Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual And

Home , Bad governance, Good governance, Governance

ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol21, No 5, pp 795 – 814, 2000

Governance,good governance and globalgovernance: conceptual and actualchallenges

THOMASGWEISS

ABSTRACT This article takes seriously the propositionthat ideas andconcepts, bothgood and bad, have an impacton international publicpolicy. It situates the emergenceof governance, good governance and global governance, as well as the UN’srole in the conceptualprocess. Although‘ governance’is as oldas humanhistory, this essay concentrates onthe intellectual debatesof the 1980s and1990 sbutexplores suchearlier UN-related ideas asdecolonisation,locali- sationand human rights, againstwhich more recent thinkinghas been played out.A central analytical perspective is the tension betweenmany academics and international practitioners whoemploy ‘ governance’to connote a complexset of structures andprocesses, bothpublic and private, while morepopular writers tendto use it synonymouslywith ‘government’.

‘Governance’is nowfashionable, but the conceptis as oldas humanhistory. 1 This essay concentrates onthe intellectual debates ofthe 1980sand1990 s, essentially since the term becamewidespread in developmentcircles and prominentin the international publicpolicy lexicon. Many academics and international practitioners employ‘ governance’to connotea complexset of structures andprocesses, bothpublic and private, while morepopular writers tendto use it synonymouslywith ‘government’. Governancefor the latter refers tocharacteristics that are generallyassociated with asystem ofnational administration. The New Webster’s International Dictionary denes the term in muchthe same wayas journalists fromthe New York Times or TheEconomist :‘act, manner,of ce, or power of governing; government’, ‘state ofbeing governed’ , or‘ methodof government or regu- lation’. As MortenBø aÊ s has shown,before being studied at the globallevel, governancewas employedgenerically in academic discourse. 2 It was, for instance, widelyused in relationship to business literature aboutthe micro- behaviourof rms. 3 GoranHyden has arguedthat it refers mainly to running governmentsand other public agencies orprivate oneswith social purposes. 4 Analysts ofinternational relations andinternational civil servants, in contrast, nowuse the term almost exclusively to describe phenomenathat gobeyond asynonymfor ‘ government’and the legal authoritywith whichsuch polities are vested.For instance, the Commission onGlobal Governance de nes

ThomasG Weiss isat thePolitical Science Department,the CUNY Graduate Center, 365 Fifth Avenue— Suite 5203,New York,NY10016-4309, USA. E-mail: [email protected].

ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 00/050795-20 Ó 2000 ThirdWorld Quarterly 795 THOMAS GWEISS

‘governance’as ‘the sum ofthe manyways individuals andinstitutions, public andprivate, manage their commonaffairs. It is the continuingprocess through whichcon icting ordiverse interests maybe accommodated and co-operative action maybe taken.’ 5 James Rosenauis the USacademic most closely associated withthe term. Andfor him, whether at the grassroots orgloballevels, it ‘encompasses the activities ofgovernments, but it also includes the manyother channelsthrough which “ commands” owin the formof goals framed,direc- tives issued, andpolicies pursued’. 6 Somethingof an intellectual cottage industryhas arisen aroundthe term over the past twodecades. Since the early 1980s, ‘governance’and increasingly ‘good governance’have permeated development discourse andespecially research agendasand other activities fundedby public and private banksand bilateral donors.Moreover, publications byscholars andeminent commissions have extensively usedthe term forcontemporary global problem solving. 7 Theemergence of governance can be traced at the countrylevel to a disgruntlement with the state-dominated models ofeconomic and social developmentso prevalentthroughout the socialist blocand much of the Third Worldin the 1950s, 1960sand 1970 s. At the international level ‘global governance’can be traced toa growingdissatisfaction amongstudents of international relations withthe realist andliberal – institutionalist theories that dominatedthe studyof international organisationin the 1970sand1980 s. In particular, these failed to captureadequately the vast increase, in bothnumbers andin uence, of non-state actors andthe implications oftechnology in an age ofglobalisation. This article takes seriously the propositionthat ideas andconcepts, both good andbad, have an impact. Inpointing to the role ofpolicy and academic ‘scribblers’, JohnMaynard Keynes wrote in 1936that ‘the ideas ofeconomists andpolitical philosophers,both when they are right andwhen they are wrong, are morepowerful than is commonlyunderstood’ . 8 This essay thus seeks to correct the fact that ideas, whethereconomic or otherwise, have until recently beenignored by students ofinternational relations. 9 It situates the emergenceof governance,good governance and global governance, as well asthe role ofthe UnitedNations (UN),inthe conceptualprocess.

Governanceand good governance Theworld organisation was built onthe basis ofunquestioned national sovereignty.In spite ofarticle 2(7)of the UNCharter,sovereignty and non-interferencein the internal affairs ofstates havecome under re.As formerSecretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote, ‘ Thetime ofabsolute and exclusive sovereignty,however, has passed’. 10 Sovereignty’s status and relevanceare contested increasingly within international organisations and forums.Moreover, the climate forgovernance has changedimmensely since the UN’sfounding.Indeed, de nitions ofgovernance vary substantially, as is evidentfrom views ongovernance of various international organisations shownbelow. 796 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

World Bank.Governanceis dened as the mannerin which power is exercised in the managementof a country’s economicand social resources. TheWorld Bank has identied three distinct aspects ofgovernance: (i) the formof political regime; (ii) the process bywhich authority is exercised in the managementof a country’s economicand social resources fordevelop- ment; and(iii) the capacity ofgovernments to design,formulate, and implement policies anddischarge functions. 11 UNDP.Governanceis viewedas the exercise ofeconomic, political and administrative authorityto manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes andinstitutions throughwhich citizens andgroups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations andmediate their differences. 12 OECD.Theconcept of governance denotes the use ofpolitical authorityand exercise ofcontrol in asociety inrelation to the managementof its resources forsocial andeconomic development. This broadde nition encompasses the role ofpublic authorities inestablishing the environmentin whicheconomic operators function and in determiningthe distribution of benets as well as the natureof the relationship betweenthe ruler andthe ruled.13 Institute of Governance,Ottawa .Governancecomprises the institutions, processes andconventions in asociety whichdetermine howpower is exercised,how important decisions affecting society are madeand how variousinterests are accordeda place insuch decisions. 14 Commissionon Global Governance .Governanceis the sum ofthe many waysindividuals andinstitutions, publicand private, manage their common affairs. It is acontinuingprocess throughwhich con icting ordiverse interests maybe accommodated and co-operative action maybe taken. It includes formal institutions andregimes empoweredto enforcecompliance, as well as informal arrangementsthat peopleand institutions either have agreedto or perceive to be in their interest. 15 UNSecretary-General KoAnnan .Goodgovernance is ensuringrespect for humanrights andthe rule oflaw; strengtheningdemocracy; promoting transparencyand capacity inpublic administration. 16 InternationalInstitute ofAdministrative Sciences .Governancerefers tothe process wherebyelements in society wield powerand authority, and inuence and enact policies anddecisions concerningpublic life, and economicand social development.Governance is abroadernotion than government.Governance involves interaction betweenthese formal institutions andthose ofcivil society. 17 TokyoInstitute of Technology .Theconcept of governance refers to the complexset ofvalues, norms, processes andinstitutions bywhich society managesits developmentand resolves conict, formally andinformally. 797 THOMAS GWEISS

Itinvolvesthe state, butalso the civil society (economicand social actors, community-basedinstitutions andunstructured groups, the media,etc) at the local, national,regional and global levels. 18

Theemphasis is onthe past twodecades, even though there is arich history ofsuch earlier UN-relatedideas as decolonisation,localisation andhuman rights, against whichmore recent thinkinghas beenplayed out. What is important to note hereis the dramatic quantitative andqualitative shiftin the political ambienceat the UNsince the late 1950sand early 1960s.During the ColdWar, governmental representatives ofnewly independent countries weresuccess fully onthe defensive withinUN andrelated international fora; theyremained largely untouchedby the rich scholarly debateabout the ‘newpolitical economy’, 19 ‘social capital’, 20 and ‘publicgoods’ . 21 Theyinterpreted virtually anyserious scrutiny oftheir economic andsocial choices as athreat totheir newbornand weak states. Andthey remainedimpervious to the international political economyliterature ofthe 1970s and1980s that emphasised publicchoice theory, rent-seeking behaviour, directly unproductivepro t-seeking activities, andthe newinstitutional economics. 22 Byplaying off East versus West, moreover,developing countries deected manycriticisms bydonors and investors if theyhinted at shortcomingsin economicand political management.Suggestions about what was wrongwith economicand social policies indeveloping and socialist bloccountries were viewedas sidingwith the ‘enemy’in the East – West struggle.And the ‘other’ side couldbe persuaded to be less critical, andeven nancially supportive,as part ofworld-wide competition. Theresult was anunquestioning, and at times almost obsequious,acceptance ofthe status quo.Francis MDengand Terrence Lyons have summarised the situation inAfrica, but their commenthas greater resonance:‘ Rather than promotegood governance by awarding sovereign rights to those regimes that effectively orresponsibly administered agiventerritory, Africandiplomatic principles, epitomized bythe Organizationof African Unity ( OAU), accepted whateverregime occupiedthe presidential palace,regardless ofwho (or even whether)the regime governed.’23 Ironically, OPEC’sability to increase oil prices in 1973 – 74andagain in 1979 strengthenedthe collective bargainingstrength ofthe Groupof 77 andproduced foreignexchange shortages andunsustainable indebtednessthat, in turn,forced manynon-oil-exporting developing countries to accept intrusive structural adjustment. Outside interference in economicpolicy was the quid pro quo of desperately neededinternational nance,especially fromthe International Mon- etary Fund (IMF)asthe lenderof last resort, orthe seal ofapproval required by otherfunders. 24 Asthe twin pillars ofthe postwareconomic system, the WorldBank and the IMF hademphasised domestic policies forsometime. 25 Butthe UNsystem had adifferent orientation andpro le. Thepreponderance of developing countries in the membershipmade debates distinct fromthose in Washingtonwhere weighted votingprivileged the voices ofpowerf ul donors.However, with the arrival ofthe Kohl,Thatcher and Reagan administrations, Western rhetoric hada substantial impact onNew York as well as Washington. 798 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Theref rain to emphasise domestic priorities assumed moreweight and was increasingly pertinent after the September1981 World Bank report from Pro- fessor Elliot Berg. 26 Later in the decadethe Bankissued amoreholistic sequel that emphasised political andinstitutional changeas prerequisites foreffective economicreform. 27 Within the UNsystem too,the neworthodoxy of more aid andinvestment in exchangefor economic liberalisation erodedthe reluctance to intrudein domestic policies, whattwo analysts haddescribed as ‘the global Keynesiansocial pact suggestedby the BrandtCommission’ . 28 Suchexternal economicf actors as commodityprices andinterest rates could notbe totally set aside asexplanationsfor poverty and poor economic perf orm- ance.But it becameuntenable to attribute all the woesof developing countries to outside forces beyondtheir control.This was particularly the case after Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to powerin 1985 and the onset of‘ newthinking’ in Moscow.There was nolonger a geopolitical counterweightin the East to Western demandsf oreconomic liberalisation andpolitical democratisation. Domestic policies andpriorities werecentral to the dire problemsfaced by bothdeveloping countries andmembers ofthe socialist bloc.And it became politically morecorrect in international forato say so andthereby begin a conversationabout how state andsociety werestructured. As GoranHyden has written: ‘Getting politics right is different fromgetting policyright in that it calls fora restructuring ofthe polityitsel f.Thestructural adjustment programsthat are associated withgetting policyright havebeen and could be pursued by an autocratic governmentas well as ademocratic one.’29 Adiscussion aboutthe quality ofa country’s political andeconomic governance system became acceptable withininternational publicpolicy fora for four reasons. First, there was the glaringillegitimacy ofregimes headedby such international pariahs as Uganda’s Idi Amin,Kampuchea’ s PolPot, Haiti’ s Jean- ClaudeDuvalier, or the Central AfricanEmpire’ s Jean-Be´del Bokassa.After havingsuccessfully lobbiedthe so-called international communityto consider as genuinely‘ international’the domestic policies ofwhite-majority governmentsin Rhodesiaand South Africa, it was illogical fordeveloping countries to maintain that their owndomestic behaviourwas out-of-bounds.Moreover, the endof the ColdWar suddenly removed both the willingness to turna blind-eyetowards outlandishregimes as well as incentives forthe West to supportauthoritarian rule. Second,Samuel Huntingtoncorrectly characterised the ‘third wave’of democratic rule. 30 Boththe ThirdWorld and the formerSoviet blocwere engul fedby atidal waveof political reforms,especially whenthe collapse ofthe Berlin Wall was soclosely followedby the implosionof Moscow’ s empire.Widespread democratisation, includingUN monitoringof elections in suchformer dictator- ships as El Salvadorand Haiti, broughtsquarely into focus the character and quality oflocal governance.Regimes in the ThirdWorld and Eastern Europe adoptedcivilian rule,elections andmultiparty democracy.They understood that the form,if notalways the spirit andcontent, of elections wereprerequisites to legitimise their rule andto attract Western nancing.Investors andaid agencies insisted, andmost potential recipients—with notable exceptions like China, NorthKorea, Cuba, Libya and Iraq— accepted this approach. 799 THOMAS GWEISS

Third,the proliferation ofnon-state actors changedthe political landscapein most countries.In addition to the organisations ofthe UNsystem andthe Washington-based nancial institutions, suchinternational non-governmental organisations ( NGOs) as HumanRights Watchand CARE,suchtransnational corporationsas Shell andCitibank, and such global media as the BBC and CNN penetratedwhat had f ormerlybeen something of a governmental chasse garde´e . Theyexerted a growingin uence on what once had been almost exclusively matters ofstate policy.Within developingand socialist bloccountries, civil society burgeonedafter decadesof repression. In particular, the growthof NGOs is astriking dimensionof contemporary international relations whoseimplica- tions forglobal governance and social policyin the UNsystem are notfully understoodor appreciated. 31 Inshort,economic and social policyis nolonger the exclusive preserveof governments. Human rights advocates,gender activists, developmentalists andgroups of indigenous peoples have invaded the territory ofstates, literally and guratively. Fourth,the 1990shavewitnessed aphenomenaltrans formationof the wide- spreadview that the ‘Charter is aWestphalian document parexcellence ’.32 Althoughthe UN’sconstitution prohibits actions dealingwith the domestic policies ofmember states, nonetheless humanitarianinterventions haveencour- agedthe insertion ofresponsibility as anecessary additional componentof national sovereignty,in additionto the three traditional characteristics of statehood(territory, peopleand authority). Leading the humanrights charge werenone other than the last twoUN secretaries-general, BoutrosBoutros-Ghali andKo Annan, who painstakingly put forward the contingentcharacter of sovereignty. 33 Francis Deng,their Special Representative onInternally Displaced Persons,labelled this approach‘ sovereigntyas responsibility’. 34 The acute sufferingof such f ailed states as Somalia, the formerYugoslavia and Rwanda openedthe doorto scrutinising domestic policies that hadled to mass displace- ment andeven genocide. Given the needfor the international system to pickup the costly humanitarianbill forsuch tragedies, the preventionof future disasters lent additional weightto the argumentto examinegovernance patterns in as-yet un-failedstates. 35 As aresult ofthese fourdevelopments, probing domestic policies and priorities becamethe norm;and efforts to cometo grips with the term canbe interpreted as part ofan intellectual struggle tocapture the variousunits of governancethat are notinstruments ofthe state. At the national level the work ofMorten Bø aÊ s is particularly instructive, becausegovernance is embeddedin andinterwoven with state – civil society interactions. It is the part ofthe public realm that encompasses both.Essential to governanceis the civic realm, which is maintained bypolitical actors fromboth the state andsociety, andin which ‘access toparticipation inthe publicrealm is built onrespected andlegitimate rules’. Therefore,‘ governanceis concernedwith the regime whichconstitutes the set offundamental rules forthe organizationof the publicrealm, andnot with government… Governanceclearly embraces governmentinstitutions, but it also subsumes informal,non-governmental institutions operatingwithin the publicrealm.’ 36 Byconceptualising governance in terms that transcendtra- ditional notionsof domestic politics, BøaÊ s’ treatment ofthe subject claries how 800 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE national governanceinvolves non-governmental actors exercising authoritylegit- imately in the publicrealm. AlthoughRosenau focuses onthe dynamicsof the international system, his analytical lenses are helpfulin pointing out that all governance‘ refers to mechanisms forsteering social systems towardtheir goals’. 37 Assuch,agency is important.At the national level then,we need to conceptualise governancein terms that includebut also transcendthe formal governmentapparatus. However, andin spite ofthe explosivegrowth in pro t andnot-for-pro t groupsin civil society, governmentsremain the primaryagents. The provision of public goods as well as incentive structures forcorporations’ and voluntary agencies’ con- tributing tosocial problemsolving are largely determinedby governmentpolicy. Inshort, actions to foster good governanceconcentrate on attenuating two undesirablecharacteristics that hadbeen prevalent earlier: the unrepresentative character ofgovernments and the inefciency of non-market systems. As governanceis the sum ofthe waysthat individuals andinstitutions, inboth publicand private spheres,manage their affairs, the systems ofgovernance in muchof the ThirdWorld and Eastern Europehad to change. As BøaÊ s has written, ‘the WorldBank operationalised “badgovernance” as personalisation of power,lack ofhuman rights, endemiccorruption and un-elected and unaccount- able governments’. Andso, ‘ goodgovernance must bethe natural opposite’. 38 Since goodgovernance has becomean important componentof the international agenda,discourse aboutgood governance was linkedto newpolicies in those countries receivingdevelopment assistance orinvestments frominternational lendingagencies. Good governance has becomea political andeconomic conditionality that is inseparable fromdebates aboutappropriate bilateral and multilateral nancingfor developing and f ormerlysocialist bloccountries. International efforts, in recent decades,have thus supportedpolitical democratisation (includingelections, accountability andhuman rights) andeconomic liberalisation. Recent experiencewith goodgovernance has led to criticism fromthe UN system, whichseeks to balanceassessments aboutcosts andbene ts as well as to confrontthe political andeconomic conditionality viewedby many recipient countries as unwelcomeintrusions. Goodgovernance is denitely onthe international agenda.But three types ofsubstantive UNcommentaryhave applied the brakesand slowed the momentumof the Washingtonconsensus. The rst is the needto capture the complexreality ofgovernance, which encompasses all the structures andprocesses fordetermining the use ofavailable resources forthe publicgood within a country.Although debate continues about its precise components,good governance is morethan multiparty elections, a judiciary anda parliament, whichhave been emphasised as the primarysymbols ofWestern-style democracy.The list ofother attributes, with the necessary resources andculture to accompanythem, is formidable: universal protectionof humanrights; non-discrimatorylaws; efcient, impartial andrapid judicial processes; transparent publicagencies; accountability fordecisions bypublic ofcials; devolutionof resources anddecision makingto local levels fromthe capital; andmeaningful participation bycitizens in debatingpublic policies and choices. 801 THOMAS GWEISS

TheUnited Nations DevelopmentProgramme ( UNDP)leads in dening the characteristics ofa populationthat lives withina society in whichgovernance is good.The annual HumanDevelopment Report providesas close to an authoritative snapshotas wehave. Following 10 years ofstructural adjustment loans,the effort beganin 1990under the leadership ofMahbub ul Haqand has continuedsince 1996under Richard Jolly. The UNDP has soughtto shedlight systematically onthe actual lives ofpeople, especially those onthe bottomof the incomescale. 39 Inmany ways the decade’s collection ofthe annual Human DevelopmentReports —whichare nowavailable ona single compactdisc— was apreludeto and a prolongationof the 1995Social Summit inCopenhagen. Withoutdenying the benets ofgrowth, these reports andthe Copenhagen conferenceinsist oncataloguing: 1) the aggravationof poverty and the growing divides betweenrich andpoor, within societies as well as amongthem; 2) increasing unemployment;3 )adisintegrating social fabric andexclusion; and4) environmentaldamage. Thevalue of the humandevelopment index ( HDI)is the modication ofwhat constitutes anacceptable wayto measure asociety withgood governance. Economicwell-being and human progress are notsynonymous. Countries with the same percapita incomecan have quite different HDIs, andcountries with the same levels ofincome can also havesimilar HDIs. Theclear message is that the contentof domestic policies andpriorities is crucial. TheUnited Nations Children’s Fund( UNICEF)has,since 1987,issued annual reports onthe lives ofvulnerable children and women; 40 this coincidedwith the pioneeringearlier efforts bythe organisationto put social problemsat the centre ofthe debateabout the impact ofadjustment. 41 TheUN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)has publisheda bi-annualoverview of the beleagueredstatus ofwar victims since 1993. 42 Oneconsequence of these analytical efforts is that the WorldBank’ s informationally rich annual WorldDevelopment Report has graduallybecome more attuned to measuringthe ‘softer’side ofliving condi- tions withincountries. 43 Thesecond substantive criticism fromthe UNsystem is the needto strike a balancebetween the publicand private sectors. Again,analyses havesought to gobeyond democratic symbols andportray the necessary elements ofpublic welfare.The composite viewof the UNsystem amountsto something of a reprise ofKeynesianism bypointing to the ineluctable importanceof state decisions todetermine the managementof both supply and demand. 44 Inattempting to correct the euphoriathat surroundedthe Washingtonconsen- sus ofthe early 1990s, argumentshave consistently counterbalancedthe stereotypical conservativeapproaches in voguesince the beginningof the Reaganand Thatcheradministrations— namely, that anythingthe governmentcan do, the private sector cando better; andthat moreopen markets, free trade andcapital owsare necessarily benecial. Inmany ways, an attentive readerof UN documentsof the 1990swould not have been surprised bythe disruptionsin Seattle ofthe WorldTrade Organization’ s ThirdMinisterial Summit inDecember 1999or in Washington for the sessions ofthe Bankand the Fundin April 2000. Anunquestioned faith in the normativeprinciples ofneoliberalism had becomeso widespreadamong Western andtransnational elites that seemingly 802 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE the onlyacceptable andcommon-sensical prescriptions abouthow to structure political andeconomic life werethose ofthe Washingtonconsensus. The intellectual climate hadchanged so muchthat, fora decadebetween the mid-1980sandmid-1990 s, it was almost heretical toargue that anef cient, thrivingmarket economyand civil society requirean effective andstrong government.Antonio Gramsci wouldhave found an apt illustration ofhis argumentthat ideologies canhave the ‘same energyas material force’. 45 But anarticial dichotomyhad been created between‘ state’and ‘ market’. The UN’sincipient heresyagainst this conventionalwisdom was perhapsbest exemplied by analyses ofthe formerSoviet bloc,where ‘ shrinking’but not‘ rolling back’the state was the policyrecommendation. A reportfrom UNDP’sRegionalBureau for Europe and the Commonwealthof Independent States emphasised the prerequisites forequity, legitimacy andef ciency: ‘Alegitimately stronggovernment can be described as onethat commands sufcient condence in its legitimacy to allow fora strongcivil society, andfor anetworkof non-governmental institutions andregulations that ensurethe developmentof a well-functioningeconomic system, the strengtheningof democratic procedures,and a widespreadparticipation bypeople in public life.’46 Ina departuref romprevious orthodoxy and as asign ofthe pendulum’s swing,the Bank’s WorldDevelopment Report 1997 emphasised that the state is capable,and indeed should perf ormthe role,of producing welfare-enhancing outcomes.As the text itself argues: ‘Andthere is agrowingrecognition that some neededpublic goods and services canonly be secured through international cooperation.Thus, building state capacity will meanbuilding more effective partnerships andinstitutions internationally as well asathome.’47 The report’s subtitle, TheState ina ChangingWorld ,was indicative ofa reversal led byJosephStiglitz, until December1999 the much-discussedchief economist and senior vice-president. 48 Thecontroversy surrounding Stiglitz’ s tenurein Wash- ingtonre ected the fact that, incomparison with most otherof cials inthe Bank andthe Fund,he appearedmore sympathetic towardsstriking abalancebetween market andstate andmore ambivalent aboutthe potential forunf ettered market forces.As such,his resignation also was predictable. Thus,the UN’sconceptualcontribution has altered the emphasis in the ‘good governance’debate of the mid-1980stomid-1990 s. Rescuingthe babyf romthe discardedbath water, today’ s debateabout good governance has movedaway froma visceral dismantling ofthe state. Incontrast with narrowereconomic liberalisation programmesin vogueearlier, political liberalisation programmesof the late 1990s(with greater emphasis onleadership andmanagement as well as democracy,human rights, rule oflaw, access to justice andbasic freedoms)have weakenedthe forceof arguments by proponentsof a ‘minimalist state’. Whereas the original debateabout good governance was cast as the antithesis of state-dominated economicand social developmentof previous decades, today’ s is less aboutjettisoning state institutions thanimproving and ref ormingthe functioningof democratic institutions, includingthe ‘deepening’of democracy andexploring more active andcreative roles fornon-state actors. Leadersare beingheld to higherstandards ofaccountability, and they have to contendwith 803 THOMAS GWEISS the forces ofglobalisation. But there is less faith ina blanketprescription toroll backthe state. TheWorld Bank’ s publishedstance presupposeswhat is ‘good’and what is ‘notgood’ governance. 49 Inworking to remove‘ politics’from the debate(its charter supposedlyprecludes directly addressingpolitical issues), the Bank’s position ongovernance is preoccupiedwith publicsector management,the reductionof transaction costs andcontract enforcement.These issues are certainly linkedto sustainable humandevelopment but are notframed as central to aconceptionof and strategy forgovernance that as apriority seeks to maximise local participation in addressingthe most pressing needsin agiven community.In contrast, the UNDP’sandthe UNsystem’s evolvinghuman developmentapproach to governance exhibits relatively greater supportfor empowerment—that is, providingthe tools ofdemocracy and freedom that are integral to the political andcivic dimensions ofgovernance. The Bank may not beadverseto these issues buttreats them as secondorder concerns, or ‘tag on’s’ , that are notvaluable in andof themselves butrather desirable insofar as they contributeto efciency and growth. Under the newpolitical economyof the 1970sand1980s, political rationality amongpolicy makers was emphasised as avariation onthe neoclassical theme ofeconomic rationality. This theme greatly inuenced the crafting ofthe international nancial institutions’( IFIs) gover- nancepriorities ofthe 1980sand1990s aimed at increasing economicef ciency and growth. Since the early 1990s UNDP has begunshifting awayfrom traditional public sector management(particularly civil service reform)and modest decentralis- ation programmesto addressingsuch sensitive governanceareas as human rights, legislative support,judicial reformand corruption. Responding to the growthin transitional democracies, UNDP’semphasis onelectoral assistance has providedan entry point to dealingwith this ‘newgeneration’ of governance projects. With resources to pursuethis agenda,other f actors also contributedto UNDP’sgrowinginvolvement: f ewerideological tensions since the endof the ColdWar; agrowingconsensus about the needfor such political reforms; better information ows; anddissatis faction with,and continual decreases in,traditional developmentassistance. 50 Thenew frontiers ofgovernance policy and support for institution building requiretrust anda perceivedneutral position in atarget country.Capacity buildingfor civil society andthe private sector meanthat the UNsystem has a comparativeadvantage in manydeveloping countries in relationship to the IFIs. The UNDP’sapproachto governance will continueto di ffer fromthat ofthe Bretton Woodsinstitutions’ as longas theyview ‘ goodgovernance’ in terms of strict political andeconomic conditionality. Given UNDP’srole as the lead UN agencyin the eld andas aprominentcontributor to UNpolicydebates, it is likely that the rest ofthe UNsystem will graduallyadopt UNDP’s brand of governance.This argumenthas particular salience after the 1999establishment ofa GovernanceDivision, along with the enthusiasm forthis topic ofthe new Administrator, MarkMalloch Brown. Weare movingtowards common ground that goodgovernance does not necessarily meanless butsometimes moreappropriate government. There is no 804 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE needto resurrect the follyof the stereotypical hyperactivestate ofthe 1960sand 1970s. However,we requireprocesses orrules ofdecision makingthat are more likely toresult inactions that are truly inthe publicinterest, rather than favouringthe private exploitation ofthe publicinterest. Thereis aneedto balancethe role ofgovernment and other political andeconomic institutions with functioningmarkets. Morethan occasionally, a countervailingpower to market externalities is required.And the onlycandidate is the state. Thecentral challengeis notto halt the expansionof the market butto establish properrules andinstitutions sothat the benets ofgrowth are morewidely bene cial. Thethird and nal substantive criticism fromthe UnitedNations is the need to introducesubtlety intothe infatuation with democracyand democratisation as surrogates forgood governance. The argument that individualpolitical rights and democratisation gohand-in-handwith goodgovernance is notwrong. But it has beenexpanded to reect economicand social rights as part ofa comprehensive ‘package’.51 Inshort, the initial debateover good governance was concernedless with improvingthe political leadership ofdemocracy and integrating economicand social goals (egthrough the initiation ofmore active andcreative roles for non-state actors) thanwith reversingdecades of state-dominated economicand social development.Now that the state’s role has comeinto question, the emphasis in UNcircles has changed.Going beyond the largely emptyCold War clash between‘ rst’(political andcivil right) and‘ secondgeneration’ (economic andsocial) rights, UNHighCommissioner forHuman Rights andformer Irish President MaryRobinson continually emphasises integration ofeconomic and social welfare into the bundleof goods that anywell governedsociety must have.52 Assuch,good governance can also entail improvementsin governmental institutions andsound development management. As BøaÊ s writes, ‘State and civil society are constituted throughiterated interaction, andthe governance produced(bad or good) is anoutcome of this process’. 53 Mahbubul Haqwent furtherstill towardsthe endof his life. Maintaining that ‘the conceptof good governancehas so far failed to match the radicalism ofthe notionof human development’, 54 researchers at his centre inIslamabad launchedan inclusive and ambitious idea,‘ humanegovernance’ . This denition includes goodpolitical, economic and civic governance. Humanegovernance involves those structures andprocesses that supportthe creation ofa participatory,responsive and accountable polity (that is, good political governance)embedded in a competitive, non-discriminatory,yet equi- table economy(that is, goodeconomic governance). This requires the resources contributedby people to be ploughed back to serve their ownbasic human needs,which will inturn expand the opportunitiesopen to them; peoplemust be giventhe ability to self-organise (that is, goodcivic governance).Bounded togetherby such principles as ‘ownership’, ‘decency’, and‘ accountability’, the componentsof humane governance are inextricably linked. Thehost ofde nitions earlier in this essay suggests the importanceof ideas. Governanceand its prescriptive partnerof good governance have elicited not onlycommentary by scholars anddevelopment practitioners butalso policy changesby national governmentsand international fundingagencies. The forces 805 THOMAS GWEISS ofdemocratisation andglobalisation are pressuring‘ goodgovernance’ proponents to reorient their priorities fromthe exigencies ofeconomic growth and efciency to those governancepolicies andinstitutions that best promotegreater freedom,genuine participation andsustainable humandevelopment. It is onthis fundamentalpoint that thinkingat the UNis currentlyahead of the curve, comparedwith the conventionalwisdom in the corridorsof the Washington- based IFIs. Ironically,the UNwouldprobably not have moved so quicklywithout the sea changein world politics after the endof the ColdWar and without pressure fromdonors. Theconceptual and operational battles aboutgovernance and good governance are afewdecades old, but the journeyto exploreglobal governance has just begun.It is hardlysurprising thenthat the debateis moreinchoate than the one aboutgovernance within countries.Thus far, the commentaryfrom academics andpractitioners has led tomore heat thanlight— there is noconsensus about desirable changesin policyor discourse. It is important,however, that the intellectual trek has started. It is tothis story that wenow turn.

Globalgovernance At the same time that most ofEurope adopts the Euroand moves toward a commondefence and security policy,how can the formerYugoslavia implode? Rosenauinvented the term ‘fragmegration’to capturethe confusionin the simultaneous integration andfragmentation of societal interactions andauthority patterns.55 Moreover,burgeoning information, communication, market, nance, networkingand business activities are producinga worldin which patterns are extremely difcult todiscern. This has notslowed publications andspeculations. Oneanalyst has goneso far asto quipthat ‘wesay “governance”because we don’t really knowwhat to call whatis goingon’ . 56 Therubric of ‘ globalgovernance’ is akinto ‘ post-coldwar’ , whichsigni es that oneperiod has endedbut that wedo not as yet havean accurate short-handto depict the essential dynamicsof the newepoch. Analysts are understandablyuncomfortable with the traditional frameworksand vocabu- lary usedto describe international relations; today’s conceptualtools are elemen- tary. Inspite ofvagueness in ongoingscholarly andpolicy debates, the application ofthe notionof governance to the globewas the natural result ofmounting evidencethat the international system was nolongercomposed simply ofstates, butrather that the worldwas undergoingfundamental change. Although such actors as the Catholic Church,General Motors andthe International Committee ofthe RedCross ( ICRC)are hardlynew to the Westphalian system, the proliferation ofnon-state actors andtheir growingimportance and power is a distinctive feature ofcontemporary world affairs. 57 Globalgovernance invokes shi ftingthe location ofauthority in the contextof integration andf ragmentation.Rosenau describes the process as ‘apervasive tendency… in whichmajor shifts in the location ofauthority and the site of controlmechanisms are underway on every continent, shifts that are as pronouncedin economic and social systems as theyare inpolitical systems’. 58 806 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Theessential challengefor international co-operationjumps outfrom the title of his edited volume, GovernanceWithout Government .Mobilising supportfrom the bottomup involves increasing the skills andcapacities ofindividuals and altering the horizonsof identi cation in patterns ofglobal li fe.Elsewhere, Rosenaucharacterises globalgovernance as ‘systems ofrule at all levels of humanactivity— from the family to the international organization—inwhich the pursuit ofgoals throughthe exercise ofcontrol has transnational repercus- sions’.59 OranYoung has arguedthat the valueof the conceptis that identiable social practices canbe envisaged and sometimes undertakento improveecon- omic,social andenvironmental performance even without the formal institutions capableof authoritatively takingaction. 60 Thephenomenal economic expansion and technological progress of the 1990s havenot bene ted the world’s citizens equally.The unevenness of the economic playing eld andthe powerof players onit is evident.Using the three essential componentsof the humandevelopment idea— equality ofopportunity, sustain- ability andempowerment of people— ableaker picture emerges from UNDP and otherUN reports thanfrom conventional wisdom. For instance, incomeper capita andaverage purchasing power in some 100countries was lowerin 1994 thanin the 1980s; in 70it was actually lowerthan in the 1970s, andin 35lower thanin the 1960s. 61 If informationtechnologies are drivinggrowth or are a prerequisite forit, the increasing concentrationof income, resources andwealth amongpeople, corporations and countries doesnot bode well. Therichest 20% ofthe world’s populationliving in the wealthiest countries accountfor over 93% ofinternet users while the bottom2 0%accountfor only 0. 2percent. 62 Globalisation is neither uniformnor homogeneous, but it is indisputably accelerating the paceand intensity ofeconomic and social interactions at all levels. Althoughglobalisation has alonghistory, 63 its present manifestation is fundamentallydi fferent in scale, intensity andform f romwhat preceded. As DavidHeld and others haveput it, ‘Contemporaryglobalization represents the beginningof a newepoch in humanaff airs …as profoundan impact as the Industrial Revolutionand the globalempires ofthe nineteenthcentury’ . 64 Students andprofessors, policy analysts andpractitioners shouldnot feel uncomfortableabout admitting their uneasiness andignorance about understand- ingthe details ofthe contemporarypolitical economy,and especially notabout the best wayto address abewilderingarray of global problems. As such,the logical linkbetween the patterns ofgovernance at the national andglobal levels lies in solvingthe collective action puzzleto providepublic goods.‘ Inboth modern domestic political systems andthe moderninternational system, the state has beenthe keystructural arenawithin which collective action has beensituated andundertaken’ , observesPhilip Cerny.And as aresult ofa multiplicity ofinteractions, ‘the authority,legitimacy, policymaking capacity, andpolicy-implementing effectiveness ofthe state will beeroded and under- minedboth within andwithout’ . 65 Globalisation has profoundconsequences for the natureof collective action in bothdomestic andinternational politics. Cerny arguesthat, as market activity intensies andeconomic organisation becomes increasingly complex,the institutional scale ofpolitical structures is nolonger capableof providing a suitable rangeof public goods. In eff ect, economic 807 THOMAS GWEISS globalisation is underminingthe effectiveness ofstate-based collective action, whichwas extremely weakin the rst place.Although the state remains a cultural force,its effectiveness as acivil association has declined.The result may bea crisis oflegitimacy. State-based collective action has notreached its end, butit is signicantly different fromin the past. Althoughrealists andidealists whoanalyse international organisations dis- agreeabout many issues, theyagree that the state system is ‘anarchic’. Whatever the framers ofthe UNCharter hadin mind,and whatever Keynes and his colleagues imaginedat Bretton Woods,nothing like anoverarching authority for either the highpolitics ofinternational peaceand security orthe lowpolitics of economicand social developmenthas emerged. Inone essential aspect then,‘ globalgovernance’ is quite distinct fromgood orbadgovernance at the national level. A‘good’(that is, accountable,ef cient, lawful,representative andtransparent) governmentusually leads to goodgovernance,while badgovernance is closely correlated witha conspicuouslybad government.Prescriptions toimprove policy and decision making ownaturally, albeit controversially,from adjusting boththe potential contributionof the state as agentand the rules ofthe economicand social gameso that morecontribu- tions tothe publicgood can be teased fromnon-state actors. Themerits ofmore orless interventionist stances canbe debated,but there is at least aprimaryand identiable sovereignagent at the helm. Thereis nosuch actor forthe planet.Although the glass clearly is less full thanwe would like, MarkZacher reminds us that the modest orderin today’ s international economicsystem results frominternational efforts: ‘Inshort, withoutthese andother regimes andpublic goods generated by the UNsystem, it wouldtruly be“ ajungleout there’ . 66 At the same time, the conceptualand operationalchallenges ofglobal governance are formidable. Werequire a term to signify the reality that there has neverbeen a world government,and there undoubtedlynever will beone.Thus, at boththe country andglobal levels, governanceencompasses morethan government. But as there is nogovernmentat the globallevel, ofwhat utility is the notion?Is it, as Brian Urquhartonce quipped, like the grinningbut bodyless Cheshire cat in Alice in Wonderland,anagreeable notion because it is withoutsubstance? Globalgovernance should perhaps be seen asaheuristic deviceto capture and describe the confusingand seemingly ever-accelerating transformation ofthe international system. States are central buttheir authorityis erodingin important ways.Their creations, intergovernmentalorganisations, are nomore in control thanthey ever were. Local and international NGOsare proliferating andgaining authorityand resources. And technological developments are increasing the wherewithalof corporations and criminal groups.Within this context,collective action problemsassociated with the provisionof global public goods have becomeeven more of a challenge,conceptual and practical, thanis their provisionin the national setting. Purposefulactivity forthe planet necessitates aconceptualframework to capturethe reality that supranationalcontrol or even countervailing power are notoperational concepts for the time being.Ironically weare noteven closer thanwe were in 1945.One prominent group of economists has observedthat 808 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

‘international institutions haveweakened precisely at atime whenglobal interdependencehas increased’. 67 ‘Butwho plays the role ofthe development- orientedstate in the globaleconomy?’ Canadian economist GerryHelleiner askedthe SecondCommittee ofthe GeneralAssembly. ‘ Today’s global nancial world… is utterly different fromthat facingthe original architects ofthe Bretton Woodssystem in 1944’. 68 It is humblingto realise that evena relatively powerfulinstitution like the IMF is notthe globalmonetary manager that it was supposedto be.It is apale imitation ofthe institution forwhich Keynes was sucha passionate advocate. Instead ofreserves equalto half ofworld imports, the IMF’sliquidity equals less than2% of global imports. Insuch a world,proponents and theorists ofglobal governance face enormous difculties in makinghard-hitting policy prescriptions. Inthe face ofanarchy, whatmechanisms shouldbe primarily responsible forglobal governance? Is there awayto structure areasonablemeasure ofco-ordination and co-operation amonggovernments, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations andthe private sector that wouldconstitute meaningful,or at least improved,patterns ofglobal governance? If it is the productof purposeful decisions andgoal-orientated behaviour, how can global governance exist in the absenceof a clear consensusabout goals? Towhat extent doesglobal gover- nancedepend on shared values andnorms? Onecommon reaction, especially amongrepresentatives ofgovernments, is to fall backon familiar waysof thought by attempting torecapture the ‘goodold days’of state-centric authority.Russian andChinese reactions in the Security Counciljoin those ofdeveloping countries there andin the UNGeneral Assembly intrying to emphasise the centrality ofthe state andforestall erosions ofits prerogatives.The US reliance uponexceptionalism andunilateralism withinthe multilateral system is anotherillustration ofrelated rearguardim- pulses.69 Sovereigntyis notdead, but it is hardlyas sacrosanct as it oncewas. In attempting to protest toomuch, governmental representatives are highlighting daily in international forathe extent towhich contemporary authority patterns are in uxand quite different fromthose ofthe past. Thevisceral resistance to changeamong governments and intergovernmental secretariats contrasts markedlywith the greater agility ofmost businesses and NGOs. Thereis no philosophicaljusti cation orconstitutional specication that assigns the highest formof authority to states, butrepresentatives fromnational governmentsact as if there were. Otheranalysts seek torecapture the nai¨vete´ofthe periodjust beforeand after the endof World War Two, when intergovernmental organisations were panaceasthat wouldmake the worldsaf efromboth war and economic recession. LarryFinkelstein, forinstance, sees globalgovernance as ‘doinginternationally whatgovernments do at home’. 70 But his formulationfails to specify the agents that are supposedto accomplish globallythe numeroustasks that governments donationally. Neither ourunderstanding nor our problem-solving efforts are anylonger served,as Rosenaucautions, ‘ byclinging to the notionthat states andnational 809 THOMAS GWEISS governmentsare the essential underpinningsof the world’s organization’. 71 With anincreasing diffusionof authority and a correspondingloss ofcontrol, states andthe intergovernmentalorganisations created bythem are nolonger always the onlyor even the most important players onthe worldstage. Dependingon the issue, memberstates retain manyattributes ofsovereignty, but they are past their prime andshare the spotlight with numerousother actors. Interestingly enough,the Commission onGlobal Governance was composed of28 commissioners whoseprofessional experienceswere almost exclusively within governmentsand intergovernmental secretariats. Theywere clear about notadvocating a worldgovernment or even world federalism. Inthe light of their backgrounds,it is noteworthythat globalgovernance for the members of the commission doesnot mean a single model,nor even a single structure orset ofstructures. Instead,‘ it is abroad,dynamic, complex process ofinteractive decision-makingthat is constantly evolvingand responding to changingcircum- stances’.72 Globalgovernance implies awideand seemingly ever-growingrange ofactors in everydomain. Global economic and social affairs havetraditionally beenviewed as embracingprimarily intergovernmentalrelationships, butin- creasingly theymust bef ramedin comprehensive enough terms to embracelocal andinternational NGOs, grassroots andcitizens’ movements, multinational corporations andthe globalcapital market. Thereis onenotable similarity to democratisation atthe national level because moreinclusive andparticipatory— hence, truly ‘democratic’— mechanisms for consultations andultimately governancemust becreated at the globallevel as well. Theyshould be malleable enoughto respondto anever-changing environment.There is acrucial similarity inthe reasoningof both theorists like Rosenau andpractitioners like the members ofthe Commission onGlobalGovernance to distinguish ‘governance’from ‘ government’. Atthe globallevel there canbe no single modelor form, nor even a single structure orset ofstructures. Forthe moment,we are unableeven to describe accurately all the dimensions ofinternational economicand social interactions—what Rosenau has aptly describedas causal chains that ‘followcrazy-quilt patterns’. 73 Theproverbial bottomline is: there is noclear-cut equivalentat the globallevel to the national prescriptions ofdemocratisation andeconomic liberalisation as the constituent componentsof humane governance.

Conclusion Inlight ofits universality andscope, the UNwill havea special role,albeit not amonopoly,on future leadership forglobal governance. One group of UN watchers was supportiveof the worldorganisation’ s involvement.They ‘ saw globalgovernance— both in terms ofthe playing eld andthe players—as laggingbehind globalization, and there was broadconsensus that the United Nations shouldhave a signicant, but as yet undened, role in “bridgingthe gap” ’.74 If this is tobe the case, the UNsystem shoulddo better thanin the past inswimming against the powerful currents oforthodoxy. As AmartyaSen, the 1998Nobel laureate in economicswho has playeda major intellectual role within the outside the UnitedNations, prods us to recall at the dawnof the 810 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE twenty-rst century:‘ Theneed f orcritical scrutiny ofstandard preconceptions andpolitical – economicattitudes has neverbeen stronger’ . 75 Within this context,intergovernmental organisations, both universal and regional,should be strengthened. This is the most constant refrain throughout overhalf acenturyof the UN’sstewardship overeconomic and social ideas. Thereis ofcourse more than a dollopof institutional self-interest behindthis conviction.But moreimportant is the dramatic reality that some countervailing poweris requiredto offset the excesses ofa decentralised system ofstates pursuingtheir national interests in combinationwith the private sector pursuing individualgains. Theneed f ora morecohesive and effective multilateral system is logical and evident.At the same time that alongingfor a monolithic andtop-down view of governanceis comprehensible,it seems misplaced inan increasingly decentralised world.At ahistorical juncturewhen both problems and solutions transcendnational bordersand there is nolikelihood of a central sovereign,the decibel level ofcalls frominternationalists tostrengthen intergovernmental institutions is understandablyloud but ultimately wistful.We should think creatively aboutways to poolthe collective strengths andavoid the collective weaknesses ofgovernments, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and global civil society. This ironyis behindthe UN’sconveningof the Millennium Assembly in September2 000 76 andthe growingemphases onthe private sector and NGOs by the last twosecretaries-general. 77 Paradoxically,this is the conceptualand operationalchallenge f orproponents of global governance and of the UNin the light ofa changingworld political economy. 78

Notes 1 Iam gratefulto Kevin Ozgercin andRichard Ponzio for their assistance inresearching this essay. Parts of theargument will appear inLouis Emmerij, RichardJolly & ThomasG Weiss, Aheadof the Curve? UN Ideasand Global Challenges ,Bloomington,IN: IndianaUniversity Press, forthcoming2001, ch 8. 2 Morten BøaÊ s,‘ Governanceas multilateralbank policy: the cases ofthe African DevelopmentBank and the Asian DevelopmentBank’ , EuropeanJournal of Development Research ,10(2), 1998, pp 117 – 134. 3 See, forexample, Dan Bawley, CorporateGovernance and Accountability: What Role for the Regulator, Director, andAuditor ?,Westport,CT: Quorum, 1999); OECD, CorporateGovernance: Improving Competi- tiveness andAccess toCapital in Global Markets: A Reportto the OECD, Paris: OECD,1998;Fred J Weston, Takeovers, Restructuring,and Corporate Governance ,UpperSaddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1998; Donald H Chew, Studiesin International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems: AComparisonof the US, Japan,and Europe ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1997;Margaret MBlair, Ownershipand Control: RethinkingCorporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century ,Washington,DC: Brookings Institution, 1995;and US Congress, CorporateGovernance: Hearing Before theSubcommittee on Telecommunications andFinance of the Committee onEnergy and Commerce, Houseof Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session,April 21, 1993 ,Washington,DC: USGovernmentPrinting Of ce, 1994. 4 See GoranHyden, ‘ Governanceand the study of politics’ , inGo ¨ranHyden & MichaelBratton (eds), Governanceand Politics in Africa ,Boulder,CO: LynneRienner, 1992, pp 1 – 26. 5 Commissionon Global Governance, OurGlobal Neighbourhood ,Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1995, p 2. 6 James NRosenau,‘ Governancein the Twenty-First Century’ , GlobalGovernance ,1,(1) 1995, p 14. 7 Since1995 Lynne Rienner Publishers has, in cooperation with the Academic Councilon theUnited Nations Systemand the UN University,published the journal GlobalGovernance .The rst issue contained contributionsby thenSecretary-General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali and his Special Representative on Internally 811 THOMAS GWEISS

Displaced Persons,Francis M Deng,as well as articles byRosenau and three youngeracademics. The Commissionon Global Governance was chairedby Sonny Ramphal and Ingmar Carlsson and published the views ofthe eminent practitioners on it (see note1) in 1995. In addition, see James NRosenauand Ernst-OttoCzempiel (eds), Governancewithout Government: Order andChange in World Politics , Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1992;Jan Kooiman(ed), ModernGovernance: New Government – SocietyInteractions ,London:Sage, 1993; Mihaly Simai, TheFuture of Global Governance: Managing Risk andChange in the International System ,Washington,DC: USInstituteof Peace, 1994;Meghnad Desai & PaulRedfern (eds), GlobalGovernance: Ethics and Economics of the World Order ,London:Pinter, 1995; RichardFalk, OnHumane Governance ,UniversityPark, PA: Penn State Press, 1995;Paul F Diehl(ed), The Politicsof Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World ,BoulderCO: LynneRienner, 1997; Martin Hewson & TimothyJ Sinclair(eds), Approachesto Global Governance Theory,Albany,NY: State Universityof New York,1999; and Errol E Harris &James AYunker(eds), TowardGenuine Global Governance: Critical Re ection to Our Global Neighbourhood ,Westport,CT: Praeger,1999. In addition, numerous publications from international agencies haveused the concept in their titlesand analyses. See, forexample, World Bank, Governanceand Development ,Washington,DC: World Bank,1992; and UN DevelopmentProgramme, TheShrinking State: Governance and Human Development inEastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States , New York: UNDP, 1997. 8 JohnMaynard Keynes, TheGeneral Theory of Employment, Interest andMoney ,London:Macmillan, 1936, p 383. 9 Foran important contemporary investigation of the role of ideas, see JudithGoldstein 8 RobertO Keohane (eds), Ideasand Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1993.See alsoNgaire Woods,‘ Economicideas andInternational Relations: beyond rational neglect, InternationalStudies Quarterly ,39,1995, pp 161 – 180. 10 BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, AnAgenda for Peace ,New York:United Nations, 1992, paragraph 17. 11 World Bank, Governance,The World Bank’ s Experience ,Washington,DC: TheWorld Bank, 1994, p xiv. 12 UNDP, Governancefor Sustainable Human Development , New York: UNDP, 1997, pp 2–3. 13 OECD, ParticipatoryDevelopment and Good Governance , Paris: OECD, 1995, p 14. 14 See: http://infoweb.magi.com/ , igvn. 15 Commissionon GlobalGovernance, OurGlobal Neighbourhood ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1995, p 2. 16 See http://www.soc.titech.ac.jp/uem/governance.html. 17 See http://www.britcoun.org/governance/ukpgov.html. 18 See http://www.soc.titech.ac.jp/uem/governance.html. 19 See, forexample, Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘ Directlyunproductive, pro t seeking( DUP)activities’, Journal of PoliticalEconomy ,90(5), 1982, pp 988 –1002;JM Buchanan,RD Tollison& GTullock(eds), Toward a Theoryof the Rent-Seeking Society ,CollegeStation TX: Texas A&M UniversityPress, 1980;Anthony Downs, AnEconomic Theory of Democracy ,New York:Harper andRow, 1957; Douglas North, Structure andChange in Economic History ,New York:Norton, 1981 North, Institutions,Institutional Change, and EconomicPerformance ,New York:Cambridge University Press, 1990;Gustav Ranis & TPaulSchultz (eds), TheState of Development Economics ,Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1982; and S Wellisz &RFindlay, ‘Thestate andthe Invisible Hand’ , WorldBank Research Observer , 3, no (1),1988, pp 59 –80. 20 See, forexample, Francis Fukuyama, Trust:The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity , New York: Free Press, 1995;and Robert Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti, MakingDemocracy Work: Civic Traditionsin Modern Italy ,PrincetonNJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993. 21 See, forexample, Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg& Marc Stern, GlobalPublic Goods: International Cooperationin the 21st Century ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1999;Ruben Mendez, International PublicFinance ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1992;Mancur Olson, TheLogic of Collective Choice , Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1965;and Olsom TheRise andDecline ofNations: Economic GrowthStag ation, and Social Rigidities ,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1982. 22 Thissummary was adaptedfrom Ronald Findlay, ‘ Thenew politicaleconomy: its explanatory power for LDCs’in Gerald MMeier (ed), Politicsand Policy Making in Developing Countries ,SanFrancisco: ICS Press, 1991,p 13. 23 FrancisM Deng& Terrence Lyons,‘ Promotingresponsible sovereignty in Africa’ , inDeng & Lyons(eds), AfricanReckoning: A Quest forGood Governance ,Washington,DC: BrookingsInstitution, 1998, p 1. 24 See Nassau Adams, WorldsApart: The North – SouthDivide andthe International System ,London:Zed Books,1997. 25 See Eric Helleiner, Statesand the Re-emergence ofGlobal Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s , Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1994.For a discussionof the importance of international institutions intransmitting ideas thatin part sustain the dominant order, see RobertW Coxwith Timothy Sinclair, Approachesto World Order ,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996. 26 World Bank, Accelerated Developmentin Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action ,Washington,DC: WorldBank, 1981. 812 GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

27 World Bank, Sub-SaharanAfrica: From Crisis toSustainable Growth ,Washington,DC: World Bank, 1989. ForAfrican responses,see GoranHyden, Dele Oluwu& HastingsOketh Ogendo, AfricanPerspectives on Governance,Trenton,NJ: Africa WorldPress, 2000. 28 EnricoAugelli & CraigMurphy, America’s Quest forSupremacy and the Third World ,London:Pinter, 1988, p 184. 29 GoranHyden, ‘ Sovereignty,responsibility, and accountability: challenges at thenational level in Africa’ , in Deng& Lyons, AfricanReckoning , p 38. 30 Samuel P.Huntington, TheThird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (OklahomaCity, UK: Universityof Oklahoma Press, 1991. 31 See ThomasG Weiss, International NGOs,Global Governance, and Social Policy in the UN System , GASPP Occasional PaperNo 3, Helsinki: Stakes, March 1999; and Thomas G Weiss &LeonGordenker. (eds), NGOs,the UN, and Global Governance ,Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, originally published as aspecial issue of ThirdWorld Quarterly , 16 no (3),1995. There isan ever-growing literature in the past decade, and readers may wishto consult a few keypieces fromthat time. See BertrandSchneider, TheBarefoot Revolution:A Reportto the Club of Rome ,London:IT Publications,1988; David Korten, Gettingto the 21st Century:Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda ,West Hartford,CT: Kumarian, 1990; Paul Wapner, EnvironmentalActivism andWorld Civic Politics ,New York,State Universityof New YorkPress, 1996; Peter Willetts(ed), ‘ TheConscience of the World’ : TheIn uence ofNon-Governmental Organisations in the UN System,London:Hurst, 1996; Steve Charnowitz, ‘ Twocenturies of participation: NGOsandinternational governance’, MichiganJournal of International Law ,18(2), 1997, pp 183 – 286;and John Boli & George MThomas(eds). ConstructingWorld Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875 , Stanford,CT: Stanford University Press, 1999.See alsoalso UN Non-GovernmentalLiaison Service, The UnitedNations, NGOsandGlobal Governance: Challenges for the 21st Century , Geneva: NGLS, 1996. 32 Kalevi JHolsti, TheState, War, and the State of War ,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996,p 189. 33 Fora discussion,see ThomasG Weiss, ‘Thepolitics of humanitarian ideas’ , SecurityDialogue ,31(1)2000, pp 11– 23. 34 FrancisM Deng, Protectingthe Dispossessed: AChallengefor the International Community ,Washington, DC:Brookings institution, 1993; Deng et al, Sovereigntyas Responsibility ,Washington,DC: Brookings Institution,1995; and Deng, ‘ Frontiersof sovereignty’ , LeidenJournal of International Law ,8(2)1995 pp 249– 286.For more recent analyses andcase studies,see RobertaCohen & FrancisM Deng, Masses in Flight:The Global Crisis inDisplacement ,Washington,DC: Brookings, Institution, 1998; and Cohen & Deng (eds), TheForsaken People: Case Studiesof the Internally Displaced ,Washington,DC: Brookings Institution,1998. 35 See, forexample, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Con ict, PreventingDeadly Con ict , New York:Carnegie Corporation, 1997. 36 BøaÊ s,‘ Governanceas multilateralbank policy’ , quotesfrom p 120.Morten Bø aÊ s andDesmond McNeill are directinga research projectat theUniversity of Oslo that is seekingto trace thein uence ofgood governanceand three otherideas withinselected intergovernmentalorganisations. See theirforthcoming editedvolume, TheRole of Ideas in Multilateral Institutions . 37 James NRosenau,‘ Towardan ontology for global governance’ , inHewson & Sinclair, Approachesto GlobalGovernance Theory , p 296. 38 Boas,‘ Governanceas multilateralbank policy’ , p119. 39 UnitedNations Development Programme, HumanDevelopment Report 1990 ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1990and the subsequent yearly reports. Mahbub ul Haq’ s ownaccount of this effort is foundin Reections on Human Development ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1995. 40 See UNICEF, TheState of the World’ s Children1987 ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1987and the subsequentyearly reports. 41 GiovanniAndrea Cornia, Richard Jolly & Frances EStewart, Adjustmentwith a HumanFace , Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1987. 42 See UNHCR, TheState of the World’ s Refugees1993; The Challenge of Protection ,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1993; TheState of the World’ s Refugees1995: In Search of Solutions ,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1995;and TheState of the World’ s Refugees1997 –98:A HumanitarianAgenda , Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1997. 43 See, forexample, the expositions on poverty and health, respectively in World Bank, WorldDevelopment Report 1990,New York:Oxford University Press, 1990and WorldDevelopment Report 1993 , New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1993. 44 See StephenMarglin & JSchor, TheGolden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Post-War Experience , Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1990. 45 AntonioGramsci, Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks ,London:Lawrence andWishart, 1971, p 377. 46 UNDevelopmentProgramme, TheShrinking State , p 1. 47 World Bank, WorldDevelopment Report 1997: The State in a ChangingWorld ,New York:Oxford UniversityPress, 1997,p 131. 813 THOMAS GWEISS

48 See, forexample, Joseph Stiglitz, ‘ Redening the role of the state: whatshould it do? How should it do it? Andhow should these decisionsbe made?’ , http://www.worldbank.org. 49 See especially WorldBank, WorldDevelopment Report 1997 and WorldDevelopment Report 1992 , New York:Oxford University Press, 1992. 50 Remarks byThomas Carothers, from the Carnegie Endowment on International Peace, at UNDP’s Global ResidentRepresentatives Meeting,29 February 2000. 51 UNDP, HumanDevelopment Report 2000 ,New York:Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 52 See, forexample, Reportof the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ,UNdocument A/54/36,23 September 1999. 53 BøaÊ s,‘ Governanceas multilateralbank policy’ , p129. 54 TheMahbub ul Haq HumanDevelopment Centre, HumanDevelopment in South Asia 1999: The Crisis of Governance,Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1999,p 28. 55 James NRosenau,‘ “Fragmegrative”challenges to national security’ , inTerry Hens (ed), UnderstandingUS Strategy:A Reader ,Washington,DC: NationalDefense University,1983, pp 65 – 82. 56 Lawrence SFinkelstein,‘ Whatis globalgovernance?’ , GlobalGovernance ,1(3),1995, p 368. 57 Fora persuasivediscussion, see DavidHeld & AnthonyMcGrew withDavid Goldblatt & JonathanPeraton, GlobalTransformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture ,Stanford,CT: StanfordUniversity Press, 1999. 58 Rosenau,‘ Governancein the twenty- rst century’, p18. 59 Ibid, p 13. 60 Oran Young, InternationalGovernance: Protecting the Environment in a StatelessSociety ,(Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1994. 61 UNDP, HumanDevelopment Report 1996 ,Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996,p 3. 62 UNDP, HumanDevelopment Report 1999 ,Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1999,p 2. 63 Emma Rothschild,‘ Globalizationand the return of history’ , ForeignPolicy ,115,1999, pp 106 –116. 64 DavidHeld & AnthonyMcGrew withDavid Goldblatt & JonathanPeraton, ‘ Globalization’, Global Governance,5(4),1999, p 494.See alsoSimai, TheFuture of Global Governance , pp 349–354. 65 PhilipG Cerny,‘ Globalizationand the changing logic of collective action’ , InternationalOrganization , 49 (4),1995, pp 595, 621. 66 MarkW Zacher, TheUnited Nations and Global Commerce ,New York:United Nations, 1999, p 5. 67 Mahbubul Haq, Richard Jolly, Paul Streeten & KhadijaHaq (eds), TheUN andthe Bretton Woods Institutions ,London:Macmillan, 1995, p 13. 68 Gerry Helleiner,‘ Anew framework forglobal economic governance’ , speech tothe Second Committee of theGeneral Assembly,15 October 1999, p 2. 69 EdwardC Luck, MixedMessages: American Politics and International Organization 1919 –1999, Washing- ton,DC: Brookings Institution, 1999. 70 Finkelstein,‘ Whatis globalgovernance?’ , p369. 71 Rosenau,‘ Towardan ontology’ , p287.See alsoRosenau, TheUnited Nations in a TurbulentWorld , Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 1992. 72 Commissionon Global Governance, OurGlobal Neighbourhood , p 4. 73 Rosenau,‘ Towardan ontology’ , p293. 74 StanleyFoundation, GlobalGovernance: De ning the United Nations’ Leadership Role ,Muscatine,IA: StanleyFoundation, 1999; and report of the United Nations of the Next Decade Conference,Adare Manor, 13–18June 1999, p 15. 75 Amartya Sen, DevelopmentAs Freedom ,New York:Knopf, 1999, p 112. 76 Ko A Annan, ‘Wethe Peoples’ : TheRole of the United Nations in the 21st Century ,New York:United Nations,2000. 77 Forexample, see BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, ‘ Foreword’, inThomas G Weiss &LeonGordenker (eds), NGOs, theUN, and Global Governance ,Boulder,CO: LynneRienner, 1995, pp 7 – 12;and Ko Annan, Renewing theUnited Nations: A Programmefor Reform ,New York:United Nations, July 1997. 78 ThomasG Weiss, DavidP Forsythe& RogerA Coate, TheUnited Nations and Changing World Politics , Boulder,CO: Westview,forthcoming, esp ch10.

814