Pricing Policies for New Products
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The Industry-Technology Life Cycle: an Integrating Meta-Model?
THE INDUSTRY-TECHNOLOGY LIFE CYCLE: AN INTEGRATING META-MODEL? Robert U. Ayres International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Lazenburg, Austria RR-87-3 March 1987 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS Laxenburg, Austria International Standard Book Number 8-7045-0081-x Research Reports, which record research conducted at IIASA, are independently reviewed before publication. However, the views and opinions they express are not necessarily those of the Institute or the National Member Organizations that support it. Copyright @ 1987 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design by Martin Schobel Printed by Novographic, Vienna, Austria Summary This report attempts to answer a rather deep question: To what extent can "pure" economics explain economic growth and technological change? By "pure" economics, it is meant the relationships governing the behavior of abstract enti- ties, producing abstract products or services for sale in an idealized competitive market. Pure economics, in the above sense, admits R&D and innovations of an unspecified kind; it also admits improvements (unspecified) and learning curves or experience curves. The report concludes, however, that the dynamic behavior of the product "life cycle" in specific cases, and the observed clustering of innovations in partic- ular fields at particular times, with periods of rapid progress followed by slow- downs, can only by explained by also taking into account the preexisting state of technology, and the laws of nature. -
Innovation Adoption and the Product Life Cycle
INNOVATION ADOPTION AND THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE Charlie Karlsson Umeå Economic Studies No. 185 UNIVERSITY OF UMEÅ 1988 INNOVATION ADOPTION AND THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE Charlie Karlsson AKADEMISK AVHANDLING som för avläggande av ekonomie doktorsexamen vid samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Umeå universitet framlägges till offentlig granskning torsdagen den 6 oktober 1988 kl 13.00 i hörsal C, samhällsvetarhuset. INNOVATION ADOPTION AND THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE Charlie Karlsson Umeå Economic Studies No. 185 UNIVERSITY OF UMEÅ 1988 *The research that is reported here and which is the result of a co-operation between the Regional Science Research Unit at the University of Karlstad and CERUM has been supported financially chiefly by The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (Grant Dnr 84/266). Author and title Karlsson, Charlie (1988). Innovation Adoption and the Product Life Cycle. Umeå Economic Studies No. 185, 232 pages. Abstract The objective of the study is to present a number of hypotheses concerning (i) the adoption of innovations for product and process development within enterprises (establishments), (ii) the spatial diffusion of innovations, and (iii) the adoption of applications of information technology to automate the production processes within enterprises (establishments), and to test these hypotheses empirically by means of econometric methods, using a data base containing primary data from several regions in Sweden on the adoption of different applications of information technology at the establishment level. The study has two main parts; the theoretical foundation and the empirical results. In the theoretical part of the study product and process development by means of new innovations is discussed within the general framework provided by the product life cycle theory. -
Post-Keynesian Economics - Challenging the Neo-Classical Mainstream
Munich Personal RePEc Archive Post-Keynesian Economics - Challenging the Neo-Classical Mainstream Heise, Arne University of Hamburg 2019 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/99280/ MPRA Paper No. 99280, posted 27 Mar 2020 08:06 UTC Post-Keynesian Economics – Challenging the Neo-Classical Mainstream Arne Heise University of Hamburg Department of Socioeconomics VMP 9 20146 Hamburg [email protected] Abstract This article takes an in-depth look at post-Keynesianism as a paradigmatic alter- native to the dominant neoclassical mainstream. It quickly becomes clear that post-Keynesianism is not a unified school of thought, but rather an assortment of theoretical approaches that share certain methodological and epistemological similarities and characteristic postulates. The Article does not attempt to describe the full array of Kaleckian, Kaldorian and Sraffian variants of post-Keynesian theory but instead analysis the paradigmatic and formal structure of one particu- lar form of post-Keynesianism, the monetary theory of production in order to re- construct these characteristic postulates from the axiomatic core of post- Keynesianism. It then sets out the theory of market participation, an alternative theory of economic policy that builds on monetary production economics. JEL codes: B 41, B 50, B 59, E 11, E 12, E 60 Keywords: post-Keynesianism, heterodox economics, neoclassical economics, paradigms 1 1. Introduction – is there any such thing as (the) post-Keynesianism? The challenge of how to describe the body of thought generally known as post- Keynesianism can be approached in very different ways. You could point out that post-Keynesian work is not situated within any unifying paradigmatic framework; rather, there is a series of different approaches with different founding figures: John Maynard Keynes, Michał Kalecki, Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson, Piero Sraffa and Hyman P. -
Small Enterprise and Oligopoly; a Study of the Butter, Flour, Automobile, and Glass Container Industries
Small Enterprise and Oligopoly A Study of the Butter, Flour, Automobile, and Glass Container Industries HAROLD G. VATTER OREGON STATE COLLEGE CORVALLIS, OREGON, PRINTED AT THE COLLEGE PRESS. 1955. OREGON STATE MONOGRAPHS STUDIES IN BOTANY No. 1. Tuberales of North America, By Helen M. Gilkey, Ph.D., Professor of Botany; Curator of Herbarium $0.50 No. 2. Developmental Morphology of Alpova, By S. M. Zeller, Ph.D., Plant Pathologist .35 No. 3. Paleoecology of Two Peat Deposits on the Oregon Coast, By Henry P. Hansen, Ph.D., Professor of Botany ....... ..... .50 No. 4. Moss Flora of the Willamette Valley, Oregon, By Clara J. Chapman, M.S., Graduate Assistant, and Ethel I. Sanborn, Ph.D., Professor of Botany .50 No. 5. Floral Anatomy of the Santalaceae and Some Related Forms, By Frank H. Smith, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Botany, and Elizabeth C. Smith, Ph.D. .50 No. 6. Septoria Disease of Gramineae in Western United States, By Roderick Sprague, Ph.D., Pathologist 1.50 No. 7. Clavaria, the Species Known from Oregon and the Pacific Northwest, By Maxwell S. Doty, Ph.D., Department of Botany, Northwestern University .75 No. 8. The Marine Algae of the Coos Bay-Cape Arago Region of Oregon, By Ethel I. Sanborn, Ph.D., Professor of Botany and Pa leo botany, and Maxwell S. Doty, Ph.D., Department of Botany, Northwestern University .75 No. 9. Northwestern American Plants, By Helen M. Gilkey, Ph.D., Professor of Botany, Curator of Herbarium .75 No. 10. Species of Selenophoma on North American Grasses, By Roderick Sprague, Ph.D., Pathologist, and A. -
Lecture Notes on Pricing
Sloan School of Management 15.013 – Industrial Economics for Strategic Decisions Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Robert S. Pindyck Lecture Notes on Pricing (August 2010) These lecture notes cover a number of topics related to strategic pricing. I begin with a discussion of markup pricing. In 15.010, you saw how the profit-maximizing price-cost margin is inversely related to the firm’s price elasticity of demand. (If you have forgotten this, go back and reread Chapter 10 of Pindyck & Rubinfeld, Microeconomics.) But how does one obtain an estimate of the firm’s price elasticity of demand? We will see how this can be done in the simple Cournot model, and we will also see how a linear approximation to a general demand curve can be used to simplify the entire pricing problem. Next, I turn to product line pricing. We discussed this briefly in the context of pricing and bundling complementary products; here, we will go into it in more detail. Afterwards, I turn to pricing in markets with strong network externalities. First, we will see how the markup pricing rule can be adjusted to account for a positive or negative network externality. Second, we will examine dynamic pricing policies. In particular, how should one set price when competing with a firm in a “winner-take-all” market? If the firm currently has a small market share, should it lower its price aggressively to try to capture more market share from the leading firm, or maintain a high price and lets its market share dwindle further. Finally, I will discuss some of the issues that arise with long-term contracting. -
Dynamic Optimization of an Oligopoly Model of Advertising Ashutosh
Dynamic Optimization of an Oligopoly Model of Advertising Ashutosh Prasad1, Suresh P. Sethi The University of Texas at Dallas November 2003 1 Corresponding author. Tel.: 972-883-2027. Fax.: 972-883-2799. Email [email protected]. Dynamic Optimization of an Oligopoly Model of Advertising Abstract. We examine an oligopoly model of advertising competition where each firm’s market share depends on its own and its competitors’ advertising decisions. A differential game model is developed and used to derive the closed-loop Nash equilibrium under symmetric as well as asymmetric competition. We obtain explicit solutions under certain plausible conditions, and discuss the effects of an increase in the number of competing firms on advertising expenditure, market share and profitability. Key Words: Advertising, Oligopoly, Differential games, Optimization. 1 1. Introduction Many industries are characterized by firms competing for market share primarily on the basis of advertising. The markets for cola drinks, beer and cigarettes are some examples that have been studied in the literature (Erickson 1992, Fruchter and Kalish 1997). Each firm’s advertising acts to increase its market share while the competitors’ advertising acts to reduce its market share. Owing to the carry-over dynamics of advertising, an analytical solution in continuous time typically starts by modeling the competitive interaction as a differential game, where each firm tries to increase its profit while taking into consideration the response of its competitors. Whereas elements of the marketing environment such as carry-over dynamics, competition, competitive and non-competitive decay have been described by individual models, understanding optimal advertising policies in differential games is hindered by the difficulty in obtaining explicit solutions. -
How to Create a Growth-Oriented Market Constellation for South Africa
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Heise, Arne Working Paper How to create a growth-oriented market constellation for South Africa Arbeitspapiere für Staatswissenschaft, No. 22 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics Suggested Citation: Heise, Arne (2007) : How to create a growth-oriented market constellation for South Africa, Arbeitspapiere für Staatswissenschaft, No. 22, Universität Hamburg, Department Wirtschaft und Politik, Hamburg This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27090 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially -
Barriers to Entry 2005
Barriers to Entry 2005 The OECD Competition Committee debated barriers to entry in October 2005. This document includes an executive summary and the documents from the meeting: an analytical note by Mr. Jeremy West of the OECD, written submissions from Brazil, Chinese Taipei, the Czech Republic, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and BIAC, as well as an aide-memoire of the discussion. The concept of barriers to entry is important to many aspects of competition policy, but the question of exactly what constitutes an entry barrier has never been universally resolved. While most competition enforcement agencies indicated that they do not need a fixed definition of barriers to entry, several others have one and have found it to be valuable. A barrier to entry does not have to prevent firms from entering a market forever in order to affect competition and consumer welfare; sometimes merely retarding the arrival of new firms is enough. Therefore, entry conditions are usually analysed from a dynamic, rather than a static perspective. Furthermore, entry analysis goes beyond asking whether entry barriers exist and whether entry could conceivably occur. Typically, it also asks whether entry would occur and, if so, whether it is likely to happen quickly enough and be substantial enough to fix the anticompetitive problem that is central to the case. Conditions that constitute entry barriers may be structural or strategic. While structural barriers are sometimes relatively easy to quantify, strategic barriers are often difficult to measure. -
Bundling for Flexibility and Variety: an Economic Model for Multi-Producer Value Aggregation
Bundling for Flexibility and Variety: An Economic Model for Multi-Producer Value Aggregation Hemant K. Bhargava1 [email protected] University of California Davis ABSTRACT Many markets feature an economic structure in which value is co-created by multiple producers and aggregated into a common bundle by a producer-consortium or independent firm. Examples in- clude in-home video entertainment, technology goods and services, multi-sourced data platforms, and patent pools. This paper develops an economic model to study demand, production choices, revenue-sharing, and relative market power in such markets. Producers in these markets are not rivalrous competitors in the usual zero-sum sense, because output of each casts an externality on production decisions of others and total market demand expands with total output, albeit with di- minishing returns. This property allows multiple producers to flourish in equilibrium (vs. just one with the most favorable technological or cost structure), and more so when the market ex- pands less quickly with total output. Equilibrium production quantities of competitors are strategic complements, yet competition between producers does manifest itself, e.g., if one acquires better production technology (i.e., makes value units at lower cost) then the equilibrium production lev- els of other producers are reduced. Insights are also derived for alternative market structures, e.g., producers have more output and earn higher profit when organized into a distribution consortium (e.g., Hulu, or consortia of zoos or museums) vs. relying on a separate retailer. Mergers between producers have similar effect. The formulation enables us to rigorously answer economic questions ranging from pricing, revenue sharing, and production levels in a static setting, to market dynamics covering both the causes and effects of changes in industry structure.