What Is Eazfuscator.NET? 1
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Bypassing Web Application Firewalls
Bypassing Web Application Firewalls Pavol Lupták [email protected] CEO, Nethemba s.r.o Abstract The goal of the presentation is to describe typical obfuscation attacks that allow an attacker to bypass standard security measures such as various input filters, output encoding mechanisms used in web-based intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and web application firewalls (WAFs). These attacks may include different networking tricks, polymorphic shellcode and various code techniques. At the beginning we analyse and compare different HTML parsing and interpretation approaches used by most-common browsers that can lead to unique attack vectors. Javascript, with a full range of features, represents another effective way that can be used to obfuscate or de-obfuscate code – some existing obfuscation tools are mentioned. We describe how it is possible to construct “non-alphanumeric Javascript code” which does not contain alphabetic or numeric characters, but still can contain malicious executable code. Despite the fact that most current applications are immune to SQL injection attacks, it is still possible to find many vulnerable applications. We focus on different fuzzy techniques (and useful open source SQL injection tools that implement them) which can still be used to bypass weak input validation controls. We conclude our presentation with a demonstration of the most basic obfuscation techniques that can be successfully used to bypass traditional web application firewalls (WAFs). Finally, we briefly describe current mitigation techniques that are recommended for efficient malicious Javascript code analysis and sanitizing user input containing untrusted code. Keywords: WAF, IPS, IDS, obfuscation, SQL injection, XSS, CSS, CSRF. -
C++11 Metaprogramming Applied to Software Obfuscation
C++11 METAPROGRAMMING APPLIED TO SOFTWARE OBFUSCATION SEBASTIEN ANDRIVET About me ! Senior Security Engineer at SCRT (Swiss) ! CTO at ADVTOOLS (Swiss) Sebastien ANDRIVET Cyberfeminist & hacktivist Reverse engineer Intel & ARM C++, C, Obj-C, C# developer Trainer (iOS & Android appsec) PROBLEM Reverse engineering • Reverse engineering of an application if often like following the “white rabbit” • i.e. following string literals • Live demo • Reverse engineering of an application using IDA • Well-known MDM (Mobile Device Management) for iOS A SOLUTION OBFUSCATION What is Obfuscation? Obfuscator O O ( ) = YES! It is also Katy Perry! • (almost) same semantics • obfuscated Obfuscation “Deliberate act of creating source or machine code difficult for humans to understand” – WIKIPEDIA, APRIL 2014 C++ templates OBJECT2 • Example: Stack of objects OBJECT1 • Push • Pop Without templates Stack singers; class Stack { singers.push(britney); void push(void* object); void* pop(); }; Stack apples; apples.push(macintosh); • Reuse the same code (binary) singers apples • Only 1 instance of Stack class With C++ templates template<typename T > Stack<Singer> singers; class Stack singers.push(britney); { void push(T object); T pop(); Stack<Apple> apples; }; apples.push(macintosh); With C++ templates Stack<Singer> singers; singers.push(britney); Stack<Singers> Stack<Apples*> Stack<Apple> apples; apples.push(macintosh); singers apples C++ templates • Two instances of Stack class • One per type • Does not reuse code • By default • Permit optimisations based on types • For ex. reuse code for all pointers to objects • Type safety, verified at compile time Type safety • singers.push(apple); // compilation error Optimisation based on types • Generate different code based on types (template parameters) template<typename T> class MyClass • Example: enable_if { .. -
Appref-Ms Abuse for Code Execution & C2
National Cybersecurity Assessment s and Technical Services Appref-ms Abuse for Code Execution & C2 William J. Burke IV Information Security Specialist Advanced Operations Table of Contents Background ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Initial Requirements .................................................................................................................................. 4 Process Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 4 Microsoft Applications Overview.................................................................................................... 5 Application Publishing Overview - Online & Offline Availability ............................................................... 5 Application Deployment Process .............................................................................................................. 7 Application Installation Process .............................................................................................................. 10 Appref-ms abuse for payload delivery .......................................................................................... 12 Pre-Deployment Requirements............................................................................................................... 12 Initial Access - Phishing via OLE Delivery................................................................................................ -
Software Protection Through Obfuscation
This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Software protection through obfuscation Balachandran, Vivek 2014 Balachandran, V. (2015). Software protection through obfuscation. Doctoral thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/62930 https://doi.org/10.32657/10356/62930 Downloaded on 02 Oct 2021 00:34:50 SGT Software Protection through Obfuscation School of Computer Engineering A Thesis Submitted to the Nanyang Technological University in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Vivek Balachandran under the supervision of Prof. Ng Wee Keong and Prof. Sabu Emmanuel 2015 2 Acknowledgments Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisors Prof. Sabu Em- manuel and Prof. Ng Wee Keong for the continuous support of my Ph.D study and research, for their patience, motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. I thank my fellow labmates in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore: Shaheen Ansari, Deepak Subrmanyam, Chia Tee Kiah for their kind support. Many friends have helped me stay sane through these difficult years. Their support and care helped me overcome setbacks and stay focused on my graduate study. I would like to thank Aditya Venkataraman, Chitra Panchapakesan, Ganesh Bharadwaj, Girid- haran Karunagaran, Karthik Raveendran, Manaswini Ramkumar, Manisha Mujumdar, Nirnaya Sarangan, Ponnu Jacob, Roshan Wahab, Shubha Nageswaran,Vidhi Patel and Vipin Pillai for making my life wonderful as a grad student. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family: my parents G. Balachandran and V. Santhakumari, and my brother Vishakh Balachandran who were always there for me. -
6.858 Final Project
6.858 Final Project Predrag Gruevski Paul Hemberger Andres Romero Albert Wu Introduction Since remote desktop applications are such powerful tools for controlling computers from across the Internet, it stands to reason that adversaries would be motivated to discover and exploit vulnerabilities in such software. In our final project, we explored many of the most popular remote desktop applications for Android clients. Most of them provide little to no security, and we were able to easily create exploits to compromise the keyboard and mouse of the remote machine. Methods We looked at the following popular Android clients (each has at least 100,000 installs on the Google Play app market): 1. TeamViewer for Remote Control 2. Air HID 3. Remote Mouse 4. WiFi Mouse 5. Android Mouse and Keyboard 6. Mobile Mouse Lite 7. Remote Control Collection We installed each of the above clients on an Android phone and the corresponding server on a remote machine running Windows, OS X, or Linux. We used two types of tools for reverse engineering the messaging protocols: 1. Wireshark Wireshark is a network protocol analyzer. Using Wireshark, we were able to analyze incoming and outgoing packets from the remote machine. This was extremely useful for applications using plaintext protocols. 2. Decompilers Tools like Java Decompiler Project, JetBrains dotPeek, Decompile Android, and dex2jar allowed us to decompile many of the client APK files and server executables into very readable Java code. After reverse engineering the protocols, we set up virtual machines running the above applications and send arbitrary keyboard and mouse commands from the host machine via UDP and TCP. -
Achieving Obfuscation Through Self-Modifying Code: a Theoretical Model
Running head: OBFUSCATION THROUGH SELF-MODIFYING CODE 1 Achieving Obfuscation Through Self-Modifying Code: A Theoretical Model Heidi Angelina Waddell A Senior Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation in the Honors Program Liberty University Spring 2020 OBFUSCATION THROUGH SELF-MODIFYING CODE 2 Acceptance of Senior Honors Thesis This Senior Honors Thesis is accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation from the Honors Program of Liberty University. _____________________________ Melesa Poole, Ph.D. Thesis Chair ______________________________ Robert Tucker, Ph.D. Committee Member ______________________________ James H. Nutter, D.A. Honors Director ______________________________ Date OBFUSCATION THROUGH SELF-MODIFYING CODE 3 Abstract With the extreme amount of data and software available on networks, the protection of online information is one of the most important tasks of this technological age. There is no such thing as safe computing, and it is inevitable that security breaches will occur. Thus, security professionals and practices focus on two areas: security, preventing a breach from occurring, and resiliency, minimizing the damages once a breach has occurred. One of the most important practices for adding resiliency to source code is through obfuscation, a method of re-writing the code to a form that is virtually unreadable. This makes the code incredibly hard to decipher by attackers, protecting intellectual property and reducing the amount of information gained by the malicious actor. Achieving obfuscation through the use of self-modifying code, code that mutates during runtime, is a complicated but impressive undertaking that creates an incredibly robust obfuscating system. While there is a great amount of research that is still ongoing, the preliminary results of this subject suggest that the application of self-modifying code to obfuscation may yield self-maintaining software capable of healing itself following an attack. -
Programming with Windows Forms
A P P E N D I X A ■ ■ ■ Programming with Windows Forms Since the release of the .NET platform (circa 2001), the base class libraries have included a particular API named Windows Forms, represented primarily by the System.Windows.Forms.dll assembly. The Windows Forms toolkit provides the types necessary to build desktop graphical user interfaces (GUIs), create custom controls, manage resources (e.g., string tables and icons), and perform other desktop- centric programming tasks. In addition, a separate API named GDI+ (represented by the System.Drawing.dll assembly) provides additional types that allow programmers to generate 2D graphics, interact with networked printers, and manipulate image data. The Windows Forms (and GDI+) APIs remain alive and well within the .NET 4.0 platform, and they will exist within the base class library for quite some time (arguably forever). However, Microsoft has shipped a brand new GUI toolkit called Windows Presentation Foundation (WPF) since the release of .NET 3.0. As you saw in Chapters 27-31, WPF provides a massive amount of horsepower that you can use to build bleeding-edge user interfaces, and it has become the preferred desktop API for today’s .NET graphical user interfaces. The point of this appendix, however, is to provide a tour of the traditional Windows Forms API. One reason it is helpful to understand the original programming model: you can find many existing Windows Forms applications out there that will need to be maintained for some time to come. Also, many desktop GUIs simply might not require the horsepower offered by WPF. -
Appendixes APPENDIX A
PART 8 Appendixes APPENDIX A COM and .NET Interoperability The goal of this book was to provide you with a solid foundation in the C# language and the core services provided by the .NET platform. I suspect that when you contrast the object model provided by .NET to that of Microsoft’s previous component architecture (COM), you’ll no doubt be con- vinced that these are two entirely unique systems. Regardless of the fact that COM is now considered to be a legacy framework, you may have existing COM-based systems that you would like to inte- grate into your new .NET applications. Thankfully, the .NET platform provides various types, tools, and namespaces that make the process of COM and .NET interoperability quite straightforward. This appendix begins by examin- ing the process of .NET to COM interoperability and the related Runtime Callable Wrapper (RCW). The latter part of this appendix examines the opposite situation: a COM type communicating with a .NET type using a COM Callable Wrapper (CCW). ■Note A full examination of the .NET interoperability layer would require a book unto itself. If you require more details than presented in this appendix, check out my book COM and .NET Interoperability (Apress, 2002). The Scope of .NET Interoperability Recall that when you build assemblies using a .NET-aware compiler, you are creating managed code that can be hosted by the common language runtime (CLR). Managed code offers a number of ben- efits such as automatic memory management, a unified type system (the CTS), self-describing assemblies, and so forth. As you have also seen, .NET assemblies have a particular internal compo- sition. -
Optimizing Away Javascript Obfuscation
Optimizing Away JavaScript Obfuscation Adrian Herrera Defence Science and Technology Group [email protected] Abstract—JavaScript is a popular attack vector for releasing • Applying techniques rooted in compiler theory to the task malicious payloads on unsuspecting Internet users. Authors of of deobfuscating JavaScript malware; this malicious JavaScript often employ numerous obfuscation • The design and implementation of SAFE-DEOBS, an techniques in order to prevent the automatic detection by antivirus and hinder manual analysis by professional malware open-source tool to assist malware analysts to better analysts. Consequently, this paper presents SAFE-DEOBS, a understand JavaScript malware; and JavaScript deobfuscation tool that we have built. The aim • An evaluation of SAFE-DEOBS on a large corpus of real- of SAFE-DEOBS is to automatically deobfuscate JavaScript world JavaScript malware. malware such that an analyst can more rapidly determine the malicious script’s intent. This is achieved through a number of Unless otherwise stated, all malicious code used in this static analyses, inspired by techniques from compiler theory. We paper is taken from real-world malware. demonstrate the utility of SAFE-DEOBS through a case study on real-world JavaScript malware, and show that it is a useful II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK addition to a malware analyst’s toolset. Software obfuscation has many legitimate uses: digital Index Terms—javascript, malware, obfuscation, static analysis rights management, software diversity (for software protec- tion), and tamper protection, to name a few. However, software obfuscation is being increasingly co-opted by malware authors I. INTRODUCTION to thwart program analysis (both automated and manual). -
Key Benefits of Microsoft® Visual Studio® 2008
Key Benefits of Microsoft® Visual Studio® 2008 White Paper December 2007 For the latest information, please see www.microsoft.com/vstudio The information contained in this document represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation on the issues discussed as of the date of publication. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information presented after the date of publication. This white paper is for informational purposes only. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, IN THIS SUMMARY. Complying with all applicable copyright laws is the responsibility of the user. Without limiting the rights under copyright, no part of this document may be reproduced, stored in, or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise), or for any purpose, without the express written permission of Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft may have patents, patent applications, trademarks, copyrights, or other intellectual property rights covering subject matter in this document. Except as expressly provided in any written license agreement from Microsoft, the furnishing of this document does not give you any license to these patents, trademarks, copyrights, or other intellectual property. Unless otherwise noted, the example companies, organizations, products, domain names, e-mail addresses, logos, people, places, and events depicted herein are fictitious, and no association with any real company, organization, product, domain name, e-mail address, logo, person, place, or event is intended or should be inferred. © 2007 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. -
Large-Scale and Language-Oblivious Code Authorship Identification
Large-Scale and Language-Oblivious Code Authorship Identification Mohammed Abuhamad Inha University, Incheon, South Korea Tamer AbuHmed Inha University, Incheon, South Korea Aziz Mohaisen University of Central Florida, Orlando, USA DaeHun Nyang Inha University, Incheon, South Korea CCS '18: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pages 101-114. Toronto, Canada — October 15 - 19, 2018 ISBN: 978-1-4503-5693-0 doi>10.1145/3243734.3243738 link: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3243738 Abstract: Efficient extraction of code authorship attributes is key for successful identification. However, the extraction of such attributes is very challenging, due to various programming language specifics, the limited number of available code samples per author, and the average code lines per file, among others. To this end, this work proposes a Deep Learning-based Code Authorship Identification System (DL-CAIS) for code authorship attribution that facilitates large-scale, language-oblivious, and obfuscation-resilient code authorship identification. The deep learning architecture adopted in this work includes TF-IDF-based deep representation using multiple Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) layers and fully-connected layers dedicated to authorship attribution learning. The deep representation then feeds into a random forest classifier for scalability to de-anonymize the author. Comprehensive experiments are conducted to evaluate DL-CAIS over the entire Google Code Jam (GCJ) dataset across all years (from 2008 to 2016) and over real-world code samples from 1987 public repositories on GitHub. The results of our work show the high accuracy despite requiring a smaller number of files per author. Namely, we achieve an accuracy of 96% when experimenting with 1,600 authors for GCJ, and 94.38% for the real-world dataset for 745 C programmers. -
Automated Malware Analysis Report for Jetbrains-Toolbox
ID: 85 Sample Name: jetbrains-toolbox Cookbook: defaultmacfilecookbook.jbs Time: 19:01:50 Date: 18/12/2020 Version: 31.0.0 Emerald Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Analysis Report jetbrains-toolbox 3 Overview 3 General Information 3 Detection 3 Signatures 3 Classification 3 Startup 3 Yara Overview 3 Signature Overview 3 Mitre Att&ck Matrix 4 Behavior Graph 4 Screenshots 4 Thumbnails 4 Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection 4 Initial Sample 5 Dropped Files 5 Domains 5 URLs 5 Domains and IPs 5 Contacted Domains 5 Contacted IPs 5 Public 6 General Information 6 Joe Sandbox View / Context 6 IPs 6 Domains 7 ASN 7 JA3 Fingerprints 7 Dropped Files 7 Runtime Messages 7 Created / dropped Files 7 Static File Info 7 General 8 Network Behavior 8 Network Port Distribution 8 TCP Packets 8 UDP Packets 8 System Behavior 8 Analysis Process: mono-sgen32 PID: 570 Parent PID: 493 8 General 8 Analysis Process: jetbrains-toolbox PID: 570 Parent PID: 493 9 General 9 File Activities 9 File Created 9 File Read 9 File Written 9 Directory Enumerated 9 Directory Created 9 Copyright null 2020 Page 2 of 9 Analysis Report jetbrains-toolbox Overview General Information Detection Signatures Classification Sample jetbrains-toolbox Name: RReeaaddss lllaauunncchhsseerrrvviiicceess ppllliiissttt fffiiillleess Analysis ID: 85 Reads launchservices plist files MD5: 4650b54b3ec808… Ransomware SHA1: 2b9318975b9e56… Miner Spreading SHA256: f1a93cf94ae4e62… mmaallliiiccciiioouusss malicious Evader Phishing Most interesting Screenshot: sssuusssppiiiccciiioouusss