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3 August 2020

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Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict A Comparison of Russia and the United States Dani Belo & Dr. David Carment

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Doomie Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent Lochet, French Air Force Editorial Advisory Panel Jeffrey T. Biller, JD, LLM Dr. Adam Lowther Assistant Professor of Cyber Law and Policy Professor of Political Science United States Air Force Academy School of Advanced Military Studies CMSgt Jackie-Lynn M. Brown, PhD, USAF, ret. Mr. Johnathon Martin Author, Editor, & Pearson Vue Test Administrator Program Manager National Reconnaissance Office Lt Col Tom “TC” Cappelletti, USAF, ret. Dr. Sandeep "Frag" Mulgund Aviator and Consultant Senior Advisor (HQE) Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (AF/A3) Headquarters United States Air Force

Mr. Daniel J. Collier Dr. Yoichiro Sato Chief of Intelligence Operations, LeMay Center Professor Air University Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University CAPT Jerry L. Gantt, USNR, ret. Lt Col Jorge Serafin, USAF, ret. Former Research and Writing Specialist Acting Director Air University Press Air University Press Dr. Donald M. Gooch Lt Col Victoria Thomas, USAF Associate Professor of Political Science Director of Staff, 94th Flying Training Squadron Stephen F. Austin State University Lt Col Darin Gregg, USAF Col Jobie Turner, PhD, USAF, ret. Director of Warfighting Education Author and Editor Air University Dr. Manabrata Guha Dr. Heather Venable Research Associate Associate Professor University of New South Wales–Canberra @ ADFA Air Command and Staff College Maj Gen Brian Killough, USAF, ret. Capt Jayson Warren, USAF Former Deputy Commander, Headquarters Pacific Deputy Director, Commander’s Action Group Air Forces 16 Air Force, JBSA-Lackland Lt Col Tyler "Princeton" Lewis, USAF, ret Dr. Austin Wyatt VP, Public Sector Engagement Research Associate Dataminr University of New South Wales–Canberra @ ADFA Maj John H. Long, Jr., USAF Troop Commander, Joint Exploitation Squadron JSOC Intelligence Brigade FEATURE Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict A Comparison of Russia and the United States

Dani Belo

Dr. David Carment

Abstract

We argue that today’s alliances constitute a form of competitive multilateralism that puts allies in a difficult position. To understand this transformation, we -ex amine several cases. We assess US gray-zone campaigns against adversaries and allies in the Middle East and Europe. Additionally, we consider Russia’s engage- ments in Ukraine and Georgia and their impact on relations with Belarus and Kazakhstan. We find that in the short run, great powers punish adversaries and discipline allies for their own relative gains. However, such behavior carries long- term political, economic, and military costs. We conclude that such actions pose significant challenges for conflict management. By providing strategic-level considerations of great-power behavior this article sets the foundation for an operational-level discussion among military professionals regarding their engagement with both adversaries and allies. Introduction

Growing tensions among great powers place their allies in a difficult position. This is because today’s geopolitical conflicts involve a desire by great powers to fundamentally revise the order of alliances as well as solidify new norms of conduct. Rather than making direct hits on their adversaries, great powers choose to put pressure on their allies to reduce those costs of direct conflict. Our analysis opens a conversation for military and security professionals to contribute complementary perspectives on geopolitical challenges and adversarial intent in gray- zone conflict derived from practical on –the-ground experience. Thus, our strategic-level analysis provides a foundation for an operational-level discussion among military professionals regarding their engagement in gray-zone conflicts. We argue in this article that great-power concerns with relative gains has long influenced the foreign policy postures of the United States and Russia.1 What has changed in the era of gray-zone conflicts are the tools and methods used to not only pursue maximum relative gains but to bring allies in line and challenge

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 1 adversaries. Proficiency in hybrid warfare tools and tactics, which have become an integral part of engagement in gray-zone conflict, enables states to pursue their geopolitical aims at a lower cost. However, as we argue below, such behavior carries long-term consequences, including a potential weakening of alliances, increased great-power vulnerability to retaliatory measures, and reduced opportunities for effective conflict management. Since great powers are the most sensitive of all states to the relative gains made by their opponents and allies, the alliances they form are a kind of competitive multilateralism. We define competitive multilateralism as multilateral engagement, in which great powers dominate operations economically and politically to maximize their relative gains. The notion of competitive multilateralism comes from the idea that for partners who stay loyal to alliance arrangements there is motivation to discipline defectors who may be looking to change sides. As we show below, with hardening multipolarity, there are more opportunities for states to make gains across and not just within geopolitical axes. To offset this change in alliance behavior, great powers will use unilateralism to punish allies who defect and derive benefits from cooperation with adversaries. Great-power unilateralism further encourages those allies who stay loyal to the original agreement to also punish such defectors, resulting in a further fracturing of alliances. For example, we observe that US and Russian foreign policy postures have become increasingly assertive and bold, as both nations attempt to maintain their hegemony—either globally in Washington’s case or regionally in Moscow’s case. This increasing foreign policy brashness can be attributed to the endowment effect, in which actors place more value on assets already in their possession relative to others that may possibly be gained.2 Gray-zone conflict and hybrid warfare are important because they act as enablers, essentially allowing great powers to coun- terbalance some of the potential costs of their increasingly assertive and antago- nistic foreign policy posture through reduced costs and lower risks. In comparing the US and Russia cases, we find that engagement in gray-zone conflict in pursuit of maximum relative gains transcends regime type. Even with their distinct historical and cultural contexts, the United States and Russia have evolved and became subject to the same underlying structural incentives to act competitively against both allies and adversaries. Both American and Russian decision making in gray-zone conflict is dominated by relative gains considerations. We observe this in Ukraine, where the United States not only stepped up its aid to Kiev when EU interests in the conflict waned but also sought to punish NATO allies who sought greater cooperation with Russia and Iran. We argue this behavior is problematic for two reasons. First, in gray-zone conflict there is a constant demand for genuine multilateralism among states to

2 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict increase the tactical and operational success of hybrid tactics and deterrence against complex low-intensity operations. Yet as we show below, the relative gains calculus alters great-power strategic calculations leading to a reduction in the potential for genuine multilateralism. Second, a key implication of competitive multilateralism is an erosion of trust in relation to adversaries and allies. Among allies, this may translate into a decline of trust among military professionals and decreased interoperability at both the operational and tactical levels. For example, the erosion of traditional partnerships at the strategic level, as in the case of Turkey in relation to other NATO members, has detrimentally influenced the willingness of allies to continue strong and effective collaboration among its security professionals.3 In making these arguments, the first section of the article draws attention to the emerging literature on gray-zone conflict and key debates that underpin gray- zone strategic behavior. The article then examines the effect of relative gains on past and present American and Russian foreign policy. We conclude with implications for future scholarly research and policy. Defining Gray-zone Conflict and Key Debates

In gray-zone conflict, state actors use a complex combination of strategic and operational-level techniques, making this form of warfare exceptionally resistant to resolution. Onset and termination are ambiguous because many of the operations undertaken in gray-zone conflicts are largely contingent upon a highly globalized, interconnected international economic and political world order, and highly permeable international borders.4 Based on the experience of the United States, conventional military operations have become increasingly expensive to the point of being cost-prohibitive. Fur- thermore, conventional tools of warfare have become increasingly sophisticated and deadly over the past 30 years, making their application less likely due to potential human costs.5 Also, it is unlikely that nuclear-armed parties would be willing to engage in direct military confrontation because the potential destruction experienced by any of the parties would be unacceptable. To bypass these barriers, states engage in low-intensity gray-zone conflicts. Conventional conflicts are generally characterized by overtness at the tactical level, with hybrid techniques as support. In gray-zone conflict, states rely primar- ily on covert operations that never pass the threshold of war. There is an overarch- ing ambiguity regarding long-term victory objectives by participants and stake- holders. Finally, there is a desire by one or more parties to gradually, but fundamentally, revise the regional or global system of alliances and norms of international conduct to a degree not even seen during the Cold War era.6

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 3 Hybrid warfare techniques are used within the broader gray-zone conflict cat- egory. Parties engaged in gray-zone conflicts use unconventional hybrid warfare tactics such as political and information warfare, propaganda appealing to diaspo- ras and transnational actors, equipment and training of nonstate actors, state-level economic pressures, and “unconventional” operations by the security apparatus. These tools and tactics, however, are used gradually in the achievement of a victory point that is entirely ambiguous to the opponent—an element unique to gray- zone conflicts.7

Table 1. Characteristics of gray-zone conflicts Characteristic Gray-zone Conflict

Level Tactical, operational, strategic Utilization of conventional military operations Utilized alongside nonconventional operations

May be utilized standalone or Utilization of nonconventional military operations alongside conventional operations

Protracted engagement One of the dominant characteristics

Global and/or regional revisionist ambitions One of the dominant characteristics

Utilized under both symmetric and asymmetric Symmetry between opponents conditions

The question of whether the rise of gray-zone conflict is driven by absolute or relative gains is debated by structural realists and institutionalists. Realists argue that major powers are not only preoccupied with the relative gains of their geopolitical adversaries, they are also concerned with defection and cheating within alliance formations.8 In this view, the gains of one will necessarily be at the expense of another partner. This concern for relative gains and losses is compounded in situations of potential cheating by allies who seek to maximize their own relative gains through alternative arrangements. For example, allies may engage in cooperation with an adversary, while attempting to keep their traditional alliances. From the realist perspective, such defections are corrosive as they create an imbal- ance in gains to the detriment of the allies who stayed loyal to the original agreement. With regard to the rigidity of alliances, realists argue that if the distribution of relative gains among allies is unclear as is often the case in gray-zone conflicts, states will forego forming durable alliances. Thus, as gray-zone conflict increases, alliances become less cohesive and durable. To maintain alliance cohesion, the fight against defection becomes a critical task.

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In contrast, institutionalists contend that international institutions and organi- zations can help eliminate some of the structural barriers to cooperation. The core difference to facilitate deviations between the two theoretical camps is the belief regarding positive versus zero-sum distributions of gains. Institutionalists observe that states are largely preoccupied with defection as such a phenomenon can hin- der the collective ability to produce gains for all members.9 With regard to alliances, institutionalists claim that if an arrangement among allies facilitates some- what similar and even absolute gains, cohesion among states will be strong and durable. However, we believe that states are more concerned about relative gains when the use of force to achieve specific outcomes is a possibility – especially when the cost of fighting is low.10 When the use of force is not an option, states are no longer concerned with relative gains and will consider absolute gains. Akin to this argument, David Rousseau contends that, in the contemporary security environment, states are preoccupied with relative gains, but once an issue has been dese- curitized, parties will move away from concerns over relative gains.11 The gray-zone conflict environment complicates these causal relationships in a couple of important ways. First, the costs of nonconventional warfare of the kind we see in gray-zone conflict are now lower. Due to technological advancement, new economic, cyber, and other unconventional tools and techniques have become readily available to use against opponents. These tools and techniques frequently achieve results previously only conceivable through the deployment of troops. Building on this logic, such material transformation in the conduct of operations means that the cost of coercion has dropped significantly, paving the way for continuous preoccupation by states with relative gains and unilateral action. Second, even though gray-zone conflict is a post–Cold War phenomenon, the acceptance of unilateralism by great powers is firmly etched into their political fiber. Only now are institutional mechanisms falling into place to address nonconventional warfare and even these do not go far enough. For example, the meaning of the UN Charter article 2(4), specifically about the use of force has slowly and erratically changed to incorporate nonmilitary coercion that never passes the threshold of war.12 But with regard to the economic and political aspects of gray- zone conflict, international institutions are slow to catch up.13

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 5 Formation of American Exceptionalism: A Manifestation of the Politics of Relative Gains

The exceptionalism that frequently permeates American foreign policy, as the representative of the democratic world, directly reflects the country’s historic preoccupation with relative gains vis-à-vis allies and adversaries. In this section, we examine the historic formation of this worldview that now serves as the basis for American engagement in gray-zone conflict through competitive multilateralism and unilateralism. The idea of exceptionalism is often misunderstood. Simply put, it means primus inter pares—or first among equals. The United States decides on the exception, meaning that an American leader can defy the law to serve the greater good. This preoccupation with defining the greater good, even when the United States can defy it, has pushed Washington to deploy unilateralism and engage in competitive multilateralism at an increasing frequency—especially in the post–Cold War era. Even though American unilateralism has gained significant attention in the twenty-first century, its roots can be traced to the founding of the nation. George Washington, on 19 September 1796, warned in his farewell address that the United States should be averse to “entangling alliances” that would prevent the nation from achieving its foreign policy goals.14 At the time, the young American nation was carving out its own sphere of influence in the New World. The concept of American exceptionalism provided the necessary ideological environment to continue economic, military, and geographic expansion at the expense of imperial powers. When Spanish and Portuguese colonies gained independence, and other great powers were in retreat, the Monroe Doctrine established the US right to carve an exclusive sphere of influence in South America. Pres. James Monroe stated that any attempts by a European colonial power to coerce a newly established government in the New World would amount to “unfriendly” disposition toward the United States.15 Following the end of the World War I, and the decline of the British Empire, US president Woodrow Wilson promoted the creation of the League of Nations to create a friendly environment for the proliferation of US political interests in Europe.16 This was a true manifestation of American exceptionalism as the insti- tution was built to reflect an American “sense of self.”17 However, the League of Nations is an early example of competitive multilateralism. The key informal component of the League was that member nations would be bound by a set of rules as prescribed by the founding documents. This would make the foreign policy of member states more predictable and transparent for

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Washington. However, the United States had no plans to be confined by such rules at all times; Wilson and his administration were expecting that Washington would be able to deviate from its commitments to the organization in accordance with its own foreign policy priorities.18 During the Cold War, with a self-prescribed role as the defender of democracy and capitalism, the United States was keen to stop the spread of communism in Asia. As noted at the Diplomatic History Roundtable ( June 2005), when the United States perceived threats from the Third World, Washington was poised to act unilaterally.19 The United States largely acted unilaterally in Vietnam—with only minor support from non-European allies like Australia and New Zealand. Over the course of 20 years, the United States lost nearly 60,000 soldiers (with over 300,000 wounded), in its attempt to defend the “free world” against Soviet- and Chinese-backed adversaries. Even though engagement in Vietnam was a tactical and strategic defeat for Washington, unilateralism continued to permeate American foreign policy strategy. Post–Cold War Unipolarity and American Dominance

Following the collapse of the USSR, Cold War restraints such as tight alliances, the need for multilateral consultation, and the need for legitimation of action, were no longer perceived as absolute requirements.20 The United States emerged as the single global superpower. Under the influence of the endowment effect, the newly emerged unipolar world order facilitated a bolder and more confrontational foreign policy posture from Washington. The international environment, transformed from bipolarity to unipolarity, compelled a shift in US foreign policy posture from a change-oriented actor to a status-quo defender. Instead of pursu- ing gains in the Soviet sphere of influence, Washington emerged as a protector of its hegemonic status. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not result in a decline in the cost of conventional engagement, as nuclear weapons and other more conventional tools remained a risk. Thus, with innovations in low-intensity hybrid warfare methods and tools, engagement in gray-zone conflict through competitive multilateralism and unilateralism has become a compelling way to pursue Washington’s post–Cold War objective. For example, the Defense Planning Guidance for the FY 1994–99, also known as the Wolfowitz Doctrine, became the core framework to guide American interventionism in the 1990s and the twenty-first century. For our purposes, this doctrine served as the strategic foundation for America’s engagement in gray-zone conflict against great-power adversaries over the past 20 years.21

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 7 There are a number of elements in the Wolfowitz Doctrine that have been the foreign policy modus operandi for leadership in Washington. First, the perception of American exceptionalism has continued as a key component of American political credo. In fact, the elimination of Moscow as a key adversary in the 1990s reinforced the position that the American democratic-capitalist system is, and should remain, dominant.22 With this, leadership in Washington believed that the new post–Cold War order should be built and backed by the United States.23 Sec- ond, Washington is interested in ad-hoc as opposed to permanent and potentially entangling alliances. Third, the United States will act unilaterally as it would be imprudent to “depend solely on international mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different from [Washington’s].” This concept was followed up by a green light to employ preventive intervention and promote US global interests. However, such intervention is highly controversial under international law, which dictates that only preemption (with a sufficient degree of proof of imminent danger) is a legitimate basis for action across international borders.24 All these components are key to the paradox of interventionism which has emerged in the post–Cold War era: the United States employs military or nonkinetic coercion, often over an extended period, to achieve American-style freedom.25 A shift to kinetic diplomacy occurred when Pres. George W. Bush declared a War on Terror following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.26 In accordance with the Wolfowitz Doctrine, US strategy then moved from the containment of threats to an engagement against adversaries, preemptively across international borders. This foreign policy priority was translated into more special forces on the ground and fewer diplomats.27 The United States has acknowledged that its forces are involved in these missions, sometimes with foreign-partner special operations forces, in an undeclared conflict zone.28 This is highly controversial, and many of these partnerships remain classified. In 2018, there were some 70,000 US special operators worldwide, compared to fewer than 10,000 foreign service officers. The United States became “addicted to security.”29 The “security trumps everything” political culture has increased Amer- ican propensity for unilateral action, as leadership in Washington is convinced that multilateralism could not compel states to cooperate consistently and effec- tively against opponents. This deep-rooted conviction remained unshakable over the second decade of the twenty-first century even as the world transitioned away from unipolarity. The gradual transition to a multipolar world in the 2000s, with the emergence of competing great powers like China and Russia, persuaded American leaders that their ability to intervene militarily would be restricted. Costly wars would be

8 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict fought against nonstate actors, but the price of directly fighting main adversaries who possess nuclear weapons would be unacceptable. The shift from the War on Terror to great-power rivalry is highlighted in the December 2017 US National Security Strategy.30 Low-intensity tools and tactics originally deployed against enemy nonstate actors would be used in tandem with other state-level kinetic and soft means coercion to target geopolitical opponents like Syria, Iran, and Russia.31 For example, Washington employed a combination of competitive multilateralism and unilateral action in weak and fragile states such as Syria, where a power vacuum created permissive conditions for external interveners to maximize relative influence in the region. From the American perspective, if the United States did not carve out a foothold in Syria, competitors like Iran and Russia would certainly exploit the power vacuum to their benefit. Moreover, Washington perceived a window of opportunity to widen the power vacuum in Syria by deposing the Assad regime and replacing it with a pro-US regime akin to Iraq following the 2001 war. In September 2014, the US-led coalition intervened in Syria’s civil war on behalf of Assad’s opponents. The most impactful of these programs was the Syrian Train and Equip Program run by US special operations forces.32 In the early years of the intervention, the coalition provided a large number of ground troops and air support for selected opposition groups, with the United States investing the most war materiel and personnel.33 In February 2016, US allies such as Canada largely withdrew their material support. However, in light of successful efforts by Russia and Iran in maintaining Assad’s hold on power, the Obama administration believed it could not follow its allies and relinquish regional influence to its adversaries. The subsequent pursuit of maximize relative gains through hybrid warfare operations vis-à-vis adversaries inflicted significant damage on Syrian government forces and diluted the regional influence of Russia and Iran. However, in the long term, these tactical operations provided a ripe environment for the emergence and mobilization of the Islamic State (ISIL).34 Third-party intervention in support of weaker participants often results in the prolongation and escalation of violence.35 Thus, it should not be surprising that the conflict became increasingly complex, drawing in many state and nonstate actors, all highly resistant to resolution. Looking beyond Syria, we see that competitive multilateralism became even more pronounced during conflict onset in Ukraine. On the one hand, multilateral efforts by the United States, European Union, and Canada increased Ukraine’s military capacity to counter Russia. On the other hand, such efforts have not prevented Russia’s intervention in support of the separatists. Further, the proliferation of interveners’ interests has proved detrimental to Ukraine’s sovereignty.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 9 For example, Kiev migrated from a vassal status in Moscow’s political camp under Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, to subordinate and dependent to another political and economic bloc. At the onset, the United States, European Union, and Canada provided similar degrees of support for the post-Maidan government. Washington provided aid packages to Ukraine in the range of 200–500 million USD. Concurrently, security-oriented aid from Washington included small arms training programs and military advisers. A critical component of the US training mission was conducted through the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine.36 Key training missions included the participation of the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the US National Guard from Tennessee, which was deployed to the Lviv region throughout 2018.37 Canada’s Operation UNI- FIER and the Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) were intended to build security in Ukraine. More than 13,000 of Ukraine’s Armed Forces and National Guard members underwent training within Canada’s programs.38 Military aid programs provided by Washington significantly outpaced those of other allies such as Canada. The European Union provided much of its security- related aid to Ukraine through the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine. Direct payments to Kiev averaged 710 million EUR per year.39 Even though training and other military aid initiatives improved Kiev’s military capacity in the short run, they also weakened Ukraine’s internal cohesion. For example, since November 2014, Ukraine’s National Guard, which underwent training by Western militaries, incorporated right-wing militias such as the Azov Battalion. This is an organization with a well-documented history of human rights violations.40 Veterans of this organization are also the main political base for the far-right National Corps political party, which has drawn hundreds of thousands of supporters in the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election.41 The direct or indi- rect empowerment of such movements from third-party interveners undermines the original purpose of the Euromaidan movement to create social cohesion among all ethnic groups. Starting in January 2018, competitive multilateralism by the United States in Europe escalated as Washington saw an opportunity to further tie Kiev to its interests. With the approval of the Nord Stream pipeline from Russia to Western Europe, the EU position with Russia entered a phase of détente, while European aid to Ukraine was cut in half.42 From the position of the United States, such warming of European–Russian relations meant that Moscow would have an opportunity to put further political and economic pressure on Ukraine. In terms of relative gains, this was an unacceptable outcome for the United States. Concurrently, Washington saw Europe’s relative disengagement as an opportunity to further solidify Kiev’s dependence on Washington. It is unlikely that the

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United States stepping up its military and economic aid to Ukraine during the Moscow–EU détente was arbitrary. Rather, it was an opportunistic maneuver. For example, in March, the US military offered new Javelin missiles to Ukraine. Fol- lowing this, the United States released another 200 million USD in security assistance.43 However, in January 2020, Washington’s pursuit of maximum relative gains transitioned from competition against allies to coercive unilateralism, targeting adversaries and allies. Thus, the delineation between allies and foes becomes increasingly blurred. For example, Washington imposed unilateral sanctions on the builders of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline through the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).44 From Washington’s perspective, this action was necessary to discipline allies as well as undermine adversaries. Such schemes have become characteristic of gray-zone conflicts. European nations have positioned themselves optimally: traditional military and economic ties are maintained with the United States, while renewed energy relations with Russia enable them to obtain economic benefits. The NDAA is intended to sanction all entities involved in the financing and construction related to the nearly completed pipeline. From Washington’s perspective, the discontinuation of the pipelines hurts Moscow’s energy-dependent economy while improving American chances of selling US liquefied natural gas to Ukraine. At the same time, US leaders perceived détente in relations between EU nations and Moscow as an avenue to maximize their gains (relative to the United States) by engaging in deals in two opposing political camps. However, there should be a clear understanding that such measures are often coupled with long-term consequences for traditional alliances. For example, unilateral actions by Washington against European companies signal US readiness to employ hard power and coercion against geopolitical opponents like Russia, even if such measures come at the expense of relations with America’s closest European allies. Even though the act has, thus far, proved inef- fective in stopping the pipeline’s completion, Washington’s diplomatic relations with major European powers will bear the costs, further undermining long-term political and economic cohesion within the US–Europe alliance. This rift is help- ful to adversaries for which the fracturing of opposing alliances is a key goal in gray-zone conflict. For example, the NDAA’s measures were met with condemnation from Germany. Moreover, a number of senior US officials have conceded that the act is unlikely to affect the project’s completion.45 The act also incorporates sanctions against companies involved in the Turk Stream pipeline project along with a clause to block the delivery of F-35 fighters to Turkey. These NDAA provisions strain the already fragile relationship between

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 11 the United States and Turkey and may further persuade Ankara to undercut NATO operations in the Baltics and elsewhere.46 America’s unilateral action in gray-zone conflicts is not confined to the economic sphere. For example, the drone that killed Iranian general Qasem Solei- mani on 3 January 2020 occurred on Iraqi soil without Baghdad’s consent. The assassination of the general was meant to create a political-economic rift between Iran and America’s European allies like the United Kingdom, France, and Ger- many. This is because on 8 May 2018, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA) was met with condemnation from European allies who wanted to keep the deal. Alongside Washington’s geopolitical adversaries like Russia and China, the United King- dom, France, and Germany continued their commitment to the JCPOA. On 17 May 2018, the European Commission declared the sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran illegal in Europe and told European companies they did not need to comply with their provisions.47 From the US perspective, akin to the circumstances with Nord Stream II, allies would benefit from both continued cooperation with Washington, while maintaining their ability to derive economic benefits from an adversary. From the position of a relative gains-maximizing nation, such defection by allies is unacceptable, and Washington found it necessary to “yank their chain.” Following the assassination, European nations were forced to pick a side. At least partially, the assassination pushed allies such as the United Kingdom and Germany to reiterate their faithfulness to the United States and sever some of the goodwill established vis-à-vis Tehran. For example, British foreign minister Dominic Raab reacted to the incident by highlighting that his government had continuously recognized the threat posed by Iranian forces associated with Solei- mani.48 Concurrently, German foreign minister Heiko Maas said that the air strikes had not “made it easier to reduce tensions,” but the US operation followed a series of dangerous provocations by Iran.49 Even though Washington’s preoccupation with relative gains has been correlated with the emergence of the exceptionalism ethos and unilateralism, similar patterns of behavior can be traced to Russia. Russia’s “Special Path” and the Incentive to Act Alone

Russia’s perceived “unique historic path” and unilateralism in foreign policy is entrenched in a continuous preoccupation with relative gains.50 Gray-zone conflicts did not change the focus; rather, the decreasing costs as a result of technological advancement, enabled the pursuit of maximum relative gains more in- tensely. As in the case of the United States, allies and adversaries became the

12 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict target of Russia’s operations. However, Moscow’s engagement against allies like Belarus, and ally-turned-adversary, such as Ukraine, is rooted in a historic perception that if Russia did not act preemptively, influence over its near abroad would inevitably be lost to an adversary. As a result, Moscow itself would be crippled. The contemporary Russian political ethos is based on neo-Eurasianism, in which Russia frames itself as a special civilization with a worldwide cultural–historical mission and a duty to protect its traditional sphere of influence.51 As in the case of the United States, this logic is directly linked to the endowment effect. Russia’s “special path” ideology has been key to legitimizing the country’s intervention across international borders over time. Whether during the czarist period, Soviet rule, or the post–Cold War era, Russia’s self-identification as a nation with its own unique path has been at the forefront of its foreign policy. Prior to 1918, Russia’s Orthodox religion helped justify imperial exceptionalism in which Eastern and Northern Europe and Central Asian territories must be conquered.52 Following the October 1918 revolution, the same exceptionalism was reshaped in line with secularism and the global communist revolution. Finally, following the collapse of the USSR, the same concept was reframed as a special path largely based on pre-Soviet cultural symbolism, the heroism of the Great Patriotic War, and the continuous encroach- ment of adversaries.53 This post–Cold War foreign policy doctrine is strongly connected to a narrative focused on Russia’s disenchantment with, and betrayal by, the West and other allies in the post-Soviet region.54 There were a number of circumstances and events in the 1990s and early 2000s that motivated the adoption of this foreign policy posture. First, Russia’s weak economic, military, and political position in the 1990s demanded that Moscow cooperate with the United States and Europe. Russia saw the economic aid provided by the United States and its allies in the 1990s as a manifestation of the Wolfowitz Doctrine meant to keep Russia per- petually weak.55 Second, Russia’s leadership saw NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in the 1990s as a signal of the alliance’s disregard for Moscow’s geopolitical interests. Third, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004–2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine brought anti-Moscow leaders to power among those countries thought to be in the Russian camp. Moreover, from Russia’s perspective, these events served to confirm that NATO members and their allies were working closely to undermine Russia’s power and influence across the near abroad.56 Thus, it becomes Moscow’s task to “repel the assault.”57

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 13 Belo & Carment

Russia’s Unilateralism in the Post-Soviet Region

Across the two conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia relied on various hybrid tools and tactics detailed elsewhere.58 As in the case of the United States under the influence of the endowment effect, Russia engaged in gray-zone conflict through competitive multilateralism and unilateralism to maintain hegemony across its historic sphere of influence. Moscow went from competing for influence in the American and European spheres of influence during the Cold War to sal-vaging its regional influence in places such as Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Social media has been a key channel through which Russia eroded the social cohesion of societies in its near abroad. For example, prior to the conflict, Russian-language television solidified existing social networks within the Russian-speak-ing diaspora in eastern Ukraine, thereby contributing to the subregion’s social cohesion. Starting with the Euromaidan demonstrations and related political unrest in 2014, Russian media outlets identified those forces opposed to Yanu-kovych as right-wing extremists, criminals, oppressors, and fascists. This descrip-tion lay in stark contrast to Ukrainian television channels and online media, which presented the events and individuals associated with the overthrow of the Yanu-kovych government as heroic. As a result, a large portion of the Russian-speaking population of southern and eastern Ukraine became distinctly sympathetic to Russia’s point of view, while the ethnic Ukrainian population in the rest of the country largely accepted the opposing narrative. Few remember that between 1.2 to 2.5 million civilians from eastern Ukraine instinctively fled the conflict to Russia instead of Ukraine in 2014 and 2015.59 However, Russia’s attempt at dividing its adversaries has not been confined to the subnational level. For example, Russia has shown some success in developing strong bilateral relations with individual EU states, such as Hungary and Italy. For example, Italy’s prime minister Matteo Ranzi was eventually convinced to oppose a majority of EU policy makers who proposed an even stricter sanctions regime against Russia. These efforts have helped erode the bloc’s cohesiveness and weaken its support for Ukraine. States frequently use economic pressure against their opponents in gray-zone conflicts as a method to subvert the opponents’ offensive and defensive capacities. The inducement of economic pressure, through methods such as sanctions, is in-tended to erode the essential sectors of the opponents’ economy, especially in situations of asymmetric economic interdependence, in hopes of facilitating a change in policy direction. For example, prior to the events in 2014, Russia and

14 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict

Ukraine engaged in substantial cooperation in the energy sector. Russia has been the single largest supplier of Ukrainian oil and gas. In December 2013, Russia and Ukraine signed the Ukrainian–Russian Action Plan, which solidified their energy cooperation and provided Ukraine with a discount for Russian natural gas at one- third of the market value. In 2014, during the unrest in eastern Ukraine and the Maidan, Gazprom, operated by the Russian government, annulled the discount. Concurrently, the Russian oil and gas company recalled Ukraine’s gas- and oil- related debt and demanded prompt payment. In May 2014 Ukraine was able to pay 786 million USD to Gazprom.60 Then in 2015, Russia unilaterally ceased the export of its gas to Ukraine, de- manding upfront payments for natural gas as well as immediate repayment of energy debts. Even though this scenario between Russia and Ukraine appears as an energy dispute, its timing and magnitude was an attempt to establish the upper hand. Ultimately, neither Western sanctions against Russia nor Russian manipu- lation of gas deals in relation to Ukraine can be classified as conventional tools in conflict or a declaration of war, thus falling within the essential toolkit available to states in gray-zone conflicts. An important element of Russia’s gray-zone operations is the direct support for substate criminal and militant elements that fight on behalf of one or both of the conflicting parties. Considering that even prior to the conflict, 35 percent of the Ukrainian economy was operating in the shadows, the environment is set up perfectly for underground and criminal elements that engage in black-market arms sales and profiteering.61 Alongside its support for nonstate militias, Russia has also engaged in covert operations. For example, the Crimean operation used swiftness and the element of surprise to establish a fait accompli in the operational environment in Crimea, thus, making any counteractions by Ukraine nearly impossible. Russian victory was secured by the deployment of 16,000 regular military personnel already on the ground in the peninsula; however, the initial action by special operations forces and other special and elite forces elements was the decisive element in Russia’s success.62 As noted by Ukrainian officials, and later confirmed by the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the key to the success of the covert operation, colloquially known as the “little green men,” in Crimea was the deployment of the 18th Motor Rifle Brigade, 31st Air Assault Brigade, and 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade, which amounted to a total of up to 10,000 operatives. However, such swift kinetic operations were not only employed in Ukraine.63 Similarly, the Russian military assault on Georgia in August 2008 resulted in temporary interruptions to gas and oil pipeline shipments; however, these were soon resumed once Russia discontinued the military campaign. The Georgia

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 15 conflict reasserted Russia’s military dominance over critical energy transporta- tion routes and disrupted Georgia’s NATO accession. On 5 August 2008, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline experienced a failure outside the city of Refahiye, Turkey. This crisis was attributed to a cyberattack, and Turkish authorities’ response to the situation was slowed as a result.64 Following the conflict, Gazprom resumed its supply of natural gas to Georgia. Russia’s cyberattacks against Geor- gia were well-synchronized with its military campaigns in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Other than attempting to change the regional balance of power in relation to adversaries, Moscow’s actions were also meant to “discipline” traditional allies. As in the case of the United States, Russia sent a signal that allies could be disci- plined if they chose to establish closer ties with adversaries to gain profit from two opposing political camps. For example, Russia worried about Kazakhstan’s increasing military cooperation with the US Army through joint annual exercises such as STEPPE EAGLE.65 By 2014, the European Union became Kazakhstan’s largest trade partner, putting Russia in second place.66 With regard to Belarus, Minsk’s ties with the European Union began to solidify economically between 2007 and 2009.67 For example, by 2010, the Euro- pean Union was Belarus’ largest trade partner, accounting for 44 percent of Be- larusian exports relative to 32 percent going to Russia. Moreover, in a 2009 poll, the number of Belarusians who would vote for accession to the European Union (42.2 percent) exceeded the number of respondents who would prefer unification with Russia (34.9 percent).68 However, the short-term tactic of yanking the chain to discipline allies in gray-zone conflict must be examined alongside long-term consequences. In March 2014, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry recognized that the Crimea ref- erendum reflected the will of the local population to join Russia.69 Concurrently, Pres. Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus stated that Crimea was a part of the Rus- sian Federation.70 However, Kazakhstan does not legally recognize the referen- dum of 16 March 2014 and claims that the territorial integrity of states as prescribed by the UN Charter should be the priority. Subsequently, Lukashenko adopted the position that Russia’s actions in Crimea have set a “bad precedent,” fearing that a similar operation could be undertaken in his country.71 Looking ahead, academics have begun to speculate whether Russia will continue to support separatism and engage in similar formats of intervention in these countries.72 What has become apparent is that interventions across the post-So- viet space eroded traditional alliances and thereby the collective trust necessary to facilitate peaceful conflict prevention and resolution in the region. The table below summarizes the gray-zone campaigns, engagement type and desired outcomes.

16 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict

Table 2. Summary of US and Russia gray-zone engagement format and desired outcomes

Russia United States

Ukraine Ukraine Georgia Nord Stream II Soleimani Syria Arms and Campaign Campaign Sanctions Assassination Intervention Training Gray-zone Engagement Competitive Competitive Format Unilateralism Unilateralism Unilateralism Unilateralism multilateralism multilateralism

Dilute Russian Dilute Russian Dilute Iran’s Dilute Iranian Prevent further NATO expan- influence in influence in regional influ- and Russian sion into Eastern Europe; dis- Ukraine; gain Ukraine and ence; prevent regional influ- Desired cipline traditional allies such greater foot- Europe; prevent EU coopera- ence; gain a Outcomes as Belarus and Kazakhstan to hold in EU cooperation tion across large foothold prevent cooperation across Ukraine rela- across geopoliti- geopolitical in Syria com- geopolitical axes (i.e., Western tive to the Eu- cal axes (i.e., axes (i.e., pared to Euro- powers) ropean Union Russia) Iran) pean allies

Impact of Competitive Multilateralism and Unilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict Management

Engagement in either competitive multilateralism or unilateralism, targeting both adversaries and allies in pursuit of relative gains, erodes the international trust necessary for the management of gray-zone conflicts. In the short run, states can punish adversaries and discipline allies, but in the long run the fracturing of alliances is detrimental to global (collective) security. As we discussed in the cases of the United States and Russia, perceived short-term relative gains often come at the expense of long-term strategic prudence. Unilateralism sets the precedence for legitimizing and normalizing states’ continued use of unprincipled and potentially illegal actions across international borders. As we highlighted in this our related study, unilateralism is often synonymous with a violation of international law.73 Concurrently, the laws of war provide relatively few guidelines due to their low intensity and high degree of operational co- vertness.74 Thus, either due to lack of enforcement of existing rules or as a result of international law’s blind spots, great powers have largely been able to maintain their foreign policy course with impunity. Unless international frameworks, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, are updated or new frameworks emerge to regu- late the use of low-intensity hybrid tools and tactics, great powers will continue to increase the legitimacy of the methods of coercion identified in this article. How- ever, this does not mean that unilateral actions remain entirely unpunished.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 17 For example, vulnerability to retaliatory measures by a weaker opponent becomes more likely when engaging in unilateral action. This is largely tied to the lack of legitimacy associated with unilateralism. When acting alone, states often sacrifice the legitimacy of their action in favor of achieving some short-term outcomes. For example, with broader support for the assassination of Soleimani from European allies, it becomes less likely that Iran’s leaders would choose to engage in retaliation as readily as they did against American forces or through support for protests. However deep-rooted preoccupation with relative gains against the Eu- ropeans have prevented the United States from seeking the legitimacy to engage Iran through genuine multilateralism. Thus, from the US perspective, it is more important to sever the goodwill between the Europeans and Tehran than legiti- matize cooperation. It is more important that the United States protect its own military personnel and infrastructure from possible retaliation than find a long- term stable resolution to the conflict. Building on this point, another risk that states undertake when engaging unilaterally in gray-zone conflicts is increased vulnerability to “war fatigue.” Low- intensity countermeasures become especially potent when used sporadically, across a long period, to wear out and undermine the initiator of the fight. For example, following the assassination of Soleimani, Iran supported protesters against Americans stationed in Iraq.75 Moreover, Iraq’s parliament threatened to revoke the right of US forces to remain in the country.76 Washington responded that US troops would not leave until Baghdad paid its debt to the United States. Iran, was able to provoke the United States into a response that was considered illegal under international law. The risk, thus, becomes for national governments to be trapped in a continuous and costly cycle of hostilities. In the long run, US efforts to discipline allies in Europe and punish adversaries like Russia have had a conflicting effect. Sanctions by Washington have pushed the European Union into closer relations with Russia. For example, we see that the Nord Stream II project was frozen temporarily, but the European Union and Russia are working cooperatively to find alternative means to complete it. Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008 and in eastern Ukraine and Crimea have eroded the political cohesion necessary to resolve conflicts in the post-Soviet space. The conflict in Ukraine correlated with an escalation of the tug-of-war between Minsk and Moscow, with Lukashenko recently escalating negative rhetoric toward Russia.77 In the case of Kazakhstan, even though trade and political relations have generally remained positive with Russia, the country has accelerated its sociocultural separation from Moscow—for example, through the Latinization of its alphabet.78 In the long run, such rapid nationalization may provoke a similar interethnic rift as in case of Ukraine, providing a ripe

18 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict environment for Russia’s intervention. In either case, the goodwill created under the Commonwealth of Independent States has been eroded, thereby limiting the capacity of post-Soviet states to engage in genuine multilateral conflict resolution. Conclusions

We argued in this article that competitive multilateralism and unilateralism carry unintended negative consequences that increase the resistance of gray-zone conflicts to de-escalation and resolution. Looking ahead, collective action and multilateralism, the opposite phenomena to what we discussed in this article, should not be treated as the essential remedies to manage gray-zone conflict. A key challenge for mediation in gray-zone conflicts is they often incorporate long chains of state and nonstate intermediaries who often act as veto players.79 For example, at the tactical level, the greatest strides toward the implementation of the Minsk Agreements in Ukraine have been taken through the Trilateral Con- tact Group, which incorporates the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia, Ukraine, and on occasion, representatives of the separatist territories of eastern Ukraine. Building on this, the rift between the United States and European NATO members, which may be perceived as a weakening of US–European collective security, may in fact contribute to a resolution in Ukraine. The rift between Wash- ington and the European Union has grown to the point that the hands of France and Germany are now untied to go confidently into future negotiations with Moscow without looking back at Washington’s support for Ukraine. Gray-zone conflicts will be the key relationship format between great powers, who will continue to exploit weaknesses in adversaries and allies to increase their own relative gains. For example, Russia’s medical support mission in Italy during the COVID-19 in March 2020 was used to solidify Moscow’s bilateral relations with Italy and gain political influence in Europe. This was undertaken while Washington and other European nations have been preoccupied with their own crises. As gray-zone tools and tactics become increasingly complex, the demand from both academicians and policy makers for creative conflict management strategies to respond to the constant pursuit of maximum relative gains will increase. For military professionals, the strategic-level considerations highlighted in this article, such as erosion of trust among traditional allies, should provide a sound basis to initiate a discussion regarding implications for those working at the operational level.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 19 Moreover, our research raises an important question: as political trust among traditional partners continues to decline, and competitiveness increases, will nations be willing to undercut their allies and forego aiding their partners on the battlefield? The ground-level expertise of military and security professionals would be valuable for a follow-up analysis and for the continued development of this research direction more broadly. Their operational knowledge can offer compelling alternative or complementary explanations for states’ behavior in contemporary gray-zone conflicts.80

Dani Belo Mr. Belo is a PhD candidate and SSHRC Doctoral Fellow in international conflict management and resolution at The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada). His research focuses on gray-zone conflicts, hybrid warfare, the evolution of NATO–Russia relations, conflict mediation, ethnic conflict, and nationalism in the post-Soviet region. Mr. Belo was the editor in chief of the Paterson Review of International Af- fairs Journal and worked as an analyst for the Government of Canada. His recent publications, among others, include “Non-State Actors and Conflict Management in an Era of Gray-zone Conflict” in The Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security, and Development (Ed. Hampson et al.); “Conflict in the Absence of War: A Comparative Analysis of China and Russia Engagement in Gray Zone Conflicts” in the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ); “Gray Zone Media- tion in the Ukraine Crisis: Comparing Crimea and Donbas” in the Handbook on Mediating International Crises (Ed. Wilkenfeld et al.); and “War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Gray Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare” for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI).

Dr. David Carment Dr. Carment (PhD, political science, McGill University; MA, international affairs, Carleton University; MA, religious studies, McMaster University; and BA, religious studies and political science, McMaster University) is a professor of international affairs at The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada). He is series editor for Palgrave’s Canada and International Affairs, editor of Canadian Foreign Policy Jour- nal, and Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. His research focuses on Canadian foreign policy, mediation, and negotiation; fragile states; and diaspora politics. Dr. Carment is the author, editor, or coeditor of 21 books and has authored or coauthored over 90 peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters. His most recent books focus on diaspora cooperation, corruption in Canada, branding Canadian foreign policy, and state fragility. In 2017, Carment was a visiting scholar at the World Institute for Development Economics Research (Finland) and in 2015 a Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research (Germany). His most recent books include Canada-US Rela- tions (2019) and Exiting the Fragility Trap (2019).

20 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict

Notes

1. See Joseph Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: New York University Press, 1993); and Duncan Snidal, “International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4 (1991): 387–402. 2. Building on the endowment effect argument, Belo calls Russia’s interventions in its near abroad “hybridism in retreat.” See Dani Belo, “Conflict in the Absence of War: A Comparative Analysis of China and Russia Engagement in Gray Zone Conflicts,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 26, no. 1 (2019): 73–91. 3. The strategic-level rift between Turkey and other NATO members has been a key enabling factor for Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. Turkey’s decision will likely pose a danger to the interoperability of NATO members’ air defense systems. See “The Great Unwinding: The U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Dispute,”https://www.csis.org/ . Another indicator of declining trust among Western allies is the European Union’s (EU) highest court’s recent decision to void a data-sharing deal between the EU and the US. This decision was a response to growing concerns over US security services’ surveillance on EU citizens. See “EU’s Top Court Voids Data- Sharing Deal with U.S. Tech Companies,” https://www.pbs.org/. In July 2020, France’s willingness to continue its military collaboration with Turkey has come under question when it suspended its role in NATO Operation Sea Guardian as a response to Turkish hostilities in the Mediterra- nean. See France 24, “France Suspends Role in NATO Naval Mission over Tensions with Turkey,” 7 January 2020, https://www.france24.com/. 4. Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Car- lisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015); and David Carment and Dani Belo, “War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare,” Cana- dian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI), October 2018, https://www.cgai.ca/; David Carment, Milana Nikolko, and Dani Belo, “Gray Zone Mediation in the Ukraine Crisis: Comparing Crimea and Donbas,” in Handbook on Mediating International Crises, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, and David Quinn (Northampton, MA: Elgar, 2019), 124–40; and Dani Belo, “Conflict in the Absence of War: A Comparative Analysis of China and Russia Engagement in Gray Zone Con- flicts,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 26, no. 1 (2019): 73–91. 5. Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007). 6. David Carment and Dani Belo, “Gray-zone Conflict Management: Theory, Evidence, and Challenges,” Journal of European, Middle Eastern & African Affairs 2, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 21–41. 7. For some, gray-zone conflicts are a kind of war of attrition with less reliance on troops in favor of unconventional warfare. See Peter Munson, “The Return to Attrition: Warfare in the Late Nation-State Era,” Strategic Insights 6, no. 6 (December 2007): 1–14. However, wars of attrition typically arise when powerful modern states are unable to mobilize, and control is in decline. In gray zone conflicts, we observe the exact opposite. Especially illiberal and highly centralized nations can mobilize the whole of society as well as nonstate actors across international borders to achieve their geopolitical aim. 8. Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation.” 9. Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 3 (1991): 701–26.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 21 10. Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,”American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (1991): 1303–20. 11. David L. Rousseau, “Motivations for Choice: The Salience of Relative Gains in Interna- tional Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 3 (June 2002): 394–426. 12. Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Appli- cable to Cyber Operations: Prepared by the International Groups of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 13. Carment and Belo, “Gray-zone Conflict Management,” 25. 14. “Farewell Address 1796,” US diplomatic mission to Germany, accessed 30 April 2020, https://usa.usembassy.de/. 15. John Ruggie, “Doctrinal Unilateralism and Its Limits: America and Global Governance in the New Century,” in American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World, edited by David P. Forsythe, Patrice C. McMahon, and Andrew Wedeman (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006), 42. 16. Ruggie, “Doctrinal Unilateralism and Its Limits,” 42. 17. “Farewell Address 1796,” US diplomatic mission to Germany. 18. “Farewell Address 1796,” US diplomatic mission to Germany. 19. “Diplomatic History Roundtable: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Historical Perspective,” Diplomatic History 29 ( June 2005). 20. Charles William Maynes, “US Unilateralism and Its Dangers,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 3 (1 July 1999): 515–18. 21. The DPG was also key to the emergence of the American “intervention trap.” See: Richard Higgott, “US Foreign Policy and the ‘Securitization’ of Economic Globalization,” International Politics 41, no. 2 (1 June 2004): 147–75; and Uriel Marantz, Fanny Siauw-Soegiarto, and Sharon Zhengyang Sun, “The Intervention Trap in a Time of Tumult,”Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (2017), 197. 22. Emma M. Ashford, “Hegemonic Blackmail: Entrapment in Civil War Intervention,” Ca- nadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (2017), 218. 23. G. John Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: Americas Postwar World Order in Transi- tion,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific5, no. 2 (2005), 133–37. 24. Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter states that “Nothing in the present Char- ter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” See “Charter of the United Nations,” UN, accessed 30 April 2020, https://www.un.org/. 25. “Charter of the United Nations.” 26. Monica Duffy-Toft, “Fewer Diplomats, More Armed Force Defines US Leadership To- day,” The Conversation, 20 September 2018, https://theconversation.com/; and Dani Belo and David Carment, “Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Threats,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, January 2020, https://www.cgai.ca/. 27. Ibid. 28. Marina E. Henke, “Why Did France Intervene in Mali in 2013? Examining the Role of Intervention Entrepreneurs,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (2017), 307. 29. Frank P. Harvey, “Addicted to Security: Globalized Terrorism and the Inevitability of American Unilateralism,” International Journal 59, no. 1 (March 2004): 27–57.

22 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict

30. “A New National Security Strategy for a New Era,” The White House, 19 December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/. 31. David Carment and Dani Belo, “Non-State Actors and Conflict Management in an Era of Gray-zone Conflict,” inThe Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security, and Development, ed. Fen Hampson, Jonathan Kent, and Alp Ozerdem (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2020). 32. “Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) (Office of the Sec- retary of Defense, March 2019), https://comptroller.defense.gov/. 33. Kathleen McInnis, “Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State” (Congres- sional Research Service, 24 August 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/. 34. Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, “Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable?,” Survival 59, no. 3 (15 May 2017): 7–54. 35. Patrick M. Regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 55–73. 36. “Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine,” 7th ATC, accessed 30 April 2020, https:// www.7atc.army.mil/. 37. “US Military Arrive in Ukraine on a Training Mission,” uawire.org, 4 May 2019, https:// uawire.org/. 38. “Operation UNIFIER,” Government of Canada, 3 December 2018, https://www.canada. ca/. 39. “Progress in Reform,” EUAM Ukraine, 3 July 2019, https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/. 40. “Роз’яснення Щодо Статусу Спецпідрозділу ‘Азов,’ “Роз’яснення щодо статусу спецпідрозділу “Азов” | НГУ, accessed 30 April 2020, http://ngu.gov.ua/; and “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine16 February to 15 May 2016,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/. 41. Michael Colborne, “There’s One Far-Right Movement That Hates the Kremlin,”Foreign Policy, 17 April 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/. 42. Iain King, “Not Contributing Enough? A Summary of European Military and Develop- ment Assistance to Ukraine Since 2014,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 April 2020), https://www.csis.org/. 43. Ryan Browne, “US Releases $200 Million in Defensive Aid to Ukraine as Moscow Seeks Better Ties,” CNN, 20 July 2018, https://www.cnn.com/. 44. “H.R.2500—116th Congress (2019–2020): National Defense Authorization Act for Fis- cal Year 2020,” Congress, 10 September 2019, https://www.congress.gov/. 45. Belo and Carment, “Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Threats.” 46. Decisions are reached in NATO through a consensus-building process. The North Atlan- tic Council (NAC) achieves consensus through a process in which no member states its objection. To object or de-facto veto a collective decision, a NATO member state can send a letter of objection to the Secretary General within a specified period. See NATOs Decision-making Procedure, by Paul E. Gallis, Cong., 2–4. For example, through this process Turkey may undermine future efforts by NATO to continue operations in the Baltic region. 47. Bruce Love, “Companies Caught in EU-US Sanctions Crossfire,” Financial Times, 29 January 2020, https://www.ft.com/. 48. John Leicester, “‘A More Dangerous World’: US Airstrike Responsible for Killing Iran’s Top General Triggers Global Alarm,” Chicago Tribune, 3 January 2020, https://www.chicagotri- bune.com/.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 23 49. “Germany Withdraws Some Troops from Iraq over Iran Tensions,” Bloomberg, 7 January 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/. 50. Aleksandr Melikhov, “The ‘Special Path’ Ideology as an Instrument of Modernization,” Russian Politics & Law 50, no. 6 (1 November 2012): 69–71. 51. Aleksandr Kubyshkin and Aleksandr Sergunin, “The Problem of the ‘Special Path’ in Russian Foreign Policy,” Russian Social Science Review 56, no. 3 (4 May 2015): 31–42. 52. Liliya Berezhnaya and Heidi Hein-Kircher, Rampart Nations: Bulwark Myths of East Eu- ropean Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism (New York: Berghahn Books, 2019). 53. Brendan Humphreys, “Russian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Perspective,” Politics in Central Europe 12, no. 1 (1 April 2016): 9–20. 54. The signal of Russia’s heightened perception of threat from NATO was first defined in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation in June 2000. See “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” 28 June 2000, https://fas.org/. 55. Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, Russian Views of the International Order: Building a Sus- tainable International Order: A RAND Project to Explore U.S. Strategy in a Changing World (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2017), 23–27. 56. Kubyshkin and Sergunin, “The Problem of the ‘Special Path,’” 34. 57. Melikhov, “The ‘Special Path’ Ideology,” 69–71. 58. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone; Thomas Ambrosio, “The Rhetoric of Irredentism: The Russian Federation’s Perception Management Campaign and the Annexation of Crimea,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 27, no. 3 (3 May 2016): 467–90.; Carment and Belo, “War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict”; and Belo, “Conflict in the Absence of War,” 77. 59. Carment et al., “Gray Zone Mediation in the Ukraine Crisis: Comparing Crimea and Donbas,” 127. 60. Carment et al., “Gray Zone Mediation in the Ukraine Crisis: Comparing Crimea and Donbas,” 127. 61. Igor Vinnychuk and Serhii Ziukov, “Shadow Economy in Ukraine: Modelling and Anal- ysis,” Business Systems & Economics 3, no. 2 (2013): 141–52. 62. Tor Bukkvoll, “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas, Russian Mili- tary Power,” Parameters 46, no. 2 (22 June 2016): 13–21. 63. Interfax-Ukraine, “В Крыму Находятся Российские Военнослужащие Не Только Из Частей ЧФ РФ, Утверждают в Генштабе ВСУ,” Интерфакс-Украина, 4 March 2014, https:// interfax.com.ua/. 64. Jordan Robertson and Michael Riley, “Mysterious ‘08 Turkey Pipeline Blast Opened New Cyberwar,” Bloomberg, 10 December 2014, https://www.bloomberg.com/. 65. “Exercise STEPPE EAGLE,” US Army Central, 2019, https://www.usarcent.army.mil/ Steppe-Eagle/. 66. “EU-Kazakhstan Relations,” EEAS, 15 January 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/ ; and Casey Michel, “Russia-Kazakhstan Relations Took a Dive in 2014,” The Diplomat, 20 December 2014, https://thediplomat.com/. 67. Alaksandr Łahviniec and Alaksandr Papko, “Unfinished Business: Challenges for Belarus on Its Way to Democracy,” European View 9, no. 2 (December 2010): 253–62. 68. NISEPI (Nezavisimyj Institut Socialno-EkonomicˇEskih i PoliticˇEskih Issledovanij), Nacyonalnyj opros v marte, 2009.

24 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Unilateralism and Competitive Multilateralism in Gray-zone Conflict

69. The official statement by the Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan outlines that: “The referen- dum held in Crimea is seen in Kazakhstan as a free expression of the will of the Autonomous Republic’s population, while the decision of the Russian Federation under the existing circumstances is regarded with understanding.” “Kazakhstan Responds to Ukraine Crisis,” Refworld, United Nations, 24 March 2014, https://www.refworld.org/. 70. Artyom Shraibman, “The Lukashenko Formula: Belarus’s Crimea Flip-Flops,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 6 January 2016, https://carnegie.ru/. 71. “Belarus Says Russia’s Annexation of Crimea Sets a ‘Bad Precedent,’” Moscow Times, 23 March 2014, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/. 72. Marlene Laruelle, Dylan Royce, and Serik Beyssembayev, “Untangling the Puzzle of ‘Rus- sia’s Influence’ in Kazakhstan,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 60, no. 2 (4 March 2019): 211– 43; and Alexander C. Diener, “Assessing Potential Russian Irredentism and Separatism in Ka- zakhstan’s Northern Oblasts,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 56, no. 5 (3 September 2015): 469–92. 73. David Carment and Dani Belo, “Gray-zone Conflict Management,” 31–32. 74. Jenny Döge, “Cyber Warfare Challenges for the Applicability of the Traditional Laws of War Regime,” Archiv Des Völkerrechts 48, no. 4 (2010), 486. 75. Idrees Ali, “Trump Aides Call US. Strikes on Iraq and Syria ‘Successful,’ Warn of Potential Further Action,” Reuters, 30 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/. 76. Eric Levenson and Amir Vera, “Iraqi Parliament Votes for Plan to End US Troop Pres- ence in Iraq after Soleimani Killing,” CNN, 5 January 2020, https://www.cnn.com/. 77. “Belarus Buys Oil from Norway as Russia Dispute Continues,” Moscow Times, 21 January 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/. 78. “Kazakhstan Rewrites Its Alphabet to Shed Its Soviet Past,” Deutsche Welle, 1 July 2019, https://www.dw.com/. 79. Carment et al., “Gray Zone Mediation in the Ukraine Crisis,” 132. 80. A follow-up contribution from military and security professionals can supplement the foregoing discussion by addressing points such as what war fighters should expect to see, correct at their level, and avoid if they can; what can a squadron, group, or wing commander control when competitive multilateralism or unilateralism turns the operational environment or allies hostile. Moreover, military and security professionals may offer alternative explanations to several of the strategic-level causal mechanisms we propose. For example, key questions that can be addressed through ground-level experience is whether America’s increase of combat and intelligence support in Syria was genuinely initiated as a fight against the Islamic State and if footholds in Syria to oppose Iran and Russia were tertiary goals.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 25 COMMENTARY Strike Back! India–China Border Skirmish

Dr. Jyotirmoy Banerjee

he June 2020 violent clash at Galwan Valley in Ladakh between Indian and Chinese border forces led to the death of 20 Indian soldiers and an indeterminate number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops. This Tclash was the first bloodletting after four-and-a-half decades along the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC) that substitutes for a disputed border. The two giant Asian neighbors, who are also nuclear powers, fought with stones and sticks.1 What factors, as the Germans say, were the Anlass (trigger) and the Ursache (underlying reason) for this breakdown of decades-long relative peace along the 3,488 km India–China LAC in the Himalayas? How should India react? And what does the Himalayan clash mean for US strategy? The Anlass (Trigger): Strategic Highway Politics

China was busy for decades building roads, railways, and other infrastructure in its far west, in Tibet and Xinjiang. Two of its highways straddle South Asia. Its Xinjiang–Tibet Highway G219 runs through the disputed Aksai Chin region of Ladakh. China’s other strategic road, the Karakoram Highway in the far west, is expected to play a major role in the 62 billion USD China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC connects China’s Kashgar in Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. It would enable China to haul its seaborne imports, especially oil, thereby circumventing the Strait of Malacca. Time and money would be significantly spared. New Delhi, on the other hand, had for decades refrained from building border roads. Following the debacle in 1962, New Delhi feared that an invading PLA force would make use of any roads India built near the LAC. From 2008, however, this policy reversed. India belatedly got busy with building roads near the LAC.2 Since 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s nationalist government stepped up these activities. India’s strategic DS–DBO Road in Ladakh runs 255 kilometers from Darbuk- Shyok to Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), which is about 18 kilometers south of China’s strategic Karakoram Pass. The road and 37 bailey bridges running parallel to the LAC would immensely facilitate the movement of troops and supplies to the strategic north Ladakh, the up to 18,000-foot-high Sub-Sector North (SSN).

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The SSN is precariously perched between Pakistan-controlled Gilgit-Baltistan in the west and China-controlled regions of Shaksgam in the north and Aksai Chin in the east. Surrounded by these potentially hostile regions, India controls the Saltoro Ridge, the Siachen glacier further east, and the advanced landing ground (ALG) of DBO in altitudes where breathing itself is a luxury. The ALG operates AN-32s and US-supplied C-130 J Hercules aircraft. Feeder roads to the LAC are also being built. The Galwan Valley provides direct access to Aksai Chin from India. Since the DS–DBO Road and a bridge across the Galwan nallah (riverbed) would mean swift access to it, China opposes such construction. Beijing feels free to build roads in undemarcated areas but objects when India does the same. There is also Beijing’s trepidation that India’s military presence in north Ladakh poses a threat to China’s two major highways on either side. The PLA has now dug in. The ridges in the Galwan Valley overlook India’s road. This means the PLA can cut off the road, and thereby the SSN, at will. The Galwan River flows mostly in Aksai Chin. However, its last few kilometers west where it meets the Shyok River are in Indian territory.3 China is now un- hesitatingly claiming the entire valley.4 The Ursache (Underlying Cause)

China vehemently opposed New Delhi’s 5 August 2019 revision of Article 370 of India’s constitution. This article—along with article 35A—had conferred a special status to India’s state of Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K), which included Ladakh. India’s ruling nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) party converted J&K and Ladakh into two separate Union Territories under direct central government rule. In Beijing’s view, this altered status affected the Sino–Indian LAC, which stands undelineated and undemarcated.5 This, along with India’s road-building activities near the LAC, was seen as provocation. The Strategic Situation

A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, suggests that the current Sino–Indian LAC clash was seasonal.6 However, this research misses the point that this time the situation is different.7 China has started to lay claim to the entire Galwan Valley and other points along the LAC. There were several near-simultaneous intrusions in Ladakh and in Sikkim (at Naku La) during May–June. With these moves, China has seized the first-move advantage, occupied fresh territories along the LAC, and placed India in the uncomfortable

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 27 Banerjee position of having to choose its countermove to a fait accompli created by a powerful adversary. PLA Forces in Tibet

A formidable PLA force stares India in the face. China’s Western Theatre Command (WTC), the largest of the reorganized five regional commands, is responsible for the LAC bordering China’s provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet. The Tibet Military Command/Military District under the WTC has been elevated and placed under the PLA army.8 The Tibet Autonomous Region has more than 200,000 soldiers, including those from support services, border guards, and armed police. The PLA has created a viable military ecosystem and has been conducting combat training.9 Two new commands have appeared. The Strategic Rocket Force, formerly the army’s Second Artillery Corps, handles both nuclear and conventional missiles. The Strategic Support Force (SSF) specializes in electronic and cyberspace warfare as well as psychological operations. The SSF can threaten India’s vital infrastructure. Chinese components in India’s government and private telecom hard- ware, including the omnipresent microchip, also make them vulnerable. Since even America is wary of Beijing’s perceived challenge,10 would it not be foolhardy of India to provoke Beijing? This is precisely what China is counting upon. It has reminded India of the 1962 debacle, should New Delhi again try to test China’s patience.11 The Confronting Forces at the LAC

However, India today is better prepared than it was in 1962. India’s military has been beefing up the LAC with armor, artillery, infantry, and airpower. It has several army corps deployed in the border states of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Ut- tarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, and Ladakh. The XIV Corps is responsible for Ladakh’s defense. There is an infantry brigade stationed at DBO; an armored brigade is deployed near Leh. A new XVII Mountain Strike Corps, (the Brah- mastra Corps), with headquarters in Panagarh in India’s eastern state of West Bengal, is probably still shaping up. It commands two divisions and a brigade. The corps is meant to be an offensive unit with the ability to move, deploy, and launch limited offensives in the mountains.12 In terms of airpower, both sides have many air bases and landing strips. China has several times more combat aircraft than India. However, China’s disadvantage is that most of its air bases are located on the high Tibetan plateau, such as at Ngari Gunsa, which is just 200 km from the disputed Pangong Tso lake. The

28 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Strike Back! India-China Border Skirmish rarified air at these high-altitude airfields does not permit the kind of aircraft load that India’s lower altitude bases can handle. Also, Beijing’s main strategic concern (Schwerpunkt) is in its east. Thus, India can put up a good fight despite its -nu merically inferior airpower.13 The PLA and Pakistani air forces have been regularly conducting joint exercises like the Shaheen and Warrior series. Some of these exercises take place in China’s Hotan prefecture near the LAC.14 Among the participating aircraft are the reli- able but not state-of-the-art single-seater JF-17 combat jet,15 jointly developed by Pakistan and China. The JF-17 is Pakistan’s workhorse. Additionally, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has the Chengdu F-7, the French Mirage III and 5, and the US F-16.16 The PAF also has a number of European and Chinese early warning and electronic warfare aircraft. The J-10 and J-11 form the backbone of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Besides having the versatile J-16, the PLAAF has the latest J-10 C, equipped with the AESA radar system that allows for stealth and jam resistance. The PLAAF pos- sesses a number of other combat aircraft, often copied from Soviet-era MiGs and Sukhois but then updated indigenously. The latest advanced jet fighter in the PLAAF is the J-20.17 Shortly after the Shaheen 8 exercise in fall 2019, India’s XVII Corps launched its Him Vijay exercise. India’s air force inventory of combat aircraft includes the Mirage-2000; state-of-the-art and stealth Rafale, which are in the pipeline; Su- 30MKI; MiG-29; the HAL Tejas light combat aircraft that is now replacing the veteran MiG-21; and upgraded MiG-27 and Jaguar.18 On the ground the PLA has an edge with its Type 15 light tanks, which are better suited for high altitudes than India’s T-72s and T-90s. India’s Next Move: Strike Back!

Bilateral talks at various levels, from foreign ministers to corps commanders, so far have failed to make the Chinese agree to revert to status quo ante (April). After marathon talks, the PLA has made a few cosmetic moves, agreeing to pull back troops—on a mutual basis—a few kilometers at some spots. Critics allege the buffer zones thus created would be on India’s territory. Beijing has refused to budge from the Depsang Valley near India’s DBO air- strip, or from the Finger 4 area—hitherto patrolled by both sides—on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso lake.19 The PLA’s “pull back” in Galwan is also sus- pect. As in the past, the PLA keeps nibbling at Indian territory to create new “facts on the ground,” a “new normal.” It seizes an area, asserts that it has always been a part of China’s territory, and then offers to negotiate.20

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 29 Banerjee

India’s Options

India now faces the dilemma of how to force the PLA to roll back without triggering a full-scale war. To carry out a tit-for- tat , India could swiftly move into Chinese-held territory along the long LAC with plenty of salient features.21 Its XVII Mountain Strike Corps finds itsraison d’etre precisely in offensive activity. India could then use the newly captured promontories as a bargaining chip to get the PLA out of its new posts along the LAC. A nonkinetic and better alternative is for India to pinch, if not punch, China’s underbelly in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India should hold naval exercises like the Malabar series (with the United States and Japan), with the third Quad member, Australia, and ASEAN states near the regions that are China’s Achilles’ heel. These regions are the Strait of Malacca, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, and Gwadar. China is the world’s top crude oil importer. Some 80 percent of this and some liquefied natural gas move through the Malacca Strait.22 Kyaukpyu is an oil, gas, and railway terminal connecting China’s Kunming in the Yunnan province.23 Gwadar takes the cake in shortening China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC), as already noted. Exercises in these regions would force a detour of China’s SLOCs and push up the time and cost of its seaborne trade. The Indian navy is already engaged in countering China’s “string of pearls” strategy. The latter involves surrounding In- dia with military and economic relationships with other littorals. India’s only triservice Andaman and Nicobar Command is strategically located at the mouth of the Malacca Strait. New Delhi is beefing it up. Additionally, New Delhi has struck naval access agreements with a host of IOR/Persian Gulf littorals as well as with the United States, France, and Australia.24 To pinch China further, India could encourage the Tibetans (their revered leader, the Dalai Lama, is a refugee in India), the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang, and people in Hong Kong and Taiwan to assert their freedom in international fora. Key US Role

The current Sino–US Cold War works out to New Delhi’s advantage. India’s “strategic partnership” with the United States will come in handy in a scenario where India seizes the initiative. Washington has long perceived India as a potential bulwark against an expansionist China that aims to dominate not only Asia but also eventually Mackinder’s “world island” (Africa and Eurasia),25 particularly through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. To quote a Congressional Re- search Service report from way back in 2013:

30 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Strike Back! India-China Border Skirmish

Concerns about an increasingly assertive or even aggressive China appear to have led American friends in the region [South Asia] to issue new calls for a greater US security role there. In Washington, DC, India’s rapidly growing military capabilities tend to be viewed by American officials and analysts as providing at least a partial hedge against the emergence of any new hegemonic power on the Asian continent.26 The conclusion, drawn seven years ago, rings highly relevant today: Chinese “blunderings” in recent years—mainly what were viewed as a series of ham- fisted policies toward neighbors with whom Beijing has territorial disputes—have had the effect of pushing Washington and New Delhi into closer relations, perhaps overrid- ing other concerns. Global Times recently expressed China’s wariness: India should not “believe that worsening China–US ties would provide a chance for India to challenge China.”27 Apart from receiving advanced weapons under existing agreements and possible intelligence on PLA deployments,28 India can ask Washington to conspicuously frown upon any adventurous and opportunistic tendencies of Islamabad. That approach should neutralize much of India’s two-front worries. In addition, Washington could serve to distract Beijing in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Straits region. Two aircraft carriers from Honolulu’s Indo-Pacific Command, accompanied by their escorts, have already patrolled in the South China Sea. A long-range B-52 Stratofortress bomber joined them.29 This double- carrier exercise came after many years in the region much to Beijing’s dismay. Southeast Asian littorals, Australia, and Japan are actively joining in the fray as well. Last June, ASEAN leaders, led by Hanoi, declared the 1982 UN oceans treaty as applicable in the South China Sea. This declaration was their strong demonstration of opposing China’s claim to virtually the entire disputed waters.30 In nine months of 2019, Japan’s air force intercepted Chinese planes 523 times. Tokyo has also stepped up Japan’s defense preparedness.31 Australia declared that it was to buy long-range missiles. While listing several regional disputes involving Beijing, Prime Minister Scott Morrison took care to mention its Himalayan border conflict with India.32 Leading senators and other US government officials have been openly critical of China on a host of issues, including its border clash with India.33 The United States, India’s key partner opposing Beijing’s irredentism, is already helping its army with ultra-light M-777 mountain howitzers with precision-guided Excali- bur munitions and heavy-lift Chinook and Apache attack helicopters. Washing- ton is also extending help to India’s navy with P8I long-range, antisubmarine, sea patrol aircraft, drones, and the CENTRIXS communication system.34 It can also

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 31 Banerjee aid India with high-tech signals and electronic intelligence from its National Se- curity Agency.35 It is time that New Delhi delivers the unmistakable message to Beijing that China’s salami-slicing tactics for territorial acquisitions will no longer work. In this, India will enjoy the active or tacit support of several other states around the South China Sea because Beijing simply tramples underfoot their claims on that water body. China understands a message only if backed by strength. When faced with toughness, China retreats, as it did after a short border skirmish with the Soviet Union on the Far Eastern Ussuri River in 1969 or with Vietnam 10 years later. For all their rhetoric, the communist Chinese have not dared to invade Taiwan, which enjoys the protection of the United States.

Dr. Jyotirmoy Banerjee Dr. Jyotirmoy Banerjee, ex-professor of international relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India, has more than four decades of academic experience, including frequent research and teaching stints in Germany, Poland, and the United States. Besides winning Fulbright, Goethe Institute, and Alexander von Humboldt Fellowships several times, he held Rockefeller, Erasmus Mundus, and UGC Research Fellowships. Banerjee serves on various academic boards, presented papers in seminars in India, Europe, and the United States, notably at the Slavic Studies World Congresses in Washington, DC (1985), and Honolulu (1993). A frequent TV commentator, he has authored several books and scholarly articles. Professor Banerjee is fluent in German and has working knowledge of Russian and Dutch in addition to English, Bengali, and Hindi. He autodidactically built websites for his students. At reunions he rocked a la Elvis Presley, backed by his students.

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Notes

1. The Line of Actual Control is neither delineated nor demarcated. It is purely perception- based. The use of firearms has been prohibited for border patrols as both sides fear escalation. 2. Anurag Kotoky and, N. C. Bipindra, “After decades Decades of Neglect, India Builds Roads along China Border,” India Times, accessed 22 June 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/. 3. Ananth Krishnan, “The Hindu Explains:Who Does Galwan Valley Belong to?, The Hindu, 22 June 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/. 4. Pranab Dhal Samanta, “View: How to get Chinese to Vacate Galwan is India’s Main Chal- lenge,” India Times, 19 June 2020,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/. 5. China’s Foreign Ministry’s statement, 8 June 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/. 6. Henry Boyd and Meia Nouwens, “Military Build-Up on the China–India Border,” Interna- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 June 2020,https://www.iiss.org/. 7. Sushant Singh, “Experts Explain: What Triggered China’s Line of Actual Control (LAC) Moves?,” Indian Express,16 June 2020,https://indianexpress.com/. 8. Most provincial-level military districts are under the National Defense Mobilization De- partment of the CMC with responsibility for reserves, militia and conscription. See John Pike, “National Defense Mobilization Department,” Global Security, accessed 22 July 2020,https:// www.globalsecurity.org/. 9. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Tibet Military Command Holds Nighttime High-Altitude Drills,” Global Times, 2 June 2020,https://www.globaltimes.cn/; and Pravin Sawhney, “All’s Not Well for India,” The Wire, 10 June 2020,https://thewire.in/. 10. Congressional Research Service, “Conflict at the China-India Frontier,”17 June 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/. 11. Arun Joshi, “Chinese now Media Urges India Not to Equate Beijing with Pakistan,” The Tribune, 22 June 2020, https://www.tribuneindia.com/. 12. StratNewsGlobal, “2020 is not 1962; How Ready is India to Take on Chinese Aggression,” YouTube video, 30 May 2020, 16:11, https://www.youtube.com/.There is also an independent brigade in Siachen, but this has nothing to do with Indian deployments in eastern Ladakh at the moment. The XVII Mountain Strike Corps pitted three Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs, each with a little more than 4,000 troops drawn from different combat forces) against other units in a mock battle. Nitin A. Gokhale, “Mountain Strike Corps Starts Testing New Concept,” Bharat Shakti, 3 October 2019,https://bharatshakti.in/. According to Indian media, its second division at Pathankot was not completed due to lack of funds. See Sushant Singh,“Explained: What Hap- pened to the Mountain Strike Corps?,” Indian Express, 19 June 2020, https://indianexpress.com/. 13. “Since the 1990s, China constructed on a large-scale dual-use and military airfields across the Tibetan Plateau and the Western provinces, spanning the Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions (Tibet proper falls across the boundaries of these two MRs). It built airfields in Chengdu MR, north of Burma and inside Burma under the umbrella of military aid. The specific strategic aims are containment of India in the West, and the “Second Island Chain” strategy in the South- ern and Eastern provinces.” See Dr. Carlo Kopp, People’s Liberation Army Air Force and Naval Air Arm, Air Base Infrastructure Technical Report APA-TR-2007-0103, 3 April 2012, https:// www.ausairpower.net/. On India’s air force, “PLAAF does have four times the number of fighters and bomber as compared to IAF, but what will operationally matter is the actual number they can ‘throw at us.’” China’s main worry is to its east. Rajat Pandit, “IAF Watching Chinese Bases, Sure of Matching Air Power,” India Times, 28 June 2020,https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 33 Banerjee

14. “Pakistan, China Engage in Joint Air Force Exercise 300 km North of Leh: All You Need to Know about Shaheen VIII Military Exercise,” Firstpost, 27 August 2019,https://www.firstpost. com/. 15. Liu Xuanzun, “Upgraded JF-17 Fighter Jet Makes Maiden Flight, Equipped with J-20 Tech: Report,” Global Times, 1 January 2020,https://www.globaltimes.cn/. JF-17 Block 3, upgraded with many off-the- shelf technologies from China’s top-notch J-20, will enter Pakistan’s air force. 16. Pakistan’s F-16s are supposed to be used only in counter-terror operations. 17. Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power 2019, https://www.dia.mil/. 18. Arjit Garg, “Now That India Has Rafale, A Look at the Existing Fighter Jet Fleet of the Indian Air Force,” News 18, 8 October 2019, https://www.news18.com/; and “Why Rafale Jets Are Important for Indian Air Force,” India Today, 8 October 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/. 19. There are eight “fingers” or mountain spurs, on the north bank of the lake. China refuses to back off from Finger 4 area in Ladakh, India increases deployment of tanks near LAC. “China Refuses to Back off from Finger 4 Area in Ladakh: India Increases Deployment near LAC,” Zee News, 16 July 2020,https://zeenews.india.com/. See also Nirupama Subramanian, “Explained: The Strategic Road to DBO,” The Telegraph, 16 June 2020, https://indianexpress.com/. 20. Manoj Joshi, “Making Sense of the Depsang Incursion,” The Hindu, 8 June 2016,https:// www.thehindu.com/. 21. “America’s Asia Expert Dr Ashley Tellis Exclusive on Ladakh Standoff,” Newstrack with Rahul Kanwal, India Today, YouTube video, 28 May 2020, 25:44, https://www.youtube.com/. Tellis recommends India’s tit-for-tat policy along the Himalayan salients. 22. Chu Daye, “China Raises Alert for Malacca Strait as Regional Tensions Threaten Global Shipping Lines,” Global Times, 4 July 2019. http://www.globaltimes.cn/. 44.8 percent of Chi- na’s imported crude oil originates from nine Middle Eastern nations. See CIA, “Today in Energy,” https://www.eia.gov/; and Daniel Workman, “Top 15 Crude Oil Suppliers to China,” 11 July 2020, http://www.worldstopexports.com/. 23. Gregory Poling, “Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 4 April 2018, https://amti.csis.org/. 24. The Information Fusion Centre—Indian Ocean Region at Gurugram, India, keeps a close watch on the movement of ships in the gulf region. Catherine Austin, “Indian Navy Increases Presence in Gulf of Oman Following Tanker Attacks,” 21 June 2019, https://safetyatsea.net/; and David Brewster, “Indian Ocean Base Race: India Responds,” 15 February 2018,https://www. lowyinstitute.org/. 25. Geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder had proposed at the beginning of the last century that whoever controlled the “Heartland,” meaning Asiatic plains, controlled the “World Island” (Afro-Eurasia) and thereby the world. 26. CRS, “U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues,” CRS Reports, 24 January 2013, 38, https://crsreports.congress.gov/. 27. Quoted in Bertil Lintner, “China Shoots Itself in the Foot in the Himalayas,” Asia Times, 18 June 2020,https://asiatimes.com/. 28. Indo–US defense agreements include the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agree- ment, Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, Communica- tions Compatibility and Security Agreement, and Defense Technology and Trade Initiative. See note 35 on intelligence sharing.

34 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Strike Back! India-China Border Skirmish

29. “US Redeployment of B-52H in Guam a Blatant Show of Muscle: Expert,” Global Times, 7 July 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.The exercise involved two strike groups with the nuclear- powered aircraft carriers USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan. China expressed its resentment at the exercise. 30. Reference is to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. “ASEAN Leaders Cite 1982 UN Treaty in South China Sea Dispute,” The Guardian, 27 June 2020, https://www.theguardian. com/. 31. Jay Pandya, “Japan Deploys Ballistic Missiles at China-facing Border After Land-grab Clash With India,” Republic World, 22 June 2020, https://www.republicworld.com/; Oki Nagai, “Beijing Keeps Japan Busy Scrambling Jets in East China Sea,”30 January 2020, Nikkei Asian Review, https://asia.nikkei.com/; and Yoshihiro Inaba, “Japan’s ATLA Developing Hypersonic Anti-Ship Missile,” Naval News, 27 April 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/. 32. Ben Westcott, “Australia Announces $186 billion in Defense Spending amid Rising Ten- sions in the Indo-Pacific,” 1 July 2020,https://edition.cnn.com/ . 33. Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell, Senators Marco Rubio and Tom Cotton, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, besides President Trump himself, have accused China of aggressive policy. See PTI, “Top US Senators Slam China’s Unwar- ranted Armed Aggression against India,” The Week, 30 June 2020, https://www.theweek.in/; and PTI, “Ladakh Face-off: US Senators Express Solidarity with India,” The Hindu, 30 June 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/. 34. The Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIX) is a reli- able system that allows combined forces to communicate through secure channels and share information in a tactical, real-time setting. The Indian Navy headquarters now have two Pacific- fleet-provided CENTRIXS kits. Riyaz ul Khaliq, “US to Supply India 4 Anti-Submarine Aircraft from May,” Americas-Asia- Pacific , 18 March 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/. 35. India has been a member of the NSA’s 10-member SIGINT Seniors Pacific since 2008. Although this platform is meant to be counter-terror, India’s NSA ties can be extended to strategic intelligence as well. Sanjib Kr Baruah, “India Joined US-Led Top-Secret Alliance in 2008,” Asian Age, 10 March 2018, https://www.asianage.com/.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 35 SCI-FI AND STRATEGY Doomie Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent Lochet, French Air Force

SCENE I: The Report

White House, Washington, DC, 21 FEB 2112

Louis was anxious. All indicators seemed to point to the fact that the year 2112 would not be a good one for him. Polls were average. That was not the problem. As he reflected on the situation, he recognized that he would still have to do something to get rid of this troublemaking Republican candidate. That’s not my main problem now. I will deal with her later. He knew how to win a presidential campaign. He had done it almost four years ago. The intelligence report on his desk, however, painted a dire picture. “Mr. President?” a voice interrupted his thoughts. He looked toward the facial hologram that slowly appeared in mid-air in front of his desk.

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“Go on, Debbie, it can’t be worse.” He had always addressed his secretary by her nickname, a breach of protocol that people seemed accustomed to now. Louis despised rigid protocols. “Mr. President, they have arrived. May I let them in?” prompted Deborah Wi- eseldon, with her delicate soothing voice. “Stand-by,” he snapped. He paused for a second, thinking. Then he said, “Let them wait in the conference room instead; I’ll join them in a few minutes.” Let the Joint Chiefs take the time to coordinate a bit, he told himself. I’m fed up with all these nonsense, so-called solutions they keep bringing in and fighting over. We need to be more united and effective now. The stakes are higher than their pathetic concerns about their individual careers or the benefit of their services. I need to force them to actually speak with each other. “Will do, sir. I’ll open the Eisenhower Room and prepare some coffee. You look exhausted,” she added with sympathy. “Thanks, Debbie. I’m tired indeed. I don’t know what I’d do without you.” “You’re welcome, sir. The room will be ready in less than five.” The hologram swiftly disappeared. She is truly the linchpin of my presidency, he admitted to himself. If only they were all as smart as Debbie! He sighed, thinking of the people gathering in the Eisen- hower Conference Room. The report on his desk was 350-pages long, delicately bound so he could read it easily. 350 pages full of useless details, as usual, he thought. Fortunately, the first page was clear enough to understand the problem. Written by Debbie, it was a summary that cut out all the complex math detailed in the report. He may have graduated from Harvard, but he was not a mathematician. It looked like some random Estonian female scientist-astronaut— whatever she is!—raised the scientific community’s concerns about a distant asteroid she just discovered some billion miles away from Earth. Louis could not comprehend that distance. The discovery had occurred more than two months ago, but nobody had paid serious attention to it at that time. No doubt NASA scorned her. It wasn’t backed up by any American sources! I guess the tables have turned now that the USSF is backing up her claims! 1 This is just more evidence of the lack of coordination between our services. They should have reported together, he sighed. From the start, the Estonian astronomer was arguing that the course of this massive asteroid—What is that name again? Some stupid combination of digits and letters. . . I just can’t remember—was inbound toward Earth. An almost perfect interception course. There was still some uncertainty for some reason he could not understand. In short, he should expect a collision before the end of the year.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 37 Lochet

Simple and effective. A Big Boom somewhere and everybody dies in the region or even all over the place. That, he easily understood. What Ester Klaviste’s initial report forgot to mention, though it was clearly the most important piece of information, was the size of this “Doomie” asteroid. The nickname that social networks eventually settled on to christen the asteroid is sure easier to remember! Louis smirked. Indeed, as people eventually figured out, Doomie was huge. Desperately huge. The “Planetary Defense” scientist community—How strange a name and belief they have, to think that they can defend this blue dot with telescopes and computers!—finally agreed to estimate its average size to something close to 97 percent the size of the Moon. . .97 percent! That’s huge indeed! The report was hardly able to list all the potential consequences of a collision. “Too complicated,” they complained. With her elegant handwriting, Debbie simply scribbled three words to sum it up on the top of the report’s front page: “Humanity’s extinction.” That, for sure, is going to cause more trouble than Lily Turner taking my seat in the Oval Office, Louis reflected.2 Let’s face it, now, he thought. I need the Joint Chiefs to develop a plan. We can’t fail! This is not only about me, or US citizens. It’s a matter of humanity’s survival.He remembered a famous quote from Arthur C. Clarke, “Dinosaurs died because they didn’t have a space program.” Well, good news, we do have one! I know better than anyone else how much it costs the American taxpayer! What I don’t know perfectly well, however, is what they actually do with those billions of dollars we give them! I should have dug more deeply into that subject. Just couldn’t find the time. . . Anyway, now it’s damn well time to do so! He stood up and put his jacket back on. Let’s face it. After all, isn’t it an American that always saves the world at the end of every Hollywood movie? Let’s make it happen again! He headed to the door, taking a deep breath. While wondering how he would deal with this vital threat, he attempted to lift his spirits. Perhaps history will remember Pres. Louis Fitzgerald Kennedy for his space program? How could we find a powerful slogan for my presidential campaign with that? I need to talk with Merryl about that. She will know how to turn this situation to our advantage. Still, I don’t want them to refer to JFK again. I think people are done with all that bullshit about my blue bloodline. How about something more subtle? “Vote Kennedy: his space program is our only hope to save America and the world.” Yes, we need that space program. Let’s hope it will be good enough now. He opened the door.

38 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Doomie

SCENE II: 2111-KH7586 European Center of Planetology Research, Narva, Estonia, 29 FEB 2112

Dr. Ester Klaviste was a famous astronomer in Estonia. She held three PhDs in astronomy, planetology, and geology from prestigious universities in Europe. She had even held an internship at Caltech, when she was only 18 years old. That is not too bad a memory, she recalled. Like any space dreamer born in the 2070s, she was deeply influenced by the tremendous Indian success of 2076: the first occupied base on the Moon. She very well remembered how stunned she had been in front of the Live TV broadcast that streamed the landing of the first Indian astronauts. Ten wary Michelin Man- esque figures were greeted by human- size robots, who introduced them to the new Moonbase remotely built for them. To the great la- ment of Ester’s parents, that moment had been her epiphany. Her mother was worried that she was growing up too fast. She has never stopped studying space since 2076. She deeply wanted to become an astronaut, and she succeeded. Today, her parents felt immense pride in her accomplishments.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 39 Lochet

She started studying for her first PhD when she was 18. Initially, she focused on how Moon geological resources could be used to sustain life on the Moon on an industrial scale. She was sponsored by the European Space Agency (ESA), which had just recently signed a partnership with the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to work on Moon-related subjects. At that time, the Indi- ans were facing tremendous difficulties in exploiting the Moon’s underground resources. As their work progressed, they were slowly realizing that sustaining life was not simple at all, despite all their advanced technologies. Based on all the samples she received for her studies, Ester was inclined to conclude that it was impossible to grow anything in the lunar soil. Most likely, the Indian Moonbase would have to rely on supplies from Earth forever—an extraordinary logistic challenge that did not please the ISRO. However, in her PhD dissertation, she expressed her hope for a potential solution using revolutionary digging techniques and complicated chemical reactions to bury crops in the deep, frozen crust. Though it was a tiny hope, it triggered the Indians’ interests enough that they finally de- cided to open the Moonbase to foreigners, and especially ESA astronauts, provided that the ESA would recruit Ester. In a flash, she became extraordinarily famous and an astronaut trainee. Today, people wanted to hear from her all over the world. Oddly enough, it was no longer to hear about her experiments on the Moon in 2095—which ultimately proved her technique was unviable. Instead, people wanted to hear about her more recent discovery and publication. It was more attractive than her tall silhouette and shiny smile—which, she must honestly admit, was rather unusual. To be fair, today, she was not smiling. “So, you say that this asteroid, hmm . . . what’s its name again?” asked the journalist.

“2111-KH7586. The International Astronomical Union has nicknamed it El- pis-97,” responded Ester. “Elpis-97,” the journalist nodded and scribbled in his Q-Pad. “So, Elpis-97 is about the size of the Moon?” “It is. Approximately 97 percent, based on my calculations. That’s why we call it this way: Elpis-97,” Ester obligingly answered. I’m not going to do any more interviews after this one. I just can’t bear saying the same things over and over again. I have more important research to do. I need to assess the potential damage and point of impact to see if there is a possibility of survival somehow. “Ah, I see,” commented the journalist. Yeah, you see, thought Ester. Always pre- tending that you understand everything, you journalists! But what interests you is only the potential drama, scandal, or natural disaster behind any news. I need to end this quick.

40 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Doomie

“The most important things to know are in the report I gave you,” she said. “Elpis-97 is on a highly-probable interception course with Earth, and my latest predictions indicate a time-window comprised between December 15th and the end of the year 2112. I have about 95-percent certainty on these figures for now. It significantly grows over time though. If nothing deviates, the asteroid Elpis-97 will collide with Earth. Based on its size, there may simply be no chance of humanity’s survival if it hits Earth right in the middle. Again, you will find all the details for your article in my report. There are even pictures of Elpis-97 that we have made here at the observatory. They are clear enough for your front page, and you are authorized to use it. The pictures belong to the international community anyway. This report was officially published yesterday.” It could have been published much earlier if it wasn’t for that stupid government! They were afraid of its conclusions and couldn’t believe it. They initially asked me to remove almost two-thirds of the report, including the size of the asteroid! What’s the point of hiding such information? That’s outrageous! People will panic eventually, regardless of when the information comes out. You can’t fight that! The sooner a mitigation plan is worked out, the better the government’s narrative would be. I thought we had learned the lesson in 2104, after the first KCC in LEO!3 “Now, if you please, I have work to do. You can ask the front desk office to show you the way out.” She stood and gently gestured toward the door. She knew her imposing 5-foot-9-inch stature would compel the journalist to obey. He stared at her as if he was finally realizing her remarkable attractiveness. Meanwhile, he was seemingly troubled by her natural authority. While standing up, he surprisingly dared to ask: “It is said that you initially predicted that,” he looked at his notes, “that Elpis-97 was going to hit Earth on December 21st, 2112. Can you confirm this? Do you believe it has anything to do with the Nibiru cataclysm?4 Could it be something launched at us by an alien civilization? From Zeta Reticuli for instance?”5 Ester gasped, literally stunned. This is such nonsense! Now,I see why you wanted to interview me! That is not going to happen again, she firmly told herself. “Those are merely doomsday tales for naïve believers. It has nothing to do with science. There are no aliens on Zeta Reticuli, nor is there any credence to whatever other such fantasies people may have. You will have plenty of time to see Elpis-97 approaching with your own eyes, in due time. This is an actual natural disaster. Now, please, I have real work to do,” she disdainfully gestured him toward the door again, while she headed back to her desk, completely ignoring him. The journalist watched her turn away, seemingly abashed. As he closed the door behind him, he realized that he should have asked her out to dinner instead of poking her with

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 41 Lochet that Nibiru thing. Especially considering that the end of the world was perhaps approaching.

SCENE III: Kennedy’s Speech

Kennedy Space Center, Merritt Island, Florida, 14 MAR 2112

“Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome the 61st President of the United States of America.” Louis climbed the few steps that separated him from the stage and slowly walked toward the podium. He was taking advantage of his presidential posture, his elegant style, and relatively athletic build that belied his 60-year age. He faced

42 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Doomie a partisan crowd from which there was nothing to fear. He was not going to campaign today— at least not directly. Louis was hoping to write history and, if possible, save the world. What a cliché. To be honest with himself, he was not entirely confident with the final strategy his advisors had proposed.At least they have all agreed on something, he thought, and, as far as I know now, it’s the best option we have. He could not recall all the stupid things he had heard during the past weeks, but he remembered one scientist saying that they should attempt to con- tact Zeta Reticuli, just in case. . . They had discussed that for two hours, seriously considering the option. Perhaps the most desperate hours so far. . . This Zeta-Reticuli story is just absurd. At least our strategy is rational, and we have a significant chance to succeed. Hope matters! Let’s focus on that. Something has to be done anyway. Failure is not an option! Each new daily scientific report he received seemed to confirm collision with Doomie was a certainty. “Dr. Daven, Mr. Vice President, Governor, Congressmen and Congresswomen, Senators, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: “What a blessed day in The Sunshine State! I believe you all appreciate our privilege to enjoy such perfect weather. Yet, my concern today is to make sure there will be other such blessed days—many others—for all of us. “As you know, we are facing a dreadful threat. I say we, but I don’t mean Amer- icans, because this time, it’s not only Americans who are threatened but instead the entire human race on Earth. “I am told, and I am sure you have heard the news too,” he paused while the crowd gently chuckled. Indeed, media and social networks have gone completely crazy about that asteroid. There is a constant flow of so-called new reports or stupid man-on- the-street interviews. It’s hard to keep calm in such a climate. But polls show that people are growing tired of it. It is time to act and change the course of history. “I am told,” he repeated with a subtle smile, “I am told that an asteroid is bound to destroy our home planet, just like that,” he snapped his fingers. “I must tell you, this is real. This is not a drill. This is real. NASA administrator Dr. Catherine Daven here can confirm. In coordination with all US departments and services, and with the support of all our spacefaring nation partners, we have confirmed the existence of this threat. As I speak to you now, analysts are con- stantly monitoring the asteroid’s approach and building stronger confidence in our data. This is real,” he said firmly. “India, with the help of their remote Moonbase sensors and their best quantum computers, has confirmed the exactitude of our prediction. Likewise, New-Town has also confirmed this analysis.6 SpaceX, who oversees New-Town’s operations, has already offered its help in dealing with this new threat. I will come back to that in a minute.

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 43 Lochet

“What I must tell you now, and what I want you to strongly believe, is this simple thing: we are not afraid. We are not afraid because we have planned for this for decades. We are not afraid because we, the United States of America, have never been afraid. We know what to do, and we have a plan for this.” Louis sounded much more confident than he truly was. “What I am going to tell you today is one of our most guarded secrets. One that we have been developing in Area 51 since 2075. I am sure you will appreciate this deliberate sharing.” He paused. The crowd had broken into loud whispers. He waited for the noise to die down. If only it had been already fully developed and tested! This program has been running over budget from the very first year. It’s not surprising that my predecessors were reluctant to keep it going. Fortunately, military generals can be relied on for their relentless perseverance when it comes to dumping money into pits. They somehow managed to keep the program alive, despite every president’s attempt to shut it down. I must admit this particular one knows his job. He cast a glance at General Robert C. Laville, Chief of Space Operations. Louis’s eyes were saying: Now, you must make it work. He slowly reviewed his other advisors. They all must feel the pressure now. Louis addressed the crowd, “I share this with you today, because the United States is a country of sharing. Through sharing our values, our culture, and our technologies, we are committed to make the world a better place for humanity. For we, the people of the United States of America, believe that we have an important role to play in this world. This is not because we believe ourselves to be superheroes, nor superior or more capable than other nations. No, it’s not about who we believe we are, it’s about what we believe the world needs. Today, we will ensure the Earth remains a safe place for all of us. Together, with all our partners, we will prevent our planet from meeting a terrible fate.” He paused and looked at the audience. They were almost religiously listening. He could feel the tension himself too. He took a deep breath before declaring, “We are deeply committed to justice and we believe that there’s no justice in let- ting an asteroid collide with our home planet. Preventing that from happening is a just cause, and I solemnly declare that the United States will dedicate all its efforts to that task. I will personally ensure it. We will leverage all our resources from all our departments to succeed. My advisory team behind me knows very well how hard I will press them to succeed, and I already know the Congress and the Senate will support us.” After weeks of fighting over the budget, the needed reorganization of funding and resources, and particularly complex negotiations with the Republican Party (represented by his long-time foe, Lily Turner), LFK felt proud of having reached national consensus.

44 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Doomie

“As you know, I have fought hard for this these past weeks. I have done so, because we must not fail. We can’t let our space program fail as it did in the 2070s. American citizens know more than any others what it means to fail. We have never accepted it, and there are even fewer reasons to accept it today.7 That is why I can assure you, we will defeat Elpis-97, and we will keep on. HUMANITY WILL PREVAIL!” Louis shouted. Tremendous clapping ensued. He looked at Debbie and nodded. A picture appeared on the screen behind him. “So, this is it. The Boston Project.” The picture was showing a massive spaceship, standing on four streamlined legs. It was equipped with a very large nozzle, featur- ing the latest SpaceX hybrid-engine, capable of delivering 1,000 tons of payload to Mars, back and forth. The total height of the spaceship was only 250 feet, but its width was close to 30 yards. It was clear that it had multiple internal holds. “I won’t get into the details, that will be the job of Catherine and Bob in the following press conference that some of you are authorized to attend. But I can assure you, this space weapon—let’s call it what it is—is very capable. It features multiple options to take down, repulse, or remove any threat,” he claimed. “This was merely a project until yesterday. Today, I am pleased to tell you that I have signed an agreement with the United Launch Alliance to build this spaceship with the help of our finest space companies.8 It shall be launched in less than ten months. I repeat, less than ten months! “Once, we pledged to reach the Moon in less than a decade. Thanks to our extraordinary space industry, our brilliant American scientists, and our very capable partners, I now pledge, my fellow citizens, that we will save the world in less than 10 months!” he roared. Crowd clapping. It’s going well, he thought, looking at Debbie to get her usual approval nod. “I will pass a bill to Congress, no later than tomorrow morning, to redirect most of our project funding toward the Boston Mission. It is not a project anymore. It is the United States’ prime mission, our contribution to the survival of our species. That will be hard, but we don’t fear it. Next week, in the United Nations, I will also open discussions with all our partner nations to request additional funding and to guarantee our collective success. All willing help is welcome. We are all facing the same threat, and we need to be united. I have already approached the Indian government this past week to request their support, and I am pleased to say that they have agreed to send us scientists, resources, and additional funding no later than next week. For that, I wish to personally thank Prime Minister Ujjwal Ku- mar. India is a key partner in this endeavor. Please join me in a round of applause for the Republic of India.”

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 45 Lochet

They clapped altogether, again. “Now, as I leave the stage, I want you to remember one thing.” Louis paused for solemn effect. “Human beings are survivors. We have survived every single threat so far, and we shall not be afraid of any future one, including that asteroid! We will survive through ingenuity and grit. Our tremendous force is our ability to believe in the future and make better things happen.” Louis waved at the screen behind him without looking at it. He was too concentrated in connecting his voice with every mind and soul of the audience. “Here, I give you hope, and on this hope, we will build our future.” “Thank you. God bless America, and God bless Planet Earth.” A mix of cheers, clapping, and shouting filled the air as people stood in ovation. Nearly 10,000 spectators were realizing the historical depth of the LFK speech they had just heard.

SCENE IV: The Wrong Stuff

USS X-101, Lagrange Point No. 4, 20 DEC 2112

Bradley glanced at his watch. Less than 24 hours before impact now.

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The past three days had been the most intense of his whole life. No doubt about it. He adjusted his belt, feeling slightly uncomfortable in his sophisticated chair. Comfort was certainly not one of the top priorities of the engineers that designed this deadly weapon, he thought. He checked one digital screen on his left. Two and a half hours before the next opportunity. I have time. But that will be the last attempt. He felt angry for the past two days of previous failures. “Captain Martin?” spoke a familiar voice. “Yes, Houston, I know,” he snapped. “It is probably time to grab some food by your standards. But I’m not hungry. I’d rather review the procedure before,” he added, anticipating the remarks. “Don’t worry about me, I’m fine.” “I’m sure you are, Brad,” another familiar voice echoed in the speaker system. “But you know we care about you, brother, and your vitals here, as we read it, show that you have very low blood sugar. You didn’t eat anything for the past 24 hours. Please grab and eat a snack bar for me, will you?” Sure, you care about me, Nick! Very kind of you not to say that I’m your last hope too! The same hope that conveniently made LFK popular enough to be re-elected... I have enough pressure here. Thank you, brother! “All right, all right. I’ll eat something real quick. Thank you for caring, guys, but don’t worry. I’m good.” Indeed, eating could help. His stomach was aching, but it was not due to the thought of failing once more. He needed calories to get through the next three hours at his peak. Bradley Martin unfastened his seatbelt and smoothly floated to the back of the ship. While he was unfolding a small pack of food and mechanically cooking it, he recalled the events of the past 48 hours. It has been harsh from the start, he told himself. As expected, the launch sequence had been some of the most dangerous he had ever experienced. Since 2108 and the second KCC in LEO,9 launching anything above 300 kilometers had become almost impossible. SpaceX was now the only company with enough knowledge and resources to dare launch anything to space above LEO. The company could afford repetitive failures. However, they would never dare to launch any human being above LEO—until today. SpaceX’s success rate was too low (roughly around 35 percent) because of all the collisions that would occur during the LEO belt crossing. Only the survival of New-Town, the SpaceX Mars colony, was enough of a justification to take the risk of sending payloads above LEO. New-Town had once required supplies from Earth to sustain life on Mars. It was initially said that the colony would be able to reach 100-percent autonomy by the end of the year 2110. Bradley recalled reading that in some SpaceX plan but did not know if they had succeeded without delay. He wondered if the 25 people living on Mars were safe now.10 At least some humans may survive Doomie anyway, whatever happens, he thought. He wondered if one

WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 47 Lochet day he would have the opportunity to visit New-Town. Kazuo Mishigori would surely welcome me! he believed. What a coincidence that Kazuo happened to be the mayor of the Mars colony. Or maybe not! All Bradley was able to remember of Ka- zuo, back in Japan, were the stories about space the scientist kept telling him and Nicholas when he was visiting. Bradley and Nicholas immensely enjoyed those visits. To their delight, Kazuo was so passionate in his storytelling that he could never stop. Their mother was the only one who would complain, protesting that Kazuo was enticing her kids to pursue dangerous dreams of space exploration. She was afraid for them, as would be every mother, Brad reflected. And how right she was! No doubt Kazuo had influence on Nick’s career choice at NASA, and mine in the Space Force. X-101 was a tough and well-crafted spaceship, probably the best that had ever been built. It was nearly as perfect as expected. In that sense, it was a success in itself, for it was very much compliant to the requirements of the initial Boston Project’s design. It was the result of almost a century of studies to make the perfect battlecruiser for space. At least, it was perfect before it eventually crossed the 1000-km iso-altitude above Earth. The field of countless pieces of junk that the ship had to traverse had seriously damaged it. The harpoon was no longer func- tional, nor was the net for debris removal. Neither of these, however, was a serious issue. The ship’s single solar panel had been completely destroyed by an unfortu- nate collision with a rather big object that had not been tracked by the space surveillance network. Though the damage was significant, the effect was less so, since X-101 was designed to run on nuclear power as a primary source of energy. The solar panel was merely a back-up in the event of a switch to survival mode, in case of a reactor shutdown, for instance. In addition to those malfunctions, there were multiple impacts all over the outer hull. That, was more troubling. Most of the damage, according to the few, still functioning external cameras, was no deeper than the first layer of the ship’s shielding. The structural integrity of theX-101 was good; it had weathered the barrage of debris well through multiple collisions. However, in some visible places, it was looking truly battered. It was probably worse in the regions that were not visible by camera. Bradley knew he would have to conduct an EVA at some point, to assess the damages and see if he could fix it before being able to come back on Earth.11 That’s Future Brad’s problem, he thought. The LaserGun, unfortunately, one of the two primary weapons he was counting on, was malfunctioning, too, as he learned from the last two attempts to repulse Doomie. For some reason, the LaserGun had lost about 95 percent of its power. It was unable to maintain a constant beam, and it was not precise enough. It was just not working. Bradley had managed to hit Elpis-97 in the last attempt but it

48 WILD BLUE YONDER  3 AUGUST 2020 Doomie did almost nothing to change the course of the asteroid, as his brother sadly reported. To be honest, he had guessed that by himself, by the look of it. At least the EM drive, that wonderful technology that SpaceX had developed in the last decade and used to finally reach Mars, was still working well. It was cheap, efficient, and powerful. He would be able to reach the Moon or even Mars in a few days if he failed to deviate Elpis-97. “No way!” he whispered to himself. He quickly swept away that thought. It was not even acceptable. Now, he had to concentrate on the final attempt. The last resort option: nuclear weapons. X-101 had been carefully loaded with 5,000 miniaturized nuclear warheads—the equivalent of 5 million megatons of energy. Brad remembered Nick telling him that it was huge, but maybe not quite enough to turn away Doomie from its collision path. While planning for the mission two months ago, Nicholas had several arguments with geologists, physicists, and other scientists about the viability of this nuclear option. He had not had the last word. “Anyway, you shouldn’t have to use them, so let’s not worry about that. We’ll do that in due time,” Bradley recalled Nick saying. The nuclear option wasn’t planned to be used unless all other options failed. Nick clearly would have liked it not to happen. “There would be terrible consequences, and it will certainly complicate our procedure,” Nicholas had warned him. “There would be terrible consequences if we do nothing too, you know,” Bradley had answered.

⁂

“It’s time to set-up now,” Nick’s voice echoed. “Initiating procedure,” replied Brad. “I’m loading the ‘Fatboy’ in the torpedo tube,” he dialed a few digits on a screen and put his right palm on another for authentication. “You should see the red light blinking in 3, 2, 1, now.” “Red light’s on. I’ll give you weapon access. You will be able to arm the weapon in 3, 2, 1. Green light’s blinking now.” Nick had followed the same authentication procedure in the mission control center on Earth. “All green for me too. I still have five minutes before being in position. I’m holding on the weapons. Increasing the speed to 75 percent. I can see Doomie well now, from where I am. Are you getting the camera downlink?” Bradley asked. “Unfortunately, no, Brad. We’ve been working on it the whole night, but we’ve reached the conclusion that there’s nothing we can do to fix it. It must be broken on your side. Take pictures of this stupid asteroid with TramCam for me, will you?”

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“Ha, done!” Bradley pushed a red, round, and rather large button on the board. The video-tracking mode was now activated on the TramCam, it would follow the asteroid as long as it could, if it was not too damaged itself. He could see from the feedback monitor on his far right, that the quality of the image was not as good as expected. He hoped the targeting system for the nuclear payload would work better than that. Time to check it out, now! Bradley started the radar set-up sequence. The radar was the latest, state-of- the-art model produced by the smartest Indian engineers. They called it the spherical radar or SpheRad. They had put in a lot of effort over the past six months to design and create this high-performance system. It was able to track any object in any direction from the size of one square micrometer at 200 kilometers to the size of one square kilometer at one astronomical unit (AU).12 It was a feat that had never been accomplished before. X-101 was equipped with the only on-orbit model of SpheRad. Based on its tremendous results so far, they were hoping to use it to exhaustively track all the LEO belt debris over the next decade. Hopefully, they will be able to clean it one day, Bradley thought. Nicholas had told him that they had already started to build another model. What mattered most in Bradley’s case, however, was the radar’s ability to track and characterize Doomie. Bradley was still concerned: SpheRad had never been thoroughly field-tested, which was why they did not want him to let it run permanently, fearing an early breakdown. This was only its third test. Bradley was slowly building confidence in it. He could hear a gentle wheeze growing in the cockpit. Good, he thought, it seems to start up nice and gently, as in our previous attempts. As he was watching the data flowing toward the quantum computer in the back, he was slowly gaining confidence in the powerful SpheRad.All right! Now, Shiva, let me see how good you are. Give me a course to Doomie. He pushed the central main button of the computer board on his right. Nick and about 25 other engineers had spent weeks determining the best way to get rid of Elpis-97 with the LaserGun or nuclear weapons. Despite the question of the energy, trajectory mattered a lot. The weapon had to perfectly hit Doomie at the exact right spot with the appropriate angle, to be able to influence the movement of its center of gravity as desired. Without samples, the desired position of impact could only be inferred, and it involved a lot of complicated statistical calculations. Nick and his team had finally agreed on a trajectory program that they had conveniently called Shiva, “the Destroyer.” It was running on the ship’s Indian-made computer. Nuclearizing that asteroid was not as simple as people might believe. It was only possible if both SpheRad and Shiva were combined in one single effort. “Five minutes left,” Nick said. “You can arm the weapons now.”

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Brad put his left hand on the side of the bomb-hold lock and let it read his palm and fingerprints. He took off the key he had been keeping around his neck for three days now and inserted it in the command pad. He turned it clockwise. Finally, he lifted the trigger’s security cover and pushed the big red button without hesitation. He could not hear any noise indicating it was working, but he could see the message on the pad saying it was armed. He had no doubt that it was working. It was not the first time nuclear weapons were used in space. “System armed,” he said. “All right Brad, do you have a course?” “Shiva is still running the data from SpheRad. It should be good in a second or two. . . That’s it! I just got it. Shiva is ready to deliver destruction and save the world!” “Is that your ‘Neil Armstrong quote’ for posterity?” quipped Nick after a pause. “Hmm, yeah? I thought it was kind o’ appropriate,” he sheepishly answered, hearing the sarcasm in his brother’s tone. “That’s pathetic. We will discuss your education later.” Brad was pretty sure Nick was smiling broadly. “Now, look, you have three minutes before launching the weapon. I want you to remember, we most likely won’t be able to communicate after the blast. The electromagnetic perturbation will certainly cut us out. You will be isolated for some days. Don’t attempt a reentry before we get back online. If it lasts so long that you run out of food supply, which I doubt, you can still get to the Moonbase or even New-Town. It would be safer than attempting to cross the LEO belt without our support. They have tons of unused supplies on the Moon, and you could be there in no time; so, there’s no reason to rush. If you do have to go there, you’ve been inoculated against the virus, so it shouldn’t affect you. That would be the opportunity to perform another useful experiment! The Indians will thank you!” he joked cynically. “I bet they will,” replied Brad on the same tone. “Seriously, in that case, you must do your best to check and repair the external hull of the ship. But again, I’d rather have you wait for us to help you with that. TheX-101 seems to have been quite seriously damaged; we need to make a thor- ough external safety check together. In any case, I want you to wait long enough for the nuclear electromagnetic radiation to dissipate, before you do any EVA. Shiva will be able to tell you when it’s safe to get out. So, just be patient. And I repeat, don’t attempt to come back to Earth before we reestablish communication. You will need our help. Do you copy?” “Yes, sir!”

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“No kidding Brad, it’s gonna be seriously dangerous out there.” Nick’s concern was perceptible. “I know! Don’t worry, Nick. I will do as planned . . .” Silence filled the air for about a minute as the countdown was relentlessly running toward the final decisive moment. There was nothing else to say. “Ok, 15 seconds left. It’s up to you now. Good luck, brother,” Nick broke the oppressive silence. Bradley could swear he heard a faint quavering in his brother’s voice. “No worries Nick, It will work . . . 10, . . . 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, bomb gone.” He felt a significant shake as the bomb pumped out of the ship and ignited. The 5,000 warheads, packed in a single torpedo, were now heading toward Elpis-97. Brad checked Shiva’s monitor. It was apparently running normally. He could see a dis- play of the trajectory and the position of Fatboy on it. On glide, on track, he thought, recalling his father’s favorite quote. He slowly breathed. One window on the screen was indicating the speed and the time before impact. Already 100 km/s, less than a minute now. As he had done in simulations so many times, he gently pushed back the throt- tle, to begin maneuvering X-101 out of the blast radius. The screen was already indicating that he would be out of range in less than 10 seconds. That is looking good, he reflected confidently. Unexpectedly, something blinked to the right of his field of vision and caught his attention. He turned toward the board on his right. Shiva’s monitor was now displaying an error message: insufficient data. “Damn’ it! What’s happening now?” Bradley spit. He immediately looked on the other side of the cockpit to check SpheRad’s monitors. One of the five screens was blank, and two others were blinking abnormally. The conclusion was obvious: SpheRad had stopped working properly, and Shiva did not like it. It was lacking sufficient data to calculate the perfect trajectory and communicate it to Fatboy. Oh shit! Something’s wrong with that damn radar! Could it have been the shake when the torpedo tube opened? “Dammit, dammit, dammit!” he let go out loud. He gestured in anger toward the monitor, about to strike it with his fist. He held his hand in mid-air. No! Hold yourself! It’s too risky; it may completely break. Suddenly all five screens went dark. SpheRad was down. An alarm immediately rang, Shiva was not communicating anymore with Fatboy, unable to update the trajectory in real-time. Everything was given to luck now. 15 seconds before impact. The countdown was still running, unaware of the ongoing tragedy. “What’s wrong Brad? I heard an alarm, and we lost your. . .”

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Slowly the window shields automatically turned black, to avoid any eye trauma that the dreaded blast may cause. All systems were shutting down to prevent X-101 from taking damage. It was switching to survival mode. Bradley was now deaf, dumb, and blind. Fortunately, the computer system knew the solar panel was broken, and it was keeping the reactor running. He would still have power. He would survive, but he may be the only one. 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, . . . It was done. But impossible to know if it has succeeded. And he had not even had time to say a word to Houston. Nick would also probably not know what happened until it was too late. “Houston, do you read me?” he desperately called, knowing his zero chances of success. “Nick? . . . Do you read me?” He was truly cut off from the world. His despair was growing, as his fear of having probably failed again was growing too. He was feeling tears coming at the corner of his eyes. He violently brushed them aside and hit the monitoring board of SpheRad. The screen blinked twice or so, and then turned back on. All five screens were up and running. He swiftly realized that the characteristic wheezing noise had not stopped during the entire sequence. It was just a connection issue that had cut Shiva out! Deprived of the precious data from SpheRad, the computer program had not been able to compute the best trajectory and communicate it to the weapon. Bradley quickly browsed the data to search for Doomie’s actual trajectory. SpheRad had been built to resist the blast of Fatboy, and it was supposed to be running even in survival mode. It still should be able to track Doomie. And indeed, it was. The associated precision factor was lower than usual though.The system must be getting a lot of false tracks and EM interference. He compared the data. He could see a significant change of orbit!The weapons hit! Fatboy had finally reached its target. He could see as well, that Doomie had been significantly reduced in mass. Maybe down to 85 percent of the size of the Moon now, he guessed. The data is unstable, probably some bouncing or secondary effects. Hard to assess the result of such a huge collision! He quickly turned toward Shiva, to run a collision risk assessment between Doomie’s new orbit and Earth; the data was now perfectly flowing between the radar and the ship’s computer. He had to look twice at the results. He looked back at SpheRad, which was still running normally. Doomie’s trajectory was still changing, but the accuracy factor was still bad. The effects of Fatboy were still playing out.

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He ran a second assessment with Shiva. No, I can’t believe it. With all the energy of that nuclear hit? That’s all? I can’t believe it! He checked SpheRad data again. Doomie’s trajectory was slowly getting stable now, and the accuracy factor was rising. Back to Shiva, he ran another assessment but finally faced the truth. He had failed again. Doomie was still on an interception course with Earth, though the trajectory was less direct. It will take one more day. Shiva’s assessment was project- ing an 85-percent chance of collision but with a more asymptotic interception path. That would most likely yield less damage. Still, Shiva’s estimation was that 20 percent of Doomie’s mass could physically hit Earth. That was enough to destroy everything. It will probably change the Earth’s rotation, its orbit, and whatever other unimaginable consequences . . . 21-12-2112 would finally be the end of the world. Bradley could not help but sob. ---

Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent Lochet, French Air Force LCL Lochet is a recent graduate of the US Air Command and Staff College, earning a master’s degree in military operational arts and serving as a Schriever Scholar. He is currently attending the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, the US Air Force and Space Force graduate school for strategists. Before coming to Air University, LCL Lochet served as director of space surveillance operations for the French Air Force.

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Notes

1. United States Space Force 2. Senator Lily Mary Turner (R-AL) is the Republican candidate for US president in the election of 2112. 3. In 2104, several satellites collided with each other in low Earth orbit (LEO), causing what is called now the 1st Kessler Collision Chain. It practically transformed LEO into a junkyard, which was barely passable for rockets. Scientists lodged complaints, internationally, against the insufficient debris mitigation procedures adopted by spacefaring nations. Subsequently, nations agreed on a declaration signed at the UN to commit themselves to develop remediation efforts. This had very little consequences until the 2nd KCC in 2108, after which people finally took the threat seriously, and leaders agreed to develop an international program for debris removal, which was slowly cleaning the orbits. 4. The Nibiru cataclysm is a supposed future disastrous encounter between the Earth and a large planetary object. Believers in this doomsday event usually refer to this object as Nibiru or Planet X. 5. Zeta Reticuli is a wide binary star system in the southern constellation of Reticulum. From Earth’s southern hemisphere the pair can be seen with the naked eye as a double star. Based upon parallax measurements, this system is located at a distance of about 39.3 light-years (12.0 parsecs) from Earth. Many in the UFO community associate the system with the so-called Grey aliens, who emerged as an archetypal image of an intelligent nonhuman extraterrestrial species associated with the Roswell incident and abductions. 6. New-Town is a privately-owned base on Mars, settled in 2099 and self-sustainable since 2111. 7. LFK refers here to the notorious failure of the NASA space program in the 2070s, when the agency was unsuccessful in establishing a base on the Moon, losing the competition to India. The United States lost trillions of dollars trying, which ultimately led to the worst economic crisis it had ever faced and the Wall Street crash of 2079. 8. United Launch Alliance is a Boeing and Lockheed Martin joint venture whose engines have been exclusively procured by SpaceX since the 2070s. 9. The 2108 Kessler Collision Chain is also known as KCC II. 10. Between 2099 and 2104, SpaceX limited the number of people simultaneously present on Mars for security reasons and because of the lack of hosting facilities. After KCC I, SpaceX de- cided to completely stop sending and recovering crew capsules back and forth. In 2112, the 25 people present on Mars have been there for eight years. 11. Extravehicular activity, i.e., a space walk 12. A unit of measurement equal to 149.6 million kilometers (93 million miles), the mean distance from the center of the Earth to the center of the Sun.

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