Insure++: An Automatic Runtime Error Detection Tool 1
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Defeating Memory Corruption Attacks Via Pointer Taintedness Detection
Defeating Memory Corruption Attacks via Pointer Taintedness Detection Shuo Chen †, Jun Xu ‡, Nithin Nakka †, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk †, Ravishankar K. Iyer † † Center for Reliable and High-Performance Computing, ‡ Department of Computer Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, North Carolina State University 1308 W. Main Street, Urbana, IL 61801 Raleigh, NC 27695 {shuochen, nakka, kalbar, iyer}@crhc.uiuc.edu [email protected] Abstract formal methods have been adopted to prevent Most malicious attacks compromise system security programmers from writing insecure software. But despite through memory corruption exploits. Recently proposed substantial research and investment, the state of the art is techniques attempt to defeat these attacks by protecting far from perfect, and as a result, security vulnerabilities are program control data. We have constructed a new class of constantly being discovered in the field. The most direct attacks that can compromise network applications without counter-measure against vulnerabilities in the field is tampering with any control data. These non-control data security patching. Patching, however, is reactive in nature attacks represent a new challenge to system security. In and can only be applied to known vulnerabilities. The long this paper, we propose an architectural technique to latency between bug discovery and patching allows defeat both control data and non-control data attacks attackers to compromise many unpatched systems. An based on the notion of pointer taintedness . A pointer is alternative to patching is runtime vulnerability masking said to be tainted if user input can be used as the pointer that can stop ongoing attacks. Compiler and library value. A security attack is detected whenever a tainted interception techniques have been proposed to mask value is dereferenced during program execution. -
Representing and Reasoning About Dynamic Code
Representing and reasoning about dynamic code Item Type Proceedings Authors Bartels, Jesse; Stephens, Jon; Debray, Saumya Citation Bartels, J., Stephens, J., & Debray, S. (2020, September). Representing and Reasoning about Dynamic Code. In 2020 35th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE) (pp. 312-323). IEEE. DOI 10.1145/3324884.3416542 Publisher ACM Journal Proceedings - 2020 35th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2020 Rights © 2020 Association for Computing Machinery. Download date 23/09/2021 23:26:56 Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ Version Final accepted manuscript Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/652285 Representing and Reasoning about Dynamic Code Jesse Bartels Jon Stephens Saumya Debray Department of Computer Science Department of Computer Science Department of Computer Science The University Of Arizona University Of Texas The University Of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721, USA Austin, TX 78712, USA Tucson, AZ 85721, USA [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT and trace dependencies back, into and through the JIT compiler’s Dynamic code, i.e., code that is created or modified at runtime, is code, to understand the data and control flows that influenced the ubiquitous in today’s world. The behavior of dynamic code can JIT compiler’s actions and caused the generation of the problem- depend on the logic of the dynamic code generator in subtle and non- atic code. E.g., for the CVE-2017-5121 bug mentioned above, we obvious ways, e.g., JIT compiler bugs can lead to exploitable vul- might want to perform automated analyses to identify which anal- nerabilities in the resulting JIT-compiled code. -
HALO: Post-Link Heap-Layout Optimisation
HALO: Post-Link Heap-Layout Optimisation Joe Savage Timothy M. Jones University of Cambridge, UK University of Cambridge, UK [email protected] [email protected] Abstract 1 Introduction Today, general-purpose memory allocators dominate the As the gap between memory and processor speeds continues landscape of dynamic memory management. While these so- to widen, efficient cache utilisation is more important than lutions can provide reasonably good behaviour across a wide ever. While compilers have long employed techniques like range of workloads, it is an unfortunate reality that their basic-block reordering, loop fission and tiling, and intelligent behaviour for any particular workload can be highly subop- register allocation to improve the cache behaviour of pro- timal. By catering primarily to average and worst-case usage grams, the layout of dynamically allocated memory remains patterns, these allocators deny programs the advantages of largely beyond the reach of static tools. domain-specific optimisations, and thus may inadvertently Today, when a C++ program calls new, or a C program place data in a manner that hinders performance, generating malloc, its request is satisfied by a general-purpose allocator unnecessary cache misses and load stalls. with no intimate knowledge of what the program does or To help alleviate these issues, we propose HALO: a post- how its data objects are used. Allocations are made through link profile-guided optimisation tool that can improve the fixed, lifeless interfaces, and fulfilled by -
Architectural Support for Scripting Languages
Architectural Support for Scripting Languages By Dibakar Gope A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Electrical and Computer Engineering) at the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON 2017 Date of final oral examination: 6/7/2017 The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee: Mikko H. Lipasti, Professor, Electrical and Computer Engineering Gurindar S. Sohi, Professor, Computer Sciences Parameswaran Ramanathan, Professor, Electrical and Computer Engineering Jing Li, Assistant Professor, Electrical and Computer Engineering Aws Albarghouthi, Assistant Professor, Computer Sciences © Copyright by Dibakar Gope 2017 All Rights Reserved i This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Monoranjan Gope and Sati Gope. ii acknowledgments First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, Sri Monoranjan Gope, and Smt. Sati Gope for their unwavering support and encouragement throughout my doctoral studies which I believe to be the single most important contribution towards achieving my goal of receiving a Ph.D. Second, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor Prof. Mikko Lipasti for his mentorship and continuous support throughout the course of my graduate studies. I am extremely grateful to him for guiding me with such dedication and consideration and never failing to pay attention to any details of my work. His insights, encouragement, and overall optimism have been instrumental in organizing my otherwise vague ideas into some meaningful contributions in this thesis. This thesis would never have been accomplished without his technical and editorial advice. I find myself fortunate to have met and had the opportunity to work with such an all-around nice person in addition to being a great professor. -
Sok: Make JIT-Spray Great Again
SoK: Make JIT-Spray Great Again Robert Gawlik and Thorsten Holz Ruhr-Universitat¨ Bochum Abstract Attacks against client-side programs such as browsers were at first tackled with a non-executable stack to pre- Since the end of the 20th century, it has become clear that vent execution of data on the stack and also with a non- web browsers will play a crucial role in accessing Internet executable heap to stop heap sprays of data being later resources such as the World Wide Web. They evolved executed as code. This defense became widely known into complex software suites that are able to process a as W ⊕ X (Writable xor eXecutable) or Data Execution multitude of data formats. Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation Prevention (DEP) to make any data region non-executable was incorporated to speed up the execution of script code, in 2003 [45, 54]. To counter DEP, attackers started to per- but is also used besides web browsers for performance form code reuse such as Return-Oriented Programming reasons. Attackers happily welcomed JIT in their own (ROP) and many variants [10, 11, 32, 68]. In general, if an way, and until today, JIT compilers are an important target adversary knows the location of static code in the address of various attacks. This includes for example JIT-Spray, space of the vulnerable target, she can prepare a fake stack JIT-based code-reuse attacks and JIT-specific flaws to cir- with addresses of these gadgets. As soon as control of cumvent mitigation techniques in order to simplify the the instruction pointer is gained, these gadgets execute exploitation of memory-corruption vulnerabilities. -
Rockjit: Securing Just-In-Time Compilation Using Modular Control-Flow Integrity
RockJIT: Securing Just-In-Time Compilation Using Modular Control-Flow Integrity Ben Niu Gang Tan Lehigh University Lehigh University 19 Memorial Dr West 19 Memorial Dr West Bethlehem, PA, 18015 Bethlehem, PA, 18015 [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT For performance, modern managed language implementations Managed languages such as JavaScript are popular. For perfor- adopt Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation. Instead of performing pure mance, modern implementations of managed languages adopt Just- interpretation, a JIT compiler dynamically compiles programs into In-Time (JIT) compilation. The danger to a JIT compiler is that an native code and performs optimization on the fly based on informa- attacker can often control the input program and use it to trigger a tion collected through runtime profiling. JIT compilation in man- vulnerability in the JIT compiler to launch code injection or JIT aged languages is the key to high performance, which is often the spraying attacks. In this paper, we propose a general approach only metric when comparing JIT engines, as seen in the case of called RockJIT to securing JIT compilers through Control-Flow JavaScript. Hereafter, we use the term JITted code for native code Integrity (CFI). RockJIT builds a fine-grained control-flow graph that is dynamically generated by a JIT compiler, and code heap for from the source code of the JIT compiler and dynamically up- memory pages that hold JITted code. dates the control-flow policy when new code is generated on the fly. In terms of security, JIT brings its own set of challenges. First, a Through evaluation on Google’s V8 JavaScript engine, we demon- JIT compiler is large and usually written in C/C++, which lacks strate that RockJIT can enforce strong security on a JIT compiler, memory safety. -
Rust: Systems Programmers Can Have Nice Things
Rust: Systems Programmers Can Have Nice Things Arun Thomas [email protected] @arunthomas EuroBSDCon 2019 On Systems Programming [A] systems programmer has seen the terrors of the world and understood the intrinsic horror of existence -James Mickens, The Night Watch 2 What Makes Systems Software Hard? • Stakes are High: Systems software is critical to enforcing security and safety • Kernels, hypervisors, firmware, bootloaders, embedded software, language runtimes, browsers, … • Usually written in C or C++ for performance • BUT C and C++ are not memory-safe • Memory corruption vulnerabilities abound (and are exploited) • See recent Microsoft study (next slide) 3 Memory Unsafety is a Problem https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/07/16/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/ Microsoft found ~70% of CVEs in their products each year continue to be memory safety issues (Matt Miller, MSRC @ Blue Hat IL 2019) 4 Microsoft and Rust 5 Intel and Rust 6 Talk Overview “Systems Programmers Can Have Nice Things” -Robert O’Callahan Random Thoughts On Rust • Why Rust? • Rust for Systems Software • Getting Started with Rust on BSD 7 Why ust? 8 I like C. 9 But it turns out programming languages have evolved in the last 50 years. 10 Rust is a safe, fast, productive systems programming language. 11 Mozilla and Rust • Rust was originally created by Mozilla Research • Initial use case: Servo browser engine • Mozilla began shipping Rust components in Firefox 48 in 2016 • Oxidation is Mozilla’s term for “Rusting out” components • Rust code has improved Firefox’s -
Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities, Part II Gang Tan Penn State University Spring 2019
Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities, Part II Gang Tan Penn State University Spring 2019 CMPSC 447, Software Security Integer Overflow Vulnerabilities * slides adapted from those by Seacord 3 Integer Overflows An integer overflow occurs when an integer is increased beyond its maximum value or decreased beyond its minimum value Standard integer types (signed) signed char, short int, int, long int, long long int Signed overflow vs unsigned overflow An unsigned overflow occurs when the underlying representation can no longer represent an integer value. A signed overflow occurs when a value is carried over to the sign bit 4 Overflow Examples unsigned int ui; signed int si; ui = UINT_MAX; // 4,294,967,295; ui++; ui = 0 printf(“ui = %u\n", ui); si = INT_MAX; // 2,147,483,647 si++; si = -2,147,483,648 printf(“si = %d\n", si); 5 Overflow Examples, cont’d ui = 0; ui‐‐; ui = 4,294,967,295 printf(“ui = %u\n", ui); si = INT_MIN; // ‐2,147,483,648; si‐‐; si = 2,147,483,647 printf(“si = %d\n", si); 6 Integer Overflow Example int main(int argc, char *const *argv) { unsigned short int total; total = strlen(argv[1]) + strlen(argv[2]) + 1; char *buff = (char *) malloc(total); strcpy(buff, argv[1]); strcat(buff, argv[2]); } What if the total variable is overflowed because of the addition operation? 7 Vulnerability: JPEG Example Based on a real‐world vulnerability in the handling of the comment field in JPEG files void getComment(unsigned int len, char *src) { unsigned int size; size is interpreted as a large size = len ‐ 2; positive value of 0xffffffff -
Runtime Detection of C-Style Errors in UPC Code
Runtime Detection of C-Style Errors in UPC Code Peter Pirkelbauer Chunhua Liao Thomas Panas Lawrence Livermore National Lawrence Livermore National Microsoft Laboratory Laboratory Parallel Data Warehousing [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dan Quinlan Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [email protected] Abstract Software frequently contains flaws, and the size and complexity Unified Parallel C (UPC) extends the C programming language of modern software makes the detection of such flaws difficult. Re- (ISO C 99) with explicit parallel programming support for the parti- ducing the number of software flaws is an effort that permeates tioned global address space (PGAS), which provides a global mem- all stages in software development. For example, adopting rigid ory space with localized partitions to each thread. Like its ancestor coding standards and restricting programming languages to a safe C, UPC is a low-level language that emphasizes code efficiency. subset can eliminate error-prone coding techniques. Static and dy- The absence of dynamic (and static) safety checks allows program- namic code analysis tools that operate on source or binary code mer oversights and software flaws that can be hard to spot. are also used to reduce software flaws. Static analysis tools uti- In this paper, we present an extension of a dynamic analysis lize source code (style) analysis or formal analysis techniques such tool, ROSE-Code Instrumentation and Runtime Monitor (ROSE- as dataflow analysis, abstract interpretation, and model checking. CIRM), for UPC to help programmers find C-style errors involving Static analysis tools do not influence the running programs but of- the global address space. -
Wind River® Vxworks® 7 Third Party License Notices
Wind River® VxWorks® 7 Third Party License Notices This document contains third party intellectual property (IP) notices for the BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY Wind River® VxWorks® 7 distribution. Certain licenses and license notices THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, may appear in other parts of the product distribution in accordance with the OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN license requirements. ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. Trademarks All company, product and service names used in this software are for ACPICA identification purposes only. Version: 20170303 Component(s): Runtime Wind River and VxWorks are registered trademarks of Wind River Systems. Description: Provides code to implement ACPI specification in VxWorks. UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group. IBM and Bluemix are registered trademarks of the IBM Corporation. NOTICES: All other third-party trademarks are the property of their respective owners. 1. Copyright Notice Some or all of this work - Copyright (c) 1999 - 2016, Intel Corp. All rights reserved. Third Party Notices 2. License 2.1. This is your license from Intel Corp. under its intellectual property rights. You may have additional license terms from the party that provided you this software, covering your right to use that party's intellectual property rights. 64-Bit Dynamic Linker Version: 2.2. Intel grants, free of charge, to any person ("Licensee") obtaining a copy Component(s): Runtime of the source code appearing in this file ("Covered Code") an irrevocable, Description: The dynamic linker is used to load shared libraries. -
Practical Control-Flow Integrity
Practical Control-Flow Integrity by Ben Niu Presented to the Graduate and Research Committee of Lehigh University in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science Lehigh University January, 2016 Copyright © 2015 Ben Niu. All rights reserved. ii Approved and recommended for acceptance as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the re- quirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Ben Niu Practical Control-Flow Integrity Date Gang Tan, Dissertation Director Accepted Date Committee Members Gang Tan (Chair) Mooi-Choo Chuah Michael Spear Stephen McCamant iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am very grateful to my great advisor Prof. Gang Tan. I had no idea how to do research when I came to Lehigh, and he taught me what to think of, how to think, how to present my thoughts, and how to write them down. His door was always open for discussion, he replied emails during weekends, and he provided detailed guidance on any technical problem. I was constantly surprised at his breadth of knowledge and depth of understanding, and I enjoyed working with him. I also thank my thesis committee members, Prof. Mooi-Choo Chuah, Prof. Michael Spear, and Prof. Stephen McCamant for their courses, research works and insightful comments on my research. Michael’s parallel programming course introduced me lock-free algorithms and his operating system course consolidated my system programming skills. Stephen’s research on SFI provided me a foundation in my research, without which I would be still looking for decent solutions. I appreciate my colleagues at MSRC during my internship at Microsoft, especially Matt & Ken, Suha, Vishal, Swamy, Joe, Axel and Marcus. -
Matrox Imaging Library (MIL) 10.0 MIL 10 Processing Pack 3 Release Notes (C) Copyright Matrox Electronic Systems Ltd., 1992-2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Matrox Imaging Library (MIL) 10.0 MIL 10 Processing Pack 3 Release Notes (c) Copyright Matrox Electronic Systems Ltd., 1992-2018. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Main table of contents Section 1 : Differences between MIL 10 Processing Pack 3 and MIL 10 Processing Pack 2 with Update 63 Section 2 : Differences between MIL 10 Processing Pack 2 with Update 63 and MIL 10 Processing Pack 2 Section 3 : Differences between MIL 10 Processing Pack 2 and MIL 10 Processing Pack 1 Section 4 : Differences between MIL 10 Processing Pack 1 and MIL 10 Section 5 : Differences between MIL 10 and MIL 9 Processing Pack 2 with Update 56 Section 6 : Differences between MIL 9 Processing Pack 2 with Update 56 and MIL 9 Processing Pack 2 Section 7 : Differences between MIL 9 Processing Pack 2 with Update 45 and MIL 9 Processing Pack 2 Section 8 : Differences between MIL 9 Processing Pack 2 and MIL 9 Processing Pack 1 Section 9 : Differences between MIL 9 Processing Pack 1 and MIL 9 Section 10 : Differences between MIL 9 and MIL 8 Processing Pack 4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 1: Differences between MIL 10 Processing Pack 3 and MIL 10 Processing Pack 2 with with Update 63 Table of Contents for Section 1 1. Overview 2. New functionalities and improvements 2.01 MIL processing specific examples 2.02 Classification module 2.03 Blob module 2.04 Calibration module 2.05 SureDotOCR® module 2.06 Registration module 2.07 Pattern Matching module 2.08 Model Finder module 2.09 Metrology module 2.10 3dMap module 2.11 Code Reader module 2.12 Measurement module 2.13 String Reader module 2.14 Color module 2.15 Primitives 2.16 Graphics 2.17 General 3.