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Published by THE LIBERIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION, INC.

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The Liberian Studies Journal is dedicated to the publication of original research on social, political, economic, scientific, and other issues about Liberia or with implications for Liberia. Opinions of contributors to the Journal do not necessarily reflect the policy of the organizations they represent or the Liberian Studies Association, publisher of the Journal.

Manuscript Requirements

Manuscripts submitted for publication should not exceed 25 typewritten, double-spaced pages, with margins of one-and-a-half inches. The page limit includes graphs, references, tables and appendices. Authors may, in addition to their manuscripts, submit a computer disk of their work preferably in MS Word 2000 or WordPerfect 6.1 for Windows. Notes and references should be placed at the end of the text with headings, e.g., Notes; References. Notes, if any, should precede the references. The Journal is published in June and December. Deadline for the first issue is February, and for the second, August.

Manuscripts should include a cover page that provides the title of the text, author's name, address, phone number, e-mail address, and affiliation. Anonymous referees will review all works.

Manuscripts are accepted in English and French.

Manuscripts must conform to the editorial style of either the Chicago Manual of Style, or The American Psychological Association (APA), or Modern Language Association (MLA).

Authors should send their manuscripts for consideration by regular mail or e- mail attachments to: Al-Hassan Conteh, Editor Liberian Studies Journal, University of Pennsylvania Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict St. Leonard's Court, Suite 305, 3819-33 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104 E-mail:[email protected]

All Book Reviews should be mailed to: William C. Allen, Book Review Editor Liberian Studies Journal, Virginia State University

Department of Languages, 1 Hayden Drive, P.O. Box 9072, Petersburg, VA 23806 E-mail: wallen(cOsu.edu

Cover map: United Nations: Department of Public Affairs, Cartographic Section.

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LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL Editor, Al-Hassan Conteh University of Pennsylvania

Associate Editor, James Guseh Book Review Editor, William C. Allen North Carolina Central University Virginia State University

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD:

William C. Allen, Virginia State University D. Elwood Dunn, The University of the South James N.J. Kollie, Sr. University of Liberia Alpha M. Bah, College of Charleston Warren d'Azevedo, University of Nevada Momo K. Rogers, Kpazolu Media Enterprises Christopher Clapham, Lancaster University Yekutiel Gershoni, Tel Aviv University Thomas Hayden, Society of African Missions Lawrence Breitborde, Knox College Svend E. Holsoe, University of Delaware Romeo E. Philips, Kalamazoo College Coraann Okorodudu, Rowan College of N.J. Henrique F. Tokpa, College

LIBERIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS:

Al-Hassan Conteh, University of Pennsylvania, President Gordon Thomasson, Broome Community College, SUNY/Binghampton, Vice President

Dianne White Oyler, Fayetteville State University (NC), Secretary-Treasurer James Guseh, North Carolina State University, Parliamentarian Yekutiel Gershoni, Tel Aviv University, Past President Timothy A. Rainey, Johns Hopkins University Joseph Holloway, California State University-Northridge

FORMER EDITORS C. William Allen Amos J. Beyan Edward J. Biggane D. Elwood Dunn Svend Holsoe- Jo Sullivan

Edited at the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict and the African Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania

The Editors and Advisory Board gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the Solomon Asch Center and the African Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania in the production of the Journal.

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From the Editor

Envisioning Africa: American Slaves' Ideas about Liberia

Eric Burin 1

`Here We Live under Our Own Vine and Palm Tree': The Syncretism of African and American Worldviews of Americo-Liberian Ex-Slaves. Gabriel Guarino 18

America's African Colonization Movement: Implications for New Jersey and Liberia Edward Lama Wonkeryor 28

A Comment on "Assessing Liberia's Economic Performance and its Impact on Mano River Union Members: 1960-1992" By Anthony Paul Andrews James S. Guseh 43

A Rejoinder to James S. Guseh's Comment Anthony Paul Andrews 54

Recent Publications & Theses 65

Minutes of the 34th Annual Meeting of the Liberian Studies Association .67

Documents 70

A refereed journal that emphasizes the social sciences, humanities and the natural sciences, the Liberian Studies Journal is a semiannual publication devoted to studies on Africa's oldest Republic. The annual subscription rate is US$40.00, US$15 for students, and US$50.00 for institutions. and includes membership in the Liberian Studies Association, Inc. All manuscripts and related matters should be addressed to Dr. Al-Hassan Conteh, Editor, Liberian Studies Journal, Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict, University of Pennsylvania, St. Leonard's Court, Suite 305, 3819-33 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104. Subscriptions and other business matters should be directed to Dr. Dianne Oyler, Secretary-Treasurer, Liberian Studies Association, Inc., Fayetteville State University, P.O. Box 14613, Fayetteville, North Carolina, 28301-4297.

Copyright © 2001 by the Liberian Studies Association ISSN 0024 1989

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor From the Editor Eighteenth century testimonies of former African-American bondpersons who emigrated to Liberia and returned to the United States had destabilizing effects on both the American Colonization Society (ACS) and the slaveholding society of the American south, Eric Burin reports in this issue. The Slave States could not survive with the reports about the benefits of emancipation, which the ACS needed to continue to exist. This survivorship paradox ultimately led to the demise of the ACS. Gabriel Guarino, relying on similar slave narratives, reports that the emigrants' attitudes were mixed and shaped by time and space constructions that were respectively linear and prosaic as opposed to the cyclical and relatively preservationist views of the natives. Both studies corroborate the findings of earlier studies regarding emigrants' mixed attitudes about the ACS, the realities of their voyages to Africa, their new lives, the disease environment in Liberia, and their relationship with the indigenous people of the Grain Coast. Edward Wonkeryor examines the policy implications of the ACS's dilemma in a case study on emigration from New Jersey, where the colonization movement focused its early activities because of that state's thriving black population in the early 1800s. He reports that the probability of African-American emigration from New Jersey to Liberia was very low between 1820 and 1853 and adjoining years, which might also have been due to its Free State status. On another note, James S. Guseh comments on Anthony Paul Andrews' paper published in Vol. 26 No. 2 of the LSJ, about the relationship between ethnopolitical conflict and economic development in the Mano River Union countries of Liberia, and Guinea. The crux of Guseh's concern is that Andrews' model and conclusions are unsupported by his macroeconomic theory and empirical methods. To which Andrews replies that his theory and methods are shored up by recent development in the field that Guseh overlooks. They both agree that further research is needed on the relationship between ethnopolitical conflict and economic development in the Mano River Union, however. We invite others interested in this topic to join the dialogue by submitting original research on the unresolved issues reported by the two scholars in this exchange. We encourage further dialogue on articles published in the LSJ to strengthen the scholarship mission of the Liberian Studies Association. The Editor

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In 1816, whites who wanted to remove blacks from the United States established the American Colonization Society (ACS). With the aid of private organizations, state legislatures, and the federal government, the ACS founded Liberia in 1822. Over the next forty years, approximately 11,000 American blacks settled in the African colony. Nearly 55% of these emigrants were former slaves who had been manumitted on the condition that they go to Liberia. This article examines slaves' pre-emigration ideas about Liberia for the period 1820 to 1840, and how their thoughts and actions affected the colonization movement.2 Previous scholars have paid little attention to slaves' role in the colonization movement. Researchers have generally focused on opinions expressed by ACS officers, abolitionist objectors, and free blacks. In examining bondpersons, this paper does not simply "fill a gap" in the existing literature; it does not merely add another voice to the historiographic clamor. Rather the purpose here is to demonstrate the centrality of slaves' activities to the colonization project. In doing so, it offers new perspectives regarding colonization's relationship with slavery and the reasons for the ACS's downfall. Many of the antislavery accomplishments of the ACS, along with the group's eventual demise, were partially due to slaves' actions.3

I Assistant Professor of History, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND. His areas of interest include African-American, U.S. South, Early National Period, Civil War and Reconstruction issues. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (1999). 2 Statistics for the Liberian emigrant population come from ACS ship registers. I have used these documents to compile a database of all 10,939 blacks who emigrated to Liberia during the antebellum period (hereafter ACS Database). The ship registers are located in four different sources: First, the ACS's The African Repository; second, the organization's Annual Reports; third, the U.S. Congress's Roll of Emigrants that have been sent to the colony of Liberia, Western Africa, by the American Colonization Society and its Auxiliaries, to September, 1843, & c. (28th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 150); and fourth, handwritten passenger lists in the Records of the American Colonization Society, Reel 314 (hereafter RACS). I would like to thank Antonio McDaniel for generously sharing his work on the Liberian emigrant population with me.

3 For scholars have who examined slaves' opinions, see Randall M. Miller, ed., "Dear Master": Letters of a Slave Family (1979; reprint, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990); Bell I. Wiley, ed., Slaves No More: Letters from Liberia, 1833-1869 (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1980). For both antislavery and proslavery interpretations of the ACS, see footnote 3, below. For a discussion of the viability of colonization from a scholar contends that the program was not doomed, see William W. Freehling, The Reintegration of American History: Slavery and the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 138-157.

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Bondpersons who contemplated going to Liberia consulted a variety of sources about the African settlement. They conferred with their owners, ACS agents, colonization's foes, and-most credibly, from the slaves' perspective-Liberian colonists. The resulting cacophony of advice had two ramifications. First, it vexed the deliberating bondpersons. Some declined going to Liberia. Others went, only to discover that they had grossly underestimated the settlement's many imperfections. Second, slaves' efforts to learn about Liberia contributed to the collapse of the colonization movement in the South. Whereas bondpersons demanded information about the colony (especially from blacks who had been to Liberia), southern whites wanted to suppress communications about freedom (especially from blacks who had been to Liberia). In short, the very thing that promised some success for the ACS also insured the organization's ultimate failure.

The ACS and Slavery Scholars have long debated the ACS's relationship with slavery. Through the first half of the twentieth century, most historians portrayed the ACS as a conservative antislavery institution, a group that hoped to erode black bondage gradually and peacefully. Phillip Staudenraus advanced this argument most persuasively in The African Colonization Movement (1961), a book still considered the standard work on the topic. During the Civil Rights Era, however, researchers increasingly questioned the organization's antislavery credentials. This trend has continued of late. Over the last fifteen years, scholarship by Amos Beyan, Antonio McDaniel, Wilson J. Moses, and Lamin Sanneh have all suggested that the ACS did more to help than to hurt slavery.4

4 Henry N. Sherwood, "The Formation of the American Colonization Society," The Journal of Negro History 2, no. 3 (July 1917): 209-228; Early Fox, The American Colonization Society, 1817-1840 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1919); Frederic Bancroft, "The Colonization of American Negroes, 1801-1865," in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., Frederic Bancroft: Historian (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), 147-258; P. J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), vii; Leon F. 'Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 28-29; Eugene H. Berwanger, The Frontier Against Slavery.. Western Anti-Negro Prejudice and the Slavery Extension Controversy (Urbana, IL: The University of Illinois Press, 1967), 4-5; V. Jacque Voegeli, Free But Not Equal. The Midwest and the Negro during the Civil War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 22-25; Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men.. The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 269-280; George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind. The Debate on Afro- American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), 1-34; Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters.. The Free Negro in the Antebellum South (New York: The New Press, 1974), 106, 168; 355-60;

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There can be little doubt that certain aspects of the colonization movement strengthened the South's "peculiar institution." For example, nearly 38% of ACS emigrants were free blacks, yet free blacks constituted only 13% of the black population during the 1820-1860 period. In other words, the ACS devoted a sizable portion of its resources to removing blacks that were already free. The underlying ideology of the movement was even more maleficent. By insisting that African Americans could never secure equality in the United States, by maintaining that blacks could reach their full potential only in Liberia, ACS advocates pardoned-even abetted-white racism. Yet if the demography and ideology of the Liberian project cast doubt on the ACS's antislavery reputation, other evidence suggests that it was not just a proslavery facade.5 For starters, the ACS orchestrated the manumission of 6,000 slaves. While some scholars have contended that occasional liberations strengthened slavery by exacting obedience from eager bondpersons, those who participated in emancipations saw things differently. Southern whites inveighed against ACS manumissions, insisting that such activities destabilized black bondage. The problem, from their viewpoint, stemmed from slaves' agency in the affairs: Because emigration to Africa was supposed to be a voluntary endeavor, ACS emancipators gave their bondpersons the choice of remaining bonded in America or being free in Liberia. ACS manumissions were not

Floyd Miller, The Search for Black Nationality: Black Emigration and Colonization, 1787-1863 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Leonard I. Sweet, Black Images of America, 1784-1870 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976), 23-124; Leonard P. Curry, The Free Black in Urban America, 1800-1850: The Shadow of the Dream (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 232-236. Several scholars continued to focus on the antislavery aspects of colonization. See, for example, Penelope Campbell, Maryland in Africa: The Maryland State Colonization Society, 1831-1857 (Urbana, IL: The University of Illinois Press, 1971), 242-243; Miller, "Dear Master"; Wiley, Slaves No More. Amos Beyan, The American Colonization Society and the Creation of the Liberian State (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991); Antonio McDaniel, Swing Low, Sweet Chariot: The Mortality Cost of Colonizing Liberia in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 47; Wilson Jeremiah Moses, ed., Liberian Dreams: Back-to-Africa Narratives from the 1850s (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), xvii; Lamin Sanneh, Abolitionists Abroad: American Blacks and the Making of Modern West Africa (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 216- 217. See also, Douglas R. Egerton, Charles Fenton Mercer and the Trail of National Conservatism (Jackson and London: University Press of Mississippi, 1989), 107-108, 243. 5 ACS Database; Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters, 136-137; Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind, 28; Moses, Liberian Dreams, xvii; Sanneh, Abolitionists Abroad, 216-217.

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unilateral acts by slaveholders. They entailed myriad activities on the slaves' part, as wel1.6 Bondpersons' thoughts and actions were informed by the context of the times. Their choice was not between a liberty-laden but uncertain future in Africa and a somber but stable servitude in America. Rather, slaves selected from two unpalatable, volatile scenarios. Uncertainty always harried bondpersons. The death of an owner-to take a familiar example-had the potential to wreck havoc on slaves' lives. But the 1820s and 1830s were especially tenuous times for bondpersons. By then, a mounting conservative storm had swept the South off its half-hearted course of Revolutionary liberalism. Moreover, slave mortality rates remained appallingly high. Finally, with cotton's westward expansion, Upper South slaves were forcibly moved to the Lower South with their owners or, even more likely, were sucked into the abyss of the interstate slave trade. So whatever doubts slaves harbored about Liberia, they could be equally unsure about their future in America.' So what factors weighed most heavily in minds of bondpersons who considered going to Africa? Unlike free blacks, who sometimes saw emigration as a business endeavor or missionary enterprise, slaves were not obsessed about commercial and religious matters. Of course, bondpersons thought about how they would make a living in Africa, and some hoped to preach to indigenous Africans, but other issues dominated their deliberations. Familial considerations were unquestionably the preeminent factor in slaves' decisions concerning emigration to Liberia. Their ideas about Africa, it turned out, were also vitally important.8

6 ACS Database; Berlin, Slaves Without Masters, 149; Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 217. For rebuked emancipators, see John Paxton, Letters on Slavery, Addressed to the Cumberland Congregation, Virginia (Lexington, KY: Abraham T. Skillman, 1833), 10; Caspar Morris, Memoir of Miss Margaret Mercer (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1848), 121; C.W. Andrews, Memoir of Ann R. Page (1856; reprint; New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1987), 35. 7 Michael Tadman, Speculators and Slaves: Masters, Traders, and Slaves in the Old South (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Donald R. Wright, African Americans in the Early Republic, 1789-1831 (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1993). 8 Eric Burin, "'If the rest stay, I will stay-If they go, I will go': How Slaves' Familial Bonds Affected American Colonization Society Manumissions," in Jack Greene, Randy Sparks, and Rosemary Brana-Shute, eds., Manumission in the Atlantic World (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, forthcoming).

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Learning About Liberia: American Sources Bondpersons had several ways of learning about Liberia. They could start with their own families and communities. As Sterling Stuckey and others have argued, the retention of African cultural characteristics among slaves was extensive. Additionally, bondpersons might have also consulted actual Africans. Despite 1808 federal law, which banned slave importations, an estimated 10,000 bondpersons were illegally smuggled into the United States every year. Indeed, a handful of emigrants are listed in the ACS ship registers as Africans. Yet the African influence should not be overstated. Liberian emigrants simply did not identify with indigenous peoples. Numerous settler- native conflicts amply demonstrated the limits of pan-Africanism among freedpersons. As one bondman contemptuously remarked, "if we have any ancestors they could not have been like these hostile tribes in this part of Africa."9 Candid slaveholders also alerted their bondpersons to Liberia's attributes and shortcomings. As Ann R. Page of Virginia readied her slaves for emigration, for example, she told them to expect adversity in Africa. Another Virginian, John Hartwell Cocke, offered his bondpersons similar advice, as did John McDonough of Louisiana. Mississippian Edward Brett Randolph likewise warned his slaves that sickness and poverty-pervaded Liberia. Although abolitionists alleged that colonizationists cast unprofitable and unwary bondpersons to the wilds of Africa, few ACS emancipators acted malevolently or improvidently. To the best of their ability, they prepared their bondpersons for freedom in Liberia. To the best of their knowledge, they informed their slaves of the colony's flaws. Most freedpersons suffered anyway, but their misfortunes cannot be ascribed to malicious intentions or cunning deceptions.") ACS agents discussed Liberia with potential emigrants, too. The officials' information about the colony was less than perfect, but they knew more than most people and the facts were downright disturbing. ACS recruiters were presumably familiar with a medical report that was authored by a Dr. Henderson and presented to the ACS Board of Managers in May 1832. According to the report, the "acclimating fever" alone was killing one out of every six emigrants. Henderson analyzed the matter thoroughly. He showed

9 Sterling Stuckey, Slave Culture: Nationalist Theory & the Foundations of Black America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 3-98; Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), 25; Svend E. Holsoe, "A Study of Relations Between Settlers and Indigenous Peoples in Western Liberia, 1821-1847," African Historical Studies IV (1971): 331-362; Peyton Skipwith to John H. Cocke, 22 April 1840, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 53. I° Andrews, Memoir of Ann R. Page, 53, 58; Miller, "Dear Master", 35; John T. Edwards, ed., Some Interesting Papers of John McDonogh (McDonogh, Md.: Boys of McDonogh School, 1898), 49-50; Niles' Weekly Register Vol. XLIX, No. 1 (21 Nov. 1835), 195.

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when emigrants could be sent out most safely and compared how persons from different regions of America fared in Liberia. So when ACS agents conversed with slaves, they knew what they were talking about. Whether they spoke forthrightly with would-be emigrants is another matter." ACS officials may not have flat-out lied to slaves and their owners, but they seldom committed acts of full disclosure either. In 1828 and 1829, the ACS sent 346 blacks to Liberia; twenty-five percent of them died before 1830. Nevertheless, ACS agent Ralph Gurley informed one supporter whose mother had sent slaves to Liberia that "the intelligence from the Colony is of a very encouraging character." In 1832, Gurley was again playing a shell game with the facts of colonization and, by extension, the lives of emigrants. By then, another 740 American blacks had gone to Liberia (twenty percent of whom perished) and Henderson's medical report had come out, yet Gurley wrote a Virginia slaveholder who was about to send slaves to Liberia that the latest word out of colony was heartening.I2 No doubt ACS leaders did receive positive reports from some well-situated colonists. Yet their over-reliance on such materials left bondpersons with misconceptions about Liberia. Colonization representatives denied that they suppressed unfavorable intelligence. "Our managers are exceedingly anxious to know the truth concerning the colony," professed Gurley, who then added, "even should it be distressing." Gurley was sincere about this matter. Maybe too sincere. He desperately wanted the colonization movement to succeed, and truly desired accurate information about Liberia. Yet the zealousness, which prompted him to seek reliable data, left him in a poor position to interpret it. Simply put, his dedication to the cause predisposed him to highlight the encouraging reports and downplay-even dismiss-the disparaging ones.13 To the extent that ACS agents conceded Liberia's problems, they had ready explanations for the setbacks. Pointing to America's own early history, they asserted that colonization was an indelicate business. "You must expect disappointments, and difficulties, and troubles in every place," they warned future colonists, "and it is only by perseverance that any body succeeds." Those who practiced prudence would be spared in Africa: "Foolish and unnecessary exposure to the dew and night air, and the indulgence of their appetites," they averred, "have caused the death of many emigrants before they had become accustomed to the climate." In effect, the ACS blamed the victims for their own misfortune.'4

11 One version of Henderson's report is printed in McDaniel, Swing Slow, Sweet Chariot, 153-157. 12 R. R. Gurley to Mrs. M. B. Blackford, 19 May 1830, Folder 2, Blackford Family Papers, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (hereafter UNC- CH); R.R Gurley to Major Robert Hairston, 6 October 1832, Wilson and Hairston Family Papers, Box 14, Folder 126, UNC-CH. 13 R. R. Gurley to Mrs. Mary B. Blackford, 18 August 1838, Folder 5, Blackford Family Papers, UNC -CH. 14 Samuel Wilkenson, "To the Emigrants now preparing to embark for Liberia" (27 January 1840), RACS, Reel 319.

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To the consternation of colonization officials, slaves also learned about Liberia from the ACS's opponents. Whether northern abolitionists' diatribes against the ACS reached the slave quarters is uncertain, although David Walker's Appeal, with its blistering attack on colonization, definitely circulated in the South. But even if northern remonstrations did not reach slaves' ears, there was still plenty of anti-ACS squabbling in the South. Free black protests against colonization occurred in Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, while other southern cities such as Charleston and Richmond witnessed heated debates on the topic. Even southern whites joined the anti- Liberian refrain. As one colonization agent pointed out, individuals freed by testamentary decree often declined going to Africa because the deceased's kin-who were the heirs at law and would be entitled to the blacks that refused to emigrate-would disingenuously tell slaves that death and deprivation awaited them in Africa. Even if bondpersons recognized the heirs' wile, the warnings, especially if corroborated by other sources, had to be taken seriously.15

Learning About Liberia: Returnees Slaves who desired a clear picture of Liberia confronted a puzzle of incongruous pieces. The information offered by their owners, colonization officials, interested onlookers, ACS opponents, and the occasional African simply did not fit together. ACS workers knew that bondpersons were likely to discard their accounts first. In 1818, before the ACS had sent a single person to Africa, Robert G. Harper offered an easy answer to this credibility question. "However distrustful of whites, they will confide in the reports made to them by the people of their own color and class," he wrote.16 Harper was thinking about free blacks at the time, but his remarks applied equally to slaves. For bondpersons who were considering emigration, blacks who had visited Liberia provided the most reliable information about the colony. Many freedpersons were eager to leave Liberia. All totaled, between 1820 and 1843, eighteen percent of manumitted colonists quit the colony. Yet getting back to the United States was a very difficult task. Most southern states did not permit the return of freedpersons and even if they had, financial obstacles made a journey to America virtually impossible for most of the ex- slaves. As one former bondman, John M. Page, Sr., complained, a voyage from Monrovia to Baltimore cost about $40 or $50. Then there were additional expenditures for transportation to one's fmal destination, housing, food, and other sundry items. Obviously, individuals who lacked sufficient

15 Sean Wilentz, introduction to David Walker's Appeal, by David Walker (1829; reprint, New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), xiv-xv; William Lloyd Garrison, Thoughts on Colonization (1832; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1968); Marie Tyler-McGraw, "Richmond Free Blacks and African Colonization, 1816-1832," Journal of American Studies Vol. 21, No. 2 (Aug. 1987): 207-224; Campbell, Maryland in Africa 177-178. 16 William H. Pease and Jane H. Pease, eds., The Antislavery Argument (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 31.

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food and clothing were in no pecuniary position to go to America. As a result, only twenty percent of the former slaves who left Liberia managed to return to the U.S. The others mostly went to Sierra Leone or Cape Palmas, the latter being a comparatively well-run settlement established by the independently operated Maryland Colonization Society (MCS).17 Despite the impediments, between 1820 and 1843, 113 emigrants returned to the United States. Nearly 80% of them were originally residents of the South, and over half of these were manumitted colonists.18 Not surprisingly, those that came back had more resources to draw on than other ex-slaves in Liberia. For example, whereas ten percent of freed persons during this time period could read or write, 38% of the liberated returnees boasted some degree of literacy.19 In a like manner, women were under-represented in this reverse migration. During the first two decades of Liberian colonization, forty-five percent of the emancipated emigrants were females. Yet women constituted only sixteen percent of manumitted returnees. Had females and illiterate emigrants-two groups that fared poorly in Liberia-been better represented among the returnees, the African colony's reputation would have been worse among American blacks. Not that Liberia's standing was particularly good. The freedpersons who made it to America told stories about wild beasts, hostile natives, and harrowing conditions in settlement. When a Mr. Pee le of Northampton County, North Carolina sent forty-five slaves to Liberia in 1828, he was the largest emancipator to date. After eight of his former bondpersons died within their first year in Africa, one of remaining emigrants, William Pee le, rushed back to America. The following year, two of Margaret Mercer's ex-slaves quit Liberia. Franklin Anderson sent six slaves to the African colony in 1830. Five of them were dead by year's end, and the sole survivor, thirty-year old Charity Claget, returned to America in 1831. Although Hubbard Elder's former bondpersons did comparatively well-only three of the sixteen died- two of them came back to the United States after one year in Liberia. To be sure, not all of the returning freedpersons defamed Liberia. Some admired the colony, and sojourned to America only to secure their kin's liberty. From the ACS's perspective, though, such affairs were rarities. Most of the returning

17 ACS Database. Returnee statistics exclude the 984 ex-slaves who died in Liberia between 1820 and 1843. Of the 1,200 remaining freedpersons, 214, or 17.8%, departed the colony. John M Page, Sr., to Charles W. Andrews, n.d. but probably 1840, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 103-104. See also, Examination ofMr. Thomas C. Brown, A Free Colored Citizen of S. Carolina, as to the Actual State of Things in Liberia in the Years 1833 and 1834, at the Chatham Street Chapel, May 0 and 10th, 1834 (New York: S. W. Benedict & Co. Printers, 1834), 9. 18 ACS Database. It is not certain whether they returned to their original residences, or went to some other part of the country. 19 Figures are for persons age ten or older.

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor ERIC BURIN 9 freedpersons had found Liberia disappointing, and expressed their discontent to anyone who would listen.2° Free blacks who left Liberia for America confirmed these melancholy tales. As was the case with manumitted returnees, the southern free blacks that came back were disproportionately skilled, literate males, and, like their ex-slave counterparts, some of them praised Liberia. Frederick James emigrated in 1820, and on a subsequent visit to America, he told free blacks in both the North and South about Liberia's virtues. George McPherson was another Liberian devotee who criss-crossed the ocean several times, spreading the good word on each trip. Richmond free blacks heard positive reports from several of their former neighbors. None outdid Lott Cary. A tobacconist who emigrated in 1821, Cary did not return to America but in letters and articles he contested inimical rumors about Liberia and encouraged blacks to emigrate there. "You will never know, w [h] ether you are men or monkies so long as you remain in America," taunted Cary in 1827. "I shall believe you to be men [,] when I see you conducting the affairs of your own Government," he continued, "and not before."21 These southern free black promoters were weak voices straining to overcome a chorus of anti-Liberia invective. Even in Richmond African Americans grew skeptical. Cary himself died in battle in 1828-an untimely demise that caused many blacks to question the sagacity of emigrating. To worsen matters, the following year, Gilbert Hunt, a quarrelsome man who had purchased his freedom and then moved to Liberia, returned to Richmond thoroughly disgusted with the colony. Along with him came three other dissatisfied persons. Richmond free blacks' interest in colonization declined precipitously thereafter. One dejected ACS official knew exactly why the city's African Americans had turned their backs on Liberia, simply noting, "I fear they have received unfavorable accounts."22 Perhaps the most devastating attack came from Thomas C. Brown. In 1833, Brown emigrated from Charleston, a city that, like Richmond, had witnessed a fair amount of free black interest in colonization. After fourteen frustrating, sorrowful months in Liberia, Brown returned to America, where his disillusionment became fodder for anti-ACS forces. Brown claimed that the ACS had deceived him. "My expectations had been raised by the Colonization Society," he explained, insisting that his disappointment was by no means unusual. Bemoaning the infirm economy, political oligarchy, and graveyards that "always look[ed] fresh," Brown asserted that "Great numbers would like to come back, and had rather suffer slavery than stay in that

20 n preceding examples were all drawn from the ACS Database. 21 Tyler-McGraw, "Richmond Free Blacks and African Colonization," 220. Cary quoted in John Saillant, "Circular Address to the Colored Brethren and Friends in America: An Unpublished Essay by Lott Cary, Sent from Liberia to Virginia, 1827," The Magazine of History and Biography Vol. 104, No. 4 (Autumn 1996): 494, 495. 22 McGraw, "Richmond Free Blacks and African Colonization, 1816-1832," 221; ACS official quoted in Salient, "Circular Addressed to the Colored Brethren and Friends in America," 485.

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country and starve." Brown added that this feeling was not confined to the poorest colonists: "Some who appear to be doing well are anxious to remove from that country." ACS officials disputed Brown's testimony, but without success. For African Americans, the scale of truth always tipped in favor of blacks' accounts of Liberia.23 Colonization agents acknowledged the influence that returnees were having on their movement. They responded by denigrating displeased returnees and inviting carefully selected colonists to promote their program among African Americans. For example, in 1833 the Maryland Colonization Society (MCS), worried about the unfavorable reports coming out of the colony, asked Jacob Prout to talk with blacks about the enterprise and to head the upcoming expedition of the Lafayette. Prout, a twenty-nine year old, literate free black from Baltimore, had sailed to Liberia aboard the Indian Chief in 1826. He was visiting America when the MCS made its offer, and, after a moment's reflection, agreed to the bargain. When nearly 150 blacks sailed to Africa shortly thereafter, colonization leaders were convinced that Prout's efforts had been instrumental in making the expedition a success.24 A few years later, the Maryland Society once again used an emigrant to advance the colonization cause. This time they picked Alexander Hance, who had taken up residence in Africa in the mid-1830s. The move had required Hance to leave his children in Maryland, and the separation left the freedman in emotional agony. In 1835, he implored colonization officials to help him buy his offspring, declaring, "I Cannot bear the idea of staying heare without them. For if it is ten or twelve years to com I will go Back Again to them." As it turned out, Hance was in Maryland within two years, trumpeting colonization to blacks and trying to arrange the emancipation of his children. From the colonization agents' perspective, the affair was a resounding success-thanks to Hance's efforts, eighty-five blacks, whom the Society officers deemed "generally respectable people," boarded the Niobe in November 1837 and headed for western Africa. A less-enthused Hance was more ambivalent about the venture. On one hand, he had managed to purchase his children's freedom. On the other hand, the new colonists were dissatisfied with Cape Palmas and the old ones were eager to settle some festering grievances against Hance. "I regret my trop [trip] to America," he wrote in April 1838, noting that his detractors "would deprive me of my existance were it in their power."25

23 Examination of Mr. Thomas C. Brown, 7 (first quote), 8 (second quote), 9 (third quote). For a similar tale that involved a highly-touted colonist, see Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., -To be truly free': Louis Sheridan and the Colonization of Liberia," Civil War History Vol. XXIX, No. IV (December 1983): 342-344. 24 Campbell, Maryland in Africa, 44, 46, 48, 110. 25 Alexander Hance to William McKenney, 19 March 1835, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 217 (first quote); Jno. H. B. Latrobe to "The Master of the Brig Niobe," 24 November 1837, Reel 27, Maryland State Colonization Society Papers, Microfilm Edition, University of Southern Mississippi (second quote)

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Colonists who toured America at the behest of colonization officials were not simply tools of calculating whites. They profited from the arrangements, too. As we have seen, Alexander Hance obtained his children's liberty. Similarly, Jacob Prout's position as leader of the Lafayette party gave him power-a power that he arrogantly abused by having his way with the ship's provisions and women. Colonization leaders were dismayed when they heard of Prout's transgressions, but they never doubted that former colonists were indispensable in promoting the movement. Indeed, they embraced this strategy throughout the antebellum era, implementing it in both the North and South. As time passed, the returnees encountered more and more opposition. Spirited northern abolitionists and outraged southern whites made the recruiters' job almost impossible. Yet, in the end, colonization leaders had little choice but to stick with the black boosters.26

Learning about Liberia: Letters Slaves who did not have the opportunity to converse with a previous emigrant relied on the next best thing-a letter from Liberia. Colonists who corresponded with Americans had their own agendas, so deliberating slaves had to take their advice with a grain of salt. Epistlers who desperately needed whites' aid, for example, tailored their remarks to achieve that goal. An exceptionally perspicacious bondperson might also have considered who was producing the missives: Most letter writers were literate, adult men, and that group tended to think more highly of Liberia than, say, illiterate widows or unskilled oldsters. Nevertheless, bondpersons had good reason to take the colonists at their word. If nothing else, they were blacks who had personally experienced Liberia, and that was important to slaves. Moreover, the epistlers were not strangers; oftentimes, they were the kin or close friends of the inquiring bondpersons. As such, they wanted slaves to make well-informed decisions, and consequently represented Liberia's delights and defects in a frank and honest manner.27 Not surprisingly, some freedpersons advised black Americans to forget about coming to Liberia. For example, Kentuckian George Crawford was an ex-slave who emigrated with his recently manumitted wife aboard the Ajax in 1833. The enterprise was a disaster. The ACS reported that one third of ship's colonists died during their first year in Liberia. Crawford thought the figure higher-more like eighty percent had perished, he estimated. When one of the survivors, Samuel Jones, decided to return to Kentucky, Crawford asked him to pass along a letter to his former master. In the missive, Crawford discussed the colony's problems and counseled against a mass migration. Two years later, he again wrote his old owner, reiterating his criticisms of Liberia. He bemoaned the lack of dray animals and cursed the dense forests that were

(hereafter USM); Alexander Hance to J. H. B. Latrobe, 7 April 1838, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 218-219 (third quote). 26 Campbell, Maryland in Africa, 111. 27 Wi ley, Slaves No More, 7-9.

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor 12 Envisioning Africa home to depredating leopards. For Crawford, the lesson was clear: "This is not the place for the general imagration of the coloured people."28 Females could be even more monitory. In 1833, the twelve-year-old Diana Skipwith went to Liberia with her parents and five siblings. Her mother, one sister, and one brother soon passed away. Her father, Peyton, initially deplored Liberia, but after a few years he slowly began to embrace the colony. Diana remained convinced that it was a horrid place. She wanted to return to America, and told slaves at her former master's plantation that "They had better be thire [than] to be hear Sufferin En lest they had Some money to Start with." The next year, she again brought up the possibility of returning to America. Even a short stay would be nice, she sighed. Diana wistfully concluded that it would be impossible for her to make the trip. Her increasingly optimistic father might go, but because he would entrust the care of his remaining children to no one but Diana, she was obliged to stay in Africa. Peyton's proposed visitation never materialized, but had it occurred, he surely would have offered slaves different advice than his downcast daughter.29 Some ex-slaves entreated their bonded brethren to move to Africa. When he lived in Frederksburg, Virginia, James C. Minor had heard all the acerbic complaints about Liberia, but the bondman emigrated anyway. Once in Africa, he wondered why others from his old home had not followed. "Surely they do not shrink back for the fabrications of its enemies," he roared. Another former bondman, Paul Lansay, held comparable views. Although emigration entailed a heart-wrenching departure from his enslaved wife and children, Lansay believed he had made the right choice and that others might learn from his example. "[I] f any of my friends enquire about me," Lansay wrote a colonization official in 1839, "tell them I am under my own vine and fig tree [and] none dare molest nor make me afraid." Like Minor and Lansay, the ex-slave Henry Hanon was enamoured with Africa and challenged those who held contrary opinions. "[T] here have bin some persons gone to america from this place and have said th [e] y could not live hear," wrote Hanon in 1840, three years after his arrival in Cape Palmas. "[T] h [e] y could not live in the bank of money if th [e] y were put in [one]," he countered, "th [e] y ...cannot work." Since there was no consensus among the letter writers, the advice they offered, when combined with counsel of returnees and other persons in America, further muddled bondpersons' conceptions of Liberia.3°

28 George Crawford to John M. McCalla, 3 May 1834, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 251, 252 (quote); George Crawford to John M. McCalla, 25 September 1836, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 252. 29 Diana Skipwith to Sally Cocke, 7 May 1838, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 42 (quote); Diana Skipwith to Louisa Cocke, 20 May 1839, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 46. 30 James C. Minor to Ralph R. Gurley, 11 February 1833, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 17 (first quote); Paul F. Lansay to John H. B. Latrobe, 16 January 1839, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 219 (second quote); W. Wayne Smith, "A Marylander in Africa: The Letters of Henry Harmon," Maryland Historical Magazine Vol. 69 No. 4 (1974): 399 (third quote).

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Refusals Repelled by the uncertainty, a fair number of slaves refused to emigrate to Liberia. For example, when two Maryland brothers-in-law, the Rev. Henry B. Goodwin and John D. Parkham, intended to manumit and colonize over thirty bondpersons, many of their slaves objected and one reportedly rebuked his owner for proposing the scheme. William Mc Kenny, the agent for the Maryland Society, deftly explained the wisdom of emigration to the bondpersons. Their masters had acted benignly and generously, he asserted. Their children would escape racial oppression. The law demanded their removal. Mc Kenny's pleadings proved largely futile. When the emigrant ship departed Baltimore in 1835, most of Goodwin's and Parkham's slaves remained on shore.31 The two thwarted slaveholders responded to the episode quite differently. At first, Parkham was quite calm about the matter. His patience soon expired, though, and he requested that the local sheriff transport his ex- slaves out of the state, as the law required. Goodwin took the affair in stride. He seriously pondered why so many of his slaves had rejected his offer of freedom in Africa. For generations, he thought, blacks had encountered whites who professed benevolence, but betrayed them in the end. From the blacks' perspective, Goodwin speculated, white altruism must have seemed like a contradiction in terms. No wonder they declined going to Liberia. Goodwin held out the hope that those who had emigrated would send back positive reports and thereby induce the doubters to reconsider their positions. In the meantime, he hired his former bondpersons, and discovered they were more productive as free laborers than as slaves.32 Goodwin and Parkham could have conferred with many other foiled emancipators. Indeed, many of the well-known liberators of this era encountered individuals who rejected their professed benevolence. Mary Blackford, Margaret Mercer, Anne Page, Edward Brett Randolph, Hubbard Elder, Richard Bibb, Emily Tubman, and John Rex-to cite just a few-all confronted bondpersons who were unwilling to move overseas. We will never know how many slaves fell into this category. But enough did to demonstrate slaves' affinity for their kin in America and their concerns about adversity in Africa.33

31 W. Mc Kenny to C. Harper, et al, 29 April 1835; W. Mc Kenny to C. Howard, 28 May 1835, and W. Mc Kenny to Charles Howard, 1 June 1835, Papers of the Maryland State Colonization Society, Microfilm Edition, Reel 27, USM. 32 Campbell, Maryland in Africa, 104-106. 33 L. Minor Blackford, Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: The Story of a Virginia Lady Mary Berkeley Minor Blackford, 1802-1896, Who taught her sons to hate Slavery and to love the Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 20, 45, 31; Caspar Morris, Memoir of Miss Margaret Mercer (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1848); Will of Edward Brett Randolph, 9 May 1848, Randolph-Sherman Papers, Mississippi State

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Slaves not only reserved the right of refusal, they exercised this prerogative in ways that flabbergasted white colonizationists. Consider the deeds of Peter Fischer's and Alexander Donelson's bondpersons. In 1827, Fisher died and left a will which called for the emancipation of his slaves. Heirs contested the will, but in 1834 the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the bondpersons should be sent to Liberia. Chief Justice John Catron explained that the state's laws prohibited the freedpersons from remaining in Tennessee while "moral duty" proscribed their being sent to other states. White northerners, Catron predicted, would brutalize the newly liberated blacks. "In the non-slaveholding states," he elaborated, "the people are less accustomed to the squalid and disgusting wretchedness of the negro, [and] have less sympathy for him..." Unbeknownst to Catron, the freedpersons wanted to assess northern Negrophobia for themselves. Two years after the court decision, Fisher's former slaves, along with others who had been manumitted by Alexander Donelson, headed east toward the embarkation port of Norfolk. But when the group reached Pittsburgh, most of the freedpersons deserted the emigrant party. Only four members of the group-all Donelson slaves-left for Liberia. Slave refusals, whether occurring on the plantation, during the trip to port, while awaiting embarkation, or on the day of departure, exasperated colonization officials. "There may be those among the colored population," the ACS Board of Managers finally lashed out, "who are incapable of fully appreciating the blessings of colonization."34

Landing in Liberia: Emigrant Attitudes upon Arriving in Africa For those slaves who settled in Liberia, did the situation there conform to their expectations? Randall Miller, Bell Wiley, and other scholars have analyzed whether new arrivals liked Liberia. The concern here is slightly different: Were freedpersons surprised by conditions in the colony? The two subjects are closely related, perhaps inextricably connected. But an exclusive focus on the latter question would yield insights concerning slaves' pre- emigration ideas about Africa. The extent of surprise among new arrivals, it stands to reason, reflects how well they had been briefed before embarkation.35 A small number of freedpersons felt that they had been reasonably well informed about the settlement. Jacob Gibson landed in Cape Palmas on

University; Elder v. Elder's Ex'or 1833 WL 2083 (Va.); James M. Gifford, "Emily Tubman and the African Colonization Movement in Georgia," The Georgia Historical Quarterly Vol. LIX No. 1 (Spring 1975):10-24; Memory F. and Thornton W. Mitchell, "The Philanthropic Bequests of John Rex of Raleigh, Part I" The North Carolina Historical Review Vol. XLIX No. 3 (July 1972): 254-279. 34 Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs and others (Tn., 1834) (1834 WL 996 *6 [both quotes](Tnn.Err. & App.); African Repository Vol. 13 (January 1837): 5; ACS, Annual Report, Vol. 31. 35 Wiley, Slaves No More, 16; Miller, "Dear Master", 43, 45-46; Randall Miller, "'Home as Found': Ex-Slaves and Liberia," Liberian Studies Journal V, 2 (1975): 92-108.

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23 August 1833, and one week later notified two colonization officials, "I can say that I have realized all that I expected." The former Virginia bondman Sampson Caesar expressed almost the same sentiments upon his arrival in Liberia in January 1834. But Gibson and Caesar were unusual in this regard. Even the most wary freedpersons found that the situation in Liberia surpassed their direst suppositions.36 When the brothers Jesse and Mars Lucas arrived in Liberia with their respective families in late January 1830, they initially indicated that their new home exceeded their expectations. Mars announced to his former master that he was much pleased with the colony, and would not have believed its splendid condition unless he had seen it for himself. Unfortunately, the undertaking suddenly unraveled. Jesse's wife soon passed away; then three of his children died. The Lucases began reassessing their situation. The despairing brothers concluded that they had been misinformed about the colony. "The reports is all a lie, merely to encourage people to come to this country," complained Mars in June 1830. Although the siblings eventually grew accustomed to their new home, they never escaped hardship or the sense that they had been deceived. "We never knew what slavery was until we came to this country," they wrote in 1836, "& that is the cry of living man in the colony. X37 Once Alexander Hance settled in Cape Palmas he found that, for the most part, he had been well briefed about the colony. But he also noted that colonization agents had left out some very important particulars. For example, there were no dray animals. "[W] e have no way to till the ground without them," exclaimed Hance. Moreover, colonization leaders were mistaken in assuming that new colonists could get themselves situated in six months time. Hance's effrontery soon earned him an admonishing letter from the Maryland Society. Hance replied that, yes, he had responsibility to be obedient to God and man, but he also owed an allegiance to the truth. "I did state to Mr gould that things was not hear as you tole us," Hance informed two officials, reiterating his complaint that it took longer than six months to establish oneself

36 Jacob Gibson to John H. Latrobe and William Mc Kenney, 31 August 1833, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 216; Sampson Ceasar to David S. Haselden, 7 February 1834, Sampson Ceasar Letters, University of Virginia (hereafter UVA) 37 Mars Lucas to Mr. Townsend Heaton, 12 March 1830 (first quote); Mars Lucas to Townsend Heaton, 19 June 1830 (second quote); Jesse and Mars Lucas to "Dear Friends", 24 April 1836, (third quote), all in Lucas-Heaton Letters, Alderman Library, University of Virginia (hereafter UVA). See also, Marie Tyler-McGraw, "The Prize I Mean is the Prize of Liberty': A Loudoun County Family in Liberia," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 97, no. 3 (July 1989): 355-374.

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in the colony. And since he was on the topic of emigrant expectations, Hance added, "I want you to send me the shoe tools & leather what promste me..."38 Despite the tiff, the relationship between Hance and colonization officials was not exclusively, or even generally, antagonistic. Although annoyed on occasion, Hance liked Liberia and thought that other blacks should emigrate. In a similar way, Maryland colonization officials, though sometimes piqued by the forceful Hance, also recognized a potential ally in the strong- minded, persuasive freedman. Thus in 1837, the MCS asked Hance to promote its cause in Maryland. He did so, and upon his return to Cape Palmas, he had an eerie sense of déjà vu. Hance became one of the few people to have been surprised by conditions in the colony twice. Perhaps when Hance was in America, eagerly championing Liberia and working for his children's freedom, he came to believe his own acclamations. This might explain why, when he came back to Cape Palmas, he claimed that the settlement had seriously deteriorated. "[I]t really astonished me to see it in that time how the colony had fallen from its former prospects," he professed, specifically noting that "it is in quite abad sutuation both in regard to provisions & Government." If Hance and the emigrants he had recruited were taken aback by the situation in Cape Palmas, the colonial authorities there were equally astonished at this new contingent of settlers. The recent arrivals were purportedly exigent, unruly, and shockingly immodest. "[T] hey were a scandal to our quiet town...," asserted John B. Russwurm, governor of the Maryland colony.39 Malinda Rex was also gravely disappointed with her new surroundings. Rex, along with sixteen other bondpersons, had been liberated by the will of her former master, John Rex of Raleigh, North Carolina. One of the freedpersons refused to go to Liberia, and after her arrival in Africa, the forty-year-old Malinda probably wished she had done the same. Whereas one of the party's members, Abraham Rex, managed to return to America, Malinda had no choice but to remain in the colony. A few months after moving to Africa, she wrote the executor of her former master's estate:

I am not satisfied. I have not found nothing as they said and never will like [?] it. My Dear Sir if you had of known that this place was as poor as it is you would not [have] consented for us to come here. If I had of known myself when you was telling me I would not of been so willing to come. But I thought I could git along like I could there but I fond it to the contrary.4°

38 Alexander Hance to William McKenney, 19 March 1835, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 217 (first quote); Alexander Hance to William McKenney, 30 August 1835; in Wiley, Slaves No More, 217 (second and third quotes). 39 Alexander Hance to J. H. B. Latrobe, 7 April 1838, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 218; Russwurm quoted in Campbell, Maryland in Africa, 147. 40 Malinda Rex to Duncan Cameron, 3 November 1839, in Wiley, Slaves No More, 253.

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For Rex, and many others like her, Liberia proved less a land of liberty and more a site of shock and sadness.

Although previous scholars have tended to overlook slaves' role in ACS affairs, bondpersons affected the colonization movement in pivotal ways. Their demands for information about Liberia, in particular, had profound ramifications. The things they managed to learn shaped their ideas about Africa, informed their decisions about emigration, and influenced their initial responses to the colony. But bondpersons' quest for reliable intelligence-and especially their preference for black informants-had an even greater impact on ACS fortunes. Ultimately, it doomed colonization as an antislavery force in the South. Whereas ACS officials had insisted that their program could eliminate slavery gradually and peacefully, the organization's dependence on black witnesses ensured that a degree of social instability attended every emancipation. Discussions about freedom and Africa could not be confined to deliberating bondpersons; they invariably reverberated outward to other plantations, where enraged slaveholders decried the resulting inquisitiveness and restlessness among their bonded laborers. Other incidents that accompanied ACS manumissions-the trek to port and the docking of an ACS vessel, for example---had the same destabilizing effect. But the role played by the black messengers, the way they spoke their minds on the taboo subject of black freedom, proved especially offensive to southern whites. In the final analysis, the colonization movement could not survive without the black testimonials, but a stable slave society could not survive with them.

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor `Here We Live under Our Own Vine and Palm Tree': The Syncretism of African and American Worldviews of Americo-Liberian Ex-Slaves.

Gabriel Guarino

Commemorating the sesquicentennial anniversary of the independence of Liberia, Liberianists analyzed the utopian dream of the first African republic: to build a safe haven for repatriating African-Americans to the land of their forefathers, which would spread the Gospel and Western civilization to the local natives. This degenerated into a minority rule of Americo-Liberians over an alienated majority of indigenous inhabitants, which would eventually bring about a devastating civil war.' This paper focuses on one historical root of the problem. It analyzes the transitional phase of the largest group of African-American emigrants to Liberia. It argues that they had more in common with the local population than has been hitherto realized. Relying on the vast research on the culture of African-American groups in bondage during the nineteenth century, which reveals a mélange of African and Western traditions; I assess how these cultural traditions affected the ex-slaves' interpretation of their new environment. This supposition is contrary to the prevalent view regarding the lack of African culture among the emigrants, who held exclusively to the values of the white American South. This conclusion is also contrary to the literature's historical emphasis on the values of the black ruling class of Liberia, including freeborn blacks, at the expense the ex-slaves whose values are neglected or dismissed as irrelevant.2 Some of them were of rural origin, with a poor Western education, generally alienated from white society, among whom better chances exist to fmd a surviving African cultural values than the lighter skin, urban, Westernized freeborn blacks. I investigate their attitudes through letters they sent to their ex-masters in the United States, who provided material and ideological support for their repatriation to Africa. Despite the obvious problematic nature of these documents, they form a critical body of evidence, which if used carefully, can allow a glimpse into the experience of Americo-Liberian ex-slaves returning to their "old" home. Before proceeding with analyzing the letters, it is necessary to outline both the African and Western worldviews. Since my focus is on the transition to a new place, I place special emphasis on attitudes towards space and time - the two basic dimensions of any given environmental context. African attitude

See in Liberian Studies Journal Vol. XXII, No. 1 (1997), especially the following essays: Amos J. Beyan, 'The Antitheses of Liberia's Independence in Historical Perspective, 1822-1990, pp.3-'7; Yekutiel Gershoni, 'Ideals and Politics in Sesquicentennial Liberia', pp. 30-36; and James S. Guseh, 'Liberia: A Country in Search of Identity and Unity', pp. 37- 44. 2 See for example, J. Gus Liebnow, Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege (Ithaca, 1969); Anthony J. Nimley, The Liberian Bureaucracy: An Analysis and Evaluation of the Environment, Structure and Functions (Washington, 1977); Katherine Harris, African and American Values: Liberia and West Africa (Lanham, 1985).

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manifests a deep appreciation of the environment. This tradition views the world as a holistic and harmonic whole. The African perceives his surrounding space as holy, due to the association of biotic and abiotic things through spiritual mechanisms. Time perception is characterized by the trailing of the cyclical motions of nature. In such a cyclical perception of time, the future is expected to recreate the past.' Generally, these features are characteristic of traditional societies, past and present, and they also characterized the West until the seventeenth century. Then, a number of sweeping changes, among others, the Scientific Revolution and the collapse of the Catholic Church's monopoly on knowledge, gave way to the beginning of the modern Western tradition, which is radically different. According to it, humans view their surroundings as apt to manipulation and maximal exploitation. The expansion of this mastery attitude brought the idea that the whole world is inert, unconscious matter - including fauna, flora and even human beings belonging to less technologically advanced cultures - and as such it can be exploited without limits. Synchronously, time perception changed from cyclical to linear, in which human beings were beginning to be perceived as promoters of change striving constantly to improve their future.4 This sketch opposes the two worldviews in a simplified way.5 True enough, the "mastery view" of nature in the West, however influential in the beginning of nineteenth century America, was not representative of all the white population in its regional and social variations. Likewise, African tradition was an amalgamation of the attitudes typical to different African

30n African worldviews see John S. Mbiti, 'African Views of the Universe', in Roger S. Gotlieb, ed., This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment (New York, 1996); Dominique Zahan, The Religion, Spirituality, and Thought of Traditional Africa (Chicago, 1979). For the migration of African worldviews to the New World see Mechal Sobel, Trabelin' On: The Slave Journey to an Afro-Baptist Faith (Westport, 1979), 5ff. For a general discussion on different conceptions of time see Norbert Elias, Time: An Essay (Oxford, 1992); and Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis, 1977), pp. 179-180. For a discussion on African conceptions of time see Mechal Sobel, The World They Made Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth-Century Virginia (Princeton, 1987), pp. 21-44. See also the compilation edited by Joseph K. Adjaye, Time in the Black Experience (Westport, 1994). 4 For the transition from traditional to Western, see Elias, Time, pp. 169-171. For a general overview of the Western tradition see David Arnold, The Problem of Nature: Environment, Culture and European Expansion (Oxford, 1996). 5 For the discussion of an oppositional paradigm see Yi-Fu Tuan, Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974), pp. 17-18. See also Roy G. Willis, `Introduction' in Roy G. Willis, ed., Signifying Animals: Human Meaning in the Natural World (London, 1990), pp. 1-6.

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groups, which was often very different from each other in cultural terms.6 Despite these nuances, this model's purpose is to serve as a measuring rod which will tell us the relative position of the ex-slaves' on an axis that runs from one dichotomous worldview to another on seemingly different issues.

In this context, I examine the attitude of the ex-slaves towards Africa as their homeland. I assume that there was a common basis of expectancies shared by African-Americans, free born and ex-slaves alike, from their emigration to their mythical home. Most of them believed that their emigration was part of a providential plan, destined to close once and for all the chapter of misery on African history. The kidnapping of their forefathers to the new world, the learning of the Gospel while in bondage, and the return to Africa, were all meant to bring the African continent to the faith of Christ.' In concordance with this belief that originated from the Jewish-Christian tradition, especially from the idea of the Promised Land, the new settlement of the Americo-Liberians was usually described as a terrestrial paradise. For example, in Henrietta Fuller's report, the tropical environment is adapted to the scriptures through an original nuance: "... Its soil yields abundant harvest to the husbanman. Its climate is healthy. [...] Here we live under our own vine & Palm Tree..."8 Grandville Woodson first gives the description: "In my Estimation this is a good Country..." Then, he exposes the mythical vision he believes in: "This is the land of our fore fathers, the land from which the children went, back to the land they are Returning..."9 These descriptions may be compared to what Todorov denominates "finalist interpretations" of reality, namely, the rigid interpretation of signs only as verifications of what is expected in the first place.") In other words, their positive descriptions are nothing but self-fulfilling prophecies.

6For the environmental attitudes of the Southern slaveholders see Joyce E. Chaplin, An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower South, 1730-1815 (Chapel Hill, 1993), especially pp. 358-365. For the diversity of African cultures see Michael A. Gomez, Exchanging Our Country Marks: The Transformation of African Identities in the Colonial and Antebellum South (Chapel Hill, 1998), pp. 13-16. 7Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa (London, 1965), pp. 26-27; George M. Fredrickson, Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa (New York, 1995), p. 63. 8Henriefta Fuller McDonough to John McDonough, 24 Oct. 1849, in Bell I. Wiley, ed., Slaves no More: Letters from Liberia. 1833-1869 (Lexington, 1980), p. 153. Hereafter, all quotations from the letters will be brought in their original form without corrective interventions. 9Grandville B. Woodson to Isaac R. Wade, 10 February 1853, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p.162. 1°Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York, 1984), p. 25.

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Part of this shared image had also a propagandistic agenda." Ex-slaves tried to do their best to attract new emigrants, but it is crystal clear that the deliberate mitigation of the problems encountered resulted from a truthful expectancy for a better future. Therefore, we may label their time perception as Western, since they manifested a historical consciousness and a linear orientation directed towards the future. How were the ex-slaves' reports affected by the immediate environmental perils of Liberia? Tropical diseases and a high death rate were parts of the formative experience of new emigrants:2 In the first instance I was compelled to believe that the ex-slaves displayed a Western attitude, concomitant with the medical knowledge of the American South, concerning the causes and distribution of the tropical diseases they encountered. Which means that they did not attribute the causes of diseases on personal factors like witchcraft, according to the African attitude, which implies that a disease can be caused, both, from natural reasons and/or from human intervention. Rather, they pinpointed the natural causes alone.I3 They accepted as a matter of fact what was generally called "the acclimatization process". Basically it was a process of natural selection afflicting all the emigrants during their first year in Africa. Deadly eruptions of fever, most probably caused by Malaria, afflicted them until their immune systems were able to support them, in which case they survived.I4 Abraham Blackford's description is exemplary of the unanimous acceptance of this explanation, even if he is trying to downplay the seriousness

' Some of the ex-slaves not only asked their ex-masters to inform potential immigrants that were under their influence, but even suggested publicizing their positive reports. See for example James J. Wilson to William McLain, 5 August 1858, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 245. 12For the European encounter with tropical diseases see Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900- 1900 (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 132-44; Henry Hobhouse, Seeds of Change: Five Plants that Transformed Mankind (London, 1985), pp. 5-32; David Arnold, `Introduction: Tropical Medicine before Manson', in David Arnold, ed., Warm Climates and Western Medicine: The Emergence of Tropical Medicine, 1500- 1900 (Amsterdam, 1996), pp. 1-20.; Philip D. Curtin, Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1989). For a study on Liberia see Antonio McDaniel, Swing Low Sweet Chariot: The Mortality Cost of Colonizing Liberia in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1995). 13 For a concise description of the two systems see Giovanni Levi, Inheriting Power: The Story of an Exorcist (Chicago, 1988), pp. 20-22. See also Charles M. Good, Ethnomedical Systems in Africa: Patterns of Traditional Medicine in Rural and Urban Kenya (New York, 1987), especially pp. 13-15; Albert J. Raboteau, 'The African-American Traditions', in Ronald L. Numbers and Darrel W. Amundsen, eds., Caring and Curing: Health and Medicine in the Western Religious Traditions (New York, 1986). I4McDaniel, Swing Low, 85-87.

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of the Liberian trial: "It is very true [that] most all of the people who immigrate from America [...] has to undergo an acclimating process. I mean by that, that they have the fever, and in many instances it is very slight..."15 His account of the reasons for the casualties has a flare of quasi Darwinist explanation, with a cold assessment of "the survival of the fittest": "... And out of two hundred and more emigrants there has not more than three or four of them died, and they was old persons."16 However, the examination of the medical treatments chosen by the ex-slaves tells a different story. Not only did they make no use of Western medical treatments; but they also rejected them when available.' Moreover, there are depositions, that are absent in our letters, showing they were using African traditional methods.18 Here, for the first time, I discovered the problematic nature of the documentation, which rose to the surface several times hereafter. I suppose that the ex-slaves, who had been exposed while in bondage to the etiological beliefs of their masters, parroted in their letters what they learned from them, knowing that African medicine was considered with abhorrence by their masters as "idolatrous". But as a matter of fact they preferred to use their own traditional system of health. If such is the case, their attitude towards the environment was more holistic than their ex-masters' since the African health system was found on the belief that the way to avoid sickness was to keep a harmonious and balanced relation between the individual, the community and the natural world. A further inquiry into the ex-slaves' attitudes towards the lethal aspect of the Liberian environment can be done upon their direct reaction to the death of their beloved. Surprisingly, they hardly expressed any feelings of sorrow for their losses.19 Randall Kilby's report is probably the most striking one, whereas he seems to be browsing through a checklist when contemplating his losses: "Davy is dead. Josiah, is dead. Martha Ann is living. Joshua is dead...."20 A further comment of his on the subject is totally puzzling: "My wife is sitting with her two little ones on her Knees Lap; the other one I do not

15 Abraham Blackford to Mary B. Blackford, 14 February 1846, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 24. 16Idem. "Penelope Campbell, Maryland in Africa: The Maryland State Colonization Society, 1831-1857 (Urbana, 1971), pp. 157-58. 18See Randall M. Miller, ed., 'Dear Master': Letters of a Slave Family (Ithaca, 1978), p.43; and also Wiley, Slaves no More, note 1 to letter no. 97, p.323. 19 See for example Titus Glover to William W. Rice, 20 September 1851, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p.178; Mary Ann Clay to Brutus J. Clay, 27 September 1853, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 265; Lucy Clay to Brutus J. Clay, 29 September 1853, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 266. 20Randall Kilby to John R. Kilby, 26 June 1856, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 268.

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know where she would put it if it was living."21 How can this be interpreted? Is it cynicism? Is it black humor, so to speak? Or is it just a cold, fatalist acceptance of destiny? A solution to the puzzle came from comments such as this one: "For though after many tribulations here below I expect to reign in heaven with Christ my advocate on high."22 Many expressed the same sure security in their celestial transcendence. For example, Peyton Skipwith seemed to have no doubt of being able to reconstruct his entire family in Heaven, where "we may meet to part no more."23 This belief can be traced to the African conception of the Afterlife. While the standard Protestant view of Afterlife left the believer in perpetual uncertainty concerning his final destination, the ex-slaves believed that those who embraced sincerely the Gospel could expect, assuredly, for a better world, although not much different from their own, where those who accompanied them in life will endure at their side. This belief can be traced back to the African tradition of Afterlife. The common belief there was that the spirits of the dead continued their existence, somewhere better, close to the place they used to live. A cue to the alleged familiarity and comfort attributed to Afterlife can be the usage of the expression "home coming" when a person "passed away".24 This testifies to a cyclical view of time that expects the recycling of past things, again and again, eternally. Significantly, this cyclical perception of time coexisted side by side with their Western linear perception that strove for a better future in the old-new homeland. The direct attitude towards the environment can be traced through the economic system erected by the ex-slaves. In this case I consider, first, the system that had been chosen by the white managers of the colony before the Liberian declaration of independence. Their ideal was to erect a prosperous plantation system in Liberia, in concordance with the Southern idea of material progress based on Jefferson's formulation of the ideal agrarian society.25 This goal was not accomplished. Objective environmental difficulties such as an adverse climate, swamplands, the lack of beasts of burden and so forth, made the task difficult.26 But the failure resulted mainly in the worldview that guided the black settlers. Apparently, some of the letters show that they were oriented

21Idem. 22Thomas M. Page to Charles W. Andrews, May 1849, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 111. 23Peyton Skipwith to John H. Cocke, 10 February 1834, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 36. 24Sobel, World They Made Together, pp.174, 214. 25Santoth Chandra Saha, leudi Ashmun's Agricultural Policy: Organizing the Settlers for Self Reliance', The International Journal of African Historical Studies Vol. 18, No.3 (1985), pp. 505-511; P. J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York, 1961), p. 152. 26Saha, `Ahmun's Agricultural Policy', p. 506; McDaniel, Swing Low, pp. 68-69.

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in a progressive way, planning their future and reporting to their ex-masters of investments being made to enable the production of exportable crops. But this was another example of a discontinuity between what was being said and what was being done. Take for example John Page's following comment. It embodies in a nutshell Max Weber's theory of the intrinsic relationship between Capitalism and the Protestant ethic:

I hope your son Matthew will improve himself, take hold of golden minutes as they fly, and thereby prepare himself for future usefulness in this world, and dying leave abundant testimony that he has not been reared in a Christian country for naught, but have so improved the talents granted him that he can enter into a world of rest.27

Was Page living by his own words? Significantly, he never mentioned in his letters what he was doing for a livelihood. But we know that in 1840 he was striving to gather enough money to buy a ticket to see his mother in the United States. Fifteen years later, he was still dreaming of making the trip. George R. Ellis McDonough is one of the few that seemed to be pursuing the ex-masters' will, and he had proofs too: "This coffe I send [...] to show that I took Your advice in farming... "28 Robert M. Page sends, as well, the fruit of his labor to his ex-master, and he seems to be especially proud of it: "... The coffee I send is altogether of my own raising. I would be happy if you could [...] send my mother [...] four pounds [...]] which I would like her to have [. .] especially as it is of my own raising."29 Does it mean that these specific ex-slaves were able to raise enough coffee for export? Worse even, are we supposed to believe that the coffee they were sending was really of their own raising? In 1828, the Liberian leader Lott Cary pretended to be a farmer and sold 6,000 pounds of coffee to the Richmond's market, in order to earn recognition for the project of colonization. Posthumously, it was discovered that he bought the merchandise from a trader.3° So, maybe the fact that Page over-stressed the source of the coffee did not derive from pride, but was meant to erase similar suspicions. Sure enough, he deserved the benefit of the doubt. However, from a letter written by his son we come to realize that his efforts to raise coffee were nothing but futile.31

27John M. Page to Charles W. Andrews, 1 April 1855, in Wiley, Slaves no More, pp. 114-15. 28 George R. Ellis McDonough to John McDonough, 25 March 1847, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 146. 29Robert M. Page to Charles W. Andrews, 5 May 1849, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 109. 30Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, p. 152. 31John M. Page to Charles W. Andrews, 7 May 1849, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 110.

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In short, ex-slaves probably understood what was expected of them and accordingly they reported the progression towards the direction desired. In fact, they preferred an economic system based on self-sustenance agriculture and on barter exchange with the natives. By the way, the natives' economic system was virtually the same.32 It might be assumed that the combination of the negative associations of hard work experienced in bondage with their African cultural tradition, contributed to a more moderate attitude towards the utilization of time and towards the maximization of profits, then that of their masters. If so, this attitude was similar to those of the Africans, as opposed to the progressive attitude they displayed to their ex-masters. Also, the related attitude towards place, leaves their environment almost unaltered, contrary to the mastery attitude of the Southern planters that aspired to absolute control and useful management of their plantations. True enough, the settlers took lands out of the natives' hands during the whole of the nineteenth century, but that did not involve the rational exploitation of natural resources in Western style. Contrary to their attitude towards the natural world, the impact of the settlers was critical on the lives of the natives. One of the causes that brought Liberianists to conclude that there were no African influences left among the Americo-Liberian settlers was their attitude of contempt towards the culture of native population, and their failure to assimilate this people into the Liberian state. How can this be explained in light of our fmdings that point clearly towards the existence of a common cultural tradition? We must also take into account the first actions chosen by the American Colonization Society, towards the native population, since they were the first managers of the colony. The different environmental attitudes displayed on the first encounter between the local population and the white members of the American expedition, who were sent to buy land for the planned colony, can give a hint of the problems that would be met in the future. The negotiation between the two parties quickly arrived to a serious impasse since the natives declined to sell any land to the Americans. The land, according to the local tradition, belonged to the community and it was collectively tended and protected. Moreover, it had a sacred value, because it contained the bones of their ancestors. That is why they could not understand nor accept the terms of the deal proposed by the Americans, who wanted to buy, individually, a piece of land as if it was a commercial asset, void of any personal feelings. Another reason for the rejection was the American promise of great changes that the settlement was supposed to bring to the lives of the natives, by means of Christianity and civilization. Of course, the Americans' ethnocentric, progressive point of view prevented them from understanding that nothing could be perceived more apprehensively by the natives than drastic changes in their lifestyle. Finally, the differences were settled with the

32Wiley's introduction, Slaves no More, pp. 6-7; Staudernaus, African Colonization Movement, pp. 152-54; McDaniel, Swing Low, pp. 68-9.

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persuasion of a gun pointed at the heads of the natives' representatives. The colony of Liberia was founded on the outcome of this dubious negotiation.33 Apparently, Americo-Liberians followed the footsteps of their aggressive sponsors. For starters, one of their first actions was to declare open war against the slave trade. The natives reacted with fierce opposition. They just refused to relinquish one of the most flourishing businesses in West Africa. But Besides the humanitarian issue, Americo-Liberians had an ulterior motive in this conflict. The punitive missions organized against tribes that persisted in the trade were used as an excuse to dispossess the natives from their lands. The numeral advantage of the natives was crashed with the power of firearms.34 But this policy had a problematic consequence. The natives became a growing majority that enhanced constantly with the seizures of land. Americo-Liberians from all the social strata started to fear the loss of their monopoly of power. Especially, when towards the end of the nineteenth century, the ratio between the Americo-Liberian population and that of the natives was estimated, respectively, at 1:50. Accordingly, if the local population had been accorded citizenship and the right to vote, the result might have been political suicide for the settlers. Therefore, the natives living on the lands that were annexed to the Liberian State were left as subjects void of civil rights.35 Another reason for the mistreatment of the local population had a more social character. Since the socioeconomic status of the ex-slaves was fragile compared to free blacks, they felt threatened by the presence of the natives within colony limits, especially those who were close to them in terms of economic status. Since skin color was a common denominator, cultural contempt served as a useful strategy to elevate themselves above the natives.36 The letters are replete with this scornful attitude. Finally, we have to consider a problem of cultural incongruity between the Americo-Liberians' expectations from the natives and the related response. Americo-Liberians supposed that all Africans had a common, self- evident, identity, and that the natives would accept their better ways with open hands. Clearly, this view was influenced by Western theories of race. They did not take into consideration that the aforesaid identity was a result of many years of interaction with whites that inculcated in them a racial code, which dictated their position, their role and their meaning in American society. Of course, the racial factor was also a binding role that diverged from the interests of their masters.37 But it was unrealistic to expect that without similar historical circumstances, the natives, who perceived themselves in tribal and

33Nimley, Liberian Bureaucracy, pp. 129-39; Harris, African and American Values, p. 14. 34Harrison Akingbade, 'The Liberian Settlers and the Campaign Against the Slave Trade', Africa, Vol.38, No. 3 (1983), pp. 339-368. 35Fredrickson, Black Liberation, p. 70. 36Miller, 'Dear Master', p. 49. 37Gomez, Country Marks, pp. 11-13.

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local terms, would acknowledge a pan-African common interest. The natives' refusal to conform to the Americo-Liberian standards shifted the settlers' attitude toward them. Soon enough the natives were transformed from "brothers" to "others", perceived as hostile to the settlement and its values. The widening gap between the two groups can be best illustrated by the designations The Americo-Liberians chose for themselves: "settlers", "colonists", and "civilized." On the other hand, they called the local population "natives", "savages", and "uncivilized". This in-group/out-group perception is especially accentuated in the ex-slaves descriptions of overt conflict. For example, Titus Glover opposed the emigrants' stance: "The President and his troops just left [...] to put down those natives who rise against the Americans to fight."38 H.W. Ellis wrote an analogous opposition, but essentially different in its meaning: "Here we have excellent neighbors, both Americans and natives. Here we have Virginians, Kentuckians, Tennesseeans, & c. We have (natives), Golahs; Pezzeys, Bassas, Veys and Boatswains [...], choice people." 39Such a positive attitude, which conceived the possibility of coexistence, while showing respect to group differences, is exceptional in the letters. Probably most of the ex-slaves believed that the best formula of coexistence was to coerce the natives, as discerned from the following account: "Peace and harmony exists among us, with our Savage natives. The U.S. fleet has done great good [...] They has in a measure dispursed the slave trade, & also subdued the Natives and brought them to Know their place...". 40 In sum, this research shows that although African-American ex-slaves portrayed mixed values derived from white America and Africa, emigration to Africa concealed their African values. Besides the reasons already stated, their will to hold on to their American heritage, especially regarding material culture, depended on more prosaic reasons: their food, dress, shelter and language all appertained to the American South. I have attempted to prove that underneath The American value system laid African attitudes, which even if not always understood, survived both the Middle Passage to the New World and the return "home".

38Titus Glover to William W. Rice, 19 January 1856, in Wiley, Slaves no More, pp. 181-182. 39H. W. Ellis to William McLain, 20 November 1849, in Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 229. 40Peyton Skipwith to John H. Cocke, 29 September 1844, Wiley, Slaves no More, p. 60.

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INTRODUCTION The fundamental question that lingered in the hearts of many white Americans in the nineteenth century was whether whites and blacks could coexist after slavery. Racism was paramount in America at the time, and the American Colonization Society (ACS) did not believe blacks could live equally, peacefully, and progressively in white society. For most ACS supporters, the argument that colonizing black Americans in Africa would have a positive impact was deceitful. On the one hand, New Jerseyans like Commodore Robert Field Stockton and the Reverend Robert Finley, among others, held the view that only they (Anglo-Americans) should lead the world. Because of this belief, they felt that they should instill their values and cultural mores in others. In this regard, they believed holistically in the idea of colonizing Africa with colonists (educated, civilized, and religiously oriented black Americans) and not whites from America. The goals of ACS were

To rescue the free colored people of the United States from their political and social disadvantages. To place them in a country where they may enjoy the benefits of free government, with all the blessings which it brings in its train. To spread civilization, sound morals, and true religion throughout the continent of Africa. To arrest and destroy the slave trade. To afford slave owners, who wished, or were willing, to liberate their slaves, an asylum for their reception. (Vermont Colonization Society, 1858)

In December 1816 the Reverend Robert Finley, a Presbyterian clergyman from Basking Ridge, New Jersey, organized the American Society for Colonizing Free People of Color (commonly called the American Colonization Society). The goals of the society appealed to many northern and

I Project Coordinator and Consultant for the Underground Railroad Project at the New Jersey Historical Commission, New Jersey Department of State. He received a B.A. from Rowan University, an M.M.C. (Master of Mass Communication) from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. from

Temple University. He is co-author of "Steal Away, Steal Away . . ." A Guide to the Underground Railroad in New Jersey and American Democracy in Africa in the Twenty-First Century? He is also the author of On Afrocentricity, Intercultural Communication, and Racism; The Effects of United States' Political Communication and the Liberian Experience, 1960-1990: An Afrocentric Analysis; and Liberia Military Dictatorship: A Fiasco "Revolution". Dr. Wonkeryor is now collaborating with colleagues in writing two books on America's Ailing Democracy and America's African Colonization Movement.

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southern whites who held a variety of objections to slavery; Finley was able to enlist the help of such prominent men as John Randolph, Daniel Webster, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and Judge Bushrod Washington, nephew of George Washington. The New Jersey Colonization Society, the state auxiliary of the national organization, was founded the same winter, benefiting from the efforts of Assemblyman Charles Mercer, who secured passage of a bill through the New Jersey legislature two days before Christmas requesting assistance in colonizing the state's free blacks. The New Jersey auxiliary, however, got off to an uncertain start. The original group floundered with the departure of Finley, who left to become president of the University of Georgia and then died suddenly in October 1817 (Williams, 1984). This essay addresses the following issues: (1) the views of American policymakers with regard to colonizing freed black Americans in Liberia; (2) whether and to what extent New Jerseyans were represented disproportionately among the leadership of the ACS; (3) the implications for New Jersey of removing its black citizens to Liberia; and (4) the presence of freed black Americans in Liberia and its attendant effects. As previously stated, the ACS was formed in 1816, and it became active in many states. The states with ACS chapters included Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. Many distinguished policymakers, including President James Monroe, actively cooperated with the ACS. The aims of the ACS was to expediently and practically address the perceived problems of freed African Americans in the United States by establishing a colony either on the American continent or in Africa. Equally important, when Abraham Lincoln became president of the United States, he endorsed many positions of the ACS, especially the ones that dealt with relocating African Americans to Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Since black Americans were in minority and could not co-exist peacefully and equally with whites (dominant majority) in America, ACS supporters felt that ACS, by establishing a colony to accommodate blacks, could lead blacks to achieve freedom and self- determination as a political, ideological, and Christian entity.

I. VIEWS OF SOME AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS Many European Americans wanted to rid America of black people, but the viability of slavery consistently rendered that dream impossible. Nevertheless, the idea of a nation purged of its black inhabitants appeared throughout the nineteenth century. Thomas Jefferson was one of a number of significant white statesmen who figured that blacks and whites simply couldn't co-exist:

Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained, new

provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made . . . will divide us into parties and produce convulsions which will probably never end but in the extermination of one or the other race. (1785 [1955], cited in Robinson, 2001, p. 138)

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Robinson states that Jefferson wasn't quite sure what created the difference in color-whether it derived from a membrane just below the skin, or color of the blood created the pigment. But he concluded that the differences between races were real, because they were "fixed in nature." He called for a government agency that would deport free "Africans" and replace them with European immigrants. Similarly, Abraham Lincoln considered a colonization scheme. His reasoning grew out of the crisis of the Civil War, and his thoughts about what to do about free blacks were based on an assumption that racial prejudice was a permanent feature of American politics. Lincoln presented his own argument for black colonization in an "Address on Colonization to a Committee of Colored Men" in 1862: "even when you cease to be slaves, you are far

removed from being placed on equality with the white race . . .. It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated" (cited in Delbanco, 1992, p. 235). An appointed select committee produced a bill that would compensate former owners of the emancipated slaves of the Border States, and colonize these freed black Americans outside the United States; Lincoln favored Central America (Robinson, 2001). P. J. Staudenraus states that Finley "argued that colonization would benefit every state, especially southern states. Besides removing the blacks, colonization would be a "happy and progressive" means for ending slavery-one that would avoid southern fears that emancipation was dangerous" (1961, p. 20). Basing their arguments on the deplorable condition of enslaved Africans and freed blacks in the United States in the nineteenth century, colonizationists argued that, writes Leon F. Litwack:

As long as Negroes remained in the United States, public opinion would bar them from the polls, the jury box, and the white man's schools, church pews, workshops, and dining tables. Besides this social and legal proscription, the Negro had to contend with an

obviously "superior knowledge, wealth and influence . . . a competition to which he is unequal." Such distinctions, be they justifiable or not, made it impossible at any foreseeable time to assimilate the two races, or to ameliorate the Negro's political and social position, or to alter substantially the white man's racial attitudes. "This is not the fault of the colored man, nor the white man, nor of Christianity," the Colonization Society explained, "but an ordination of Providence, and no more to be changed than the laws of nature." Throughout the United States, a "broad and impassible" line divided blacks and whites and "neither refinement, nor argument, nor education, nor religion itself" could successfully soften or obliterate the customs and prejudices of white society." (1961, pp. 21-22)

II. NEW JERSEY REPRESENTATION IN ACS LEADERSHIP New Jerseyans were significantly represented among the leadership of the ACS and played an active role in the colonization efforts. Robert Finley, Robert Field Stockton, Theodore Frelinghuysen, John Frelinghuysen, Samuel

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Bayard, Isaac H. Williamson, and Charles Ewing were founding and active members of the New Jersey chapter. The position of the New Jersey leadership that called for the removal of New Jersey's freed black population to Africa and eradicating the multiracial character of the state was similar to that of the parent organization and other state chapters. For example, Commodore Robert F. Stockton states his support for African colonization thus:

It is plain to the very eye that Africa is a land to which civilization must be brought. The attempt has been made over and over again, by devoted missionaries and others, to penetrate that land and seek to impart the blessings of civilization and Christianity to her savage hordes. But the labor has been spent in vain. The white man cannot live in Africa. The annals of the Moravians, of Cape Colony, of Sierra Leone, of Liberia, contain the records of the sacrifice of some of the best men that have lived to grace the pages of any people's history, in the vain attempt to accomplish something for her redemption through the instrumentality of white men. Who, then, is to do this work? Let now any calm, reflecting spectator of the present state of the world be asked to look at Africa, and then, from among the nations, point out the people best calculated to do this work; and when his eyes falls upon the descendants of the sons of that continent now in America, will he not say, These are the people appointed for that work? (Stockton, 1865, p. 74)

Stockton argued further that an inequality in relationship existed in America between whites and blacks, and that it would be good for freed blacks to return to Africa and proselytize Christianity instead of fighting to remain in the bondage of slavery in the United States. Stockton's support for African colonization had twin reasons: (1) that one of the advantages of sending freed black Americans to Africa was that they were already Christians and could in turn proselytize Christianity in Africa, and (2) that by relocating these freed black Americans to Africa, America's white racial character would be reflected. He comments that

But has He no purpose in all this arrangement that has been going on-in the gathering of a vast family of these people here-in their condition of servitude, endurance, discipline-in the difficulties with which their emancipation is surrounded-in the natural impossibility that the whites ever will or can consent to raise them to a condition of equality? (Stockton, 1865, p. 75)

Similarly, Henry Clay of Kentucky supported the idea of removing freed black Americans and relocating them in Liberia. Clay's support for African colonization was based on his racist beliefs. He advocated white nationalism as a benchmark of racial enfranchisement and economic hegemony in the labor market. He encouraged African colonization so that slave labor in the United States could be replaced with white labor. Kwando M. Kinshasa (1998) states that

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Clay's thesis was not to be dismissed, as it did advocate the elimination of slavery. Yet, it sought to deport the very same people whom it had previously enslaved! From this perspective, Liberia assumed the character of a colony, existing under the benevolent exploitation of a secure and economically expanding slaveholding society. (1998, p. 124)

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW JERSEY OF REMOVING ITS BLACK CITIZENS TO LIBERIA To delve into this theme, one should take into account the conditions of African Americans in the United States in general and New Jersey in particular during the first 65 years of the nineteenth century-an era in which the enslavement of African Americans was legal and pervasive, as was the perception of African Americans as substandard by the dominant white majority. Racism was omnipresent in American society, and blacks suffered immensely because nearly all whites objected to the idea of indiscriminate mixing of the races. Slavery contributed significantly to the economic development of the state, but also produced an exploitative society lacking justice and equality for all its members. The harsher attitudes toward slavery and race relations, which characterized East Jersey in the colonial era, prevailed in the laws after the two Jersey provinces were reunited in 1702. A 1682 East Jersey law forbade any white person to trade with free blacks or Indian or black slaves. A 1694 law prohibited slaves from hunting with guns unless accompanied by their masters. It imposed fines on people who entertained slaves in their homes for more than two hours. In addition, the law made it legal for anyone to apprehend a slave who was more than five miles from his or her owner's home. A 1695 law established slave courts where blacks accused of felonies were tried before three county justices of the peace and a twelve-man jury. A 1704 New Jersey law stipulated burning for slaves who committed arson or murder and castration for those having "any carnal knowledge of a white woman." Although Queen Anne disallowed this law, the brutality necessary to maintain a system of slave labor remained apparent. A 1713 act of the New Jersey legislature incorporated all the provisions of the 1704 law, but without reference to barbaric forms for punishment (Greene, 1994, pp. 8, 9). New Jersey's 1713 law tightening the regulation of slaves was in direct response to the fear and hysteria generated by the April 6, 1712 uprising of New York City blacks. On that date, shortly after midnight, approximately twenty-four blacks armed with muskets and pistols gathered in an orchard outside the town and set fire to a building. As whites rushed to put out the blaze, the slaves attacked, killing nine and wounding seven. The town awakened and counterattacked, forcing the outnumbered slaves to retreat. Some committed suicide rather than be taken alive. A total of seventy revolters were arrested. Some were burned at the stake; others were broken on the rack and the wheel or gibbeted alive in chains. Massachusetts reacted by passing a prohibition on slave importation, and Pennsylvania and New Jersey enacted duties on slave imports in order to limit the size of the black population and possible slave rebellions (Price, 1980, pp. 15-16).

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The New Jersey law was modeled after New York's slave code. Aside from harsh punishments for the commission of crimes, it discouraged voluntary manumission by requiring owners to post £200 for each slave they manumitted. This made manumissions too costly. The purpose of the law, in addition to discouraging manumissions, was to defray any costs to the government for taking care of freed slaves, who were assumed to be unable to provide for themselves. The actual wording of the law reveals the hostility toward free blacks and the intensity of racial stereotypes: "whereas it is found by Experience, That Free Negroes are an idle, slothful people, and prove very

often a Charge to the Place where they are . . . " A provision of the law also gave compensation to owners of executed slaves out of concern for their fmancial loss in human machinery. To the colonial authorities, the loss of a slave labor was far more serious than the loss of a slave's life (Price, 1980). In his 1994 study, Greene states that

Economic and security issues were not the only factors responsible for the tariff on slave importations. The moral objections to the slave trade and slavery itself by West Jersey Quakers like John Woolman and John Hepburn contributed, in some degree, to the climate for reduction of slave importations.

As early as 1715, Hepburn told his fellow Quakers and Christians in the colony that they risked eternal damnation of their practices of owning slaves. John Woolman, a tailor and storekeeper from Mount Holly, forcefully pointed out the contradiction between Christian teachings and slave holding in classic antislavery tract, "Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes," published in 1754. Woolman affi rmed the dignity of Africans, Indians, and those enslaved at a time when religion and government failed to acknowledge their humanity. The efforts of Woolman and Hepburn along with economic and security factors were preparing the stage for the abolition of slavery. (Greene, 1994, p. 10). In New Jersey as elsewhere in the United States, many freed and manumitted African Americans yearned for relocating in Africa because they were denied basic fundamental and human rights in the United States. For example, James Ciment (1998) writes, "To Americans on the other side of the racial divide, colonization was an answer to hope, frustration, and above all, faith. Even before Liberia was envisioned, Paul Cuffee, a wealthy free black sea captain, took that view" (p. 32). On the contrary, in his "Address to the Citizens of New Jersey," John S. Rock (1850) called on African Americans to emigrate to Africa because of their disenfranchisement and oppression. He said, for example,

But some of our enemies say we "had better go to Africa." We ask, Why? They say, we "cannot rise in this country, the prejudices are too strong to overcome"; that we had better be "kings among beggars, than beggars among kings." (Rock, 1850, p. 87).

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The ACS focus on New Jersey emanated from the premise that it had a large African American population. In 1810 New Jersey had the largest slave population in the North, and it was expected to have a large increase in the free black population in the 1820s under the terms of the gradual emancipation act of 1804. Ruling politicians, business interests, and ideologues were not willing to accord equal citizenship rights to this growing, independent component of the population, and they feared this group's freedom would endanger their own political and economic status. Henry Clay, a founding father of the ACS, characterized nominally free African Americans as "a Dangerous part of the population." Robert Finley, the New Jersey initiator of the colonization scheme, advanced as a selling point the prospect that through colonization, "We should be cleared of them [free African Americans]." Peter D. Vroom openly enunciated a policy calling for the denial of citizenship rights to free African Americans. He based his program of raw discrimination entirely on race. Characterizing free Africans as "this unhappy, degraded class of citizens," he argued that the increase in the number of free African Americans was threatening and rendered equal rights "entirely out of the question." From an unconcealed white supremacist viewpoint he offered the alternative of colonization as serving "our interests," with persons of color not being included in the first person plural (Fishman, 1997). The expected increase of the African American population in New Jersey provided the impetus for the resurgence of the state chapter of the American Colonization Society (NJCS) and its reorganizational meeting held in Princeton in 1824. Members of the state's political elite were in attendance. Commodore Stockton, a Princeton graduate, distinguished naval officer, and future Democratic senator, was a leader in the meeting. Also in attendance were Theodore Frelinghuysen, a future senator and Whig candidate for Vice President; General John Frelinghuysen; Samuel Bayard, a Federalist state legislator and judge; Governor Isaac H. Williamson; and Charles Ewing, Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court (Seaton, 1978, as cited in Greene 1994). The NJCS, like its parent national organization, claimed to desire the emancipation of all the slaves in America and the establishment of a colony of free blacks who would Christianize Africa. The New Jersey legislature endorsed a colonization resolution to achieve these goals in October 1825. Since neither the NJCS nor the state legislature favored governmental abolition of slavery, it is doubtful that southern slavery could have been eliminated through voluntary manumissions by slaveholders enjoying the financial rewards of a profitable economic system. Stockton maintained that emancipated blacks could not be assimilated into a modern and more advanced American society, asserting that the abolition of slavery without colonization would result in "letting loose upon the community of the United States such a body of men, who had no important interests at stake, nor any common concern in the permanency of our institutions." Although the NJCS held additional yearly meetings from 1825 through 1827, declining funds and insignificant progress toward colonization resulted in a decade of organizational lethargy (Greene, 1994). In 1838 the NJCS was revived on a wider scale through the efforts of

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William Halsey of Newark, the new colonization agent for the state. Halsey succeeded in winning the support of several hundred middle- and upper class New Jersey residents, some three hundred of who attended a public meeting in Newark on June 30, 1838. With increased financial support, the NJCS purchased a ship, the Saluda, and in 1853 purchased 160,000 acres of land for the establishment of a New Jersey settlement to be added to the Liberian colony founded by the ACS. Yet the efforts of the NJCS, like those of the national organization, failed to colonize significant numbers of blacks. The ACS colonized only 8,204 blacks between 1820 and 1853. Of the 592 who were residents of northern states, only 24 were from New Jersey. After 1853, only 78 more blacks from New Jersey emigrated to Liberia. Aside from the failure to obtain substantial emancipations from southern slaveholders, the opposition of the free black population doomed ACS efforts to promote black emigration (Greene 1994). In fact, "Opposition to the ACS-colonization was the overwhelming position among New Jersey African Americans" (Fishman, 1997, p. 190). The Rev. Samuel E. Cornish, pastor of the Colored Presbyterian Church in Newark, was at the center of anti-colonization activity in New Jersey. On October 6 and 13, 1838, the Colored American, which Cornish co- published, took the offensive against the colonizationists, accusing them of "swindling up the souls and drying up liberality, benevolence and piety of Jerseymen." It added that it was in vain for them to hold public meetings because the minds of the African American people were made up on the subject-in opposition (cited in Fishman, 1997). In the issue of January 9, 1839 was a letter addressed to Cornish by Abner Francis of Trenton, who had been secretary of the anti-colonization rally at Trenton. It called for urgent action to deal with the role of the ACS in defaming African Americans and obscuring truths about them. Cornish agreed, explaining that as a resident of New Jersey he had seen "the bitterest persecution, the meanest and most shameful deeds worked upon and toward defenseless colored people." He held responsible the Princeton Theological Seminary, which he characterized as the fountainhead of "the colonization abomination," together with pro-slavery forces and "sinful prejudice against color." Here was a reflection of the fact that African Americans would not accept degradation or portrayals of themselves as degraded. Furthermore, they were finding ways to speak with dignity and public statesmanship on their own behalf (Fishman, 1997, pp. 191- 92). Out of this social crucible came a defmitive manifesto of African American aspirations. Dated April 1, 1840, it was written by Cornish and the Rev. Theodore Wright, then of New York, on behalf of their African American communities and churches. It was addressed to two eminent ruling class and colonizationist representatives-Theodore Frelinghuysen, by now former U.S. Senator and mayor of Newark, and Benjamin F. Butler of New York, former U.S. Attorney General under Jackson and Van Buren, then U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Frelinghuysen maintained ties with the ruling class in both North and South. In both instances- Cornish/Wright and Frelinghuysen/Butler-there was a Newark/New York and national focus.

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The Cornish/Wright letter addressed the current campaign and meetings of the ACS. The importance of African American leadership speaking for the African American people was highlighted by the authors' thrust at paternalism. They brought out at the beginning of their statement that, while the ACS argued that its meetings were called "to act on the interests of the colored people," yet no African Americans were invited to attend and take part. On the contrary, they pointed out, the meetings were "carried on without any reference whatever to the wishes or opinion" of African Americans. In their commentary Cornish and Wright indicated that they would discuss the effects of the colonization scheme on "the colored people of the free states" and Africa, and on the prospects for putting an end to the slave trade. Cornish and Wright challenged Butler's claim that African Americans received the scheme "with great delight" because of a yearning for Africa. They argued that this claim might have been true for southern slaves but not for free African Americans of the South or North. They documented their position, recalling African American opposition to the colonization scheme from 1817. They bluntly characterized the colonization scheme as being in the interest of slaveholders concerned with preserving their system. They reasserted the claim of African Americans to the land of their birth and expressed the hope that in the future they would be able to enjoy the fruits of their labors under the principles of freedom set forth by the government at its founding. They took a solid stand against racism, rejecting the colonizationist assumption that color prejudice could not be overcome. Here they related the equality of African Americans to black-white unity and democratic rights overall. Next they challenged the international policies of the ACS, with special reference to the claim that colonization by free African Americans would benefit Africa. They gave counter-examples showing the decimation of Africans by Christian colonizers. The results would be no different, they argued, if the missionaries were persons of color instead of white. They further disputed the ACS claim that African colonization would end the slave trade- not as long as it continued to be profitable. Concerning statistics of expatriation by New Jersey African Americans under the sponsorship of the ACS, the colonizing agency itself reported that in the period 1820-53 there was only 24 takers (figures from the African Repository, cited by Fishman, 1997, p. 193). It should not be assumed that those who returned to Africa under these conditions necessarily agreed with the ACS philosophically or remained in the ACS African colony. It was not until the1850s, when intensified persecution of free and runaway African Americans, on the one hand, increased ACS resources from new funding by the New Jersey legislature and increased financial contributions by the wealthy, on the other hand, caused the ACS to make limited inroads among the state's African Americans. Even then, despite its improved organizational stance, the agency in 1872 could only report 77 takers in the later decades (ACS, 1872). That is, in over fifty years, only some 100 New Jersey African Americans were repatriated to Africa under ACS auspices, a very small fraction of the free African American population of the state. This paltry

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response to ACS overtures reflected the growing importance and independence of free African Americans. The U.S. Census of 1820, the first after the reorganization of the NJCS, reported the free African American population of New Jersey as 6.2 percent of the state's African American population. By 1830 it had increased to 90 percent (Fishman, 1997). The increase in the free African American population multiplied the expatriation efforts of the ACS, which intensified racism. It also exposed the nihilistic futility of running contrary to long-range historical processes. The most telling refutation to colonization was the unfolding of African American life. Accompanying the growth in the free African American population was growth in the number, size, and role of African American communities. These communities were bases for the African American people in the struggle for freedom and equality (Fishman, 1997).

IV. THE PRESENCE OF FREED BLACK AMERICANS IN LIBERIA When freed black Americans arrived in the ACS colony of Liberia, they brought with them western culture, traditions, and customs. The founding of Liberia originated with the philanthropic ACS, just as that of Sierra Leone originated with English philanthropists. In fact Sierra Leone was the base and starting point for the first American attempts at a settlement for freed slaves in West Africa. In 1818 agents were sent to make inquiries; the first party of emigrants apparently arrived in 1820; land was acquired at Cape Montserrado, now Cape Mesurado, and in 1822 a settlement was established there. The names Liberia and Monrovia, its capital city, named after President James Monroe, author of the Monroe Doctrine, came into use in 1824. The settlement at first was independent of the U.S. government, which had a separate agency in Africa appointed under an Act of Congress to receive freed slaves, but soon, its agent assumed head of the settlement. The settlement was controlled by an ACS agent, who subsequently became governor and given an advisory council. Subsequent governors were intermittently white and colored men. The ACS gradually left the settlers to manage their affairs. It finally relinquished all control in 1846. In 1847, the Liberians issued a high-sounding Declaration of Independence and proclaimed themselves a sovereign republic. The country was immediately recognized by Great Britain, France, and other European powers, but not until 1862 by the United States. A separate settlement, emanating from Maryland and called Maryland, had been planted farther south in the neighborhood of Cape Palmas. This was amalgamated with Liberia in 1857 (Lucas, 1922 [1972]). In Liberia, the freed black Americans, known variously as Americo- Liberians, settlers, or freed Africans, had unpleasant encounters with African kings (Peter, Long John, Blumly, among others) along the west coast of Africa. From the perspectives of these kings, the presence of freed black Americans in their midst would disrupt the slave trade that benefited them. There were fundamental differences among the indigenous Liberians, as well as among "recaptive" Africans, and freed black Americans. Carl Burrowes (1996) notes that the area now called Liberia "was occupied by about 16 different ethnic groups. Tensions among and within local societies increased as the demand for African slaves increased in the New World" (p. 2).

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Burrowes explains that this area, under-populated to begin with, is estimated to have supplied 547,000 enslaved persons to the Americas between 1710 and 1810. To that figure must be added 16 to 24 percent who died en route to the coast, plus another 15 to 20 percent lost during the Atlantic crossing. The recaptive Africans, who were liberated from the slave ship Pons off the Congo coast in November 1845 by the American naval ship Yorktown and settled in Liberia, had tensions among themselves. Even freed black Americans from the United States were divided among themselves by competing religious and nativistic loyalties (Burrowes, 1996, pp. 2-4). James Ciment provides a summary of the factors to which caused tensions among the settlers:

Nineteenth-century Liberia was fractured along fault lines of class, color, and culture. Settlers who were the mixed-race offspring of American planter-slave liaisons usually came with financial resources that let them quickly position themselves at the top rung of the Liberian society. Natives and "recaptives," the thousands of Africans from various tribes liberated by American anti-slaving patrols and resettled in Liberia, did much of the hard agricultural work, on land that the mercantile class owned. (1998, p. 34)

In fact, many of the freed black American immigrants who were business- oriented forcibly used the recaptive Africans and indigenous Liberians as plantation laborers to produce raw materials and goods for the Atlantic trade. This move by the business class of the freed black American community allowed it to trade in both African and American goods. The business class became fabulously wealthy while the indigenous Liberians and recaptive Africans became miserably poor. According to John Saillant (1996), "Under this scheme, Africans would provide materials for the Atlantic trade while consuming American finished goods. But such raw materials were produced by slave labor" (pp. 486, 487). Saillant reports that Jehudi Ashmun, an agent of the ACS, estimated that about three-quarters of the population in the Monrovia area was enslaved and slaves performed agricultural labor. Even though he deplored the cruelty of the slave trade, Ashmun viewed it as a means of creating wealth. On a tour of several sites in West Africa in 1824, he noted ambivalently that their "importance" derived from the slave trade, while he marveled at the productivity of agriculture under the "perfectly despotic" government. The freed black American immigrants whom Lott Cary, a vice-agent of the ACS, recruited from Virginia and elsewhere in the United States, were to be a critical mass of Americo-Liberians who could control the recaptives and resist the violent outbursts of local African peoples (Saillant, 1996). Even in more recent times the Liberian government under the leadership of Americo-Liberians continued to engage in slave trade. For example, in his historical study, Joseph Saye Guannu comments:

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One of the darkest periods in Liberian history was between 1929 and 1934. In 1929 Monrovia was charged with slavery and forced labor by Washington. The consequent inquiry conducted by a commission of the League of Nations almost culminated in the loss of Liberia's national sovereignty and political independence. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Commission of Inquiry recommended a series of socioeconomic reforms, which Liberia accepted in principle. (1989, p. 5)

The scathing League of Nations denunciation of the Liberian government's involvement in the 1930 Fernando Po scheme led to the resignation of both the vice president, Allen Yancy, and the president, Charles D. B. King. That the leaders of a country founded on the principle of black freedom were literally enslaving their fellow Africans was shocking, but, as the editors of the NAACP magazine The Crisis pointed out, there was "a piece of smug hypocrisy" in the League's response. The Spanish government received no censure even though it was "they who demanded the enslaved labor" (Ciment 1998). Leaders of Liberia from its foundation to the present have used unscrupulous methods such as the ones previously indicated: suppress and deny fundamental basic rights and economic empowerment to the indigenous Liberian population, and separate the Americo-Liberian and indigenous communities. In concert with the former argument, massive exploitation of the indigenous Liberian majority by the settler minority for wealth and political power and the maintenance of the settler class thrived from 1821 to 1980, when the Americo-Liberian regime collapsed. In 1980-90, during the military interregnum, Liberian leadership, comprised mainly of indigenous Liberian stock, introduced a dangerous political element--tribalism that culminated in social intolerance--as a recipe for dismantling military rule. Another dark spot in the Liberian history was the Civil War (1989-96), which saw destruction of lives and property in the country. The current leadership is presiding over a Liberia that is in ruins and a populace traumatized by war. Now Liberians must learn from history the errors of the past and start to rebuild a Liberia that will incorporate all its citizens, regardless of class and ethnic divisions.

V. CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE This paper highlights numerous contradictions about the American Colonization Society among those who supported colonization, freed black Americans who emigrated to Liberia, and indigenous Africans or native Liberians. The paper delineates the reasons why freed black Americans were removed from New Jersey and elsewhere in America and relocated in Liberia as well as the roles of those who supported and opposed the idea of African colonization. It discusses the presence of freed black Americans in Liberia and their contributions (good and bad) to the making of a democratic order and civil society in Liberia. Liberia has rich culture, traditions, and customs that its people should be proud of. But not to contribute to finding genuine solutions to the problems affecting Liberia today would leave the next generation on the edge of an

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abyss. Reconstruction, democracy and developments in technology, infrastructure, and human resources are attainable in Liberia provided Liberians (1) recognize that immigrants, naturalized people, and those who were born in Liberia are all Liberians; (2) integrate the government bureaucracy-Liberia's civil servants should reflect the country's ethnic diversity and represent its 16 ethnic groups; (3) avoid antagonisms among the various group; (d) commit themselves to enhancing Liberian nationalism- love for Liberia should be second to none; (e) develop the country and distribute wealth evenly; and (f) have tolerance for law and order and shun violence. The truth of the matter is that Liberia has gone through a lot. Liberians must put aside their differences-political, ideological, religious, or others-and work together to take the country to another level in this millennium. Otherwise the prospect of rebuilding Liberia in the aftermath of the civil war will be hopeless.

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REFERENCES

American Colonization Society (1872). Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: ACS. Burrowes, Carl Patrick (1996). "The Founding of Liberia: Realities, Ideals and Implications." Paper presented at the Liberian Studies Conference, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., July 16. Ciment, James (1998). "The Idea of Liberia." American Legacy: Celebrating African-American History and Culture, 4, no. 3 (fall): 32- 40. Caputo, Michael J. 1965. "New Jersey's Role in the African Colonization Movement 1790-1865." Master's thesis, Montclair State College, June. Delbanco, Andrew, ed. (1992). The Portable Abraham Lincoln. New York: Penguin. Fishman, George (1997). The African American Struggle for Freedom and Equality: The Development of a People's Identity, New Jersey, 1624- 1850. New York: Garland. Greene, Larry A. (1994). "A History of African Americans in New Jersey." Journal of the Rutgers University Libraries 56, no. 1. Guannu, Joseph Saye. (1989). The Perennial Problems of Liberian History. Occasional Papers 2, no. 1. Sanniquellie City: Liberian Observer Corp. Jefferson, Thomas (1785 [1955]). Notes on the State of Virginia. Ed. and intro. William Peden. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Kinshasa, Kwando M. (1998). Emigration vs. Assimilation: The Debate in the African American Press, 1827 -1861. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland. Litwack, Leon F. (1961). North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lucas, Sir Charles (1922[1972]). The Partition & Colonization of Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprint New York: H. Fertig. Price, Clement Alexander (1980). Freedom Not Far Distant: A Documentary History of Afro-Americans in New Jersey. Joint project of the New Jersey Historical Society and the New Jersey Historical Commission. Newark: New Jersey Historical Society. Robinson, Dean E. (2001). Black Nationalism in America: Politics and Thought. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Rock, John S. (1850). "Address to the Citizens of New Jersey." (Rochester, N.Y.) North Star, February, pp. 86-87. Saillant, John. (1996). "'Circular Addressed to the Colored Brethren and Friends in America': An Unpublished Essay by Lott Cary, Sent from Liberia to Virginia, 1827." Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 104, no. 4 (autumn): 481-504. Seaton, Douglas P. (1978). "Colonizers and Reluctant Colonists: The New Jersey Colonization Society and the Black Community, 1813-1848." New Jersey History 96 (1978). Staudenraus, P. J. (1961). The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Stockton, Robert Field (1865). A Sketch of the Life of Com. Robert F. Stockton; With An Appendix; Comprising His Correspondence with Same Subject; Together With His Speeches in the Senate the Navy Department Respecting His Conquest of California; Extracts from the Defense of Col. J.C. Fremont, in Relation to the of the United States, and His Political Letters. New York: Derby and Jackson. Vermont Colonization Society (1858). The Thirty-Third Annual Report of the Vermont Colonization Society. Montpellier, Vt.: E. P. Walton. Williams, Robert J. (1984). "Blacks, Colonization, and Antislavery: The Views of Methodists in New Jersey, 1816-60." New Jersey History, 102, nos. 3 & 4 (fall/winter): 51-67.

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor Assessing Liberia's Economic Performance and its Impact on Mano River Union Members: 1960-1992: A Comment

James S. Gusehl

In a recent paper, Anthony Paul Andrews (2001) examined the effects of government expenditure, the oil embargoes of the 1970s, and the ethnopolitical conflict in Liberia on economic growth in the Mano River Union in West Africa. A growth model for each country, as well as for the pooled data set, was employed and tested using data for the period 1960-1992. His main findings were as follows: 1) The oil shocks of the 1970s affected the economies of Liberia and Sierra Leone, but not that of Guinea; 2) the conflict in Liberia had very little impact on the Mano River Union countries; and 3) government expenditure ameliorated the effects of the oil embargoes and the Liberian conflict on economic growth in Liberia. A review of Andrews' study shows that the models have important statistical limitations that also affect his conclusions. The growth models are misspecified since they exclude relevant economic variables, such as capital and labor. As a result the estimated coefficients obtained may be biased. Moreover, his conclusions are not consistent with these estimates. In view of these limitations, relying on his findings could have serious policy implications for the development of the countries in the Mano River Union. Therefore, an evaluation of his model and conclusions is needed for further research on the subject. The purpose of this paper is to conduct such an assessment.

REVIEW OF THE MODEL Using growth models, Andrews examined the impact of government expenditure, internal and external shocks, and openness of the economy on economic growth in the Mano River Union countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea over the period 1960-1992. Economic growth is measured as the growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.' Government

1 James S. Guseh is Professor of Law, Political Economy, and Public Administration at North Carolina Central University. He holds a B.A. and M.S. in Economics, a joint J.D.-M.P.A. in Law and Public Administration, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Economy. His fields of research include the political economy of development, government reorganization and privatization, international law, and electoral politics.

2. Andrews' measure of economic growth seems to differ from the conventional approach. He measured economic growth as "growth in GDP per capita, " while the conventional measure is the growth rate of GDP per capita (or the growth rate of GDP). Growth in GDP per capita is the change in GDP per capita from one period to another. The growth rate is the percentage change in GDP per capita (or GDP). However, in his analysis, Andrews also refers to growth in GDP per capita in percentages.

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expenditure is measured as the share of government expenditure in GDP. (For the purpose of this analysis, the terms share of government expenditure in GDP, government expenditure or spending, and government size are used interchangeably.) Internal shock is the impact of the ethnopolitical conflict in Liberia during military rule and the civil war in the 19980s-1990s. External shock is the impact of the oil embargoes by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) during the 1970s. To model the impact of these shocks on economic growth, the sample period was divided into three regime periods that were represented by dummy variables. Regime I is referred to as the take-off stage of Liberia's economic expansion from 1960 to 1971. Regime II, referred as the period of the oil shocks, covered the period 1971-1980. Regime III is the period of military rule and the civil war in Liberia from 1981-1992. The degree of the openness of the economy is measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. His growth model for each country was specified as follows: gGDpc t= a,+ (a, + a, D2 + a, D3 )gsGE, t + a2gopENt+ ut where g1GDPC,t is the growth in GDP per capita for country i.. g, t. is the growth in the share of total government spending in GDP. gopEN t is the degree of openness represented by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. D, and D3 are dummy variables for oil shocks and conflict shocks, respectively,

with D2 =1, 0 otherwise; and D3 = 1, 0 otherwise. D1, the take-off state, is the excluded category. a, is the constant term.

a,, a, and a, " are parameter estimates for the respective variables The data for the three countries were also pooled using a fixed effects model.' The models were estimated by ordinary least squares regression method and the results are reported in Table 1 (See end of text for all tables).

SPECIFICATION ISSUES One of the limitations of the study deals with the specification of the models. Although an economic growth model was employed, capital and labor were not included. According to economic theory and prior empirical work, capital and labor should be included in an economic growth model or production function. Failing to include these two relevant economic variables indicates a misspecification of the models. Hence, the parameter estimates obtained may be biased, and inferences drawn therefrom may be inaccurate. Another specification issue deals with the additive and interaction

3. The fixed effects model is used to control for intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities being investigated.

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variables. To assess the effects of government spending, the oil embargoes, and the conflict shock, Andrews estimated the variable for government expenditure in the models as an additive term and as interaction terms with the variables for the oil embargoes and the conflict shock as presented in Table 1. This specification is based on the assumptions that: 1) the impact of government expenditure on economic growth depended on the oil embargoes and the ethnopolitical conflict in Liberia and 2) the impact of the oil embargoes and the political conflict depended on government spending. While the additive term of the government expenditure variable was tested, the additive terms for the variables for the oil embargoes and the political conflict were not. Whether a variable should enter a model as either an additive or interaction variable or both depends on the underlying theory and specification tests. However, Andrews did not provide the underlying theory or specification tests to justify the use of the additive and interaction variables, thereby raising another specification issue. Related to the use of interaction variables is the problem of multicollinearity where two or more explanatory variables in the regression model are highly correlated leading to statistically insignificant estimated coefficients. Most of the parameter estimates in the four models are not significant at the conventional levels. Andrews employed two interaction variables consisting of the interactions of the government expenditure variable with the variables for Regime II and Regime III. The variables that are being multiplied to obtain the interaction terms are often highly correlated with the resulting interaction terms, leading to insignificant estimated coefficients, as in Andrews' study.

REGRESSION RESULTS The Oil Embargoes and the Liberian Conflict Andrews' interpretations of the models, especially in the case of Liberia, are not consistent with the estimated coefficient obtained. According to Andrews, The individual regression for Liberia indicates that the government's share of GDP and the oil shocks (Regime I) are both significant, especially the latter. The impact of the oil and conflict shocks negatively impacted the Liberian economy, although the coefficients are not significant. In Regime II the degree of openness is nearly significant, indicating that external forces seem to dominate the emergence of ethnopolitical conflict. Fiscal policy, on the part of Liberia, to ameliorate the decline in economic activity after 1971 is substantiated by the signs of the coefficients on the dummies to each of the regime shocks. (2001, p. 40)

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There are contradictions in Andrews' statement above. On one hand, he stated that the impact of the oil shocks is significant in Liberia, but, on the other hand, he stated that the impact is not significant, along with the conflict shocks. Since the data for Liberia is for the period 1960-88 and with four parameter

estimates, the coefficient for the oil shocks (Regime II) is significant at the 1 percent level, while the coefficient for the conflict shocks (Regime III) is significant at the 10 percent level.4 Thus, contrary to Andrews' conclusions, the coefficients for the oil and conflict shocks are statistically significant. Given the model specification, the effects of the oil embargoes and Liberia's ethnopolitical conflict depended on government expenditure. Table 2 presents their effects on economic growth in comparison to the take-off stage, the base category, for a percent increase in government size. These effects are the estimated coefficients of the interaction variables. According to Table 2, the oil embargoes and the Liberian conflict had negative impact on economic growth in the three countries, and the magnitude of the impact depended on the size of government. For example, in the case of Liberia, the impact of the oil embargo was a 1.36 percent decline in economic growth in comparison to the take-off

stage for a 1 percent increase in government size. Similarly, for a 1 percent increase in government size, the impact of Liberia's ethnopolitical conflict was a 0.54 percent decline in economic growth in Liberia in comparison to the take-off stage. Although Andrews concluded that government expenditure in Liberia ameliorated the decline in economic growth resulting from the effects of the oil embargoes and the ethnopolitical conflict, the results of his estimated models proved the contrary. The results show that the negative effects of the oil and conflict shocks on the economy were exacerbated by government expenditure. That is, as government expenditure increased, the negative impact of the oil embargoes and conflict on the economy also increased, ceteris paribus. For example, in the case of Liberia, given a 10 percent increase in government spending, the impact of the oil embargoes and the political conflict would be a 13.6 percent and 5.4 percent decline in economic growth, respectively. (See Table 2) Andrews provided other contradictory assessment of the effects of the oil and conflict shocks. On page 40, he stated that none of the regimes shocks impacted the economies of Guinea and Sierra Leone. However, on page 43 he stated that the oil shocks affected the economies of Liberia and Sierra Leone. He also stated that the conflict period in Liberia had very little impact on the Mono River Union members." (p. 43).

According to Table 1 and Table 2, Liberia's take-off period (Regime I) had a positive and significant impact on the economies of Liberia and Sierra Leone, for a given level of government spending. The oil shocks had a negative

4. The coefficient of Regime II is significant using a two-tailed test, while that of Regime III is significant using a one-tailed test.

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and significant impact on the economies of Liberia and Guinea and not Sierra Leone. The estimated coefficient for the interaction between the oil shocks and

government spending is significant at the 1 percent level in the case of Liberia. With respect to the Liberian conflict, it had a significantly negative impact on the Liberian economy, depending on government spending. Using the point estimates, the conflict period also had a negative impact on the economies of Guinea and Sierra Leone, with the impact in Guinea being three times that of Sierra Leone. See Table 2. Thus, contrary to Andrew's assessment, the regime periods impacted the economies of the Mano River Union members. Andrews' results on the effects of the oil embargoes and Liberia's political conflict have fiscal policy implications for development. According to his results, an increase in government spending exacerbated the recessions resulting from the oil embargoes and political conflict. Macroeconomic theory postulates that expansionary fiscal policy is the appropriate tool for addressing an economic recession or a decline in economic performance. Andrews' results, however, challenge this policy. Whether this is an acceptable result depends on the specific research question. This paper simply demonstrates the implications of the interaction variables used in Andrews' models, especially when no theoretical justification was provided for their use.

Openness of the Economy Andrews stated that the degree of openness is "nearly significant" in Regime II. (p. 40) The degree of openness has no relation to Regime II in the models. The models controlled for the degree of openness irrespective of the type of regime or the level of government spending. Therefore, the degree of openness is not in Regime II, and it is also not "nearly significant." Although the estimated coefficients for the variable for openness are not significant in each country model, the signs are positive in the model for Guinea and negative in the models for Liberia and Sierra Leone. The negative coefficients especially in the case of Liberia are contrary to common perception. In the 1960s Liberia had one of the highest economic growth rates in the world. (Clower, et al., 1966). Between 1969 and 1978, Liberia had 13 percent of the total private investment in Africa, with only 0.3 percent of the continent's population (Dunn and Tan, 1988, p. 126). These impressive economic results were attributed to the openness of the Liberian economy. As a result, one would have expected the openness of the economy to have a positive, instead of a negative, impact on economic growth in Liberia.

Government Expenditure With respect to the impact of government spending, Andrews concluded that it had a significant impact on economic growth in Liberia and Sierra Leone in particular, as well as in all of the countries on the average using the pooled data set. In assessing the impact of government expenditure on the economy,

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Andrews focused only on the estimated coefficients of the additive term of the government expenditure variable. Given the model specification, the impact of government expenditure on economic growth is a function of the type of regime. In other words, the magnitude of the impact of government on economic growth is conditional on the regime period-- the oil shocks or the Liberian conflict. However, by focusing only on the additive term to determine the impact of government expenditure on economic growth, Andrews failed to assess the total impact of government expenditure. Taking the derivative of each economic growth model in Table 1 with respect to government expenditure and substituting therein the values of the dummy variables for the regimes can obtain the total impact of government expenditure on economic growth. The results are presented in Table 3. Although some of the interaction variables are not significant, the total impact of government expenditure can be computed using the point estimates. By focusing only on the additive terms, Andrews reported that in the pooled regression: "On average in the sample per capita GDP growth increased

0.28 percent for every 1 percent increase in the share of government in GDP . . . ." (p. 41) As Table 3 shows, this increase in economic growth resulting from a percent increase in government spending only applies to the take-off stage (1960 - 1971) and not to the entire sample period. The impact of a percent increase in government spending was 0.05 percent and 0.15 percent increase in economic growth during the periods of the oil embargoes and the Liberia's political conflict, respectively. Thus, the impact of government spending on the economy depends on the regime periods. By focusing only on the additive variable, Andrews did not provide an accurate assessment of the impact of government. As Table 3 shows, the impact of government expenditure also varies from country to country. In the case of Liberia, government expenditure had a positive impact on economic growth during the take-off stage and the conflict period and a negative impact during the oil embargoes. Using the point estimates, the impact of government spending on economic growth was positive and negative in Sierra and Guinea during all of the regime periods, respectively. In the pooled data set, the impact was positive in all of the regimes. Comparing the impact of government expenditure on economic growth among the three countries, the highest negative impact and the highest positive impact occurred in Liberia during the oil shocks (Regime II) and the take-off stage (Regime I), respectively. Thus, as noted above, the magnitude of the impact of government expenditure depends on the type of regime. As in the case of the oil and conflict shocks, these findings have policy implications that are disturbing. For example, in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the results show that an increase in government spending had a positive impact on economic growth during the civil war period. This raises the issue of whether war is needed to stimulate economic growth. Whether this is an acceptable policy depends on the purpose of the research. My analysis is again designed to show the implications of Andrews' model. If war could promote economic growth, African countries, such as Liberia and Angola, would be among the highest performing economies in the world.

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The share of government expenditure in GDP was tested in the model to determine the extent to which it ameliorates the negative effects of the oil and political shocks on economic growth. Andrews assumed that an increase in government expenditure had a positive impact on economic growth, since he expected government spending to ameliorate the negative effects of the oil and conflict shocks. However, whether government expenditure has a positive or negative impact on economic growth is a debatable issue in the literature. Some studies have found that growth in government expenditure promotes economic growth, while others have found that it depresses growth. Moreover, whether government expenditure promotes or hinders economic growth depends on the specification of the government expenditure variable. Studies that have specified government expenditure as a share in GDP have found a negative relationship between government expenditure and economic growth (Barro, 1991; Guseh, 1997, 2000; Landau, 1983, 1985, 1986). On the other hand, studies that have used the growth rate of government expenditure (dG/G or AG /G) have found a positive relationship. (Ram, 1986, Guseh, 2000). Though previous studies have shown that the share of government expenditure in GDP is negatively correlated with economic growth, the impact of the share of government expenditure in GDP in Andrews' study varied from country to country and from one regime period to another. (See Table 3) The diversity of results of the impact of government expenditure in Andrews' study in relation to those of prior empirical work indicates the need for further research on the impact of government expenditure on economic growth in the Mano River Union.

CONCLUSIONS Employing growth models, Andrews examined the effects of government spending, the OPEC oil embargoes of the 1970s, and Liberia's ethnopolitical conflict of the 1980s-1990s on economic growth in the Mano River Union. His models were misspecified since they excluded relevant economic variables such as capital and labor. As result, the estimated coefficients obtained may be biased and inferences drawn therefrom may be inaccurate. His conclusions are not consistent with the estimated results of his models. Although he concluded that the conflict in Liberia had very little impact on the Mano River Union members, his estimated coefficients show that the conflict had a significantly negative impact on the Liberian economy, for a given level of government spending. The negative impact of the conflict on the Guinean economy was three times that of Sierra Leone. He also concluded that government expenditure ameliorated the negative impact of the oil embargoes and Liberia's ethnopolitical conflict on economic growth. However, the estimated coefficients show that an increase in government spending exacerbated their negative effects on economic growth. His finding challenges the role of fiscal policy in a recessionary period. A

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problem with his assessment of the impact of government is that he did not take the total effects of government into account, which depended on the type of regime. The effects of government spending on economic growth vary from country to country and from regime to regime. During all of the regime periods, the effects were positive in Sierra Leone and negative in Guinea. In the case of Liberia, the effects of government spending were positive during the take-off stage and the conflict period and negative during the period of the oil embargoes.

These results indicate that an increase in government spending promoted economic growth during the period of the civil war. These findings have serious implications about the role of war in the development in Liberia. In view of the limitations, the contradictory results, and the implications of Andrew study, further research is needed to assess the impact of government spending, the oil embargoes, and Liberia's ethnopolitical conflict on economic growth in the Mano River Union.

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Table 1: Regression Results of the Impact of Government Expenditure and Internal and External Shocks on Economic Growth in the Mano River Union

Variables Liberia Guinea Sierra Leone Pooled

g 0.6233 -0.0548 0.4319 0.2825 (1.808) (-0.277) (3.221) (1.816)

0 -0.2549 0.2228 -0.1358 0.2283 (1.151) (1.917) (1.267) (3.014)

First order Interaction with g

D2 -1.3615 -0.4113 0.1373 -0.2345 (3.661) -1.4041) (-0.682) (-0.8806)

D3 -0.5463 -0.5071 -0.1668 -0.1354 (1.552) -0.8569) (-0.845) (-08392)

R2 0.385 0.202 0.548 0.1005

SER 0.0473 0.0636 0.062 0.0709

DW 2.037 2.102 1.89 2.3950

Source: Prepared in tabular form from Andrews' (2001) estimated equations. Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-scores. g is the share of government expenditure in GDP; 0 is openness of the economy; D2 is the dummy variable for the period of the OPEC oil embargoes; D3 is the dummy variable for the period of Liberia's ethnopolitical conflict.

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Table 2. Impact of the Oil Embargoes and Liberia's Ethnopolitical Conflict on Economic Growth in the Mano River Union in Comparison to the Impact of Regime I (the Take Off Period) for a One Percent Increase in Government Spending.

Regime Liberia Guinea Sierra Leone Pooled

Regime II -1.36 -0.41 0.14 -0.23 Regime III -0.55 -0.51 -0.17 -0.14

Source: Estimated coefficients of the interaction variables in Table 1.

Table 3. Matrix of the Impact of Government Expenditure on Economic Growth During Various Regimes (Percent)

Regime Liberia Sierra Leone Guinea Pooled

Regime I (1960-71) 0.62 0.43 -0.05 0.28

Regime II (1972-80) -0.74 0.57 -0.47 0.05

Regime III (1981-92) 0.08 0.27 -0.56 0.15

Source: Derived from Table 1 by taking derivatives of each Equation with respect to government spending and substituting therein the values of the dummy variables. Notes: Regime I is the take-off stage in Liberia; Regime II is period of the OPEC oil shocks; and Regime III is the period of Liberia's military rule and civil war.

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REFERENCES

Andrews, Anthony Paul (2001). "Assessing Liberia's Economic Performance and its Impact on Mano River Union Members: 1960-1992," Liberian Studies Journal 26 (2): 33-47. Barro, Robert (1991). "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 407-443. Clower, Robert W., George Dalton, Mitchell Harwitz, and A.A. Walters (1966). Growth without Development: An Economic Survey of Liberia (Evanston: Northwestern University Press). Dunn, D. Elwood and S. Byron Tan (1988). Liberia: A National Polity in Transition (London: The Scarescrow Press). Guseh, James S. (1997) "Government Size and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Political-Economy Framework, " Journal of Macroeconomics 19, no. 1: 175-192. (2000). "Government Size and Economic Growth: The Case of Liberia," African Social Science Review 1, no. 1: 30-39. Landau, Daniel (1983) "Government and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study, " Southern Economic Journal 49: 783-792. (1985). "Government and Economic Growth in Developed Countries: 1952-76," Public Choice 47: 459-477. (1986) "Government and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study for 1960-1980," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35: 35-75. Ram, Rati (1986). "Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and Some Evidence from Cross-Section and Time-Series, " American Economic Review 76: 191-203.

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I. Introduction

Theoretical models in economics and econometrics have changed considerably since the mid-1980s. In fact, both fields witnessed substantial innovations in theory and modeling of the new theoretical foundations. The literature on Economic Growth (or Growth Theory) is so large that it merits a field of study of its on. The same can be said of the field of Time Series Analysis as a sub-field of Econometrics. The contributions of my paper (Andrews, 2001) are based on innovations in both areas, which are now standard practices in growth and econometric theory literature. In this context, my paper makes use of current growth and econometric theory to say something about modeling an economic community: The Mano River Union of West Africa. The constraints on the models are clearly delineated and reference (1) incomplete comparable data, (2) the non-availability of certain data, and (3) comparable data over a range of periods for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Guseh's critique neither recognizes nor includes an understanding of these contributions to field's literature.

Data limitations, however, do not, in any sense, limit what can be said empirically. The role of the social scientist is to use what is available to construct meaningful inferences. Aiding in this cause is the approach I took to investigate the available data. In the context of the paper under discussion, the choice of theoretical and empirical macroeconomic and econometric (or macroeconometric) models selected are those associated with a school of thought which examines the empirical investigative model from a lens different from classical school of econometrics. Pagan (1995) provides an in- depth discussion of the significant extensions from classical econometrics modeling and the resulting directions, which are a result of these extensions2. To a large extent, what lies behind the Guseh's critique is a continuation of the dialogue which took place at the 5th World Conference of the Econometrics Society in 1985, in which the discussion was devoted entirely to issues of methodology, which led to Adrian Pagan to conclude that "[o] ur data are such we cannot ignore the fact that the information [contained] therein may need to be extracted by a wide range of techniques borrowed from many different

Anthony Paul Andrews is Associate Professor of Economics and Liberal Studies at Governors State University and Director of the Global Trade Research Institute. He holds the B.A., and M.A., in Economics, and M.A. and Ph.D. in Regional Science from the University of Pennsylvania. His fields of research include macroeconmetrics, econometrics of panel data modeling, labor market theory and econometrics.

2 See Oxlely et al. (1995), Chapter 2.

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approaches.3 My response to Guseh's comments will be to point out these differences in three key areas: (1) critique of the type of model incorporated in the paper, (2) interpretation of empirical results, and (3) particular comments outside both of these areas.

In Section II, I address the theoretical issues by reviewing recent developments in growth and econometric theory, respectively. While this is a review of each theory, its central focus is to addresses the theoretical framework of the model used in the paper; thus, there is a great deal of theory-mixing taking place in this short survey. In Section II, I discuss critical comments on the interpretation of the results. The implication here is that, by not having the actual results, Guseh's interpretation of the regression results are incomplete and without justification. Finally, in Section III, I address a number of ancillary issues raised by Guseh, which merit attention.

II. Recent Developments in Growth and Econometric Theories: A Brief Review

Guseh begins by defining two critical issues with the standard format of the model presented in Andrews (2001). His criticism includes the absence of capital and labor in the model's specification and my interpretation of the results. In the first instance, the implication is that growth models should include capital and labor in the specification based on "economic theory and prior empirical work." His statement leaves no room for deviation in construction, which is quite interesting in that a number of deviations have been posited based on the inefficiency of this specification. First, including capital and labor in the specification requires one to consider the host of problems associated with (1) aggregation of heterogeneous outputs and inputs into indices and (2) imposition of stringent restrictions on the form of the production function under consideration. These conditions alone test the limits of any aggregate data; however, despite these limiting conditions, aggregate production functions, of the type described by Guseh, are a common, but declining, feature of today's macroeconometric landscape. This does not preclude the fact that different methodologies exist and provide challenges to the pure neoclassical framework. In fact, one of the major modifications to the concept of the aggregate production function has been what Barro and Sali-I- Martin (1995, p.13) posit as the way in which "recent research pays close attention to empirical implications and to the relation between theory and the data." However, while their statement addresses, in particular, extensions of the neoclassical growth model to arrive at the impact of endogenous growth theory and overlapping generation modeling considerations, it also indirectly refers to the revolution in econometric theory, specifically in time series

3 Ibi d., p. 26

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analysis, that has taken place in concert with the "wave of new research" in growth theory.4 This concomitant revolution has to do with the way in which models are defined and, in this case, reference is made to "general-to-specific" modeling approach associated with the London School of Economics, and, in particular, D. Hendry (1983, 1987). The discussion of this method and its extensions is summarized in Backhouse and Salanti (2000).5 My approach is to develop a model, which explains the data and extends modeling economies with severe data constraints. In fact, the fundamental contribution to the literature is that the model posited is one, which (1) provides an endogenous specification of growth in a comparative framework for countries in the Mano River Region and (2) does so with the only comparable data available for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

In matters of specification, Guseh appears to be on the side of the modeling paradigm known as "specific-to-general," which follows the Cowles tradition of econometric modeling. This approach has come under severe scrutiny and been recast as the "new econometrics." Research on this issue can be found in Hendry (1980), Sims (1980), Bodkin et al. (1991), and, especially, Dharmapala McAleer (1996). The questions that should be asked are (1) what type of specification is modeled in Andrews (2001) and (2) why is it not necessary to use capital and labor in the specification? Answering this question requires a review of the standard literature of economic growth models and what models of this specification have to say.

The role of the aggregated production function is to provide a specification of the factor inputs to output relationship; that is, the general four-factor production function

y = f(k,l,e,m) (1.1)

where output, y is a function of capital, k; labour, 1; energy; and materials. The use of equation (1.1) has seen a topic of considerable debate, primarily with respect to ascertaining the correct functional form. The first, and seminal, contribution to the specification was by Cobb and Douglas (1928), which was a two-factor production function, incorporating only capital and labor. However, specification is only one of a number of crucial issues and what has been the standard dimension of discussion of the production function is (1) definition and measurement of the included exogenous variables and (2) more importantly, what variables to include in the specification.

If one were to follow developments in the field of growth theory, one would see that, with the advent of the Cobb-Douglas production function, early attention focused on the production function's quantitative specification.

4 Barro and Sala-I-Martin, p. 12.

5 See Section 10C.

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Following Blanchard and Fischer (2001), the next seminal specification of the Cobb-Douglas formulation was the So low decomposition, which, while not theory free, provided a useful description of the data as follows:

gy =a g+ (1 -a) gk +go (1.2)

where gy , is the growth rate of output; g, the growth rate of labor; gk, the growth of capital; a , the share of labor input under constant returns to scale; and go , the Solow residual, which measures that part of growth which cannot be explained by the growth of capital and the growth of labor. Empirical estimates of the contributions to both labor and capital were about 13% with the remainder, 87%, attributed to the residual, which is defined as the growth in multifactor productivity. As the residual was given to be exogenous it did not explain (1) what causes productivity to change over time and (2) why some countries grow faster than others. The last point is of particular interest for developing economies (e.g., Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone), in that due to lack of perfectly mobile capital markets across space and time and evidence of high marginal product of capital in these economies, we should expect massive capital flows in the direction of these economies.6 Since this is not the case, then the residual must contain the answer to these questions and, in fact, this has been the direction of the "New" economic growth, which focuses on endogenizing the residual in order to account for the missing contribution to by factors other than capital and labor. For example, Abel and Bemanke (1998) notes that "several statistical studies reveal that the Solow residual is in fact correlated with factors such as government expenditures ... [and] ... other factors." Thus, my inclusion of government expenditures is consistent with empirical evidence with respect to endogenous growth theory and which, to restate, is the point I make in the paper: due to the impact of government spending, it is more like to fmd government spending being a relevant determinant of growth in the economies of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone than the contributions of capital and labor. Thus, the basis of the specification of the model presented in my paper is to propose a new approach in examining comparable growth in these economies. The specification and associated conceptual framework are now standard in all major undergraduate macroeconomic texts (see Abel and Bemanke, 1998, chapter 11; Gordon, 2000, chapter 9; and Mankiw, 2000, chapter 19). Thus, the relevance of Guseh's comments on these matters is anachronistic.

6 See Gordon, p. 303.

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III. The Empirical Model and Results

My second response to Guseh's critique involves interpretation of the regressions results and will be based on his (1) misunderstanding of the definition of the structure of the data and (2) interpretations of the econometric results. To support the specifications and results in the paper, I have included the complete regression results. To make the type of critique made by Guseh, one must have applied replicated the experiment using the data in my paper. Guseh could have been done this by requesting for the data set used in the analysis or, by simply downloading from the Internet the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 5.6, which I used in the paper. The PWT database has been available for public use for a long period of time and is available to users free of charge. The database is widely known in international comparison macroeconometric and development literature and is the standard database used because of its data comparability across countries. However, data availability on the series for Liberia is limited and this was a major point of discussion in my paper. For example, Figure 1 provides an indication of data availability for Mano River Union members.

GDP Per Capita 1600 Sierra Leone 1400 _

1200 _

1000

800 _

600 _

400 , . , 1 , 1960 1965 19170 19175 19180 1985 1990

Figure 1:

There are 26 data points of relevant observations; two initial data points are missing for Sierra Leone. One, initial, and 6 terminal periods are also missing for Liberia. Including lagged terms further truncates the data so that the limited observations restrict the time period of the regression analysis. Additionally, data on capital and labor are not present for Liberia in the PWT and recent examination of the updated tables indicate that all of the data on Liberia has be eliminated. Thus, this study might have been the last empirical study, which utilized these data on Liberia.

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The regression results presented in my paper are presented below (See the end of this rejoinder for the tables). The results were estimated using EViews, Version 4.0. The actual results are presented in Tables 1-3. The regression results show that all of the variables indicated significant in the paper are, in fact, significant as verified by the relevant t-statistics and associated p-values.

Guseh's criticism of these results are based on his argument that the data period for Liberia is from 1960 - 1988; however, it can be seen from the actual results on line 3 in the table that the actual included observations, after adjusting endpoints in the regression is actually 24 observations. Thus, the results are the same as reported in the original paper.

Additional comments by Guseh can now be viewed in terms of the actual results and not his calculated test results. Regarding, Guseh's comments on the significance of openness and growth rates based data from Clower et al. (1966), it must be remembered that the data sets are entirely different in contextual definition. The PWT database, as described in the original paper, is based on dollar denominated, quality-adjusted output baskets for a large number of countries, and is the preferred database to be used in international comparisons involving incomes and price indices. In fact, the PWT database is preferred to the UN World Bank databases and are

Guseh makes another critical error is in his section on government expenditures where he derives the impact of government expenditure despite the fact that some of the interaction effects were not significant. The total impact on each of the regimes cannot be derived since the Liberian civil war regime is not significant. This was discussed with respect to the parameter estimates, which provide both magnitude and direction of impact. This applies to each country and the respective impact indicators.

Guseh's makes a further point from my analysis that if war promoted economic growth then Liberia and Angola would have been among the fastest growing economies in the world. The fact that war has been an engine of growth is testament to the US economy emerging from the Great Depression of the 1930s and apparent growth of the US economy during the Korean War. The important difference here is that war is an engine of growth if it does not take place in your own back yard. With respect to Liberia and Angola, the wars were fought in their respective countries resulting in significant destruction of both physical and social capital.

Two final comments require addressing. The first is his apparent definition of growth. He seems to feel that the "growth in" GDP is defined as change in GDP from one period to the next while the "growth of GDP is the percent change in GDP. It is my understanding that the first concept, as he defines it,

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refers to the average annual change in GDP. Thus, I am aware of the average annual growth in GDP and the growth of GDP, or GDP growth. Finally, in his footnotes, he makes references to significance levels with respect to one- and two-tailed tests. It is standard statistical theory that a test, whether one- or two-tailed, is employed specifically with respect to the structure of the hypothesis tested. The first is based on a hypothesis in which an inequality if utilized, while the second is with respect to an equality (see Stock and Watson, 2003, chapter 5).

IV. Conclusions

I appreciate Guseh's critique. Where we both agree is on the need for further research in this important area. Additionally, we agree that empirical work in this area, especially with respect to the direction of causation of the share of government expenditures, has not been tied down and continues, as my study did, to present implications on the direction of causation. As Guseh points out, empirical studies have validated both positive and negated growth on the share of government expenditures. What must me kept in mind, in the context to the structure of the model, is to let the data speak for themselves, and given the limitations of the data, we can say something meaningful about modeling economies in the Mano River Union.

Where Guseh and I disagree is on the type of model used in the analysis. Clearly, the formulation was shown to have empirical merit. It just so happens that Guseh has not kept pace with the fact changing methods in the both theoretical and empirical Macroeconometrics. The development of econometric methodology has recently picked up focus and the results are remarkable in terms of the innovations and extensions of tools and methodologies. The debate over econometric methodology, as I indicated earlier, is as much a part of the field as it is a part of unit root tests and cointegration. Modeling strategy is important in econometrics. More importantly, modeling should be done in a way that let the data speak through their generating process. I beg to differ with Guseh's fmal point that my results may not have any relevance and meaning for policy in Mano River Union countries. We should remember that the So low model was the workhorse of both econometric and econometric theory for over 30 years and, yet, was known only to account for about 13 percent of factor contribution to the growth process. Recent extensions to the model have significantly increased accountability for the growth accounting process. My model is a first step in examining an area, clearly in need of further investigation. Hopefully this discussion will not take us 30 years to come up with a more efficient model to explain growth among the members of the Mano River Union.

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Table 1: Regression Results for Liberia

Dependent Variable: GR_GDPPC_Liberia Method: Least Squares Sample (adjusted): 1963 1986 Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints Convergence achieved after 14 iterations GR_GDPPC_L = C (2)*GR_GOV_L + C (3)*GR_GOV_L*D_1 + C(4)*GR_GOV_L*D_2 + C(5)*GR_OPEN_L +[AR(2) =C(6) ] Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. C(2) 0.623306 0.344585 1.808861 0.0863 C(3) -1.361538 0.371820 -3.661824 0.0017 C(4) -0.546348 0.351864 -1.552722 0.1370 C(5) -0.254960 0.168566 -1.512522 0.1469 C(6) 0.568137 0.215348 2.638227 0.0162 R-squared 0.492361 Mean dependent var 0.004733 Adjusted R-squared 0.385490 S.D. dependent var 0.060401 S.E. of regression 0.047349 Akaike info criterion -3.079492 Sum squared resid 0.042597 Schwarz criterion -2.834064 Log likelihood 41.95390 Durbin-Watson stat 2.037806 Inverted AR Roots .75 -.75

Table 2: Regression Results for Guinea

Dependent Variable: GR_GDPPC_Guinea Sample (adjusted): 1962 1986 Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints Convergence achieved after 14 iterations GR_GDPPC_G = C(1)*GR_GOV_G + C(2)*GR_GOV_G*D_1 + C(3)*GR_GOV_G*D_22+ C(4)*GR_OPEN_G + [AR(2)=C(5)] Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. C(1) -0.054843 0.199831 -0.274445 0.7866 C(2) -0.411324 0.292764 -1.404965 0.1754 C(3) -0.507176 0.591844 -0.856942 0.4016 C(4) 0.222863 0.116232 1.917399 0.0696 C(5) -0.077076 0.235220 -0.327675 0.7466 R-squared 0.335674 Mean dependent var 0.010233 Adjusted R-squared 0.202809 S.D. dependent var 0.071278 S.E. of regression 0.063641 Akaike info criterion -2.494261 Sum squared resid 0.081004 Schwarz criterion -2.250485 Log likelihood 36.17826 Durbin-Watson stat 2.102181

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Table 3:Regression Results for Sierra Leone

Dependent Variable: GR_GDPPC_SL Sample(adjusted): 1964 1986 Included observations: 23 after adjusting endpoints Convergence achieved after 13 iterations GR_GDPPC_SL = C(1)*GR_GOV_SL + C(2)*GR_GOV_SL*D_1 + C(3)*GR_GOV_SL*D_22+ C(4)*GR_OPEN_SL + [AR(2)=C(5)] Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.

C(1) 0.431910 0.134073 3 .221449 0.0047 C(2) 0.137373 0.201332 0.682320 0.5037 C(3) -0.166800 0.197270 -0.845541 0.4089 C(4) 0.135825 0.107119 1.267990 0.2210 C(5) 0.116812 0.236563 0.493786 0.6274 R-squared 0.630785 Mean dependent var -0.003080 Adjusted R-squared 0.548738 S.D. dependent var 0.092585 S.E. of regression 0.062195 Akaike info criterion -2.527421 Sum squared resid 0.069628 Schwarz criterion -2.280574 Log likelihood 34.06534 Durbin-Watson stat 1.896476 Inverted AR Roots .34 -.34

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor REJOINDER TO GUSEH'S COMMENT 63 REFERENCES

Abel, A. B. and B. S. Bernanke (1998). Macroeconomics, 3rd edition (New York: Addison-Wesley).

Andrews, A. P. (2001). "Assessing Liberia's Economic Performance and its Impact on Mano River Union Members: 1960-1992", Liberian Studies Journal 26(3):33-47.

Barro, Robert and Xavier Sali-I-Martin (1995). Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill).

Blanchard, 0. J. and Stanley Fischer (2001). Lectures on Macroeconomics (Cambridge: MIT Press). Bodkin, R.G., L.R. Klein, and K. Marwah (eds.) (1991), A History of Macroeconometic Model Building (London: Edward Elgar, Aldershot).

Cobb, C. and P.H. Douglas (1928). "A Theory of Production," American Economic Review, 18.1:139-165.

Dharmapala, D. and M. McAleer (1996) "Econometric Methodology and the Philosophy of Science", Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 49:9-37.

Gordon, R. (2000). Macroeconomics, 8th edition (New York: Addison Wesley Longman).

Hendry, D. F. (1980). "Econometrics - Alchemy or Science?" Economica 47:387-406.

(1983). "Econometric Modelling: The Consumption Function in Retrospect." Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 30:193-220.

(1987). Econometric Methodology: A Personal Perspective. In Advances in Econometrics: 5th World Congress, Bewley, T.F. (ed.), 2:236-261. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Mankiw, N. G. (2000) Macroeconomics, 4th edition (New York: Worth Publishers).

Oxley, Les, Donald A.R. George, Colin J. Roberts, and Stuart Sayer (1995). Surveys in Econometrics (Oxford: Blackwell).

Pagan, A. (1995). "Three Econometric Methodologies: A Critical Appraisal", in Oxley et al., Surveys in Econometrics (Oxford: Blackwell).

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Sims (1980). "Macroeconomics and Reality", Econometrica 48:1-48.

Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2003). Introduction to Econometrics (Boston: Addison Wesley).

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS AND THESES

Adebajo, Adekeye. Building Peace in West Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2002.

Adebajo, Adekeye. Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria: ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2002.

Bandele, Ram la Marie. "Diaspora Movements in the International Political Economy: African-Americans and the Black Star Line." PhD diss. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY. 2002.

Bekoe, Dor Ma Akosua Oduraa. "After the Peace Agreement: Lessons for Implementation from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia." PhD diss. HARVARD UNIVERSITY. 2002.

Chiang, Paul. "A Spiritual Strategy for Cross-cultural Mission in Africa: A Chinese Missionary's Practical Proposal (Liberia)." PhD diss. UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA (SOUTH AFRICA). 2002.

De Gourville, Richard Everest. "Social and Academic Experiences of Liberian Students Adapting their Cultural Literacies to a United States Urban High School: A Critical Inquiry." PhD diss. THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY. 2002.

Dunn, D. Elwood, Amos J. Beyan, Carl Patrick Burrowes (eds.). Historical Dictionary of Liberia. Edition: 2nd ed. Lanham, Md.; London: Scarecrow Press. 2001.

Fahnbulleh, Jimah Ann. "Transcultural Adoptions and the Formation of Cultural Identity" MSW Thesis CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, LONG BEACH. 2002.

Hanes Walton, Jr., James Bernard Rosser, Sr., and Robert L. Stevenson (eds.). Liberian Politics: The Portrait by African American diplomat J. Milton Turner. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 2002.

Irizar, Eugenia Garcia. "Parental Participation Among Recent Minority Immigrants in an Urban Public School. EdD diss. SETON HALL UNIVERSITY. 2002.

Kialain, David Payegbuseh. "Obstacles Inhibiting Managerial Leadership Initiatives and Performance Within Formal Organizations in Liberia." PhD diss. GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY. 2002.

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor 66 RECENT PUBLICATIONS AND THESES

Marten, James. Children and War: A Historical Anthology. New York: New York University Press. 2002.

McBride, David. Missions for Science: U.S. Technology and Medicine in America's Africa World. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 2002.

Nagbe, Moses K. The Road to Romeo. 3rd ed. Accra, Ghana: Sedco. 2001.

Polumaine, Augustine G. K. "Firestone Rubber Company and its Influence in Liberia: A Historical Perspective." MA Thesis. MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY. 2002.

Rainey, Timothy Allen. "Buffalo Soldiers in Africa: The Liberian Frontier Force and the United States Army, 1912-1927. PhD diss. THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. 2002.

Reeves, Samuel Broomfield, Jr. "Congregation-to-Congregation Relationship: A Case Study of Two Local Churches in Two Different Christian Communities and Cultures (Michigan, Liberia)" Dmin. Diss. PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY. 2002.

Stedman, Stephen John, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.). Ending civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner. 2002.

Wesley, Patricia Jabbeh. "Becoming Ebony: Poems." PhD diss. WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY. 2002.

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Minutes of the 34th Annual Meeting of the Liberian Studies Association

Mary Moran & Al-Hassan Conteh

The board approved the minutes of the 33rd Annual meeting as published in Vol. 26 No. 2 of the Liberian Studies Journal.

Dr. Dianne Oyler, the Secretary/Treasurer, presented her financial report, which the board approved. Each issue of the journal cost about $2,500 to produce. A print run out of the journal was about 350 copies. The LSA made its funds from profits derived from its annual conferences. Current fees included $50, $40 and $15 for libraries, faculty and students respectively. The LSA paid for storing journal negatives, which the Journal's publisher stored. The LSA should look into electronic storage. Sheridan Books took about 6 weeks to produce the journal from the time they received a camera-ready copy from the editor. Other questions pertaining to the Journal included how it was distributed, and whether there was a lower rate for subscribers in Africa? The LSA sent copies of the journal to the University of Liberia and Cuttington University College. The LSA also sent a full set of back issues to both institutions. It was suggested that interested members in the United Sates should consider buying extra subscriptions for professionals and institutions in Liberia. Potential institutions included the Liberian Institute for Public Administration and the W.V.S. Tubman Technical College, should it reopen. The board agreed that the Secretary/Treasurer would send a request to Dr. James T. Tarpeh, the Director General of LIPA, for a list of organizations in Liberia to receive copies of the LSJ. Dr. Tarpeh agreed to use the LSA request as the basis for inviting institutions in Liberia to apply for journal copies.

Dr. Al-Hassan Conteh, the editor of the LSJ, presented his report. Drs. William C. Allen and James S. Guseh were now the book review editor and the associate editor of the LSJ respectively. The Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict and the African Studies Center, both at the University of Pennsylvania, provided about $2,500 of in-kind support towards the production of the journal. Turnaround time for journal articles was currently rather long. The difficulty was getting reviewers to send in their reports in a reasonable amount of time. It was suggested that the editor should give all reviewers a firm deadline and let them know that if they could not return papers on time, he would go to someone else. The question was raised about some inactive editorial board members currently listed in the Journal. For example, the University of Liberia (UL) and Cuttington University College should be contacted to nominate new representatives to the editorial advisory board of the Journal. Other pertinent questions raised included: how the editorial board should function? What criteria should be used to appoint its members? It was suggested that board members should be active scholars who were themselves publishing research, and who had extensive networks of contacts who can be asked to do peer review of journal articles. Editorial Advisory Board members should also assist with peer

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reviews in their areas of expertise. It would be very useful to have a separate meeting of the editorial board of the journal at annual meetings to discuss these issues

further. It was suggested that the past editors be listed in reverse chronology by year of service in the LSJ.

Current LSA membership stood at 100 institutions and about 150 individuals. There were now separate mailings for membership renewal. Renewal forms were not placed in the most recent issue of the Journal as done in the past. Some members were still behind in their payments. It was asked how long to give delinquents before stopping their subscriptions? The LSA already had an informal "amnesty" under which subscribers received the journal without paying immediately. This practice would henceforth stop.

The board decided to create different categories of membership for individuals and institutions in Africa. Suggested categories were lifetime, 3 months and five years. It also recommended that strategies should be devised to involve the expatriate Liberian community in the LSA. Dr. George Gompu volunteered to send the LSA the addresses of Liberian Organizations in the USA. Mr. Massaquoi Galakpa agreed to assist with the recruiting of Liberian professionals, including Liberian engineers, for LSA membership. Paper presenters at annual meetings must be LSA members.

The Thomas Hendrix Dissertation Fund had $400. The LSA was trying to raise $10,000. The interest would be used to fund dissertation research on Liberia. Jim Gray's Friends of Liberia e-mail service could be used to advertise this idea.

Dr. Gordon Thomasson agreed to look into the possibility with his institution of hosting the 34th LSA meeting in Binghamton, NY. Tel Aviv University would continue to remain a venue option for the 36th Annual Meeting.

Dr. Al-Hassan Conteh was elected the new LSA President. Dr. Mary Moran would be the incoming Secretary/Treasurer starting January 2003. Drs. Tim Rainey and Gordon Thomasson became member-at large of the board and vice president of LSA respectively. Dr. Dianne Oyler agreed to continue maintaining the LSA's web site at Fayetteville Sate University.

The board recommended that Dr. Conteh should write a letter of commendation to Fayetteville in recognition of Dr. Oyler's 6 years of distinguished service as LSA Secretary/Treasurer. A similar letter should be sent to Tel Aviv University in recognition of Dr. Yuketiel Gershoni's distinguished service as LSA president.

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The fall's board meeting would be held at the African Studies Association annual meeting. Suggestions were made to create a membership database, including areas of expertise. It was also recommended that the call for volunteers to host subsequent annual meetings be made in advance of annual meetings to enable decision make about the venue ahead of the annual business meeting, which would then be productive.

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Indiana University Research & Creative Activity January 1999 Volume XXI Number 3 Opening the Vault The staff at the Archives of Traditional Music at Indiana University Bloomington is used to getting requests from scholars for access to archive holdings. With more than 250,000 hours of recorded music and countless manuscripts, photographs, films, and early recording devices in its subterranean vault, researchers from as far away as South Africa and Japan routinely contact the archives about making the trek to middle America. So when scholars contacted Gloria Gibson, the archives' director and an associate professor of Afro-American Studies at IUB, about reviewing some newly deposited African materials, it should have been business as usual. Except for one thing.

"The collection is currently in more than 200 boxes, some of which are stored over at IU's warehouse," Gibson says, smiling at the embarrassment of riches. Svend Holsoe, a professor emeritus of anthropology from the University of Delaware who has written numerous books and articles on Liberia, chose to deposit his invaluable collection of research--conducted primarily in Liberia- - at IU's prestigious archives, and so those 200-plus boxes hold sound recordings, photographs dating back to the turn of the century, maps, and what may be the only extant copies of many government documents. "His collection is massive. It will probably take us several years to catalog all the material," Gibson says. That is why outside researchers' eagerness to see the material, while understandable, is a tad premature.

"We would prefer to have the material properly accessioned," Gibson says. But because that's going to take awhile--and because one scholar who has research already in progress has talked to Holsoe and has secured not only his blessing but an idea of where in those boxes she might find the materials she needs --at least one intrepid explorer has been given the go-ahead to delve into the material.

"The importance of archives--for me, anyway--is history. I've always been struck by their timeless quality. They blend, in a most exciting way, the past and the present. Archives serve as repositories of histories: formal and informal, personal and societal." But preservation is only half the archives' purpose, observes Gibson, who is also assistant director of the Black Film

Center/Archive . "There has to be a balance between preservation and outreach. I believe in making sure the materials are made accessible to the general public as well as scholars and intellectuals." And, of course, classes. People teaching folklore, anthropology, Afro-American, and African studies all make use of the voluminous holdings of the Archives of Traditional Music for undergraduate and graduate instruction. This commitment to outreach has also given rise to a project which just secured for the archives a $145,000 grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. That money will fund the completion of a new CD-ROM,

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"The Straus Expedition: Musical Instruments of West Africa." In 1934, financed by money from the Straus family, Laura Boulton (1899-1980), an enthusiastic collector of African musical data and instruments, traveled through West Africa amassing film and audio footage upon which she based a series of multimedia lectures back in the United States. Using the CD -ROM -- which already exists in prototype form--students will be able to navigate materials from Boulton's collection coupled with more contemporary musical examples to make discoveries about and connections between West African musical traditions and their cultural contexts.

Gloria J. Gibson, associate professor of Afro-American studies and director of the Archives of Traditional Music at Indiana University Bloomington, holds a poster with a picture of Laura Boulton, an ethusiastic music collector, who is recording the Tuaregs in Timbuktu. Gibson is at Hoagy Carmichael's piano, part of the archives' collection. --credit

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The CD-ROM's holistic approach to music is important to Gibson. "It's different from other CD- ROMs on the market," she observes. "It presents the story of musical instruments as a part of cultural and social history instead of just showing instruments with brief musical excerpts." In addition to developing the CD-ROM, the archives are partners with the African Studies Program --along with several African institutions and other units at IUB-- on a new project, part of a $150,000 grant from the Ford Foundation. This grant focuses on documenting Africa's oral heritage as understood through music, interviews, and poetry. And on the heels of that substantial grant came yet another one, subsidizing the digitizing of the music and related materials of songwriter Hoagy Carmichael and distributing it via the Internet. As the archives enters its fifty-first year (it celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in October) and looks toward the next millennium, Gibson would like to pursue other projects which, like the CD-ROM and Carmichael projects, have the potential to allow the archives' copious offerings to reach more people. "We're dedicated to preserving and disseminating the music treasures of the world's peoples," Gibson says. "Combining traditional music and technology, in diverse formats, is one means by which to showcase one of Indiana University's most important resources." That's no small feat. But with its international reputation and dedicated staff, the Archives of Traditional Music are poised to achieve great things. And why shouldn't they be? As Gibson says, "After all, we have access to a most precious cultural resource - world music." Credit--Eric feffinger

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Executive Summary

1. Since the Panel submitted its last report (S/2001/1015) in October 2001, the war in Liberia's Lofa County has spread towards Monrovia and a State of Emergency was declared in February 2002. In neighbouring Sierra Leone in contrast the peace process is running smoothly and in January 2002 President Kabbah declared the conflict over. The RUF has transformed itself from a brutal rebel force into being a political party preparing to contest the 'presidential and parliamentary multi-party elections in May 2002.

2. During this investigation the Panel tried to assess whether any renegade RUF structures remained intact in Liberia that could pose a threat to the election process and its aftermath in Sierra Leone. Although the Panel found credible evidence of small clusters of ex-RUF combatants fighting in Liberia as guns for hire for both the government and rebels there did not seem to be a connection with RUFP.

3. The Panel also attempted to locate the last unaccounted for key RUF military commander Sam 'Maskita' Bockarie. Despite persistent rumours that he is active in Liberia the Panel could only confirm that he travelled under a false name to Ghana in 2001. We also established that his wife and mother live in Monrovia although they are preparing to return to Sierra Leone soon. Beyond these facts all about Bockarie is rumour and his name has entered regional mythology and contributed to an inflation of the use of the 'Mosquito' label.

Arms and Air Transportation

On Arms

4. The Panel found credible evidence that Liberia keeps violating the arms embargo and that the numerous special units deployed by the Government carry new weaponry and ammunition. The Panel is also worried about the continued arms build-up in other neighbouring countries. In view of the volatile situation in the sub region the Panel recommends that: The arms embargo on Liberia should continue and should be regularly monitored for violations; The ECOWAS Small Arms Moratorium be broadened to an information exchange mechanism for all weapons types. This new mechanism should be binding on both supplying and receiving countries;

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor U.N. PANEL OF EXPERTS REPORT ON LIBERIA -2002 74 All arms producing and exporting countries should abstain from supplying weapons to each Mano River Union country; An immediate embargo be imposed on all non-state actors in the Mano River Union countries, including the dissident groups constituting the LURD.

On Air Transportation

5. The Panel reiterates the recommendations made on the issue of air transportation in its previous Report (S/2001/1015).

6. Air transportation remains important for the violation of the arms embargo. In this report the Panel describes a series of suspicious flights to Monrovia, one of which crash-landed near Roberts International Airport on 15 February 2002. In view of the irregularities associated with these flights, the Panel recommends that Liberia be requested to supply the Sanctions Committee within three months a full report on: Basic facts about the plane crash, including pictures of the crashed plane and the crash site; The nature of the flights from and to Ndjamena on 15 February, 25 February and 5 March 2002; The irregularities involved with the registration and flight plans of the flights with registration numbers ER-ADL, ER-ACZ and ER-ACL; A full list of the crew, the pilots and the cargo on board of these flights; The flight plans for these flights; The contracts showing the consignee of these flights; The fuel manifests for all these flights; The payments made for these flights.

7. The Panel further recommends that, in order to verify the fmdings of this report, an independent investigation be conducted.

Diamonds

8. The imposition of an embargo on the export of Liberian rough diamonds, coupled with progress in the Sierra Leone peace process has continued to ensure that "Liberian" labelled rough have disappeared from the official markets. The sanctions and the spreading internal conflict in Liberia have greatly impacted domestic production. Fighting in the last few months in the richest diamond producing areas of western Liberia and rebel occupation of some of these areas has cut diamond production. This has contributed to a further decline in the supply of Liberian diamonds for smuggling and the LURD rebels have begun trading in "conflict diamonds". Many artisanal miners have shifted to alluvial gold production and moved to the peaceful southeast of the country.

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9. The Panel found that Liberian diamonds were still smuggled into neighbouring countries but believes the volume has declined in recent months because of the conflict. The Panel continues to believe that Liberia should have its own credible certification scheme so that there is less incentive for Liberian rough to be deliberately mixed with the rough of neighbouring countries.

Recommendations on diamonds

10. The Panel recommends that the UN should encourage its member states to assist the Liberian government in setting up a credible and transparent certification scheme which is independently audited by an internationally recognized audit company. This scheme should be independently assessed and effective in order to facilitate the consideration of a monitored suspension of the diamond ban by the Security Council.

The travel ban

11. In recent months there has been better compliance by Liberian officials of the travel ban. However, a small number of key individuals continue to regularly violate the ban and the Panel has documented how several of them have been issued Liberian passports with false names to assist their travel. Abidjan's International Airport remains a loophole and the Ivorian authorities continue to turn a blind eye to arriving Liberian officials listed on the UN travel ban.

12. The travel ban may have contributed to significant financial savings for the government. International travel consumed US$600,000 of government funds per month in 1999. A ban on travel may have reduced government expenditures by about US$400,000 per month. According to the Ministry of Finance these funds have been used to pay for fuel imports and more recently to helping pay arrears of civil servants salaries.

Recommendations on travel ban

13. The travel ban has continued to be a source of complaints and individuals have continued to request to know on what grounds their names had been placed on the list. The Panel believes that the 129 names on the current list is too long and that this list is cumbersome and should be reduced to a list of all cabinet members, key government officials and individuals documented in Panel reports that have violated UN sanctions or consistently obstructed investigation.

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A. General

14. In pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1395 (2002) of 27 February 2002 concerning Liberia, the Secretary-General appointed a Panel of Experts (S/2002/237) on 6 March 2002 to conduct a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring countries to investigate and compile a brief independent audit of the compliance by the Government of Liberia with paragraph 2 and of any violations of paragraphs 5,6 and 7 of resolution 1343 (2001).

15. The Panel recognized that the demands made to the Government of Liberia under paragraph 2 of resolution 1343 (2001) to immediately cease its support for RUF in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region required the following concrete steps: Expel all Revolutionary United Front (RUF) members from Liberia; Cease all financial and military support to RUF; Cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds, which are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of Sierra Leone; Freeze funds or fmancial resources or assets controlled directly or indirectly by RUF; Ground all Liberia-registered aircraft operating within its jurisdiction until it updates its register of aircraft as per International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) guidelines.

16. Paragraph 5 of resolution 1343(2001) imposed a tightened arms embargo against Liberia, which in particular: Prevented all states from sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all types to Liberia, whether or not originating in their territories; Prevented all states from providing technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related materiel of all types by their nationals or from their territories to Liberia.

17. Paragraph 6 of resolution 1343(2001) prohibited the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, irrespective of whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia.

18. Paragraph 7 of resolution 1343(2001) required all states to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of senior members of the Government of Liberia and its armed forces and their spouses and any other

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individuals providing financial and military support to armed rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia. On 4 June 2001 the Security Council Committee on Liberia published a list of 136 persons to be covered by this travel ban. Subsequently five names were deleted from this list on 19 December 2001 and two on 11 March 2002.

19. In a letter dated 20 March 2002, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Liberia informed the Security Council that the Government of Liberia has taken measures to provide for its legitimate self defence in the wake of persistent armed attacks against its territory. The Panel remained cognizant of all such correspondence from the Government of Liberia, made available to it by the Security Council Committee on Liberia and by the Task Force of the Government of Liberia. 20. The Panel of Experts consisted of Mr. Atabou Bodian (Senegal - Expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization), Mr. Johan Peleman (Belgium - Arms and Transportation Expert), Mr. Harjit S. Sandhu (India - Expert from Interpol), and Mr. Alex Vines (United Kingdom - Diamond Expert) (S/2002/237, annex 1).

21. The Panel had its first organizational meeting at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 13 to 16 March 2002, and it was agreed with the Security Council Committee on Liberia that the Panel's assessment report would be submitted on 11 April 2002.

22. The Panel received logistical and moral support from the Security Council Committee on Liberia, the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Peace Building Office in Liberia (UNOL), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) officials in Guinea, COte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The report that follows is a supplement to the previous report of the Panel (S/2001/1015 of 26 October 2001) in which the Panel highlighted in detail several cases of violations of resolution 1343 (2001).

B. Mandate of the Panel- a dilemma

23. The Panel's mandate is described in section "A" above. The Panel was repeatedly reminded that the sanctions imposed on the Government of Liberia under resolution 1343 (2001) resulted from the Report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195), which concluded that the Government of Liberia was actively aiding, and abetting war in Sierra Leone by providing military and financial support to the RUF. Since then, the Government of Liberia has claimed that it has completely disassociated itself from RUF. The RUF has since transformed into a political party (RUFP) in Sierra Leone and on 18 January 2002 the President of Sierra Leone declared the end of war in Sierra Leone.

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24. Under the changed set of circumstances, a question of reasonableness has been raised as to the continuation of sanctions against Liberia, as per Resolution 1343 (2001) of the Security Council. The main concern of the Panel is the continued presence in Liberia of hardcore elements of the RUF, now referred to as Independent RUF or RUF-I and its possible repercussions for the whole sub region. The Panel remained cognizant, throughout its work, of its role and its responsibility in helping to end the suffering of the people of the sub region.

C. Methodology of investigation

25. Questionnaires: The Panel requested specific information from the relevant countries, through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations, regarding the movement of certain suspicious aircraft used for illegal transportation of arms and ammunition.

26. Interviews: In each country visited, the Panel interviewed government authorities, and where relevant, diplomatic missions, civil society organizations, aid agencies, private sector firms and journalists (annex 2). The Panel also contacted a number of key individuals whose names have been a subject of interest and controversy in recent months in connection with the crisis in the sub region. Given the sensitive nature of the subjects investigated by the Panel, however, it should be noted that many individuals spoke under conditions of confidentiality. Numerous meetings have therefore not been listed.

27. Visits to countries: The Panel travelled to each of the three Mano River Union countries Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone twice during its mandate. The Panel also travelled to Cote d'Ivoire.

28. Field trips: Within the limited time available, the Panel visited border areas in Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire to get a first hand information on the ground realities. The Panel wanted to obtain recent information on the exact nature of the conflict in Lofa, a province in Liberia that has become inaccessible because of the escalating war between the LURD and the different militias and forces of the Liberian Government. In Liberia, the entire Panel visited Kakata. A Panel member also visited Charlesville and Harbel. In Sierra Leone, the entire Panel visited Bo, Kenema and Buedu. In Guinea, three members visited Macenta, Kuankan, Daro, Badaro and Nzerekore. In Cote d'Ivoire, the Panel visited Danane and Guiglo. During these field visits, the Panel spoke to various factions involved in the conflict in the sub region. The prominent ones being the RUF, the Civil Defence Force (CDF), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The Panel also interviewed a large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees spread over all the four countries of the sub region.

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29. Police and judicial records: The Panel was able to access police and judicial records of certain under-investigation and under-trial cases linked to trafficking of arms and ammunition in the West African sub region.

D. Standards of Verification

30. The Panel agreed at the outset of its work to use high evidentiary standards in its investigations. This required at least two credible and independent sources of information to substantiate a finding. Wherever possible, the Panel also agreed to put allegations to those concerned in order to allow them the right of reply.

31. During the investigation, where possible, the Panel shared the relevant information and cooperated with the States concerned for further thorough investigation by them. A significant number of countries came forward with useful information on individuals behind certain shady companies and their financial transactions.

32. In addition to its own detailed verification, the Panel also received corroborating information from international law enforcement agencies. The assistance of Interpol specialists was also taken as and when required. Throughout its investigation, the Panel did not rely solely on oral testimonies. Corroborative documentary and circumstantial evidence was always insisted on. The evidence, therefore, is incontrovertible and irrefutable.

I. Liberia's internal conflict and the RUF

A. The Lofa war

33. The Panel wanted to get a clear picture of the unfolding situation in Lofa, a County where access for independent observers is impossible. This motivated the Panel to visit the areas of Sierra Leone and Guinea that border Lofa County to try and get eye-witness accounts from recently arrived refugees in those areas. The Panel also interviewed NGO-workers, UN agencies, local authorities, government officials and members of the LURD.

34. In 2002 the impact of the Lofa war was felt in Monrovia. President Charles Taylor declared a state of emergency with immediate effect on 8 February after shooting was reported at Kley Junction, some 50 km north of Monrovia. A few days before, LURD rebels had also attacked Tubmanberg.

35. Since mid-April 1999 when rebels crossed into Liberia from Guinea and attacked the Lofa County town of Voinjama, what has now become to be called the LURD insurgency has become a growing problem for the Liberian government. Fighting between the LURD and the government has flared up

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since the end of November 2001, destroying the assets of timber companies and creating a major problem of IDPs that have been fleeing Lofa.

36. The LURD itself was formed in February 2000 a result of a merger of the Justice Coalition for Liberia, the Organisation of Displaced Liberians and a group calling itself the Union of Democratic Forces of Liberia. LURD says it has no involvement with former Liberian warlords, but many of its members formerly fought for the United Liberation Movement for Democracy or for the ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K factions. The LURD leadership acknowledged to the Panel that there are serious difficulties to strike a balance between all the different ethnic and other interest groups within the LURD.

37. The LURD leadership includes Voinjama-based Sekou Dammante Conneh, a Liberian Mandingo with personal ties to President Lansana Conte through his wife Ayesha Conneh who is spiritual advisor to President Conte. General Joe Wylie, a friend of former Ulimo-J leader Roosevelt Johnson, is a military advisor based in Conkary and William Hanson, a former human rights activist is their political spokesperson. When the Panel on Liberia first visited Guinean border towns of Macenta, Gueckedou and Nzerekore in September 2001, armed LURD combatants were clearly visible. During its latest visit to these border towns the Panel found that these armed men had moved into Liberia, with Voinjama as their main stronghold. They form a de facto buffer zone protecting the Guinean border.

38. The LURD has probably some 2,000 men fighting for it. These are a motly bunch including Liberian dissidents that had formerly fought for the Sierra Leone 'Special Forces', some 500 Kamajor fighters, defected AFL and other units members from Liberia and up to 200 ex-RUF fighters from Sierra Leone that have been offered several hundred dollars cash and the fruits of war to fight for the LURD.

39. The LURD has been recruiting in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire and in Ghana. In March 2002, the Panel interviewed young men in Freetown at the Brookefields Hotel who were ex-CDF, Ulimo-K and Ulimo-J fighters. They explained enthusiastically that they were waiting for orders to join the LURD from Joe Wylie in Conakry and that some fifty of their colleagues had left in drips and drabs to join the rebels via Guinea or down to the Liberian border via Zimmi. They were being promised a retention fee of US$ 200 and the booty of conflict.

40. A LURD commander told the Panel that the rebels had two Brigades (First and Second), each consisting of four Battalions (Thunder, Marine, Wide Door and Special Force).

41. The LURD leadership claims to have conducted two offensives in Liberia. A January 2001 offensive following incursions into Guinea by the

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RUF sought to capture Gbamga but failed. The LURD began a second military offensive in November 2001. This offensive drove south along the Sierra Leone border in an effort to join up with dissidents waiting along the southern part of the border. Voinjama fell to the LURD in early December 2001, and in following weeks Vahun and later Foya were under attack. A counter-offensive by government forces from Kolahun attacked the LURD's rear and retook Foya on 25 December and it has been contested ever since. Both sides subsequently contested other towns, such as Kolahun and Zor-Zor. In March attacks were reported near Suehn and two ambushes on the road between the diamond-mining towns of Lofa Bridge and Gbarma. In early April incidents occurred at Kakata and at Tubmanberg (Bomi Hills) and at Bong Town, bringing the conflict closer to the capital. During all these confrontations civilians are the main victims, who have their assets looted by either one side or the other.

42. The role played by the government's uncoordinated security units in the conflict appears to have inflamed the situation. Salary payments of many months are owed to the Armed Forces of Liberia although elite units such as the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and the Special Security Service (SSS) are more regularly paid. Military action offers poorly paid soldiers and militia members the chance to loot. The Panel witnessed this during its visit to Kakata on 4 April, only a few hours following an incident in which armed individuals killed two Lebanese traders.

43. There is also suspicion that the unfolding humanitarian crisis and the level of government setbacks is sometimes being stage managed by the authorities in an attempt to force the UN to lift the arms embargo and sanctions imposed on Liberia. The rebels in turn capitalise on these incidents to claim military progress.

44. Many of the displaced simply flee following rumours of an upcoming attack or hearing gunshots. In many of these incidents there are no casualties and indeed few signs of fighting but plentiful evidence of looting. The incidents do displace people, and in recent months military unrest in northwestern Liberia has forced tens of thousands of refugees to move south to live in makeshift camps. The Liberia Refugee, Repatriation and Resettlement Commission has registered over 32,000 displaced from Lofa. The war in Lofa County has prevented any large-scale repatriation of refugees and is causing a steady influx into neighbouring countries.

B. Looking for "Mosquito" and his RUF in Liberia

45. Sam `Maslcita' Bockarie is the last prominent individual of the former armed RUF not accounted for. During its previous mandate the Panel of Experts tracked Bockarie's movements up late September 2001. He had left Liberia and resided in a number of locations including Ghana since mid-2001.

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Subsequent to the Panel's report (S/2001/1015) the Ghanaian authorities officially confirmed that Bockarie visited Accra between 17 and 28 May 2001 and stayed at the Ebony Hotel, Dzorwulu under the assumed name, Sam Johnson (annex 3). The Panel during its examination of flight manifests noted that in 2001 one Sam Johnson travelled between Accra and Monrovia a number of times. The Panel continues to obtain reports, including from an acquaintance of his, that Bockarie spends time in Accra.

46. In Liberia there are persistent rumours of Bockarie playing a prominent role in recruiting for an independent militia to fight the LURD.

47. In late October and November 2001 in Sierra Leone there was a reoccurrence of reports, albeit of questionable accuracy that 'Mosquito' was recruiting RUF to be 'mercenaries' for Liberia. CDF forces reported in late December 2001 that Sam Bockarie was in the southern Liberian border town of Congo with a large number of men. The Sierra Leone government responded by calling a rapid deployment of forces along the border and authorised constant helicopter patrols, but could fmd no trace of him or his men. In January 2002 Bockarie was once more rumoured to be in Foya leading the fight against the LURD and in February 2002 reported to be operating in Lofa County just across from Dia Chiefdom in Sierra Leone, rallying RUF troops to take up the fight.

48. In the first week of April 2002 the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) units in Buedu and Zimmi reported rumours that Bockarie was once more preparing men for a three day cross border campaign to destabilise the upcoming elections. They requested an impressive list of extra resources to deal with the perceived threat. The Panel visited Bockarie's former stronghold in Buedu and asked local chiefs if they had received news of his whereabouts. They said they had not heard about him since early 2001 although some family members of his had recently returned home from a refugee camp in Guinea.

49. A LURD commander from Foya also told the Panel that their forces monitored "Mosquito" on their HF radio sets. According to Gen 'Last Order', a LURD commander from the Foya area, several hundred ex-RUF fighters form part of an independent militia fighting in Lofa. Its base is Vahun but it is operational in Lofa County and is led by one "Mosquito". Under him is one Sweet Kenny (phonetic), and third in command is a Captain Solo (call sign "Red Bush 5"), both Sierra Leoneans. Guinean dissidents are also part of the militia, led by one Mama Tomo. The Guineans are distinguishable by their printed T-shirts. Commander Rowland Duo liaises with this militia but it takes its orders and falls under the authority of Liberia's Special Security Service Commander Benjamin Yeaten.

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50. The Panel has also heard of other ex-RUF combatants fighting in small groups for other Liberian militia and regular units. There does not seem to be any coherence of these groups and except for the militia in Lofa, there is nothing particularly distinguishable about them other than as mercenaries.

51. Bockarie has entered regional mythology and verifiable sightings have proven impossible to obtain. This situation has not been helped by the inflation of 'Mosquitos' in the Liberian conflict. There are at least three Liberian 'Mosquitos' in addition to Bockarie. After rebel fighting in northwestern Liberia in August 1999, a character calling himself "Mosquito Spray" rang the BBC to denounce President Charles Taylor. There are also Colonel Faso and General Vambo, both known as `Maskita' too, fighting for the Liberian government.

52. The Liberian government continues to deny to the Panel that it has any knowledge of the whereabouts of Sam Bockarie.

53. The Panel agrees that hard facts are few. It was able to confirm from the Sierra Leone Embassy in Monrovia and the Liberian National Security Advisor that Sam Bockarie's wife and mother still live in Monrovia in a house in the Twelve Houses area of Paynesville. According to the Sierra Leone Embassy they will shortly be returning to Sierra Leone.

54. The Panel concludes that the remnants of the RUF, resident in Liberia (sometimes referred to as the Independent RUF or RUF-I) pose no direct threat to the stability that has returned to Sierra Leone. The Panel could find no direct link between those hardcore RUF that did not join disarmament and demobilisation in Sierra Leone, and RUFP.

Mano River Union and ECOWAS Engagement The long awaited meeting between the Mano River Union Heads of State was hosted by Mohamed VI, King of Morocco on 27 February 2002 in Rabat. The three presidents agreed to work together to end cross-border insurgencies and to 'promote peace, understanding and good-neighbourliness'. Following this summit the Joint Security Committee met on 5 to 7 March 2002 in Freetown. A second meeting of the Joint Security Committee was held in Conakry on 25 March and a Committee of Legal Experts meet on 13 March in Freetown. At the Joint Security Committee meetings the problem of dissidents; the deployment of joint security and confidence building units; proliferation of small arms and the need for intelligence sharing were key issues discussed. ECOWAS has also been engaged. It sponsored in March 2002 a conference in Abuja, Nigeria on political dialogue in Liberia at which the Liberian government, civil society and opposition groups attended. The LURD rebels were invited but failed to attend claiming late receipt of invitation. The Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council was held in Dakar on 29 March 2002. The meeting examined the security situation in Liberia. At the end of the meeting, the Ministers condemned the LURD attacks in Liberia and declared a ban on travel to and residence within Member States of the LURD leadership. A Committee was set up, comprising Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Senegal and the ECOWAS Secretariat to monitor the enforcement of these measures.

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Government forces were carrying guns and belts with brand new ammunition around their shoulders. II. Arms and Air Transportation A. Arms Introduction 55. There is little doubt that the Government of Liberia continues violating the arms embargo. Although the AFL soldiers on the streets in Monrovia and the armed young boys of different militia groups sometimes carry old rifles, members of the notorious militia called the ATU can be seen in the streets of Monrovia carrying new weapons. During its visit to Kakata, some forty kilometres north of Monrovia, the Panel witnessed that the Government forces were carrying guns and belts with brand new ammunition around their shoulders.

56. The Panel stressed in its previous reports (S/2000/1195 and S/2001/1015) the risks posed by great quantities of weapons floating around in the sub region. The Panel is pleased with the outcome of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Process that ended in Sierra Leone in January 2002. Over a period of three years (since September 1998) some 72,500 combatants disarmed in three different Disarmament and Demobilisation phases, which were disrupted midway by the flaring up of a conflict in May 2000. The number is far in excess of the original estimate of 45,000 combatants. Under the fmal third phase of Disarmament and Demobilisation that commenced in May 2001, 19,183 RUF, 27,695 CDF and 198 others were disarmed.

57. In a subsequent 'Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme' the Sierra Leone Police collected arms that were not suitable for registration under the Disarmament and Demobilisation Programme. Some 9,000 arms, mostly shotguns, were collected. Although these shotguns are usually single barrelled weapons used for hunting purposes only, they could be lethal. During this collection exercise, small numbers of former-RUF came forward to with weapons.

58. The Sierra Leone Police have also started cordon and search operations to remove remaining illegal arms from circulation. The Panel welcomes any such measures, as they will significantly reduce the risk of renewed hostilities. Localized violence does occur as has been reported in the recently liberated diamond areas around Kono and Tongo Fields, but it poses little long-term risk.

Regional problem far from solved

59. The successful conduct of these disarmament exercises does not preclude that small arms are still in the possession of non-state actors,

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including former RUF. One indicator is the weapons that had been captured from UNAMSIL forces by the RUF. Those were all registered and of the 629 weapons captured only 181 have been recovered through the disarmament process. The exact number of weapons delivered to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the ECOMOG that were captured by the RUF is not properly accounted for. Many such weapons have not been returned and must therefore still be circulating in the region. They may be hidden in secret arms caches in Sierra Leone or may have been sold across the borders.

60. During discussion with the Defence and Law Enforcement authorities in Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea the Panel learned that the proliferation of arms within these countries is a reality. The Panel was also informed that these governments face a lack of capacity for dealing with this problem. Such issues are primarily an internal policing problem for Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, but they do contribute to the risk of violent outbreaks of conflict and organized banditry.

61. A related problem is the mushrooming growth of uncontrolled rebel groups and loosely controlled and underpaid army or police units in the sub region. The Panel received numerous accounts of arms and ammunition being sold or bartered away by hungry or unpaid military or police personnel. These units show little loyalty to the groups they are fighting for and they change sides whenever they see an opportunity that might benefit them.

Positive developments on the international level

62. Since the publication of its Report (S/2001/1015) the Panel has received communication from many member states about their efforts to curtail the smuggling of conflict diamonds and proliferation of arms in West Africa. The Panel wishes to highlight the responses from the Governments of Belgium, the Slovak Republic and Guinea.

63. On 5 March 2002 the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations reported that an international arrest warrant was issued against . Bout is accused of money laundering and criminal conspiracy. Sanjivan Ruprah, also a key figure in the Panel's Report (S/2001/1015), was arrested in Belgium on 7 February 2002 along with Carlos "Beto" Laplaine. The involvement of Ruprah and Laplaine in illegal arms trafficking to Liberia in violation of the arms embargo, was described in detail in the Report (S/2001/1015).

64. The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Guinea to the United Nations reported on 24 March 2002 to the Panel that an investigation in Guinea, subsequent to the publication of the report of the Panel (S/2001/1015) had led to the official cancellation on 30 November 2001 of the company PECOS from the register of corporations. The Panel described the activities of

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PECOS as a supplier of false end-user certificates in the section on End-User Certificates (S/2001/1015 paragraphs 253 to 267).

65. The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovakia to the United Nations reported that in December 2001 criminal charges were brought against Alexander Islamov, for his role in the illegal sale of arms. The Panel had reported that Islamov facilitated the supply of helicopter spare parts and helicopters from Kyrgyzstan. His role was also highlighted in several other arms shipments. The Slovak Republic also arrested Peter Jusko. Both individuals are being prosecuted in connection with their involvement in the sale of one Mi-35 helicopter gunship to Liberia and the attempted sale of a second one. The Slovak Republic also adopted new legislation fine-tuning the law on the Trade with Military Material in December 2001 in order to eliminate the risk of further attempts to violate the sanctions regimes by individuals or business entities in the Slovak Republic.

66. The Panel views these measures taken by individual member states as significant steps in the monitoring of sanctions. The Panel once again interviewed Mohamed Yansane in Guinea. Yansane had set up the PECOS company in Guinea that was used by Jusko, Islamov, Bout and others to create forged end-user certificates. After Jusko was released on bail, Yansane told the Panel that he kept receiving phone calls from Jusko who wanted to send people to buy diamonds. This continues to show a close link between arms trafficking and diamond deals. The Panel passed on this information to the authorities in Guinea and in the Slovak Republic for further investigation at their end.

Recommendations on arms

67. The continued availability of unregistered arms in the Mano River Union countries and their neighbours has to be dealt with. The Panel is concerned about fresh reports of weapons being brought into the region from abroad.

68. The Panel, in its previous reports (S/2000/1195 and S/2001/1015) emphasised on the need to have a more thorough implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms for West Africa. The Panel once again recommends that, for reasons of transparency and confidence building the existing moratorium be broadened to an information exchange mechanism for all weapons types procured by the ECOWAS member states.

69. The Panel also reiterates its recommendation that the information exchange should be binding on both suppliers and the receiving states and that they should report every arms transaction to the newly established mechanism including data on the names and companies of the brokers and transport agents.

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70. The Panel re-endorses its recommendation that all arms producing and exporting countries abstain from supplying weapons to countries of the Mano River Union.

71. The Panel re-endorses its recommendation that the arms embargo on Liberia should continue.

72. The Panel once again strongly recommends an immediate and complete embargo on all non-state actors in the Mano River Union countries, including the dissident groups constituting the LURD.

B. Air Transportation

The establishment of a new aviation registry

73. Liberia has established a new aviation registry in cooperation with ICAO and in conformity with its international procedures'. Planes registered in Liberia will now carry tail numbers with the prefix "A8" instead of the old one "EL".

Management of Air Space

74. Liberia decided to take over operation of its own airspace, which has been controlled from Conakry (Guinea), where the Area Control Centre (ACC) of the Flight Information Region (Roberts FIR) is located2. Eventually Liberia wanted its airspace to be controlled exclusively by Liberian nationals. This needed to be done, Liberia felt, for reasons of national security. It should be noted that this decision was taken shortly after the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone had published its report (S/2000/1195). Some of the Panel's investigations on arms smuggling had relied on flight information from different Flight Information Regions in Africa to identify planes landing in Monrovia since the Liberian authorities had not provided such a list.

75. Since every state has the right to control its own airspace under the Chicago Convention regulating International Civil Aviation, the Panel does

1 ICAO Annex 7 (Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks). 2 Roberts FIR stands for Roberts Flight Information Region. Roberts FIR covers the sovereign airspaces of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. When the Flight Information Region was founded in 1975 the Flight Information Center (FIC) was located at the airport of Robertsfield. Because of the war in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone the Center was transferred to Freetown and later to Conakry in Guinea where it is still based today. The international airport of Monrovia is called Roberts International Airport (RIA). In the setup of the Flight Information Region (Roberts FIR) the airports of Conakry, Freetown and Roberts all dispose of their own so-called Approach (APP) zone, basically their territorial airspace that falls under their responsibility.

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not think the issue should be subject to any sanctions. A letter of agreement was signed on 22 November 2001 between the Roberts Area Control Centre in Conakry and the Approach Control Unit of Roberts International Airport. The letter of agreement describes the precise modalities of responsibility of the two Centres but the agreement does not degrade the integrity of the Roberts FIR. For the future monitoring of aircraft movements to and from Monrovia, information can still be obtained from the different Flight Information Regions in West Africa and elsewhere.

Recommendations on Air Transportation

76. The Panel reiterates the recommendations made on air transportation in the Report S/2001/1015.

C. The plane crash landing of 15 February 2002

The Crash

77. On 15 February 2002, a plane crashed as it approached the runway of Roberts International Airport. International media reported a series of explosions after the crash that could have been caused by the presence on board of arms and ammunition. The Panel tried to find out more about this plane-crash especially in the light of arms embargo on Liberia, but the Government authorities steadfastly prevented any independent observer from going to the site up to now.

78. Immediately after the accident happened, the Ministry of Information in Liberia reported that an Antonov 12 had crashed at 5 O'clock in the morning. The plane had sought emergency landing permission while flying over Liberian territory. From this official press release it appears that the plane was not actually meant to land in Monrovia but was flying elsewhere, crossing Liberian airspace (annex 4).

79. The Panel's reconstruction of the facts, based on the information collected through contacts with several Flight Information Regions in Africa and certain states in other regions, clearly contradicts the official statement of the Government of Liberia.

80. On 12 February 2002, the Directorate of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Chad issued a request for overflight to the Civil Aviation Authorities of Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia for a flight with landing in Monrovia. The message that was sent from Chad contains the following facts: Aircraft type: An 12 Registration: ER-ADL (this is the tail number and shows that the plane was registered in Moldova)

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Operating agency: Inter Trans Congo Charterer: Government of Chad Object: Transport of VIPs Route: Ndjamena/Monrovia Date: 13 February 2002

81. Liberia received this overflight and landing request on 13 February 2002 and gave permission for the flight on the same day through its Civil Aviation Authority. The plane finally left Ndjamena on 15 February 2002 with destination Monrovia, where it was supposed to land at around 6 O'clock in the morning with 10 passengers on board. The Panel interviewed the Air Traffic Controller on duty in Monrovia. Apart from reduced visibility due to fog (visibility only 500 meters) the pilot did not, at any moment, mention any technical problem to the Control Tower. The pilot was following the instructions of the controller and was approaching the runway, when the controller suddenly lost contact with the plane and saw a light flash at some distance from the beginning of the runway. This was the accident and the Control Tower immediately notified the fire service of the airport. During this interview with the Air Traffic Controller the Director of Civil Aviation was present in the room.

82. Further discussions with the Liberian authorities regarding this accident did not add much to this. Meetings and telephonic conversations with the Minister of Transport, his deputy, the Director of Civil Aviation, the Commissioner of Immigration, the Chief of Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and the Director of the airport added the following: 1. One person was killed and nine others were wounded in the crash. 2. The airport fire service intervened very quickly. 3. The aircraft was totally destroyed. 4. All documents on board were destroyed. 5. The wounded were evacuated and taken to a private hospital. 6. There was no black box on board. 7. Since there were no appropriate aeronautical means of telecommunication available, the Director of Civil Aviation sent, by e-mail, a notification of the accident to the Republic of Moldova (the state of registration), to Chad (the charterer), to Russia (the manufacturer of the plane) and to ICAO, partly confirming the information about the flight as reconstructed independently by the Panel. 8. The country of the operator of the plane (Inter Trans Congo) was not notified. 9. A commission of inquiry was established to investigate the accident.

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A web of contradictions

83. The Panel noted many contradictions with respect to this accident. The interviews with the Liberian authorities took place between 2 April and 5 April 2002. This is more than 45 days after the accident occurred. Until then, according to the Liberian authorities, no response had been received from the above-mentioned concerned states, as would be the procedure under ICAO- regulations. In addition, none of the states of which the citizens were among those killed or wounded in the crash have responded. None of the authorities were able to give the Panel a list of the names or nationalities of the people on board.

84. Not a single document related to the plane-crash was given to the Panel despite an official request to the Minister of Transport who had promised to supply the Panel with any information requested. According to the authorities no pictures were taken of the plane and there was no tape recording of the conversation between the pilot and the Control Tower.

85. Despite many assurances, including authorization by the Minister of Defence, the Panel was never allowed to visit the site where the accident had occurred. Whenever the Panel wanted to proceed to the site, the authorities always created another hurdle. Finally on the day of its departure from Liberia, the arrangements were made for the Panel to visit the site along with the Director of Civil Aviation. But all of a sudden the site had become a "no-go area" because of the "presence" of dissident fighters in the area. The Panel checked with commercial companies and diplomatic missions as to whether they had been informed about any insecurity in the direct vicinity of the airport but nothing like this had happened.

86. Despite the fact that the crash-site was close to the runway of Roberts International Airport, the Aviation Authorities issued no "NOTAM" (Notice to Airmen) warning users of the airport of any such dissident threat. Three members of the Panel departed from the same very airport a few hours after they had been refused to visit the crash-site citing security reasons. While passing through the airport, the Panel noticed no extra security. At the time of take off, the Panel saw the crashed plane from the air, very close to Roberts Airport perimeter fence and a track passed by it. A cockpit and a tail were clearly visible, but the fuselage and the wings were not visible. The whole site appeared to have been covered by soil, giving the site from the air, a clean yellow-reddish colour although some of the trees and vegetation around it appeared burnt. From the air, there was no sign of any military or indeed human activity anywhere near the crash-site.

87. According to the request for overflight and landing, the plane was a VIP flight. An Antonov 12 is generally known as a cargo transport aircraft and it is highly unlikely that the plane would be carrying any VIPs at such a late

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hour. Multiple credible eye witness accounts obtained by the Panel referred to the sound of what seemed like gunfire for hours after the crash. Even at the Firestone Plantation, which is miles away from the airport, people thought that the airport was under attack.

88. The Panel asked for a copy of the "Accident Notification" as required under Chicago Convention of ICAO3, but the Director of Civil Aviation did not provide this document and he told the Panel he had not started his draft report as yet.

89. Another Antonov 12 with Moldovan registration ER-ACZ, operated by the same operator and chartered again by the Government of Chad landed in Monrovia on 25 February 2002. The plane left the next day. When the Panel asked the Liberian authorities to produce the landing permission for this flight, the Director of Civil Aviation told the Panel he was not aware of any such flight.

What are the Liberian authorities hiding?

90. There are several additional anomalies connected with both these flights. The registration numbers ER-ADL and ER-ACZ do not exist. Or do they? The Panel contacted the Civil Aviation Authority of the Republic of Moldova, where "ER-" planes should be registered. According to the Director of Civil Aviation in Chisinau, a company in Moldova operated the planes, until June 2001. Since then the planes had been deregistered (annex 5) and officially no new operator or owner is known. The Panel crosschecked this with an aviation industry database and found confirmation of the "pending" status of both the aircraft. The Panel also called Tiramavia, the company that had operated both the aircraft in Moldova. It had not heard about any crash of its aircraft, nor did they acknowledge that they were currently operating any of these planes. Later phone calls by the Panel to Tiramavia Company were not answered.

91. The Panel also received from a company in Togo that leased the planes, Certificates of Registration issued by the State Administration of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Moldova for both these aircraft. They were issued on the same day as the deregistration documents and the company also sent the Panel copies of the insurance for the planes and an Airworthiness certificate (annex 6), issued on the day the aircraft were deregistered. These documents show as the operating agency for the plane, Tiramavia Company in Moldova and that the owners of the planes are SABAA Tours and Travels Agency, a firm in Fujairah, in the United Arab Emirates.

3 Annex 13, Chapter 4

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92. So the planes were both deregistered and registered in Moldova on the same day. Clearly, one of these documents - deregistration or registration - must be false.

93. Fraudulent aircraft registration numbers and the use of non-existent airline companies for arms trafficking purposes have been dealt with extensively in previous reports of the Panel (S/2000/1195 and S/2001/1015). Inter Trans Congo, the company mentioned, as the operator of the aircraft on the overflight requests received by West African traffic controllers, seems not to exist. Requests by the Panel were sent to the authorities of both the Congos as to the existence of this company. Only the authorities of the DRC responded saying that there was no such company registered. No response was received from the Republic of Congo.

94. There is also a problem with the route followed by these planes. In response to a letter sent to several West African countries, the Panel received a response from the Republic of Togo. A request from a company Africa West was issued through the Civil Aviation Authority in Togo for a flight, between 24 and 26 February 2002 from Lome to Brazzaville, then to Malabo, and back. The document mentions a cargo consisting of "Supplies" and also mentions that an Antonov 12 registered as ER-ACZ would perform the flight. But the Panel contacted the Operations Manager of the company Africa West who said that, in the end, another Antonov 12 with registration number ER-ACL was used to perform this flight. The company supplied the Panel with computer records of the flight movements of the planes, showing that the company was not aware of the flights that had been conducted between Ndjamena and Monrovia. Instead the records showed flight movements between Lome, Brazzaville, Pointe Noire, Cotonou, Abidjan and Malabo.

95. The Panel knows that the ER-ACZ registered plane did go to Ndjamena in Chad and performed a flight to Liberia, where it arrived at Roberts International Airport on 25 February 2002. A request for overflight and landing was only issued when the plane was already in the air. The plane must have crossed the airspace of several other countries, but none of them received any notification or request, except for the original request showing a route to Malabo and Brazzaville.

96. As mentioned above, the Director of Civil Aviation in Liberia also did not receive a request for the overflight and landing of the plane, but the plane did receive guidance from the control tower at Roberts International Airport. The Panel asked the Commissioner of Immigration of Liberia, John Enrique Smythe, for a list of the passengers or crew of the plane, but no information was given. The Panel did establish that the plane was refuelled the next day, and left Monrovia on 26 February.

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97. During its short assessment mission, the Panel could not establish the full extent of the events surrounding these suspicious flights to Monrovia. Especially the cargo on board of the aircraft remains a mystery. The second plane took the same routing, Ndjamena-Monrovia, as the plane that crashed and that the Panel was kept away from.

98. The Panel is also aware of a third flight, with a plane carrying a similar registration number ER-ACL. The Panel only knows that the plane landed at Roberts International Airport on 5 March 2002. It was also refuelled there and flew back on 6 March 2002. The Roberts Flight Information Region in Conakry was not informed about this flight.

99. Fraudulent registration of the aircraft, the lack of an official overflight or landing request for the ER-ACZ in Liberia, the fact that other countries have not traced any of these planes crossing their airspace and the fraud with flight plans are the facts that have been established so far.

Recommendations

100. On a short assessment mission, the Panel was not in a position to investigate these mysterious flights any further. However, given the clear anomalies and the secrecy of the Liberian government with respect to these flights, the Panel would recommend that Liberia be requested to supply the Sanctions Committee, within three months with a full report on: Basic facts about the plane crash, including pictures of the crashed plane and the crash site; The nature of the flights from and to Ndjamena on 15 February, 25 February and 5 March 2002; The irregularities involved with the registration and flight plans of the flights with registration numbers ER-ADL, ER-ACZ and ER-ACL; A full list of the crew, the pilots and the cargo on board of these flights; The flight plans for these flights; The contract showing the consignee of these flights; The fuel manifests for all these flights; The payments made for these flights.

101. The Panel further recommends that, in order to verify the findings of this report, an independent investigation should be conducted.

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III. Diamonds and the region

A. The Diamond Embargo on Liberia

102. Sanctions were imposed on the export of Liberian rough diamonds following the conclusions of the report (S/2000/1195). This report illustrated how diamonds far in the excess of the quality and quantity available in Liberia had been imported into Belgium. Most of these diamonds were illicit diamonds from other countries, taking advantage of Liberia's involvement in the illicit diamond trade. This trade provided Liberia with convenient cover for the export of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone.

103. The imposition of an embargo on the export of Liberian rough, coupled with continued progress in the Sierra Leone peace process has resulted in "Liberian" labelled rough disappearing from the official markets. There have been no imports from Liberia recorded in Antwerp, the only country providing statistics on imports. Since the imposition of the sanctions no official exports have been recorded from Liberia by its Central Bank or its Ministry of Finance.

104. All Diamond Dealers' License and Export Permits were suspended on 7 May 2001. No Dealer's license has been renewed for 2002 and there has been a steep decline in the registration of alluvial mining claims. On 23 October 2001 the Ministers of Finance and Lands, Mines and Energy issued a joint administrative notice that was published in the Liberian press on 27 November 2001 calling for continued strict adherence to the UN Resolution and calling on dealers' offices to remain open to avoid crisis in the industry. The Ministry also suspended the dealers' license fees from 1 July to 31 December 2001 to encourage the dealers to remain operative.

105. The Ministers of Finance and Lands, Mines and Energy issued a second memorandum on 6 March, 2002 once more calling for strict adherence to the United Nations sanction; calling for all registered dealers to remain open and suspending the issuance of licenses for the period 2 January to 31 December 2002 or until such time when the sanction will be lifted.

106. There are in 2002 three registered diamond dealers in Liberia: MARS Diamonds; Empire Diamonds; Diandorra Minerals.

107. In 2002 only five registered diamond brokers are left; seven others have closed down because of lack of business, although one of these has transferred to dealing in alluvial gold.

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108. The Government in May 2001 placed Mineral Inspectors into the buying offices in Monrovia to monitor and keep record of daily diamond purchases on the internal market. These inspectors were also there to ensure that the diamonds were only bought from legitimate buyers or brokers. According to the Government they withdrew their inspectors in late 2001 because there was no diamond trade to monitor.

109. In its report (S/2001/1015) the Panel of Experts reported that the artisanal trade in rough had been impacted by the embargo providing additional hardship to those who seek to make a living out of this sector and with improved world prices had increasingly shifted to artisanal gold production. Figures for export of alluvial gold from Liberia show a rise in the production from 5.36 ounces (US$1,317.93) in October 2001 to 192.90 ounces (US$41,642.19) in January 2002. The Government claims that there are some 60,000 miners in the alluvial diamond-mining sector, others in the industry estimated some 20,000 to 30,000 people in the rural areas are dependent on the trade.

110. Commercial and artisanal production of alluvial diamonds has been badly impacted by the upsurge of fighting in western Liberia such as the Smith Camp Mining Agency and the Weasua Mining District. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy reported that the prevailing war in western Liberia has brought mining activities to a complete halt, which has led to a 50 percent decline in revenue generation from mining activities. At least twelve mining districts have been attacked or occupied by LURD rebels and several eyewitnesses spoke of having to wash unprocessed gravel to extract diamonds for the rebels. Although LURD officials denied to the Panel that they are engaged in the diamond business such "conflict diamonds" are likely to be smuggled through Guinea and Sierra Leone. A rebel LURD commander interviewed by the Panel also admitted that rebel soldiers seized diamonds during their operations and had sold them to buyers in Guinea.

111. In its report (S/2001/1015) the Panel of Experts reported that since it is impossible to sell Liberian rough officially, dealers and brokers were seeking to camouflage their Liberian diamonds as those from neighbouring countries markets. The Liberian Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy reported that three Liberian dealers had opened buying offices in Sierra Leone, which also bought smuggled Liberian rough. The Panel was aware of one such office in Bo and had visited it in September 2001. The dealer at that time admitted in trading in Liberian rough. When the Panel revisited this buying office in Bo in March 2002 it was told that the last purchase was in November 2001 and that the decline in the Liberian trade was due to low prices for Liberian gemstones and the disruption caused by the war inside Liberia on quality production such as from Weasua.

PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor U.N. PANEL OF EXPERTS REPORT ON LIBERIA -2002 96 112. The Panel was also told by the European Union of four dealers in Abidjan that had become specialists in laundering Liberian rough since the diamond embargo entered into force. The Panel had already confirmed that two dealers operated through the Hotel Ivoire in Abidjan, using a Lebanese middleman who carried the parcels from Monrovia. These dealers continued to buy from Liberia. Sanjivan Ruprah also told the Panel that he had an office in Abidjan where Issa Sessay (RUFP's interim leader), through a middleman had come to offer great quantities of diamonds in late 2001. Independently, another diamond dealer said he had heard about Sessay's selling attempts through Abidjan and he mentioned exactly the same amount of diamonds, 8,000 carats. None of these two sources knew who had actually bought the diamonds. Other former RUF leaders, such as Gibril Massaquoi, are also active in the diamond trade but these commercial activities serve the interests of the individuals themselves, rather than the RUF or its follow-up political party.

113. The documents S/2000/1195 and S/2001/1015 reported the issue of so-called "Gambian" diamonds as an issue of concern. The Gambia, a non- producing country, continues to feature prominently as the initial destination for smuggled diamonds. The Sierra Leone Government voiced their frustration about the level of smuggling to The Gambia. The Panel also established that the Chairman of the Diamond Dealers of Liberia, Mohamed Shour, is Gambia- based and maintains a network of buying offices run by his family in Sierra Leone (he has an export licence as Sima Stars which exported 13,411.47 of carats from Sierra Leone in January and February 2002) and he is a registered diamond dealer in Liberia (Mars Diamond Company).

114. The Gambian authorities have insisted that they have never had any record of an official diamond transaction through Gambia nor a smuggling incident on its territory. In 2002 for the first time the authorities have arrested two diamond smugglers. The Panel learned this from sources within the diamond industry, but could not independently confirm it.

115. The Panel of Experts continued to hear uncorroborated stories about President Taylor and his family taking an active interest and benefiting from the diamond trade. The Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy reported that in the recent past the President had heard of a twenty-six carat stone from Lofa County and had insisted that the mine inspectors locate it for him. It was the President that ordered the suspension of the assistant and vice-ministers at Lands and Mines after Japanese national Tatsunari Uchida, who is president of the Tokyo-based Kinshodo Co. Ltd, a diamond import and export company was arrested on 21 November 2001 for attempted diamond smuggling and possession of US$135,000 in undeclared cash. He was subsequently deported on 5 December 2001 from Liberia.

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116. The Panel obtained more details about the dealings of President Taylor and the sale of RUF-diamonds through Monrovia until, at least, early 2001. Hotel Boulevard, a hotel in the heart of Monrovia, served as the most important meeting place for businessmen who came to deal in diamonds or arms. One of its customers was Sanjivan Ruprah, who stayed in Hotel Boulevard before he moved to a more permanent residence in Monrovia in the house of the late Police Commissioner Joe Tate. The POE report (S/2001/1015) describes in detail how Ruprah was acting on behalf of both Viktor Bout and the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs. A letter the Panel obtained during its latest trip to Liberia shows how Ruprah also paid for the accommodation of pilots of a plane that was used for transportation of the President. Ruprah, apart from being involved in violating the arms embargo, is mainly a diamond dealer.

117. The Panel also interviewed Samih Ossailly, a Sierra Leone born Lebanese who worked closely with Ibrahim Bah and is living in Belgium. Both stayed on many occasions in Hotel Boulevard where their rooms were turned into diamond buying offices. Bah, who was a key middleman between the RUF and Liberia, was exporting through a company called Greenstone Diamonds. Other diamond dealers were based there as well and it is here that RUF-commanders and representatives of President Taylor set up their negotiations of diamonds and arms deals and where international buyers came to buy them for export. Many of these wrote in the Hotel Register that they were guests in Liberia of the Liberian Government. Several eyewitnesses, including hotel staff confirmed this to the Panel and acknowledged that many of the dealers were picked up with government vehicles, including vehicles from the Presidential mansion. The Panel has no knowledge of any recent dealings in Hotel Boulevard. The Hotel had been closed for several months and was reopened only on 1 March 2002. It is now called Hotel Royal.

118. According to Samih Ossailly, Ibrahim Bah travels a lot and phoned him regularly from Togo in March 2002 but has shortly thereafter moved to another country. Bah had been Burkina Faso-based and in December 2001 was interviewed in Ouagadougou by a US diplomat. The Panel obtained phone numbers for Bah and requested, through a middleman, an interview but did not succeed to speak to him.

B. Certificate of Origin schemes

Background

119. Sierra Leone and Guinea have now fully implemented the Certificate of Origin schemes and since the RUF was officially disbanded, by defmition the problem of conflict diamonds is now solved. The problem of the illicit sale of diamonds however remains. A recent study of Sierra Leone's diamond industry by Britain's Department for International Development concluded

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that in this industry corruption had its "most deleterious effect" and that dealing with this is a key challenge.

Sierra Leone

120. There have been three "90-day" reviews of the certificate of origin scheme established by the Government of Sierra Leone in compliance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1306 (2000) of 5 July 2000. Earlier reviews had been issued as documents S/2000/1145 of 4 December 2000 and S/2001/794 of 16 August 2001. The Sierra Leone government presented a submission (S/2002/38) to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone prior to the Security Council meeting on 13 December for informal consultations on the ban on illegal trade in Sierra Leone diamonds. The Council approved on 19 December 2001 Resolution 1385 extending the ban for a further twelve months from 5 January 2002.

121. Since the certificate of origin scheme became operational, 252,132 carats of rough and uncut diamonds valued at US$30.52 million have been exported to various markets in the world, such as Belgium, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States.

122. The government reports that the system continues to work well. The volume of exports continues to increase although the quality of stones entering the system has declined. By 1 January 2002 Sierra Leone had issued 184 certificates of origin and all corresponding import information had been returned to the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO). Digital photographs of rough and uncut diamonds for valuation and export are transmitted electronically with the information contained in the original certificate of origin. The Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources reported that although Belgium and Israel responded to their information other importing countries had not.

123. The Independent Diamond Valuator and his assistant also work closely with the GGDO and no major differences in valuation or quality of identification were reported to the Panel. Key to the success of the certification process is monitoring of mining and trading activities in the country. This is conducted by Mines Monitoring Officers, although interviews with such officers in Kenama indicated they were poorly or not paid, lacked mobility and were prone to financial inducement. Three persons were arrested for unlawful possession of diamonds in recent months. A total of 140 carats valued at US$20,000 were confiscated and the culprits fined. The Anti-Corruption Commission in Freetown also recently moved against one senior government official for diamond smuggling, but there are many more widely talked about offenders.

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Table 1: Comparison of 2001 and 2002

2001 2002 Months Carats Value ($) P/CT Carats Value ($) January 13,486.10 1,991,773.84 147.69 20,890.75 1436,569.50 February 15,384.67 1,909,276.29 124.10 16,988.55 1,782,848.73 Totals 28,870.77 3,901,050.13 135.12 37,879.30 3,219,418.23

Source: GGDO Sierra Leone

Table 2: September 2001 to February 2002 Export Figures Exports September 2001 to February 2002

Month & Year Total carats Value (US$) September 2001 29 706.68 2 194 349.36 October 2001 24 097.92 2 488 455.56 November 2001 21 358.88 2 152.522.95 December 2001 16,669.34 2 032 708.34

January 2002 20,890.75 1 436 569.50 February 2002 16,988.55 1 782 848.73

Source: GGDO Sierra Leone

Restoring state control over diamond areas

124. Although the RUF has ceased to exist as an armed entity, it has continued to try as a political one to maintain a grip on diamond production from the Kono and Tongo diamond fields. Although the deployment of the Sierra Leone Army in October 2001 did not immediately challenge the RUF's grip on the trade, violence erupted on 19 December 2001 following a dispute over an agreement to stop mining in Koidu. This led to rioting and deaths. It seems probable that the vociferous support for banning of mining in the town was a short-term measure to dislodge the RUF's vested interests in the trade. By 4 January 2002 a joint statement of intent to stop mining in Koidu town was reached and there has only been one reported incident of mining in the town since.

125. There has been less progress in the Tongo Fields. The RUF held out longer against disarmament there but finally bowed to grass root pressure in early January 2002. Mining continues in Tongo and UNAMSIL officials admitted they preferred to turn a blind eye since the attractions of mining in the area seemed to have transcended all factors, including mutual antipathy between former warring factions. In February 2002, UNAMSIL feared there might be a similar outbreak to the Koidu violence in the Tongo Fields following the occupation by 200 members of a youth group (allegedly to be

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backed by remnants of the CDF). Effective and fair handling of this by the local authorities avoided any conflict.

Guinea

126. Guinea followed Sierra Leone and in June 2001 introduced a Certificate of Origin scheme, which is controlled by the centralized "Bureau national d'expertise de diamants et autres gemmes" (BNE). According to the annual report of the Minister of Mines, Geology and Environment in 2001, Guinea exported 363,883 carats, valued at US$23,681,860. The authorities though complain that since they introduced the Certificate of Origin scheme the quality of the stones entering their system has declined, contributing to a decline from US$129,84 per carat in 2000 to US$65,08 in 2001. They also blame the collapse of international prices, and the events of 11 September 2001 on the consumer markets for contributing to this decline.

127. In Guinea the Mining Ministry and the Police and Defence authorities provided the Panel details of a recent case showing how the black market in diamonds continues to impact the economy. Guinea has a special fraud brigade that operates as an inter-agency body. Surveillance teams inspect suspicious activities in the major diamond trading centres, at ports, airports or in the major hotels. In early December 2001 they watched two Ukrainians who were involved in efforts to buy diamonds but these negotiations were abruptly ended. When the Ukrainians were passing through the Conakry airport to depart, customs inspected them and found a small quantity of diamonds on them. These diamonds were undeclared and the Ukrainians offered a bribe of US$10,000 to be let to continue. The offer of such a large bribe raised suspicions further and an additional inspection of their luggage produced US$1.5 million which when examined by the Central Bank was discovered to be counterfeit.

128. The Ulcranians were then arrested and taken into custody. During their interrogation they said they obtained the money from a third person in Conakry and it should have been used as a down payment for the purchasing of diamonds. While negotiating to buy diamonds, their interlocutors had refused their dollars and had verified that they were counterfeit. They had wanted to take the money to Moscow, from where they received orders from an unidentified man called "Serguei". The diamonds they were carrying were from Kenema in Sierra Leone and had been smuggled to Guinea they claimed. The investigation is ongoing and Guinea has sought cooperation and assistance from Interpol.

129. The Panel welcomed these operations by the Guinean authorities. This showed a commitment by Guinea to deal with diamond smuggling, the very problem that had enabled rebels in Sierra Leone to wage their brutal war for many years. Such arrests, as with the arrests of those violating the arms

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embargoes, create a deterrent and make trafficking operations riskier and costlier for the traffickers. The fact that counterfeit dollars and smuggling were involved, shows the necessity to match the introduction of a certificate of origin scheme with thorough inspections and investigations into diamond smuggling. This case shows the magnitude of the problem. It not only involves dealings in diamonds by rebel groups but also tax evasion, money laundering and other criminal activities on an international scale.

Liberia

130. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy has remained committed towards establishing a credible diamond certification system. The Ministry has produced a draft certificate of origin (annex 7) and has sought assistance from the British Government, the EU and the Belgium High Diamond Council (HRD). The Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy met the Director for International Affairs of the HRD in early January 2002 to request technical assistance to draw up a road map that the Liberian government might present to the UN Security Council for its approval so as to enable Liberia to establish its own credible scheme. Liberia wishes to draw up a protocol with the HRD for such technical support.

131. The government wishes to open a one-stop diamond export centre. This would work through a four-stage export process: The Inspectorate at the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy would check and verify export licences, weigh and photograph the diamonds for export and attest to the receipt of the parcel for shipment. These would then be passed onto an appraiser to determine the quality (gem or industrial) and the value in carats and US$. This would then be assessed by the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL) for taxes and royalties and the CBL would serve as the custodian of the parcel that was to be shipped. The Customs department at the Ministry of Finance would verify all shipment documents and affix a customs seal and the parcel would then be approved for export.

132. The Government of Liberia has proposed that this one-stop export centre should be located either at the Central Bank of Liberia or at the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy.

133. The Government of Liberia has participated at Kimberly process meetings. The Minister of Mines most recently obtained a travel exemption from the UN to attend the London meeting in September 2001. Since then the UN Travel Ban and lack of fmance has discouraged any additional participation. However, the government has indicated that it will support draft General Assembly resolution 04 (2002) by member states participating in the

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Kimberly Process. On 11 March 2002 Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy, Jenkins Dunbar wrote to the Foreign Minister asking him to inform the Liberian mission to the UN that the resolution should be signed and adopted.

134. Liberia's own official exports of diamonds in 1999 were valued at US$900,000, only 10 to 15 percent of what is actually leaving the country according to the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy. In 2000, 22,112 carats were exported and there continued to be a rush to export diamonds prior to the imposition of sanctions in May 2001. Diamond specialists in Belgium and Britain believe that Liberia's true artisanal and commercial production is between US$10-15 million per year and easily identifiable. Any dramatic rise above this level of exports should raise the alarm that the Liberia label is once more being used to launder non-Liberian diamonds.

COte d'Ivoire

135. Although C6te d'Ivoire has participated at some of the Kimberly process meetings it has not yet implemented a Certificate of Origin regime and there is an urgent need for a review of its mining code. Currently, parcels exported from C6te d'Ivoire are accompanied by a document that is delivered after the inspection of each parcel by the government's specialists. This document is not the same as a Certificate of Origin. Ivoirian authorities claim that they lack the resources to afford the printing of such certificates and to install the necessary hard and software needed for feedback from transit and importing countries. The Ivoirians claimed that they would be more engaged in the Kimberly process if sponsorship were available.

C. Recommendation on Diamonds

136. The diamond embargo on Liberia has contributed to the dramatic decline in the misuse of the Liberian label for diamond smuggling. The embargo has, however, reversed the problem in effect with continued smuggling of Liberian rough out of the country and into neighbouring certification systems. If these certification schemes are to be credible, this situation needs to be dealt with urgently. Liberia should have its own credible certification scheme so that there is less incentive for Liberian rough to be deliberately mixed with rough of neighbouring countries.

137. Any dramatic increase in exports from could act as an early warning system for the Liberian label being once more used to launder non-Liberian diamonds. The Panel encourages the Liberian Government to put in place a credible and transparent certification scheme which is independently audited by an internationally recognized audit company. This scheme should be independently assessed as credible and effective in order to facilitate the consideration of a monitored suspension of the diamond ban by the Security Council.

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IV. Other Sources of Revenue and Government Expenditure

A. Background

138. The budget for the fiscal year 2001/2002 (July to June) was submitted late to parliament in late November 2001 and passed on 20 December 2001. The budget forecasted expenditure of US$92million, a decrease of some 9.5 percent over the previous year. According to the government and the IMF spending on defence takes up about half of income, and following a decision to reduce civil service wage arrears from ten months to four, non-wage domestic arrears continued to accumulate. On 18 October 2001 President Taylor claimed that his government had spent US$25 million on the war in Lofa County.

139. According to the IMF following their Article 4 assessment mission in December 2001 to Liberia, "Governance problems pervade Liberia's fmancial administration. Budgeting has become dysfunctional, tax incentives for large projects are granted on an ad hoc basis, the procurement system is weak, there are no apparent rules of oversight for purchases by the military.... there is little or no independent oversight of government operations". The Panel itself saw that the Auditor General's office was largely un-funded, unable to function while other government offices enjoyed support. Tax exemptions to concession holders were worth US$2.5 million in 2001 according to government figures.

140. In December 2001 the European Union initiated 'consultations' under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement following its decision in June 2001 to suspend its aid totalling US$42million because of 'worsening conditions' in the country. Article 96 allows for a consultation period of 60 days with a recipient country. Amongst the EU's demands was the Liberian government submit to a financial audit of its public finances. The Liberian government consented just before the expiration of the 2-month deadline given by the EU.

141. This independent management and administrative audit is of selected government public and parastatal institutions. The aim of this EU-funded initiative is to establish proper management, transparency and accountability in the public sector. The Panel welcomed this news as this may help reduce the practice of opaque off-budget expenditure, which has been favoured for funding covert weapons procurement in violation of UN sanctions.

B. Rubber

142. Rubber production remains one of the major foreign exchange earners for the Government and the world's largest rubber estate - 90,000 acres with 11 million high-yielding trees at Harbel and Cavalla is run by Firestone.

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Rubber production has plateaued in its growth. It increased only by 11 percent in 2001 and low international market prices have impacted profits. The rubber sector could begin an irreversible decline in years ahead. With a gestation period for rubber trees of five to six years, a significant part of the three main plantations are coming to the end of their productive life, and no significant replanting is underway. Rubber requires a longer-term approach and it remains a less easy target for "at source" off-budget expenditures, although once the profits enter the government's accounts there is no guarantee on how they are used. The spread of the Lofa war has also impacted rubber production, especially around Bomi.

143. The government, in 2002, has removed its fuel tax exemption on the three main rubber producers and backdated the arrears. In December parliament approved the Agriculture Concession Act, which effectively empowered the President to approve who was awarded new rubber concessions.

C. Logging

144. In its previous report (S/2001/1015) the Panel of Experts examined at length the timber industry and documented how in one case it had provided funds for weapons. Logging activities in 2001 apparently reached a plateau although it was one of the few areas of revenue growth for the government because of efficiency in tax collection from logging activities, which netted an extra US$6 million in 2001 over the previous year.

145. The war in Lofa County has badly impacted timber production, and resulted in the loss of equipment. It has contributed to a steep decline in traffic through Monrovia port. Port figures overall provided by Bureau Veritas (BIVAC) show large amounts of timber continue to be exported through Buchanan in 2002.

146. International scrutiny on the timber industry has resulted in the announcement of two initiatives. In August 2001 President Taylor announced that for the first time since his election in 1997 significant development aid from his government totalling US$7.5 million will be distributed to five counties in south-eastern Liberia. These will be deducted from the total taxes collected annually from each county. Maryland, the home to some major logging companies will receive US$4million paid by those companies, Sinoe, Grand Gedeh and River Gee will receive US$1million each and Rivercess will receive US$500,000. A presidential committee has been established to discuss projects with each county and the funds are budgeted for the 2001/2002 fiscal year.

147. In a second initiative the government signed on 17 January 2002 a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Environmental Commission

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of Liberia and the US-based Conservation International Foundation for establishing a biologically representative network of protected areas covering at least 30 percent of the existing forest area, some 1.5 million hectares. This initiative has been widely welcomed by environmentalists.

148. The Panel found that the Forestry Development Agency was last audited by the Auditor General in 1994. However it will fall under the EU funded audit. According to the FDA during 2001 the highest production of round logs was recorded in March with a volume of 138,647.956M3, while in October the volume declined to 10,071M3. Total production for 2001 was put at 982,292.02M3 from sixty species of wood. Niangon represented some 12 percent of total production in this period. There are twelve principal companies in the sector. These companies produced 91.25 percent of round logs in 2001. The Oriental Timber Company continued to dominate in 2001 with a total production of 484,087.982M3, accounting for 49.28 percent of total production.

149. In 2001 the three main destinations of round logs from Liberia were China (451,877.144M3), France (98,694.358M3) and Italy (48,822.283M3). According to the FDA FOB Value reached US$79,833,926.79. These figures are likely to be under-estimates because of tax evasion by companies and widespread corruption but the inspection of logs by BIVAC International in 2001 has increased the governments tax revenue from timber significantly. In January to March 2002 BIVAC inspected 33,740,041M3 of log exports.

150. During its visit to Liberia the Panel continued to encounter keen advocates from NGOs and in the timber industry for the implementation of a UN embargo on round log exports and an independent audit of the industry. The Panel explained this fell outside its immediate mandate but agreed to report these views. There were fewer advocates in Liberia for a total timber ban although this remains an advocacy goal of a number of international NGOs.

D. Maritime and corporate registry

151. Liberia has the second largest maritime fleet in the world. In April 2002, Liberia's gross tonnes stood at 54,545,000. The net tonnes were 29,191,000. There are to date 1,715 vessels registered under its flag of convenience (open registry).

152. In its previous report (S/2001/1015) the Panel of Experts documented how the Bureau of Maritime Affairs and its agent LISCR had been used for cover and funds for arms and transportation in violation of UN sanctions. The Commissioner of Maritime Affairs Benoni Urey continued to deny that his Bureau was involved in such activities to the Panel. The Panel has obtained additional documentation, including a passport and letter showing that arms

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dealer Sanjivan Ruprah had been a deputy commissioner of maritime affairs and maintained a close relationship with Urey.

153. A key recommendation of the Panel of Experts in S/2001/1015 was that the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs and his BMA are little more than a cash extraction operation and cover from which to fund and organise off- budget expenditures including for sanctions-busting and that the funds will need to be protected from Bureau misuse. The Ministry of Finance acted quickly and on 23 November 2001 announced that it would audit and ring fence the registry. On receipt of the funds the Ministry of Finance would channel the income through the Central Bank of Liberia and would segregate the funds for infrastructure, social, health and welfare development and support programmes.

154. On 3 December 2001 Liberia wrote to the IMF requesting assistance to set up a financial monitoring mechanism. The IMF replied on 14 December, welcoming the initiative, but claiming "oversight proposed in your letter is primarily enterprise-specific and thus outside of the Fund's mandate". The Liberian authorities and their agent LISCR have continued to seek a credible organisation to provide financial oversight of the maritime revenue.

155. Figures provided by the Central Bank of Liberia for 2001 continue to show irregularities versus figures from the Ministry of Finance and the Maritime agent LISCR. The IMF noted following its Article 4 consultations in December 2001 that "reported payments from the shipping registry to the government differed from collections at the Ministry of Finance by some US$2 million, possibly reflecting deductions at source by the BMA or timing differences in the transfer of funds from offshore accounts".

Table 3: Maritime Remittances, 2001

Jan-Feb Mar-Apr May-Jun Jul-Aug Sep-Oct Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual (US$) (US$) (US$) (US$) (US$) 387,272 489,091 1,198,181 0 3,356,363

Source: Central Bank of Liberia

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Table 4:Maritime Remittances, September 2001 to February 2002 Month & Year Ministry of Finance LISCR September 2001 448,118 286,368 October 2001 555,463 254,503 November 2001 667,714 537,378 December 2001 1,902,308 1,990,741 January 2002 1,688,909 1,819,370 February 2002 993,187 893,593 Total US$ 6,255,771 5,781,885

Source: Ministry of Finance and LISCR

156. The Panel tried to examine the BMA's accounts but was informed the generator had broken down and would only be repaired on a day after the Panel had left Liberia. The Panel remains concerned about the activities of the BMA. Although in October 2001 the authorities directed that government bank accounts be moved from commercial banks to Central Bank of Liberia, the BMA continues to maintain its three signatory account at Ecobank in Monrovia. Although the BMA should be funded by the Ministry of Finance of 10 percent raised from the maritime revenues, the Panel found that it did not feature in the payroll status report of the Ministry of Finance (9 March 2002) and in the Bureau of the Budget's Budget for 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 the BMA fell under the Government of Liberia Special Commitment - budgeted for L$48 million, more than the Senate. According to the Auditor General, his office last audited the BMA in 1988.

157. The Panel did obtain figures from the Central Bank of Liberia, LISCR and the Ministry of Finance. None of the figures match with each other and they show significant discrepancies illustrating the urgent need for independent auditing and oversight.

V. The Travel Ban

A. Complaints

158. The Travel Ban has continued to generate numerous complaints. Individuals on the list requested to know on what grounds they were on the list and how to appeal. The Panel also received several complaints from individuals who said that they had been wrongly accused of violating the ban by travelling. The Panel took all such complaints seriously and is investigating their veracity.

159. Following the publication of S/2001/1015 the Liberian government circulated a memorandum reminding its officials not to travel. Indeed sightings of Liberian officials at Abidjan Airport have declined in 2002 due to Monrovia's clamping down on certain types of travel for cost saving and

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political reasons. However, a core of senior officials or business associates continues to float the ban with impunity. Dutch national Gus Kouwenhowen has even boasted to the Liberian media that he travels regularly.

B. False Passports

160. Problems with Liberian passports, including diplomatic passports are well known and are also acknowledged by the Liberian authorities. According to the Liberian government some embassies abroad have been involved in fraud. A lot of the fraud and the lack of proper oversight due to the years of war had caused a proliferation of diplomatic passports without proper authorization.

161. President Taylor had all passports revoked in 1997 and new ones were introduced with unfalsifiable security features. The Foreign Ministry issues passports but other Ministries may issue requests. The President also has discretionary powers to order issuing of such passports. The Liberian National Investment Commission may also issue diplomatic passports to foreign businessmen that are appointed to find interested investors abroad. Since a special clause in the Liberian constitution prohibits everyone of non- negro descent to be a Liberian citizen, foreigners can get some sort of an honorary citizenship and become bearers of a Liberian diplomatic passport. Gus Kouwenhoven for instance, has such a passport.

162. The Panel had during previous work in Liberia requested to have a full list of all the valid diplomatic passports that had been issued and a list was prepared by the Foreign Ministry, with the understanding that the list was not accurate. Regularly foreign countries and Interpol request clarification from Liberia on passports presented abroad. These requests are dealt with by the Liberian authorities and many irregularities had been rectified. Some cases had to do with wrongdoings by government officials that were no longer part of the government or by embassies that were staffed with persons that had been appointed by previous administrations the Panel was informed.

163. The Panel however has credible evidence that the problem with diplomatic passports is also caused by the current authorities. As shown in the report S/2001/1015, Sanjivan Ruprah, who was instrumental in arms supplies to Liberia, travelled with different diplomatic passports and under different names. For his sanctions busting activities on behalf of the Liberian government he carried two different diplomatic passports as a deputy commissioner of the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. The panel has now also found a document showing Ruprah signed letters as deputy commissioner, on letterhead of the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. The panel wants to flag this point, because even after all the evidence presented by the Panel in S/2001/1015 the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs of Liberia kept claiming that Ruprah had nothing to do with his business.

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164. The Panel found that a way to avoid being stopped at airports is for Liberian officials or businessmen on the UN travel ban use multiple passports, issued under different names by the Liberian authorities. The Panel has obtained evidence on at least two such cases. Ambassador-at-Large Mohamed Salame, who plays a pivotal role in Liberia's operations through Cote d'Ivoire has a diplomatic passport issued under his real name and another diplomatic passport, with a completely different identity, under the name of Ameri al Jawad. The latter was issued in June 2001, just a few weeks after the imposition of the travel ban. In addition to copies of the two passports the Panel also obtained corroborating documentary as well as direct oral evidence proving that Mohamed Salame has indeed been using that second passport while travelling. The Panel showed the pictures on these passports to several acquaintances of the Ambassador. All of them recognized both the pictures as those of Mohamed Salame.

165. Another similar example is that of Mussa Cisse, a Guinean born businessman who has been one of President Taylor's confidents for years and who plays a key role in the sale of diamonds and arms. The Panel has also obtained copies of both his passports, one diplomatic passport under his own name Mussa Cisse as 'Chief of Protocol Executive Mansion' and the other an ordinary Liberian passport under the name Mamadee Kamara. The Panel showed copies of both these passports to relatives and acquaintances of Mussah Cisse in Monrovia and they identified both the pictures as being him. Copies of both these passports are added in annex 8 to this report.

166. Another individual on the travel ban is the RUF's Sam "Maskita" Bockarie. He was reported by this Panel in its previous report S/2001/1015 to be travelling under false names. As already mentioned in paragraph 45, the Ghanian authorities have confirmed that Bockarie stayed in Accra in May 2001 under the assumed name of Sam Johnson.

167. During its previous visits to Liberia the Panel interviewed Gus Kouwenhoven at length and met him on different occasions. When the Panel questioned him about his breaches of the travel ban, he said he needed to travel for his business interests elsewhere in Africa. Although the Panel was not able to document this, several sources in Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire) told the Panel he was seen there very frequently, at the airport. Although the Panel inspected all the records and passenger lists of flights out of Monrovia from the start of the ban, his name did not appear in those records. The Panel also interviewed the owners of airlines in Abidjan. They did not know him as their customer. The Panel cannot explain how Mr. Kouwenhoven manages to travel without being recorded on passenger lists, unless he would also have different passports or travel under false name. Many Liberians and expatriates in Monrovia and Cote d'Ivoire gave the Panel exact dates of his travelling from and to Liberia, always on Weasua flights such as:

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22 December 2001, Gus Kouwenhoven arrived Monrovia from Abidjan. 3 March 2002, Gus Kouwenhoven departed from Monrovia to Abidjan. 15 March 2002, Gus Kouwenhoven arrived Monrovia from Abidjan.

Savings from the Travel Ban President Taylor in his November 2001/2002 budget speech admitted that "with the imposition of UN sanctions on Liberia, came travel restrictions on certain officials of this government. While such action on the part of the UN limits our capacity to mobilize external commitments to our reconstruction needs, it curtails the proliferation of travel plans which, as we have seen in the past, have no bearing on the well being of the people". Indeed the travel ban may have contributed to some significant savings. International travel consumed around US$600,000 of government funds per month in 1999. Following the Security Council travel ban many of these funds went unspent. Travel restrictions were extended to others not banned, further reducing expenditures. A circular reminding officials to respect the travel ban was circulated in November 2001 following the Panel of Experts report (S/2001/1015) documenting violations. According to the Ministry of Finance these funds were first spent on fuel imports and more recently on helping to pay arrears of civil servants' salaries. This may have reduced government expenditures by about US$400,000 per month, a quarter of the average bill for monthly public salaries.

VI. The Impact of Sanctions on Liberia 168. The perception of the average Liberian is that sanctions are impacting them. The government has since May 2001 conducted an anti-sanctions campaign blaming the US, the UK and the UN for the imposition of sanctions. The Ministry of Information runs this campaign. There have been two phases to the campaign. A poster and billboard campaign in April and May 2001 was followed by demonstrations and critical reports in the press.

169. In 2002 this campaign entered a second phase with 1000 new posters distributed around Monrovia to be put up in government buildings claiming "arms embargo killing our people" and "sanctions: killing our economy" (annex 9). The government has also been actively trying to keep the population ill informed about the sanctions and the work of the Panel of Experts.

170. When the News newspaper published on 16 November 2001 a feature about violations of the travel ban, it found it suddenly confronted by a massive tax arrears demand and was forced to cease publication for several weeks. The Panel when invited to appear on radio DC-FM for a phone in show on 4 April 2002 was at the last moment discouraged from participating by the manager of the radio station. The public were told the programme was postponed for "technical reasons".

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171. In February 2002 the Senate Foreign Affairs Standing Committee in Monrovia held a series of hearings on the impact of sanctions, which included testimonies of several respected voices from civil society who also called for sanctions to be lifted or modified. The Committee produced a confidential report on the sanctions, which also made recommendations on how to extricate Liberia from them. This was followed on 1 March 2002 by a Senate Resolution 003, which called on the UN to lift the arms embargo.

172. There have also been a variety of claims about the impact of sanctions. The University of Liberia Press Club (ULPC) in a 14 January 2002 letter to UNOL claimed that suicide rates had increased due to sanctions. Another individual threatened to go on hunger strike because of UN sanctions but the UN Secretary General's Representative met him and encouraged him to consider an "exit" strategy because the "Council can take a long time to make a decision." The individual decided then not to continue with his hunger strike. The Liberian Council of Churches wrote to UNOL in January about the "suffering of the Liberian people, socially, psychologically, economically and spiritually".

173. The UN has been poor at defending the Security Council's decision to impose targeted sanctions. This has also been highlighted by the OCHA report (S/2001/939 of 5 October 2001) on humanitarian impact. The Panel found that few people had read the Panel of Experts report and that in Liberia down- loading the report from the internet is a rare, costly and time consuming luxury. The UN needs to proactively distribute hard copies of the Panel's reports to interested parties in Monrovia. Since POE report (S/2001/1015) is out of print the Panel recommends that a second print run of 1000 copies be arranged and that UNOL be tasked to hold a series of workshops in Monrovia on the findings of the Panel of Experts to balance the one-sided nature of current discussion.

174. Sanctions have had some collateral damage. They and the war have contributed to the depreciation of the Liberian dollar. The Economist Intelligence Unit notes that until local traders abandon their practice of hoarding the US dollar and refusing to do business in local currency, it will be difficult for government to stabilise the exchange rate. The February 2002 State of Emergency has increased capital flight and contributed to a further down turn of consumer confidence rather than the sanctions. But in public perception they are intertwined.

175. There has also been a steep increase in inflation following the imposition of sanctions. The year-on-year rate of inflation was basically a one- digit figure until July 2001 when inflation began to rise. By February 2002 the rate of inflation was recorded at 22.4 percent having risen from 3.8 percent in May 2001 due to rapid escalation of goods and services, partly due to sanctions but also because of the war and opportunistic profiteering by traders.

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176. International NGOs also complained to the Panel of continuing to experience difficulties in finding funding from international donors for projects in Liberia but admitted this was due as much to the government's poor governance record and the war. Liberia's relations with the World Bank group, however, have been frozen and will be re-evaluated when UN sanctions are lifted.

Annexes

Meetings and consultations

Cote d'Ivoire Government Airport Authority Ministry of Mines, Geology and Environment Ministry of Defence Ministry of Interior

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies Liberia United Kingdom United States of America UNDP

Civil Society Centre for Democratic Empowerment Modern Africa

Private Sector Air Inter Ivoire Hotel Ivoire Inter-continental

Others Ms. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf

Guinea Government Air Navigation Agency Commissioner of Judicial Police Directorate of Civil Aviation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defence

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Ministry of Mines, Geology and Environment Prefecture of Macenta Sub-Prefecture of Daro Village Chief of Badaro

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies Mano River Civil Society Movement Conference, Conakry Secretariat of Roberts Flight Information Region (FIR) UNDP UNHCR United States of America

Private sector Mr. Mohamed Yansane (Pecos)

Others Liberian Refugees in Daro and Kouankan camps

Liberia Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Lands, Mines & Energy Ministry of Transport Ministry of Revenue Ministry of Defence Ministry of Finance Auditor General Office Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation Bureau of Maritime Affairs Central Bank of Liberia Director of Civil Aviation Expenditure Team (Minister of Finance, Director of Budget, Deputy Minister of Revenue, Deputy Minister of Expenditure and Coordinator of International Economic Cooperation) Forestry Development Agency Liberian Petroleum Refining Corporation National Security Agency Roberts International Airport

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Task Force on Compliance with Resolution 1343(2001)

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies Canada European Union Guinea Sierra Leone UNDP UNOL United States of America

Civil society Mr. Michael Kpakala Francis, Archbishop of Monrovia Conservation International Fauna & Flora International Liberian Women Initiative Medecins sans Frontieres National Campaign for Liberia's Survival (NACALS) Save the Children, UK

Private sector Mr. Eid, owner of Hotel Boulevard (now Hotel Royal) Mr. George Haddad, Head of Lebanese Community BIVAC (Bureau Veritas) Diamond Star Company Firestone Global African Minerals Mobil RIA UMARCO (Liberia)

Media Analyst BBC Reuters The Enquirer The News

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Sierra Leone Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Mineral Resources (in Freetown and Kenema) Ministry of Justice Sierra Leone Police (Special Branch and Criminal Investigation Department) Sierra Leone Army

Private sector American Diamonds in Bo H. Shour and Sons Ossailly Diamond office in Kenema Rex Diamonds in Freetown Salim Ossailly Diamond Office in Bo

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies UNAMSIL -CIVPOL officers in Bo and Freetown -Civil Affairs Officers in Bo -Force Commander -MIO Freetown -MILOBS in Freetown, Bo and Buedu UNV (United Nations Volunteers) United Kingdom

Civil society Chiefs and Elders from Kailahun District Civil Defence Force leaders in Brookefields Hotel, Freetown International Crisis Group RUF (P) representatives

Miscellaneous Air West, Togo Africa Confidential Amnesty International Conciliation Resources De Beers Diamond High Council (Hoge Raad voor Diamant), Belgium

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Department of Defence, USA Department of State, USA Directorates of Civil Aviation, DRC, Moldova and Togo Economic Intelligence Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Global Witness Human Rights Watch International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Peace Information Service (IPIS), Belgium Interpol General Secretariat, Lyon (France) J.P. Airlines Fleet in Switzerland (Mr. Sommers) LISCR LURD representatives Merlin Oxfam UK Samih Ossailly, diamond dealer Tiram-Avia, Moldova The Perspective Wall Street Journal

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Abbreviations

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia ATU Anti-Terrorist Unit (Liberia) BIVAC Bureau Veritas International BMA Bureau of Maritime Affairs BNE Bureau National d'Expertise de Diamants et Autres Gemmes (Guinea CACD Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme CBL Central Bank of Liberia CDF Civil Defence Force ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FDA Forestry Development Agency (Liberia) FOB Freight on Board GDDO Government Gold and Diamond Office (Sierra Leone) HRD Hoge Raad voor Diamant/High Diamond Council (Belgium) ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund LISCR Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy NOTAM Notice to Airmen OCHA UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance OTC Oriental Timber Company POE Panel of Experts RIA Robertsfield International Airport (Liberia) Roberts FIR Roberts Flight Information Region RUF Revolutionary United Front RUFP RUF Party SLA Sierra Leone Army SSS Special Security Service (Liberia) RSLAF Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces* ULIMO United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia ULPC University of Liberia Press Club UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNOL United Nations Peace-Building Office in Liberia

* The former SLA was renamed Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces or RSLAF

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