convened at Rajagriha to draw out mention. First, the Mahasamghikas orig- the canonical texts and creed in its purity. inated the theory of Lokattara Buddha. This was the First Council and it main The Buddha was no longer conceived as achievement was to settle the and ordinary human being, who, moved by the the Vinaya. There was as yet no mention of miseries of his fellow beings, preached the Abhidharma. This is significant, for the Ab- doctrine of the cessation of sufferings; he hidharma mainly embodies the metaphys- was viewed as a supernatural or super ical speculations of the later Buddhists, mundane being, a veritable deity. This while the Dharma and particularly Vinaya theory was developed further by the later were chiefly concerned with the codes of Mahayana Buddhists in whose view the conduct. Apparently the monks at the First Buddha became virtually the god receiving Council were still too close to the Master a highly ceremonial form of worship from to have drifted far away from his original the devotees. We have moreover faint emphasis. glimpses of some metaphysical assertions

20 Breakthrough, Vol.18, No. 2, November 2015 Series Article of the Mahasamghikas that may be taken 3. Sastri, H P, Bauddha Dharma (Bengali), 37. as foreshadowing the idealistic philosophy 4. Garbe R, Samkhya Pravacana Bhasya, Har- of later Mahayana. vard Oriental Series, 1895 Pref. xi. Thus a philosophy, which was started 5. Seal B N, Positive Sciences of the Ancient with a strong atheist stand transformed it- , , 1958, 2. self into an idealist one. And it was an irony 6. Stcherbatsky T, Buddhist Philosophy, I, 18. that a philosophy which was developed by opposing Upanisadic tradition, gave shelter 7. Dasgupta S N, A History of Indian Philoso- to that very Upanisadic idealism. phy, I, 218. 8. Thomson G, Studies in Ancient Greek Soci- References ety, ii, 311. 1. Garbe R, Aniruddha’s Commentary on the 9. Chottopadhyay DP, Indian Philosophy, A original parts of vedantic Mahadeba’s Com- Popular Introduction, Calcutta, 126. mentary on the Samkhya Sutras, Calcutta, 10. Engels F, The Origin of Family etc, 163. 1892, Intro, xxi 11. Hiriyanna M, Outlines of Indian Philosophy. 2. Garbe R, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, xi, 189.

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