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Heidegger, Correspondence Truth and the Realist Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance John D Liberty University DigitalCommons@Liberty University Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary and Graduate Faculty Publications and Presentations School 4-1997 Heidegger, Correspondence Truth and the Realist Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance John D. Morrison Liberty University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lts_fac_pubs Recommended Citation Morrison, John D., "Heidegger, Correspondence Truth and the Realist Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance" (1997). Faculty Publications and Presentations. Paper 100. http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lts_fac_pubs/100 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary and Graduate School at DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. EQ 69:2 (1997), 139-155 John D. Morrison Patenloster BIbHcal and ~Iogical Monol!I"aphs A new series of doctoral theses of high academic standard. Heidegger, COITespondence Truth Calvin and English Calvinism R.T. Kendall and the Realist Theology of To this ground-breaking work, originally published by the Oxford University Press in the 19805, the author has added a new preface and Thomas Forsyth TOlTance two appendices, one consisting of extracts from calvin's Commen­ taries and the second of an extract from a PhD thesis by Ktu1: Daniel. The author demonstrates that the English'Pmitans', which he calls 'experimental predestinarians', were followers of Jo~ ~'s suc­ cessor in Geneva, Theodore Beza, and not of Calvin himself. Dr Once known, Truths acquire a utilitarian crust; they no longer Kendall maintains that what became known as English Calvinism was interest us as truths but as useful recipes. That pure, sudden largely the thought of Beza not Calvin. illumination which characterizes truth accompanies the latter only at His book. is an important clarification ofcaIvin's position in relation the moment of discovery. Hence its Greek name aletheia, which to those who have been regarded as his followers. origtnally meant the same as the word apocalypsis later, that is, June, 1997 . discovery, revelation, or rather, unveiling, removing a veil or cover.1 ISBN: 0-85364-827-11300pp approx./pbl229 X 145mm £19.99 Ortega y Gasset The Extent of the Atonement The concept of truth enshrines at once the real being of things and A Dilemrrm for Refonned Theo~ from Calvin to the Consensus the revelation of things as they are in reality. The truth of being G. Michael Thomas comes to bear in its own light and in its own authority, constraining us by the power of what it is to assent to it and acknowledge it for This work traces the debate about the extent of the atonement in what it is in itself. 5t Anselm who developed that further in a more RefoImed theology to the Fonnula Consensus Helvetica of 1675. The realist way held truth to be the reality of things as they actually are introduction sketches the background in patristic and medieval independent of us before God and therefore as they ought to he theology and in the thought of Martin Luther and Martin Bucer. known and signified by us. Everything is what it actually is and not Chapter 2 identifies the dual approach in Calvin's thought on the atonement, and chapters 3-5 examine the approaches developed by something else and cannot according to its nature be other than it is. Theodore Beza, Heinrich Bullinger and Girolamo Zanchi and the That is what he called its inherent 'necessity" or 'truth.'2 Lutherans. Chapters 6 and 7 give an account of the development of a Thomas F. Torrance Covenant Theology and the reactions of the Refonned at the Synoo of Dort to Arminianism. Chapter 8 explores the teaching of John Cameron, whilst chapters 9 and 10 follow the development of I. Introduction Cameron's theology at the hands of Moise Amyraut. The final chapter The question and nature of truth has long been at the heart of concludes that the refonners never succeeded in defining the extent of various the atonement in a way which commanded general assent amongst philosophical ConCenl at levels and within and between themselves. It is proposed that a new approach is required and that schools of thought and method·. Truth as 'correspondence,' Karl Barth's reworking of the Refonned doctrine of predestination however that has been construed historically, has remained at makes significant progress in resolving the inconsistencies of the the center among the major competing views on the nature of classical refonned stance. truth. It has been called by some the 'common-sense' perspect­ June, 1997 ive. Yet in the last two centuries it has faced, as have emphases on ISBN: 0-85364-8Z8-X/OOOppl229 X 145mm £19.99 1 Jose Ortega y Gas.set, Meditations on Qui.rote, trans. E. Rugg and D. Marin Paternoster Press (New York: Norton, 1961) p. 67. PO Box 300 CarlIsle CumbrIa CAS 0QIi UK paternoster press • Thomas F. Torrance, Reality and Scientific ~ (Edinburgh: The Scottish • Academic Pre.., 1961), p. 141, Hereafter RST. 140 The Evangelical Qunrterly Correspondence Truth &' Realist Theo/o:!}l of Torrance 141 (critical) realist knowledge of the world, much negative re­ 'the true one states about you the things that are as they are,' and sponse.' In the twentieth centuIy such antagonism has arisen not 'the faIse statement states about you things different from the only from among neo-Kantians and some analytical philosophers things that are.'5 While the dialogue questions the human but from philosophers influenced by the thought of Martin capacity to know what is real and what is unreal at several Heidegger. It has been commonplace in some quarters to identifY points, the Stranger proposes a definition of 'real being' as that Heidegger's understanding of truth as 'disclosure' or 'uncovering' which is constituted so as to 'possess any sort of power either to (a-letheia) as an overthrowing of the old, static, constrictive affect anything else or to he affected.'" But if knowing is an correspondence notions of truth. But this is not in fact what 'acting upon' the object known, then to he known is to be Heidegger has expressed. In fact his point is to support or changed. But this cannot occur in that which is changeless.' But undergird correspondence truth by his emphasis on disclosure. It Plato, throu~ the Stranger, is not asserting that reality is only the is this interpretation of Heidegger which Reformed Christian 'changeless, that which cannot he acted upon by the knower. theolOgian Thomas Torrance carefully appropriates for his own Rather, as he later asserts, reality is comprised of both 'all that is discussions of the Truth of God disclosed in his Word-thus his changeless and all that is in change.'8 But in the Sophist, Plato's emphases on both correspondence and coherence truth, and on arguments are not brought to resolution in relation to presenta­ critical realism. tions of truth as correspondence. Correspondence theory is here qualified by attendant arguments which question the simplicity or self-evidence of perceptual givens as static realities which can II. COJTeSpondence Truth: Some Classical Expressions be 'read off the surface.' In the process of examining Martin Heidegger's apparently Similar {,oints are developed in the Theaetetus where Socrates negative response to 'correspondence theories' of truth, it is says that things are not given in themselves but rather 'for each necessary that one see clearly that against which Heidegger is other,' i.e., 'whether we speak of something's 'being' or its responding. For that reason we will examine briefly what are 'becoming,' we must speak of it as being or becoming for often regarded as three 'classical' formulations of correspond­ someone, or of something, or toward something.'" He then ence truth in the Western tradition: the Platonic, the Aristotelian develops the argument that 'agent' and 'patient' are relative to and the Thomistic. In the words of Richard Rorly, these three are each other, which raises the problem of relativism, that 'what all found (rightly or wrongly) to fall within the paradigm of 'the every man believes as a result of perception is ... true for him.' mind as a great mirror, containing various representations­ To avoid this, Socrates turns the argument away from perception some accurate, some not-and capable of being studied by pure, to the mental operations involved in perceptuaIly grounded nonempirical methods. '4 judgments. Knowledge occurs on a level that is as much mental Plato's understanding of correspondence truth is said to be as perceptual, as shown by knowledge based on memory, covertly developed in the Republic, with the first explicit formula­ knowledge of a fact not even present to the senses and thus tions of a correspondence theory to he found in the Sophist and de,!"ed not from sense experience but from mental operations the Theaetetus. Yet even here Plato seems to reflect some which transcend such (as in mathematics). Along simllar lines, hesitation about it. In the Sophist, truth as correspondence is ~ates finally ~oncludes that :we must not look for (knowledge) pres~ted ~ relation to basic inst~ces of human judgment ill sense perception at all, but ill what goes on when the mind is illvolvmg direct perceptual apprehenslon of the current condition of a particular given. Regarding the truth or falsity of statements, 5 Plato, Sophist 236a, trans. P.M. Comfocd, Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith 3 In contrast to naive realism, critical realism, as Torrance understands it, seeks Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, knowledge of and correction by the external fuct of the object, 'the truth of 1961), pp.
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