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The Transatlantic Relationship in an Era of Growing Economic Multipolarity,” Washington, October 8, 2010 Transatlantic Relationship in an Era of Growing Economic Multipolarity Washington, DC October 8, 2010 Support for this project was generously provided by a grant from the European Commission PETER G. PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036-1903 (202) 328-9000 FAX: (202) 659-3225 www.piie.com C. Fred Bergsten, Director Edward A. Tureen, Director of Publications, Marketing, and Web Development BRUEGEL Rue de la Charité 33 B-1210 Brussels, Belgium (32) 2 227 4210 FAX: (32) 2 227 4219 www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director Andrew Fielding, Editor Copyright © 2011 by the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics and Bruegel. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. For reprints/permission to photocopy please contact the APS customer service department at Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923; or email requests to: [email protected] The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the overall program of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and Bruegel, as endorsed by their respective Boards, but does not necessarily reflect the views of individual members of the Boards or the Institute’s Advisory Committee. Contents Welcome Marco Buti Welcome Remarks Panel 1 Jean Pisani-Ferry and Adam Posen Paper Lorenzo Bini Smaghi PowerPoint Question and Answer Session Book Launch Anders Åslund PowerPoint Zsolt Darvas PowerPoint Panel 2 Bill Cline Paper Reinhilde Veugelers Paper Question and Answer Session Keynote Address Mario Draghi Address Question and Answer Session Panel 3 Morris Goldstein and Nicolas Véron Paper Anil Kashyap PowerPoint Question and Answer Session Panel 4 Garry Schinasi and Edwin Truman Paper Question and Answer Session Closing Panel Panelists’ Remarks and Question and Answer Session Post-crisis EU Governance Marco Buti, Director General European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs Welcome speech delivered at the conference “Transatlantic relationship in an era of growing economic multipolarity,” Washington October 8, 2010 Ladies and gentlemen, First of all, thank you for your kind invitation. It is a pleasure to be here today and to address such a distinguished audience. The topic I will be talking about is financial-economic governance in the EU. The EU is currently in the process of a major broadening and strengthening of the existing system. I will outline this process along the lines of a triangle of challenges and solutions. First things first, let me start with the challenges. The crisis has revealed three main sources of weaknesses: the banking sector public finances and sovereign debt markets economic growth The first weakness is vulnerabilities in the banking sector. Banks were severely hit and the public sector had to intervene to prevent the worst. Even after public interventions however, banks have been significantly weakened in their capacity to provide financing to businesses and households. The second weakness is public finances, which found specific expression in the sovereign debt crisis. The crisis took a heavy toll on public finances via two channels: the fall in economic activity and the need to support the banking sector. Average deficits in advanced economies are now reaching 7 percent of GDP and debt levels have increased by 20 percentage points in two years, thus undoing 20 years of consolidation. Countries with weak fiscal positions before the crisis or with large exposure to the crisis saw investors' confidence waning and fell into serious sovereign debt crisis. The third weakness is growth. The crisis has been the most severe economic crisis since World War II. World GDP saw the first outright fall on record. The EU and the euro area were particularly hard hit with GDP falling by 4 percent in 2009. It set industrial production back to the level it was at in 1990, two decades earlier! And it increased the number of unemployed by 4.5 million. And the crisis had a large negative impact on the productive capacity of our economies. The crisis will probably have negative implications for potential growth. The three sides of the triangle—banks, debt and growth—interact strongly with each other: Weaknesses in the banking sector translate into sluggish credit growth and hamper recovery, but also pose further risks for the public sector. Public finances, in face of severe investors' pressure and the still uncertain situation in the banking sector, are in a strong need for consolidation, possibly delaying recovery and putting some constraints on growth. Finally, growth will not take off without fully functioning financial intermediation while it is the key element to ensure credibility and sustainability of fiscal consolidation. Which brings me to solutions. In other words: how to break the negative feedback loop? We do this by putting in place a new, stronger framework for economic and financial policy, addressing all three sides of the triangle. Starting with the banking sector. The EU has agreed on a new architecture for financial regulation based on four priorities: the development of a more efficient supervisory response more and better capital in the banking system the extension of the perimeter of regulation and supervision the completion of the tools to ensure financial stability. Secondly, to safeguard the stability of sovereign debt markets the EU has created two new lending facilities for eurozone countries in distress: the European Financial Stability Mechanism or EFSM and the European Financial Stability Facility or EFSF. The EFSM has a volume 60 billion euros. It is administered by the European Commission and is similar to the facility that had previously been set to help the non-euro area countries Latvia, Hungary and Romania. The EFSF is a special purpose vehicle set up to make loans to euro area countries up to an amount of 440 billion euros, supplemented with a €250 billion IMF commitment. To secure the stability of public finances, the Commission has recently proposed significant strengthening of the EU fiscal surveillance. The proposed changes include: Giving more attention to debt developments in fiscal surveillance. The focus over the past years has been very strongly on deficits, we will be paying more attention to debt developments also. Setting minimum requirements for national fiscal frameworks, to align them with the EU fiscal rules. Putting in place a wider range of incentives and sanctions to strengthen compliance with the rules. Reinforcing the role of Eurostat to improve the quality of statistical information (proposed already in spring). Thirdly: reinvigorating growth is the main aim of the so-called Europe 2020 strategy— Europe's strategy for sustainable growth and jobs. The Strategy was agreed this summer and brings together reforms efforts in various areas such as labour and product markets and innovation and education while at the same time paying attention to climate change and social inclusion. To jump-start the Strategy, Member States have committed to "frontload" the implementation of key reforms that can have a positive impact on growth already in the short and medium term. An important part of the Strategy includes the monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances such as large current account deficits or bubbles in housing markets. The crisis has also shown that these can be very harmful for growth and stability. This is why the Commission has proposed a framework to monitor imbalances, including an alert mechanism comprising a scoreboard of indicators and thresholds and the possibility to issue policy recommendations and sanctions. Finally, we have instituted a "so-called" European Semester, comprising the first half of each calendar year. The European Semester has two major aims: integrated macro-structural surveillance of fiscal policies, key structural reforms that address growth bottlenecks and macro-imbalances, and financial systems and ex-ante policy advice: Commission and Council prepare guidance, opinions and recommendations at a time when important budgetary decisions are still in a preparatory phase at the national level. Conclusion I have sketched the triangle of challenges that faces us and the triangle of policy solutions that the EU has instituted or is instituting. I thus see this crisis as an opportunity to advance our reform agenda and make inroads on structural reforms, permanent crisis resolution modalities for the euro area and economic governance framework. As a result, post-crisis EU governance will be deeper, stronger and more comprehensive. We have learned the lesson of the crisis and will not allow it to happen again. From Convoy to Parting Ways? Postcrisis Divergence Between European and US Macroeconomic Policies Jean Pisani-Ferry and Adam S. Posen Paper prepared for Bruegel-PIIE conference, Washington, October 8, 2010. The authors are grateful to the European Commission for its support of this project, and to Christophe Gouardo, Tomas Hellebrandt, and Neil Meads for excellent research assistance. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and cannot be attributed to the Bank of England, Bruegel, PIIE, or the Commission. © Bruegel and PIIE, 2010. The initial response in 2008–09 to the global financial crisis was in many ways a high
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