ISP-Myanmar Briefing Paper

February 2019

Security Integration Efforts in Myanmar (1945-2010): A Historical Overview

By John Buchanan

Key Points: l The issues related to security reintegration are not new to Myan- mar. A review of Myanmar’s post-World War II history shows that the country has experienced a broad range of processes related to security reintegration. Among these are demobilization, surrender and disarmament by armed groups; reform of state security forces; and the integration of former combatants into state security organizations. In some instances, these activities took place without incident. Other such moves have however produced tensions that led to armed violence. l Current discussion of security reintegration primarily focuses on ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the Tatmadaw. A review of Myanmar history shows that a conception of security that addresses the concerns of the population is an important component of effective security reintegration. In several cases, the lack of adequate protection for communities has led to the emergence of militarized conflict. Consequently, reforms that strengthen the ability of judicial and administrative systems to hold armed groups and other actors accountable for abuses of the population are useful steps towards preventing a resumption of armed conflicts. l The Tatmadaw’s militia system has expanded from its initial function as a component of Myanmar’s national security strategy and now serves as a means for integrating EAOs into the state security system. In some cases the transformation of EAOs into ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper Tatmadaw-allied militias has encountered problems that include February 2019 the refusal by soldiers to participate and armed conflicts. These outcomes raise concerns about the challenges faced in trans- forming EAOs into Tatmadaw-allied militias.

Section One: Introduction Security reintegration poses a challenge for ending armed conflicts in Myanmar. One premise for security reintegration is that a durable settlement to armed conflicts requires a system for security provision that addresses the needs of a diverse society. A consensus among various actors for security reintegration has however yet to emerge. A review of Myanmar's history shows that state security actors and armed resistance organizations (both ethnic nationalists and Bamar dominated groups) engaged in an array of changes that date back to the post-World War II period. Paramilitary units have both demobilized and integrated into the Tatmadaw. Members of armed resistance organizations have surrendered, disarmed and engaged in ceasefire arrangements that in some cases led to their transformation into Tatmadaw-allied mili- [S]tate security actors and armed resistance tias. These steps did not succeed in putting an end to militarized con- organizations (both flicts. In some cases, these processes have led to further armed con- ethnic nationalists and flicts. While these earlier instances are often not considered security Bamar dominated groups) engaged in an reintegration, they have involved changes for state security actors array of changes that and armed resistance organizations that could provide insight for date back to the post- current discussions. World War II period. Security reintegration has become a contentious issue in Myan- mar's peace process and reflects the different views held by actors about what this entails. While security reintegration is one objective of Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) (2015), the text does not clearly define the term.1 In the absence of a clear defi- nition, discussions of security reintegration often involve its separa- tion into two different processes – security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The Tatmad- aw has pushed for DDR, which affects ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), noting that the effectiveness of state security forces means that SSR – which includes state security actors - can take place after DDR.2

1 There are three references to security reintegration in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement - Chapter 3, Article 6; Chapter 5, Article 20, Sections C and G. 2 Col. Zaw Win Myint. Presentation, Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong, 2016.

2 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper The concepts of SSR and DDR draw on practices and examples February 2019 from dozens of countries that have engaged in negotiated settle- ments to armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War period. The experience of SSR/DDR in a number of countries, including Colombia and Nepal, provides useful lessons for Myanmar. The application of insight from these cases for Myanmar may have limited utility be- cause Myanmar's armed conflicts exhibit features that differ from most – if not all – other countries. One, Myanmar's civil wars are exceptionally long. Since widespread fighting broke out in 1948, militarized violence has become an ongoing feature in Myanmar, which ranks among the longest-running civil wars of the post-World War II period. Two, Myanmar's civil wars have an unusually large number of armed actors. Depending on how one defines civil war or armed actors (both state and non-state), Myanmar's civil wars have involved several dozen armed groups opposed to the Tatmadaw and multiple state security actors.3 In addition to the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's other state security actors are the police and paramilitary organizations, a category that includes Tatmadaw-allied militias.4 Myanmar itself possesses an extensive history of security inte- [T]hese steps have led 5 to the re-emergence gration. During the period 1945 to 2010, armed groups – both state and or resumption of security forces and armed resistance organizations – have engaged armed conflicts. in demobilization, surrender, disarmament and integration into several state security organizations. These efforts have had mixed success. In some cases, these processes have taken place without incident. In other cases however these steps have led to the re-emergence and or resumption of armed conflicts. All too often this earlier experience is given little attention in both studies of SSR/DDR and current discussions in Myanmar. This discounting of past ceasefires and demobilization efforts, is in part a reflection of prevailing political sensi- tivities, which have resulted in the limited disclosure of the details of earlier agreements between EAOs and the Tatmadaw. Current discussions of security reintegration benefit from exam- ining this earlier under examined history. Understanding the limita- tions of what occurred in the past can inform the ongoing discussions

3 See Appendix III in Lintner (1999) for a list of rebel armies and other anti-government groups in Myanmar (1945-1999), which includes both EAOs and ideologically oriented armed groups. Note that other groups have emerged since its publication in 1999. 4 For an overview and history of militias in Myanmar see Buchanan (2016) Militias in Myanmar. 5 This briefing uses the term security integration to analyze earlier changes in Myanmar’s security environment, inclusive of institutions and organizations that impact both national and the physical security of its population.

3 of possible scenarios for security reintegration. Two of the overarch- ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper ing concerns raised in this briefing are that security reintegration if February 2019 neither attuned to Myanmar's political situation nor the dynamics produced by over seventy years of armed conflict, may not be suc- cessful and thus could create conditions for the outbreak of new cycles of armed violence. Historical analysis shows that previous efforts at security integration did not accompany the alleviation of grievances, which in turn produced further instability and armed conflicts. Following the premise that unless people learn the lessons of history, they are likely to repeat the same mistakes, this briefing traces the broad contours of security integration in Myanmar from 1945 to 2010, with the aim of providing insights useful for current discussions about security integration. This paper engages with the following questions: l What were Myanmar's earlier experiences with security integration? l What are some of the factors that account for the continued violence associated with security integration? l Can security reintegration succeed in the absence of judicial and [P]revious efforts at security integration did administrative reforms? not accompany the The data for this project comes from interviews with former alleviation of members of state security organizations, EAO members, participants grievances, in the peace process, researchers, members of civil society organizations, journalists and others. Archival and secondary sources in both English and Burmese have also been used.

Section Two: Historical Overview of Security Integration (1945-2010) A review of Myanmar's history (1945-2010) shows that members of state security forces and armed resistance organizations have engaged in numerous and varied processes of security integration dating back to the immediate post-World War II period. The section below highlights some of these efforts.

2.1 The Post-War Period (1945-1948) Security integration efforts date back to the immediate post- World War II period. After the Japanese surrender in May 1945, when independence from Britain was uncertain, Myanmar faced several pressing concerns about armed fighters who had been mobilized to defeat Japanese forces. During the post-war period (1945-1948),

4 security integration involved the establishment of the post-war Tat- ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper madaw, the demobilization of wartime resistance fighters, the for- February 2019 mation of paramilitaries and expansion of the police force. At the same time, the outbreak of armed conflicts presented the first glimpse of the civil wars, which would pose significant problems for security integration. The creation of the post-war Tatmadaw involved the integration of former resistance fighters from World War II. In September 1945, the foundations for the postwar Tatmadaw were set, when local political leaders and British officials met in Ceylon. The negotiations produced the Kandy Agreement – a blueprint for the postwar Tat- madaw – that established a two-winged army, featuring ethnically homogeneous units. Ethnic Burmans composed one wing of the new Tatmadaw. These units included newly recruited members as well veterans from the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF) (formerly the Bur- ma National Army), which Aung San commanded to fight the British and later the Japanese. Many former PBF members however refused to apply for entrance into the postwar army, while others were not accepted (Callahan, 2003, pp. 99-100). The other wing contained mainly non-Burman fighters, some of whom had served with the Al- The creation of the post-war Tatmadaw lied Forces during World War II (Tinker and Ashton, 1983, Vol. 1, p. involved the integration 456). of former resistance The establishment of a post-war police force also involved the fighters from World War II. formation of a new paramilitary force. The postwar civil police forces re-established by the British drew upon the structure of the late co- lonial period. The Burma Police Force consisted of both civilian police units for Rangoon and other areas along with a paramilitary force. In 1946, the force expanded with the addition of a new paramilitary unit of special police reserves. During this period, state security officials, politicians and local leaders formed other paramilitary organizations across the country. These organizations varied in their recruitment of members, size, military capabilities and the strength of their ties to the government. The People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) was set up in 1945 as a welfare organization for PBF veterans from World War II. Many PVO members retained arms from their service in the war and the organization functioned as a paramilitary group. It rapidly grew from a force of a few thousand men, to one with an estimated range from tens to hundreds of thousands in strength, with branches across Burma.6

6 There is a lack of consensus among scholars about the number of PVO members. Traeger (1966, p. 100) places the figure in the hundreds of thousands, but other sources (Tinker, 1959) have estimated its size as much smaller.

5 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper The PVO initially served as a political bargaining chip for Aung San, February 2019 the head of the organization, in his negotiations with the British government. If London failed to heed his calls for Burmese independence, Aung San could mobilize the PVO to press his demand through armed struggle. Across the country, local paramilitaries also began to spring up. Local leaders formed many of these units, and their membership also included former resistance fighters from World War II (Ba Thann Win, n.d.). The local militias formed in ethnic Karen communities are among the most significant to emerge in this period. Frank Traeger, (1966, p. 104), describes the KNDOs as “an ex-servicemen unit similar to the PVO, with weapons and ammunition left behind by the British forces.” After independence, these groups formed the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), the armed wing of the Karen National Union. Before independence, the political divisions and militarize violence that would later spread across the country began to surface. As early as November 1945, U Sein Da, a resistance leader in Arakan during the war, established the Arakan People’s Liberation Party Across the country, local paramilitaries also (APLP) and began recruiting soldiers and procuring weapons in Ara- began to spring up. kan Division. In 1946, Thakin Soe, formerly a senior member of the PBF, split from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and his faction of the party, known as the Red Flags, rebelled against the British and the “rightist” members of the Burmese political leadership. By the end of 1947, the APLP and the Mujahids – an armed resistance organization formed by ethnic Rohingyas – both launched armed up- risings in Arakan (Lintner, 1999; Smith 1999).

2.2 Early Independence Period (1948-1957) In the months that followed independence on January 4, 1948, a series of armed rebellions from various actors, including leftists, ethnic Karen and members of both the Tatmadaw and state-allied paramilitaries shook Myanmar. In response to the ongoing turmoil, the formation and reconstitution of paramilitary organizations by state security officials between 1948 and 1957, involved their disbandment and integration into other state security organizations. An early form of security integration. During the early days of the rebellions, local media referred to these armed resistance groups as the multicolored insurgents, be- cause of their different political goals. A faction of the Communist

6 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper Party of Burma (CPB), known as the White Flags which was led by February 2019 Thakin Than Tun, went underground in March 1948 to pursue armed struggle. Later, in 1956, a group of Shans split from the CPB to form the Shan State Communist Party (SSCP). Mutinies by ethnic-Burman Tatmadaw units that began in 1948 contributed to the growing rebellion. CPB members and sympathizers serving in the Tatmadaw made up the first wave of defections to the CPB. Soon after that, ethnic Karen and Kachin units of the Tatmadaw also joined in rebellion.7 By 1949, an estimated half of all Tatmadaw troops had muti- nied (Callahan, 2003, p. 114). In July 1948, a pro-communist faction of the PVOs, known as the White bands, also rebelled. After achieving its political goal of independence, political rifts within the PVO surfaced. Some units of other recently formed paramilitary groups – the Union Military Police (UMP) and Special Police Reserves – as well as Tatmadaw units also joined the White Band PVOs. The ethnic rebellions launched by the Mujahid and the APLP grew as other ethnic groups also took up arms against the government. In January 1949, the Karen rebellion began when ongoing inter-ethnic Some units of other recently formed violence involving Karen and Burman armed units spiraled into mili- paramilitary groups – tarized conflicts. The breakaway of ethnic Kachin units from the Tat- the Union Military madaw in February 1949 represents both a mutiny and the emer- Police (UMP) and Special Police Reserves gence of an EAO. Captain Naw Seng, the unit's commanding officer, – as well as Tatmadaw broke away and later formed the first – but short-lived – eth- units also joined the nic-Kachin EAO known as the Pawngyawng National Defense Force. White Band PVOs. In Karenni State, an ethnic rebellion broke out after U Bee Tu Re, a Karenni political leader, was killed by the Union Military Police in August 1948 (Kramer et al., 2018, p. 15. Smith, 1999, p. 112). Mem- bers of the Mon National Defense Organization – an ethnic Mon militia established in March 1948 – followed the KNDO into rebellion in early 1949. Unlike the other EAOs, the Pa-O uprising launched in 1949 was not against the central government. Instead, the Pa-O Na- tional Organization (PNO) targeted the local administration of tradi- tional ethnic Shan leaders in southern Shan State known as sawbwa. The formation of paramilitary forces that began in the post-World War II period continued. Security officials and politicians established

7 The mutiny by ethnic Karen units of the Tatmadaw in early 1949 prompted a dramatic shake-up in the leadership of the Tatmadaw. A Burman-led faction of the Tatmadaw leadership interned many of the remaining ethnic Karens serving in the Tatmadaw. General Ne Win replaced General Smith Dun, an ethnic Karen, as the Commander in Chief of the Tatmadaw.

7 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper organizations, such as the UMPs, Sitwundan and Pyusawhti which February 2019 operated in several states and divisions within Myanmar. In March 1948, the government formed the Union Military Police (UMP) for the suppression of dacoits and communist, which was under the Minis- try of Home Affairs. The UMP participated in military operations (sometimes with members of the civil police) against anti-state armed groups. But some members defected to rebel groups (Traeger, 1966, p. 102). The UMPs quickly grew so that by the time of the uprising by the White PVO and CPB in mid-1948, there were at least 16 combat battalions and in 1956 the force expanded again with the addition of four new battalions (DSHMA, 1997-1998, Vol. 4, pp. 41- 42). The levies were another paramilitary force formed by the government in April 1948 to assist the Tatmadaw and the police in addressing crime and insurgency. Eighteen levy battalions, sometimes referred to as emergency armed forces, operated in district-level cities and initially came under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In October 1948, the creation of another paramilitary organization known as Sitwundan in October 1948 entailed the transfer of levy The levies were another paramilitary forces into its ranks (DHSMA, 1997-1998 Vol. 4, p. 97). force formed by the In October 1948, Prime Minister U Nu established the Sitwundan government in April to assist in combating the growing rebellion. The unruly behavior of 1948 to assist the Tatmadaw and the this paramilitary organization posed problems for state security offi- police in addressing cials. The defection of over 1,200 Sitwundan members to communist crime and insurgency. and Karen forces led to the disbandment of units in nine districts in 1951(Callahan, 2003, p. 129). In January 1955, the Sitwundan became integrated into the Tatmadaw as a type of infantry force, known as the Burma Territorial Force (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 77; A Tatmadaw Researcher, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 203-204). In October 1955, the government introduced another paramilitary organization, known as Pyusawhti The program involved township, village and mobile units (Government of Burma, 1961, p. 43). The recruitment of the Pyusawhti involved armed groups led by local political bosses, who employed them as a basis for exercising authority (Callahan, 2003, p. 182; Tinker, 1967, p. 60). Their autonomy created difficulties for state security leaders who encountered problems in controlling the Pyusawhti. Smaller, locally-formed paramilitary units – sometimes referred to as village defense forces - were also widespread. Smith (1999, p. 478, Footnote 19) suggests that by 1949, "[v]irtually every village,

8 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper whether under insurgent or govt control, had its own defence units”. February 2019 The creation of these forces was a response to the deteriorating security situation. In some cases, their establishment also reflected political rivalries within the military-political leadership. Often the national leaders that authorized the formation of these groups encountered difficulties controlling them. Several of these paramilitary outfits became known as “pocket armies,” a reference to their loyal- ties to local political bosses – often allied to the ruling coalition of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) – and their heavy-handed treatment of the civilian population.

2.3 Centralization of Authority: 1958-1987 In the late 1950s the Tatmadaw continued its efforts to central- ize authority over both paramilitary and police forces. In 1958, a peace initiative launched by Prime Minister U Nu known as “Arms for Democracy” began to bear fruit. Estimates indicate that between 1958 and 1959, 5,500 armed insurgents, principally from the APLP, the PNO, the SSCP, the MPF, the White Flag CPB and the PVOs, took up the government’s offers of amnesty and returned to civilian life The surrenders suggested a possible (Ye Baw Thit Maung, 2011, pp. 170-175). Martin Smith (1999, pp. decline in armed 168-169) suggests that “many more simply returned home to their conflicts, but this did villages without first informing anyone”. not pan out. The surrenders suggested a possible decline in armed conflicts, but this did not pan out. In the late 1950s, a new wave of ethnic conflict broke out. In November 1959, the Shan uprising began when Bo Mawng, a commander of a UMP battalion led an attack on the northern Shan State town of Tangyan. In February 1961, the Kachin Inde- pendence Organization (KIO) followed suit launching an uprising of their own. At the same time, a number of figures from EAOs that had dis- solved as part of the “Arms for Democracy” scheme began to mobilize support for armed resistance. Nai Shwe Kyin, an MPF member who did not take part in the group's surrender, formed a new EAO – the New Mon State Party – the day after the MPF laid down arms. His force grew in strength with an influx of new members after the military coup in 1962 (Smith, 1999, p. 169). Mo Heng (also known as Kornzurng), a member of the SSCP who had surrendered as part of the Arms for Democracy initiative, again took up arms against the government (Ibid.). He briefly joined the Num Suk Harn, the first ethnic Shan EAO, before moving on to play a leading role in the formation of

9 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper first the Shan National United Front in 1961 and then the Shan State February 2019 Army (SSA) in 1964. In 1968, Mo Heng broke from the SSA to estab- lish the Shan United Revolutionary Army. By 1962, the PNO had also taken up arms again, but this time in opposition to the central government. The outbreak of the second wave of ethnic conflict coupled with the resumption of conflict by members of groups that had surrendered added to the continued armed resistance of Karen, Karenni and other EAOs. During this period, Tatmadaw officials also took steps to assert greater control over paramilitary organizations and police forces. Their approach involved the continuation of earlier practices such as the disbandment of units and their integration into other state security organizations that included the Tatmadaw, but also the introduction of a new, more centralized system of militias. In October 1958, the newly formed Ne Win led caretaker government, disbanded the Pyusawhti. The unruly behavior of some units had made the organization unpopular and as Martin Smith (1999, p. 175) describes several had become "quite indistinguishable from da- coit gangs." The process of disbandment involved the dissolution of Their approach involved the continuation of township-level units and also a review of the members of village se- earlier practices such curity forces for their involvement in criminal and/or political affairs. as the disbandment of Those who passed review became integrated into the Special Police units and their integration into other Reserve (DSHMA, 1997-1998, Vol. 4, pp. 240-241; Tinker, 1967, p. state security 61). organizations ... In June 1960, the Special Police Reserves became integrated into the regular police force. The move, according to a 1961 Ministry of Information report, reflected concerns about weak administrative control over its units and their provisional status (Government of Burma, 1961, pp. 43-44). With the latter resulting in a situation where there was limited benefit and little job security for those involved (ibid). In 1964, members of the police force became integrated into the Tatmadaw forming 13 infantry battalions (DSHMA, 1997- 1998, Vol. 5, p. 116). The UMP also underwent several reforms which eventually led to its integration into the Tatmadaw as well. In 1958, General Ne Win's caretaker government instituted changes that saw the UMP re branded the Union Constabulary and its members receive permanent appointments. In October 1962, the newly formed military government transferred these battalions to the Tatmadaw, where they became organized into as many as 27 infantry battalions (DSHMA,

10 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper 1997-1998, Vol. 4, p. 131; A Tatmadaw Researcher, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. February 2019 199-200). Reforms of the police also continued. In 1958 and again in 1964, General Ne Win transferred army officers into the police force (Selth, 2011, p. 12). In 1964, other changes involved the consolidation of all police units into one centralized police structure and a change in name to People’s Police Force (PPF). Andrew Selth (2012, p. 56) describes these moves “as the effective eclipse of Myanmar’s national police force as an independent entity. It continued to exist as a sepa- rate institution but answered to the armed forces, which assumed responsibility for all functions of government, including law and order.” After mass demonstrations in the early 1970s, the capacity of the police increased with the creation of six paramilitary units between 1974 and 1979. Again from 1986 to 1988, additional security battalions were added (Selth, 2011, p. 9). During the 1960s, the Tatmadaw formulated a new national security doctrine premised on the concept of people's war that involved the use of militias. A history of the Tatmadaw notes three types of militias: people’s militias (pyithusit), anti-insurgent groups (Ta Ka Sa Tatmadaw formulated a new national security Pha) and home guard (Ka Kwe Ye) (DSHMA, 1997-1998, Vol. 5, pp. doctrine premised on 139-158; Maung Aung Myoe, 1999, p. 149). In some cases, the for- the concept of people's mation of Ka Kwe Ye militias involved the Tatmadaw’s conferral of war that involved the use of militias. militia status to units of EAOs. One of the earliest of these instances was in 1966, when the United Anti Socialist Army – a Shan State- based EAO led by Khun Sa – accepted militia status (Khun Sa, 1993). Tatmadaw officials reportedly offered the status of militia to other individual units of EAOs in Shan State.8 In 1973, the Tatmadaw attempted to disband Ka Kwe Ye militia units in Shan State. Negotiations between the Northeast Regional Command and 23 Ka Kwe Ye militia units set April 1973 as the final deadline for the surrender of weapons by the militias. All but seven of the 23 groups complied. Among the groups that did not follow the order to dissolve were two units led by Lo Hsin Han and Mahasang (also Maha San) who formed EAOs (Yebaw Thit Maung, 1991, Vol. 5, p. 61).9 At the same time, the government expanded its use of pyithusit militias. One of the advantages cited in a military-authored

8 Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, a former leader of the Shan State Army, notes that secret talks with Tatmadaw Lt.-Col. Chao Saw Ohn involved an offer of status as a Ka Kwe Ye militia. Other SSA units - the 2nd and 6th brigades – briefly became militias (Yawnghwe, 2010, pp. 24, 40). 9 In 1974, Mahasang established the Wa National Army (Lintner, 1999, p. 493).

11 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper history is that they were under the control of the government since February 2019 their beginning (DSHMA, 1997-1998, Vol. 5, p. 155).

2.4 The First Ceasefire Period: 1989-2010 The patterns of accommodation between the Tatmadaw and EAOs that began in 1989 marked a new period of security integration. Negotiations between the Tatmadaw's Military Intelligence Ser- vices (MIS) and EAO leaders produced ceasefire arrangements and surrender by EAOs. Over the next two decades, the experience of these EAOs led to different outcomes. Several became Tatmad- aw-allied militias, others disarmed, and a handful of the powerful EAOs retained their ceasefire arrangements. In 2010, the government nullified the remaining ceasefire arrangements and new cycles of both militarized conflicts and peace agreements followed (BNI, 2013, p. 33). The collapse of the CPB in 1989 opened the door for MIS officials to negotiate with the newly formed EAOs that emerged in the after- math of the CPB's implosion. These were the Kokang based Myan- mar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the United Wa Several became Tatmadaw-allied State Army (UWSA), the Mong La based National Democratic Alliance militias, others Army and the New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDAK), all of whom disarmed, and a quickly concluded ceasefire arrangements. Other EAOs followed suit handful of the powerful EAOs retained their so that by the mid-1990s, the Tatmadaw had secured deals with ceasefire most of the EAOs. arrangements. The surrender agreement reached between the Mong Tai Army (MTA) and the Tatmadaw was an exception to the ceasefire arrangements.10 In early 1996, top leaders of the Shan State-based MTA un- expectedly announced the conclusion of secret negotiations with MIS officials. Rather than a ceasefire arrangement, the agreement was for an unconditional surrender. Some MTA troops demobilized, while other units became designated by the Tatmadaw as peace groups and later received the status as Tatmadaw-allied militias (Yan Nyein Aye, 2000 p. 81-89). Some MTA soldiers did not accept surrender and regrouped under the leadership of Yawd Serk, a former MTA officer. He established the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), an EAO sometimes referred to as the SSA-South. The RCSS/SSA, like the KNU and Chin National Front/Army, are among the few EAOs

10 The MTA was the name adopted after mergers by the Shan United Army, Shan United Revolutionary Army and a unit of the Shan State Army in the mid-1980s.

12 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper that did not engage in a ceasefire arrangement during this period. February 2019 The arrangements produced a two-tiered hierarchy of forty groups, which the military government referred to as peace groups.11 The first-tier included 17 EAOs, known as "major armed groups." Ar- rangements for these groups tended to be more favorable than for the others. The Tatmadaw designated the areas where some of these EAOs operated as "special regions." In some cases, the leaders and members of major EAOs received commissions in the police force and drew salaries from the government (ISP Interview, 2018). While details of these arrangements are not well-known, their status as police units represents a form of security integration. The second tier of peace groups included 23 EAOs, which the Tatmadaw labeled “mi- nor armed groups.”12 The arrangements also brought several changes to areas where ceasefire groups operated. One, heavy fighting declined. Two, the military allowed for limited business and government socio-economic initiatives in the economically anemic, war-torn areas. But the implementation of resource extraction and infrastructure projects proved unpopular with many people. Finally, the military invited This ranged from cajoling that involved many leaders of the peace groups to attend a national convention for the offer of economic the drafting of a new constitution. After prolonged recesses, the pro- concessions and cess finally came to an end in 2008 when the constitution was offi- permission to form political parties to cially approved via a controversial referendum. The fact that the intimidation and "battle-oriented ceasefires" did not address underlying political threats. grievances has been seen by many observers as a significant omis- sion. For its part the military government that negotiated the deals maintained that it was a transitional government without a mandate for political dialogue with ceasefire groups. Several ceasefire EAOs encountered pressure from the Tatmad- aw to disarm. This ranged from cajoling that involved the offer of economic concessions and permission to form political parties to intimidation and threats. In 2005, the SSNA and the PSLA – both ceasefire groups in northern Shan State – were ordered by the Tat- madaw to disarm. Rather than obey, Colonel Sai Yi of the SSNA led three battalions to join the RCSS/SSA, while some SSNA members engaged in disarmament and later joined Tatmadaw-allied militias

11 For lists of the Major and Minor groups, see New Light of Myanmar, August 11, 2013, pp. 6-7. 12 Several of the peace groups were units formed out of one EAO. For instance, at least six of the 40 peace groups listed by the Tatmadaw were former MTA units.

13 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper (Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), 2005 September 21; SHAN February 2019 2005 July 18; South, 2008, p. 133). In the same year, PSLA troops also disarmed. Some former members joined Tatmadaw-allied militia units. Later, others joined the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) after its founding in 2009 (Meehan, 2016, p. 377). By 2008, Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SSNPLO), a ceasefire group in southern Shan State, had surrendered its arms in response to ongoing pressure from the Tatmadaw (Democratic Voice of Burma, 2008, August 7; Mizzima, 2007, July 2; New Light of Myan- mar, 2007, July 27; Saw Yan Naing, 2008, February 22). The final two years of the ceasefire period involved a push by the Tatmadaw for ceasefire EAOs to become Tatmadaw-allied militias. In April 2009, during the last years of direct Tatmadaw rule and before the 2008 Constitution came into effect (in 2011), the Tatmadaw issued orders for ceasefire EAOs to transform into Tatmadaw-allied militias. The initiative, sometimes referred to as the Border Guard Force (BGF) Transformation Proposal, involved two different arrangements. One was that EAO would become a new type of militia known as Border Guard Forces. The other arrangement was for EAOs The final two years of the ceasefire period to become a People’s Militia Forces (PMFs) (sometimes referred to involved a push by the as Pyithusit). The structures of the two militia have several key dif- Tatmadaw for ceasefire ferences. The transformation into a BGF involved the restructuring of EAOs to become Tatmadaw-allied EAOs into battalion-sized units of 326 soldiers of which 30 mem- militias. bers, including one out of the three commanding officers, were drawn from the Tatmadaw (BNI, 2013, p. 51). In additions, BGF members would receive salaries and other economic benefits from the Tat- madaw. The PMF arrangement did not involve the integration of Tat- madaw soldiers into the units, nor did it require adherence to a uni- form structure. The responses by ceasefire EAOs to the BGF proposal were mixed. Several EAOs – including the KIA, the NDAA, the NMSP, and the UWSA – refused. One objection was that political dialogue was nec- essary before any changes or reduction in their armed forces (Na- tional Democratic Front, 2010). The KIO made a counter-proposal that involved the creation of a Kachin Regional Guard Force not under the direct command of the Tatmadaw, but the Tatmadaw did not accept the proposal (Keenan, 2010, pp. 3-4; National Democratic Front, 2010). The three brigades of the SSA/SSPP, also referred to as the SSA-North, split over the issue. The SSA-North’s 1st Brigade refused to accept the proposal. The 3rd and 7th Brigades of the SSA-North

14 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper however became PMFs. Other ceasefire EAOs – including the KDA February 2019 (Kachin Democratic Army), the PNO and the Lasang Awng Wa peace group – also transformed into PMFs. As for the BGF arrangement, units from four ceasefire EAOs – the DKBA, NDA-K, KNPLF, and MN- DAA – became BGF units (BNI, 2013; Buchanan, 2016). In a few cases, the demand by the Tatmadaw for EAOs to become militias produced tensions that escalated into full blown armed conflicts. Fighting erupted in Kokang near the Chinese border in August 2009 after longtime MNDAA commander Peng Kya Shin (Peng Ji- asheng) refused to accept the BGF proposal, a split in his group emerged and a faction of the MNDAA sided with the Tatmadaw (Kramer, 2009b). Fighting with the Tatmadaw also led to tens of thousands of refugees fleeing to China, causing a massive humani- tarian crisis. Government forces were eventually able to take control of the Kokang capital Laukkai and an estimated 700 Kokang troops who remained loyal to Peng Jiasheng escaped to China where they were “immediately disarmed by the Chinese authorities” (Maung Aung Myoe, 2011b). Bai Suo Cheng, Peng’s former deputy was placed in command of the MNDAA's remaining 300 troops who were trans- In a few cases, the th demand by the formed into BGF unit 1006 on December 4 2009 (Deutsche Presse Tatmadaw for EAOs to Agentur, 2009; Maung Aung Myoe, 2011b; New Light of Myanmar, become militias 2009). The octogenarian former veteran BCP commander launched produced tensions that escalated into full another campaign against the central government in February 2015 blown armed conflicts. (Lintner, 2015). A similar pattern emerged in eastern Myanmar in 2009 when Saw Law Pwe – also known as Bo Na Kham Mwe (Bo Mustache) and the commander of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)’s 5th Brigade – refused to integrate into the BGF. Immediately following the 2010 general election, his troops launched attacks on Myawaddy in Karen State and, a few days later, Three Pagoda Pass in Mon State, both adjacent to Thailand (Phanida, 2010).13 While Saw Law Pwe14 did reach a ceasefire agreement with the central government in November 2011, there were further splits in the group, which became known as the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, as the group's charismatic leader's health worsened. In July 2015, a splinter faction of the “Benevolent” DKBA was “dismissed from its ranks af-

13 In 2012, Saw Law Pwe renamed his organization as the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, which also used the name Kloh Htoo Baw. The organization later became a signatory to the NCA. 14 Saw Law Pwe died from from cancer in 2016.

15 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper ter clashes with the Myanmar Army over control of the Asian High- February 2019 way” (KESAN/KHRG/THWEE 2016). This new faction, which resumed using the original Democratic Karen Buddhist Army name in January 2016, has yet to reach a ceasefire with the government and has clashed repeatedly with the military since its 2015 inception. Police forces also underwent further changes during the SLORC/ SPDC era. The expansion of paramilitary forces operated by the police that began in the 1970s continued with the addition of new battalions between January 1989 and February 1990. The transfer of five paramilitary police battalions into the Tatmadaw in July 1990 represents another instance of security integration (Ei Ei Zaw, 2002, pp. 56-57). In 1995 the Peoples Police Force underwent a further reorganization and another official name change to become the My- anmar Police Force.

2.5 A Review of Security Integration A review of the period from 1945 to 2010 shows that Myanmar's experience with security integration is extensive. Assessing the effectiveness of security integration raises questions about the criteria Assessing the effectiveness of for evaluating the successes and failures of these efforts. On the one security integration hand, many instances of security integration can be considered suc- raises questions about cessful. Members of armed groups have surrendered, demobilized the criteria for evaluating the and integrated into other state security organizations without inci- successes and failures dent. But on the other hand, efforts at security integration have not of these efforts. succeeded in stopping the fighting between members of the armed groups and the Tatmadaw and in some instances have created tensions that led to renewed violence. One of the factors that helps account for the persistence of armed conflict associated with security integration efforts is that they did not address the grievances that form the root causes of armed conflicts. Earlier efforts at security integration encountered problems. World War II resistance fighters who joined paramilitary units, such as the PVOs, later switched their allegiance from the government to take up arms against it. Earlier instances surrender have also had mixed success. For example, surrender by members of several armed resistance groups in the late 1950s involved the demobilization of thousands of insurgent members. But the cases of Nai Shwe Kyin and Mo Heng demonstrate that even when EAOs have surrendered, it is not always sufficient for alleviating armed resistance by their members. The surrender by the MTA in 1996 also led to the demobi-

16 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper lization of thousands of troops. Not all of its members accepted the February 2019 terms and many troops joined what became the RCSS/SSA. Surren- der may appeal to some members of EAOs, but the persistence of unresolved grievances created conditions for the continuation of armed violence. Security integration involving the disarmament of armed groups has also encountered difficulties. Efforts by the Tatmadaw to disarm Ka Kwe Ye militias in Shan State in 1973 led some militia units to go underground and form EAOs. In the mid-2000s, two ceasefire groups – the SSNA and PSLA – encountered pressure from the Tatmadaw to disarm. Rather than comply, some units of the SSNA led by Colonel Sai Yi joined the RCSS/SSA. Some members of the PSLA later joined the TNLA, which was established four years after the PSLA’s disarmament. These cases show that when armed groups disarm under pressure from the Tatmadaw, some members have refused and joined other EAOs or formed their own group. The record for integrating EAOs into Tatmadaw-allied militias has produced mixed success. As in many countries, a militia system forms part of Myanmar’s national security strategy. Over time, the function [W]hen armed groups disarm under pressure of Myanmar’s militia system expanded beyond a national security from the Tatmadaw, plan premised on the doctrine of people's war to serve as a means for some members have the integrating of EAO units into the Tatmadaw. refused and joined other EAOs or formed The Tatmadaw’s conferral of militia status to EAOs is not new, their own group. but dates back at least to the 1960s, when Khun Sa’s United Anti-So- cialist Army and a few units of the SSA temporarily accepted militia status. In 2009, Tatmadaw leaders ordered the remaining ceasefire EAOs to transform themselves into one of two types of Tatmadaw militia arrangements – People’s Militia Forces and Border Guard Forces. During a 2011 press conference, Minister of Information U Kyaw Hsan offered some insight into the militia transformation proposal.

During negotiations, ethnic leaders said that their subordi- nates would face a lot of difficulties in trying to adapt themselves to ordinary civilian life, asking permission to hold arms and also jobs and food, clothing and shelter. Consequently, the government, taking into account laws, rules, and agreements, has transformed ethnic armed organizations into border guard forces – BGFs – or people’s militia forces – PMFs – so that members could enjoy jobs and life security and serve the nation with dignity. As

17 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper these forces become units under Tatmadaw’s command, matters February 2019 concerning their monthly salaries, rations, uniforms, and arms and ammunition have to be carried out according to rules and reg- ulations and proper bookkeeping system - Kyaw Hsan - (New Light of Myanmar, August 13, 2011).

As the Kokang and DKBA examples show security integration involving the transformation of EAO units into Tatmadaw-allied militias have at times triggered serious conflicts. Reports also indicate that the BGF units formed by the NDA-K and the MNDAA have experienced defections to other EAOs (ISP Interviews, Yangon, July 2018). These instances show that pressure for EAOs to transform into Tat- madaw-allied militias can be counterproductive to the goals of conflict resolution and lead to militarized violence.

Part Three: Key Considerations for Understanding Security Reintegration A review of earlier security integration efforts provides useful insights for current discussions about security reintegration. Admit- [O]ne overarching factor that helps tedly, it is difficult to generalize about these processes. Instances of account for ongoing security integration reflect specific conditions and the circumstances ethnic conflict is the of participants in multiple armed groups of different types over a six- failure to address the root causes of conflict ty-five year period. Nonetheless, one overarching factor that helps and grievances ... account for ongoing ethnic conflict is the failure to address the root causes of conflict and grievances that produced the earlier mobilization of armed resistance continued. Security integration has not addressed the political concerns of EAOs and ethnic communities. In some cases, security integration by armed resistance groups has involved limited political concessions by the government. The members of armed resistance groups that surrendered – such as those in the late 1950s received amnesties. Members of many EAOs participating in ceasefires arrangements were permitted by the military government to attend the national convention for the drafting of a new constitution. But representa- tives of EAOs attending the national convention expressed disap- pointment that it did not involve substantive political dialogue, and that the 2008 Constitution did not address their political concerns.15 The military government maintained that it was a transitional government without a mandate for substantive political reforms. Thus,

15 For an overview of ceasefires, see Kramer (2009a) and Zaw Oo and Win Min (2007).

18 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper while the ceasefires offered opportunities for political participation, it February 2019 was limited and did not address the key political concerns of ethnic communities. Instead, many security integration efforts have focused on economic and military issues. During the earlier instances of surrender and recent ceasefire period, armed groups received limited compen- sation from the government. Since the 1960s, some EAOs that became Tatmadaw-militias have engaged in illicit drug-related activities (McCoy, 1999; Palaung Women's Organization, 2010, 2011; Shan Herald Agency for News, 2003, 2005). More recently, some EAOs that participated in ceasefire arrangements have received lu- crative economic concessions (Woods, 2011). One element of the ceasefire period was the military government’s promise to promote development in ethnic areas and financial support for the peace groups. But these efforts often did not meet local expectations. In several regions, business initiatives in post ceasefire areas were seen as not having provided benefits to the local population. A view shaped in part by the significant level of environmental degradation and land seizures that many of these projects brought to these rapidly chang- [B]usiness initiatives in 16 post ceasefire areas ing areas. were seen as not The fact that earlier efforts at security integration did little to al- having provided lay the security concerns of the local population is clearly another benefits to the local population. serious shortcoming. While fighting in ceasefire areas declined. Peo- ple in these areas continued to encounter militarization, illegal taxation by various armed groups and limited legal protection by state authorities (Vicary, 2011). Moreover, the mostly agrarian populations faced threats to their livelihood posed by land taking, the destruction of the environment and ineffective economic policies. From a human security viewpoint, security integration efforts have not addressed threats posed to ethnic communities. The focus on armed groups – both EAOs and Tatmadaw – in current discussions of security reintegration reflects an implicit assump- tion that other institutions are effective and legitimate. This empha- sis on EAOs and the Tatmadaw reflects their capacity for militarized violence and roles in armed conflicts. Other organizations and institutions also play essential roles in security provision. Among these are the police and the judicial system. Taking a broader conception of security inclusive of other institutions charged with ensuring the

16 For a discussion of the shortcomings of economic development initiatives in the ceasefire period, see Lambrecht (2008) and Woods (2011).

19 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper physical safety of the population raises a number of questions. February 2019 Whether security reintegration in Myanmar can succeed in the absence of judicial and police reforms is perhaps the most pressing of these concerns. The security dilemma is a concept that helps account for the outbreak of armed conflicts. It is useful for understanding the earlier instances of violence in Myanmar, potential sources of renewed violence post-settlement as well as the importance of a broader conception of security in mitigating threats of violence. The crux of the dilemma is the difficulty for one group to correctly interpret the intentions behind another group's actions and how this can create conditions for the outbreak of armed violence between the two groups. When faced with uncertainty, groups cannot always deter- mine whether actions taken by another group to enhances its security are for offensive or defensive purposes. A possible outcome is that one group may perceive the actions taken by another as threatening, which then leads the first group to take measures to address concerns for own their safety. In the absence of effective mechanisms for safeguarding the well-being of an ethnic group from threats [W]hen members of an ethnic community feel posed by another can create a security dilemma that may spiral into threatened by another, violence. When this situation occurs, an escalation – or security spiral they may take steps to – may lead to the outbreak of violent conflict. Put differently, when protect themselves. members of an ethnic community feel threatened by another, they may take steps to protect themselves. And this can lead to the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict. The security dilemma provides a perspective useful for viewing the outbreak of interethnic armed conflict between Karens and Bur- mans in the late 1940s. Several conditions heightened insecurity among members of both groups. During World War II, armed clashes took place between the Karens who sided with the British and the Burma Independence Army (BIA). This inter-ethnic tension continued into the post-war period. The inability of the British-led Civil Af- fairs Service and later the U Nu government to guarantee people’s security exacerbated people’s vulnerabilities (Tinker, p. 38-40). Calls by some Karen for a state of their own raised concerns among Bur- mans that some Karen would take up arms if the government did not meet demands for greater political autonomy. At the same time, many Karen viewed the decision by the government to raise and arm of Sitwundan paramilitary units in Karen-inhabited areas as a threat (Callahan, 2003, pp. 132-133). Moreover, Sitwundan units along with

20 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper UMP members ordered local Karen militias and ethnic Karen UMP to February 2019 surrender their arms; many did not and left with their weapons (Smith, 1999, p. 116). Faced with these growing tensions, a security dilemma emerged in which the inability of one group to ascertain the intentions behind steps taken by the other group produced both insecurity and an escalation of tensions that boiled over into militarized violence. Actions taken by both Karen and Burman armed groups heightened the sense of vulnerability among members of both communities. Karen irregu- lar forces deployed to provide security for Karen populations. The killing of dozens of Karens on Christmas Eve 1948 in Palaw Township in Mergui District by Burman Sitwundan units likely served as a tip- ping point (Tinker, 1967, p. 38). Recurring retaliations by both Karen and Burman forces ensued, leading to widespread conflict (Smith, 1999, p. 117). The concept of a security dilemma shows the importance of ensuring security for a population. During and after security reintegration, if members of a community feel insecure, they then may take steps to protect themselves. These steps can lead another group to The concept of a security dilemma views these actions as threatening. This is in turn could lead to steps shows the importance being taken that heighten the overall insecurity and lead to a re- of ensuring security for sumption of violence with the potential for further escalation. One a population. step to prevent a security dilemma from escalating into the resumption of violence is taking a more inclusive view of security that en- compasses both national security and human security. At present, the government's inability to adequately safeguard the security of the population exacerbates the vulnerability of ethnic communities. Decades of civil war in non-Burman areas, featuring counter-insurgency operations, and poor governance under the military government have eroded people's trust in the ability of state agents and organizations to protect them. As one UK based law pro- fessor recently noted in a commentary piece, "Myanmar's legal system is unable to prevent human rights abuses or hold violators accountable" (Aguirre, 2018). The limited legal protection presents far-reaching implications for security integration and poses a challenge for a durable resolution of armed conflict. As was the case in earlier periods, when communities have not had adequate protection, they have responded by taking matters into their own hands. During the early independence period, communities formed village militia forces as part of a self-help

21 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper approach to addressing threats. The recent growth in non-state February 2019 counter-narcotics initiatives – such as the Pat Jasan movement in Kachin State and those of several EAOs most notably the TNLA – are other instances of local responses to the government's failure to adequately address the population's drug-related security concerns . Given these concerns, the provision of legal protection is a useful step for supporting a durable settlement to armed conflicts. The provision of security requires not only addressing concerns related to core security actors but also building people's confidence in the ability of the judiciary to punish those involved in abuses. One way to reduce this is to take steps to improve the effectiveness of the judicial system and the police to ensure people's well-being. The Tatmadaw often overshadows the role of the police in security provision. For this reason, police forces are not usually part of discussions of security reintegration. Nevertheless, the police play an extensive role in security. The police along with the Tatmadaw and Tatmadaw-allied militias are the only groups sanctioned by the state to carry weapons.17 Police units have also assisted the Tatmadaw in combat and counter-narcotics operations and engaged in the sup- One way to reduce this is to take steps to pression of anti-government protests. Moreover, the police are the improve the state security organization with whom the majority of the population effectiveness of the most often interacts with in their day to day lives. judicial system and the police to ensure The government's support for training police forces about human people's well-being. rights suggests that in the future the police may play a more significant role in security provision. Given their current responsibilities and their potential for taking on a more substantial part in security, discussions of security reintegration benefit from the inclusion of police-related issues.

Conclusion Myanmar currently faces several challenges in its efforts to re- solve decades of civil war. The success and failures of SSR and DDR in other counties as well as Myanmar offer useful insights. Many of the challenges related to security reintegration are not new to Myan- mar and similar to issues that the country has grappled with in its past. Just as the conclusion of World War II marked a change in My-

17 As Major General Maung Maung Ohn. the then Director of the People’s Militias and Border Forces Directorate, was reported to have said during a meeting with militias in 2010, “[t]here are only three organizations that are allowed to hold weapons, the Tatmadaw (the army), police, and militia units” (Shan Herald Agency for News. December 15, 2010).

22 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper anmar's security environment, which led to the creation of a new se- February 2019 curity sector system, the prospect of a negotiated political settlement also suggests a change in the security situation. Among the issues that Myanmar faces are the roles that soldiers and its security system can play in a society no longer experiencing war. Both the Tatmadaw and EAOs have encountered problems with security integration. The Tatmadaw has faced defections by both paramilitary organizations – including Tatmadaw-allied militias - and mutinies by both Burman and non-Burman units. The disarmament, surrender and transformation by EAOs have not increased security and in some cases led to renewed violence. These earlier experiences raise the prospect that efforts at security reintegration may lead to a repeat of past failures. Myanmar's track record with security integration indicates that the failure to address the core concerns of many armed groups has led to continued violence. This experience suggests that the current focus of security reintegration on core security actors - EAOs and the Tatmadaw - may not prevent the resumption of conflict in a post-settlement Myanmar. The current peace negotiations take place in a milieu that differs The disarmament, surrender and in some ways from earlier ones. The Tatmadaw has shifted from a transformation by position of opposing federalism to favoring it. The NCA represents a EAOs have not multilateral framework, that while stalled and flawed, presents a increased security and in some cases led to platform for negotiations. Recent political reforms have introduced a renewed violence. more democratic regime that features an elected government and the transfer of power to the first civilian government in over fifty years. Nonetheless, the Tatmadaw retains a role in the political system and dominance over issues related to the security sector. And the recent democratic gains have occurred in tandem with the resumption of war in recently peaceful areas of Kachin, Rakhine and northern Shan states. The shortcomings of Myanmar’s earlier experience with security integration indicate that a broader conception of security is useful for addressing security needs. Security reintegration without a judicial system capable of protecting people may lead groups to take protection into their own hands, which could lead to renewed violence and armed conflicts. Whether recent developments can translate into a durable peace settlement depends in part on whether a consensus on security can emerge. n

23 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper References February 2019 English Language Source

Aguirre, Daniel. “ Rule by Law and Impunity Undermine Prevention of and Account- ability for Human Rights Violations in Myanmar.” Tea Circle, June 4, 2018. Retrieved from https://teacircleoxford.com/2018/06/04/ rule-by-law-and-impunity-undermine-prevention-of-and-accountabili- ty-for-human-rights-violations-in-myanmar/

Ba Thann Win. “Administration of Shan States from the Panglong Conference to the Cessation of the Powers of the Saophas 1947-1959.” M.A. thesis, Rangoon Arts and Sciences University, n.d..

Burma News International. Deciphering Peace, 2013. Retrieved from https://www. bnionline.net/sites/bnionline.net/files/publication_docs/deciphering_ english_2013.pdf

Buchanan, John. Militias in Myanmar. The Asia Foundation, 2016. Retrieved from https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Mili- tias-in-Myanmar.pdf

Cady, John. A History of Modern Burma. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1960.

Callahan, Mary. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell Uni- versity, 2003.

Democratic Voice of Burma. “SSNPLO members pressured to disarm.” August 7, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.dvb.no/uncategorized/ssnplo-members-pressured-to-disarm/1294

Deutsche Presse Agentur. “Myanmar claims Chinese intelligence led to Kokang conflict” . September 9 2009

Ei Ei Zaw. A study on the changing role of the Myanmar police force (1988-2000). M. Res. University of Yangon, 2002.

General Khun Sa: His Life and Speeches. Chiang Mai: Shan Herald Agency for News, 1993.

Government of Burma. Burma: The Thirteenth Anniversary. Rangoon: Ministry of In- formation, 1961.

Keenan, Paul. The Kachins’ Dilemma – Become a Border Guard Force or Return to War- fare. EuroBurma Office Analysis Paper No. 2, 2010. Retrieved from http:// www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/EBO_Analysis_Paper_No_2_2010_-_ The_Kachins%27_Dilemma.pdf

Keenan, Paul. The Karen National Union Negotiations 1949 – 2012. Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies, Working Paper No. 2, 2012. Retrieved from http:// www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/BCES-WP-2-red.pdf

Keenan, Paul. Questionable Legitimacy: Recent Conflict in Karen State. EuroBurma Of-

24 fice Background Paper No.5, 2016. Retrieved from https://euroburmaof- fice.s3.amazonaws.com/filer_public/b4/f0/b4f0f11d-f75c-4613-a544- ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper 677059b441aa/ebo_background_paper_no_5_2016_-_karen_state. February 2019 pdf

Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN), Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) and THWEE Community Development Network “Beautiful Words, Ugly Actions:The Asian Highway in Karen State” August 2016 http://khrg.org/sites/default/files/beautiful_words_ugly_actions_-_ english_for_web.pdf

Kramer, Tom. Neither War nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Bur- ma. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009a. Retrieved from https:// www.tni.org/files/download/ceasefire.pdf

Kramer, Tom. Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, September 2009b. Retrieved from https://www.tni.org/files/download/psb1.pdf

Kramer, Tom, Oliver Russell, and Smith, Martin. From War to Peace in Kayah (Ka- renni State). Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/tni-2018_karenni_ eng_web_def.pdf

Lambrecht, Curtis. “Oxymoronic Development: The Military as Benefactor in the Border Regions of Burma,” in Duncan, Christopher R., ed. Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government policies for the development of mi- norities (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 150- 181.

Lintner, Bertil. “Kokang: The Backstory,” Irrawaddy, March 10, 2015

Lintner, Bertil. Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948. Chiang Mai: Silk- worm, 1999.

Maung Aung Myoe. Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces since 1948. New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2011.

Maung Aung Myoe. “The Counterinsurgency in Myanmar: The Government’s Re- sponse to the Burma Communist Party.” Ph.D. Dissertation: Australian National University, 1999.

Maung Aung Myoe (2011b) In the Name of the Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar’s China Pol- icy Since 1948. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Maung Pho Shoke. Why Did U Khun Sa’s MTA Exchange Arms for Peace? Yangon: U Aung Zaw, 1999.

McCoy, Alfred W. “Requiem for a Drug Lord: State and Commodity in the Career of Khun Sa.” In States and Illegal Practices. Oxford: Conference Publication, 1999, 129-167.

Meehan, Patrick. “The Continuation of War by Other Means.” in War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar: The Kachin Ceasefire, 1994-2011, ed. Mandy Sadan (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2016), pp. 363-389.

25 Mizzima. “Myanmar: SNPLO terminates ceasefire and returns to jungle.” July 2, ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper 2007. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myan- February 2019 mar-snplo-terminates-ceasefire-and-returns-jungle

National Democratic Front. NDF Report on Ceasefire Groups Resisting SPDC’s Pressure and Instability. March 7, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.burmapartner- ship.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/NDF-on-CFG-Eng-March-2010. pdf

New Light of Myanmar. “Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SSNPLO) led by Chairman U Chit Maung that had returned to legal fold unconditionally exchanges arms for peace.” July 27, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM2007-07-27.pdf

New Light of Myanmar, “Government Already Acceded to Peace Proposals of KIO to Most Possible Degree.” August 13, 2011.

New Light of Myanmar “Fruits of peace bearing witness to River Thanlwin” Decem- ber 12 2009.

Palaung Women’s Organization (PWO). Poisoned Flowers: The Impacts of Spiraling Drug Addiction on Palaung Women in Burma. Chiang Mai: Palaung Women’s Organization, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.womenofburma.org/Re- port/PoisonedFlowers.doc

Palaung Women’s Organization (PWO). Poisoned Hills: Opium Cultivation Surges under Government Control in Burma. Mae Sot: Palaung Women’s Organization, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs08/Poisoned_ Hills-PWO.pdf

Phanida. “Junta bombards DKBA splinter group at Three Pagodas Pass.” Mizzima. November 9, 2010. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/ web/20110519092708/http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/4561-junta-bombards-dkba-in-three-pagodas-pass.html

Saw Yan Naing. “Three Pa-O Ceasefire Leaders Detained.” Irrawaddy, February 22, 2008. Retrieved from http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_ id=10514

Saw Yan Naing. “Karen BGF Troops Begin Returning to the DKBA.” Irrawaddy, June 3, 2011. Retrieved from http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?ar- tid=21424

Selth, Andrew. Burma’s Police Forces: Continuities and Contradictions. Regional Out- look Paper No. 32, 2011. Retrieved from https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/bitstream/handle/10072/151189/SelthPUB14.pdf?se- quence=1&isAllowed=y

Selth, Andrew. Myanmar’s Police Force; Coercion, Continuity and Change. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2012.

Selth, Andrew. Police Reform in Burma (Myanmar): Aims, Obstacles and Outcomes. Griffith University, Griffith Asia Institute, 2013.

26 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper Selth, Andrew. “Police Reform in Myanmar Changes in ‘Essence and Appearance’."- February 2019 Cheesman, Nick, Nicholas Farrelly, and Trevor Wilson, eds. Debating democratization in Myanmar. Vol. 233. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014.

Selth, Andrew. “Police Reform in Myanmar: Changes ‘in Essence and Appearance.’” Chapter. In Debating Democratization in Myanmar, 205–28. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2014.

Shan Herald Agency for News. Hand in Glove: The Burma Army and the Drug Trade in Shan State. Chiangmai: Shan Herald Agency for News, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/HandinGlove.pdf

Shan Herald Agency for News. Show Business: Rangoon’s “War on Drugs” in Shan State. Chiang Mai: Shan Herald Agency for News, 2003.Shan Herald Agen- cy for News. “Junta to Issue More Weapons for Militia Units.” December 15, 2010.

Shan Herald Agency for News. “Col Sai Yi: Ceasefire pact torn down by Rangoon.” September 21, 2005.

Shan Herald Agency for News. “Ex-ceasefire group urges former allies to renew efforts for three-way talks.” July 18, 2005.

Shan Herald Agency for News. “Junta to issue more weapons for militia units” De- cember 15, 2010.

Smith, Martin. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. Dhaka: The University Press, 1999.

South, Ashley. Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict. London: Routledge, 2009. Tinker, Hugh, and S. R. Ashton. Burma, the Struggle for Independence, 1944-1948, Vol. 1. London: Hmso Pubns Ctr, 1983.

Tinker, Hugh. The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Traeger, Frank. Burma: From Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Vicary, Alison. “The Actual System of Taxation in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States.” Conference paper, June 2011. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate. net/profile/Alison_Vicary/publication/269223491_The_Actual_Sys- tem_of_Taxation_in_Burma’s_Ethnic_Minority_States/links/54852f- 550cf24356db60e71c.pdf

Woods, Kevin. "Ceasefire capitalism: military–private partnerships, resource concessions and military–state building in the Burma–China Borderlands," Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 4 (2011): 747-770.

Yan Nyein Aye. Endeavors of the Myanmar Armed Forces Government for National Rec- onciliation. Yangon: U Aung Zaw, 2000.

27 ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper February 2019 Yawnghwe, Chao Tzang. The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile. Singapore: In- stitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.

Zaw Oo and Win Min, eds. Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords. Vol. 39. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007.

Burmese Language Sources

Saw Bo Mya. Real story of My Life. Yangon: Nay Yi Yi Book Centre, 2014.

Defense Services Historical Museum and Archives. History of the Armed Forces. Vol. 4: 1948-1962. Yangon: News and Periodicals Enterprise, 1996.

Defense Services Historical Museum and Archives. History of the Armed Forces. Vol. 5: 1962-1974. Yangon: News and Periodicals Enterprise, 1997-1998.

A Tatmadaw Researcher. A Concise History of Myanmar and the Tatmadaw’s Role 1948-1988. Yangon: Ministry of Education, 1991.

Thit Maung, Yebaw. History of Domestic Insurgency. Vol. 3. Yangon: Ministry of Infor- mation, 1991.

Thit Maung, Yebaw. History of Domestic Insurgency. Vol. 5. Yangon: Ministry of Infor- mation Press, 2011.

Colonel Zaw Win Myint. Presentation, Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Pan- glong, 2016.

The Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP – Myanmar) is an independent, non-partisan and non- governmental think tank. The goals of ISP – Myanmar are to promote democratic leadership and strengthening civic participation by conducting policy-oriented research, analysis, public outreach, training and through leadership-level dialogue. 29 Myanmar's track record with security integration indicates that the failure to address the core concerns of many armed groups has led to continued violence.