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HUMANITARIAN HPN

The magazineexchange of the Humanitarian Practice Network March 2002g 20 IN THIS ISSUE EDITORIAL

Silent emergencies Shared humanity and the principle of impartiality are the foundations of humani- Giving voice to silent emergencies 2 tarianism. Evolving global policy trends are, however, moving away from the The Casamance conflict: out of sight, impartial allocation of public humanitarian assistance, and eroding the universality out of mind? 5 of humanitarian action. The humanitarian impact of neglect: Over the last decade, major political and military interventions have taken place Uganda’s emergencies 7 under a humanitarian banner, and the total volume of humanitarian aid has Shabunda: the ‘forgotten Kosovo’ 9 steadily increased. These trends would seem to auger well for people in need of Russia, Chechnya and the international humanitarian assistance and protection. But in reality, international engagement community 11 and resources are being deployed very selectively; depending on where they live, Manipulating crisis in North Korea 13 there are very significant differences in people’s ability to access international India’s volatile north-east 15 humanitarian assistance. In the majority of cases, international engagement in crisis areas is notable by its absence. Practice notes For these silent, forgotten emergencies, humanitarian assistance remains the last, often very small international contribution to protecting some of the most Aid responses to Afghanistan 17 vulnerable populations on earth.The near-abandonment of these people is increas- Lessons for post-Taliban ingly obvious as humanitarian resources are being concentrated in countries, or Afghanistan 19 parts of countries, of greatest strategic significance to the main actors. This is a Kosovo and ‘humanitarian’ relief 21 violation of the principle of impartiality at a global level. Humanitarian action and private Yet it is surprisingly difficult to match humanitarian assistance with need security 24 globally. The impact of under-resourcing and the lack of response to silent, Mainstreaming disaster mitigation 26 forgotten emergencies is not documented systematically,and there are no interna- tionally-accepted figures which allow easy comparison between countries of the Institutional initiatives extent of need for protection and assistance.There is, however, plenty of evidence Benefits–harms analysis: a rights-based from around the world concerning people’s lack of access to food, shelter, medical tool 29 care and other basic prerequisites for survival in conflicts and disasters. The refugee experience: a resource Many agencies and organisations concentrate their assistance in line with globally- for aid practitioners 31 available resources, and the implications of global trends on the impartiality of Reproductive health and assistance seem to have drawn relatively little comment. It remains to be seen whether displacement 33 humanitarian actors manage a concerted riposte to broader changes in international Supporting livelihoods in conflict 35 response, and ensure that humanitarian aid really does address need without discrim- ination and irrespective of race, religion, political affiliation and other considerations. Policy developments Silent emergencies are the special focus of this issue of Humanitarian Exchange. Germany’s humanitarian system 36 Anna Jefferys of Save the Children (UK) examines the concept of the silent emer- Ensuring quality: Medair and ISO gency, and suggests ways to assess and address this silence.We also look at six of the 9001 38 world’s most silent emergencies: Shabunda in the Democratic Republic of Congo; CARE’s rights-based response to the Casamance in Senegal; Uganda; Chechnya; north-east India; and North Korea. conflict 40 Following up our special feature on Afghanistan in the last issue, we have two articles which draw on previous evaluations of humanitarian response to political Endpiece crisis, and on the review of the Strategic Framework, to identify lessons for the inter- national response in Afghanistan. Articles on a wide range of humanitarian practice, The challenges to humanitarian institutional initiatives and policy developments around the world complete the issue. action 42

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SILENT EMERGENCIES

Giving voice to silent emergencies Humanitarian agencies have developed mechanisms to gauge a society’s vulnerability to conflict and natural disaster. But, says Anna Jefferys, little attention has been paid to analysing the forces that shape the international humanitarian system’s response

Since 1989, more than four million people have been Save the Children (UK) uses the following definition of a silent killed in conflicts, most of them internal, and many of emergency: them chronic, localised and long-running. Natural disasters too are costing more lives and causing more A crisis situation that overwhelms the capacity of a society damage, particularly in the developing world. In the to cope by using its resources alone, where the level of last ten years, 300 natural disasters have been recorded, response, including political, humanitarian, multilateral affecting people in 108 countries and killing up to and press, is insufficient to meet the level of immediate 150,000 annually. While some of these emergencies humanitarian need. attract significant amounts of publicity and political attention, others fester outside of the public eye. How many people know, for instance, that famines are funding that may be available, thus reducing levels of occurring right now in Malawi, Angola, Sudan and proposed programming for the next round of funding. Somalia, and that famine conditions are currently Even lower down the scale are those long-running unfolding in Zimbabwe? These emergencies are effec- emergencies – the separatist war in the Western Sahara, tively silent: marginalised in donors’ funding decisions; the ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the the object of little if any political interest in the West; insurgency in the southern Philippines, for instance – rarely if ever covered in the media; and all too often that do not merit a CAP appeal at all. neglected by humanitarian organisations themselves. Moreover, although the international donor commit- Funding patterns ment to humanitarian crises has risen in recent years, Aid is apportioned in highly unbalanced and partial committed funds are often extracted from overall – ways. While responses to UN consolidated appeals and dwindling – aid budgets. During the 1990s, as the (CAPs) do not paint a complete picture, they are number of active wars increased, foreign aid budgets indicative of wider aid trends. In 1999, the donor stagnated; OECD humanitarian aid decreased from response to CAPs for the former Yugoslavia was $207 0.03% to 0.022% of total gross national product per person; for Sierra Leone, it was $16, and $8 for the (GNP), and only five of the Development Assistance Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Between 1993 Committee (DAC)’s 22 donors reached the UN target and 1997,Africa as a whole received on average just half for aid spending of 0.7% in 1999.Thus, aid from DAC of the requested CAP funding. While these funding donors in 1999 was 12% lower in real terms than it commitments reflect the different costs of doing was in 1992. Over the last ten years, aid to Sub- business in Africa and Europe, the differential is never- Saharan Africa fell by 29%, from $37 to $21 per head. theless significant. The consistent under-funding of particular CAPs reflects a wider funding cycle, whereby International interest and political will low media attention leads to low donor interest, leading These patterns of funding are linked to the level of to low aid commitments, and low estimates of the outside political interest and media attention that

The ten countries/areas receiving most The ten countries/areas with the most people in need humanitarian assistance of assistance

Country/area Assistance (US$m) Country/area People in need FRY (Serbia & Montenegro) 237.24 North Korea 8,044,000 Europe (unallocated) 177.64 Somalia 4,000,000 Ex-Yugoslav states (unspecified) 141.79 South-Eastern Europe 3,500,000 Ethiopia 102.39 Sudan 2,367,200 Mozambique 94.59 Angola 2,000,000 East Timor 91.56 Afghanistan 2,000,000 Iraq 75.77 Tajikistan 1,300,000 Sudan 51.91 Burundi 860,000 Angola 48.27 Sierra Leone 760,000 Bosnia 43.06 Uganda 585,000

Notes: Bilateral allocations only; data refer to 2000 Note: Data refer to 1999 SILENT EMERGENCIES Source: Development Assistance Committee Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal data

HUMANITARIAN 2 exchange SILENT EMERGENCIES 3 Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March starve enemies within a wider security a wider within enemies starve agenda. In 2001,December for instance, Pakistan pledged the US in debt forgiveness, $1 billion over investment, trade on ‘war part for its in the as a reward relief and refugee terrorism’. same month, In the against Iraq sanctions six months, another by extended were despite their clear humanitarian impact. Donor, countries and non-recipient recipient can be of influence, spheres seen to sit in interconnected geopolitical (political,encompassing the economic, cultural and historical), as the geographic.The as well to Hurricaneresponse Mitch, instance, for in the US,strongest Canada and Spain; Australia, was New to emergen- more tend to respond Zealand and Japan Asia and the Pacific.cies in In 1999, ECHO funding four times was and Kosovo Yugoslavia for the former African,that for all 70 Caribbean (ACP) and Pacific countries combined. 1990 and 1994, Between Germany,Austria humani- their and Italy all increased tarian to need in the Balkans. assistance to respond As Oxfam puts it: to help people likely ‘donors more are them,who look like and whose history or plight they to or understand’.can relate in deter- an instrumental role The media also plays mining whether, and how, an emergency is communi- cated to the world. Editorial what choices govern constitutes a story, and what does not; in the US, for instance, 25 times more the conflict in Bosnia received genocide. than the Rwandan coverage press In the 1990s, on US television bulletins news evening coverage to foreign the airtime 82% of given devoted to just 14 countries, total. world’s or 7% of the Europe Africa, than all of coverage more received Central and America combined.South particular where Even crises attention, do attract media tends to be coverage short-lived; eruption in of the volcanic within a week the DRC in 2002, for instance, British channels news and large stopped reporting on it. had by that these crises the misleading impression This creates short-lived,too are with a finite beginning a and end.Whenconclusive the story is dropped, the crisis is to be over. the public by perceived In this way, emer- the norm, from depicted as being a break gencies are be the normal themselves condi- when in fact may they affected people.tion for many Thus, while the eye- catching and sudden disaster – the earthquake, flood or eruption – grabs the headlines and attracts the lion’s of assistance,share catas- equally severe less dramatic yet languish unnoticed,trophes and under-funded. Each 1992 and 1998, between year an earthquake, flood, eruption or hurricanevolcanic attracted the largest to natural of humanitarianproportion aid devoted disasters. on low are drought disasters like Slow-onset the list; in 2001,Africa, in the Horn the drought of for instance, funding. just 13% of requested received Silent emergencies and humanitarian principles Using a principled, go would needs-based approach the inequities that shape the to addressing some way mentioned least in the media, with lowest donor mentioned least in the media, with lowest support and highest needs); Donors and forgotten emergencies: emergencies: and forgotten Donors ECHO DFID and to to ‘seek DFID stated its commitment In 2001, to addressing approach a more universal promote they need, wherever in needs. People humanitarian to assis- status and rights equal have are, should some interested in developing tance’. DFID is also to measure humani- which by form of indicators former the in the same year tarian need. However, the top recipient of DFID still was Yugoslavia This with £32 million committed. humanitarian aid, double the amount committed to more than was Africa While recipient, Ethiopia. the second-largest assis- humanitarian 35% of DFID bilateral received with 29%. close behind tance, Europe was to ECHO has also emphasised its commitment it has devel- addressing forgotten emergencies, and them. Each oped a methodology to help pinpoint as media things is monitored for such emergency and then grouped and donor presence, coverage into one of three categories: • are (the upper 25% of countries that high • (the middle 50%); and middle • (the bottom 25%). low listed the After an initial assessment, ECHO Angola, countries: priority emergency as following Yemen; and Tanzania Burma, Uganda, Chechnya, particularly was media coverage those where of of interest or lack either through lack lacking, Equatorial access, were identified as Burma, Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, North Korea, Sahara Western Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, to selected ECHO aid while and Uganda. However, Western and Tajikistan ‘forgotten’ countries – for instance – did indeed increase in 2001, Sahara, again the recipient of the was Yugoslavia the former of ECHO humanitarian aid. largest tranche particular emergencies attract. In turn, this depends important countries these greatly on how to the are major states and regional of the relevant interests organisations. Thus, of assistance is on the geo-strategicdecided more priorities the provision of the of need. existence main donors than on the objective donorstheir channel increasingly key As many funding bilaterally, multilateral rather than through the UN (bilateral funding for humani- agencies like four times higher than tarian on average assistance was decade),in the previous this linkage will probably because it will prominent become all the more donorsbecome easier for individual to earmark their funds for particular countries. of 11 In the wake September, be returning to a may it appears that we allies and punish or aid is used to reward where world HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:32 am Page 3 Page am 10:32 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:32amPage4 4 SILENT EMERGENCIES analysis of emergencies occurring around theworld. analysis ofemergenciesoccurring so astopromote amore in-depthawareness and nated advocacy strategytowards themediaanddonors coordi- community shouldadoptamore transparent, thehumanitarian Linked intotheabove process, • emergenciesare silent. certain andtomonitorhow andwhy need; humanitarian tostandardise relative levels of populations; ties facing anddifficul- rate acontextualanalysisofthereal risks soastoelabo- toanalysethisdata, should beformed NGOs, A ‘watch group’ governments andacademicbodies. drawn agencies, from humanitarian cies, capture existingresearch relating tosilentemergen- resource shouldbesetupto A centralisedinformation • ofkeySC-UK hasalsooutlinedaseries areas foraction: how didkey emer- NGOsrespond toaparticular • NGO capacityandresponse how much coverage over timedoesanemergency • Media interest isthere a what of Western presence? Ifso, military • how much diplomaticactivity isassociatedwitha • how emergencyraisedin many timesisaparticular • Wider politicalinterest percentage what ofCAP appealsisraisedandallo- • doDAC what statisticsreveal?; • how much aidisreceived percapita?; • Donor interest of: ofagiven emergencyinterms ‘silence’ tive thatcouldbeusedtojudgetherelative indicators Save ofquantita- hasidentifiedaseries lines inthisarea. tohaveamong thefew agenciessofar produced guide- Save theChildren (UK)andCARE Australia are ciples. prin- toberespected inlinewithhumanitarian security and cleanwater, shelter, food, ofcivilians tolife, the rights they canpress for ofcivil war, to defenditselfintheface cannot claimthatagovernment doesnothave theright aidagencies response toemergencies.While international HUMANITARIAN nAC B,CBSandCNN? NBC, on ABC, Public exposure andanalysis Information-gathering intheirannual reports? asdescribed expend, gency? What level andresources ofeffort didthey Figaro continentalEuropean like newspapers broadsheets, theUK’s main receive inkey outlets–theBBC, andwhose? type, démarches?; such asresolutions and emergency, particular Council?; UN Security orinthe tabled by European Parliament members; (as listedinthe the UK(aslistedin questionsin of Commonsdebatesorparliamentary suchasHouse government fora, andparliamentary emergency? cated toaparticular exchange and Die Welt Congressional Record UStelevision news programmes , Hansard ); in Congress intheUS inCongress ); ;inquestions ); ular crisis. torespond toapartic- andhow, in decidingwhether, they apply agencies needtothinkthrough thecriteria humanitarian not cloudtheemergencyresponse, donorinterest, profile do andinfluencingopportunities international andthatmediapressures, lined, thatemergenciesdonotgetside- ciples are protected, the requisite funds.To prin- ensure thathumanitarian carefully inorder toreappick andchoosetheircrises andmust appealsallthetime, cannot hold ‘special’ NGOs on themediatomobiliseprivate fundraising. and donor decision-makingforinstitutionalfunding, silent emergenciesbecauseofthedependenceon itisdifficulttomaintainthesestandards in However, sizeorlocation. irrespective oftheirtype, impartially, meansresponding toallemergencies of conduct.This intheRedCrossarticulated andRedCrescent code NGOs aimtolive ethicbroadly uptoahumanitarian aidbudgets.preparedness intheirhumanitarian theircommitmenttoemergency response by bolstering multilaterals and NGOs willincrease theflexibilityoftheirhumanitarian governments, Finally, based fashion. meeting CAP requirements across theboard inaneeds- andwillshare theburden of realities; international cial planningsothatCAPs becomemore reflective of willdevelop donors more needs-basedfinan- corollary, a response.As toguidetheirhumanitarian their interests, ratherthan law toallowtions underinternational need, governments live and theirobliga- uptotheirrhetoric whereby shouldbedeveloped, tional fundingstructure equitable andneeds-basedinterna- A more rigorous, • level andscopeofdebate. itcanatleastraisethe of politicalwilltoresolve crises, While advocacy alonecannotcompensateforthelack Children (UK),fortheirinputintothisarticle. Mike Gaouette,EmergenciesDirector, Save the Barry; Amelia Bookstein,Policy Advisor, Oxfam;and thank independenthumanitarianpolicy advisor Jane section ofSave theChildren(UK).Shewould liketo Anna Jefferys (London: ZedBooks,1999). War ReportingandRepresentationsofEthnic Violence Tim Allen andJean Seaton(eds), (London: Earthscan,2000). Development Initiatives, International, May 2000). An EndtoForgotten Emergencies? Emergency?’, SC-UKEmergency SectionPolicy Paper, 2001. Jane Barry, ‘WhenShouldSC-UKRespondtoan Humanitarian Exchange Marcus Oxley, ‘MeasuringHumanitarianNeed’, World DisastersReport2001 References andfurtherreading Influencing international fundingchoices Influencing international is apolicy officerintheEmergencies 19, September2001. Global Humanitarian Assistance (Geneva: IFRC,2001). The MediaofConflict: (Oxford: Oxfam HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:32 am Page 5

The Casamance conflict: out of sight, out of mind? The separatist rebellion in the Casamance in southern Senegal is West Africa’s longest-running civil conflict. Yet, compared with wars elsewhere in West Africa, it is virtually unknown in the outside world. Martin Evans describes the humanitarian impact of one of the world’s forgotten wars

Since 1982, the separatist Mouvement des Forces combatants on both sides, together with actors in Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) has been neighbouring countries, are exploiting the Casamance’s fighting for an independent Casamance, first through natural resources, though with no benefit to most of popular protest, then since 1990 through a guerrilla the civilian population. war. Despite ceasefires and accords throughout the 1990s and improved security conditions, durable peace Various agencies have been active in the Casamance. remains elusive. The death toll directly due to the At times of significant displacement, assistance has conflict is probably around 1,000, either killed in included food and healthcare for IDPs by the armed attacks, by landmines or as a result of human Senegalese Red Cross, Caritas, the Agence des rights abuse. Many more have been displaced, either Musulmans d’Afrique and UNICEF.With most IDPs within the Casamance or into neighbouring coun- taken in or otherwise assisted with accommodation by tries. Patterns of displacement are complex, and their families, housing them in camps has not featured reliable figures are difficult to obtain. A 1998 Caritas beyond the Red Cross reception centre on the census gave a figure of 62,638, out of a total outskirts of Ziguinchor, although UNHCR partners Casamance population of around 1.1 million. in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau run camps housing Ziguinchor, the capital of the western region of the some Casamance refugees. The psychological impact Casamance, has received some 14,000, with a further of the conflict is also starting to be addressed, with 6,000 in other Casamance towns. UNHCR figures UNICEF training community leaders in psychosocial indicate that a further 10,000 people are refugees in support for people traumatised by violence. Landmine Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia. awareness and rehabilitation of mine victims also form relatively small but significant aspects of relief in the Denied access to their land, the livelihoods of many Casamance, implemented by Handicap International IDPs have been severely affected. Even for populations and local NGOs. Since the beginning of the conflict who have remained in place, the use of productive in 1982, human rights abuses have been the subject of resources is restricted or prevented by fear of rebel advocacy by Amnesty International and the Senegalese attacks and landmines. For the Casamance population NGO RADDHO (Rencontre Africaine pour la as a whole, the climate of insecurity, principally the Défense des Droits de l’Homme). danger of armed robbery on roads or in villages by rebels or bandits, together with failing infrastructure, International neglect stifle much normal economic activity, particularly the The Casamance rebellion is much less well known sale of agricultural produce and tourism. Instead, internationally than other civil conflicts in West Africa,

notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone. There are a SILENT EMERGENCIES number of reasons for this. First, it is on a relatively The Casamance small scale. In Sierra Leone, for example, numbers of combatants, casualties and displaced people have all The Casamance is the southern limb of Senegal. It is been an order of magnitude greater. Also, while brutal largely separated from the rest of the country by The enough the conflict has not involved the same system- Gambia. This sense of separation is enhanced by atic mutilation of civilians, nor the forced recruitment marked geographical differences: the Casamance is of child soldiers – both attention-grabbers in the the wettest part of an otherwise mostly semi-arid reporting of contemporary conflicts. country, with high rainfall promoting the growth of forests containing commercially important timber The second reason is the paucity of international, species, and orchards of cashews, mangoes, citrus particularly multilateral, intervention. While The fruit and oil palms. There is a strong tradition of Gambia and Guinea-Bissau have both been involved rice-growing, and other cereals, groundnuts and in the Casamance peace process, the Casamance has vegetables are also widely cultivated. Ethnic differ- not seen the concerted political and military efforts ences are also evident, principally the Diola that have been made in Sierra Leone by the majority in Ziguinchor region (the western part of Economic Community of West African States the Casamance and the area most touched by the (ECOWAS) and the UN; the peacekeeping mission in conflict), together with the presence of other groups Sierra Leone is the largest UN operation in the with little affinity for northern Senegal and its world. Its specialist agencies aside, UN action on the hegemony of Wolof and other Sahelian peoples. Casamance has been limited to occasional statements The area also has a separate colonial history. encouraging dialogue. Political involvement by the former colonial power, France, has also been limited,

Number 20 • March 2002 5 HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:32amPage6 6 SILENT EMERGENCIES fia eeomn udad mostimportantly, DevelopmentAfrican Fundand, the including theFood and Organisation, Agriculture of anumber ofkey from donors theCasamance, mines by theMFDCin1997provoked thewithdrawal ofwidespread seedingofland- Thestart been mixed. has the conflicttoattentionofwiderworld, andhencetheneedabilitytobring Casamance, the record ofdonorcommitmenttothe Fourth, little ornocontactwiththeCasamancecrisis. willhave but mosttourists destination fortheFrench, Senegalisapopularholiday English-speaking world. outofsightmuch ofthe keeping thecrisis French, andacademiccoverage but mostjournalistic isin visible, dimensionsoftheCasamanceconflict human rights national level,Amnesty’s have reports helpedtokeep the Ataninter- government againstDakarnewspapermen. andlegalproceedings have beeninitiatedby the conflict, onthe fortheirreporting in thepastbeenarrested have journalists of onesideortheotherinconflict; foul falling intheCasamancerisk Reporters Senegalese. andflightsare tooexpensive formost unreliable, are services Ferry troublesome crossing of The Gambia. involves andthetrip a where mostmediaare based, thearea isalongroad from journey Dakar, However, theconflict. itself hasbeenlargelyaccessible during with goodlinksto TheCasamance Western academia. Senegalalsohasastrong academictradition, free press. largely hasavigorous, andthecountry able information, habitofsuppressing undesir- Senegal hasnoparticular conflict isprobably lessdifficulttoinvestigate thanmost. sincethe Thisisperhapssurprising, about theconflict. there are obstaclestodisseminatinginformation Third, outside interest. Mouvement hashadonlylimitedsuccessinattracting Senegalmeansthatthe communications innorthern tion from themaincentres ofpower andinternational but theCasamance’s isola- case totheoutsideworld, French andUNmediationiskeen to make its TheMFDChassought presence. tion andmilitary wise stable allyhostingasubstantialFrench popula- another- initsrelations withSenegal, embarrassment seeminglyregardingwith Paris theconflictasan Camaracounda, neartheborderwithGuinea-Bissau HUMANITARIAN The impactofconflict:anabandonedhousein

exchange ©Martin Evans ©Martin donor commitmenttotheCasamanceisneeded. sustained peace process (however troubled) inplace, Nowactivity. thatthesituationiscalmerandapolitical Casamance andweakened thecredibility ofaid whichstymieddevelopment inthe in 1997, was theflightofdonors though, More damaging, ities. willcontinue theirrefugee-relatedlocal partners activ- even ifits TheGambiaandGuinea-Bissau, Senegal, regrettable thatUNHCRistocloseitsofficesin andinthisrespect itis ties couldalsobehelpful, overview sub-regional A greater inaidagencyactivi- elements intheCasamance’s neighbours. highlighting thedestabilisingtendenciesandpredatory may involveprocess.This apoliticallytoughstancein theCasamancepeace insupporting political efforts may bettercoordinatethese countries theirbilateral Inrecognising itstransnationaldimensions, Bissau). (TheGambia)andPortugal (Guinea- Britain France, coloniesare implicatedin theconflict– whose former Such couldbemirrored byintegration thethree countries includingECOWAS. organisations, regional andsub- which willcollaboratewithotherregional the mandateofaUNofficetobesetupinDakar, of Thisispart CouncilinDecember2001. Security to West Africa’s conflictswas stressed totheUN approach needforanintegrated ficking networks.The anddrug-traf- through particularly arms- Casamance, includingwiththe but these conflicts have widerlinkages, Leone/Guineanexus, Liberia/Sierra Conflict in West tendstobeequatedwiththe Africa approach toaddressing conflictsandtheireffects. sub-regional way itintoawider, may betointegrate prominence and–hopefullyswifter resolution? One How mightthisforgottenwar bebrought togreater most Casamançais. isnottothebenefitof Senegalese politicalinterests, whileitmay suitsome mation abouttheconflict, theresulting pooroutward flow ofinfor- instrumental, accidentalor Whether of ‘Casamance-blindness’. allmay thussufferfrom adegree agencies are inDakar; and offoreign donors headquarters (and sub-regional) thenational workers media andintelligentsia, makers, Together withmostofthecountry’s policy- critical. Casamance from thecentres ofSenegalesepower is Thephysical separationofthe factors. geographical geopoliticaland result ofacombinationpolitical, The relative oftheCasamanceconflictis obscurity The needforaregional approach orare present asobservers. financially, thepeaceprocess are alsosupporting and UNHCR, theUNDevelopment Programme European Union, the includingthe World Bank, andagencies, donors Multilateral ofpeaceandreconstruction. support USAID beganathree-year $10mprogramme in in2000, response totheimproved situation; security have donors in toreturn However, started Ziguinchor. and resentment isstillevident amongNGOsin development, especially inagricultural large projects, endedanumber of abruptly Theirdeparture USAID. SILENT EMERGENCIES 7 , this rosy Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March Mark Adams (Lyon: Handicap International, 2000). Handicap (Lyon: missing, rebels. abducted by In early 2001, an additional 190,000 people in the Karamoja region in the north- classified as drought-affected.east were Uganda is also host to almost 176,000 refugees, principally Sudan. from human cost,Despite their heavy these emergencies the international been largely forgotten by seem to have community. Last year, annual the UN’s funding for expected to reach Appeal for Uganda was Consolidated just 40% of needs, committed. with $14,680,300 In 1999, internally-displaced people (IDPs) in Uganda of assistance per head, $2-worth around received Afghanistan, with $23 in compared and $21 in Liberia. NGOs, has gener- on which the Ugandan government for assistance to IDPs,ally relied also struggled to have raise funds. In September 2000, a joint position paper ten internationalissued by on the EU to NGOs calling met activities funding for emergency response increase with only a limited response. complex, for this neglect are The reasons with to do competence and commitment within government Uganda, and the political and strategic priorities of donor states. As OCHA puts it: of ‘The perception nation Uganda as a strategically located and favoured acknowl- discouraged some potential donors from edging the various crises basic and the need to restore “close one services and rights.There a tendency to was eye” to maintain relations’. in order failings Capacity and governance emergencies – in The internal of Uganda’s nature – means that responding particular the IDP problem during 2000 and 2001. Thanks to the numerous to the Thanks and 2001. 2000 during including be interviewed, to agreed who Casamançais Scholarships the SOAS and NGO staff, and agency many Additional and Fellowship Student a Research Fund for research. of doctoral in support Award Fieldwork (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, forthcoming 2002). Policy (London: Humanitarian (Paris: Éditions francophone d’Amnesty International, 1998). francophone Éditions (Paris: (London: Africa Research Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Commonwealth Group, Foreign Africa Research (London: Les Victimes de Mines en Casamance (Sénégal) 1988–1999 de Mines en Casamance (Sénégal) Victimes Les Sénégal. La terreur en Casamance Sénégal. La terreur en Source: UN Population Fund, www.unfpa.org UN Population Source: Uganda: key indicators Uganda: key The Casamance ConflictThe 1982–1999 The Political Economy of War in Casamance War of Economy Political The works in the Geography Programme at the Programme Geography in the works PopulationGNP per capita (1999)Life expectancy $1,160 Infant mortality 24 million births) (per 1,000 live of populationPercentage 45; female 47 male 15 illiterate over 22; female 42 male 94 of population Percentage with access to safe water 50 Martin Evans, Martin Evans, Margaret Hall, References and further reading References Amnesty International, 1999). Available at: http://files.fco.gov.uk/info/research/casamance/casamance.pdf. at: Available 1999). Handicap International, Uganda is widely regarded as one of Africa’s few success stories. But, says few success stories. But, says Africa’s of Uganda is widely regarded as one conflict and political emergencies crises, civil picture masks continuing natural The humanitarian impact of neglect: Uganda’s impact of neglect: Uganda’s humanitarian The emergencies When it is in the news at all,When it is in the news associated Uganda is often of democratisation and poverty policies with progressive reduction, in the fight against achieved and successes complex reality this image hides a more HIV/AIDS.Yet that includes displacement, and conflict. natural disaster Long-running insurgencies in the north (Acholiland) (Rwenzoris),and west along with raiding by Karamojong in the north-east, than left more have 500,000 people displaced. Organisations such as Amnesty International report systematic rape regularly groups; rebel by of civilians and mutilation to according of Humanitarianthe UN Office for the Coordination Assistance (OCHA), are an estimated 6,600 children Martin Evans Martin of University Studies, African and of Oriental School This is: [email protected]. His e-mail address London. the conducted in based on fieldwork article is and Dakar Guinea-Bissau Gambia, The Casamance, HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:32 am Page 7 Page am 10:32 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:32amPage8 8 SILENT EMERGENCIES punish the regime in Khartoum, particularly theUS. particularly inKhartoum, punish theregime thatwishtocontainand useful toothercountries itisalso andpoliticalreasons forthissupport, historical WhileUgandahasitsown Uganda. bases innorthern whichhas Sudan People’s Liberation (SPLA), Army Sudanwaged byfor theinsurgencyinsouthern the The conflictin Acholiland islinked toUganda’s support positionintheGreat Lakesoccupies astrategic region. but alsobecauseit ment afterdecadesofwar anddecline, economically liberalandpro-poor modelofdevelop- ademocratic, topursue only becauseofitsefforts To Uganda ispopularnot Western donorgovernments, andpoliticalfactors. in Ugandaisinfluencedby strategic The response ofdonorgovernments totheemergencies Strategic andpoliticalfactors 54% ofallgovernment money islostthrough graft. andhasestimatedthat nationintheworld, corrupt (TI)ranksUgandaasthethird most International Transparency isalsoamajorproblem; Corruption there isrelatively littlethatNGOscando. resources, lacking NGOstoassistthembut, international callon andnationalauthorities district Often, capacity. because displacementhasreduced localtax-raising revenues have decreased intheseareas In addition, isolatedandconflict-affectedareas. exists inperipheral, hampered by staffingthat theoftenpoorcivil service Many have todothis, struggled interventions. are required todesignandimplementemergency withlittlehumancapacity poorly-resourced districts whichbeganin1992, process ofdecentralisation, aresult ofthe poorcapacityandcorruption.As sation, The reasons forgovernment includedecentrali- failure provide forresettling IDPs. support are callingonNGOsto authorities district for example, Uganda, Inwestern providers ofresources andservices. as ratherthanthemselves, They continue tolookonNGOs, andtheauthorities. donors between NGOs, the changesthathave taken placeintherelationship with have tocometerms local authorities struggled Government institutionsand government structures. translate intoeffective emergencyresponse by local thisdoesnotnecessarily gency-affected populations, are madetorespond totheneedsofdisplacedandemer- andgovernment commitments able atanationallevel, whileresources are madeavail- suggeststhat, Experience ofthevictimstheseemergencies. needs andrights development ofalong-term processpart hasignored the on thestateandgovernment foremergencyresponse as However, many NGOsbelieve thatthisreliance citizens. are responsible forassistingandprotecting theirown governments Legally, inmanyresponse ways. iscorrect Placing agovernment atthecentre ofanemergency available forNGO-definedinterventions. andthere islittlefunding largely sub-contractors, but insuchcasesNGOsare and thegovernment, finance programmes jointlyimplementedby NGOs funding beingchannelledthrough to statestructures There are instancesof government’s responsibility. the to themisseenby asprincipally largedonors HUMANITARIAN exchange fetv sucer They dononethelessseek to effective isunclear. Whether thesealternative ways ofworking willprove protection andcare. togiveeffort substancetoitslegalresponsibilities of the isencouraging forinstance, government todevelop aclearpolicyonIDPsinan OCHA, capacity. thedevelopmentencouraging ofnationalpoliciesand and government capacityforemergency response; building local between NGOsandwithUNagencies; planning andproject implementationandadvocacy, joint andsharing; such asinformation-gathering are investigating otherways ofadvancing theirwork, Others agenciesdirectly. willing tofundinternational are morethe politicalcontextchangesanddonors to conflict-andemergency-affectedpopulationswhen remaining ready toprovide assistance out thissituation, andsee ofactionisto the onlycourse ‘hunker down’ Somefeelthat with thisinanumber ofdifferent ways. NGOsandagenciesare comingtoterms International toconsiderable problemshas given rise andtensions. context interventions withinabroader ‘development’ Trying emergency-type torun situations isnoteasy. ways ofworking andtheresponse tothesedifferent Balancingthesedifferent andtheauthorities. donors dothey Nor reflect therelationship between priate. popular andsuchoperatingprocedures seeminappro- thegovernment isrelatively isgood, security however, ofthecountry, Inmostparts or itsrepresentatives. associate themselves toocloselywiththegovernment demandsthatagenciesdonot ofpersonnel security The are plannedandimplementedonaproject basis. Emergencyinterventions models. not developmental, many NGOshave usedhumanitarian, On theground, such adecision. mayand multilateral donors well bereluctant totake governmental fortheUgandangovernment, support Given political thegeneralinternational government. tothe reduction inpoliticalandpracticalsupport implyinga decision, asmuch asatechnical, a political, reverting toemergencyrelief would represent approach, Having madetheswitch toadevelopmental tures. andstrengthen governmentlegitimise andstatestruc- to the abandonmentofneutralityandconsciousefforts includingamuch biggerscale, has very different features, Development assistance jealously guard theirneutrality. delivered by organisationsthat impartially fied needs, gencies istypifiedby aproject-based response toidenti- actioninconflict-related emer- humanitarian However, approaches (SWAps) andgeneralbudget support. project-based suchassector-wide instruments usingprogramme-based ratherthan counter HIV/AIDS, and poverty to eradicationandtoassistwithefforts economicdevelopment programmes ofdemocratisation, focused onworking withthegovernment toimplement and multilateral donorinstitutionshave increasingly Donornations ratherthanhumanitarian. developmental, hasbeenpredominantly tance tothecountry assis- over thepast15years, sive statehave meantthat, perceptions ofUgandaasastable andprogres-External SILENT EMERGENCIES 9 describes (Kampala: (Kampala: War and Hunger War Uganda’s Recovery: The Recovery: Uganda’s Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March Charles Mampasu (London: Amnesty International, Decentralisation and Civil Society and Civil Decentralisation Uganda: ‘Breaking God’s Commandments’: Uganda: ‘Breaking God’s has worked in relief and development has worked References and further reading and References Rights in Protecting Human Uganda: Breaking the Circle, Zone War the Northern and Government Firms Role of Farms, Publishers, 2001). Fountain Apolo Nsibambi (ed.), 1997). Robert Gersony, Army Resistance the Lord’s Destruction of Childhood by The Amnesty International, 1997). (London: War of an Ugly Anatomy for the Congo: Scramble International Crisis Group, 2000). (Washington: Collier, Reinikka and Paul Ritva Quest for Good Governance The in Uganda: 1994). (London: Zed Books/SCF, Fountain Publishers, 1998). Fountain Macrae, Zwi and Joanna Anthony The extent of the crisis in Shabunda extent The region is particularlyThe Shabunda isolated. It is the largest territory province, in South Kivu covering kilometres, than 25,000 square more and home to a million people.over east of It is in the extreme DRC; centre, the administrative Shabunda, is nearly the capital,3,000km from Kinshasa. This isolation is the lack of communications.compounded by There no telephones,are no postal services and no radio. Only landing strips the territory keep from being completely cut off. is Conflict in Shabunda important in promoting long-term development for long-term important in promoting development the country, of much failed it has the but address to people. emergency-affected needs of Moreover, the development,commitment to political rather than humanitarian assistance, contributed to appearshave to of these needs.the downplaying Efforts encourage to standards,minimum consis- and professionalisation in the humanitarian response tency of emergency the factsector underline for that this is no reason neglect, response.When a proportional rather for a but country than 550,000 IDPs, more has the surely should be substantial. response Mark Adams Africa since 1997. the Horn of Africa and projects in East carrying out an for Irish NGO GOAL, In 2001, he worked needs assessment in Uganda. emergency is: [email protected]. His e-mail address the effect that this neglect has had in Shabunda Shabunda: the ‘forgotten Kosovo’ ‘forgotten Shabunda: the has become war complex and brutal four-year the DRC’s the international relief community, For but insecurity and neglected emergencies. Humanitarian need is desperate, another of the world’s relief. distance mean that large areas of the conflict are isolated from any The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is in the The Democratic Republic grip conflicts – internal, of some nine individual international and internationalised – among six national armies and 21 irregular groups. than More died,2.5 million people have and this only in areas based. NGOs are where Isolated and cut-off regions forgotten,are and fear in which their and the poverty donors and by not been addressed have people live agencies alike.most relief Currently, only one inter- national NGO, (MSF), Médecins Sans Frontières is in Shabunda. active address the pressing needs of emergency-affected of emergency-affected needs the pressing address that exist. constraints the within populations However, such as for initiatives even limited remains funding these. to to respond that it is unable ECHO has claimed international from NGOs proposals project emergency the given have agencies because different in Uganda information. unreliable and therefore office inconsistent Oxfam attempt by an to carry out a comprehensive Yet country of the has of IDP needs in the west survey in is also inconsistent interest indicated that there and surveys.funding assessments last year, In November Oxfam only 50% funded. reported was that the study At the same time, unwilling or seem donors themselves to clarifyunable the criteria use to decide whether they or not a particular situation is a humanitarian emergency functional – donorsor not.This wish do not is obviously ‘technical’ by to be constrained criteria responding into when decisions are to emergencies or not responding made as much,probably if not more, on the basis of and political considerations.resources However, without such clarity, good-quality informationnot necessarily is action that the donors sometimes to prompting the key suggest. Effortsgenerally to establish NGOs by the through response for emergency standards minimum and the Quality Platform, Project Sphere recent and independent Australia to develop efforts CARE by criteria for emergencies, to important are initiatives emergency response. these inconsistencies in address In this context, be doomed. may they however, human cost of neglect The have we boxes Uganda does not fit into the neat constructed for managing aid programmes. The country in some places, is peaceful and stable in but others the midst of long-term is in and often violent conflicts,extremely the are in which civilians principal target. The support of most bilateral and is donors government multilateral for the present HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:32 am Page 9 Page am 10:32 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 10

widespread, and depredation by armed groups common. Hundreds of people have been killed, and many exist in a climate of fear and acute insecurity. Many have taken refuge in jungle areas, or in towns where relief agencies have a presence, like Bukavu, Kalima and Kindu. Others have resigned themselves to these conditions, and joined armed bands.

Once the granary of Kivu, Shabunda today faces hunger and widespread malnutrition. Traditional subsistence agriculture is at a standstill, livestock rearing has been decimated and fisheries have been destroyed. People are living off tubers and manioc leaves, which grow wild along the roads. Signs of marasmus and Kwashiorkor are everywhere, and malnourished women are unable to breastfeed their children properly. Facilities for processing agricultural products, such as palm nuts and rice, have been destroyed, and jobs are largely non- ©Fiona Lloyd Davies existent. Although Shabunda is extremely rich in mineral resources, their exploitation is monopolised by the Great Lakes Mining Company, an operation set up by one of the area’s rebel groups. Six armies and 21 irregular groups are fighting Rates of morbidity and mortality have rapidly in Shabunda increased; four out of five children die before they reach five years of age.There is very limited access to primary health care. The only referral hospital in What needs to be done Shabunda is in ruins. A health centre, run by Catholic In the face of this disaster, well-planned emergency aid nuns, serves a population of some 35,000, and cannot could play a triple role. It could provide a space for hope to meet demand. Five or six patients share treat- people to commit themselves to a range of peace ment courses meant for one, and the single doctor is initiatives; supply the means for local and international the only one in the territory.The territory’s 50 or so aid agencies to set up a forum for cooperation; and be dispensaries cater for a population of 1.5m – one for a catalyst for raising financial and material resources to every 30,000 or so people. Only the Shabunda facility provide immediate relief and promote sustainable has anything like adequate supplies. Illnesses that had development. Given the depth of need, this work been eradicated, such as smallpox, chickenpox and would need to proceed in stages. measles, have reappeared. Meanwhile, widespread rape of women and young children by armed groups has First stage: led to high rates of HIV infection.What schools exist • strengthen the capacity of local civil society to are without equipment, and have little prospect of publicise humanitarian disasters, through technical getting any. Over 95% of children no longer have training and technical, financial and logistical access to any education at all. In the face of this support; disaster, new local groups have proliferated: associa- • organise an inclusive awareness-raising meeting for tions of young Christians, women, widows, parents of the benefit of both the authorities and the benefi- school-age children, small planters, fish farmers and ciaries; brick-makers. • focus on the most vulnerable; and • make the beneficiaries aware of the need to repair Why has Shabunda been forgotten? the roads and landing strips to allow access to relief Given the scale of the humanitarian crisis in supplies. Shabunda, how has it remained unknown to interna- tional relief agencies? The answer lies partly in the fact Second stage: that those who wield power in the territory wish it to • draw up the best possible inclusive intervention remain unknown because this allows them to continue policy, together with beneficiaries, local organisa- to exploit the territory’s mineral wealth in secret. tions and local authorities; and Second, high levels of insecurity make any relief work • set priorities together. dangerous; ASCDES, for instance, has moved its coor- dinating office out of the territory. Insecurity has also Third stage: reportedly reduced access for MSF. Third, unlike • identify and set up centres where humanitarian Kosovo, the DRC in general is regarded by many interventions can be based. Western governments and donors as an overwhelm- ingly big and complicated crisis, of little direct Any intervention will also need to identify main

SILENT EMERGENCIES strategic interest or threat. spheres of activity.

HUMANITARIAN 10 exchange SILENT EMERGENCIES 11 (London, , July 2001. , July Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March is the Coordinator of the Shabunda is the Coordinator Informations sur l’ONG ‘Actions Informations sur l’ONG Crisis and Hope in Africa Crisis and Hope in Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies with Working (London: Zed Books, 2000). , 26 July 2001. , 26 July Rapport des Quelques Infrastructures Rapport des Quelques References and further reading References Prendergast, John 1996). IAG-COG, Charles Mampasu, pour le Développement Solidarités Chrétiennes ASCDES en Sigle, Economique et Social’ ASCDES, Recensées Simon Fisher, for Action Post-Soviet Chechnya Post-Soviet up in 1991, Union broke As the Soviet Chechnya Federation. the Russian independence from declared as Georgia such However, the Union republics unlike and Moldova, status as an autonomous Chechnya’s position within Russia placed it in a different republic under international law.Union republics, The position in practice, their whatever legally were states within the Soviet to be sovereign considered Union. Chechnya, contrast, by sovereign did not have status, has not and its declaration of independence internationally.been recognised Perversely, this has attempted that never meant that Union republics secession, Belarus, such as into in effect forced were independence, Chechnya, while a region like that the to wipe out, state had striven Russian and then Soviet within a political framework compelled to remain was that it rejected. incarnation Russia is the third of Russian Post-Soviet had to deal. statehood with which the Chechens have The experience has turned out to be no better than the two.previous collapse, after the Soviet Immediately when democracy and anti-imperialism in the air, was the Russian authorities came close to recognising Chechen independence; on their side, Chechens were ‘asso- formula to accept a compromise such as prepared ciate membership’ of the Russian Federation. However, as Russians became disenchanted with economic reform nostalgicand increasingly for the certainties of the Union,Soviet elections approached, and presidential • livestock; rebuild and • training to farming technical provide groups. Charles Mampasu Chrétiennes (Actions Solidarités ASCDES organisation Social). His e- Economique et pour le Développement mail is [email protected]. , the more the Chechen ‘problem’ becomes just another forgotten crisis or one ‘problem’ becomes , the more the Chechen Dmitry Furman Dmitry to existing services; groups; breeding barrows, pickaxes, saws, and machetes; axes masonry tools; and teachers help in the running and to pay of projects schools. Russia, Chechnya and the international community and the international Russia, Chechnya Yet, and terrorism. at all, it sees a hotbed of extremism looks at Chechnya When the outside world says it will impose itself later the more forcefully September, more target of US anger after 11 The current Chechen crisis 1991, began either in their independence from when the Chechens declared Russia, or in 1994, separatists down. decided to put the Boris when Russian President The roots Yeltsin deep.of the conflict are In the nineteenth century, Chechen opposition to Russian imperial expansion led to a series and uprisings, of wars brutally which were suppressed; an estimated 1,500,000 Chechens where at the start of the nineteenth in Chechnya lived century,the census listed just 400,000.This 1926 Soviet the into continued and repression sequence of revolt ‘second’ Russian empire, Union. the Soviet During the the Revolution, that followed war civil the Chechens ‘White’fought against forces. initially The Bolsheviks to according the Chechens self-government promised Islamic law, and the Chechen culture and promoted of the nation.development However, the bureaucratic at odds and totalitarian state was character of the Soviet and traditions,with Chechen values and uprisings during period.continued the Soviet in Under Stalin 1944, deported en masse to Kazakstan Chechens were ceased to exist as an Asia and Chechnya and Central Union.entity within the Soviet Up to a quarter died during resettlement, murdered. or were Khruschev, Under as an reconstituted was Chechnya ‘autonomous republic’ within the Russian Federation, and surviving deportees returned. the Chechens, For not only an episode of great the deportation represents suffering, which has also a humiliation – a trauma but Russia within for Chechens to live made it impossible as a national minority. Health and nutrition: • supply essential drugs and medical materials; • the logistics for dispatching these products provide • set up feeding centres,• and aid-distribution centres; management; train staff in resource • village pharmacies; set up community • distribute agricultural tools to farming and fish- Restoration of the infrastructure (roads and landing and (roads of the infrastructure Restoration schools): and health centres strips, • volunteers; identify village groups rehabilitation of • distribute and materials: equipment spades, wheel- • metal sheeting, provide nails, saws,• planes and income-generating train education staff in setting up HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 11 Page am 10:33 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:33amPage12 12 SILENT EMERGENCIES neteeybod n mrlcnlc.InKosovo, an extremely bloody andamoralconflict. but alsointheattitudeofoutsideworld towhatis treatment atthehandsofsuccessive Russianregimes, notonlyintheir senseofinjusticelies, The Chechens’ The impact ofinternationalneglect beworse thandefeat. the longterm may in term intheshort forRussiavictory form.Thus, andperhaps inmore virulent take again, upthestruggle new generationofChechenswilleventually emergeto a surrender, exhaustedanddepleted, Even ifthefighters, consent toChechnya oftheFederation. remaining part by they reason willalsonever oftheirhistory tarily, Chechens donothave theforces todefeatRussiamili- Whilethe against thevicissitudesofRussianhistory. andtosecure themselves against aseconddeportation, independence asthebestway ofprotecting theirnation pendence inde- Infact, asothernations. accorded thesamerights they have notbeen of democraticpoliticsinRussia, end oftheSoviet Unionandthesupposedemergence given the Chechens have why, notbeenable tograsp the Conversely, than hispredecessor tostepdown. conflict thandid andwouldYeltsin, finditmore difficult Putinhasstaked more onthe Moreover, toral process. control Putinisexerting over themediaandelec- given thestronger todayimportant thanitwas then, Public opinionismuch less cult thanitwas in1996. along thelinesofKhasavyurt willbemuch more diffi- achieving anagreement However, ning toweary ofit. Russiansare andordinary begin- have much needofit, nolonger theauthorities conflict, case withthefirst As was the AzerbaijanandGeorgia. refugees inRussia, ofthepre-conflict populationare nowmajority but itisclearthatthe people now live inChechnya, of theSecond World Nooneknows how many War. battles afterthegreat asStalingrad isasruined Grozny, The two Thecapital, wars have devastated Chechnya. ratherthanChechenmilitants. work ofprovocateurs, bombings inMoscow andelsewhere may have beenthe there issuspicionthatthe certainly, Chechen separatism; the politicalobjectives ofMoscow’s élitethanwith the latestround offightingmay have more todowith have somecommentators suggestedthat earlier episode, Aswiththe re-entered Chechnya inSeptember1999. Russiantroops which have never beenfullyexplained, other Russiancitieswhichleftalmost300deadand ofbombblasts inMoscow andaseries and Dagestan, republic of intotheneighbouring Chechen fighters Following by incursions stepped down inDecember. whobecameactingpresident when Yeltsin Putin, with theemergenceof Vladimir Yeltsin’s successor, andislinked the Chechenconflictbeganinlate1999, thesecondphasein After three years ofrelative calm, issue ofChechnya’s statuswas deferred. but the Russiantroops withdrew from Chechnya, ments, UndertheKhasavyurt agree- political useforthewar. inelections1996,Yeltsinhis victory hadnofurther Following andconflictbegan. Positions hardened, tion. Yeltsin seizedupontheChechenissueasausefuldistrac- HUMANITARIAN exchange per se sntteam ahr Chechenssee rather, is nottheaim; togyaantti,ee f vnuly independence eventually, even if, strongly againstthis, tional law globalconditionsmilitate andcurrent interna- Chechnya independenceinthenearfuture; It isunrealistic toexpectthatRussiawillgrant have shown any sympathy withtheChechencause. least becauseIslamicextremism istheonlyforce to not onlylater, Theconflictbecame ‘Islamised’ Union. in theBalticstatesaround thecollapseofSoviet ratism was modelledontheindependencemovements Chechensepa- Atthestart, picture ismore complex. the However, for theUS-led ‘campaign againstterror’. andMoscow’s support in thewake of11September, Russia’s unchallengeable positionhasbecomevirtually extreme Islamandtheforces of ‘global terrorism’. but asafightagainst as apoliticalcontestforpower, not Russiahassuccessfullypresented theconflict, third, And would bedangerous. Chechens by Russianforces, abuse against raisingtheissueof human rights instance, taken placesincetheSoviet collapse.To for offenditby, large andpowerful nationdespitethechangesthathave andremains a Russiaisstillanuclear power, Second, andIngushetia. but Georgia heading forGermany, refugees from Chechnyathe world’s are not backyard; istakingplacein ontheotherhand, Chechen conflict, The and directly affectsthemajorEuropean powers. theKosovan conflictisinEurope,Kosovan war? First, different fromconflict sostrikingly theattitudeto attitudeto the Chechen Why istheinternational has always beenexceptionallyweak. the world theChechenconflict community during pressure onRussiafrom Bycontrast, Macedonian state. also achieved themostthatthey couldinaunified Macedonian Albanians haveunder NATO protection. Kosovo is into pendence orcondoneitsintegration Albania, no onehasbeenprepared Kosovo togrant legalinde- Even though response andsignificant Western action. prompted afull-scalemilitary of Chechenopposition, which was thanRussiansuppression much lesscruel Serb suppression ofKosovar Albanian separatism, de facto Grozny: anewStalingrad?

needn rmBlrd,and independent from Belgrade, ©MSF SILENT EMERGENCIES 13

©Peter van Quaille , juche 18, March Chechnya: Calamity in Calamity Chechnya: Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March (Providence, RI: Watson Institute, Watson RI: (Providence, Humanitarian Exchange is director of the Commonwealth of is director of the Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power Tombstone Chechnya: Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Action in the Caucasus: Humanitarian (New York: New York University Press, 2000). University York New York: (New Famine will persist in North Korea Famine the Caucasus Greg Hansen, Guide for Practitioners in Russian. Also available 1998). – and the Failure Misery of Chechnya ‘The Davis, Austen of Humanitarianism?’, 2001. References and further reading References Anatol Lieven, Press, 1998). University Yale CT: (New Haven, Waal, De Thomas Carlotta Gall and Collusion and shadow plays Collusion and shadow This manipulation is first of all North is Korean.There no doubt that the humanitarian crisis the country in is severe, of and that the country a number has suffered and floods. natural disasters in the shape of droughts it is also clear that the regime has used these events Yet as an excuse for the wider failings of the economy. principleThe fundamental North of Korean roughly translated as ‘self-sufficiency’, translated as roughly sits uneasily with the tonnes of rice sacks,‘Gift of the stamped and more gruesome.more and victory Russian prove will Even self-government real towards steps unless short-lived taken.are the international For community, helping out of their to find a way and Chechnya both Russia only a moral obligation, deadlock is not present an but act of self-interest. Independent States Research Center at the Russian Research Independent States of Sciences Institute of Europe, Moscow. Academy Dmitry Furman Dmitry , this is not so much a hidden crisis as a masked and manipulated one a hidden , this is not so much Jean-Fabrice Piétri Jean-Fabrice Manipulating humanitarian crisis in North Korea Manipulating humanitarian and related illnesses between starvation died from have may An estimated 3.5 million North Koreans in need of food aid. a third of the population – are – over 1995 and 1998, and more than 8m According to North Korea is in the midst of acute humanitarianNorth Korea crisis. the largest allocations of with one of Even – almost a million tonnes food aid in the world – famineannually will persist; North many Koreans grasses. and edible subsist on roots This crisis is most secretive, unfolding within one of the world’s states,closed and inaccessible with a regime that appears impervious to the terrible conditions in live. of Northwhich the bulk Koreans In the face of complete economic collapse and virtually total inter- national isolation, to proclaim the regime continues West, the imminent victory over and to socialism’s of its Dear Leader, figure eulogise the near-mythical Il. Kim Jong in the countryOutsiders – for who manage to work the most part humanitarians, and, UN employees exceptionally,a journalists discreet few extremely – are see.about what they aid organisations, For this silence is perhaps understandable: of the the nature given regime, is to quiet is crucial if aid work keeping this silence masks a deeper manipulation continue.Yet of the conditions in the country,whereby human need is used to conceal political agendas, the both by outside powers the key and by regime in Pyongyang in maintaining it. with an interest is the only workable outcome. only workable is the Nevertheless, inter- the some formula, to devise can help community national partially if it is only the parties, to acceptable even face, save Russia to allow which would while giving for self-government. guarantees real Chechens The ‘deferred status’ formulaKhasavyurt of a not entirely is bad thing. However, international for the guarantees missing in the crucialagreement are (and were agreements,Khasavyurt were which meant that they the start),dead from with international monitoring of their implementation. to consent Securing Russia’s monitoringsuch guarantees and be extremely will difficult, though not impossible. However, this requires immense, degree any effort. single-minded achieve To of success, concernreal all is a above what is needed for the problem. future The 11 September, before Even conflict was the Chechen Western than a minor embarrassmentno more to leaders.thinking about it has stopped Now,West the extremism. of except as a cauldron altogether If of the to the realities indifference Western continued conflict confirms Chechens in their sense of isola- the tion and injustice, will only become bloodier the war HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 13 Page am 10:33 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:33amPage14 14 SILENT EMERGENCIES antb lal dniid whatisleftofthehuman- cannot beclearlyidentified, populations inasmuch asthemostfragile strategy, Korea toaclearhumanitarian doesnotcorrespond Ifwe believe thattheaidbrought toNorth system. hasfoundaperfecttoolintheUN this strategy, inorder toimplement community, The international What oftheUN? aid. mask ofhumanitarian ithastojustifyitselfby donningthe own legitimacy: and thatpoliticalactioncannolongerproduce its there isnolongerany politicalactioninandofitself, Itseemsthat thatsuchachoiceisbeingmade. fact must notallow themselves tobeusedconceal the they allthesame, But suchapoliticalchoice. judging organisationshave Humanitarian nobusiness collapse. and thushelpprevent andpainfulpolitical abrutal ofthisiron aninsidiouscorrosion regime, the system, inputs canonlyfavour aprogressive of metamorphosis that maximisingthecountry’s openingto ‘Western’ Thekey ideais concept. been calledthe ‘soft landing’ basedonwhathas alogic West Korea: tofeedNorth But there isalsoamore positive thatleadsthe logic morecapacities are worrisome. far ofapotentialenemyface –Chinawhosemilitary to keep itsmainalliesinthearea underpressure inthe andalso presence inthiskeyimportant zone, strategic tion mainlyallows tomaintainan theUSmilitary Some Russiandiplomatsslylysuggestthatthissitua- Korea? onNorth spend hundreds ofmillionsdollars reach Japan? Isitreally fearthatleadsthe West to developing nuclear weapons andmissilesthatcan supposedly regime, the West propping upa ‘rogue’ ofan President Bushtobepart ‘axis ofevil’? Why is recently declaredaid operationsinacountry by does the West sustainoneoftheworld’s largestfood Why So tootheNorth’s apparent threat’. ‘security is notthecase. but everybody pretends thatthis absurdity ofthesystem; to dowiththeclimateandeverything todowiththe haslittle economic catastrophe suffocatingthiscountry Everyone thatthe fullyunderstands hasfailed. regime namelythatthe toavoid actors the various thereal issue, but everyone plays thegameinorder toallow anyone, thesestatementsnolongerfool of thislittlegame, Aftereightyears overflows causesexceptionalflooding. andevery river that is calledanunprecedented drought, every hydrographicof real causes.Year deficit afteryear, a naturalcatastrophe thantohave toargueonthebasis convince torespond toanemergencycausedby donors easierto itisfar forinstance, For theUN, these games. community hasplayedThe international itsown in part even whileitspeoplestarve. anditsdevelopment weaponry,with security ofstrategic itsobsession justifiesitsparanoia, theregime attack.Thus, been onawar-footing forfearofimminent ‘capitalist’ has theNorth For halfacentury, imminentwar. another: Thisshadow play follows as thesamelogic Nampo. of thatare heapedonthedocksideatport USA’, HUMANITARIAN exchange decision basedonabeliefintheregime’s willingness a KoreaNorth have decidedtoremain silent, Thoseorganisationsstillworking in concerned. Korea aidprogrammes inNorth of international is asthelogic seeingany results tangible asfar admit, we have to without, Korea, remained inNorth both withtheUNandNGOsthathave we therefore launcheddiscussions tional community; hand inwithapublic debatewiththeinterna- hadto go suchadifficultdecisionnecessarily ACF, For and painful decisiontowithdraw Oxfam from Korea. ACF North –totake the CARE, MDM, thatledanumbersation offailure ofNGOs–MSF, Itisthisreali- antee genuine accesstothesepeople. guar- inreturn, morally unjustifiable ifitdoesnot, Butsuchasilencebecomes maintained thisposition. we Koreansassist North where lives were atrisk, we could ourrole by aswitnesses, sacrificing that, Aslongaswe couldhope delivered Korea. inNorth aidwas being tions underwhichhumanitarian thecondi- limited itspublic declarationsconcerning like otheragencies, ACF, Between 1998and2000, Silence andmorality seem keen toseekmediaattention. andwhy theUNagenciesdonot not highlypublicised, This iswhy Korea foodaidprogrammes inNorth are aidgoes. in theinstitutionswhere alltheinternational but they are not Korea, inNorth dying ofmalnutrition There are children provincestricken we worked in. themost Hamgyong, ofNorth and kindergartens andthe1%level foundinthenurseries stood at15%, which between overall levels ofsevere malnutrition, Contre laFaim(ACF) notedtheastonishinggap Sometimeago,Action way meansaccesstothehungry. accesstopublic institutionsinno Korea, InNorth tures. are excludedfrom thesestatestruc- vulnerable members, by definitionitsmost ofthepopulation, that alargepart refused toengagewith: and onethattheUNhassofar produce any proof ofthis–stillleaves thekey point, –thoughtheyare have correct never beenable to Even ifwe they acceptthatthusfar it. with distributing the presence ofthisaidinthepublic tasked structures becausethey cancontrol most vulnerable populations, they that thefoodthey are donatereaches certain the andclaimthat conduct massive foodaiddistributions, TheUNagencies Korea. mentation ofaidtoNorth approach canbeseeninthemethodology oftheimple- Korean andapolitical analysis oftheNorth crisis A concrete exampleofthisgapbetween ahumanitarian causes. instrumentalisation idealsthatthis between politicalandhumanitarian andabouttheconfusion tion ofUNagencies, questions needtobeasked abouttheinstrumentalisa- But these politicalchoiceswere ornot. pertinent itappearwhether will whenresults are known, later, only the situationandaimstoproduce politicaleffects: This engagementproceeds from apoliticalanalysisof Korea.political decisiontoengagetheUNinNorth we are notarguingthe UNICEF? Letusbeclear: mandateofagenciessuchasthe itarian WFP or SILENT EMERGENCIES 15 , Kim Il-song’s Korea Through Through the Korea (New York: Basic Books, Basic York: (New Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March The Two Koreas Two The (Washington DC: Brookings, 2000). (Washington The Prospects for North Korea’s Survival for North Korea’s Prospects The (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999). Praeger, CT: (Westport, References and further reading and further References J. Solarz, Hunter and Stephen Helen-Louise North Korea Reese, David Adelphi Paper 323 (Oxford: OUP for the IISS, 1998). OUP for the IISS, 323 (Oxford: Adelphi Paper Ralph C. Hassig, Dan Oh and Kong Looking Glass Don Oberdorfer, 2002). www.kcna.co.jp. (KCNA): Agency News Central Korean There is little industryThere in the north-east, and agricul- is backward.Althoughture the north-easthas substan- of oil,tial reserves natural gas, limestone-dolomite and coal, of these political violence means that much go unexploited.Thereresources is also huge potential power,for hydroelectric harnessing but this raises and political issues.environmental In 2001, the Indian prime a $2 billion development minister announced package for the area, in the short but term insurgency and the trade in small arms will remain and narcotics people. young for the region’s options attractive The oldest insurgency is in Nagaland.main Naga The militant group, of the National Socialist Council Nagalim (Isaak-Muivah), claims a territory six times the Nagaland,size of present-day most of including Manipur,Assam, as parts of as well Arunachal Pradesh and Burma. Assamese nationalism emerged in the against immigration late 1970s as a protest from ‘foreigners’ Bengal and the influx of West from Bangladesh.Assamese insurgent The most prominent for group is the secessionist United Liberation Front Asom (ULFA). has lost some of its While the ULFA mass appeal, of violence and it is still a major source instability. The Bodos,Assam the largest plains tribe of with an estimated population of 1.1m, fighting for are indigenous rights and tribal in a majority empowerment non-tribal state.They in 1987 to demand the mobilised of a separate state,creation Bodoland, since and have non-Bodos,been driving away especially the Santhals, to Bodo areas.The into exclusively their strongholds make a pattern of ethnic cleansing that is missing Bodos have the ULFA,from to their insurgency response and India’s military. has been predominantly Indian response The political and military efforts The Indian government’s met with to deal with these various insurgencies have , the outside world knows virtually nothing about the crisis there knows , the outside world is Asia Desk Officer, Action Contre Action Asia Desk Officer, is Siddharth Deva India’s volatile north-east volatile India’s Yet, other part of the country. any than north-east has seen more violence in the last 50 years India’s reports Jean-Fabrice Piétri Jean-Fabrice la Faim. to change and on a perception of significant progress significant of on a perception and to change to work. allowed are agencies genuine A way in the subject, place on this take debate must the UN but this for far too avoided in particularagencies have long. imposed on the silence benefits from Everyone the crisis North – except the in North Korea people. Korean is apolo- when the UN At a time ‘failure’gising for its during genocide, the Rwandan ‘inaction’its of foresight’‘lack in Bosnia and its in Timor,East formulating of is it already expressions ‘blindness’ for its regret in NorthKorea? More than half of all Indians killed in political violence than half of all Indians More north-east.in the 1980s and 1990s died in the The with armedregion is bedevilled insurgencies or seces- 50 groups. over from sionist movements Thousands of died,people have are more of thousands and hundreds internally displaced, in unhygienic, living camps; makeshift is little year, every disease.Yet die from hundreds about conditions in a region the size of the UK. known ‘Quasi-martial’ for journalists it difficult makes – law in the region, – to work Indian and foreign while security concerns, obstruction and the government political situation hamper aid and highly sensitive efforts. protection Sisters) constitute as the Seven known states (also Seven the Indian north-east: Assam (the largest and most important), Nagaland,Arunachal Pradesh.Together, and cover they Meghalaya Mizoram, kilometres, Manipur,a total of 255,000 square with a combined Tripura, 30 million.Thepopulation of over region is connected neck of land, a narrow of India only by to the rest the 21km-wide Siliguri corridor. It borders China, Burma, Bhutan and Bangladesh.Assam, the exception of With rivers.this is a region of huge mountains and fierce It is 200 tribal groups and sub-groups. home to over Christianity is the majority religion in Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland, substantial are and there Christian minorities of the region. in the rest of the insurgencies roots The and complex many Although each of the region’s and history, roots conflicts has its own they together raise common issues to do with language and ethnicity, human rights,resentment, tribal rivalry and ethnic migration, local resources,over under-development, access to markets, of the decay control feeling of political institutions and a widespread the Indian state. exploitation and alienation from HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 15 Page am 10:33 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:33amPage16 16 SILENT EMERGENCIES The key liesina toasaferfuture forthenorth-east A more stablefuture? is ahotbedofPakistani intelligenceactivity. thenorth-east For New Delhi, by ChinaandPakistan. atdestabilisation ofwiderefforts discontent but as part notasexpressions oflocal insurgencies inthenorth-east New Delhiviews the training inPakistan andhave andChina. received BhutanandBurma, Bangladesh, Dissidentgroupshave soughtrefuge inNepal, aspect. The insurgenciesalsohave acomplicatingregional oflocalleaders. much totheirritation political life, east play adominantandmeddlesomerole inlocal Delhi-appointedgovernors inthenorth- cratic process. againstthebackdrop ofashambolicdemo- militants, trapped between arepressive government andintolerant Thelocalpopulationis compounded theproblem. have ofdailylifeintheregion militarisation only Delhi’s intensive counter-insurgencyoperationsandthe New Althoughaceasefire isinplace, the Nagatribes. theNSCN(I-M)doesnotrepresent Moreover, all states. toother belonging onterritory because they infringe complicatedthepicture however, of theNagashave, ambitions Theterritorial exclusive negotiatingpartner. where ithasacceptedtheNSCN(I-M)asits Nagaland, thesameapproachgovernment in tobetrying appears Indian recognised figure withinthepolitical system.The allow aninsurgentleadertoemergeasofficially totheIndiangovernment’sattributed willingnessto anditspositive outcomesare anti-insurgency policy, Mizoram isoftenviewed asthemodelofasuccessful ‘development package’. fited from significantfundsfrom ofa thecentre aspart hassincebene- Mizoram in thenewly-pacified state. andmakingtheMizoleaderchiefminister Mizoram, signed apeacedealendingthe20-year thegovernment insurgencyin Inthemid-1980s, mixed results. key issuesofdebate,andputsforward recommendationstofurtherdialogue,and toguidepolicy andpractice. Detailed analysisislacking, andfewguidelinesforpolicy orpractice have beendeveloped. This paperclarifiesthe cooperation, establishingpolicy andnegotiatingthemorecontentious‘greyareas’onacase-by-case basis. result, thecapacitytoalleviatesufferingwillbediminished.Stillotherstakeapragmatic approach tocivil-military the sameframework, thereisadangerthathumanitarianobjectives andprincipleswillbecompromised;asa and desirable. Othersbelieve that,intheattempttobringpolitical,militaryandhumanitarianobjectives within Some analystsconsiderthismergingofhumanitarian,politicalandmilitaryrolesgoalsinevitable,practical humanitarian aimsthatithasengendered. Afghanistan following theattacks of11September, andtheincreasinglyexplicitlinkageofmilitary, politicaland tional communityasawhole. These questionshave onlybecomemoreurgentinthewake ofthewar in ciple, aswellpolicy andoperational questionsnotonlyforhumanitarian agencies,butalsofortheinterna- encroachment intowhat hastraditionally beenseenas‘humanitarianspace’raises significantissuesofprin- Since theearly1990s,militaryforces have becomeincreasingly involved inhumanitarianassistance. This HUMANITARIAN exchange A bridgetoofar:aidagenciesandthemilitary inhumanitarianresponse by Jane Barry with Anna Jefferys. January 2002 HPN Network Paper 37 inlcmuiy andgiventional community, theattentionthey deserve. people ofIndia’s benoticedby theinterna- north-east Onlythenwillthe anddevastation. human misery whichhascausedsomuch violence intheregion, impactofdecades to address thehumanitarian against any grouporlocality.This may betheonlyway aspirations ofpoorpeopleanddoesnotdiscriminate the promise ofgenuine development thatmeetsthe inIndia’s with north-east peacemust be today, ‘bought’ Aswith Afghanistan only improve ifpeaceisrealised. will situationinthisregion thehumanitarian Ultimately, more intensive atreconciliation. efforts and process andstronger civil societyinstitutions; astrengthened democratic work withlocalleaders; awillingnessto toleranceoflocalcontrol; greater cially ontheneedsofpoorandsociallyneglected; focusingespe- economicdevelopment, of whichare: ingredients theprincipal better mixofIndianpolicies, Oxfam GB. Siddharth Deva India Northeast’, Autonomy: InsurgenceandInstitutionalDevelopment in Jyotirindra Dasgupta,‘Community, Authenticity, and (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,2001). Atul Kohli (ed.), East India B. P. Singh, (New Delhi:RupaandCo,2001). Prakash Singh, Report S. Parasuraman andP. V. Unnikrishnan(eds), References andfurtherreading May 1997. (New Delhi:OxfordUniversity Press,2000). (New York: OxfordUniversity Press,1987). The ProblemofChange: A Study ofNorth- Kohima toKashmir:Onthe Terrorist Trail The SuccessofIndia’s Democracy Journal of Asian Studies is Policy Adviser forSouth Asia at , vol. 56,no.2, India Disasters HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 17

PRACTICE NOTES Aid responses to Afghanistan: learning from previous evaluations

This article distils nine key lessons from previous eval- uations that have direct – or potential – relevance to Afghanistan today. More than 50 formal evaluation reports were drawn on, supplemented by key evalua- tive studies. While there are unique aspects to the current situation in Afghanistan, many elements, and their likely evolution, stand comparison with previous crises and international responses. If aid actors learn the lessons of the past, there is a real opportunity to get relief and rehabilitation right.

Lesson 1: develop a coherent policy framework that recognises ‘humanitarian space’ ©MSF Aid cannot be a substitute for political action. In the absence of a just and sustainable political settlement, the Will we get relief right this time? potential achievements of aid will be modest. International responses are most effective when the full range of tools and forms of influence (political/diplo- together and to achieve meaningful changes. Where matic, military, economic, administrative, legal, social, these conditions are not met, as at key points in rule of law and human rights instruments) are Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Sierra Leone, the situa- employed in a complementary manner. At the same tion can rapidly deteriorate, and conflicts resume and time, policy coherence should not lead to the integra- deepen. Inclusiveness and ‘local ownership’ should be tion of all these tools into one monolithic management seen to embrace not only the leadership of different framework.They should be seen as complementary but factions, but also key elements of civil society. In different, sometimes uncomfortable, bedfellows. Somalia, early efforts to establish a centralised, interna- Humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality tionally-recognisable form of government played into and the provision of aid on the basis of need have to be the hands of factional ‘warlords’. Later strategies respected in relation to humanitarian work; overriding undercutting the power-base of such factional leaders or disregarding such principles is likely to lead to by strengthening the standing of elders, traditional reduced access to at-risk populations, and endanger the leaders and women’s organisations have been broadly lives of humanitarian aid personnel. effective. However, the potential and procedures for transferring and scaling-up such initiatives are unclear. As a result of the UN-led Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (SFA) process launched in 1997, the inter- Lesson 3: approach and manage the situation national community has significant experience of as a regional crisis attempting to achieve policy coherence in Afghanistan During the crises in Rwanda, Somalia and Kosovo, the PRACTICE NOTES (see Chris Johnson’s article on the SFA, page 19). international response initially failed to take into However, the SFA did not realise its full potential as an account the regional nature of these emergencies, and aid coordination mechanism.The lessons of this expe- the need to coordinate approaches inside the affected rience, including both the importance and the diffi- country with approaches in neighbouring states. This culty of putting into place a functioning SFA, should requires some form of regional political framework be heeded. Particular attention should be given to the and the involvement of regional and sub-regional need for a clearer conception of the role of aid in organisations. The so-called ‘6+2 Group’ of interested relation to politics; agreement is needed on the appro- states (Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, priate role of aid, and structures and programmes Turkmenistan and China, plus the US and Russia), designed accordingly. together with the UN, would seem to offer a key element of such a framework. Lesson 2: international engagement must be long-term and inclusive At the operational level, a regional approach requires: High levels of international engagement need to be sustained for many years in order to create the ‘space’ • appropriate arrangements within organisations and necessary framework of incentives and disincen- where two or even three separate departments may tives to enable all parties to learn to live and work be responsible for Afghanistan and its six neighbours;

Number 20 • March 2002 17 HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:33amPage18 18 PRACTICE NOTES the activities ofagencypersonnel. andaidagencies canendanger tions ofhumanitarian Confusionofroles andoflocalpercep- aid delivery. between andother suchforces andany humanitarian aclearseparationhastobemaintained the conflict, larly inthosesituationswhere they are belligerents in andparticu- roles, forces undertake security military Where external restoration ofvitalinfrastructure. may playmilitary ausefulrole intheimmediate the capacity ofthosechannelsisnotsufficient, contexts where fightinghasjustendedandwhere the In orcommercial suppliers. than humanitarian several timesmore expensive perunit ofaiddelivered Kosovo andEast Haiti, Whatevidence there issuggeststhatthey are Timor. Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq, forinstanceinnorthern operations since1990, delivery roles inmany ofthelarge-scaleemergency aid of assumed varyingdegrees ‘humanitarian’ and peacekeeping forces military haveExternal protection rather thanaiddelivery forces shouldbetheprovision ofsecurityand Lesson 5:theprimary role ofexternal military behaviour ofthosebeingcoordinated. ofcoordination mechanismsandthe performance andbenchmarksforassessingthe developing criteria organisations shouldcollectively take theleadin Donor of operationalagenciesandsectoractivities. andintheirselection cipal coordination mechanisms, in vesting responsibility greater intheprin- behaviour, coordination mechanismsthrough theirown nationalandlocal play international, insupporting multilateral donor organisationshave role to acritical and Bilateral their abilitytoaccessfinancialresources. exercise control over physical accessby agenciesand wasagency personnel reinforced by anabilityto refugee campsin where strong by leadership Tanzania, suchasEast Timor andinRwandan some places, Coordination hasbeengoodin national agencies. level ofprovision served by different forbeneficiaries withwidediscrepancies inthe was markedly bilateral, initialrelief responsesuit theirinterests.The inKosovo disregard coordination mechanismswhenthey donot Many organisationsandagenciestendto unclear. are where linesofauthority nation mechanisms, overlapping coordi- scale responses generatemultiple, Large- perceptions assistance. oftherole ofexternal andaffectinglocal sendingunintended ‘signals’ tive, where disjointedaidislessthanfully effec- contexts, potentiallyvolatile Coordination isvitalinsensitive, structure andleadership Lesson 4:coordination requires clarityof clearaccountabilitiesframedaccording tothe • a cross-border communication/media strategyso • goodcommunication andregular face-to-face • HUMANITARIAN agreed divisionagreed oflabouramongorganisations. and to realise them; ofintervention are structured aid andotherforms aboutthegoalsandhow are informed that allactors states; Afghanistan andneighbouring contact between key working personnel in exchange optto’aogognstos andcreate the areperception bene- thatagenciesandtheir personnel amongorganisations, competition’ spur ‘bidding rolesfrom andjobs, theirnormal draw goodlocalstaffaway office andhousingrents, Suchinfluxes drive up inKosovo some300. present, approximately 200organisationswere Rwanda, In feature interventions. ofhigh-profile international Unmanaged influxes ofaidagenciesare anincreasing thatare notassociatedwithviolence.partners local andidentifylegitimate growth ofcorruption the sametimecare needstobetaken toprevent the at while resources torebuild localconfidenceinthem, Institutionsandorganisationsneedsufficient country. community’sthe international commitmenttothe of that increased localsuspicionsaboutthesincerity tion capacityofcentralandlocalgovernment –adelay took aconsiderable timetobuild uptheimplementa- level was thatit anddisruption sogreat ofdestruction the InRwanda, androutine. security sense ofprogress, increating a oflaw, withtherule those concerned particularly activities andfunctioninglocalinstitutions, daily roleevidence ofnormal pointstothecritical evaluation However, altogether clearin Afghanistan. may notbe notion ofwhatconstitutes ‘normality’ the ofconflictandinstability, After suchalongperiod institutional capacity Lesson 7:strengthen, useandsupportlocal costs ofrecurrent debtrelief andtheunderwriting • clearschedulesandassignedresponsibilities for • theestablishment ofatrackingsystemforaidflows • and tothefield, ofspendingauthority delegation • prefer- offundsforrecovery rapiddispersal needs, • oflaw fortherule (judiciary, earlysupport • theessential ajointneedsassessmentthatprioritises • avisionoftheend-goalswhich isshared by the • ments ofbestpracticepointtotheneedfor: assess- Current developmentlonger-term assistance. relief provision andthedelivery ofrehabilitation and sitions reveal continuing disjunctionsbetween initial Evaluations ofrelief–rehabilitation–development tran- flexibility andstrengthened monitoring transition requires delegationofauthority, Lesson 6:therelief–rehabilitation–development to deliver goods, services andprotection. services to deliver goods, sense ofconfidencethatthere are inplace structures elements ofrecovery localpopulationsa giving for civil administration are oftenimportant and development programmes; rehabilitation and undertaking to theirsuccessors hand-over from andagencies emergencypersonnel andensure accountability; gies communication strate- inform corrections, course and benchmarkmeasures inorder toenable mid- nationals; donor-country functionsor projects, no tyingoffundstoparticular ably through acommonfund; andlandtenure institutions; security/policing) elements ofbasicneedsandpeace-building efforts; donor community andkey local actors; PRACTICE NOTES 19 , and The (New (Boulder, Loya Jirga Loya NATO and NATO , Occasional Recovering From Recovering Winning the Peace: Winning Learning from Somalia: The Learning from Somalia: Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March Assessing 20 Years of Humanitarian Years Assessing 20 (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Wissenschaft (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Humanitarian Action: Learning from Evaluation Humanitarian (Paris: Médecins du Monde, 1999). (Paris: References and further reading and References ALNAP, 2001). ALNAP/ODI, Annual Review (London: ALNAP Clarke and J. Herbst (eds), W. Armed Humanitarian Intervention Lessons of Press). CO: Westview Salomons, and D. S. Patrick S. Forman, for an International Response Conflict: Strategy 2000). Center on International Cooperation, York: A. Suhrke, Sandison and M. Barutciski, P. R. Garlock, Concept and Lessons Learned of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 1996). Politik, Baarda and M. Sommers, Van T. L. Minear, Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of An Independent Evaluation Refugee Crisis: Kosovo Preparedness and Response Emergency UNHCR’s 2000). UNHCR, February (Geneva: Schumer, T. Cross and P. Kuhne, W. Crisis Action in the Kosovo Humanitarian 2000). University, RI: Brown 36 (Providence, Paper (ed.), Trintignac F. Action This article is drawn from a paper submitted to a Senior from a paper submitted to article is drawn This Assistance Committee meeting of the Development Level Niels Dabelstein, the Chair of the OECD by of the (DAC) in December 2001. Aid Evaluation, for Party Working DAC Borton based on contributions from John paper was The for Development Ian Christoplos (Collegium (ALNAP); Eriksson (Operations John Studies, Uppsala University); (Center on Forman Department, IBRD); Shepard Evaluation NYU); Hans Lundgren International Cooperation, War and Larry Minear (Humanitarianism (OECD/DAC); Macrae and Joanna University); Tufts Project, paper is avail- full The Group, ODI). (Humanitarian Policy website at www.alnap.org. ALNAP able at the the Great Lakes and Somalia, and Lakes the Great use for be adapted could Afghanistan.in for ensuring Mechanisms lessons that incorporated are operations new into previous from in developed insufficiently operations are and on-going organisations,many system generally. and in the aid A is the Learning field level mechanism at the potential ALNAP. by Support concept developed Office country will return to the chaos of the early 1990s. Authority,Afghan Interim The agreed in Bonn in December 2001, and plans for holding a summarises the findings of the Review (including disarming and per se Chris Johnson Afghanistan discharge); ii) life; reinsertion into civilian and iii) society. and reintegration into the economy Lesson 9: accountability and learning need strengthening mechanisms structures in the accountability of aid Weaknesses been recurrent findings of many organisations have evaluations. a particular to responsibility Donors have consistent standards leadership in promulgating provide of accountability to beneficiaries of their assistance, as as to taxpayers.well been Codes of conduct that have in,developed for instance, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, fiting more than the local population.The the local than more fiting heightened rein- Afghanistan in and religiouscultural sensitivities of international the number the need to limit force and personnelagencies and the quality and ensure staff.Thetraining of the to contain way most efficient of expatriateproblems and disruption dominance is to prioritise local engagement of identification and the actors, and rehabilitation and national emergency even structures remain and governmental national where fully legitimate.The or not weak significant skills and Afghan diaspora Afghanistan and the capacities within and harnessed;should be recognised this will require donor organisations. leadership and action by the and control Lesson 8: understand economy’ ‘war can be an important activities Semi-legal and illegal for factional conflict and for sustaining motivation faction leadersAfghanistan, in power. In illegal the key commodity is narcotics. Early efforts to rehabilitate irrigation of food production systems and re-establish will be required,and other legal crops with together of illicit trade. the role efforts and reduce to regulate will require programmes Drastic narcotic-substitution safety nets for people made destitute.After such a long period of conflict, Afghanistan faces real the very violence. chronic of entrenched prospect Evaluative and points to the need for demobilisation evidence economies. of war and reduction the regulation Experiences Ethiopia, from Namibia and Uganda demobilisation: phases for effective suggest three i) demobilisation The Strategic Framework Review: lessons for post- lessons Review: Framework Strategic The Taliban designed to promote greater coherence between the Afghanistan was for Framework Strategic The Review concluded Framework the Strategic later, years Three assistance and political wings of the UN. that it has failed. of hope and with a mixture Afghans look to the future fear.that, Hope war, decades of than two after more something good will finally happen; fear that the HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 19 Page am 10:33 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:33amPage20 20 PRACTICE NOTES this ‘failed state’. this ‘failed of withtherulers Memorandum ofUnderstanding –despitehaving tosigna ‘surrogate government’ also justifiestheideaofUNsystemactingasa statenotion non-élite politicsfrom Thefailed below. activity is to build theonlylegitimate a interlocutors; nalised statedoesnotprovide acceptable political andcrimi- afailed ofpeace-making, the purposes For Afghanistan (UNSMA)were seenasproblematic. oftheUNSpecialMissionfor alliance strategies thediplomaticmediationand At thesametime, has beenfragmentedandrebuild whathascollapsed. thatpromise oftechnologies torejoin what a series into theaidprogramme istransformed state, In afailed theSFA. underpinned The notionofthe state’ ‘failed should by eachother’. andbe informed ‘inform actors assistanceandhumanrights cated thatpolitical, itadvo- Rather, brought undercommonmanagement. SFA didnotrequire tomergeorbe thesethree pillars The were distinguishedasitsthird institutionalpillar. but itwas notuntillaterthatthey totheSFA, integral were rights Human always forpeace. opportunities political andaidmissionsinorder tomaximisethe UN thatinvolved coherence greater between the Itsetoutanew role forthe coordinated andmanaged. the way thataidinconflictsituationsisorganised, The SFA was anexampleofthesignificantchangein conflict resolution andsocialreconstruction. tosuchthingsas and stabilitythrough contributing asitsactivities areinsofar thoughttopromote peace role aidtakes onasecurity Thus, global security. and inclusionbecomesa thepromotion ofdevelopment ment andexclusion, as threatened by forces associatedwithunder-develop- isnow seen insecurity Sinceinternational and security. had alsoledtoarethinking oftheconceptspeace relationship betweenThe changing aidandpolitics theUNwas thinking reflecting thisclimate, • assistanceinconflictsitua- therole ofinternational • developments were underway: two other Externally, with scantregard foreachother. conflictingcourses andoftenpursuing cant impact, withthe tomakepolitical andaidmissionsfailing any signifi- was inastateofcrisis, meanwhile, work, TheUN’s consolidated theirpositionin Afghanistan. SA aeit en n19,the (SFA) cameintobeingin1998, FrameworkBy thetimeStrategic for Afghanistan Background totheStrategic Framework made successfully. significantly affectthechancesofthattransitionbeing objectiveshuman rights oftheUNinterconnect will assistanceand How thepolitical, to seelastingpeace. ical transitionwillhave totake placeif Afghanistan is Butapolit- eventual electionsconstituteabeginning. HUMANITARIAN through itsrole andorganisationalstructure. and calls forreform; tions generallywas and subjecttogrowing criticism exchange strategic act that contributes to act thatcontributes Taliban had the UNSMAsaw differed inmany ways. Afghanistan under The workings ofUNSMAandtheaidagencies notunity. bywas division andanimosity, characterised therelationship between politicsandaid In thefield, number ofproblems andcontradictions. The workings oftheSFA inpracticesuffered from a The SFA inpractice had few obvious solutions. and political –forregional Western governments that economicand ofproblems –humanitarian, series Thisposeda werecontrol andlegitimacy evolving. ofeconomicdevelopment forms andpolitical illiberal, ifoften local andglobalnetworks andinwhichnew, anadaptive systemthatrelied onlinksto complex’, Afghanistan was betterseenasan political ‘emerging thereview teamfeltthat Rather thana state’, ‘failed event, changing the changing event, Inthe Coordinator’s OfficeandtheCivil Unit. Affairs not helpedby thepoorrelations between theUN inamore coherentaddressing mannerwas humanrights and favoured above economicandsocialrights others, anincomplete agendathat UN tendedtopursue The alongwitheconomicandsocialrights. concerns were toaddress political/civil aloneintrying rights assistanceactors both inside Afghanistan andinPakistan, andvery littlecommitmenttoprotection concerns tion, Intheabsenceofmeaningfulpoliticalatten- it deserved. Council northeOHCHRtackledwithseriousness was anissueneithertheSecurity theculture ofimpunity, Another key problem thattheSFA was unable toaddress andhadlittleinvolvement in SFA, Afghanistan. Human Rights(OHCHR)was leftoutoftheoriginal thattheOfficeofHighCommissionerfor fact protection inthefieldwere by the alsoundermined toadvance Efforts humanrights competing priorities. inaculture ill-equippedtodealwith principles the SFA toimplementhumanrights –but withefforts were of rights part acceptedby mosttobeanintegral not somuch withindividuals orobjectives –human problem wasstrategy forpromoting humanrights.The institutional obstaclesthatworked againstaviable FrameworkThe Strategic toovercome alsofailed ences thatcannotjustbecoordinated away. Theseare differ- such asisolationversus engagement. tional community toowas divided onkey questions, interna- many aidactors.The did notseemtoconcern thoughthis they penalisedthelatter, 2001, February ByclosingtheUNSMAofficesin manipulation. andshowed themselves adeptat aid andpolitics, Council.The totheSecurity andreported not ‘project funded’, itwas andhadnopretensions totransparency; dential, regarded itcollectedasconfi- much oftheinformation It notincrease it. so wanted development torestrict aid, not explicitlyaddressed intheSFA. anissue was thelack ofattentiontorefugee protection, Anotherconcern proved almostimpossible foragencies. Taliban oea ou tt hnafie tt,and more asarogue state, statethan afailed Taliban Taliban themselves distinguishedbetween ’s issues approach torights PRACTICE NOTES 21 Humanitarian Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March was the Director of the Strategic was , by Mark Duffield, Patricia Gossman and Mark Duffield, Patricia , by 19, September 2001. The Review of the Strategic Framework for Framework Strategic Review of the The regionalglobal links, and its activities to adapt and actors; of non-state account to take system: to the aid responsibility delegating aid policy vacuum; a broader cannot fill to securityrelation concerns, limited; was of impunity; culture the prevailing and concerns, in neigh- Afghanistan and both inside bouring countries. asks whether the aid community can succeed in asks whether the aid community learning them. from messages Key is that the The principal message of these evaluations included – lacked international – NATO community rapidly to large-scale emergency the capacity to respond • by could not be resolved political problems key • a strategic ability of aid to play the role, in especially • serious to addressing needed to be given attention • to protection needed to be a commitment there and analytical problems systemic revealed The Review contradictions,itself and among the both in the SFA agencies involved. of problem Rather than a technical coordination, differences intrinsic of politics, and role and unresolved the nature over remained assistance and rights. of 11 September have the events While some of the specifics redundant,rendered the question of the international engages with how community importantAfghanistan is more than ever. The Review’s serious need to give conclusions argue for the continued Afghanistan;political attention to that for a recognition will be no long-termthere stability unless a proper of impunity and attempt is made to end the climate human rightsaddress issues; and for an assistance commu- for a country goals nity that can put shared of ahead for profile.agency mandate and the desire Afghans have much;suffered no less than that the interna- deserve they risestional community to these challenges. Chris Johnson Framework Monitoring Unit at the time the Strategic a freelance consul- She is now undertaken. Review was tant. Afghanistan 2001. See published in September was Leader, Nicholas For Assistance website: www.pcpafg.org. Afghanistan the and a descrip- Framework more analysis of the Strategic Strategic Harrison, ‘The tion of its principles, see Penny A and Principled Common Programming: Framework Assistance’, Challenge to Humanitarian Exchange on learning the lessons of the Kosovo crisis on learning the lessons of the Kosovo more respectable to the aid system, respectable more and under- conflict between politics and aid – and having conflict between to take,decided which course it wanted back it accordingly; cile, or judge between, competing priorities; understanding of the political and economic Afghanistan and their operating in networks Raymond Apthorpe Raymond at least a dozen agency-commissioned evalua- are There tions of the international in Kosovo, aid response and articles dozen essays with another three together in intent.similarly evaluative Although their quality, vary greatly,taken they together and coverage credibility of an aid response.This article view assesses a broad give emerging messages these evaluations, from the key and Was international emergency relief aid in Kosovo relief international emergency Was ‘humanitarian’? In the assistance community more generally, more community assistance In the the political,diverse of agendas and institutional assistance of policy the level and donorsagencies prevented required. that the SFA coherence This could be seen the evolu- dominated that agency agendas in the way of up the architecture elements that made tion of the the SFA, local, of the in the resilience and short-term, characterise that interventions most project-level Afghanistan. in work also be seen in the resis- It could tance of both donors coordination and agencies to of engagement. issues over been agencies have UN resistant,notably expect to hardly the UN can yet effortlead a coordinated cannot coor- if UN agencies dinate among themselves. of the reason While much institutional agendas of agencies, for this lies in the donors as they responsibility bear perhaps the ultimate for making the delegated responsibility simultaneously Taliban their funding by mined the chances of this happening insisting on engagement at the practices and by level. project institutional rivalries by also plagued and was The SFA an what was discredit to jealousies that did much and bold initiative.imaginative However, the reasons primarily not seen for its failure were as managerialor organisational in nature. Rather, a major unre- aid and politics represented between the relationship donor and inadequately analysed issue between solved governments. situation Implications for the current Review lessons of the Strategic Framework The key that: were • the the international needed to resolve community • to recon- ways the UN system needed to develop • a better the political mission needed to develop HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 21 Page am 10:33 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:33amPage22 22 PRACTICE NOTES sation behaved ‘just like thecommunist party, tomethattheorgani- NGOreported an international oneKosovar employed by littlepositive issaid; ment, there issomeevaluation ofhumanresource manage- among theaidagencieswere alsolessclear-cut.Where Conclusions aboutissuestodowithhumanresources tively supportive. ratherthan construc- were debilitatinglydispossessing, theseinterventions inaword, commercial contractors; consultative andover-dependent on ‘in-and-out’ non- interventions canbeseenasperemptory, Thus, architecture schoolsandavibrantindependentmedia. from tohealthclinics, kindergartens civil society, Kosovo hadbeenforced tocreate theirown parallel Albaniansin For adecade, community intervened. employed whentheinternational inreconstruction problems forapopulationthatwas already fully Someseethisashaving created time –atdevelopment. not–this atrelief, amounts ofbilateralaid ‘thrown’ Alltheevaluations commentonthelarge contested. there are othersignalswhichare weaker ormore loudandclear, In additiontothemessagesthatring Weaker orcontestedmessages (itdid). doesn’t rain’ Camp Hopewas quicklynicknamed ‘Camp –hopeit The Americans’ guidelineswereconstruction lacking. acceptthatgood Even ofthemilitary members aswell asrapidly.whether they were built efficiently, there was doubtasto However, tical importance. were logis- ofgreat built, of therefugee campssoldiers forexampleintheform that NATO’s contributions, The evaluations oftheaidresponse generallyaccept orfromeither ontheground theair. provision forprotection was available forcivilians, No protection activities from March toJune 1999. outits place inwhicheven theICRCcouldcarry emergency assistancemeantthatnoframework was in Yetactually atstake was protection. theemphasison was what Ratherthanemergencyassistance, context. inamore typicalemergency the conflicthadoccurred have beensufficienttoprevent large-scaleepidemicsif ronmental healthinterventions would probably not thequalityofsanitationandenvi- Furthermore, cies. (including remittances) thanthoseinotheremergen- healthier andwithbetteraccesstogoodresources The refugees were relatively betternourished, actuallyoccurred. asclassicallydefined, emergency, noassistance Bysomestandards, tions concerned. of would andshouldconnotefortheorganisa- ‘crisis’) (anddifferent types –ofwhatexactlya purposes ‘crisis’ ambiguous conceptualisation–foroperational This lackofdueprofessionalism extendedtoatbestan ruled. of sort ‘institutional amateurism’ a Instead, neglectedordeniedinthefield. unknown, for behaviour inacomplexemergencywere either Professional codesofconduct guidelines were bypassed. trainingand Even where they existed, professionalism. Theseevaluations alsonoteasignificantlackof needs. HUMANITARIAN exchange oiisatgte.Tu,theseevaluations over- simplify thecomplexitiesofSerbo-Albaniantensions, Thus, politics altogether. orallows evaluations toevade ingful politicalanalysis, ineffectserves asasubstituteformean- ‘ethnicity’ Thiskindofphoney analysisasto simply as ‘ethnic’. thisislabelled evaluations dospeakaboutthe conflict, Ontherare occasionswhenthese their own mandates. agencies inquestionperceived through thelensof thatthe uations tendtorefer simplytothe ‘crises’ theseeval- instead, ispracticallyabsent; word ‘conflict’ Even the thatisessentiallypoliticalinnature. crisis ofa results inthe the conflict.This ‘humanitarianising’ take intoaccountthesocialandpoliticaldynamicsof theseevaluations to generallyfailed Fundamentally, andmuch istreated anecdotallyorerroneously. tions, much ismissingintheseevalua- Despite theirmerits, Absences: thepoliticsofKosovo crisis may have worked better.and OCHA, WFP between theOSCE, division ofresponsibility, adifferent Arguably, fromheavily allangles. criticised UNHCRwas have beenassignedtoUNHCR. of whetherthehigh-level coordination role should oftheseevaluations None addresses the question case. two oftheseevaluations suggestthatthiswas notthe levels? Oneor more operational, atlower, forthcoming where goodcoordination was the response overall, of this inandofitselfaccountformuch inthepattern but did level coordination was andstrategic lacking, Higher- someinteresting questionsare raised. offered, Yet commentis where serious thanthat. farther analysisdoesnotgomuch like mostevaluations, Also isblamed foralot. ‘poor coordination’ gencies, allevaluations emer- As invirtually ofallinternational issues were reportedly ‘forgotten again’. gender asever, –and, anddeparture onarrival briefing lackof training, lackofappropriate assignments, term ofshort- pattern withafamiliar other emergencies, asin tohavemanagement appears beenthenorm, Unprofessional personnel case foreign –staff’. knowing onlyhow tolookaftertheirown –inthis and cominginfrom afar, withresources, rich powerful, Large-scale need:withintwo weeks,over 100,000

people fledKosovo forMacedonia ©R. LeMoyne/UNHCR ©R. HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 23

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1 MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Secçoes), Mozambique: A Data J. Bennett and M. Kayitesi Blewitt (1996) Collecting System Focused on Food Security and Population 19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what relief Movements by T. Dusauchoit (1994) workers need to know by J. Darcy (1997) 2 Responding to the 1991/92 Drought in Zambia: 20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and The Programme to Prevent Malnutrition (PPM) by Support of Aid Personnel ed. S. Davidson (1997) D. Mukupo (1994) 21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience 3 An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia by by I. Levine (1997) M. Duffield (1994) 22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis by 4 Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours - The Political Economy P. Atkinson (1997) of Relief and Rehabilitation in the Somali Region 5, Eastern 23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Ethiopia by K. Van Brabant (1994) Sri Lanka by K. Van Brabant (1997) 5 Advancing Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Cold War Era: 24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations by Suggested Roles for Governments and NGOs by K. C. Palmer (1998) Rupesinghe (1994) 25 Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new relief 6 The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Tanzania: initial ‘agenda’ and its limits by D. Hendrickson (1998) successes and failures in food assistance by S. Jaspars (1994) 26 The Food Economy Approach: a framework for under- 7 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red standing rural livelihoods by T. Boudreau (1998) Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief ed. 27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for J. Borton (1994) disaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998) 8 Targeting the Poor in Northern Iraq: The Role of Formal and 28 North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid by J. Bennett (1999) Informal Research Methods in Relief Operations by P. Ward 29 Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience and M. Rimmer (1995) of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda by 9 Development in Conflict: the Experience of ACORD in K. Neefjes (1999) Uganda, Sudan, Mali and Angola by ACORD (1995) 30 Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting 10 Room for Improvement: the Management and Support of Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999) Relief Workers by R. Macnair (1995) 31 The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and 11 Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha, Southern Well-being by R. Garfield (1999) Ethiopia by P. Jenden (1995) 32 Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New 12 Dilemmas of ‘Post’-Conflict Transition: Lessons from the Sector in Humanitarian Aid by C. Horwood (2000) Health Sector by J. Macrae (1995) 33 The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need 13 Getting On-Line in Emergencies: A Guide and Directory to to Know by P. Le Billon (2000) the Internet for Agencies involved in Relief and 34 NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations for Rehabilitation by L. Aris, P. Gee and M. Perkins (1996) Accountability and Learning by F. Grunewald, 14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: V. de Geoffroy & S. Lister (2000) Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of 35 Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Psychosocial Trauma Projects by D. Summerfield (1996) Assessing Risks by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and 15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for the Assessment P. Holzmann (2001) and Evaluation of Relief Operations? by A. Hallam (1996) 36 Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods 16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Approach by H. Young, S. Jaspars, Study III ed. J. Borton (1996) R. Brown, J. Frize and H. Khogali (2001) 17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security? by J. Cekan, 37 A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in A. MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996) Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002) 18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflict and 38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommendations Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report), by for Practice by A. Smith (2002)

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HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK PRACTICE NOTES 23 2001). , August , August 1999. (New York: Socialist (New York: (London: Zed Books, Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March is Visiting Professor at the Visiting is (Geneva: SDC, August 2001) August SDC, (Geneva: (Brussels: ECHO, August 2000) August (Brussels: ECHO, Forced Migration Review Migration Forced References and further reading and References and the Kosovo Diplomacy M. Barutciski, ‘Western Refugee Crisis’, on War ‘Making Sense of NATO’s Gowan, Peter and Colin Leys (eds), in Leo Panitch Yugoslavia’, Necessary and Unnecessary Utopias 2000). Register, Borton (eds), Apthorpe and John Raymond Wood, Adrian Action: International Humanitarian Evaluating Reflections from Practitioners Australian National University (ANU)’s National Center (ANU)’s National University Australian Professor at Studies, and a Research for Development African Studies (SOAS), of Oriental and the School His e-mail addresses are: of London. University [email protected]; and [email protected]. of a presentation on an extract article is based This Studies, made at the Collegium of Development 2001. in May Uppsala University, Raymond Apthorpe Raymond as to whether it is deserving of the label ‘humanitarian’. it is deserving whether as to label of the of international number involved. also Any are NGOs However, in to address for evaluations the problems complex, more even are Afghanistan the unstable given regional US. in the the interplay situation and of interests extent, what To effectively, how and the victims of will be reached,the war service relief the agencies or units by of the the nature Will concerned, evaluators? as by as well agencies in their into account by conflict be taken amateurism institutionalised Will rule programmes? human rightsWill issues again be translated just again? the analysis that is Will issues? into emergency assistance historically, to bear be sufficiently brought socially, informedeconomically and ethically – and to be credible will also of courseThere again be the once useful? gruesome and deaths to be done. arithmetic of lives lost, are lives many were many how with Compared how to turnsaved, out have did things why And and whose? again? this way Evaluation of ECHO Action in the Republic of Montenegro Action in of ECHO Evaluation Evaluation of the ECHO Actions in Serbia following the Kosovo Actions in Serbia following of the ECHO Evaluation Evaluation of ECHO Action in the Republic of Albania following the Albania following Action in the Republic of of ECHO Evaluation (Brussels: ECHO, August 2000) August (Brussels: ECHO, Evaluation of the Coordination Between ECHO, Political Authorities, Political of the Coordination Between ECHO, Evaluation An Evaluation of OFDA’s Emergency Response Program in Kosovo, June in Kosovo, Response Program Emergency of OFDA’s An Evaluation a regional humanitarian (Brussels: ECHO, August 2000) August (Brussels: ECHO, creating (Brussels: ECHO, August 2000) August (Brussels: ECHO, (Washington DC: USAID/OFDA, June 2001) June DC: USAID/OFDA, (Washington Evaluation of the Water and Sanitation Program in Kosovo and Sanitation Program Water of the Evaluation ? Kosovo evaluation reports held on the ALNAP Evaluative Reports Database Evaluative ALNAP held on the reports evaluation Kosovo Members ALNAP Reports restricted to J. Nagel Connolly and L. Larsen, 2000 1999-March G. Nembrini, P. Report Crisis: Final and Other Donors During the Kosovo Military Forces Report Crisis: Final G. Kieffer, C. Paoli and M. Van Bruaene, Van and M. C. Paoli G. Kieffer, Bruaene, Van C. Capouillez, G. Kieffer and M. Report Crisis: Final the Kosovo following Welch, Bruaene and J. Van M. S. Jadavji, Report Crisis: Final Kosovo Alderson, E. Picard, S. Roeh and E. Rogier, J. crisisanalysed. insufficiently are in Kosovo intervention the aid Was humanitarian ‘humanitarian organisa- the label use of The prejudiced tion’ in itself does not in these management evaluations question whether what these agencies the help answer as humanitarian.actually did qualifies other Among things, term to is taken key this depends on what this mean. and large, By however, did not these evaluations define the term.‘independent’ All of these evaluations agendas as if these pertain supply-side treat to donors only, such as if international and NGOs did not have of their own, agendas organisation-driven reli- be they gious, for that matter geopolitical. social or even If, meaning, its narrowest in to be humanitarian means lives, threatened to save did the international commu- lives more on balance save in Kosovo intervention nity’s threatened,than were or extinguished? jeopardised What is the brute lost arithmetic of the human lives in this conflict? Unfortunately,this calculation and saved is not available. decision to launch the air NATO’s campaign and rulelifted a out the use of ground forces lives. NATO But and saved on Milosovic constraint key against civil- offensive bloodier it failed to deter an even ians in Kosovo. As for the distribution emergency of assistance,relief aid for the most part emergency failed camps, those not in the refugee to reach that is around in population of the total refugee two-thirds Macedonia,Albania. in proportion and an additional evalua- Moreover, of the most convincing or three two tions suggest that this crisis, as with others, absorbed was themselves. the refugees and managed largely by Afghanistan Epilogue: and now Afghanistan the internationalWill in emergency response questions All these Kosovo ‘humanitarian’? turn out to be pertinentare here. Once again, in the emergency,military raising questions is significant involvement there while the politics of Western intervention and the role and intervention Western of the politics while in bombing of NATO HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 23 Page am 10:33 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 24

J. Alderson, E. Picard, S. Roeh and E. Rogier, Evaluation of the ECHO Actions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia following the Kosovo Crisis: Final Report (Brussels: ECHO, August 2000) I. Agger, M. J. Alderson, M. S. de Boer and E. Sondorp, Evaluation of the ECHO Actions in Kosovo following the Kosovo Crisis: Final Report (Brussels: ECHO, August 2000) O. Bakewell, W. Hume, R. Lavy and C. Piper, Tearfund Balkans Emergency Response April 1999–July 2000 Evaluation (London: Tearfund, July 2000) A. Paludan, Lessons Learnt from the Danish Refugee Council’s Involvement in the Kosovo Crisis 1998–1999 (Copenhagen: DRC, November 1999) F. Anema, M. Stone and H. Wissink, The Balkans Evaluation: An Examination of the Role of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s Response to the Balkans Crisis (Geneva: ICRC/IFRC, March 2000) M. Greene, K. Madi, R. Stevens and J. Telford, UNICEF Preparedness and Response in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency: A Joint UNICEF/DFID Evaluation (London: UNICEF/DFID, January 2000) C. de Ville de Goyet and E. Sondorp, Internal Evaluation of WHO Response in Kosovo from June to December 1999 (Geneva: WHO, May 2001) C. Schulte-Hillen, MSF Response in Macedonia to the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: A New Humanitarian Order? (Amsterdam: MSF-H, December 1999)

Public reports J. Telford, Coordination in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency: The Emergency Management Group (EMG), Albania (London: DFID, January 2000) G. Kieffer, T. de Klerk and T. Silkin, Report of an Evaluation of EUBK91 (Geneva: ACT, January 2000) P. Wiles et al., Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds (London: DEC, August 2000) R. Garlock, M. Barutciski, P. Sandison and A. Suhrke, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR’s Emergency Preparedness and Response (Geneva: UNHCR) B. Schelhas, Full Report of the Evaluation of the Kosovo Emergency Operation 6040 (Rome: WFP, May 2000)

Humanitarian action and private security companies Koenraad Van Brabant assesses the vexed relationship between humanitarian agencies and security providers

Governments, commercial corporations, aid agencies their own weak national security and defence functions.1 and private citizens in many countries are using ‘private Other governments have used (or allowed) private security companies’.The growth of the private security security companies to provide proxy services to belea- sector has been rapid, but it has also by and large escaped guered regimes, where direct official assistance is deemed public scrutiny and debate. Yet there are problematic politically undesirable.2 The growing interest in war aspects to it. Some governments, under pressure from economies, and the links between some types of private armed insurgencies, have used private armies to bolster security company and resources like diamonds, oil and

1 ‘Private armies’ are a form of private security company. They brokers, a ‘service’ that is very much in the ‘grey zone’ of stand out because they engage in combat operations, either legality, and sometimes in outright breach of it. directly or through the provision of strategic and tactical advice. 2 The Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, an inter-parliamen- Most private security companies do not do this, instead limiting tary group in the UK that monitors how the British govern- themselves to risk analysis, security audits and advice, security ment conducts its foreign policy, has shown how vague and training, the provision of guards, hostage negotiation, the inconsistent communications between British government management of security provisions on behalf of a client and officials provided Sandline, the private security company fraud investigation. Admittedly, though, the distinction is not concerned, with the scope for ‘plausible denial’, preventing always clear: there may be business ties between both cate- further judicial action. See www.publications.parlia-

PRACTICE NOTES PRACTICE gories. Moreover, several private security companies act as arms ment...9899/cmselect/cmfaff/116/11603.htm.

HUMANITARIAN 24 exchange PRACTICE NOTES 25 Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March The legal and regulatory vacuum surrounding the The legal and regulatory vacuum securityprivate been noted. sector has already Progress will be difficult,on this front inter- not least because national legislation, and hence international consensus, is required. Nonetheless, is scope for govern- there or enhance national legislation ments to develop the creation,covering of registration and activities securityprivate companies within their purview. Now existing instruments, be the time to revisit may such as Convention African Unity (OAU) the Organisation of Africa,for the Elimination of Mercenarism in which is decades old. than two more for also be possible It may informationstates to share and activities on the nature securityof private in their juris- companies registered diction, making international efforts to monitor the effective. sector more security companies private The as securityIf private to be perceived companies want The regulatory authorities The The aid organisations The First and foremost, organisations operating in aid political on their need to work conflict situations analysis, the wider political and to with regard notably humanitarian includes the changing environment.This of conflict;nature the changing and capacity of role the state; of traditional privatisation the increasing and for non-state roles domains of the state and new actors.Agencies sophisticated under- also need a more standing of the variety of organisations currently security‘private heading under the lumped together company’. Such firms a wide range, encompass from combat to ones companies that engage in active offeringrisk pure analysis and advice. organisational Agencies also need to look at their response. principles Are and ethical positions well- adequate to guide the agency in its they Are defined? securitydealings with the private does the sector? How securityuse of private companies fit with agencies’ management of the safety and securityresponsible of their staff and assets, in-house and the need to develop the humanitarianWithin competence in this regard? as a whole,community need to properly is a real there securitydiscuss the use of private companies. This terms,should not be done in theoretical on the but basis of case material and experiences aid agencies from firms.This used private that have in the is not possible ‘denial’,current climate of official because acknowl- reputation. edging taint an agency’s the facts may of politicians to provide secure conditions in which in conditions secure to provide of politicians work. do their can aid agencies state staff Some agency on them to donorsthat it is pressure putting are who securityuse private companies,aid through to get the of principles. irrespective forward Ways concernThe questions that not simple, are here us and the aid agencies, action from require the regulatory authorities security and the private firms themselves. Agency attitudes Agency security to stop using private unlikely Agencies are firms in the near future, and these ethical, legal and is there organisational questions will not disappear.Yet up to the subject. to square refusal a widespread Some that their organisation has agency staff simply deny security used a private firm,ever when it even argue that this is a false may patently has done so.They discussion,focus should be on the failure and that the Agency policies Agency their use governing policies Agencies tend not to have securityof private firms, nor is consolidated informa- to guide agencies in tion and experience available formulating such a policy. fundamental ethical, Yet at stake.political and management issues are Is it unac- for humanitarianceptable agencies to use security situa- there Are circumstances? companies under any tions when this should be considered, for instance if option for the protection doing so is the only available populations? If an agency and threatened of vulnerable securitydoes engage a private company, for instance to advise on site security or train staff, can it how that the firm Confidentiality ensure is reputable? to disclose the iden- means that companies will refuse tities of their other clients, or the full range of their activities. this information, do reveal if they Even it is difficult to ascertainvery whether the firm in question to other,is linked dubious concerns; more corporate in this industry notoriouslyrelationships are and deliberately complex and obscure. widely, More by on companies rather than relying using private forces,government agencies contributing are to the of security’,‘privatisation security whereby becomes, good,not a public only to a privilege but available it? In organisational terms,those who can afford is it on outside expertise, to rely preferable really rather up capacity internally?than building hardwoods, to the attention renewed drawn have security private of some firms. motives dubious Legal inade- tend to be mechanisms and oversight frameworks quate, UK, the like functioning states in even while international arrangements seen as toothless. widely are security companies and private Aid agencies aside,These problems national using aid agencies are and international security private companies, most commonly for risk analysis, staff training and profes- sional advice on managing a particular crisis, such as a kidnap. also been called upon to Such companies have ‘security audits’,do for site guards and to provide protection. agencies have in the past aid (Whereas security a private personnel hired from directly as a security serve to company officer, is nowadays this Security of in the field firmsrare.) active are demining, their services offered also in other have but areas, displaced of including advising on the protection populations. In doing so, become contractors they for the humanitariandepartments governmental of donors, official humanitarian benefiting from thereby aid money. HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 25 Page am 10:33 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 26

legitimate and respectable enterprises, they must prove Koenraad Van Brabant is Co-Director of the Humanitarian their integrity and credentials. They will therefore Accountability Project (HAP), Geneva, Switzerland. He is have to develop a code of ethics that is convincing author of Mainstreaming the Organisational Management both in principle and in its application, and demon- of Safety and Security: A Review of Aid Agency Practices strate sufficient transparency and accountability to and a Guide for Management, HPG Report 9 (London: convince sceptical observers and potential clients that Humanitarian Policy Group, 2001); and the HPN Good they are not hiding ‘compromising’ facts that would Practice Review Operational Security Management in contradict the image that they portray. Violent Environments, published in June 2000.

References and further reading

Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation (London: The Stationery Office, February 2002). Leonard Gaultiet et al., The Mercenary Issue at the UN Commission on Human Rights: The Need for a New Approach (London: International Alert, 2001). Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi (eds), Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (London: Pluto Press, 2000). David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper 316 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998). B. Wood and J. Perelman, The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1999). International Alert, The Politicisation of Humanitarian Action and Staff Security: The Use of Private Security Companies by Humanitarian Agencies, report of a seminar in April 2001. A. Vranckx, Private Security Services in the Colombian Context (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, 2001), http://users.skynet.be/ipis.

Mainstreaming disaster mitigation: findings of recent research So-called ‘natural’ disasters are generally recognised as a major threat to social and economic develop- ment. Here, John Twigg outlines some recent research with important lessons for the NGO community

Each year since the 1970s, natural disasters have, on Through semi-structured interviews with over 200 average, caused more than 80,000 deaths and affected the people and the collection of internal and published lives of some 144 million people, the great majority of documents, we studied 22 international relief and them in developing countries. During the 1990s, the development NGOs based in the UK, and 40 NGOs economic cost averaged some $54 billion a year. Risk in four developing countries: Bangladesh, Nicaragua, management therefore ought to be everyone’s business, the Philippines and Zimbabwe.This article summarises and measures to protect against future disasters are some of the key findings. widely acknowledged to be not only necessary but also cost-effective. The poor and socially-disadvantaged are Institutionalising policy change usually those most vulnerable to and affected by natural Mitigation and preparedness appear to be moving up hazards.This is the result of the social, economic, cultural the policy agenda in a number of NGOs, largely as the and political environment in which they live – the so- result of a recent series of major ‘natural’ disasters. called ‘vulnerability’ context.This is most apparent in the Many people in British NGOs spoke to us of the economic pressures forcing people to live in dangerous influence of Hurricane Mitch (October 1998), which, locations, but other underlying causes include popula- because of its massive impact on Central America’s tion growth, political structures, national and interna- long-term development, had forced them to recon- tional economic systems, the unsustainable management sider their approach to natural hazards.The old view of of natural resources and rapid urbanisation. disasters as one-off events is gradually being replaced by awareness of the connections between development Between October 1998 and March 2001, I and other processes and vulnerability.NGOs in Central America, researchers undertook a project to investigate the for instance, argued that the root causes of the Mitch extent and nature of current NGO work in this area, disaster lay in the vulnerabilities created by the region’s and examine the factors that encouraged or hindered wider political economy.VOICE’s position paper for

PRACTICE NOTES PRACTICE their involvement in mitigation and preparedness. the Stockholm meeting on post-Mitch reconstruction

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nous drought-resistant crops in Zimbabwe; identifying and preparing safe areas for Cambodian villagers to escape floods; the coordination of disaster preparedness and response in the Philippines; research into different farming systems’ resilience to Hurricane Mitch; cyclone early warning in Bangladesh; and training of trainers in West and East Africa.

Some important cross-cutting issues emerged. First, the overall quality of information was disappointing. NGO experiences are rarely written up and disseminated, while internal documentation was patchy. Second, monitoring and evaluation were poor, and focused on performance rather than impact. Admittedly, there are In 2000, natural disasters claimed 20,000 lives problems in assessing work whose result is that a disaster worldwide does not happen. Nevertheless, the considerable efforts to improve monitoring and evaluation in development and humanitarian circles were not reflected in the in May 1999 argued that ‘the transition to sustainable initiatives that we studied. Third, many of the projects development necessarily has to take into account endeavoured to reach the most vulnerable groups, but prevention and mitigation as key concepts for in many cases the information available could not prove reducing vulnerability’. that the NGOs were supporting such groups effectively. Until NGOs can make a convincing case that they are Shifts in thinking at the policy level have not been reaching the most vulnerable, they may find it difficult translated into regular operational guidelines and proce- to obtain funding from donors for disaster mitigation. dures for analysing and reducing risk and vulnerability. There was also a tendency for projects to address the Before mitigation and preparedness activities can immediate causes of vulnerability – for instance, living become embedded, institutions will have to overcome in unsafe locations or housing – rather than deeper the substantial barriers imposed by organisational struc- socio-economic causes. Gender-related vulnerability tures and ways of working.Within some larger NGOs, was commonly recognised, but measures to tackle it tensions between emergency and development teams were rare. There was some indication of a shift by are a particular constraint. Mitigation and preparedness NGOs towards community-based mitigation and have traditionally been discussed among emergencies preparedness projects, but in many cases it appeared that specialists rather than development teams. More gener- ‘participation’ was confined to involvement in carrying ally, pressures of work inhibit consideration of innova- out tasks, rather than in planning. tive ideas. This appears to be a systemic weakness in NGOs. In one UK agency, a project officer was Disaster terminology handling 40 local partners in two countries; in another, The formal language of disaster management contains a one was covering 52 projects in six countries. lot of technical terminology. How helpful is such language to NGO workers? We explored this by Nevertheless, committed and well-placed individuals can discussing the key terms ‘mitigation’ (which, interpreted ‘work’ the institutional system to promote mitigation broadly, means any action to minimise the impact of a and preparedness, even in large and highly-structured disaster); and ‘preparedness’ (specific measures taken NGOs. This view was confirmed by several intervie- before disaster strikes, usually forecasting and warning, wees, by our observations and by discussions with others taking precautions such as stockpiling supplies and PRACTICE NOTES who have worked in NGOs. In one medium-sized arranging for the appropriate emergency response). international NGO, a combination of a decentralisation policy, relatively relaxed head -office management, and a Interviews revealed that these two terms have little country director with a commitment to disaster work resonance with NGO workers, especially those in and a good sense of institutional politics meant that development. The majority of interviewees did not disaster mitigation was established as an integral part of use either on a regular basis. Those working in food the international portfolio, even though it sat oddly with security tend to use a completely different termi- the organisation’s other, sectoral, programmes. nology.The fact that ‘mitigation’ has no equivalent in many languages is also a significant obstacle to its Mitigation in practice wider use. Nevertheless, interviewees demonstrated a In addition to a series of reports, the research project good appreciation of disaster and vulnerability issues. produced 19 case studies of NGO initiatives in risk They were much more comfortable with concrete reduction.Activities covered included the creation of an examples than formal definitions: mitigation, for emergency loan fund by a Bangladeshi NGO providing example, was illustrated as strengthening houses to savings and credit to tribal people; the construction of withstand floods and earthquakes, crop diversification earthquake-resistant housing in Peru and Yemen; the and reforestation.We concluded that some elements of promotion of soil and water conservation and indige- conventional disaster terminology are unhelpful, and it

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may be time to discard the words ‘preparedness’ and • Find ways of fitting disaster issues into conceptual ‘mitigation’, at least outside very specialist circles. frameworks used in development thinking. The growing interest in development circles in sustain- External influences able livelihoods may be opening up space here. The research team looked at a number of external • Devise simple operational guidelines for assessing influences on NGO activity, notably availability of and addressing natural hazards and risk that can be funds and relations with government. Regarding grafted onto existing NGO procedures. funding, the picture was mixed. There is little dedi- • Improve networking between NGO staff. The cated funding for mitigation and preparedness, but enthusiastic response to our research project’s many NGOs have been able to raise funds for such feedback workshops and the inauguration of an work from development donors and budget lines.Two informal mitigation and preparedness network dedicated budget lines opened in the 1990s by the among UK NGOs are encouraging signs of Department for International Development’s Conflict interest; this needs to be maintained. and Humanitarian Affairs Department and the • Staff in NGOs committed to mitigation and European Community Humanitarian Office were key preparedness need to lobby much more forcefully, in stimulating NGO work in this area. both within their own organisations, and with other agencies, especially donors. Governments can play a major role in determining the scope and nature of NGO activities. Many NGOs work NGOs are beginning to take risk reduction more seri- with governments on disaster planning, and there were ously. Mitigation is still on the margins, but it may be signs that such engagement may be increasing.This was moving towards the mainstream at last. particularly true at local level. We found governments working with NGOs on risk mapping, NGOs providing John Twigg is an Honorary Research Fellow at the training to government staff, and NGO participation in Benfield Greig Hazard Research Centre, University government disaster committees. However, in many College London. The research project described in countries relations between government and NGOs are this article was funded by the Department for strained, even hostile. Even where they are not, govern- International Development’s ESCOR programme and ment disaster-management plans typically focus on managed by the British Red Cross. It was carried out issues relating to disaster preparedness in its narrowest by a team of independent researchers who are solely sense. A wider focus to embrace mitigation might responsible for the views contained in the research encourage greater NGO participation. reports. The reports are available online at www.redcross.org.uk/dmp; the 19 case-studies of Finally, the UN International Decade for Natural NGO initiatives are at www.redcross.org.uk/riskre- Disaster Reduction in the 1990s had almost no duction. Papers based on four of the research reports impact on NGOs in any of the countries studied. were published in Disasters, vol. 25, no. 3, The initiative was dominated for much of the decade September 2001. by scientists and engineers, failing to engage with field-level practitioners or the wider needs of vulner- able communities. References and further reading

New directions Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis and Ben Wisner, At These findings add up to a major challenge for Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and those trying to move disaster mitigation and Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994). preparedness into the mainstream of NGO work. Ian Christoplos, John Mitchell and Anna Liljelund, Nevertheless, many of these barriers can be broken ‘Re-framing Risk: The Changing Context of Disaster down.The following steps would help this process: Mitigation and Preparedness’, Disasters, vol. 25, no. 3, • Generate more, and better, evidence of how miti- September 2001. gation and preparedness works in practice – and David Peppiatt, ‘De-naturalising Disasters: Reflections on ensure that it is shared. Better evaluation and case the Changing Discourse of Natural Disasters’, unpub- studies are needed. lished paper, British Red Cross Society, 2001. • Replace some of the formal terminology of disaster International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent management with more comprehensible, everyday Societies World Disasters Report, forthcoming, 2002. terms such as ‘risk reduction’. PRACTICE NOTES PRACTICE

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INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES

Benefits–harms analysis: a rights-based tool developed by CARE International With the help of a host of prolific critics, our profession is coming to terms with the fact that, even while doing good, humanitarian action can and often does hurt people seriously. Paul O’Brien describes how CARE International is exploring one possible response: the use of ‘benefits–harms’ tools

Understanding the impact of our work, let alone vention, both positive and negative. Our review of taking responsibility for it, is not easy. The ‘ripple humanitarian interventions in East Africa, both by effects’ of interventions affect human lives and liveli- CARE and by others, revealed three key causes for hoods in many different ways. Most emergency relief most unintended impacts: workers know, for example, that introducing resources into a conflict zone can intensify tensions or promote (1) insufficient knowledge about the contexts in which peace; create revolving cycles of need or move people interventions occur; away from aid dependency; and marginalise the most (2) a lack of analysis of the unintended impact of inter- disadvantaged or promote equity and social justice ventions; and across groups and communities. (3) a failure to take action to mitigate unintended harms, or to capitalise on unforeseen potential benefits. Benefits–harms analysis aims to help relief and devel- opment organisations hold themselves responsible for To address these three challenges, the benefits–harms the overall impact of their programmes on people’s approach developed ‘Profile’, ‘Impact’ and ‘Decision’ human rights. In November 2001, after three years of tools. These tools are organised around three cate- development and field-testing in East Africa, CARE gories of rights: political rights, security rights and published a limited edition of the Benefits–Harms economic and social rights. This gives us a nine-part Package, containing an introductory Handbook and ‘toolbox’, as shown in the figure below. Facilitation Manual. In 2002, we plan to share these INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES tools with like-minded organisations. The benefits–harms ‘toolbox’

Background to the benefits–harms approach A series of crises in the late 1980s and 1990s left humanitarian organisations like CARE asking serious Security questions about their overall impact in complex crises. Decision In September 1998, CARE policy-makers, reviewing Decision the agency’s work in Sudan, committed the organisa- tion to undertaking regular ‘benefit-harms assessments’ Economic Political so as to better understand the humanitarian, political Decision Decision and security impacts of all CARE’s Sudan projects. For the next three years, the approach was developed, Benefits refined and tested in projects around Africa. Harms Security Categories Security Benefits–harms borrows heavily from the human rights Profile Impact field, which provided both the moral mandate – that we Profile Impact must take responsibility for our actions – and the substantive areas of analysis. It also learned much from Economic Political Economic Political Mary Anderson’s ‘Do No Harm’ work, which gave us Profile Profile Impact Impact practical, usable tools for reflection on the impact of our work in conflict settings. Finally, it borrowed broadly from CARE’s Household Livelihood Security approach How the tools work which, among other things, promotes holistic thinking The tools contain simple questions, designed for across sectors of intended impact, and multi-sectoral flexible use by programmers with different needs, programming where appropriate. resources, time and experience. They rely on the capacity of programmers to think, to take the time to The benefits–harms toolbox ask questions and to act upon the conclusions they The benefits–harms approach offers a set of nine tools reach. By framing straightforward questions across the that can be used in the field to help identify and human rights spectrum, the tools aim to highlight address the overall human rights impacts of any inter- both the moral necessity and practical feasibility of

Number 20 • March 2002 29 HPN exchangecrc11/3/0210:33amPage30 30 INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES this tooltoevaluate whetherourproject was putting we used forexample, the NubaMountainsinSudan, in themselves todiscussdifficultandsensitive subjects: we have foundthatCARE willallow programmers Inusingthesetools, problems orforaddressing them. eitherforcausinghumanrights are responsible, others aim topushustowards actionwhen rights-based andthey ingness torespond whenwe are theproblem, Decision toolsaimtostrengthen ourabilityandwill- protection processes.and rights and(4)community-based conflictresolution violence; (3)theunderlyingcausesof within thecommunity; ofviolence patterns (2)internal community security; threats to (1)external looks atfourseparateareas: It weaken orstrengthen people’s physical security. workers tothinkabouthow interventions caneither impacttoolasksrelief Thesecurity security. personal or liberty lives, may unintentionallyendangerpeoples’ thatrelief there isarisk In complexemergencywork, The securityimpacttool lensforlookingatsensitiveand principle-based issues. providing astructured the toolwas useful, particularly in Rwanda over ethnicrelations andpower dynamics, inourdiscussionswithstaff For example, our thinking. haschangedthenature of ation orsexualorientation affili- religious physical disability, ings basedonethnicity, CARE hasfoundthat usingthistooltodiscussgroup- and participation. freedom protection, ofpoliticalidentity, about rights tothink itasksusers andwhy? Finally, groups donot, which have whichgroups power, the community: tool thenprovokes thinkingaboutpower dynamicsin may beatissue.The ordiscrimination marginalisation where particularly groupings inthecommunity, toconsiderthepoliticalandsocial Itasksusers setting. inanythink through given anddiscusspoliticalrights The politicalprofile toolaimstohelpprogrammers tothedeliberateandclearlyrecognised. misunderstood, are movingpolitical from theunintentionaland ‘impacts’ Asaconsequence, their work isprofoundly political. decision-making power populations, tomarginalised whentheiraimistoreallocate resources or nise that, cally aware ourselves.Today, agenciesincreasingly recog- have becomeaware oftheneedtobecomemore politi- sowe actionforpoliticalends, humanitarian priated have increasingly appro- both donorandhostcountries, in opportunists, Aspoliticalandmilitary this sanctuary. we have however, beenforced toabandon recent years, In cism toavoid thestigmaof ‘political partisanship’. relief agencieshaveTraditionally, usedpoliticalagnosti- The politicalprofiletool socialandculturaldecisiontool. the economic, impacttooland thesecurity the politicalprofile tool, What follows isanoverview ofthree oftheninetools: people’s humanrights. thinking abouttheoverall impactofourwork on HUMANITARIAN exchange in ourprogramming. thesediscussionshave ledtoprofound changes times, some- And, inourprogramming discussions. critique to promote aculture ofhonestandconstructive namingtheseissueshashelped presented themselves, simple remedies toproblems have notalways While were reconciliation intoourprogramming. components incorporated Asaresult, adversaries. were between tobuild bridges missingopportunities we usedthetooltoconsiderwhetherwe In Somalia, refused fundingtoexpandprogramming inthisarea. andforseveral years creating a ‘magnet forharm’, found thatthere thatwe was were asignificantrisk We by itsmerevulnerable presence. peopleatrisk is damaging the economic rights ofaparticular theeconomicrights is damaging If aproject ofaction. rationale behindachosencourse have ledtoamuch ofthe bettershared understanding they atothertimes, discussions have ledtochange; these Sometimes, andvalues. organisational priorities speak more franklythanthey otherwise mightabout have foundthatstaffwilltake to theopportunity we Inusingthistool, constraintstochange. external and promote thinkinganddiscussionofinternal resources ordata)to oftime, skills andashortage staff staffinterests andwell-being, strategies, systems, style, management(shared valuescorporate andvision, modelfromThe tooladaptsthe theworld of ‘Seven S’ tool helpsthemtothinkthrough whatmust bedone. thisdecision socialor culturalright, to aneconomic, programmer uncovers orbenefit anunforeseen harm a When around culturalrespectnorms andintegrity. ahealthproject may clashwithlocal potential; earning injectingresources may affectmarkets and same rights; work enjoyment may ofthese actuallyundermine socialand culturalrights.Yet our promote economic, interventions almostalwaysHumanitarian aimto The economic,socialandcultural decisiontool Unit, POBox43864,Nairobi,Kenya. International East Africa RegionalManagement contact [email protected],orwritetotheCARE (if available) orpurchase additionalcopies,please you would liketoreceive acomplementarycopy development orhumanitarianorganisationand and charge foradditional copies. Ifyou work ina If thereissufficientdemand,weplantopublish workshop ontheuseofbenefits–harmstools. Manual withguidelinesforathree-day orientation tools andinstructionsforuse;aFacilitation a 20-pageintroductoryHandbook,followed by the individuals. The package containstwo documents: demand basiswithlike-mindedorganisationsand Harms Package, andwillbesharingtheseona CARE hasproduced1,000copiesoftheBenefits– With thesupportofUSInstituteforPeace, The Benefits–HarmsPackage HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 31

community, the tool helps a user consider why a out of these tools, using them to encourage honest donor or local authority may resist a change in project learning and constructive self-critique in their country design, or who might support an appropriate change. offices. Benefits–harms analysis recognises that we will always need to learn more, think more and make better Conclusion decisions in our work. That is the unavoidable conse- Many programmers understand well the potential for quence of taking genuine responsibility for the impact unintended impacts. In the real world, however, much we have on people’s ability to live with dignity. benefits–harms analysis goes on organically or intu- itively.The core purpose of the benefits–harms tools is Paul O’Brien is Africa Policy Advisor, CARE International. to help programmers share their experience and knowledge with each other. Like most matrix-based References and further reading tools, they aim to ensure that our communication is efficient (avoiding going over the same territory), Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support creative (ensuring that we at least consider an appro- Peace – Or War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). priate array of possibilities) and transparent (helping to flesh out what may be key unspoken assumptions). Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001). These tools are no panacea; humanitarian action and its Berma Klein Goldewijk, Where Needs Meet Rights effects are complex, and no one can fathom every (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1999). impact of any given project.The tools will not yield new Larry Minear, Humanitarianism Under Siege truths, or turn uncommitted amateurs into competent (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1991). professionals. Ironically, CARE has found that our more John Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy, Humanitarian Aid experienced programmers who already affirm the need and Conflict in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996). for intuitive benefits–harms analysis have got the most

The refugee experience: a resource for aid workers Carola Eyber on a training and information initiative that seeks to clarify some of the confusion surrounding psychosocial interventions for refugees and the displaced INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES

Over the last two decades, attention has increasingly been needs of war-affected people themselves. Critics maintain paid to the psychosocial well-being of people affected by that psychosocial programmes largely ignore the role that war. Humanitarian agencies have argued that the effects of culture plays in issues of distress and mental health, and violent conflict result not only in material and physical that ‘treatment’ and intervention practices tend to use suffering, but also in emotional, spiritual and psychological uniform approaches, implemented regardless of the distress. The interest in providing psychosocial assistance differing social, political and cultural context. In has led to a rapidly expanding ‘trauma industry’. A large Mozambique and Angola, for example, people use tradi- variety of programmes are instituted in war-affected areas, tional healers and diviners to help them with problems all of which claim to be alleviating psychosocial distress or caused by the vengeful spirits of those unjustly killed. In trauma in one form or the other. According to a such a context, some critics argue, it is inappropriate to European Community Task Force review, in the former use ‘Western’ psychological methods based on ideas about Yugoslavia in 1995 there were 185 such projects, being ‘talking through’ one’s emotions and memories. implemented by 117 organisations. This proliferation of psychosocial programmes has gone hand in hand with the Among aid workers, there is confusion as to what type of popularisation of the notion in the West of ‘trauma’ and psychosocial programme may be appropriate in particular Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD was first situations, and whether emphasis should be placed on identified in US Vietnam veterans, who experienced therapeutic or community-focused interventions. Some social-adjustment problems and psychological ‘symptoms’, agencies set up counselling centres, and train staff such as flash-backs, withdrawal and restlessness. It has since members in counselling techniques and other forms of come to dominate the way in which researchers and therapeutic activities, where drama, drawing and play are agency workers talk about the effects of war. used to help survivors confront and cope with their expe- riences of war and displacement. Other agencies argue Critiques that it is most important to help communities rebuild the This conceptualisation of distress and the emphasis placed structures that are central to their social networks, such as on the traumatisation of entire populations has been crit- places of worship, communal meeting areas and schools. icised in recent years. It has been argued that the trauma Psychosocial well-being, these organisations argue, is model is inappropriate in non-Western cultures, and that enhanced and facilitated through the social support psychosocial programmes do not reflect the expressed members of a community offer one another.

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‘The Refugee Experience’ dignity of the people they assist. Agger presents a case In the light of these complex issues, the Refugee example of a psychosocial project in Croatia, outlining Studies Centre at the University of Oxford and the the reasoning behind decisions made to constitute a Centre for International Health Studies at Queen therapeutic group. She discusses the approaches Margaret University College in Edinburgh have currently used, based on rights, trauma, culture and produced a training module for humanitarian workers, gender, and argues that there are no universal right or entitled The Refugee Experience. Editors Maryanne wrong methods for providing psychosocial assistance. Loughry and Alastair Ager invited a number of authors in the field of forced migration to reflect on a The module also raises concerns about the evaluation psychosocial understanding of the refugee experience. of psychosocial programmes. It has frequently been The resulting module, first issued in 1999 and revised pointed out that evaluation in this area is scarce or last year, is designed for humanitarian workers and non-existent, as many agencies rely mainly on anec- refugee policy-makers who do not necessarily have a dotal evidence to substantiate their claims of successful professional background in the social sciences, but who interventions. Alastair Ager identifies two main ques- wish to gain insight into the psychosocial dimensions tions that programmes need to pose: what are we of working with conflict-affected refugees. appropriately seeking to achieve?’; and what is the best way of going about this? The two-volume module provides an overview of the current debates and issues in the field of psychosocial He suggests that evaluation should be built into the assistance to war-affected populations, as well as training programme planning and implementation phases of a materials, such as notes for facilitators, additional refer- project, rather than added as an after-thought, or ences, ideas for an interactive cross-cultural game and a avoided altogether. glossary of relevant terms. It introduces the dominant psychological explanations for the experiences and The second volume also includes a section on devel- behaviour of refugees and forced migrants and, as a way oping communication and helping skills with partici- of explaining many of the issues confronting refugees, pants. The development of these skills assists presents a case example of a Rwandan refugee seeking humanitarians to work effectively in conflict and post- asylum in Canada.The example is statistically untypical conflict situations by improving the quality of their of the majority of refugees, who seek asylum in neigh- working relationships. Emphasis is placed on a commu- bouring countries rather than in countries of the indus- nity-participation approach; Eva Segerstroem, who has trialised world. It does, however, demonstrate some of worked with organisations such as Rädda Barnen the common challenges and problems of adjustment, (Swedish Save The Children), describes some of the skills adaptation, fear, identity and belonging that form part of and processes involved in applying the principles of the refugee experience. community participation in practice. Community partic- ipation is primarily seen as aimed at meeting the right to The main volume consists of a series of discussion self-determination, and as a basis for strengthening the guides that focus on various aspects of psychosocial community’s own resources, thus enabling refugees to work. Derek Summerfield analyses the nature of develop structures for identifying and responding to the modern warfare and its implications for psychosocial needs of individuals, families and the wider community. responses. Mary Diaz, the Executive Director of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Carola Eyber is a Research Assistant at the Refugee Children, investigates issues pertaining to gender and Studies Centre, Oxford University. displacement, discussing topics such as the situation of girls affected by armed conflict, mental health, repro- The Refugee Experience can be accessed at ductive health concerns, income generation and the www.forcedmigration.org/rfgexp. For further infor- empowerment of displaced women. The psychosocial mation, please contact: Carola Eyber (carola. needs of refugee children and adolescents are examined [email protected]); by Margaret McCallin, who stresses the need to contex- tualise discussions within a child-rights framework. McCallin also addresses critical issues such as separation, References and further reading education, exploitation and under-age soldiers. A. Ager, ‘Tensions in the Psychosocial Discourse, Non-Western concepts of mental health are discussed Development in Practice, vol. 7, no. 4, 1997, pp. 402–407. by Alcinda Honwana, who looks at how mental health J. Boyden and S. Gibbs, Children of War: Responses to and illness are understood in cultures that do not Psycho-social Distress in Cambodia (Geneva: UNRISD, primarily use biomedical explanations for making 1997). sense of these illnesses. She examines how mental P. Bracken and C. Petty (eds), Rethinking the Trauma of health is understood by local people; how it relates to War (London: Free Association Books, 1998). war and other social crises; and how people deal with L. McDonald, The International Operational Response to the social and emotional problems caused by armed the Psychosocial Wounds of War (Medford, MA: Feinstein conflict. Inger Agger’s chapter focuses on how aid International Famine Center, 2002).

INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES INSTITUTIONAL workers can help protect the sense of sanity and

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Reproductive health during conflict and displacement Reproductive health has only recently been recognised as an essential service for refugees. Although resources have been developed, Samantha Guy argues that much more needs to be done

In conflict-affected settings, the impact of displacement, violence and poor social and demographic indicators all contribute to poor health outcomes for displaced people, as well as, often, for host communities. A report by Physicians for Human Rights, for instance, indicates that over 50% of Sierra Leonean women experienced sexual violence during the conflict there. In Colombia, violence and displacement are leading to an increase in unsafe abortions, while in IDP camps in Sri Lanka, births are less well-spaced and with worse outcomes than they were before displacement.

In the early 1990s, a number of factors focused global attention on the reproductive health status of refugees Reproductive health: an essential service for and displaced populations. The crises in the former displaced people Yugoslavia and Rwanda heightened awareness of the specific reproductive health needs of refugee women. As a result of the conference, the Inter-Agency In 1994, the Women’s Commission for Refugee Symposium on Reproductive Health in Refugee Women and Children published Refugee Women and Situations, comprising representatives of NGOs, Reproductive Health Care: Reassessing Priorities, which academia and the UN, was convened by UNHCR and highlighted the increased health risks women face in UNFPA. In preparation for the symposium, which took refugee settings. The report concluded that many place in June 1995, three preparatory meetings were aspects of reproductive health care were seriously convened. During these meetings, participants identified neglected, including family planning information and what they considered to be the essential technical services,AIDS education and prevention, the diagnosis components of reproductive health in refugee situations: and treatment of sexually-transmitted diseases and INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES treatment of unsafe abortion. The report called for • safe motherhood; increased international attention to the provision of • family planning; full reproductive health services. Shortly after its publi- • measures to combat sexually-transmitted diseases, cation, the International Conference on Population including HIV and AIDS; and Development convened in Cairo. • initiatives to tackle sexual and gender-based violence; and A huge unmet need • abortion services. The Cairo conference was the first held by the UN to officially recognise the reproductive health needs of To accomplish its overall objective of institutionalising refugees. According to the Programme of Action reproductive health in refugee situations, participants adopted at the conference, ‘In planning and imple- decided that drafting a refugee-specific field manual, menting refugee assistance activities, special attention covering the technical components they had identified, should be given to the specific needs of refugee should be the primary objective of the June meeting. By women and refugee children. Refugees should be the time the symposium was held, working groups had provided with access to adequate accommodation, produced a draft manual for discussion. education, health services, including family planning’. A central achievement of the conference was its At the symposium, which was attended by representa- promotion of a comprehensive approach to meeting tives from more than 50 organisations, encompassing people’s reproductive health needs.The Programme of UN agencies, governments and NGOs, the Inter- Action calls for comprehensive reproductive health Agency Working Group on Reproductive Health in services, designed with the involvement of women, to Refugee Situations (IAWG) was formed, with over 30 serve women’s needs and advance women’s rights: members from UN agencies, NGOs, research organi- sations and governments. Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease The inter-agency field manual or infirmity in all matters relating to the reproductive system One of the key roles of the IAWG was to develop a draft and to its functions and processes. Reproductive health there- field manual. Extensive discussion and field-testing fore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe ensued, with the final version produced in 1999. sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the Building on the Cairo Programme of Action, the manual freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. establishes reproductive health within essential primary

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health care services to be delivered during an emer- inter-agency manual, is as an orientation, awareness- gency. The manual is a key technical document, raising and training tool for health care providers intended to support the delivery of quality reproductive unfamiliar not only with emergency settings, but also health services. Aimed primarily at health managers, it with reproductive health care. provides technical guidance on undertaking all aspects of reproductive health care in refugee settings. The challenge ahead Although resources are available, including guidelines One of the key purposes of the manual is to advocate a for HIV/AIDS interventions, guidelines on sexual and multi-sectoral approach to providing services, and to gender-based violence, assessment tools and training foster coordination between all partners. It also modules, as well as the two manuals described here, describes the Minimum Initial Service Package (MISP), the challenge remains to ensure that reproductive which comprises those services that are needed in the health becomes an integral component of any human- first phase of an emergency. Separate, detailed chapters itarian response. Currently, few agencies are consis- cover the technical areas of reproductive health for tently providing more than maternal child health refugees: safe motherhood; sexual and gender-based services, particularly in the early stages of a crisis. violence; sexually transmitted diseases, including There is little coordination between agencies to HIV/AIDS; and family planning. The manual also ensure that the complete package of reproductive covers reproductive health and young people, surveil- health services is provided, and agencies are not held lance and monitoring, information, education and accountable for the provision of reproductive health communication (IEC) and legal considerations. services. A concerted drive is required to translate progress at the international level into on-the-ground In 1998, UNFPA produced the Reproductive Health services for communities affected by conflict.This will Kit for Emergency Situations to facilitate the imple- involve much more than rebuilding infrastructure and mentation of the MISP described in the manual. This deploying medical teams. An integrated response was based upon kits created by Marie Stopes includes training and technical assistance to build International in 1994 for use in Bosnia.The reproduc- institutional capacity and leadership among NGOs, tive health kit comprises 12 ‘sub-kits’ for use at different governments and other players; developing and health care levels, among them condoms, oral and disseminating new materials for programming and injectable contraceptives, and drugs for the treatment of advocacy; and developing, evaluating and dissemi- STDs. There are also sub-kits with emergency contra- nating replicable service delivery models. ception for women who have been raped, and manual vacuum aspiration equipment for the treatment of post- Humanitarian agencies need to ensure that compre- abortion complications.The kits have been used exten- hensive reproductive health care is integrated into sively in crisis situations, including in Afghanistan, their service delivery.To achieve this, targeted training Albania, Eritrea, India, Mozambique and Sudan. is required for humanitarian workers and medical staff; Following an evaluation, they have been revised. reproductive health supplies need to be accessible and available from the earliest stage of the response; and Reproductive health during conflict and funding priorities need to incorporate reproductive displacement: a guide for programme managers health services. To complement the inter-agency field manual, WHO has designed a management guide, Reproductive Health Samantha Guy runs Marie Stopes International’s during Conflict and Displacement: A Guide for Programme Reproductive Health for Refugees Initiative. Managers. Following field-testing in a variety of refugee settings, the first edition was produced in 2000. The guide provides management tools to assess, plan, imple- References and further reading ment and evaluate reproductive health programmes. The guide positions the technical areas of reproductive Inter-Agency Field Manual on Reproductive Health in health within the broader context of conflict and Refugee Situations (Geneva: UNHCR, 1999). Available displacement, and includes discussion of the phases of from the Centre for Documentation for Refugees: fax: 41 conflict, emergency preparedness, guiding principles 22 739 73 67; email: [email protected]. including a gender approach, the stabilisation phase and Reproductive Health during Conflict and Displacement: post-conflict rehabilitation. The guide does not aim to A Guide for Programme Managers (Geneva: WHO, provide detailed clinical guidance on the technical areas 2000). Available at the WHO website, www.who.int; of reproductive health for refugees, since this is provided email: [email protected]. in the inter-agency field manual. Samantha Guy, ‘Health Issues Affecting Displaced Populations’, Refuge, vol. 18, no. 5, January 2000. The WHO guide also endorses a Core Package of Refugee Women and Reproductive Health Care: reproductive health interventions; the MISP by Reassessing Priorities (New York: Women’s Commission another name. It expands on the concepts behind the for Refugee Women and Children, 1994). MISP, and gives more detail on the implementation Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women and actual delivery of the package of services. One (Geneva: UNHCR, 1991).

INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES INSTITUTIONAL clear function for the WHO guide, in contrast to the

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Supporting livelihoods in situations of chronic conflict and political instability

Kate Longley and Karim Hussein on new work from the ODI on livelihoods and chronic conflict

The idea of a linear progression from saving lives to used in monitoring food aid requirements, and there is sustainable livelihoods, often termed the relief–devel- considerable interest in their further development for opment continuum, has been challenged for its inade- assessing broader livelihood requirements. However, quacy in analysing and responding to contemporary examples of the use of livelihoods approaches in situa- humanitarian crises. The continuum approach has tions of chronic conflict or instability have yet to be proved particularly problematic in situations of chronic documented and made available to a wider audience conflict and political instability, where violence and for useful lessons to be learnt. under-development have become entrenched features of the political economy, and where livelihoods are To date, livelihoods approaches have predominantly persistently or purposefully threatened and under- been developed and used in academic analysis and mined. Current relief instruments are not well- NGO practice for rural development in peaceful equipped to respond to situations such as this. Relief settings. Understanding the livelihood strategies of aid is designed to save lives, yet it often becomes the people in diverse local contexts is taken as the starting principal form of aid intervention when conflicts are point, in order to identify local people’s livelihood protracted. However, there is often a desperate need needs and goals. When working in situations of not only to save lives, but also to support livelihoods. chronic political instability, however, it is essential that practical interventions to support people in achieving While the conceptual and practical frameworks that their livelihood goals must be designed with an aware- guide aid and humanitarian programming are not ness of the potential impact of interventions on the well-equipped to meet these challenges, a small complex structures of power, conflict and inequality number of agencies have started to develop livelihood that exist in such situations. It is also important that approaches suitable for chronic situations. Other the design and delivery of such support by operational agencies have developed methodologies for assessing agencies should, as far as possible, follow humanitarian vulnerability and needs that are similar to a livelihoods principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES approach. Such methodologies are increasingly being independence.

Supporting livelihoods in chronic conflict: practical examples sought for inclusion in forthcoming ODI review

This year, the ODI will produce a series of ten Working Papers reviewing the range of ways in which liveli- hoods approaches are used by operational agencies and researchers working in situations of chronic conflict and political instability. The papers will be published by August, and seminars to launch them will be held in London and Nairobi in September.

The Working Paper series forms part of a wider programme for the testing and development of appropriate conceptual and practical approaches to inform policy-making, assessment strategies and aid programming for principled support to livelihoods in situations of chronic conflict and political instability. Case studies will include the impact of chronic conflict on rural livelihoods in Sierra Leone and Nepal; Household Food Economy Assessments in Kenya and Zimbabwe; the development of livelihoods monitoring tools in Afghanistan; participatory methods for livelihoods assessments in Kosovo; an expanded Vulnerability Assessment Mapping methodology used to assess IDP needs in Colombia; and livelihoods interventions in the Nuba Mountains of South Sudan.

The Working Paper editors would like to hear about further examples of assessing, supporting and/or moni- toring livelihoods in situations of chronic conflict and political instability; please contact Kate Longley ([email protected]) or Karim Hussein ([email protected]).

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POLICY DEVELOPMENTS The German humanitarian system Germany is one of the world’s largest donors of international development aid. Yet, says Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, humanitarian issues have failed to capture the political or public imagination

In the past three decades, Germany’s humanitarian actors, convenes on an ad hoc basis. The Committee also both governmental and non-governmental, have under- comes together for thematic workshops, usually once a gone two distinct phases of change.The first, in the 1960s year. The Coordination Committee has streamlined and 1970s, was a function of changes in the type and the allocation of funds when emergencies occur. frequency of disasters.The second was a consequence of Funding is provided rapidly, and administrative proce- German unification and the collapse of communism, dures are simple. Committee members have also been which compelled policy-makers to redefine Germany’s active in setting standards for their own work. They international role, including in the humanitarian sphere. have agreed to a 12-point voluntary code of conduct for humanitarian action, strongly influenced by the In contrast to most other Development Assistance Code of Conduct issued by the ICRC, as well as rules Committee (DAC) countries, official emergency relief for the delivery of drugs. In principle, the Committee has been kept institutionally separate from development is open to every professional humanitarian agency. It aid. Since the late 1970s, the Foreign Office, in the form has developed criteria for the admission of new of the Department of the United Nations, Human members, among them that the applicant must be a Rights and Humanitarian Aid, has had exclusive professional humanitarian agency, and must have been responsibility for international emergency relief and its active in the field for at least five years. coordination.The department has a Working Staff of 22 and a budget of 30–35 million euros ($26–30m), and The expansion of the military role finances projects in about 70 states per year. For specific The role of the military in humanitarian affairs has emergencies that exceed available resources, such as the become a central issue since the war in Kosovo, which Kurdish refugee crisis or the wars in the Balkans, addi- was the first out-of-area mission for the German tional resources come from a general budget line, which military.There is strong advocacy on this, especially in the Finance Minister controls. In major emergencies, the army’s civil–military branch, located at Koblenz. the Working Staff has set up bureaux abroad to facilitate The issue is also controversial among humanitarian coordination on the ‘frontline’. The Foreign Office agencies, and there has been heated debate over the representative for human rights and humanitarian affairs delimitation of humanitarian and military spheres. A is located at the executive level. This means that he or special commission has been set up to formulate rules she can define the role of humanitarian aid in German defining the proper roles of both actors, but has yet to foreign policy. Since 1998, this position has been filled come to a workable compromise. On the military side, by Gerd Poppe, a one-time East German dissident and the argument is focused on the technical performance member of parliament. of the military; for the humanitarians, the argument is based on humanitarian principles. Politically,a human- Subsidiarity and independence itarian role for the military seems desirable as it The process of institutional adjustment in the German enhances the visibility of Germany’s humanitarian political system has involved a series of incremental engagement. At this point, however, it seems that the decisions in the search for policy coherence. Thus, as military is reconsidering its initial position, and is elsewhere in the West there has been a tendency to perhaps playing down its potential humanitarian role. regard aid as one element of foreign policy, and linked to activities such as conflict prevention. At the same Funding patterns time, the core principle of the government’s ‘humani- Although the Foreign Office has exclusive institutional tarian philosophy’ is subsidiarity. This means that the competence for emergency relief, funding is split government respects – in theory at least – the impar- between the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry tiality and neutrality of the non-governmental actors for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). responsible for providing emergency relief. The The regular budget figures for both ministries vary government should only become directly involved between a low of roughly DM100,000m in 1976, and a when NGOs are unable to handle an emergency. maximum of around DM265,000m in 1990. In 1999, the figure was DM175,000m. The percentage available The subsidiarity principle has found its institutional to the Foreign Office for emergency relief has been counterpart in the Coordination Committee for steadily growing since the mid-1970s, from a low of Humanitarian Aid. The Committee has 26 members, around 17% to 29% by 2000. Following the overall including federal ministries, federal states, specialists international pattern, federal funding tends to empha- and major NGOs. It meets every two months, sise bilateral projects. In addition, the federal states (the

POLICY DEVELOPMENTS although in specific emergencies a sub-group Länder) spent an estimated DM14m between 1994 and

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1997 (which is the most recent year for which figures from a handful of PhD students scattered around the are available). This has probably a very limited impact, country, the Science Centre for Social Research in and tends to be more a kind of ad hoc support for Berlin is the only place where systematic research on specific local constituencies. humanitarian problems takes place. Humanitarian NGOs have likewise shown scant interest in debating Conceptual weaknesses and public apathy issues around aid. Their ability to cooperate and In formal and institutional terms, the German human- reach consensus is limited given their differing polit- itarian system is relatively well-developed. Structures ical, ideological, philosophical or religious back- are in place at the administrative, executive and parlia- grounds. This also explains why they differ mentary levels, and the major NGOs have formalised conceptually, in particular with respect to the linkage channels of access to the political system. Even if in between rehabilitation and development. practice the tendency is towards the instrumentalisa- tion of aid as an element of German foreign policy As elsewhere in the West, humanitarian issues gain and conflict prevention, continuous reference is prominence only in exceptional circumstances, when nonetheless made to the principles of independence, major crises erupt and attract media attention.This is impartiality and neutrality,both in relation to humani- high noon for charity,when the public and politicians tarian agencies, and to guide donor policy. alike discover humanitarian action. According to Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, media pressure In practice, however, things are different. The govern- ‘forced’ the German government to send helicopters ment has never really bothered to develop a coherent to Mozambique following floods there in early 2000. policy on humanitarian aid, and officials and the general This expensive action came too late and was, public have generally had little interest in the subject. according to specialists, superfluous. Another case in Gerd Poppe, for instance, is virtually unknown to the point is the delivery of frozen beef to North Korea in public. The German parliament’s Committee for 2001. Again, this costly decision was taken against the Humanitarian Aid and Human Rights, established in advice of specialists. Conversely, media attention 1992, has from the outset been predominantly preoccu- seems to do little to help most NGOs raise funds; pied with human rights, and specifically humanitarian Germany’s church organisations and the Red Cross matters have not been considered worthy of a session or enjoy an almost exclusive monopoly on access to the a special hearing. The Committee’s political impact is two official television stations, while other agencies limited because it cannot take binding decisions. The rarely feature. representatives of the different government agencies always operate under the prerogative of the political Conclusion directives of their superiors. Basic problems related to Although structurally distinct, Germany’s humani- humanitarian aid therefore cannot be decided at this tarian system by and large suffers from the same kinds level; to give one example of what this means in of problems as those in other countries.The military is practice, 18 months’ effort to try to agree general princi- increasingly intruding into what has traditionally been ples guiding the relationship between the military and humanitarian space, the public and politicians gener- humanitarian NGOs have so far failed. ally appear disinterested in humanitarian issues until POLICY DEVELOPMENTS they grab headlines and television time, and there is While issues to do with development, human rights very little effective thinking about humanitarianism and conflict attract political and wider attention, the and what it means today. humanitarian constituency in Germany is virtually non-existent.There is no intellectual community and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein is leader of the Working Group informed public debate is absent. The association of on International Politics at the Science Centre for Social German development NGOs, VENRO, is probably Research, Berlin; and Professor of Political Science at the only place where humanitarian issues are the University of Leipzig. His e-mail address is: discussed in a more-or-less systematic fashion. Apart [email protected].

HPN Network Paper 38 HIV/AIDS and emergencies: analysis and recommendations for practice by Ann Smith, February 2002

This paper argues that emergency practitioners need a better understanding of the links between emergencies and vulnerability to HIV. It illustrates how HIV-related considerations need to be taken into account from the earliest point of response to an emergency and through every stage of involvement. The paper stresses that HIV-related considera- tions need to go beyond a narrowly medical or even general health-care focus, and calls for a concerted multi-sectoral approach to ensure that the diverse and complex issues raised by HIV in emergency situations are addressed. The paper identifies key considerations that need to be taken into account, and invites humanitarian agencies to review their policies and practices, and implement any changes needed in the light of the issues identified.

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Medair and the ISO 9001 quality standard There is growing interest in the humanitarian sector in techniques and approaches aimed at ensuring the quality of products, services and organisations – a process characterised by some as the ‘quality revolution’. David Verboom describes Medair’s experience with the ISO 9001 quality standard

The NGO Medair applied for and ISO 9001 evaluates ‘customer satis- was recently awarded the ISO faction’ – in humanitarian terms, 9001 Certificate for its humani- whether the needs of the tarian work.The ISO 9001 is part beneficiaries are being met. In its of a family of quality management operations, Medair emphasises standards and guidelines. It looks at ‘downward’ accountability (to the the overall learning process within people we serve), rather than an organisation, rather than the ‘upward’ accountability (to donors, rigid and specific implementation for instance). This is exactly what of certain guidelines or proce- the ISO 9001 standard will assess. dures. In Medair’s case, the ISO 9001 standard • Standardisation. Medair as an organisation found required the following main steps: itself in the mid-1990s moving from the pioneering to the expansion phase. In order to improve struc- • setting up a quality policy in line with the organi- tures, procedures and standards, it started to define sation’s humanitarian mandate; all of its operational and administrative processes. • drafting and maintaining manuals describing the ISO 9001 helped to draft a Quality Manual that is way the organisation works; and lean, simple, to the point, easily accessible and user- • setting up and maintaining a feedback and friendly for all Medair staff. improvement cycle to involve beneficiaries, • Institutional knowledge. Due to the high turnover of national and expatriate staff, donors, authorities and staff and the need to constantly adapt to new emer- other stakeholders in the quality improvement gencies, gaining and maintaining institutional process. knowledge is critically important to relief agencies. ISO 9001 has helped Medair to improve its institu- Why apply ISO 9001? tional knowledge-base in the form of the Quality Medair sees ISO 9001 as an additional tool, rather Manual.This manual has also greatly improved the than as the answer to all our problems. The main induction of new staff into the organisation. reasons for us to apply for the ISO 9001 standard were: Because the advantages of ISO 9001 apply to field as well as head office operations, we found that, despite • Accountability.We feel that we are accountable to the the initial reservations of our staff, they all started to people we serve, our donors, our supporters, our embrace the ISO 9001 change process. They became national and expatriate staff and host and supporters when they saw the benefits materialising supporting governments. We have been entrusted before their very eyes. Involving all staff also helped us with financial and human resources to achieve to strip the change process of any hidden agendas or certain objectives in accordance with certain motives. We had to collectively re-emphasise that the quality standards.We want to take this responsibility only goal of the ISO 9001 process is to improve our seriously by inviting external auditors to evaluate performance and quality; it is not to be used as a our work against internationally respected ISO marketing tool or to raise more funding, and it is defi- 9001 quality standards. nitely not to be used as a top-down control mecha- • Learning. Because the environment of humanitarian nism for management. aid is enormously complex and constantly changing, humanitarian organisations have to Medair’s quality system change and improve to remain relevant, effective Medair’s quality system is set up around three major and appropriate. Because the ISO 9001 standard improvement cycles at three levels. Starting with the places emphasis on the improvement cycle, it has improvement cycle that is as close as possible to the helped Medair to strengthen its capacity as a beneficiary,we can differentiate between the following learning organisation. cycles: • Efficiency and effectiveness. ISO 9001 not only evalu- ates whether activities are in line with the main 1. Project Cycle at field level. organisational objectives, it also evaluates the effec- 2. Country Strategy Cycle at country level. tiveness of the organisation in achieving its goals. 3. Three-year Strategy Cycle at organisational level. Because this evaluation uses the organisational manuals as a reference, ISO 9001 basically assesses if The Project Cycle describes Medair’s core process, the organisation practices what it preaches. namely the implementation of relief and rehabilitation

POLICY DEVELOPMENTS • The involvement and participation of beneficiaries. projects at field level. This cycle consists of six project

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phases (research, survey,proposal, implementation, eval- departments, sectors, countries and programmes. It sets uation, exit), linked together by six decisions (research, out strategies to address organisational weaknesses and survey, Go/No Go, implementation, evaluation and exploit organisational strengths. On a three-year basis, exit). Medair has chosen the Project Cycle method to feedback and evaluation is incorporated in the increase transparency, efficiency and coordination Strategy so as to work on major improvement when initiating, implementing and tracking our processes for the organisation. In fact, it was at one of projects. Every time a project moves from one phase to these Strategy evaluations, with all key field leaders the next, a transparent, collective and coordinated present, that Medair decided to launch the ISO 9001 decision is taken with the involvement of key field and change process. headquarters staff. Each project in each country incor- porates beneficiary involvement and participation, so as When talking about the ‘how’ of quality improvement, to receive regular feedback and input from the we should not forget the importance of the Quality communities we are serving. This feedback is taken Manual. This describes the quality system and all into account in the evaluation phase, and helps us to Medair’s operations. It explains all aspects of Medair’s design and implement the next project or phase in a work, both in the field and at headquarters, from the more appropriate manner. An example of the Project overall Three-Year Strategy to detailed radio operating Cycle at work can be taken from our country instructions. The Manual is available to all staff in the programme in south Sudan. A non-food distribution form of an internet-based resource centre, installed on project was thought by some staff to be very successful. all Medair computers. By using state-of-the-art But when talking to the families during household internet technology, the Manual is made extremely visits we found that the impregnated mosquito nets user-friendly, quick and accessible. The result is a that were distributed were used for clothing and manual that provides easy access to frequently required blankets. In response, we used the Project Cycle to information, is used as a training resource for new staff, design a new project phase focusing on preventive increases efficiency by saving time and sharing knowl- health education and clothing distribution. edge, and improves transparency.

The Country Strategy Cycle operates at country The ISO 9001 quality improvement process has been programme level, and normally encompasses a number very beneficial for Medair, for its programmes, for its of different projects.The Country Cycle helps Medair staff and most importantly for its beneficiaries. It has to improve its work in a given country, taking into not solved all our problems at field level, nor has it account long-term impact and sustainability. This is solved all our performance problems, but it has helped especially useful in countries like Afghanistan, Congo, us to improve our internal quality, reinforce our Angola and Sudan, where complex crises have raged accountability to our stakeholders, increase our effi- for decades. Only by focusing on rehabilitation and ciency and effectiveness and, most importantly, training, not just relief, can people develop self-deter- increase our impact for the people we are serving. mination, self-reliance and mitigation. David Verboom is Operations Director and Quality The organisation-wide Three-year Strategy Cycle Manager at Medair’s head office in Switzerland. His POLICY DEVELOPMENTS helps Medair to be a learning organisation in all its e-mail address is: [email protected].

Some quality systems

• The EFQM Excellence Model (www.efqm.org) An over-arching framework for self-assessment and improvement, drawing on other quality initiatives. Not based on external accreditation. • Investors in People (www.iipuk.co.uk) UK standard that aims to improve organisations’ performance through improving the performance of indi- viduals. Externally accredited; currently the most commonly used standard in the UK voluntary sector. • Practical Quality Assurance System for Small Organisations (PQASSO) (http://www.pqasso.org.uk/pqasso.htm) This system allows small voluntary organisations to assess and improve their work across 12 areas, from financial management to networking and partnerships. • Social Auditing (www.neweconomics.org) This system is designed to help organisations measure and improve their social performance and ethical behaviour, and to strengthen their accountability.

Related websites • ISO 9001:2000 (www.iso.ch) • Groupe URD’s Quality Project (www.urd.org)

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Understanding conflict and evolving rights-based responses: CARE International in Sierra Leone The illicit diamond trade often features prominently in discussions of the ‘causes’ of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Steve Archibald and Paul Richards argue that this preoccupation with political economy misses valuable opportunities to break the cycle of violence

The most recent conflict in Sierra Leone is merely the and consequent exclusion from aid of ‘less powerful’ latest episode in a cycle of violence stretching back groups suggests that the humanitarian effort may be more than a century. CARE is developing a clearer channelling resources through a system that creates understanding of the issues that people believe have fed grievance, division and disorder, thereby compounding and maintained the conflict. In April 2000, we began the problems that have contributed to violence. research examining whether a human rights frame- work would be useful in helping us better understand Misappropriation of aid is one of the issues most the ‘root causes’ of the conflict, and to explore what the frequently raised during the community consultations. practical implications of this might be for our activities. Others relate to past and present problems of gover- CARE’s Rights-Based Approach to Food Security nance and basic rights that, if not resolved, will Project is the first practical output of the research.The generate further conflict.They include: emerging picture is one of disenfranchisement, discon- tent and impending social disorder, against a back- • lack of awareness of the law:‘chiefs make up the law’; ground of deep distrust of ‘traditional’ authority and • maladministration of justice, including the arbitrary governance structures. imposition of disproportionately high fines, mainly on young people, for minor infractions; Aspects of inequality • lack of accountability or transparency within local Initial analysis of the research data is feeding into an governance and justice structures; assessment of the impact of CARE’s work. As is • little popular participation in the political process; common NGO practice in Sierra Leone, CARE has • exclusion of social groups (including women and operational links with local Village Development young people) from decision-making; Committees (VDCs) and other authority structures. • no education facilities and ‘no opportunities’; and These operational arrangements were discussed during • very limited awareness of human rights. the community consultations. Respondents repeatedly alleged that local hierarchies had systematically manip- The research consultations revealed an eagerness to ulated NGO systems and misappropriated project address fundamental issues of rights and justice, and to inputs on a significant scale. A review of reports on do so openly in order to mitigate further conflict. chiefdom consultations conducted for the Paramount Respondents said that what they lacked, or had been Chiefs Restoration Unit (the PRU, situated within the denied, was a recognised, structured forum for debate. government’s Governance Reform Secretariat) found Because of this, grievances were suppressed and never similar allegations in other geographical areas. resolved, resulting in an environment of rumour and suspicion that was always susceptible to manipulation In the project areas, the allegations appear justified. Some and conflict. recipient groups prioritised by the previous food security projects did not receive assistance. Respondents said that Dr Dennis Bright of the Commission for the intended project participants, including internally Consolidation of Peace in Freetown helped in the search displaced people and recent returnees, were unlikely to for a suitable forum by suggesting that CARE might have ‘friends’ in positions of authority,and were therefore propose supporting the re-institution of traditional feast less likely to receive assistance. Interviews and checks of days. Once widespread in Sierra Leone, these events registration and distribution lists confirmed that many provided fora for the resolution of family and commu- intended recipients were excluded. In virtually every case nity quarrels. In early 2001, a CARE-funded pilot assessed, actual recipients included VDC members, village project began in ten villages in a chiefdom ‘section’ in chiefs, local authorities and their families. While central Sierra Leone. It was agreed that these events everyone in the project areas could readily be regarded should be called ‘Peace and Rights Days’. The pilot as ‘in need’, those in positions of authority generally supported a series of such days at village level for a year. have stronger assets and support networks. Access to CARE provides food and facilitation. Communities NGO resources represents just such an asset and construct meeting places, contribute food and accom- opportunity. Respondents frequently alleged that modate attendees from neighbouring villages. Every NGO field staff were either involved in, or aware of, individual in the section is invited. The day provides a graft. In this instance, field staff are often working in forum for the open discussion of issues identified by the their ‘home areas’, where friends and family still reside; community.The starting-point for the discussions is that there are many opportunities for those in positions of every person has the right to adequate food for his or power and authority to apply pressure on those her family and that, within the CARE project, every

POLICY DEVELOPMENTS distributing resources. The misappropriation of inputs person has the right to an equal amount of seed. In the

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weeks leading up to a Peace and Rights Day,every indi- Ultimately, they are long-term goals that require vidual with the will and ability to farm is registered, and commitment from CARE and its partner communi- the day itself culminates with the public distribution of ties.The recent acquisition of funding for a three-year 5kg ‘starter packs’ of seed to each recipient, along with a period enables CARE to lay the foundations on discussion of any deficiencies in the system. which the project will be built. Other encouraging progress has been made during the pilot project, with The debate about equitable access to NGO inputs is local human rights organisations and a representative the catalyst for a discussion of broader issues related to from the PRU involved in the fieldwork. community-level development, rights and governance. Discussions are facilitated and recorded by villagers, Establishing links with relevant organisations is local conciliators and CARE staff. Plenary groups and essential at this early stage, and will become still more focus groups of women, young people, chiefs and elders important as the project progresses. As rights organisa- focus attention on specific problems, and propose prac- tions and governance structures materialise from the tical measures to resolve them.Thus, at village level the ‘centre’, it becomes increasingly important that they primary objective of the project is to encourage more are connected with emergent democratic processes inclusive, transparent and accountable community- and structures in rural areas. In addition to technical based governance structures. Discussing equitable access support on food security issues, the role of CARE’s to CARE’s project inputs prompts discussion about the Rights-Based Approach to Food Security Project is to broader development process, and how the definition identify and facilitate useful linkages between village- and representation of priorities can be made more and section-level groups, and the appropriate govern- inclusive. Steps to achieve the objectives are agreed and mental or non-governmental entities at chiefdom, follow-up meetings with CARE staff and local facilita- district and national levels. Ultimately, the project aims tors are scheduled for the intervening period between to re-establish food security in CARE’s operational Peace Days (about six months). areas; support fora for the democratic resolution of community-identified problems; increase awareness of Linking local initiatives with national structures rights and governance codes; and facilitate connections The local resolution of rights and governance problems between the resultant rural capacities and their urban has only limited utility if this is not ‘connected’ to the counterparts. appropriate authorities. Ultimately,local processes should be able to make reference to the relevant governance, In Sierra Leone, many of the tensions that fed and legal and human rights frameworks at chiefdom, district maintained violence persist, their effects felt most by and national levels. Within this proposition lies the the poor and disenfranchised. CARE Sierra Leone critical issue of social membership – being recognised as will continue to develop and apply rights-based a citizen. Amongst the prerequisites for this are: aware- approaches to its other sectoral activities, and will ness of the governance framework, the law and disseminate the findings of the research to relevant citizens’ rights; effective representation; and responsive, departments of the government, as well as to donors transparent and accountable governance. and other NGOs. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

The government of Sierra Leone is working on the rein- Steve Archibald is Project Manager, Conflict and stitution of local governance structures.A vibrant human Human Rights Project, CARE International UK. His rights community is also emerging. Each ‘project’ will be email address is [email protected]. Paul Richards is more likely to achieve its ultimate goals if it is connected Professor of Technology and Agrarian Development at with, and responding to, initiatives voicing ‘grassroots’ Wageningen University, the Netherlands; e-mail: issues. However, there are many practical constraints, not [email protected]. The action-research and least the remoteness of many locations, and the lack of the design of the Rights-Based Approach to Food transport and communications. Democratic structures Security Project are the initial results of an ongoing and processes may not exist in rural areas. collaborative initiative sponsored by CARE and the Social Science Research Council (New York), led by The aim of the Peace Days is to get functioning, Steve Archibald and Paul Richards. An edited version of democratic community representation in place and this paper first appeared in CARE’s Rights and ready to engage with the agencies of governance Responsibilities newsletter in October 2001. reform, the human rights community and government or non-governmental development agencies. To this References and further reading end, the Peace Day communities are electing commit- tees of women, young people and elders which they M. Castermans-Holleman, Fr. Van Hoof and J. Smith (eds.), hope, eventually,will act as mechanisms for representa- The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century tion, regulation and enforcement at local level, and (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998). also to represent their respective issues at ‘higher’ levels Steve Archibald and Paul Richards, Cultivating Human within the chiefdom and district structures. Rights: Draft report, Social Science Research Council, 2001. Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and These mechanisms will take time to evolve to a point Resources in Sierra Leone (London: Heinemann, 1996). where the majority regard them as representative.

Number 20 • March 2002 41 HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 42

ENDPIECE The current challenges to humanitarian action As humanitarian action grapples with its unprecedented popularity and an increasingly schizophrenic identity, Austen Davis makes a plea for clarity about who we are and what we do, and for the separation of our political hopes and aspirations from our personal morality

The challenges to humanitarian action depend in part The realism behind the ideology of humanitarian on how you define humanitarian action. There is no action is that if it is to be allowed, it must have very single definition, and no one owns the concept. low political significance. It should not challenge Humanitarian action is clearly to do with notions of authority by offering hopes of democracy, peace or ‘man’, and the value of humanity. If you define freedom – because the form of peace or democracy or humanitarian action as mobilisation by human beings freedom is an intensely political question. It should be in response to the needless suffering of other human given to those who need it most, not those who will beings for the sake of a common humanity, then help the authorities most. In order to have the credi- humanitarian action becomes a small and limited bility to be allowed to work, it must be perceived as ideology. It must be action oriented; it must be non- independent of any political agenda. coercive; it must be provided solely for the benefit of those we seek to assist. But in addition, humanitarian What are the challenges to humanitarian action? action must demonstrate an ethic of restraint. The concepts underlying humanitarian action are Humanitarian action cannot be subordinated to polit- universal and do not change over time.There is therefore ical interests, military rationales or even socially no challenge to humanitarian concepts. The challenges progressive moves towards peace and democracy.These and dilemmas come in implementation. This is why are different ideologies and actions. Humanitarian humanitarian action has to be small, precise, realistic and action is smaller, more precise, self-limiting – but no reactionary,as opposed to most ideological causes, which less idealistic or important for that. are utopian, broad and progressive. Humanitarian action is a moral philosophy rather than a political philosophy – If humanitarian action is a small idea, it should be easily it does not require political positioning.The main chal- achieved through reaffirming the oneness and value of lenges to this ideal are as follows. a shared humanity. The challenges that face humani- tarian action are not in constantly renewing the Anything that undermines a common understanding ideology or vision to reflect changing times (commu- of humanity nism, globalisation, or technological change, for Humanitarian action rests on a belief that there are instance). Rather, the challenges result from the shared needs for food, shelter and conditions for dignity dilemma that authorities with interests have to fund, (freedom from fear). If political forces polarise humanity allow for and encourage radical humanitarian action – and reduce this acceptance of an important common- even if action on behalf of ‘man’ seems to waste oppor- ality – if we have different standards, if we have lower tunities for the development of society, or even to act tolerance and if we dehumanise others – then there is in contradiction to social interests. the possibility to commit great and inhumane acts. An appreciation of our common humanity involves a will- The challenges that face humanitarian action therefore ingness to accept shared responsibilities for all human result from: the attempt to institutionalise the concepts beings, even in the face of adversity and violent opposi- and drives of humanitarian action; the fact that much tion.The theory of a ‘clash of civilisations’ purposefully human suffering is often intentionally created as a creates ideas of racial or cultural separation and superi- political act (so attempts to alleviate that suffering are ority. The conflict is no longer between competing contrary to the political interest); the corruption social systems with opposing political and economic arising from the mobilisation of considerable resources interests; it becomes a fight between different groups of in poor settings; and the co-opting of the ‘good’ act by people, where one civilisation must defeat another. politicians to bolster their legitimacy and popularity There is no room for shared human responsibility in or shroud their lack of political action. People try to such a conflict (communism versus freedom, Islam divert aid for military reasons, to help their side win or versus Western secularism). harm the other. People try to divert aid to get rich. People try to block aid to punish the enemy. People Anything that undermines public support for try to direct aid to reward those who support them, humanitarian action and show others that they should do the same. People If our giving public does not understand the reality of try to control aid to show that they are a legitimate war and crisis, and only gives money to stop wars, and caring authority, and that their actions are good create peace and develop justice and democracy, then

ENDPIECE and true and just. they do not understand what we do, and the humani-

HUMANITARIAN 42 exchange ENDPIECE 43 Number 20 • March 2002 Number 20 • March is General Director of MSF-Holland. is General Austen Davis Austen Anything that reduces the sustained commitment that reduces the sustained commitment Anything to act Humanitarianism is an action-oriented philosophy. If it is morally right to go and help, commit to act then you first the lessons of history and use to try and minimise the challenges to humanitarian action. individual Every a personal political opinion.will have are If aid workers their personality to separate their political unable from humanitarianmoral personality and see how action needs to be distinct, is the danger of fatigue then there and loss of motivation. a duty by inspired If people are notions of humanity,to preserve then it is inspiring to go to Sudan in 1988 to feed starving in a children famine, return and to in 1993, and 1994, and 1996, and 1998. of power in the redemptive If a doctor believes to offer such a healing and the human responsibility possibility, in then it is not a failing to operate on a boy 1995, in Chechnya man in and on the same young 1999. If, on the other hand, that we the expectations are fail if the same person twice, is injured need to and we never our patients are sure change our actions to make again, or injured starved will lose the battle. then we the choice to end the war,Our patients do not have to starving, from their children prevent their to prevent on a land mine. stepping spouse from moti- are If we out and do something for them, to reach vated do we in 1992, the choice to be motivated not have and disil- lusioned in 2002. Anything that reduces the capacity of humanitarian that reduces the capacity Anything and react to political actors to see, understand co-optation speaking out under- whether around is a debate There of humanitarianmines the neutrality actors. Humanitarianspeak out when to actors forced are political actors or try access deny and pervert simple, precise, impartial humanitarian action. Humanitarian need to among large forces.We actors small players are governments,stand apartfrom the military and corpo- rate interests, because bad but are they not because need to interpret their betrayal interested.We are they of humanitarian are – not judge if they responsibilities these failings.good or bad – and counter the sophistication, Humanitarian actors do not have resources, or alliances that these large actors force have. moral principle; the obvious only have We popular support; access to the media to inform; and international humanitarian law. use what must We or trying to the forces to avoid to react have little we manipulate humanitarian responsibility. single efficient machine out of the internationalof the out machine efficient single ‘community’donor governments, of and UN agencies their considerable without recognising NGOs – and behaviour institutional – and enforcing differences personalunder- commitment moral over interests humanitarian entire mines the endeavour. Anything that places institutional interests over the that places institutional interests over Anything mission to assist those in need of help The current popularity of humanitarian action has led of agencies,to a proliferation all of which claim to be humanitarian, and compete for money, and influence.coverage This perverts the simple, media of humanitarian requirement action – to precise to helping people in need. fully committed remain become confused,The public try and governments a structure.Trying to create and define a coordination If all of humanity were in acute crisis,If all of humanity were be would there no humanitarian action. be some societies must There comfort,in relative can empathise with the so that they suffering of others and mobilise assistance.This implies peace and have that some societies need to be in relative resources,spare it also implies a social ethos that but to do something for responsibility a shared have they other societies in crisis. Humanitarian action cannot total war.function under conditions of a global But also,example, for and largesse of the depends on the wealth the existence of Médecins Sans Frontières public,Western commitment of and on the vocational and to social ends and equitable the medical profession ethical treatment.As commercialises society increasingly medicine, to focus on forced are medical professionals of their careers. requirements the professional Society in the medical profes- has not structured the incentives socially positive sion to encourage, and reward recognise underminesbehaviour.This the quality of service of the (including within humanitarian medical profession better technical intervention, have may endeavours).We to resistance and less in-built less care have we but decision-making that does not prioritise patients’ needs. Anything that limits the capacity of humanity to that limits the capacity of humanity Anything action accept and contribute to humanitarian tarianconfused.becomes mission to the give Givers peace, because disappointed become cause and wrong human rights for respect is not or universal democracy forthcoming. The support for humanitarian base evaporate. action will with humanitarian action that mixes Anything other goods actions can be good or not so good, different Many or badly.Humanitariandone well action is not an act of ‘doing good for people’. with a political opinion People equal, should be more society that someone else’s or should stop,their stupid war will see this as a humani- tarian goal; of the realism then the smallness and the but humanitarian confused with other becomes ideology aspirations,it to do the small thing loses its power and can do. a position can have something you It becomes on. political rather than moral. It becomes can Politics be moral, humanitarian but action focuses on a morality can be right wing or left wing, politics.You beyond and to human dignity and commitment a shared still have of acute suffering.the alleviation HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 43 Page am 10:33 11/3/02 crc exchange HPN HPN exchange crc 11/3/02 10:33 am Page 44

Humanitarian Practice Network HUMANITARIAN

The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) was launched exchange in 1994 in response to research that indicated substantial gaps between practitioners and policy-makers in the humanitarian field, as well as serious weaknesses in the published by the ability of the sector to learn and become more ‘knowl- Humanitarian Practice Network, part of edge-based’. the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute Purpose To stimulate critical analysis, advance the professional learning and development of those engaged in and around Coordinator humanitarian action, and improve practice. Frances Stevenson

Objectives Deputy Coordinator Matthew Foley To provide relevant and useable analysis and guidance for humanitarian practice, as well as summary information on relevant policy and institutional developments in the Projects Administrator humanitarian sector. Alison Prescott

Activities • Publishing in three formats: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papers and the HPN magazine Humanitarian Edited by Matthew Foley Exchange. All materials are produced in English and and Frances Stevenson French. • Operating a resource website: this is one of the key Design and production reference sites for humanitarian actors. by Publish on Demand Ltd • Collaborating with international ‘partner’ networks: this increases the reach of the HPN, and brings mutual Printed and bound in the UK benefit to the participating networks. • Holding occasional seminars on topical issues: these bring together practitioners, policy makers and analysts. Humanitarian Practice Network

Overseas Development Institute HPN target audience 111 Westminster Bridge Road Individuals and organisations actively engaged in human- London SE1 7JD itarian action. Also those involved in the improvement of UK performance at international, national and local level – in particular mid-level operational managers, staff in policy departments, and trainers. Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0331/74 The HPN exists within the Humanitarian Policy Group at Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399 the Overseas Development Institute. This not only ensures extended networking and dissemination opportunities, but Email: [email protected] also positions the HPN in a wider ‘centre of excellence’ Website: www.odihpn.org which enhances the impact of the HPN’s work.

Funding The HPG is supported by the British Red Cross, CARE, DANIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs Ireland, DFID, ECHO, Oxfam, MFA Netherlands, MSF, OCHA, SCF(UK), SIDA, UNDP, USAID and the WFP. ISSN: 1472-4847 © Overseas Development Institute 2002

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