FROM CHARTS AND DARTS TO

AUTOMA TING THE U.S. ARMY'S FIELD ARTILLERY, 1945-2005

By

Boyd L. Dastrup

Command llistorian

U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School

August 2005 III

u.s. ARl\IY FIELD ARTILLERY CENTER AND SCIIOOL

Major General David C. Ralston ------Commanding General

Colonel James M. McDonald ------Deputy Commanding General-Training

Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup ------Command Historian IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

lIitJe f>age ------_ flreface------______ii u.s. Army Field Artillery Center and School Page ------______111 11abJe 0 f Con ten ts ------______iV Chapter One: Recognizing the Need ------______1 Chapter lIwo: lIhe lIhird Generation ------______23 Chapter lIhree: Successor Systems ------______40 SeJect Bib Ji0gra phY------______61 Index ------______66 1

CHAPTER ONE RECOGNIZING THE NEED

Over a period of years, necessity forced the Army and the Field Artillery to adopt automated gunnery to complement manual gunnery. Viewing a highly mobile battlefield in the future, they realized in 1945-1946 that manual gunnery or the use of pencils, paper, darts, charts, and the graphic firing table, a specialized to solve the gunnery problem to hit a target, was cumbersome, slow, and fraught with human error. To make fire support more responsive, effective, and accurate and to minimize human error, the Army and Field Artillery searched for a more efficient method of calculating technical fire direction also known as technical gunnery. This led to automating gunnery with the electro-mechanical M 15 Gun Data in the 1950s and later the electronic digital M 18 Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer (FADAC) in the 1960s. ELIl\:IINATING HUMAN ERROR For the Army the atomic age opened when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945 to end the war in the Pacific Theater, threatening to jeopardize the Army's future. As far as the American public and government leaders were concerned, a modern air force equipped with atomic weapons would prevail in the future, would provide the primary means of preserving the delicate postwar peace, would discourage any Soviet aggression, and would make expensive ground forces irrelevant. Along with declining peacetime budgets during the latter 1940s as the United States turned from wartime to peacetime pursuits and disengaged from military occupation duty in Japan and Germany with its distractions and lax training standards, the atomic age with its emphasis upon air power impeded the development of conventional weapons and left the Army with, understrength and inadequately equipped units and sagging readiness by 1950.1 As Roy K. Flint aptly wrote in 1986, "... the Army was a hollow shell" by 1950 as a result of peacetime military policy.2 Yet, the public's growing fascination with airpower, the questionable relevance of ground forces, and shrinking military budgets during peacetime failed to prevent the Army from examining its strengths and weaknesses in light of World War II combat experiences. In mid-1945 the United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) established a general

IMaurice Matloff, American Military History (Washington, DC: The U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), pp. 530-42; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 485-87, 501-03; Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Armed Services an~ American Strategy, 1945-1953," in Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds., Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); pp. 305- 07; Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th : Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950;' in Charles E. Heller and William E. Stofft, eds., America's First Battles: J 776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), p. 269; Geoffrey Perret, A Country Made by War: From the Revolution to Vietnam, The Story of America's Rise to Power (New York: Random House, 1989), pp. 441-46. 2Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," p. 269. 2

board to assimilate the lessons from recent combat operations and make recommendations for improvements in tactics, doctrine, organization, and equipment design. Over a course of several months, the board produced 131 studies chiefly on the administrative and the organizational aspects of the European ground campaigns, plus a few on tactics. One such study focused on field artillery gunnery or technical fire direction. Although the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, had greatly improved gunnery techniques during the 1930s with the creation of the fire direction center, the development of the graphic firing table, and the adoption of the portable radio, the vision of a more lethal and mobile battlefield in the future generated the demand for even more responsive fire support than provided during the war. For field artillery units to shift fires rapidly and effectively in future combat operations, firing data had to be figured more quickly and accurately than ever before; and this would tax fire direction center personnel who depended upon manual gunnery or the employment of the graphic firing table, pencils, paper, charts, and darts to compute firing data.J Under the leadership of Brigadier General Jesmond D. Balmer who had served as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School in 1942-1944, the USFET study group on field artillery gunnery, searching for ways to improve fire support, wrote a significant report based upon extensive interviews with field artillery commanders and officers about their combat experiences during the war. After analyzing the officers' candid answers and combat after action reports, the study group composed of senior field artillery officers reached a compelling conclusion. Faulty materiel, ammunition, and human errors frequently led to 4 inaccurate fires and hindered effective fire support for the maneuver arms during the war. In light of this startling deduction that reinforced casual wartime observations about fire SUppOIt and field artillery gunnery, the group advised, "That tests [should] be initiated for the development of equipment for the mechanical computation and transmission of firing data" to replace the error-prone manual method. A mechanical analog computer would solve gunnery problems more rapidly and accurately and would make field artillery fires nlore responsive and effective in the process. Although the group failed to elucidate upon the desired characteristics of a mechanical analog computer, it basically endorsed the recommendations published in the Field Artillery ]our1lallate in 1939 by an anonymous reserve field artillery officer and early in 1940 by Colonel John W. Downer, an active duty

JReport, USFET, subj: Field Artillery Gunnery, undated, pp. 21-34,40,42, UA25.5 A52 No. 64, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL), U.S. Army Field Artillery School, FOIt. Sill, OK; 1997 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 115; Dennis J. Vetock, LeSS01lS Learned: A l!istory of u.s. Army Lesson Learnill~ (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988), pp.70-71. During World War II, fire direction personnel collected target information from the observers and weather data, used firing table information, employed the graphic firing table to compute the fire direction data, and sent the information to the battery so that it could adjust the direction of fire. See William T. Dougherty's "Tactical Fire Control- T ACFIRE Functional Description," p. 3, T ACFIRE File, HRDC, for a good definition of technical fire direction. 4Report, USFET, suhj: Field Artillery Gunnery, undated, pp. 21-34,40,42, UA25.5 A52 No 64, MSTL; 1997 USAFACFS ACH, p. 115; Vetock, Lesso/ls Learned, pp. 70-71.

______.1 3 field artillery officer. Both officers urged acquiring a to calculate technical fire direction to reduce human error and improve accuracy.5 As a part of its overall effort to recommend a course of action for the future, the USFET general board, meanwhile, convened another study group of senior field artillery officers under General Balmer to examine field artillery material. After noting the fire direction center's reliance upon labor-intensive manual methods to figure technical fire direction, the USFET study group unequivocally counseled, "Equipment which mechanically computes the essential data and designed to minimize human error was universally desired. ,,6 Like the two pre-war officers and the group on the study of field artillery gunnery, this body recognized the requirement to employ a mechanical means of calculating technical fire direction, never explained what it meant by a mechanical computer, and most likely saw upgrading the existing graphic firing table or introducing a mechanical analog computer as a viable solution.7 Within months after both study groups had published their findings and recommendations, other field artillery officers reached comparable conclusions about the necessity of acquiring a mechanical instrument for technical fire direction. Instructed by Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, the Commanding General of Army Ground Forces that oversaw individual and unit training for the Anny, the Field Artillery . School convened a conference in March 1946 to study the ways of improving fire support.H Among other critical issues, the participants debated the merits of a mechanical analog computer that depended upon to solve problems. Such a computer would calculate fire control data to mass fires more accurately, would save time and labor, and would reduce and even eliminate errors caused by human fatigue and mistakes.9 As a part of the discussion on the topic, Major R.A. Kane who had served in a battalion fire direction center in the 9th Infantry Division in Africa, Sicily, France, and Germany during the war recalled, "The personnel in our present fire direction center cannot efficiently operate twenty-four hours a

5Report, USFET, subj: Field Artillery Gunnery, undated, p. 42, UA25.5 A52 No 64, MSTL; Report, subj: FADAC: A New Concept in Computers for Artillery, p. 14, Mar 1956, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: FADAC, Jan 1965, p. 8, FADAC File, HRDC; "Gadget Wanted," Field Artillery Jounlal, Nov-Dec 1939, p. 552; Col John W. Downer, "Mechanical Data Computer," Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1940, p. 155. 6Report, USFET, subj: Field Artillery Material, undated, pp. 8-9, UA25.5 A52 No 67, MSTL. 7Jbid. 8Boyd L. Dastrup, King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S.Anny's Field Artillery (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992, reprinted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993), p. 243; Jamcs~ T. Stensvaag, ed., Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1998 (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1998), pp. 5-6. 9Report, subj: Research and Exploratory Development of FADAC, Jul 1966, p. 5, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, Field Artillery Conference, Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK, 18-29 Mar 46, Annex D, Question 5, UF7.5 A5 1946, MSTL. 4 day, seven days a week, as is necessary without outside help."tO From Kane's personal experience, a mechanical analog computer would reduce fatigue, eliminate human errors, and enhance fire support by making technical fire direction more exact. Colonel H.T. Heath of the Army Ground Forces echoed Major Kane's concerns. He noted, "Such a device [a mechanical analog computer] is needed at Battalion level as a labor saving device .... "II It would reduce the work load of fire direction center personnel and decrease human errors and 12 ir:nprove the accuracy of technical fire direction. At the Field Artillery School conference Brigadier General Charles G. Helmick who had served in various field artillery command positions during the war also lent his support for a mechanical analog computer.13 Giving his unqualified backing to automated gunnery, he commented: The F.A. [field artillery] has resisted mechanical computers as gadgets. The present FDC equipment -- GFT [graphic firing table], was adopted against misgivings of many. In this mechanical age, in the desire to save personnel, in the desire to speed training, every effort should be made to obtain mechanical computers which will be comparatively automatic and will 14 eliminate human error. Conservatism and resistance to innovation should not block adopting a mechanical analog computer to solve the gunnery problem according to General Helmick. Field artillery officers needed to be progressive, to adopt new technology, and to exploit it for field artillery use.15 Recognizing Kane's, Heath's and Helmick's insightful arguments about the necessity of improving the accuracy of field artillery fires and reducing the amount of labor required by fire direction center personnel, eighty of the ninety-three officers taking part in the Fort Sill. conference concurred about the urgency of acquiring a mechanical analog computer. They desired "further development of our High Level Fire Direction Center technique and equipment." 16 Accordingly, they insisted: Our present method of ... massing of artillery fire has proven fast, accurate, and effective, when compared with the delivery of fire of either our allies or enemy. Our present battalion level fire direction organization, equipment, and technique, has apparent need for improvement and further development to correct for personnel errors, which increase with fatigue, for improperly developed or manufactured equipment, and to increase speed and accuracy in providing firing data.17

IOlhid. Illhid. 12lhid. 13lhid. 14lhid. 15lbid.; Russell Gugler, "Fort Sill and the Golden Age of Field Artillery," p. 7, unpublished manuscript, MSTL. 16Report, Field Artillery Conference, Field Artillery School, Annex 0, Question 5, UF7.5 A5 1946, MSTL. 17lbid. 5

Persuaded by the growing demand for better accuracy, more speed, and less work by fire direction personnel, these field artillery officers endorsed obtaining a mechanical analog computer to replace the manual method currently employed in the battalion fire direction center .. As the minutes of the conference revealed, the participants approved "improving present methods in our Fire Direction Center" and suggested that a "detailed study [should] be nlade of present equipment in our Fire Direction Center with the objective of improving our present facilities (i.e., firing charts, plotting boards and equipment, firing tables, lighting, etc).,,18 Even though a consensqs of opinion at the Field Artillery School conference understood the need of acquiring a mechanical analog computer to figure firing data, ambi valence still characterized the attitudes of many officers at the conference. They clearly wanted to retain the old equipment and methods and to supplement .them with the new. Making a complete break with past methods was out of the question and also unwise to them. As Major General Louis E. Hibbs, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School in 1945- 1946, reported in the Field Artillery Journal in luly 1946, a majority of the conference participants urged obtaining a mechanical analog fire direction computer to solve gunnery problems but never rated it as a high priority for development and acquisition to reveal their true feelings and thinking on the matter. Radars for target acquisition, better propellants, and an improved variable time fuse, among other things, were far more important than a mechanical analog computer for calculating fire direction. In fact, conference participants failed to rank such a computer among their top sixteen recommended developmental projects for the Field Artillery because it was not that important to them.19 As the priority list published in the Field Artillery Journal in luly 1946 starkly reinforced, field artillery officers at the Field Artillery School conference found solid reasons to justify the mechanical analog computer's low ranking on their priority list. Although the graphic firing table was employed effectively in the fire direction center during the war, it was extremely crude. Yet, coupled with the range deflection fan and plotting techniques in the fire direction center that employed charts and graphs, the graphic firing table did a satisfactory job. In view of the striking successes of fire support and the vivid images of massed fires during the war, the officers at the conference failed to see a compelling reason to abandon existing technical fire direction practices and equipment by adopting additional computational aids and therefore did not wholeheartedly commit themselves to developing a mechanical analog computer for calculating fire direction although they wanted to improve the accuracy of fires and sought to reduce the amount of work required to calculate firing data.20

IS/bid. 191bid.; Maj Gen Louis E. Hibbs, "Report on the Field Artillery Conference~" Field Artillery Journal, Jul 1946, pp. 407-13. ~2°Report, R.J. Brachman, Frankford Arsenal, subj: Equipment Developed and Planned for Gun Data and Missile Fire Control Computer, Feb 1959, in Proceedings of Conference, Computers for Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, pp. 173-90, UJ 170.7 C6, MSTL; Report, USFET, subj: Field Artillery Materiel, undated, p. 8, UA25.5 A52 No 67, MSTL; Report, subj: Research and Exploratory Development Origins of the FADAC, Ju11956, p. 5, FADAC File, HRDC. 6

Besides failing to endorse a mechanical analog computer enthusiastically, the same group of officers resisted adopting electronic digital computers that ran on electricity and employed a binary nun1ber system of digits to solve problems. As of 1946, only large electronic digital computers along the lines of the Electronic Numerical Integrator Computer (EN lAC) could solve gunnery problems to represent a significant improvement over manual methods. Introduced in February 1946 by J. Prester Eckert and Dr. John W. Mauchly after they had designed and built it during the war at the University of Pennsylvania's Moore School of Electrical to provide field artillery ballistic computations, ENIAC was a bulky, first-generation electronic digital computer. It weighed over thirty tons, had hundreds of thousands of , , and , and consumed almost two hundred kilowatts of electrical power. The large, cumbersome sizes of ENIAC and other comparable electronic digital computers discouraged the Army from employing them because they were too bulky to be moved readily around a mobile battlefield. Until the electronic digital computer could be made smaller and portable, many field artillery officers failed to see it as a viable solution. Given the state of mechanical analog and electronic digital computer technology and the wartime experience with existing computational aids and manual methods, field artillery officers of 1945-1946 justifiably made the acquisition of computers for technical fire direction a low priority. As much as they recognized the imperati ve of the rapid and accurate computation of technical fire direction and the need to reduce the amount of work to calculate firing data, the infant computer technology and the other pressing requirements discouraged introducing mechanical analog or electronic digital computers. Soldiers assigned to the fire direction center could sit down and use a graphic 21 firing table, pencil, paper, and other simple equipnlent. At best, the USFET study groups, the participants of the Field Artillery School conference, and the various field artillery officers raised the consciousness of their peers about the imperative of improving the accuracy of technical fire direction and presented a possible solution. Yet, they were not willing to take any serious steps towards adopting automated gunnery and held to tried and proven manual gunnery.22 Although the state of technology through mid-1946, the prevailin'g attitudes of many field artillery officers who were hesitant to modernize fire direction equipment, the reduced peacetime budgets, and the lack of a sophisticated military threat had the potential of stalling the introduction of a mechanical analog computer and an electronic digital computer, the pressing need for more responsive field artillery support on the future battlefield prodded the Army to act. Notwithstanding the earlier observations of the various USFET study groups and the Field Artillery School conference of March 1946 with their cautious advocacy of

21Martin H. Weik, "The ENIAC Story," Ordnance, 45(1961): 471-75; Report, R.J. Brachman, subj: Equipment Developed and Planned for Gun Data an Missile Fire Control Computer, in Proceedings of Conference, Computers for Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, pp. 173- 90, VJ 170.7 C6, MSTL; Report, subj: Research and Exploratory Development Origins of the FADAC, Jul 1956, p. 5, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: FADAC: A New Concept in Computers for Artillery, p. 2, Mar 1956, MSTL. 22/bid., pp. 2, 14; Lt Col Henry H. Rogers, "The Role of Electronics in Warfare," Military Review, Jul 1949, pp. 23-27; Shirley Thomas, Computers: Their History, Present Applications, and Future (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 61-67. 7 automated technical fire direction, the Army Ground Forces reached an interesting conclusion after evaluating field artillery requirements from a broader perspective than many field artillery officers had done so far. In 1946 it outlined a requirement for an automated computer for calculating technical fire direction because only the adoption of improved equipment would upgrade the field artillery's responsiveness and effectiveness. In line with this thinking, the Army Ground Forces saw the compelling need for a mechanical analog computer or an electro-mechanical analog computer that would use electrical impulses to represent values or numbers to solve some problems and gears to work out others, such as those that required and subtraction, but discounted mechanical digital or electronic digital computers because they were not sufficiently developed in the mid-1940s to be seriously considered. Based upon the recommendation by the Army Ground Forces, the demand for a significant improvement in technical fire direction, and the growing rift between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Army established a requirement in 1947 for an automated fire direction system -- a mechanical analog computer or an electro- mechanical analog computer -- to replace the slow, cumbersome, inefficient, labor-intensive, and error-prone manual method. By making this decision the Army took the initiative away from the less progressive Field Artillery and developed the military characteristics for an . electro-mechanical analog computer to calculate technical fire direction to enable the firing battery to hit the target with greater accuracy and speed after receiving a call for fire and to make computation less labor intensive. This action provided the initiative to adopt automated technical fire direction.23

23Report No. TN-I071, Frankford Arse~al, subj: FADAC, Mar 1956, pp. 5-7, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, R.l. Brachman, subj: Equipment Developed and Planned for Gun Data and Missile Fire Control Computer, in Proceedings of Conference, Computers for Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, pp. 173-90, U1170.7 C6, MSTL; U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Communications and Electronics Department, Glossary of Computer Terms, Aug 1963, p. 2; J.W.D. Ward and G.N. Turner, Military Data Processing and Microcomputers (New York: Brassey's Publishers Ltd, 1982), p. 2; "Need for Electronic Computers," Trends in Artillery/or Instruction, Jun 1957, p. 19; Feasibility Study of Digital Computer for Field Artillery, W.L. Maxon Corporation, New York, Sep 1956, p.24, UL591.1 D3M462, MSTL; "Field Artillery Gun Data Computers," Trends in Artillery, Feb 1958, pp. 32-33; "Road to Good Decision Through Computer," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, pp. 16-17; Report, Artillery Instructors' Conference, 6-10 Oct 1952, pp. 1-2, UF7.5 A51 1952, MSTL; Study, subj: Application of Automatic Data Processing Systems to Field Artillery Technical Fire Control Input/Output Data, 15 Mar 1959, Section IV, p. I, FADAC File, HRDC; James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Anny Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), pp. 242-43; Irving Adler, Thinking : A Layman's Introduction to Logic, Boolean Algebra, and Computers (New York: The John Day Company, 1961), p. 54; Glenn L. White, "An Introduction to Digital Computers," Military Engineer, May-Jun 64, pp. 168-73; Shirley Thomas, Computers: Their History. Present Applications, and Future (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 76; Report, subj: Exploratory and Development Origins of the FADAC, Jul 1956, pp. 11-12, 14; Report, subj: Development of FADAC, Feb 1960, p. I, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: FADAC: A New Concept in Computers for Artillery, p. 8

Working with technicians at U.S. Army Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia and the electronic experts of the Belock Instrument Corporation of New York, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Arn and Lieutenant Colonel William I. King, both field artillery officers at The Artillery School (formerly called the Field Artillery School until 1946) at Fort Sill, assumed the lead in developing a computer. Using surplus parts from a M9 gun director, they fashioned a crude working model of an electro-mechanical analog computer by 1949. As an explicit result of their promising work and the successful presentation of their innovative ideas to Headquarters, U.S. Army Field Forces (the successor to U.S. Army Ground Forces) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, the Army reassigned them to the Frankford Arsenal to assist in the development of an electro-mechanical analog computer to solve gunnery problems. Together with Frankford Arsenal experts, Lieutenant Colonel Am and Lieutenant Colonel King produced the T29 electro-mechanical analog computer for solving technical fire direction problems. Simple in concept and designed to facilitate easy maintenance and training, the T29 computer underwent additional development and refinement during the early 1950s, successfully passed Army-supervised user tests, and was standardized as the M 15 Gun Data Computer on 15 June 1958. Based upon this, the Army issued the M 15 to field artillery units early in 1960 as an interim computer to meet the growing demand for an automated data processing device to calculate technical fire direction until a better computer could be acquired. As part of the M35 fire control system that consisted of three M 15s, a gunnery officer's M I console that permitted the gunnery officer to direct assignments to the various M 15 computers that functioned both independently and together, and any suitable 120-volt DC generator, the portable M 15 computer received the coordinates of the target, the weapon, and the observer from the gunnery officer, calculated the deflection and quadrant elevation, and determined the proper fuse. The M 15 then automatically transmitted the technical fire direction data to the battery and provided greater accuracy and speed than existing manual methods did. As Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Cahalane of the Department of Gunnery in the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, accurately pointed out in 1958, the M 15 opened a new era in the computation of technical fire direction and certainly 24 represented a significant improvement over the slower and error-prone manual method.

56, Mar 1956, FADAC File, HRDC; Matloff, ed., American Military History, pp. 428, 432, 521-24; Weigley, History of the United States Ann)', p. 486; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., "Report on the United Nations," Field Artillery Journal, May 46, pp. 279-82; Col Conrad H. Lanza, "Perimeters in Paragraphs," Field Artillery Jounlal, May 1946, pp. 297-305; "The World Situation and the Preservation of Peace," Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1947, pp. 212 -13. .., . 24Lt Col Robert E. Arn, "The Electronic Gun Data Computer, T-29," Combat Forces Journal, Nov 1953, pp. 27-28; Report, RJ. Brachman, subj: Equipment Developed and Planned for Gun Data and Missile Fire Control Computer, in Proceedings of Conference, Computers for Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, pp. 173-90, UJ 170.7 C6, MSTL; "Need for Electronic Computers," p. 19; "News of the Services," Combat Forces Jounlal, Nov 1951, p. 43; Technical Manual 9-1220-206-12, Gun Direction Computer M 15, Feb 1960, p. 3, UL591.1 G87U5, MSTL; Karl Kempf, Electronic Computers within the Ordnance Corps (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Aberdeen Proving Ground, 1961), p. 89, UL591 K4, MSTL; "Electronic Computer," Combat Forces Journal, Nov 1951, p. 43; Report, subj: 9

Although the M 15 computer could solve complex mathematical problems rapidly and accurately, it had critical limitations. First, it could only provide precise solutions for field artillery weapons with ranges of sixteen thousand yards or less. As the range increased beyond sixteen thousand yards, the accuracy of the solutions decreased. Because of this, the computer could not furnish definitive technical fire direction for guns, missiles, and rockets with ranges greater than sixteen thousand yards. Second, like all electro-mechanical analog computers, M15 could only solve a particular mathematical problem, was not readily adaptable to decipher other problems, and was dependent upon hardware configuration for problem solving. For example, M 15's physical configuration limited its ability to solve gunnery problems to one type of field artillery weapon. This constraint forced the Army to utilize the M 15 computer for the 105-mm. howitzer and to build the MI5C computer for the 155-mm. howitzer. Given the restrictive characteristics of electro-mechanical analog computers, the Field Artillery would require a different one for each weapon system. Developing such a computer for each weapon system would have been expensive and impractical. 25 Notwithstanding its notable constraints, the M 15 electro-mechanical analog computer represented a significant step forward. Under the direction of the Army that had more. foresight than many field artillery officers of the time, Lieutenant Colonel Arn and Lieutenant Colonel King created an electro-mechanical analog computer over a period of several years with the capability of computing technical fire direction more rapidly and accurately than fire direction center personnel could manually, but its limitations discouraged further development and prompted finding a better computer.

Artillery Instructors Conference, 6- I°Oct 1952; Lt Col Robert E. Cahalane, "Field Artillery Gun Data Computers." Trends in Artillery for Instruction, Feb 1958, p. 32; "No 'Magic' Still Fiscal," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, p. 93; "First Round Hits with FADAC," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, p. 8; Edward D. Ray, "TACFIRE: A Quantum Leap in FA Data Processing," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1979, pp. 54-57; Report, subj: FADAC Status Report, 29 Dec 1958, p. 1, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: Research and Exploratory Development Origins of the FADAC, Ju11956, pp. 5,11-12, FADAC File, HRDC. 25perret, A Country Made by ~Var,p. 447; Report, subj: Development of FADAC, Feb 1960, p. I, FADAC File, HRDC; "First Round Hits with FADAC," pp. 8-9; Kempf, Electronic Computers lvith the Ordnance Corps, p. 89; "Road to Good Decision Through Computers," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, pp. 16-17; Frankford Arsenal, FADAC, 1 Apr 1961, p. 3, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: FADAC Status Report, 29 Dec 1958, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: Research and Exploratory Development Origins of the FADAC, Jul 1956, p. 5, FADAC File, HRDC; Study, subj: Application of Automatic Data Processing Systems to Field Artillery Technical Fire Control Input/Output, 15 Mar 1959, Section IV, p. 1, FADAC File, HRDC. A thermometer is a good example analog computer. It can only determine the temperature and nothing else. The expansion or contraction of the mercury in the thermometer indicates the temperature. A pre-electronics automobile speedOineter is another good example of a mechanical analog computer. It translates wheel rotations into miles. A certain number of rotations represents a certain distance. Basically, a mechanical analog computer used of electricity, rotations, or some other mechanical means to represent a numerical value. 10 .

EXPANDING TIlE VISION As might be expected, the Cold War, in the meantime, had a profound impact on the Army and the automation of field artillery gunnery by providing a greater sense of urgency. In response to the Soviet detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1949 and the fall of China to the Communists in 1949, the National Security Council (NSC) which was composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the three service secretaries, and the heads of other government agencies as appointed by the President drew up a memorandum early in 1950 known as NSC-68. The memorandum called for a massive buildup of American conventional and nuclear forces and a determined military opposition to communist aggression and simultaneously permitted the Army to start developing tactical nuclear weapons. As expected, the reaffirmed the belligerent intentions of the Soviets and the communists to many Americans, the wisdom of NSC-68, and the imperative of rearming. Although the Eisenhower Administration's New Look policy with its corollary doctrine of massive retaliation of 1953-1954 emphasized the Air Force's mission of delivering nuclear weapons and reduced the importance of the Army and the Navy in national defense, the decision of 1950 to rearm the military services with conventional and nuclear weapons ran its logical course. Over ten years beginning in the mid-1950s, the Army introduced guided missiles, free-flight rockets, and cannon artillery with the capabilities of carrying nuclear and conventional warheads. Meanwhile, the Army created the Pentomic division that depended upon dispersion, mobility, and flexibility in order to survive on the tactical nuclear battlefield. For the Field Artillery, the tactical nuclear battlefield meant furnishing more responsive fire support by calculating technical fire direction faster and nlore accurately than the electro-mechanical analog M 15 Gun Data Computer could and taking advantage of the increased ranges of the rockets; missiles, and cannon artillery being introduced. It therefore faced the imperative of adopting a better fire direction computer because the M 15 under development was limited to solving firing data for field artillery weapons with ranges less than sixteen thousand yards.26 Cognizant of this, the Army took a long-term approach to technical fire direction and field artillery command and control in 1954 as the tactical nuclear battlefield began to emerge. To minimize obsolescence the Army wanted a computer with the ability of calculating firing data for all present and future field artillery weapons. Based upon a study by the Frankford Arsenal in 1953 that suggested the possibility of using electronic digital computers for solving gunnery problems, the Army awarded a contract to the Engineering

26Zachary Karabell, "Cold \Var: External Course," in John Whiteclay Chambers II, editor in chief, The Oxford Companion to American Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 150; James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations:.The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 176-78; Perret, A Country Made by War, p. 447; Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Bet\veen Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp. 12,13, 19-48,53- 59,68-70; Ambrose, "The Armed Services and American Strategy, 1945-1953," pp. 309-10; Daun Van EE, "From the New Look to Flexible Response, 1953-1964," in KennethJ. Hagan and William R. Roberts, cds., Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military llistory from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp.321- 26,330-32. 11

Research Associates Division of the Sperry-Rand Corporation in June 1954 for a design study for an electronic digital computer for calculating technical fire direction. Completed in August 1955, the Sperry-Rand study recommended the employment of solid-state electronic digital computers even though only large digital computers at the time could work out the complex problems associated with field artillery gunnery. Unlike electro-mechanical analog computers with their reliance upon shaft or rotations or electrical voltages to solve problems, electronic digital computers employed binary numbers to perform calculations, were able to solve a broad range of problems rapidly and accurately, and had more versatt.1. tty. 27 The successor to the U.S. Army Field Forces, the U.S. Army Continental Command (CONARC) with its individual and unit training and also co.mbat developments responsibility agreed with the findings of the Sperry-Rand study and other similar studies and reached its own critical conclusions in 1956. CONARC studies divided fire support problems into broad categories: target acquisition, communication of target information to. the fire direction center, calculation of technical fire direction data in the fire direction center, and transmission of that information to the battery executive officer and the individual guns. Of the four problem areas, the CON ARC studies ranked calculating technical fire direction , or solving the gunnery problem as the most critical challenge and advised developing an electronic digital computer for employment with tube, rocket, and missile artillery. At a conference on fire direction computers at the Frankford Arsenal in November 1956, CONARC therefore introduced the concept of the Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer (FADAC), an electronic digital computer, to figure ballistic problems. Given the gravity of replacing the M 15 electro-mechanical analog computer then under development with something far superior, the Army subsequently endorsed CON ARC's concept, established the military characteristics for FADAC in 1957, signed a contract with Autonetics, a division of North American Aviation Incorporated, on 20 June 1958, and set a target date of September 1959 for the first prototype computer to be ready for testing. As established by the design criteria, FADAC would be a solid-state, transistorized, electronic digital computer. It would be designed to operate under severe field conditions without a major overhaul for 2,500 hours, would be easily maintained and operated, would be a mobile replacement for the M 15 computer, and would supplement manual methods of figuring firing data. For the foreseeable future, however, manual fire direction would remain as a viable

27Report, subj: FADAC: A New Concept in Computers for Artillery, pp. 6-7, 10-11, Mar 1956, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: DevelopmentofFADAC, Feb 1960, pp.I-2, FADAC File, HRDC; "First Round Hits with FADAC," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, p. 8; Report, subj: FADAC, Jan 1965, p. 8, FADAC File, HRDC; Ray, "TACFIRE: A Quantum Leap in FA Data Processing," p. 54; Report, subj: FADAC Status Report, 29 Dec 1958, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: Exploratory and Development Origins of the FADAC, Jul 1956, pp. 5, 11-12, FADAC File, HRDC; Study, subj: Application of Automatic Data Processing Systems to Field Artillery Technical Fire Control Input/Output, 15 Mar 1959, Section IV, p. 2, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: FADAC: A New Concept in Computers for Artillery, p. 6, Mar 1956, FADAC File, HRDC; Cahalane, "Field Artillery Gun Data Computers," pp. 32-35. 12 . backup to computerized gunnery.28 Notwithstanding the imposing size of the first-generation electronic digital computers of the early 1950s that required transporting them and their associated equipment in a thirty- foot trailer van, field artillerymen clearly saw the potential benefits ofFADAC to supplement or even eliminate the time-consuming, laborious, and error-prone manual production of firing data.29 In February 1958 subsequent to the decision to develop FADAC, Lieutenant Colonel Cahalane wrote an article in Trends in Artillery, an in-house publication of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, about the significance of the proposed FADAC computer. Enthusiastically, Lieutenant Colonel Cahalane explained, "A design study conducted by the engineering research associates of the Sperry Rand Corporation indicated that a digital computer, such as FADAC, would be superior to an analog computer and would provide even greater accuracy, greater flexibility, and ease of manufacture and maintenance. ,,30 For field artillery officers accuracy translated into enhanced fire support for the other combat arms.31 Accuracy would permit firing a greater number of immediate fire-for-effect missions because the technical fire direction information would be more precise. Therefore, productive fires could be placed on the target more quickly than before with minin1al registration fire.32 Discussing this at a conference on computers for field artillery in February

28Report, subj: FADAC: A New Concept in Computers for Artillery, pp. 6-7, Mar 1956, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, RJ. Brachman, subj: Equipment Developed and Planned for Gun Data and Missile Fire Control Computer, pp. 173-90 in Proceedings of Conference, Computers for Field Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, UL591 C6, MSTL; Kempf, Electronic Computers with the Ordnance Corps, pp. 90-92; Thomas, Computers: Their History, Present Applications, and Future, p. 62; "Need for Electronic Computers," pp. 19- 21; "Road to Good Decision Through Computers," pp. 16-17; Lt Col Louis R. Van De Velde, "Computers for Artillery," Army, Apr 1960, pp. 52-58; Report, subj: Proceedings of Conference on Computers for Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, p. 18, UL591 C6 1959, MSTL; "Fieldata Aids for the Command Post of the Future," Anny Information Digest, Mar 1962, p. 19; Fact Sheet, subj: Gun Direction Computer M18, FADAC, 26 Ju11997, FADAC File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Gun Direction Computer M18, FADAC, 26 Jul 1974, FADAC File, HRDC; Rebecca R. Raines, Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Corps (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996), pp. 335-37; Col Charles T. Campbell, "Rapid-Fire Answers," Army Information Digesr, Dec 1958, p. 55; Frankford Arsenal, FADAC, 1 Apr 1961, p. 3, UL591.1 D3F21, MSTL; Ray, "T ACFIRE: A Quantum Leap in FA Data Processing," p. 54; "ADPS," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, pp. 3-7; Report, subj: FADAC Status Report, 29 Dec 1958, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: Exploratory and Development Origin of the FADAC, Ju11956, pp. 5,11-12, FADAC File, HRDC; Stensvaag, et ai, Prepare the Army for lVar, p. 6; George E. Miller, "TACFIRE: An Innovation in Artillery," Armor, Jul-Aug 1972, pp. 9-10. Mr. Miller directed the T ACFIRE program for Litton Industries in the 1960s and 1970s. 29Report, subj: Test of M18, 27 Sep 1963, MSTL. 30Cahalane, "Field Artillery Gun Data Computers," p. 34. 31"The Computer Story: Speed and Accuracy," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, pp. 30-31. 32/bid.; Report, Project Manager, Command Control Information Systems-1970, Jan 1965, p. 9, FADAC File, HRDC. 13

1959, Lieutenant Colonel Louis R. van de Velde of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, pointed out, "If we get precise target acquisition means and good computers, we may not have to adjust it [fire] on targets of opportunity, for we will know their coordinates precisely and the computer will place the fire on those coordinates. But, we will still have to conduct some registration, many fewer, but some."33 The colonel added, "We want computers for cannons for the accuracy gained.,,34 Along the same lines, an article in Artillery Trends, an in-house publication of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, in September 1960 explained the virtues of increased speed and accuracy and fewer registrations. 35 Units could move into position and quickly deliver precise fires without registering one or more batteries per battalion on the target. This would save ammunition, deny the enemy the time and the opportunity to employ countermeasures, and lead to tactical surprise.36 The capability of first round hits on a target without registration with FADAC was a distinct possibility and was ,"music to the ears to all artillerymen," according to an article in Artillery Trends, an in-house publication of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School. For many field artillery officers, FADAC would herald in a new day of unprecedented effective fire support by figuring technical fire direction more rapidly and accurately than previously and would be suitable for the emerging tactical nuclear battlefield where the rapid and accurate calculation of firing data would be imperative for survival.37 Rapid strides with improved memories, transistors, and printed circuitry in the mid- 1950s made the dream of an electronic digital computer for calculating fire direction a reality. Weighing a little over two hundred pounds, FADAC successfully completed engineering and service tests conducted by the U.S. Army Artillery Board at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in 1960 and 1961. An electronic, general-purpose, second- generation digital computer, FADAC solved the gunnery problem faster than any manual method and the M 15 electro-mechanical analog computer could, was designed primarily for the automatic computation and display of firing data for cannon, free-flight rocket, and guided missiles artillery, and calculated accurately at an extremely high rate of speed. Besides computing firing data, FADAC figured four types of survey (traverse, zone-to-zone transformation, intersection, and observer orientation) and accepted meteorological data that

33Report, Lt Col L.R. van de Velde, Department of Gunnery, U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, subj: Artillery Requirements for Gun Data and Missile Fire Control Computers, Feb 1959, in Proceedings of Conference on Computers for Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, PEe 69-79, UF7.5 A53 1959, MSTL. 4/bid. 35Since it opened in 1911, the School of Fire for Field Artillery had undergone several name changes: School of Fire for Field Artillery, 1911-1919; Field Artillery School, 1919- 1946; The Artillery School, 1946-1955; The Artillery and Guided Missile School, 1955- 1957; U.S. Army Artillery and Guided Missile School, January 1957-July 1957; U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, July 1957-1969; and U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 1969- present. 36"The Computer Story," p. 31; van de Velde, "Computers for Artiliery," p. 53; Report, subj: FADAC, Jan 1965, p. 9, FADAC File, HRDC. 37"'First Round Hits with FADAC," p. 8. 14 . could be entered manually or on a punched tape and then integrated into the gunnery solution. Based upon the test results, the Army subsequently typed classified the computer as the M 18 Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer on 9 March 1961. After the desired modifications to FADAC had been completed at the recommendation of CON ARC to correct the deficiencies identified by testing, the Army issued the computer to the field with the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School and the lIth Air Assault Division, later redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), receiving the first production units in June 1963 and August 1963 respectively. Field artillery units in Europe subsequently acquired their first FADACs in May 1964. Tables of equipment authorized one computer for every' field artillery battalion and one computer for each battery with the exception of 105-mm. howitzer batteries that did not have one, while each target acquisition battalion had four. Normally, the battery FADAC computed firing data for that specific battery's missions, while the battalion FADAC checked firing battery data.38 In the eyes of R.J. Brachman, an electrical engineer and a computer expert at the Frankford Arsenal, the M 18 FADAC would give the Field Artillery first-round accuracy and prevent the enemy from digging in to reduce the effect of field artillery fire.39 In an article in The Military Engineer in 1964, Brachman commented, "FADAC, with its accuracy, speed, and versatility, constitutes a new command tool that will greatly enhance the position of artillery as an efficient element of combat power.,,40 Although the M18 FADAC provided only technical fire control by solving gunnery problems and although the M 15 electro-mechanical analog computer broke new ground as an interim device to calculate firing data, FADAC far exceeded its predecessor's capabilities and ventured into new territory. FADAC proved that automated data processing could be applied to field artillery technical fire control, artillery survey, and meteorological functions. Using. the target coordinates sent verbally from the forward observer to the battalion, knowing the battery position, and integrating the meteorological message, the M 18 FADAC determined

3RCpt Douglas B. Stuart, "Computer, Gun Direction, M 18," Artillery Trends, Oct 1962, p. 16; Fact Sheet, subj: Gun Direction Computer M18, FADAC, 26Ju11974, FADAC File, HRDC; Cpt Read E. Myers, "Progress Report: FADAC," Artillery Trends, Feb 1962, p. 55; Field Manual 6-40-3, FADAC M 18 Gunnery, Sep 1964, p. 28, UL59 1.1G87U4, MSTL; FADAC Description and Operating Procedure Book, 19 May 1961, Introduction, FADAC File, HRDC; Report, subj: Test ofM18 Computer, 27 Sep 1963, MSTL; Frankford Arsenal, FADAC, 1 Apr 1961, pp. 3-7, UL59 1.1 D3F21, MSTL; Valerie Antoine, "FADAC Zeroes In," Army Informatioll Digest, Jan 1965, p. 55; Report, subj: Exploratory and Development Origins of the FADAC, Ju11956, pp. 5-6, FADAC File, HRDC; Memorandum, subj: None, 26 Feb 1999, HRDC. 39Report, subj: Development ofFADAC, Feb 1960, pp. 1-2, FADAC File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Gun Direction Computer M18, FADAC, 26 Jul 1974, FADAC File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Gun Direction Computer M18, FADAC, 26 Jul 1974, FADAC File, HRDC; Myers, "Progress Report: FADAC," p. 54; R.J. Brachman, "FADAC: Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer," The Military Engineer, May-Jun 1964, p. 193; Stuart, "Computer, Gun Direction, M 18," p. 16; Frankford Arsenal, Handbook of Sighting and Fire Control Materiel, Apr 1976, p. 1-3; UL175 M2F6 St 9-100, MSTL. 4°Brachman, "FADAC: Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer," p. 193. 15

the range and azimuth to the target, selected the proper propelling charge, chose the trial quadrant elevation, provided more accurate solutions, and reduced the possibility of human error. For example, computing firing data for tube artillery with FADAC took approximately one minute, while the manual method took approximately five minutes.41 In the words of Captain Roger C. Lautadi and Captain Theodore B. Patterson, both field artiHerymen, the time required to process the data manually "seemed like an eternity. ,,42 The two captains concluded in an article in Infantry in June 1964, "FADAC is regarded as the most significant advancement in artiHery since the beginning of World War II. First voHey hits now can be placed on t.he enemy anywhere within range, giving the artillery a real capability of surprise fire.,,43 Years later, a FADAC veteran and a former instructor in the Department of Gunnery, U.S. Army Field ArtiHery School, Fort Sill, Major A.D. Pickard Ill, wrote in November 1980, "From a gunnery point of view ... FADAC represented a quantum leap in determining the ballistic solution of the gunnery problem .... ,,44 Although many field artillerymen resisted the adoption of FADAC, feared the automation of fire control computation, and preferred manual procedures, the computer lived up to its potential as its performance in Vietnam revealed where it became the primary means 45 of computing firing data. In pre-FADAC days field artillerymen had to conduct registration to ensure accurate fire. The delivery of surprise fire without registration was possible, but it was always subject to inaccuracies caused by weather, variations in the muzzle velocity of the weapons, errors introduced by manual plotting, and other variable factors. Firing on targets of opportunity caHed for an adjustment with the "tell-tale" bracketing preceding fire for effect. Using FADAC, field artillerymen in Vietnam committed fewer computation errors, frequently delivered surprise fire (first-round hits) without registration, attacked targets of opportunity without an adjustment, decreased response time, fired longer missions, and hit more targets with less ammunition. For field artillerymen, these capabilities were critical because the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, especially the latter, employed hit- and-run tactics to offset American fire power superiority. Such tactics reinforced the necessity of responsive and accurate fire support. Otherwise, engaging an elusive target would be virtually impossible.46

41Maj James I. Warner, "Automatic Data Processing," FieldArtilleryman, Mar 1971, p. 55; Antoine, "FADAC Zeroes In," p. 58; Maj Gen Charles P. Brown, "TACFIRE," Artillery Trends, May 1968, p. 20; Field Manual 6-31, Operation of Gun Direction Computer, M 18, Apr 1964, p. 3. 42Cpt Roger C. Laud~~i ~nd Cpt Theodore B. Patterson, "Artillery Support: Push Button Style," Infantry, May-Jun 1964, p. 71. 43/bid., p. 73. 44Memorandum for Record, subj: TACFIRE Doctrine, 14Nov 1980, TACFIRE File, HRDC. ~ 45 Maj Robert E. Gilbert, "FADAC," Artillery Trends, May 1968, p. 45; Memorandum for Record, subj: TACFIRE Doctrine, 14 Nov 1980, TACFIRE File. 46Laudati and Patterson, "Artillery Support: Push Button Style," p. 71; Antoine, "FADAC Zeroes In," pp. 57-58; Lt Col Matthew J. Ringer and Maj Martell D. Fritz, "FADAC Computations versus Manual Computations," The Field Artilleryman, Apr 1969, p. 40; Lt Gen Frank T. Milden, "From Mekong to DMZ: A Fighting Year for the U.S. Army's 16 .

FADAC had other strengths. Writing in The FieldArtilleryman, a publication of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, in April 1969 in light of the Vietnam experience, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Ringer and Major Martell D. Fritz, both of the Field Artillery School, reaffirmed the computer's significance. Lieutenant Colonel Ringer and Major Fritz wrote, "The introduction and use ofFADAC in Southeast Asia has provided a greatly increased capability to US Field Artillery. The fatigue factor and resulting errors of FDC [fire direction center] personnel have been reduced with a corresponding rise in efficiency.,,47 As Lieutenant Colonel Ringer and Major Fritz carefully pointed out in their article, eliminating human error, improving the accuracy of fire direction center computations, and calculating the gunnery problem rapidly fulfilled the computer's reason for being.48 Even so, notable deficiencies detracted from the system's breakthrough capabilities. As Lieutenant Colonel Ringer and Major Fritz candidly admitted in an article in Field Artilleryman in April 1969, FADAC did not "eliminate the need for a ... manual backup 49 capability and a system of checks" for use when the computer was down. Captain Lautadi and Captain Patterson also pointed out, "The System is only as accurate as the input data."so Human frailties and technical problems had the potential of negating the computer's strengths and forcing field artillery personnel to resort to manual methods as backup.51 As observers from the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School reported, technical difficulties and inadequate training frequently compromised FADAC's performance and reinforced the requirement for manual backup methods. Brigadier General John J. Kenney, the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School (May 1967-J ul Y 1968), indicated that many field artillery units failed to exploit the computer system. This often stemmed from generator and problems which eroded confidence in the system's ability to calculate fire direction data accurately.52 In a memorandum of March 1968, General Kenney revealed, "Approximately 25% of all FADAC's [in Vietnam] are down for maintenance- of either FADAC or of generator.,,53 Keeping the generator operational and providing the correct electrical output were the keys to successful FADAC operations.54 Insufficient training also contributed to poor performance. In March 1968 Brigadier General Kenney pointed out the failure of Field Artillery Officer Basic Course to furnish sufficient FADAC instruction to second lieutenants. Captains graduating fronl the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School in 1966 received only twelve hours of introductory

Best," Army, Nov 1968, p. 88. 47Ringer and Fritz, "FADAC Computations Versus Manual Computations," p. 40. 4~ Ibid. 49lbid. 50Laudati and Patterson, "Artillery Support: Push Button Style," p. 72. 51Ringer and Fritz, "FADAC Computations Versus Manual Computations," p. 40; Laudati and Patterson, "Artillery Support: Push Button Style," p. 72. 52"Incoming," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1978, p. 4. 53Disposition Form with Encls, subj: Observations of Artillery Operations in Vietnam, 14 May 1968, FADAC File, HRDC. s4Memorandum, subj: FADAC, 26 Feb 1999, HRDC. 17 instruction on FADAC. Those graduating the following year had only seven hours of instruction, while lieutenants coming from the school in 1966 and 1967 had only one hour of instruction on FADAC. Given these circumstances, company grade officers simply lacked the background and training to employ the M 18 FADAC effectively. Insufficient training combined with equipment problems to restrict FADAC's usefulness.55 Although FADAC continued to be the primary means of computing technical fire direction, problems with it and its generators continued after the .56 Implying that the lack of spare parts was the problem, Michael M. Manus, a former FADAC operator, wrote in 1980 about his experience with the computer. Manus critically explained, "I was chief computer for a 155-mm SP [self-propelled] howitzer unit (I-10th FA, 3d Inf Div) in Gernlany for 29 months during which time my battalion never had two FADACs working at one time (usually there were none). In fact in 1976 the 3d Infantry Division had 13 FADACs down for one reason or another.,,57 Early in 1979, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, formerly called the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, wrote that supp0l1ing FADAC after 1980 would be questionable because of the introduction of the Tactical Fire Direction System (T ACFIRE) and Battery Computer System (BCS) in the near future.58 Later, other officers offered their impressions about FADAC's dependability. On 14 December 1981 Colonel10hn A. Seitz, the Director of the Gunnery Department in the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, wrote Brigadier General Donald E. Eckelbarger, the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School (March 1981-April 1983), "The subject of FADAC reliability and operational readiness has been a paramount concern during recent years [dating back eight years to the Vietnam War]. Input from the field suggests that FADAC is not reliable and that spare parts are not available to support the maintenance effort. ,,59 From Colonel Seitz's perspective, however, the problems arose from inadequate command emphasis in field artillery units and not insufficient spare parts. As Brigadier General Eckelbarger also pointed out, spare parts existed. Thinking that TACFIRE and BCS would be fielded shortly, Brigadier General Eckelbarger continued, field artillery comnlanders failed to keep their FADAC's operational through personal neglect and saw no need to maintain them.60

55Maj Martell Fritz, "Common Mistakes with FADAC," Field Artilleryman, Nov 1969, pp. 63-66; Disposition Form, subj: Observations of Artillery Operations in Vietnanl, 14 May 1968, FADAC File; Program of Instruction for OBC, Apr 1966, p. 22, MSTL; Program of Instruction for OAC, June 67, p. 27, MSTL; Program of Instruction for OAC, Feb 1966, p. 24, MSTL. 56Disposition Form with Encl, subj: Report of Internal Review and Maintenance Evaluation of VII Corps Artillery Battalions, 18 Aug 1981, FADAC File,HRDC; "FADAC Maintenance," Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1980, p. 35; Fact Sheet, subj: FADAC Revision 6 Program Tapes, 13 Mar 1981, FADAC File, HRDC. ~ 57Michael M. Manus, "Manual versus Automatic," Field Artillery Journal, May-J un 1980, p. 2. 5x"Transition to BCS," Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1979, p. 38. 59Disposition Form with Encl, subj: FADAC Operational Readiness, 14 Dee 1981, FADAC File, HRDC. 601hid., FADAC File, HRDC; Disposition Form, subj: Trip Report, 13 Oct 1981, 18 .

Colonel James W. Wurman, Commander of the 212th Field Artillery Group at Fort Sill and later Director of the Gunnery Department in the Field Artillery School in 1978-1980, also commented on the issue. In a letter to the editor in the Field Artillery Journal in early 1980, he wrote, "Unfortunately, during the past several years, there has been a growing tendency to gradually let FADAC suffocate from lack of support.,,61 Colonel Wurman added, "Statements such as 'TACFIRE is coming soon and FADAC will no longer be needed' or' We don't need FADAC because it is dying' have placed the FA [field artillery] in a precarious position in the FDC [fire direction center].,,62 From the colonel's viewpoint, "Everything possible must be done to keep FADAC alive and well.,,63 Colonel Wurman observed that 64 there was an availability of spare parts with the exception of memory discs. A former battery commander substantiated Colonel Wurman's contention. The battery commander recalled, "If you wanted FADAC in your FOC [fire direction center], you found a way to maintain FADAC."65 FADAC maintainability, therefore, depended upon 66 command emphasis and attitude and not the availability of spare parts. Personnel turbulence also played a key role in the crisis with FADAC readiness. For example, some units in Korea during the 1970s did not have maintenance personnel to 67 support FADAC, while other units had inadequately trained maintenance personne1. Addressing these critical problems, Colonel Wurman explicitly noted in 1980 when he was Director of the Gunnery Department, "A major problem with FADAC maintenance is the paucity of qualified FADAC repairmen in the system. This is true at the unit level, primarily because of malassignment and at the DS/GS [direct support/general support] level because not enough personnel are being trained to meet the demand.,,6~ As far as the U.S. Army Field Artillery School was concerned, insufficient numbers of qualified maintenance personnel and assignment practices caused the problems with FADAC. The equipment was not the problem. In the fall of 1980, the school warned, "... it is absolutely necessary that FADAC repairmen (MOS 31 VI OF7) be assigned only to FA [field artillery] units to insure effective organizational maintenance support. There are still too many eases where FADAC repairmen are being assigned to non-FA units or where non-trained personnel have the F7

FADAC File, HRDC; Memorandum subj: FADAC Operational Readiness, 7 Dec 1981, FADAC File, HRDC 61Col James W. Wurman, "Fire Direction Center and FADAC," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1980, p. 2. 62/bid., p. 2. 63Wurman, "Fire Directi~n Center and FADAC," p. 2. 64Disposition Form with End, subj: FADAC Operational Readiness, 14 Dec 1981, FADAC File, HRDC; Manus, "Manual versus Automatic," p. 2; Wurman, "Fire Direction Center and FADAC," p. 2. 65Memorandum, subj: FADAC, 26 Feb 1999, HRDC. 66/bid. 67Disposition Form with End, subj: FADAC Operational Readiness, 14 Dec 1981, FADAC File, HRDC; Disposition Form, subj: Trip Report, 13 Oct 1981; Memorandum, subj: FADAC Operational Readiness, 7 Dee 1981, FADAC File, HRDC. 6HWurman, "Fire Direction Center and FADAC," p. 2. 19

Additional Skill Identifier (ASI).,,69 The school then cautioned users in the field, "Adjutant General personnel cannot correct this situation by themselves -- they need help in screening records to insure that only school trained FADAC repairmen. have the ASI F7 and are assigned to only FA positions. This is particularly important because only a small number of ASI F7 personnel are trained each year (90 scheduled for Fiscal Year 1980).,,70 As the arguments suggested, the lack of spare parts and the insufficient numbers of properly trained maintenance personnel who were frequently inappropriately assigned adversely influenced FADAC readiness and field artillerymen's perception of the computer.71 Although FADAC produced accurate gunnery data, it simultaneously suffered from an image problerTI created by the nagging belief about the lack of spare parts, the insufficient numbers of adequately trained maintenance personnel, and the anticipated introduction ofT ACFIRE in the near future. All of these problems combined and overshadowed the system's usefulness and hampered readiness.72 The Army even envisioned that FADAC would be an part of a family of electronic digital computers with common hardware and software and with the ability to interact and link the various branches of the Army into a communications network. In an aggressive move to expand the employment of electronic digital computers and automated data processing equipment beyond technical fire direction, the Army and CONARC examined a broad spectrum of activities for possible automation. They wanted to determine if logistical, administrative, intelligence, command and control, additional fire support applications, and miscellaneous functions, among others, could be enhanced through automation. Conducted by the Signal Corps, CONARC, and other Army agencies in 1955- 1957, studies showed the necessity of introducing automated data processing systems (ADPS) where it could be done rationally because electronic digital computers and other types of automated data processing equipment could make a significant improvement in the effectiveness of combat operations by furnishing timely information to commanders and their staffs. In the meantime, studies completed by the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School in 1956 and 1957 at the direction of CON ARC advocated employing electronic digital computers, such as FADAC, to furnish tactical fire direction or the selection and prioritization of targets to complement technical fire direction. Computers could conduct fire planning, survey, ammunition status, and other tactical field artillery functions more rapidly and effectively than manual methods could.73

69"FADAC Maintenance," p. 35. 7°/bid. 71"Transition to BCS," p. 38; "FADAC Maintenance," p. 35; Manus, "Manual versus Automatic," p. 2; Wurman, "Fire Direction Center and FADAC," p. 2. 72See previous note. 73Report, subj: Reference Guide to Fieldata Equipment Family, 10 Mar 1958, p. 1, UJ 170.7 U5, MSTL; Report, subj: Summary of ADPS Conference at DA, 27 Nov 1957, Enclosure 3, UL591 C6, 1959, MSTL; Cpt Donald C. Fox, "Automatic Data Processing Systems," Trends ill Artillery, Feb 1958, pp. 14-15; Report, Lt Col D.R. Tam, Weapons and Equipment Division, Combat Development Department, U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, subj: Artillery Requirements for Automatic Data Processing, Feb 1959, in Proceedings of Conference on Computers for Field Artillery, pp. 95-106, UF7.5 A53 1959, 20

Based upon these initial studies with their emerging recommendations about tactical command and control being improved with ADPS, the Army initiated an ADPS program in 1956-1958 to coordinate automation efforts, to upgrade the efficiency of command and control by speeding up the exchange of data, improving accuracy, and reducing human error, and to use the FIELDATA computer code. In 1956 the Army charged the Chief of the Signal Corps, Lieutenant General James D. O'Connell, with the task of providing technical expertise ~nd overseeing the ADPS program. With prototype computer equipment nearing completion and after digesting a study completed by the Army Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, supporting the ADPS program, the Army took the next logical step in November 1958. That month, the Army directed CONARC to determine which functions should be automated and to monitor equipment development to ensure compatibility with doctrine and organization. Together, Chief Signal Officer and CON ARC not only sat on an Army ADPS Program committee to furnish direction for all automation activities but also 74 had the responsibility of having a prototype system ready for testing by 1959. The Signal Corps's and CONARC's ADPS Program efforts produced the farsighted FIELDAT A family of computers concept for military applications. According to the plans of 1958-1959, the computers would be developed by the U.S. Army Electronics Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and would range in size from equipment small enough to accompany division-level field artillery and infantry units into combat operations to large- scale mobile computers with the capability of interchanging data rapidly and efficiently through the use of a common FIELDAT A computer language for use at army- and theater- level commands. The FIELDAT A language code and family of computers anticipated the production of compatible computers and standardized computer language and led to the acquisition of the general purpose Mobile Digital Computer AN/MYK-l, called MOBIDIC, in 1961 that could fit into a thirty-foot trailer van and that could process information on intelligence, logistics, firepower, and troop strength. Following the successful completion of acceptance tests, the Army shipped one MOBIDIC computer to the Seventh Army Stock Control Center in Europe in 1961 and another one to the Ordnance Supply Control Agency at Maison Forte, France, late in 1962. In the meantime, the Army acquiredthe BAS ICPAC and INFORMER computers in 1961 as part of the FIELDA T A program and designated FADAC as an interim small FIELDAT A computer with goal of modifying it to be compatible with other FIELDA TA computers. The Frankford Arsenal, however, opposed this action because

MSTL; Report, Lt Col L.R. van Velde, subj: Artillery Requirements for Gun Data and Missile Control Computers, pp. 69-79, UF7.5 A53, 1959, MSTL; Report, subj; Fire Support Subsystem White Plan, Oct 1960, p. 8, UL502.27 U6, MSTL; "ADPS," pp. 3-7. 74"FIELDAT A Aids for the Command Post of the Future," p .. 14; Report, subj: Summary of DA/CONARC ADPS Committee Meeting at HQ DA on 22 Jan 1959, 3 Mar 1959, Enclosure 4, Enclosure 9, UL591 C6 1959, MSTL; Report, subj: Reference Guide to Fieldata Equipment Family, 10 Mar 1958, pp. 1-2, UF170.7 U5, MSTL; Report, subj: Fire Support Subsystem White Plan, Oct 1960, p. 8, UL502.27 U6, MSTL; Report, subj: Conference on Computers for Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, pp. 54-55, 138-47, 152-72, 191- 217, UL591 C6 1959, MSTL; Report, subj: Tactical Fire Control- T ACFIRE Functional Description, Mar 87, p. 1, MSTL; Karl Kempf, Electronic Computers within the Ordnance Corps, extract, unpaginated, HRDC. 21

modifications would unduly delay producing FADAC prototype models and set back the fielding of a much-needed computer for calculating complicated technical fire direction data. Notwithstanding this, the contractor at the direction of the Anny designed FADAC to employ FIELDAT A computer language upon fielding early in the 1960s.75 Because of the need for a computer for technical and tactical fire direction and the unavailability ofFADAC for FIELDATA purposes at the time, CONARC selected the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School to participate in the development of the first FIELDAT A subsystem hardware and software. Working with the U.S. Anny Electronics Proving Ground at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the school launched action to create the FIELDAT A Fire Support Subsystem that would automate fourteen field artillery functions at anny, corps, division, and 76 battalion levels. Explaining the importance of the subsystem even before it had been developed and was more than just a concept, Lieutenant Colonel Louis R. van de Velde of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School wrote in Army in May 1960, "The Fire Plan Formulator system [FIELDAT A Fire Support Subsystem], nlodified and refined as it will be at the School, will turnout a fire plan in less than a quarter of an hour -- perhaps in as little as five minutes."77 Subsequent events of 1960 and 1961 bore out Lieutenant Colonel van de Velde's unbridled enthusiasm. To prove the feasibility of the fire support subsysteIn concept designed for implementation on a FIELDAT A computer and to provide an early demonstration of the capabilities of automated data processing to solve complex field artillery fire planning problems, ajoint V.S. Army Artillery and Missile School and Signal Corps team conducted the Fire Support Subsystem WHITE PLAN I demonstration on 13 October 1960 at the V.S. Army Electronic Proving Ground, Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Because FIELDAT A computers were still being developed and were unavailable and because

75Report, subj: Summary ofDNCONARC ADPS Committee Meeting at HQ DA on 22 Jan 1959,3 Mar 1959, Enclosure 4, Enclosure 8, Enclosure 9, Enclosure 10, MSTL; Fox, "Automatic Data Processing Systems," pp. 14-15; "Fieldata Aids for the Command Post of the Future," pp. 14-17; van de Velde, "Computers for Artillery," p. 58; Kempf, Electronic Computers lvithin the Ordnance Corps, p. 92; "ADPS,", pp. 4-~; "How FIELDAT A Computers Achieve Tactical Capabilities," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, p. 42; Report, subj: Reference Guide for FIELDAT A Equipment Family, 10 rvtar 1958, pp. 1-3, MSTL; "Computer Code by the Numbers," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, p. 91; "Future Shooting: Automated Artillery," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, pp. 56-57; Report, subj: Fire Support" Subsystem White Plan, Oct 1960, p. 11, VL502.27 V6, MSTL; Report, subj: Summary of ADPS Conference at DA, 27 Nov 1957, Enclosure 11, VL591 C61957, MSTL; Report, subj: Conference on Computers for Artillery, 24-26 Feb 1959, pp. 55-56, MSTL; Raines, Getting the Message Through, pp. 336-37; Kempf, Electronic Computers within the Ordnance Corps," extract, unpaginated, HRDC. n6CoI Jack F. Diggs, "The \Vhite Plan," Artillery Trends, Mar 1961, p. 10; Report, subj: ADPS Field Artillery Subsystem I Document, 1 May 1960, pp. 1-3, Annex C, VJ 170.7 U51, MSTL; "ADPS," Artillery Trends, Sep 1960, pp. 5-6; Report, subj; Effectiveness of Computations for HE Fire Planning by Automatic Digital Computer, Oct 1959, FADAC File, HRDC. 77van de Velde, "Computers for Artillery," p. 58. 22

FADAC had not yet been modified to be compatible with FIELDATA computers and software, the team selected the International Business (IBM) 7090 computer to demonstrate the automation of field artillery functions. After being programmed the IBM 7090 imitated FIELDAT A computers. During the demonstration, the IBM 7090 considered a list of 127 targets and prepared a complete non-nuclear fire plan in about 6 minutes that weighed the type of target, the desired effect, the ammunition, and the number and type of fire units, among other factors. Also, the IBM 7090 produced a nuclear fire plan in about ten minutes. As Colonel John F. Diggs, the Chair of the u.s. Army Artillery and Missile School ADPS committee and a participant in the experiment, reported, the WHITE PLAN I demonstration conclusively showed that the fire support subsystem concept and design were sound, that the use of computers promised first-round hits if the target location wa'i accurate, that nuclear and non-nuclear fire plans could be produced within a drastically reduced time compared to manual procedures, and that these gains as well as others manifested some of the real potential of automated data processing for fire support. The subsequent WHITE PLAN II demonstration of March 1961 reinforced the feasibility of automating field artillery functions.78 Unfortunately, budget constraints, the state of technology, and the increasing involvement in the Vietnam War drained the Army's budget, causing the termination of FIELDAT A and the fire support subsystem early in the 1960s before any FIELDAT A computers with the exception of MOBIDIC, BASICPAC, and INFORMER could be produced. Linking compatible digital computers into networks did not come until the 1980s when technological advances and common computer languages finally made concepts like FIELDAT A possible. Without any digital computers to tie into as part of a system, FADAC remained a stand-alone computer even though it could transmit and receive FIELDAT A codes. This left the Field Artillery with the only automated technical fire direction 79 capabilities in the Army and without automated tactical fire direction. Even though the MIS analog computer and FADAC failed to supplant manual methods, they played a critical role in the computerization of technical fire direction. They, especially with FADAC, took the first giant step in the digitization of the battlefield and highlighted the requirement for even more effective computers for technical and tactical gunnery.

78Diggs, "The White Plan," pp. 10-11; Report, subj: Fire Support Subsystem White Plan, Oct 1960, pp. 1-2, 6, 8, UL502.27 U6, MSTL; Kempf, "Electronic Computers within the Ordnance Corps," unpaginated, HRDC. 79Raines, Getting the Message Through, pp. 336-37; "Fieldata Aids," pp. 14-15; "Computer Code by the Numbers," pp. 89-91; Kempf, "Electronic Computers within the Ordnance Corps," unpaginated, HRDC; Warner, "Automatic Data Processing," p. 55. 23

CHAPTER TWO THE THIRD GENERATION

To overcome the numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact ground forces and to prioritize their vast array of targets, including conventional and nuclear weapons, the Army and the Field Artillery recognized the requirement to move beyond technical fire direction provided by the Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer (FADAC). Beginning in the mid-1960s, they initiated research and development to automate tactical and technic~l fire direction with the Tactical Fire Direction System (T ACFIRE). After years of work, delays, and debates over the merit of T ACFIRE, the Army and the Field Artillery introduced the system in the 1980s. BEYOND TECIINICAL FIRE DIRECTION During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the advent of the tactical nuclear battlefield opened new horizons for computers for fire support. To offset the lethality of tactical nuclear weapons that were being introduced or on the drawing boards and to readdress the numerical superiority of the ground forces of the Warsaw Pact that were composed of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites over those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (NATO), the Army envisioned the need for highly mobile, well-armed units. Such units would require the ability to concentrate rapidly for a conventional or nuclear attack or to disperse quickly for protection from a Warsaw Pact nuclear attack. Under such operational circumstances fire support would need the capability of massing and shifting nuclear and non-nuclear fires rapidly and effectively around a "target-rich" battlefield. This type of fire support placed a premium on the fast, accurate calculation of firing data and the ability of storing tactical information. With this in mind, studies conducted by the Army in the 1950s' and 1960s endorsed computerizing technical fire direction as a means to improve the accuracy of field artillery fires and to eliminate human error and advocated automating tactical fire direction to select fire missions, allocate ammunition, designate targets, and perform other critical fire support tasks more effectively. Automated tactical fire direction would provide more responsive fires on a conventional or tactical nuclear battlefield by giving the Field Artillery the capacity of sorting through the voluminous numbers of targets that would be presented by Warsaw Pact ground forces during an offensive and prioritizing them efficiently. I

IDepartment of the Army, Battery Computer System, May 83, p. iii, UF 23.1 G8D3, MSTL; U.S. Army Field Artillery Board, Comparison Test of Manual/FADAC Field Artillery Fire Direction with T ACFI~E, May 1973, p. 1-5, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; Briefing, subj: T ACFIRE Source Selection, 1967, UL591.1 E5U43, MSTL; Memorandum for Record, subj: Fire Direction Strategy for the 1980s, 24 Feb 81, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Maj James I. Warner, "Automatic Data Processing," Field Artilleryman, Mar 1971, pp. 55-56; "TACFIRE," SiKllal, Nov 1973, p. 32; Maj Raymond Spigarelli and Maj Martell Fritz, "Here Comes TACFIRE," Field Artilleryman, Nov 1969, p. 67; Edward D. Ray, "TACFIRE: A Quantum Leap in FA Data Processing," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1979, p. 55; Willialn T. Dougherty, "Tactical Fire Control- TACFIRE Functional Description," U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Mar 1987, pp. 1, 3, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Development Test II ofT ACFIRE of ADSAF, 10 Dec 1974, pp. 11- 24

Based upon the conclusions of these studies and especially those conducted in 1961- 1965 to determine where command and control could be improved through automation, the Army moved forward to introduce new automated systems for fire direction. In March 1966 it approved developing T ACFIRE to compute technical and tactical fire direction. After additional studies which reaffirmed the imperative of automating technical and tactical fire direction, the Army subsequently awarded a contract on 8 December 1967 to Litton Industries' Data Systems Division of Van Nuys, California, to develop T ACFIRE with testing scheduled to begin early in 1972. As Edward D. Ray, a software field engineer for Litton Data Systems, recalled in 1979, T ACFIRE computers at various levels of command would exchange digital message traffic to complement, control, and back up each other. The T ACFIRE would be a multi-computer array of fire control power, ranging from corps artillery to the battery, and would provide timely, accurate, and continuous fire support to the maneuver arms. Equally important, T ACFIRE would have the ability to service the vast array of targets, including indirect fire systems, presented by the Warsaw Pact. In comparison, FADAC operated singly at the battery level without digital communications capabilities with other computers, furnished only technical fire direction, and was slow in 2 computing data. All of this limited responsiveness. In 1968 the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School further elaborated upon the rationale for T ACFIRE. In an annual report the school wrote, "TACFIRE makes use of the most advanced computers and display techniques to modernize the role of the artilleryman and to provide highly responsive fire direction for all cannon artillery.,,3 TACFIRE would mass fires, recommend targets, monitor ammunition inventories and fire unit status, compute survey data, distribute meteorological information, provide preliminary target analysis, screen artillery target intelligence information, furnish nuclear, chemical, and biological target analysis, and supply nuclear fire planning and fallout prediction. Basically, the systern would consist of two computers -- one in the battalion fire direction center to control the firing batteries and one in the division artillery fire direction center. The battalion computer would provide input to the division computer. The forward observer would be equipped with a fixed format entry device, and the battery would have a battery display unit. Each would be linked to the battalion computer.4

14, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Report, U.S. Army Computer Systems Command, Oct 1971, UL591.1 E5U51, MSTL; "Automated Fire Direction Instruction in USAFAS," Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1985, pp. 18-19; Ltr with atchs, Chief of Operations, U.S. Army Europe~ Maj Gen George A. Joulwan, to Cmdt, USAFAS, Maj Gen Eugene S. Korpal, ca. 1987, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; USAFAS, Tactical and Technical Fire Control, Feb 77, p. 2, UF23.5 R5U5 FD881A, MSTL; Maurice Matloff, ed.,American Military History (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1985), pp. 575,583,584,586; Maj John E. Martin, "T ACFIRE: Where Do We Go From Here," Field Artillery Jounlal, Jan-Feb 1979, p. 13. 2Ray, "TACFIRE: A Quantum Leap in' FA Date Processing," p. 55; Maj James I. Warner, "The Next Step in Automatic Data Processing," Field Artilleryman, Mar 1971, pp. 55-59. 31968 Annual Historical Summary, U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, pp. 2-3. 4/bid., p. 3. 25

As the Commandant of the U.S. Army Artillery and ~1issile School, Major General Charles P. Brown (1967-1970), explained in 1968, TACFIRE would be an integral part of the Automatic Data Systems within the Army in the Field (ADSAF) program.' Approved for development in May 1965 by Chief of Staff of the Army, General Harold K. Johnson, ADSAF which was the implementation plan for the Command Control Information System 1970 (CCIS-1970) of 1962 consisted of the Tactical Operations System for tactical operations and intelligence, the Combat Service Support System for personnel, administrative, and logistical functions, and the Artillery Fire Control System. The ArtilJery Fire Control System of CCIS 1970 which would be T ACFIRE would increase accuracy, would reduce reaction time, and would determine fire capabilities and the allocation of fires. As planned in 1965-1966, the T ACFIRE concept prescribed equipping the fire support element or other selected users at the division, brigade, and battalion with a Variable Format Message Entry Device (VFMED) to compose or edit messages for two-way communications and outlined providing the forward observer with the Fixed Format Message Entry Device (FFMED) which was a small hand-held device for one-way digital or voice communications. Both remote terminals would allow communicating with the TACFIRE computer that would be contained in a shelter mounted on a five-ton truck at the corps, division, or battalion fire. direction center. Upon receiving the information from the remote terminals, the TACFIRE computer would calculate technical and tactical fire direction and would route it digitally to the Battery Display Unit (BDU) at the battery to furnish a visual display and a permanent printout of the information required by the battery to perform its mission. This concept centralized computing at the major field artillery command posts: battalion, brigade, division, and corps. Ultimately, T ACFIRE as well as ADSAF aimed to increase the commander's ability to employ the available resources more effectively by providing accurate and timely information, to supply an automated solution to problems that were subject to mathematical analysis, and to deliver near real-time dissemination of data. T ACFIRE would ultimately make fire support more responsive to the demands of the maneuver arms on the modern battlefield and fit within the general trend emerging in the Army to automate a growing number of functions in order to improve battlefield efficiency.5 A source selection briefing for T ACFIRE held at Fort Sill in 1967 reinforced the

5Maj Gen Charles P. Brown, "TACFIRE," Artillery Trends, May 1968, pp. 19-21; Briefing, subj: TACFIRE Source Selection, 1967, UL59 1.1 E5U43, MSTL; Col Leland A. Wilson and Col Kenneth S. Heitzke, "The Computer on Future Battlefields," Army, Jun 1974, pp. 15-17; Eric C. Ludvigsen, "Harnessing the Computer," Army, Jun 1974, p. 11; Warner, "The Next Step: Automatic Data Processing," pp. 55-59; George E. Miller, "TACFIRE: An Innovation in Artillery," Armor, Jul-Aug 1972, pp. 9-13; "TACFIRE," pp. 32-34; Cpt William W. Beverley, "TACFIRE," Field Artilleryman, Aug 1971, pp. 25-34; Martin, "TACFIRE: Where Do We Go From Here?" pp. 8-13; Report, U.S. AnnyComputer Systerhs Command, Oct 1971, UL591.1 E5U51, MSTL; Cpt Gerard G. James, "TACFIRE," Field Artillery Journal, JuJ-Aug 1975, pp. 28-33; USAFAS, Concept of Operations and Employment for the Field Artillery Equipped with T ACFIRE, undated, pp. 2-2- 2-3, ULS03 C6, MSTL; Training Circular, T ACFIRE, undated, pp. 1-2- 1-3, UL 591.1 L6, MSTL Archives; Edward J. Stiles, "AFATDS: It's Not A New TACFIRE," Field Artillery Magazine, Fcb 1992, pp. 39-41; "T ACFIRE," Artillery Trends, Jul 1966, pp. 70-71. 26 . critical need for automating more field artillery tasks. The briefing officer said: There is an urgent requirement to increase the effectiveness of field artillery fire power. Present and projected fire power capabilities of potential enemies, innovations in present and expected tactical field operations, and the changing character of field artillery operations, have made increased field artillery effectiveness necessary.6 The officer continued, "At the latest artillery conference in Vietnam it was clearly determined that better accuracy with more responsive fites is needed .... TACFIRE will ... have this improved accuracy ... [and] can help in improving the effectiveness of field artillery fire power.,,7 For the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, a clear rationale for acquiring TACFIRE unequivocally existed late in the 1960s. A battlefield that was growing more sophisticated and lethal with the requirement for more accurate, responsive fires and the aging FADAC combined to create a practical need for a computer system for technical and tactical fire direction to ensure effective close support and counterbattery work. Unlike FADAC with only technical fire direction capabilities, T ACFIRE would furnish technical fire direction, would automate other critical field artillery functions to give tactical fire direction, and would eliminate the requirement for manual gunnery, according to an article written in Field Artilleryman in November 1969 by Major Raymond Spigarelli and Major Martell Fritz who were intimately involved in development of the system and strong advocates of computerized fire support. TACFIRE would unleash unsurpassed fire support capabilities and eliminate hUlnan error and fatigue as factors in fire support effectiveness. Equally as important, T ACFIRE would be part of the Army Tactical Command and Control Master Plan of August 1971 that superceded ADSAF and included the Army Tactical Data. System, the Tactical Operational System, the Air Defense Command and Control System, and the Air Traffic Management Automated Center to automate Army command and control at the division. S With hardware and software problems, especially the latter, slowing down development late in the 1960s and early in the 1970s, critics soon challenged Major 9 Spigarelli's, Major Fritz's, and other advocates' basic assumptions about T ACFIRE. In the summer of 1974, the Army Scientific Advisory Panel Summer Study sharply attacked T ACFIRE's centralized computer concept that placed a specialized computer in the corps, division, and battalion fire direction centers and peripheral equipnlent in the battery. From the perspective of the panel, mini-computers under development would be more economical and effective than a large computer at each level of command, would provide backup capabilities, and could be employed for various tasks. Given this line of thinking, the panel

6Briefing, subj: TACFIRE Source Selection, 1967, UL591.1 E5U43, MSTL. 7lbid. STalking Paper, subj: Battery Computer System Procurement Status, Jul 1976, TACFIRE File No.2, UL502-27 U7, MSTL; Spigarelli and Fritz, "Here Comes TACFIRE," pp. 67-68; Department of the Army (DA), Historical Summaryfor Fiscal Year 1972, pp. 53- 54. 9Development Test II of T ACFIRE of ADSAF, 10 Dec 1974, pp. 12-14, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; 1973 Annual Historical Summary, USAFAS, unpaginated. 27 then advised redesigning T ACFIRE around mInI-COmputers, employing off-the-shelf technology to reduce developmental costs and time rather than designing totally new software and hardware, and developing a backup computer system of some kind because computers were vulnerable to electronic warfare. If one computer became disabled, another could be used. 10 Subsequently, the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, conducted a study on TACFIRE and reached similar conclusions in the fall of 1974. Aberdeen recommended solving the problem of technical fire control first by introducing a computer system that was an improvement over FADAC. At the same time Aberdeen questioned the practicality of the forward observer's Fixed Format Message Entry Device and the need to autOlnate tactical fire direction. Also, the panel argued that T ACFIRE was too expensive, too large, and too sophisticated for what it would contribute to field artillery fire direction' and strongly opposed further development. 11 - After conducting his own inquiry into T ACFIRE in mid-1974, George W. Tyler of the U.S. Army Materiel System Analysis Agency at Aberdeen Proving Ground, in the meantime, basically concurred with the panel's and study's findings. By the time that the system would be fielded, he argued, it would be based upon twenty-five year old technology .. Tyler added, "It would be unwise to continue with current proposals [for T ACFIRE] and commit the US Army to 10-15 years of service with yesterday's systems.,,12 The Army should consider redesigning T ACFIRE around mini-computers which were the wave of the future even though they were just beginning to be introduced and were untested.13 Early during development, as such, opponents vigorously challenged the wisdom of acquiring T ACFIRE as it was designed but did not question introducing a new computer for automating technical and tactical fire direction even though some questioned the utility of automated tactical fire direction. Finding the centralized computing concept to be obsolete, they urged using mini-computers, later known as personal computers. Such computers were more versatile and less expensive than the specialized TACFIRE computer hardware being developed for fire direction.14 Such criticism evoked an unequivocal response from the Army even though it recognized T ACFIRE's shortcomings. IS As the Project Manager for Army Tactical Data Systems, Major General A.B. Crawford, Jr., wrote the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General David E. Ott (1973-1976), in a letter in the fall of 1974, the opposition to T ACFIRE should keep "us from getting overly complacent as we wind up DT/OT [developmental testing/operational testing] II successfully" and "would ensure that the user would be reasonably objective in his assessment of the candidate system meeting all

IODisposition Form, subj: Army Scientific Advisory Panel Summery Study, 29 Jul 1974, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Ltr with Encl, Maj Gen David E. Ott to Maj Gen Albert B. Crawford, Jr., Project Manager, Army Tactical Data Systems, undated, TACFIRE File, HROC. II/bid. 12lbid. IJ/bid. 14/bid. 151975 Annual Historical Supplement, USAFAS, p. 19. 28 .

the essential requirements at least cost. ,,16 As such, Major General Crawford who oversaw T ACFIRE development essentially insisted on maintaining the existing course of action by fielding T ACFIRE as planned, believed that the criticism would assure more rigorous testing and development and prevent complacency, and declined to consider any other course of action because it would mean pushing computerized tactical fire direction back a few years and involved continuing to employ FADAC which was unacceptable to the Army and the Field Artillery because the computer was growing obsolete. 17 In light of the favorable TACFIRE test results of early 1975, Major General Ott subsequently articulated his support for T ACFIRE and clearly reaffirmed the critical demand for the system.18 In the July-August 1975 issue of Field Artillery Journal, the general noted, "This command and control system will be our primary means for tactical fire control, target analysis, fire planning and target intelligence in the future. It will tie together the target acquisition, meteorological data, firing unit resources, fire planning and fire support coordination for timely effect on targets." 19 Displaying faith in the potential of the new and untested computer system, Major General Ott went on, "T ACFIRE ... is not a dream. It is in production for final testing. ,,20 Notwithstanding the two generals' determined advocacy, tests and evaluations soon bore out some of the fears of the critics. Although they indicated that T ACFIRE provided a significant improvement over FADAC by eliminating most of the transmission and recording errors that had plagued FADAC over the years and the error-prone manual method and although they indicated that TACFIRE was "effective at division and battalion level," the tests early in 1970s revealed deficiencies. The system lacked the ability to satisfy the acute need for a battery-level computer to furnish single-gun solutions and to permit the forward observer to communicate directly with a firing battery to neutralize critical targets rapidly. Because of this operational deficiency and studies that verified the requirement for an improved capability of computing firing data at the battery, the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William E. DePuy, Major General Crawford, the Director of the Gunnery Department in the Field Artillery School, Colonel Paul F.'Pearson, and other concerned senior field artillery officers, in 1974-1975 advised modifying the existing acquisition plan. The Field Artillery needed a battery computer system of some kind to replace FADAC. The computer would serve as a remote terminal forTACFIRE and replace FADAC that did not interface digitally with TACFIRE to prevent the full integration of battery and battalion functions, would supplant the Battery Display Unit (BDU),would furnish mutual support for T ACFIRE if required, and would give the battery improved ability to compute technical fire direction. Although Major General Ott concurred with their thinking, he urged waiting until T ACFIRE had been approved for production and fielding

16Ltr, OU to Crawford, undated, T ACFIRE File, HRDC. 17lbid. 181975 Annual Historical Supplement, USAFAS, p. 19. 19Maj Gen David E. Ou, "Forward Observations," Field Artillery Journal, lul-Aug 1975, p. 6. 2°lbid. 29

before designing a backup computer system.21 In response to these fears and to the Field Artillery's and Defense System Acquisition Review Council's acknowledgment of the necessity for battery-level computer to augment TACFIRE, the Army approved acquiring the Battery Computer System (BCS) in October 1975. The Battery Computer System would replace FADAC and the Battery Display Unit in TACFIRE, would permit battery dispersal for improved battlefield survivability and independent battery operations, would permit digital communications from the forward observer, would make individual gun corrections, would display firing data at individual howitzer location, would interface digitally with TACFIRE, and would represent state-of-the- art technology. Even though a critical battlefield deficiency existed to drive the introduction of the Battery Computer System, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments at TRADOC, Major General Robert C. McAlister, expressed his apprehensions about such a computer in a letter to the Deputy Commanding General for Materiel Acquisition, U.S. Army Materiel Command, Major General George Sammet, Jr., in May 1975. Like Major General Sammet, Major General McAlister worried that the Battery Computer System would become a mini-TACFIRE through product improvements over the years and would overshadow T ACFIRE.22 .

2IU.S. Army Field Artillery Board, Comparison Test of Manual/FADAC Field Artillery Fire Direction with T ACFIRE, ~1ay 1973, pp. I, 1-1, 1-5, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; Disposition Form, subj: T ACFIRE Briefing, for Gen DePuy on 15 Nov 74, T ACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7, MSTL; Disposition FornI, subj: TACFIRE BOI and Battery Computer, 24 Oct 1974, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; Ltr for Cdr, US Army Materiel Command, subj: TACFIRE and the Artillery Fire Direction Problem, 8 Oct 1974, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 UL, MSTL; Ltr, Crawford to Ott, Cdr, USAFACFS, 11 Oct 1974, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7, MSTL; Talking Paper, subj: TACFIRE Issues, 26 Aug 1974, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7, MSTL; Memorandum for Chief, T ACFIRE, subj: Communications during OT II, 19 Jul 1974, T ACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7, MSTL; Ltr with Ends, subj: TACFIRE and the Artillery Fire Direction Problem, 8 Oct 1974, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, subj: AMSAA Visit 5 Mar 1975,6 Mar 1975, TACFIRE File, HRDC; "Automated Fire Direction Instruction at USAFAS," pp. 18-19; Department of the Army, Battery Computer System, ~1ay 83, p. iii, UF23.1 G8D3, MSTL; Martin, "TACFIRE: Where Do We Go From Here?" p. 11. 22Fact Sheet, subj: Battery Computer System, Jul 1975, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7, MSTL; Ltr, McAlister to Sammet, 19 May 1975, T ACFIRE File, UL502-27 UL, MSTL; Ltr, Sammet to McAlister, 30 Apr 1975, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7, MSTL; Memorandum for AC, USAFAS, subj: AMSAA Visit 5 Mar 75, 6 ~1ar 1975, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7, MSTL; Col Paul A. Slater and Col John A. Seitz, "Backup for Survival," Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1982, p. 25; Fact Sheet, subj: Battery Computer System, Jul 1975, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: BCS, 13 Mar 1981, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, subj: AMSAA Visit 5 Mar 1975, 6 Mar 1975, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Routing Slip with atchs, 24 Oct 1974, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; Disposition Form, subj: TACFIRE BOI and Battery Computer, 24 Oct 1974, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Report, subj: Operational Test II of the Battery Computer System, 29 Jun 1979, Executive Summary, UF23.1 A7 605, MSTL; 1976 Annual Historical Supplement, 30 .

The Battery Computer System never eclipsed TACFIRE in importance as Major General McAlister feared. Upon realizing that the Battery Display Unit was inadequate and that a digital link between the battalion and battery was necessary, the Army and the Field Artillery moved quickly to acquire the Battery Computer System to serve as a remote terminal for TACFIRE and to give the battery two-way digital communications capabilities with TACFIRE and other digital message devices. Basically, the TACFIRE computer would receive the request for fire from the forward observer, would calculate the tactical fire direction solution based upon the restraints imposed by the commander and the available assets, and would figure the technical fire direction solution. After this the TACFIRE computer would disseminate both solutions to the Battery Computer System at the appropriate battery or batteries. Upon receiving the technical fire direction solution, the Battery Computer System would calculate it again to reaffirm the initial solution. By using state-of-the-art technology the Battery Computer System which was type classified in 1979 could operate as an independent gun direction computer and could compute technical fire 23 direction for individual piece corrections for up to twelve guns. As the Chief of the Computer Section in the Gunnery Department in the Field Artillery School, Captain Walter R. Harris, explained in August 1977, "The BCS is definitely a necessary item to allow the total field artillery system to operate at maximum efficiency. From the beginning it has been designed to be an integral part of the TACFIRE system. ,,24 By 1985 the Battery Computer System served as the primary source of calculating firing data for the battery which had responsibility for technical fire control. Using the Battery Computer System, the battery could compute twelve individual sets of firing data based upon individual piece location, individual piece aiming points, and individual piece muzzle velocities. This capability complemented the battalion's primary responsibility for tactical fire direction although it could supply technical fire direction if necessary.25 In the meantime, the testing ofT ACFIRE in mid-1974 revealed crucial shortcomings with the Fixed Format Message Entry Device. Because message entry and transmission

USAFAS, p. 17; James, "TACFIRE," p. 31. 23U.S. Army Tactical Data Systems, System Specification for the Battery Computer System, 5 Jan 1976, p. 4, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Richard F. Brown, "The Battery Computer System," Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1979, pp. 42-46; "FA Test and Development," Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1978, p. 38; Fact Sheet, subj: The Battery CO,mputer System, 13 Mar 1981, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Report, subj: Operational Test II of the TACFIRE Digital Message Device, 14 Jan 1977, p. 1-2, UL502.27 F52, MSTL; Msg, Dir, RQMTS, Dir, ODCSOPS, Wash DC, to Cdr, USAFACFS, Fort Sill, subj: Our November Session at Fort Sill on TACFIRE, 231248Z May 1977, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7 1977, MSTL; Memorandum for Dir, Gunnery Department, subj: Battery Computer System, 9 Aug 1977, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7 1977, MSTL; "Automated Fire Direction Instruction at USAFAS," pp. 18-19; Ltr with atchs, Joulwan to Korpal, ca. 1987, TACFIRE File, HRDC. 24Memorandum for Dir, Gunnery Department, subj: Battery Computer System, 9 Aug 1977, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7 1977, MSTL. 25"lnwith the Old," Field Artillery Jounzal, Sep-Oct 1986, pp. 3-4; "Response to 'The Battery Commander's Method of Fire Direction,'" Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1988, pp. 2- 3; "Automating Fire Direction Instruction at USAFAS," pp. 18-19. 31 times with the device were too slow and because the device was difficult to operate and created frequent operator errors, the Army awarded a contract to the Magnavox Company in August 1975 to produce engineering models of the Digital Message Device (DMD) to determine if it would be a possible replacement. During test and evaluations in 1976, the Digital Message Device had faster transmission times than the Fixed Format Message Entry Device's transmission times and demonstrated the ability to interface with other TACFIRE equipment. Thus, early in the development of T ACFIRE, unforeseen serious technical deficiencies with key components -- the Battery Display Unit and the Fixed Format Message Entry Device -- and the need for digital communications led to major overhauls with replacement equipment being adopted.26 In the March-April 1978 edition of the Field Artillery Journal, the former Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Albert B. Akers (1975-1978), reflected upon the changes in the T ACFIRE program and the urgency of acquiring improved technical and tactical fire direction. He wrote: We need these new systems. It does no good to improve. the quantity, quality, and the range of our weapons and ammunition if at the same time we fail to upgrade our ability to control and command these weapons. At the present time the 'choke point' is in 'command and control'; and that is why TACFIRE is so essential to the Field Artillery System?7 Without developing T ACFIRE and its peripheral systems the Field Artillery would have serious command and control deficiencies that would restrict its ability to provide effective close support to the maneuver arms and to engage enemy indirect fire systems and that would negate improved weapon systems. As a result, introducing T ACFIRE complemented work on modernizing other field artillery systems, including weapons, and was critically required because of the overwhelming threat of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in Europe with their numerically superior ground forces. To offset this numerical inferiority, the Army required the ability to respond rapidly and effectively with indirect fire support. T ACFIRE and its associated peripheral equipment promised to decrease response time by calculating 28 technical fire direction faster than FADAC and by furnishing tactical fire direction. Even though Major General Akers viewed T ACFIRE optimistically, others had different perspectives on the system.29 In June 1977 the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Donald R. Keith (1976-1977), noted serious shortcomings. Testing revealed the necessity of making changes in software, hardware, doctrine, and procedures to make T ACFIRE operate effectively, according to Major General Keith. In fact, the T ACFIRE User Manager at the Field Artillery School, Colonel Bruce L. Hennessey, pointed out on 13 June 1977 that software problems with the division system caused the computer to. stop processing, required the software to be reloaded, and interfered with distributing T ACFIRE messages to the Battery Computer System. These problems prevented TACFIRE

26Report, subj: Operational Test II of the TACFIRE Digital Message Device, 14 Jan 1977,~pr. I-I, 1-2,1-7,1-9, UL502.27 F52, M~TL . ..7"Journal Interviews Major General Albert B. Akers," Field Artillery Journal, Mar- Apr 1978, p. 14. 28/bid. 29Disposition Form, subj: TACFIRE ASARC Decision, 14 Jan 1975, TACFIRE File, UL502-27 U7, MSTL. 32 . from performing its entire range of functions and raised serious questions about its ability to furnish technical and tactical fire direction. Later in June 1977 after further consideration, Colonel Hennessey softened his position. The rigorous test scenario in February-May 1977 overloaded the division TACFIRE and caused the problems to mitigate some of his concerns. The test scenario created the overloading problem. Technicallilnitations did not. Other field artillery officers involved in fielding the system also noted the ease of overloading the division TACFIRE, but they attributed the problem to the system and not the test scenario. 30 Thus, testing produced ambiguous conclusions about the source ofTACFIRE's limitations. In a message to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in July 1977, Major General Keith captured the ambivalence surrounding the acquisition of TACFIRE. In response to the troubles with the system, he wrote, "We believe that TACFIRE is the best available system to automate corps fire support functions. Our rationale centers primarily around the need to automate the total fire support system soonest.,,3l Although his missive reflected a sense of urgency, he certainly failed to provide a ringing endorsement for TACFIRE but exhibited his apprehensions about fielding the system. As the general implied, the Army and the Field Artillery found TACFIRE to be attractive because it would be available before any other computer system would be and would eliminate a serious fire support deficiency. TACFIRE might have had critical faults, but it, nevertheless, offered some hope because it would interface with the Tactical Operations System as part of ADSAF, because modifications could eliminate the software and hardware shortcomings, because it would automate tactical fire direction, and because it would be more sophisticated than PADAC.32 MORE CHALLENGES Despite funding, hardware and software problems, and vocal opposition and misgivings from the skeptics, the Army conducted operational testing for TACFIRE in January 1978 employing the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, to determine ifit was operationally ready for fielding.33 After rigorous testing the 1stCavalry Division commented early in 1979, "It is. the conclusion of the Division Artillery chain of command that the

30Msg, Keith to Maj Gen Stewart C. Meyer, Cdr, TCAT A, Fort Hood, TX, 232049Z Jun 1977, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7 1977, MSTL; Msg, Maj Gen Julius W. Becton, Jr., USAOTEA, to Maj Gen Keith, et ai, TACFIRE file, UL502.27 U7 1977, MSTL; Memorandum for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Status of TACFIRE FDTE, 13 Jun 1977, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7 1977, MSTL; Msg, subj: TACFIRE Progress Report, 24 Jun 1977, UL502.27 U7 1977, MSTL; Msg, CDR, TRADOC, to HQDA, subj: Battery Computer System, 232111Z Ju11975, TACFIRE File, UL502-27 U7, MSTL; Memorandum for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Status ofTACFIRE FDTE, 13Jun 1977, TACFIRE File, UL502- 27 U7 1977, MSTL. . 3lMsg, Keith to Maj Gen Monterey, USACACDA, Ft. Leavenworth, subj: Corps TACFIRE, I1l400Z Ju11977, TACFIRE File, UL502.27 U7, MSTL. 32Ibid.; "Incoming," Field Artillery Journal, ~1ay-Jun 1978, p. 4; 1977 Annual Historical Supplement, USAFAS, pp. 41-42. 33K.Patrick Cathcart, "TACFIRE Deployment and Training," Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1981, pp. 8-13; "TACFIRE to be Issued," Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1977, p. 22; 1977 Annual Historical Supplement, USAFAS, pp. 41-42. 33

TACFIRE system is extremely effective and greatly enhances the artillery support provided by the division artillery. ,,34 Reflecting upon the suc'cessful testing, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, ~1ajor General Jack N. Merritt (1977-1980), wrote in the Field Artillery Journal in mid-1979, "We have finally achieved a real computerized command and control system with T ACFIRE in the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood and the I-17th Field Artillery at Fort Sill. ,,35 Based upon the successful operational testing, the correctable weaknesses, and the assessments of key general officers, acquisition moved forward. Following the Army System Acquisition Review Council's approval of full-scale development on 19 October 1978 and the Secretary of Defense's concurrence on 30 October 1978 and the completion of the corrective work on the deficiencies, the Army started fielding TACFIRE in 1980 with the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, the 212th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill,. and the 1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, among the first to receive an operational system.36 As the system was being fielded during the 1980s, many field artillery officers continued to express their reservations about T ACFIRE. Fearing the consequences of computer difficulties, Major A.D. Pickard III of the Gunnery Department in the Field Artillery School wrote in a memorandum for record on 14 November 1980, "Computers ... greatly enhance our capability to augment the manual solution .... It would be this department's position that computer technology enhances-- not replaces-- our Inanual methods. ,,37 A handheld calculator should augment the manual method, according to the 3M major. In line with Pickard's thinking, the Director of the Gunnery Department, Colonel Douglas W. McCarty, in February 1981 advocated preserving manual fire direction and the retention of "manual skills" because "computers only enhance or augment the manual soI utlOn.. ".W Pickard's and ~1cCarty's position immediately stirred up an intense debate in the Field Artillery School over manual versus automated backup systems and manual gunnery versus automated gunnery. Early in lvtarch 1981, the Director of the Counterfire Department in the Field Artillery School, Colonel Kenneth A. Kleypas, rejoined, "We must accept the fact that no matter what backup system we use, when T ACFIRE goes down we will be out

34Martin, "T ACFIRE: Where do we go from here?" p. 8. 35Maj Gen Jack N. Merritt, "On the Move," FieldArtillery Journal, May-Jun 1979, p. 2. 36Field Artillery Journal, bulletin on cover page, Nov-Dec 1978; Martin, "TACFIRE: Where Do We Go From Here?" p.. 8; Ray, "TACFIRE: A Quantum Leap in FA Date Processing," p. 54; "TACFIRE Update," Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1980, p. 29. 37Memorandum for Record, subj: TACFIRE Doctrine, 14 Nov 1980, TACFlRE File, BRDC. ~ 3M/bid. 39Disposition Form, subj: Strawman Position on Institutional and Unit Fire Direction Training, 2 Mar 1981, T ACFIRE File, HRDC. Col Douglas \V. McCarty served as Director of the Gunnery Department from 6 February 1980 to 18 October 1981, see 1980 USAFAS Annual Historical Supplement, p. 2-1, and 1981 USAFAS Annual Historical Supplement, p. 2-1. .34 .

for a while and our capability will be seriously degraded. ,,40 In a direct response to Colonel McCarty, Colonel Kleypas noted, "To do this [back up TACFIRE] with the manual system is dumb .... ,,41 Like other field artillery officers, he understood the requirement for redundancy, therefore advised using a handheld calculator, and pointed out that employing the Battery Computer System as a backup would be wise until a satisfactory backup computer could be developed.42 Addressing the manual system, the Program Manager for T ACFIRE at the Field Artillery School, Major P.T. Jenkins, wrote on 24 February 1981, ~'The manual system was slow, cumbersome, inefficient, manpower intensive, and often inaccurate. ,,43 Major Jenkins then added, "The purpose of automating any system, or process, is not to enhance the old system, but to replace it. When TACFIRE is completely fielded (FY85) it will be the Field Artillery [Fire Direction] System. ,,44 With such a firm position ~lajor Jenkins staunchly opposed maintaining the manual method and strongly endorsed totally replacing it with automated systems because the Army was not adopting TACFIRE to supplement manual fire direction methods but to replace them.45 The Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Manager, Colonel Louis C. Fancher, expressed his thoughts on manual backup even more stridently than Major Jenkins had done. Commenting upon the Gunnery Department's position paper of February 1981, he stated, "The central theme of this paper appears to be a determined effort to preserve the manual solution and the retention of manual skills. This approach will ensure that USAFAS [U.S. Army Field Artillery School] remains in the Dark Ages.,,46 Rather, a handheld computer should be the appropriate backup. Ironically, the Gunnery Department not only supported a handheld computer as a backup to the Battery Computer System as early as 1975 but also advocated retaining manual capabilities to reflect some uncertainty and consternation about the impact and effectiveness ofT ACFIRE and automated technical and tactical fire control in general. From the Gunnery Department's perspective, totally abandoning manual gunnery would be unwise and potentially disastrous because it could leave field artillery units without the capability of providing fire support if the computers failed.47 Although the Field Artillery adopted the Texas Instrument (TI) 59, a commercial, programmable, handheld calculator, for cannon and missile batteries in January 1980 to back up the Battery Computer System after intensive studies by the Field Artillery Board at Fort

40Disposition Form, subj: Strawman Position on Institutional and Unit Fire Direction Training, 2 Mar 1981, T ACFIRE File, HRDC. USAFAS Historical Supplement for 1981 on page 2-1 indicates that Colonel Kleypas was Director of the Counterfire Department fro In. 1979 to 1982. 4 1Ibid. 421bid. 43Memorandum for Record, subj: Fire Direction Strategy for the 19805, 24 Feb 198 I, T ACFIRE File, HRDC. . 441bid. 451bid. 46Disposition Form, subj: Strawman Position on Institutional and Unit Fire Direction Training, 2 Mar 1981, T ACFIRE File, HRDC. 471bid.; Fact Sheet, subj; The Computer Set Field Artillery General, 13 Mar 198 I, T ACFIRE File, HRDC. 35

Sill and the TRADOC Combined Arms Test Agency in 1977, the calculator failed to meet the branch's needs. As with the manual method, solving gunnery problems with the TI-59 was slow, leaving the Field Artillery without a suitable backup for automated fire control if the T ACFIRE computer should go down.48 This forced the Field Artillery School to start seriously exploring alternatives in 1982 for a suitable backup for the Battery Computer System. School instructors reasoned that using another Battery Computer System was a viable but expensive solution. They also explored using T ACFIRE or the TI-59 calculator. Because Texas Instrument stopped making the calculator in 1981, sufficient stocks would not exist throughout the lifetime of the Battery Computer System. As a result, the school ruled out the TI-59 calculator.49 In view of the limited alternatives and the requirement for backup capability, the Gunnery Department conducted a detailed study to determine the criteria for a low-cost, accurate, responsive computer system for use with existing field artillery computer systems.50 Donald J. Giuliano of the Research and Analysis Division in the Gunnery Department demonstrated the feasibility of employing a Hewlett-Packard (HP) 75 handheld computer that he had named the Backup Computer System (BUCS). It had the capacity of computing individual firing data for up to eight howitzers, stored target locations, and computed data for all types of missions.51 Because of the HP-75's capabilities and promise, the U.S. Army. Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command gave the Field Artillery School's executive committee of school department directors permission on 25 September 1984 to develop the system as a backup for the Battery Computer System in cannon batteries and as the primary fire direction means for units without the Battery Computer System. Although the Backup Computer System was small, it had virtually the same computational capability as the Battery Computer System.52

4R1bid.; Memorandum for Record, subj: TACFIRE Doctrine, 14 Nov 1980, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj; Institutional and Unit Fire Direction Training, 5 Dee 1980, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; Ltr, subj: Institutional and Unit Fire Direction Training, undated, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Slater and Seitz, "Backup for Survival," pp. 24- 27; Cpt John M. Chaney, Don Giuliano, and Dean Johnson, "The Hand-held Calculator: A Status Report," Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1979, pp. 30-32; Cpt Larry D. Gahagan and Donald J. Giuliano, "Computer Set, Field Artillery, General," Field Artillery Journal, Jul- Aug 1980, pp. 15-16; Cpt Henry W. Stratman, et aI, "The Hand-held Calculator: Meeting Today's Needs Today!" Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1980, pp. 8-13; Cpt Randall A. Mitchell and Cpt AI Cunniff, "Bringing BUCS to Battle," Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1985, p. 29; Draft Organizational and Operational Plan for the BUCS, I Oct 1984, p. 1, RG 3, HRDC. 49Ibid., 1; Interview, Dastrup with Cpt Randall A. Mitchell, DCD, 25 Mar 1986, RG3, HRDC; Maj Michael E. Velten and Donald J. Giuliano, "BUCS: A Backup Computer System for Technical Fire Direction," Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1983, pp. 20-22. 50Mitchell and Cunniff, "Bringing SUCS to Battle," p. 29. 511bid., p. 30; Fact Sheet, subj: SUCS Update, 2 May 1984, RG3, HRDC. 52Fact Sheet, subj: BUCS Description and Basis of Issue Plan, 22 Aug 1984, RG3, HRDC; Draft Organizational and Operational Plan for the Backup Computer System, 1 Oct 1984, pp. 1-5, RG 3, HRDC; "Automated Fire Direction Instruction at USAFAS," pp. 18-19. 36 .

The Backup Computer System which was fielded in"1985 to all active component and reserve component field artillery units took a positive step towards resolving the debate over the manual method and the automated method for computing technical fire direction and providing tactical fire direction in an emergency. Based upon the initial successes of T ACFIRE, the Battery Computer System, the Backup Computer System, and the euphoria over automated technical and tactical fire direction, the Field Artillery School reduced the number of hours of instruction on manual fire direction that were taught in enlisted and officer courses and increased the number of hours of instruction on automated systems late in 1985. Enlisted and officer students received only the basic manual procedures necessary to get a round on target in the event that the automated systems failed and nothing more. In other words, the school viewed manual gunnery as an emergency procedure and dedicated InstructIon.. to automated systems: 53 Over the next several years, the debates reflected the continuing controversy over manual gunnery versus automated gunnery and the apprehension of the computers crashing on the battlefield. Although it boasted about teaching the entire spectrum of gunnery skills from manual to automated in 1986, the school clearly emphasized the latter, indicating a clear intention to phase out manual gunnery at some time in the near future because of the promise of TACFIRE, and simultaneously caused an outcry throughout the field artillery community by taking such action. Many field artillery officers in the school challenged the stress placed on automated gunnery and urged more balanced gunnery instruction. In the meantime, many battalion commanders in the field who often had little experience with automated gunnery taught manual gunnery to their enlisted fire direction center personnel to ensure proficiency and to provide a means of backup when the computers went down from battle damage or some other reason. In a letter to the Commanding General ofTRADOC in . November 1986, a field artillery battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Gloriod, expressed his displeasure with T ACFIRE by listing numerous software and hardware deficiencies that prevented the system from being operational under combat conditions and by identifying the requirement for manual backup. Subsequently, in January 1987 the Deputy Chief of Operations, U.S. Army Europe, Major General George A. Joulwan, concurred with Lieutenant Colonel Gloriod's assessment and pointed out the necessity of manual gunnery capabilities as essential backup skills. In compari~on, other field artillery officers advocated increasing training time for automated gunnery and reducing the number of hours devoted to manual gunnery even more and argued that redundancy with the existing computers was sufficient.54 As Captain Richard D. Koethe III who taught TACFIRE procedures in the Field

53Fact Sheet, subj: BUCS, 1'1 Sep 1984, RG3, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: BUCS Description and Status, 11 May 1985, RG3, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Mitchell, 25 Mar 1986, RG3, HRDC; AC Field Information for BUCS, 20 lun 1985, RG3, HRDC; "Automated Fire Direction Instruction at USAFAS," pp. 18-19. 54"A Report Card-Making," Field Artillery Jounlal, Nov-Dec 1986, pp. 14-15; "BUCS as a Backup," Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1988, pp. 2-3; Ltr with atchs, Joulwan to Korpal, ca. 1987, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Ltr with atch, Cmdt, USAFAS, MG Eugene S. Korpal, to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj Gen George A. Joulwan, 13 Feb 1987, TACFIRE File, HRDC. . 37

Artillery School wrote in the Field Artillery Magazine in August 1987, "Time spent on manual gunnery training detracts from time needed to maintain TACFIRE skills. ,,55 Basically, the school could not devote the time to teaching both manual and automated gunnery. It had to focus its efforts on one or the other. From Koethe's perspective, automated gunnery should be the focal point because it was the wave of the future and cntlca.. II" lor responsIve• fi Ire support: 56 Although Captain Koethe and other field artillery officers like him acknowledged the need for some manual gunnery skills, they advised expending more time on automated gunnery because T ACFIRE and the Battery Computer System were "stern mistresses." They would not tolerate any lack of attention and were very jealous of the time not spent with them. The entire system was not user friendly because operators had to exercise the system constantly.57 . As Captain Koethe and others, such as General Joulwan, suggested, TACFIRE itself generated the requirement for increased training time and the reduction of training time on manual methods. To remain proficient officers and enlisted personnel in the fire direction center, especially the latter, had to use TACFIRE almost daily because TACFIRE skills were perishable and could be easily lost without repeated use. Because of this, they did not have time for training on nlanual methods.58 According to some field artillery officers, the system required extensive initial and sustainment training for operators to attain and Inaintain proficiency. Moreover, TACFIRE's unforgiving, hostile software and undependable hardware discouraged field artillery battalions from using automated tactical fire control, especially if the senior officers lacked experience with the system.59 As the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm of 1991 pointed out years later, TACFIRE demanded excessive initial and sustainment training for operators to maintain proficiency.6o Overall, feedback from the field indicated that young enlisted personnel in the fire

:5"Response to 'In With the Old,'" Field Artillery Magazine, Aug 1987, pp. 2-3 . .6/bid. 57/bid., p. 2. 5~Ltr with atchs, Deputy Chief of Operations, u.S. Army Europe, Maj Gen George A. Joulwan, to Cmdt, USAFAS, Maj Gen Eugene S. Korpal, ca. 1987, TACFIRE File, HRDC. 59Maj Gen John S. Crosby, "On the Move," Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1985, p. I; Maj (Ret) Edward J. Stiles, "AFATDS: It's Not A New TACFIRE," Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1992, pp. 39-41; Cpt John F. Patrick, "The Lost Art of Tactical Fire Direction," Field Artillery M(y.:azine, Oct 1989, pp. 29-31; Merritt, "On the Move," pp. 2-3; Cpt Suzanne W. Voigt, "Lightening Up on T ACFIRE," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1987, pp. 31-37; Lt Col Henry D. Urna, "AFATDS, Its Closer Than You Think," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1987, pp. 32-33; General Accounting Office (GAO)Draft Report, subj: Army's Effort to Improve the Field Artillery Tactical Data System, 9 May 1986, pp. II, 27, RQ3, BRDC; GAO Report, subj: Fire Support Systems: Army's Plans to Improve its Fire Support Capabilities, Sep 1986, p. 27, UF157.5 U54, MSTL; Ltr with atch, Joulwan to Korpal, ca. 1987; Memorandum, subj: How to Win, II Aug 1987, TACFIRE File, BRDC. 6°Annex E, Fire Support, Operational Requirenlents Document for the AFATDS to the Operational Requirements Document for the Family of Army Tactical Command and Control System, 30 Aug 1993, pp. 1-3, AFATDS File, BRDC. 38 . direction center suffered the most from the decision to cut back training time on manual gunnery in the school and caused the school to reassess its position on manual gunnery. Addressing the situation, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Raphael J. Hallada (1987-1991), wrote in the Field Artillery Magazine in December 1988, "A lack of knowledge about manual gunnery too often has caused units to be unable to mass fires or use backup fire direction center (FDC) procedures effectively.,,61 This prodded the school to increase the number of hours on manual gunnery in enlisted and officer training in i988-1989 so that graduates would be better prepared should battle damage knock out the computers.62 Meanwhile, other serious concerns with T ACARE confronted the Army and the Field Artillery. Although T ACFIRE automated tactical fire control, target intelligence processing, status accounting, target analysis, fire support coordination, and fire planning which were formerly done manually, the Army and Field Artillery acknowledged that the system was obsolete just two years after fielding had begun in 1980, had too many hardware and software problems, was too large and heavy, and had hardware and software that was difficult to support and to upgrade. The advent of microprocessors in the 1970s basically rendered T ACFIRE technology obsolete as it was being introduced and reaffirmed critics' suggestions to adopt personnel computers, while T ACFIRE's centralized architecture created vulnerable nodes that permitted easy targeting and destruction. In addition, T ACFIRE lacked survivability due to excessive heat, , and electronic signature, and limited access to soldiers equipped with the Digital Message Device, Variable Format Message Entry Device, or TACFIRE computers, and was intended to be part of the Tactical Operations System. Conceived to automate tactical data for commanders and to link various computers into a network, the Tactical Operations System failed to pass critical tests in 1977. Serious software and hardware design problems that could not be corrected caused Congress to withdraw funding from the Tactical Operations System in 1980 and to leave T ACFIRE as the sole digital computer system in the Army. As of 1980, the Army Tactical Command and Control Master Plan of 1971 had achieved little results. The other command and control 63 systems that were part of the comprehensive plan still did not work. Although T ACFIRE

61Maj Gen Raphael J. Hallada, "The Field Artillery State-of- the-Branch Address," Field Artillery Magazine, Dee 1988, p. 3. 62/bid., p. 3. . 63Crosby, "On the Move," p. 1; Stiles, "AFATDS: It's Not a New TACFIRE," pp. 39- 41; Patrick, "The Lost Art of Tactical Fire Direction," pp. 29-31; Merritt, "On The Move," pp. 2-3; Voigt, "Lightening Up on T ACFIRE," pp. 31-37; Urna, "AFATDS, Its Closer Than You Think," pp. 32-33; General Accounting Office Draft Report, subj: Army's Effort to Improve the Field Artillery Tactical Data System, 9 May 1986, pp. 11, 27, RG3, HRDC; GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System: Army's Plans to Improve its Fire Support Capabilities, Sep 1986, p. 27, UF157.5 U54, MSTL; Ltr with atch, Joulwan to Korpal, ca. 1987; Memorandum, subj: How to Win, 11 Aug 1987, T ACFIRE File, HRDC; 1980 Annual Historical Supplement, USAFAS, p. 9-1; 1983 Annual Historical Supplement, USAFAS, p. 9-4; Memorandum Report, subj: Field Artillery System Studies Performed by the Ballistic Research Laboratory in 1984, Feb 1987, p. 9, TACFIRE File, HRDC; Annex E Fire Support, Operational Requirements Document for AFATDS to Operational Requirements Document 39

had limitations, it served the Field Artillery well ,in the 1980s by furnishing tactical and technical fire direction for a conventional and tactical nuclear battlefield even though it could not be linked with other computers as planned.

for ATCCS, 30 Aug 1993, pp. 1-3, AFATDS File, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for FiscatYear 1980, pp. 25-26; Memorandum for Record, subj: None, undated, TACFIRE File, BRDC. 40 .

CHAPTER THREE SUCCESSOR SYSTEl\'IS

The widespread acknowledgment of the salient limitations of the Tactical Fire Direction System (T ACFIRE) being introduced, the growing sophistication of computer technology, and the Warsaw Pact's improved electronic warfare capabilities prompted the Army and Field Artillery to develop the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data (AFATDS). Upon fielding, AFATDS would take tactical and technical fire direction for light and heavy field artillery units into the twenty-first century and would be critical part of an Army-wide integrated automated command, control, and communications system. CIIANGING PLANS TO MEET A CRITICAL NEED On 13 November 1978 the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering directed the Army to design a plan for a successor system to T ACFIRE even before it was fielded, conceding the system's critical shortcomings. The Undersecretary wanted the new system to be based upon state-of-the-art microprocessor and packaging technologies to optimize operational efficiency, to simplify training, to ease maintenance requirements, to reduce life-cycle costs, and to improve survivability on the modern battlefield against Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground forces that had advanced electronic warfare systems with the ability to neutralize existing command, control, and communications systems and that represented the Army's greatest threat. In response to this tasking and the conspicuous need for improved automated fire direction capabilities, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense subsequently approved a Mission EleOlent Needs Statement for AFATDS completed by the Army in March 1981 after almost three years of work.} To improve the Field Artillery's automated command, control, and coolmunication abilities, the statement called for a T ACFIRE modular improvement program. Major T ACFIRE components would be replaced in three phases to arrive at the objective AFATDS system? Cognizant of the initial AFATDS program, TACFIRE's critical flaws, and fire support command, control, and communications deficiencies identified the Fire Support Mission Area Analysis of December 1980 and Mission Area Analysis Statement of March 1981, Congress subsequently acted. Congress strongly opposed making product improvements to TACFIRE to reach AFATDS as outlined by the Mission Elements Needs

}AFATDS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (S), Mar 1989, pp. I~ I -1-2, material used is unclassified, .~F~ TDS File, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC), Command Historian's Office, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS). 2Ibid.; Executive Summary, Army Modified AFATDS Program Plan, 30 Aug 1985, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: Army Tactical Command and Control Coolmon Hardware/Software, undated, HRDC; General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, Aug 1986, p. 14, UB223.4 U521, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL); Cpt Suzann W. Voigt, "Lightening Up On T ACFIRE," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1987, pp. 32-33; Discussion Paper, subj: The Need for AFATDS, 11 Sep 1987, HRDC; Report (S), subj: AFATDS, II Oct 1984, pp. 1-6, material used is unclassified, MSTL. 41

Statement. Rather, Congress mandated in 1981 that no more funds would be spent on improving TACFIRE and that money would be u~ed for an entirely new developmental program to produce AFATDS.3 . In response to this direction, the Army completed the AFA TDS organizational and operational plan on 12 January 1983 after almost two years of work. The plan described the essential characteristics required to meet a high-intensity battle in Europe against Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored forces with their reliance upon combined arms warfare to conduct close and deep operations simultaneously. While the new computer hardware would be lighter for enhanced mobility and survivability, the software would be more user friendly than T ACFIRE software and would be introduced through a series of versions with each providing more capabilities than its predecessor until the objective software would be fielded in 1990. By doing this the AmlY could get AFATDS into the field quickly to satisfy the urgent requirement for improved field artillery command, control, and communications.4 As with T ACFIRE, the Army planned to integrate AFATDS into a broad command, control, and communications system to enhance interoperability and standardization. Upon being fielded, AFA TDS would be part of the Army Tactical Command and Control System that would provide a new dimension in automated processing capacity for the Army. By creating common hardware and software standards, the system would stop the proliferation. of unique computer hardware and software throughout the Army which had become a growing concern since 1976. Besides AFATDS (Fire Support Battlefield Automation System), the Army Tactical Command and Control System would consist of the Maneuver Battlefield Automation System, the Air Defense Battlefield Automation System, the Combat Service Support Battlefield Automation System, and the Intelligence/Electronic Battlefield Automation System. Each system would provide the desired functional automation, communicate with each other digitally to create a network of computers, and furnish essential information to the force commander.5

3AFATDS Cost and Effectiveness Analysis (S), Mar 1989, pp. 1-1- 1-2, material used is unclassified. 4Voigt, "Lightening Up on TACFIRE," pp. 31-37; Lt Col (Ret) Henry D. Urna, "AFATDS, It's Closer Than You Think," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1987, pp. 32-33; Maj Gen Jack N. Merritt, "On The Move," Field Artillery Journal, JuI-Aug 1979, pp. 2-3; Test and Evaluation Report for AFATDS, 15 Dec 1995, p. 1-6, AFATDS File, Historical Research and Documents Collection (HRDC), Command Historian's Office, U.S. ArnlY Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill; Executive Summary, Army Modified AFATDS Program Plan, 30 Aug 1985, HRDC; Ltr, FATDS TRADOC System Manager, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM-FATDS Quarterly Report, 4 Apr 1985, HRDC; General Accounting Office Draft Report, subj: Army Efforts to Improve the Field Artillery Tactical Data System, 9 May 1986, p. 1 I, HRDC; Discussion Paper, subj: The Need for AFATDS, I I Sep 1987, HRDC; Army Tactical Command and Control System Required Operational Capability Plan (Extract), Annex E, Fire Support, Revised AFATDS Operational and Organizational Plan, 24 Mar 1987, HRDC; AFATDS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (S), Mar 1989, pp. 1-I - 1-2, material used is unclassified. AFATDS File, HRDC. 5Jbid.; Army Fire Support Automation Plan, 22 Aug 1986, pp. ES I-ES2, HRDC; GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, Aug 1986, pp. 5-7, UB223.4 U52I, MSTL; Ltr, 42 .

Just as serious development on AFATDS was getting underway, a cost overrun in 1984-1985 and the pressing need to supply automated fire support to the light forces being created for rapid deployment compelled the Army to revise its AFATDS procurement strategy and concurrently encouraged Congress to intervene actively into the acquisition process over the next several years. To decrease costs that were beginning to spiral out of control and to satisfy the requirements of the light forces, the Undersecretary of the Army, James R. Ambrose, modified the procurement contract in June 1985. He reduced the number of functions that the initial stage AFATDS software would perform to make it less capable than originally desired and also less expensive and simultaneously decided that initial stage software capabilities would be the minimum required by the light forces to permit them to abandon the Battery Computer System (BCS) and manual fire direction methods and to automate. At the time the light forces lacked automated command and control at the division, brigade, battalion, and forward observer levels where they relied upon manual methods for computing technical fire direction data to complement the Battery Computer System in the battery. Undersecretary Ambrose also directed the Army to have AFATDS software ready for concept evaluation program testing by early 1987 to determine the validity of the AFATDS concept and the ability of the AFATDS software to satisfy automated fire support requirements.6 Concerned about the state of automation in the light forces, House and Senate Appropriations Committees, meanwhile, tasked the Army to prepare a detailed plan to provide interim automation to the light divisions until AFATDS could be fielded and to increase automated capabilities for the entire force at the same time.7 After several months of work, the Army issued its Modified AFATDS Program Plan of September 1985. Using a four-phase approach, the Modified AFATDS Plan made automating the light forces a top priority by employing existing equipment and proven technology with AFATDS being introduced in 1989. In phase one (Near-Term Light Division Automation) the Army would procure the Fire Support Team Digital Message Device (FIST DMD) which was a product improvement to the Digital Message Device for the maneuver battalion, brigade, and division fire support elements, the field artillery battalion, and the division artillery fire direction center in all light divisions. The Army also would supply the company fire support team and the forward observer with the Digital Communications Terminal (DCT) and would give the Battery Computer System to the firing battery for technical fire direction. In phase two (the

Gen M.R. Thurman, Vice Chief of Staff, to Honorable Joseph P. Addabbo, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, House of Representatives, undated, HRDC. 6Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager FSC3 First Quarter FY87 Report, 5 Jan 1987, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: AFATDS Program Status, 23 Oct 1987, HRDC; Briefing, subj: AFATDSILTACFIRE, 3 Mar 1987, HRDC; Briefing, subj: AFATDS CEP, undated, HRDC; Disposition Form, subj: AFATDS Software 3 Block Field Approach, 21 Aug 1987, HRDC; GAO Draft Report, subj: Army Efforts to Improve the Field Artillery Tactical Data System, 9 May 1986, p. 10, HRDC; GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Sep 86, p. 36, UF157.5 U54, MSTL; Voigt, "Lightening Up on TACFIRE," p. 35; "Army Backs AFATDS Bid," Defense News, 10 Aug 1987, p. 1, AFATDS File, HRDC; AFATDS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (S), Mar 1989, pp. I-I- 1-2. 7GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Sep 1986, pp. 1-3, UF157.5 U54, MSTL. 43

Concept Evaluation Program) the Army planned to, develop AFATDS software to support brigade-level operations with a focus on the operational requirements of the light forces. This phase would culminate with concept evaluation program testing to determine further software and hardware developmental strategies. In phase three (Tactical Computer) the Army expected to procure and evaluate the Maneuver Control System computer as the candidate AFATDS hardware; to expand AFATDS software capabilities to support all fire support functions at division, corps, and echelons above corps; and to conduct developmental and operational testing in 1988. In phase four (Army Tactical Command and Control System) the Army outlined soliciting competitive bids for the computer hardware, taking steps to ensure the availability of AFATDS software, and making certain that AFATDS would fit in the Army Tactical Command and Control System. If everything worked out as programmed, the Army would have AFATDS totally functional in the light forces by 1989 and the heavy forces by 1990 to replace T ACFIRE in the latter and to make fire support totally automated throughout the field artillery force by replacing existing manual methods.8 Skeptical about the Army Modified AFATDS Program Plan's agenda for the near- term automation of fire support for the light forces, Congress directed the General Accounting Office (GAD) to evaluate it and to make a report complete with findings and . recommendations. After conducting interviews with Army officers involved with the AFATDS program and studying AFATDS documents, the General Accounting Office provided a draft report to Congress in May 1986. It criticized the Army for failing to evaluate alternatives to the FIST DMD and for planning to employ the system in a wider role than it was originally intended and designed to fill. The General Accounting Office report also noted that light division commanders had already requested Light T ACFIRE, an. improved, smaller version of the T ACFIRE system, because it was more capable than the FIST DMD. In fact, on 28 February 1986, the division artillery commander of the 7th Infantry Division outlined his unit's requirement for Light TACFIRE because the FIST DMD failed to satisfy its automated fire support requirements. In view of its findings, the General Accounting Office urged the Army to justify its decision to employ the FIST DMD with the light forces rather than Light TACFIRE because the latter offered greater capabilities.9

8"Army Backs AFATDS Bid," p. I; Army Modified AFATDS Program Plan (Extract), 30 Aug 1985, Executive Sunlmary, pp. 4, 7-9, HRDC; Ltr, FATDS System Manager to USAFAS Cmdt, subj: TSM-FATDS Quarterly Report, 4 lan 1986, HRDC; GAD Draft Report, subj: Anny Efforts to Improve the Field Artillery Tactical Data System, 9 May 1986, p. 15, HRDC; GAD Report, su~j: Fire Support System, Sep 1986, p. 29, UF157.5 U54, MSTL; Report, subj: Force Development Testing and Experimentation of the FIST D,MD, 10 Nov 1982, p. I-I, Light T ACFIRE File, HRDC. In the mid-1980s forward observers were equipped with the Digital Message Device (DMD) that had been developed prior to the development of the fire support team. Close Support Study Group II identified the need for a FIST DMD to provide digital information to the FIST chief and the battalion fire support officer. This led to the FIST DMD that was a product-improved version of the original DMD and permitted the FIST chief to coordinate calls for fire originating at the platoon level forward observer's DMD. 9Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and 44-

Not surprisingly, the Army and the Department of Defense quickly rebutted the General Accounting Office's findings and recommendation to employ Light TACFIRE in the light forces. In a letter to the Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office, Frank C. Conahan, on 16 June 1986, the Undersecretary of Defense, Donald A. Hicks, wrote: The Army evaluated the LFATDS [Light TACFIRE] as an interinl system to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System .... While LFATDS can provide some additional capability, it would be at a significant additional cost, not moderate cost as clainled by the GAO. LFATDS was, therefore, determined to be too expensive for an interim system that could not realistically be deployed until a year before AFATDS and ... has no potential for growth to meet the needs of the 1990s without major and costly . 10 red eSlgn. Although the General Accounting Office and the Department of Defense concurred that. AFATDS was the only credible option to satisfy the Mission Element Needs Statement of March 1981, that it complied with Army Tactical Command and Control System requirements, and that Light TACFIRE was better than the FIST DMD, they disagreed about the best way to automate the light forces until AFATDS could be made available. While the General Accounting Office favored Light TACFIRE, the Army desired employing the FIST DMD with an eye on the monetary savings generated by fielding the system and fielding AFATDS within a few years and rejected Light TACFIRE because it duplicated existing capabilities in the Battery Computer System and would not be compatible with Army Tactical Command and Control System requirements.1I The FIST DMD offered "a very useful, reasonable and affordable first step," according to the Department of Defense. Equally as important, the Army and the Department of Defense opposed Light TACFIRE as 12 the interim system because it might jeopardize funds for the overall AFATDS program. Over the next several months, both sides vigorously debated the merits of their respective positions without wavering or without any apparent resolution in sight. In a letter to Senator Dan Quayle of Indiana on 19 September 1986, Frank C. Conahan reaffirmed the General Accounting Office's conclusions of May 1986. Although it set out the Army's latest approach to achieve progressive improvements with fire support command and control systems, the Army Modified AFATDS Program Plan of September 1985 furnished only two

Acquisition, subj: General Accounting Office Draft Report, "Army's Efforts to Improve the Field Artillery Tactical Data System," datcd 9 May 1986, undated, HRDC; GAO Draft Rcport, subj: Army Efforts to Improve the Field Artillery Tactical Data System, 9 May 1986, pp. 19,21, UF157.5 U54, MSTL; GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, Aug 1986, pp. 14-15. lOLtr,Undersecretary of Defense to Frank C. Conahan, 16 Jun 1986, HRDC. The letter is also in GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Sep 86, pp. 34-35, UF157.5 U54, MSTL. - 111bid.; GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Sep 1986, pp. 34-48; GAO Report, subj: Battlcfield Automation, Aug 1986, pp. 13-14, UB223.4 U521, MSTL. 12"ArmyBacks AFATDS Bid," p. 1; GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Sep 1986, p. 38, UF157.5 U54, MSTL. 45 interim options for automating the light forces, did not evaluate Light T ACFIRE as an alternative, and did not include any upgrades to TACFIRE in the heavy forces until AFATDS could be fielded. The first light force option provided the light divisions with increased quantities of the FIST DMD which had the ability to display, store, edit, monitor, and forward fire missions from platoon forward observers to division, brigade, and battalion fire direction centers.13 The FIST DMD would be tied to the Battery Computer System in the battery and the Digital Communications Terminal, a handheld device used by forward observers, fire support teams, battalion and brigade fire support officers, and battalion and division artillery commanders to relay targeting data and fire commands. According to the General Accounting Office, the FIST DMD, the Battery Computer System, and the Digital Communications Terminal alternative combined to make a low-cost, quick-fix solution because the equipment was already in production and could be fielded easily in the near future with few complications.14 Opposing this option, the General Accounting Office reiterated its earlier argument of May 1986 and concerns about the FIST D~1D. In a report in September 1986, the General Accounting Office wrote, "The Army's plan calls for using the FIST/DMD in a much wider role than for which it was designed. The FIST/DMD was designed for the FIST company level, and subsequently procured for the company and battalion fire support clements." 15 By fielding the equipment at battalion-level and above fire direction centers and fire support elements with much greater requirements than the fire support team, the Army would utilize it in a role for which it was not intended nor designed to fill. As a result, the FIST DMD might not have the capabilities to meet the light division's requirements for automated fire support. The Army simply failed to study the impact of the FIST DMD's limitations upon the light divisions.16 The second option, according to the modified AFATDS plan of 1985, consisted of furnishing the light divisions with a Tactical Computer Processor. However, the Army eliminated this option as a possibility in January 1986 because the processor was too heavy and costly, because funding restraints demanded a less expensive system, and because it was not compatible with the Army Tactical Command and Control System under development. 17 Although the Army listed only two options in its September 1985 plan, a viable third one existed from the perspective of the General Accounting Office. To provide the light forces with automated fire support until AFATDS could be fielded, the Army started working on Lightweight T ACFIRE in October 1983 as part of the 9th Infantry Division's Quick Reaction Program. The system consisted of the Lightweight Briefcase Terminal (thirty-five

13Ltr, Conahan to Quayle, 19 Sep 1986, in GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Sep 1986, UF157.5 U54, MSTL. 14GAO Draft Report, subj: Army's Efforts to Improve the Field Artillery Tactical Data System, 9 May 1986, pp. 14-15, HRDC; Army Modified AFATDS Plan, 6 Sep 1985, pp. 7-<), HRDC; Ltr, Conahan to Quayle, in GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Scp 1986, pp. 1-3, UF157.5 U54, MSTL; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC Systelll Manager FSC3, First Quarter FY 88 Report, 30 Dec 1987, HRDC. 15GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Scp 1986, p. 15, UF157.5 U54, MSTL. 16/bid. 17/bid., p. 17. 46 . pounds) and peripheral equipment. If development stayed on schedule, the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) would receive the system sometime in 1988 to replace the battaIion- level TACFIRE computer and the Variable Format Message Entry Device (VFMED) located in the field artillery operations and intelligence sections. Although the commanders of the 82nd Airborne Division, Major General Bobby B. Porter, and 7th Infantry Division, Major General William H. Harrison, expressed the compelling need for Light TACFIRE in 1984- 1985 and opposed acquiring the FIST DMD because it failed to satisfy their needs, the Anny resisted their requests for several key reasons. Light TACFIRE was too expensive for employment as an interim system, could not be realistically deployed until a year before AFATDS, and lacked the growth potential to meet the needs of the 1990s without major and costly redesign. In view of these reasonable factors, the Army dropped its plans in June 1985 to use Light TACFIRE to fill the automated fire support void in light divisions, decided to limit its distribution to the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), and left it out of its September 1985 plan.ls As a result of the decision of 1985 to abandon Light TACFIRE and the one of 1986 to reject the Tactical Computer Processor, the Army's plan for furnishing an interim automated fire support command, control, and communications system in the light divisions late in 1986 ruled out two of the three feasible options and stirred up a controversy. The Army's preferred solution concentrated on providing automated capabilities with the FIST DMD, the Battery Computer System, and the Digital Communications Terminal as low-cost upgrades to existing manual tactical and technical fire control methods until AFATDS could be fielded. However, as in May 1986 the General Accounting Office repeated in the fall of 1986 the 19 FIST DMD's failure to meet any of the light division's critical fire support requirements. In light of the glaring inadequacies of the FIST DMD and its peripheral equipment,. the General Accounting Office continued to support Lightweight TACFIRE even though it was more expensive because it could perform more fire support functions. From the viewpoint of the General Accounting Office in the fall of 1986, the Army had to chose between a low-cost solution with limited increased capabilities (FIST DMD) and a higher

IS/bid., pp. 1,2, 11, 19; Ltr with Enclosure, Asst Cmdt, USAFAS, to Maj Gen Donald S. Pihl, Cdr, 9th ID, and Maj Gen Robert D. Morgan, Cdr, US Army Communications- Electronics Command, 7 May 1987, HRDC; Ltr, Undersecretary of Defense to U.S. General Accounting Office, 16 Jun 1986, in GAO Draft Report, pp. 34-35, HRDC; GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, Aug 1986, pp. 14-15, UB223.4 U521, MSTL; GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, Ju11987, pp. 1, 15, ULS03 U61, MSTL; Voigt, "Lightening Up on TACFIRE," pp. 35-37; Report, subj: Independent Evaluation of the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System, Jun 1987, Executive Summary, UL503 F31, MSTL; Report, subj: Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, Jun 1987, Executive Summary, Light TACFIRE File, HRDC; Report, subj: Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System Force Development and Experimentation, Apr 1991, Executive Summary, Light TACFIRE File, HRDC. 19GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, Jul 1987, pp. 1-2, 17, UL503 U61, MSTL; Army Fire Support Automation Plan, 22 Aug 1986, Executive Summary, HRDC; GAO Report, subj: Fire Support System, Sep 1986, p. 2, UF157.5 U54, MSTL. 47 cost one (Light T ACFIRE) with significant improvement in capacity for its interim system.20 Written in response to a congressional tasking of early 1986, the Army Fire Support Automation Plan of22 August 1986, meanwhile, superceded the Army Modified AFATDS Plan of September 1985 and simultaneously intensified the battle over the most effective means of automating the light forces. Besides maintaining a strong commitment to the FIST DMD, the Battery Computer System, and the Digital Communications Terminal, the August 1986 plan announced including the light forces in the initial fielding of AFATDS and outlined an orderly transition from T ACFIRE to AFATDS through a series of steps. As upgraded T ACFIRE software was being fielded in 1988-1989, the Battery Computer System, FIST DMD, and Digital Communications Terminal would be fielded to the light forces in 1987-1990. Subsequently, the Army would field AFATDS software in 1990-1994 to be run on Army Tactical Command and Control System hardware that would be procured beginning in 1988. This plan would provide the total force with fire support automation consisting of AFATDS, the Battery Computer System, the FIST DMD, and the Digital Communications Terminal by 1994. The plan also restated the ArnlY's intention of fielding AFATDS software in versions with each improving upon the capabilities of its predecessor and with the final variant being the objective one. As the automation plan of 1986 explained clearly, AFATDS would give the Army the ability to defeat a variety of threats and the capability of fighting in various scenarios, ranging from low- to high-intensity conflicts, throughout the world by providing effective and responsive fire support command, control, and communications.21 Although the plan presented a logical path to automate fire support, it aggravated the already strained relationship between Congress and the Army by showing the latter's determination to adhere to its preferred course of action for the light forces. Influenced by its opposition to the Army's automation plan of August 1986 and by the General Accounting Office's report of September 1986 on the Light T ACFIRE and FIST DMD, Congress kept up its persistent attack on the Army's and the Department of Defense's resolute support of the FIST DMD. Aiming to validate its position, Congress directed the Army to subject Light T ACFIRE to operational testing under the auspices of an independent Department of Defense testing agency.,., and to report its findings to Senate and House Appropriations Committees by June 1987.-- Tests conducted by the U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency from March 1987 through April 1987 revealed critical problems with Light T ACFIRE that required correcting before fielding. Based upon the tests, the agency concluded that Light TACFIRE was not operationally effective as the objective or interim fire support system for the light forces for use in combat that would range from low-intensity to high-intensity conflict. Light T ACFIRE simply failed to meet the Army's fire direction requirements.23

20GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, Jul 1987, pp. 1,2, 16, 17, UL503 U61, MSTL; GAO Report, subj: Fire Support Systenl, Sep 1986, p. 2, UF157.5 U54, MSTL. ~ 21 Army Fire Support Automation Plan, 22 Aug 1986, Executive Summary and pp. 5, 8,14, HRDC. 22GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, July 1987, pp. 1-2, 17, UL503 U6l, MSTL. 2J1bid., pp. 2,15; "Army Backs AFATDS Bid," Defellse NeHlS, 10 Aug 1987, p. I; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC Systenl Manager FSC3 Fourth Quarter 48 .

In view of the uncertainty of Light TACFIRE's ability to provide the requisite support, the Army's position that it could not be fielded any sooner than AFATDS, and the pressure being exerted by Congress, Undersecretary Ambrose formed an independent review committee to assess the proper course of action. After examining the Army's fire support automation program, the committee concluded in August 1987 that a subset of AFATDS could be introduced as quickly as Light TACFIRE. As a result, the Army should abandon Light TACFIRE in favor of the AFATDS subset, especially if the AFATDS concept evaluation program was successfu1.24 Despite this shocking recommendation, Light TACFIRE remained alive. Rather than rejecting Light TACFIRE after being briefed by the independent committee on 28 August 1987 and 3 September 1987, Undersecretary Ambrose directed the concurrent development of Light TACFIRE and AFATDS until the conclusion of the AFATDS concept evaluation program test. Based upon the outcome of the test, the Army would decide whether Light TACFIRE should be procured or no1.25 Even though the system had demonstrated significant disadvantages in terms of cost, performance, and growth potential and even though Undersecretary Ambrose and the Army demonstrated skepticism about Light TACFIRE, some senators and congressmen still persisted seeing it as not only a short-term solution but also as a cheap, long-term solution for automated command, control, and communications for field artillery in the light forces. Because of this, Congress told the Army in its Fiscal Year 1988appropriations act to develop an acquisition plan for Light TACFIRE. Later in April 1988, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the Army Vice Chief of Staff reached an agreement. While the heavy divisions would receive AFATDS, Light TACFIRE would be given to the light divisions until AFATDS could be developed and fielded. Subsequently, Congress reaffimled this agreement by directing the Army to purchase Light TACFIRE as the interim system for the light forces and provided funding.26

FY 87 Report, 30 Sep 1987, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: AFATDS Program Status, 23 Oct 1987, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager FSC3 Third Quarter FY 87 Report, 6 lu11987, HRDC; GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, lul 1987, p. 15, UL503 U61, MSTL; Report, subj: Independent Evaluation Report on the Lightweight TACFIRE System Force Development Test and Experimentation, Apr 1991, p. 3, Light TACFIRE File, HRDC. 24Fact Sheet, subj: AFATDS Program Status, 23 Oct 1987, HRDC; Memorandum' for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager FSC3 Fourth Quarter FY 1987 Report, 30 Sep 1987, HRDC. 25Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manger FSC3 Fourth Quarter FY 87 Report, 30 Sep 1987, HRDC. . 26"Army Backs AFATDS Bid," p. 1; Disposition Form, subj: Request for Out-of- Cycle Submission of Outline Test Plans for Forward Entry Device and LTACFIRE, 14 Mar 1989, HRDC; Memo, PM for FATDS to TSM FSC3, 7 lul 1989, HRDC; Disposition Form with Enclosures, subj: LTACFIRE Congressional Language, undated, HRDC; rv1sg,DA to Cdr, AMC, et ai, subj: Directed Procurement of LTACFIRE, 072121Z Mar 1988, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: Meeting Between Representative Chappell and General Brown, 28 Apr 1988,29 Apr 1988, HRDC; Briefing, subj: LTACFIRE Acquisition Strategy, 49

Even though the Army and the Field Artillery followed Congressional direction by integrating Light TACFIRE into its interim solution for automating the light forces and revised its AFATDS program to clarify that it would meet the needs of the light forces, they still pushed the FIST DMD option through late 1987 as a practical alternative until AFATDS could be fielded even though program restructuring, software problems, and limited memory capacity had pushed FIST DMD testing back from July 1985 to August 1987. The FIST DMD would go to the maneuver battalion fire support element, the brigade fire support element, the field artillery battalion fire direction center, the division artillery tactical operations center, and division fire support element. While the Digital Communications Terminal would be provided to the company fire support team and the forward observer, the firing battery would receive the Battery Computer System for technical fire direction.27 Yet, the FIST DMD tests conducted by the 7th Infantry Division in July 1987 reaffirmed the General Accounting Office's earlier conclusions and concerns, suggesting that the Army was on tenuous grounds. Emerging results from the tests indicated that the FIST DMD which had been under development since 1980 provided only "marginal improvement in the fire support system" and did not meet any of the light division's critical effectiveness requirements. In fact, the FIST DMD provided no distinct advantage over manual equipment and methods and would only give light units some digital capabilities, while Light TACFIRE . was not operationally effective nor suitable as an interim light force system. This left the Army with a conundrum. As the tests of Light T ACFIRE and the FIST DMD certified in 1987, neither system adequately satisfied the automated needs of the light forces. Yet, the Army had to adopt one or the other to satisfy the compelling automation requirements of the light forces?~ .. Pressured by ajoint committee resolution in Congress, the imperative to automate the light forces, and the realization of the limitations of the FIST DMD and Light TACFIRE, the Army revised its plan for automating the light forces in 1988-1989. The Army opted to buy a package of Light T ACFIRE Briefcase Terminals to receive, process, display, and transmit information; FIST DMDs; Forward Entry Devices (FED); and Digital Communication Terminals. While the modified FIST DMD with graphics capabilities, printer interface, keyboard interface, and expanded software with increased message formats would be used at the battalion and brigade fire support elements, dual Light TACFIRE briefcase terminals would be employed at the battalion fire direction center, the division fire direction center, and

10 Fcb 1988, HRDC; LTACFIRE Coordinating Paper, 1989, p. 6, HRDC; Report, subj: Independent Evaluation Report on the Lightweight T ACFIRE System Force Development Test and Experimentation, Apr 1991, p. 1, Light T ACFIRE File, HRDC; AFATDS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (S), t\1ar 1989, p. 1-3, matcrial used is unclassified; Voigt, "Lightening Up on TACFIRE," pp. 35-37, AFATDS File, HRDC. 27Mcnlorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager FSC3 First Quart~r FY 87 Report, 5 Jan 1987, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC Systcm Manager FSC3 First Quarter FY88 Report, 30 Dec 1987, HRDC; GAO Report, subj: Battlefield Automation, Ju11987, p. 17, UL503 U61, MSTL. 2KMemorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager FSC3 First Quarter FY 88 Report, 30 Dec 1987. HRDC; GAO Rcport, subj: Battlefield Automation, pp. 1,2,15,17, Ju11987, UL503 U61, MSTL. .50 .

the division main and fire support element. Providing the same capabilities as the Digital Communications Terminal scheduled to be fielded to the 7th Infantry Division and 82nd Airborne Division, the Forward Entry Device, a handheld terminal to compose, transmit, receive, edit, store, and display messages, would be part of the Army Tactical Command and Control System and would be given to the company fire support team, the forward observer, and battalion and division artillery commanders. Equally important, the Forward Entry Device would go to the Army's remaining five light divisions and the 29th Infantry Division of the Virginia Army National Guard. This combination of automated equipment would deliver a tactically deployable sy~tem to the light forces upon fielding and satisfy Congress. In essence, the Army accommodated Congress rather than making complete break with its 1985 plan. The 1988-1989 plan blended the desires of Congress and the Army into one program, but it was not the ideal solution because it basically failed to satisfy the automation requirements for the light forces and was acceptable only because AFATDS would be fielded shortly.29 However, Light TACFIRE software problems in 1989 set back the system's first fielding to 1990 with the last light division, the 29th Light Infantry Division, receiving the system in 1992.30 The inherent weaknesses of the FIST DMD and Light TACFIRE, the ongoing AFATDS software problems, the startling combat revelations of Operation Desert Storm of 1991 forced the development of a new TACFIRE replacement program.31 As operations in Desert Storm with the light divisions indicated, the FIST DMD was a bottleneck because it took too long to conduct a fire mission. Meanwhile, Operation Desert Storm also reaffirmed

29Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager FSC3 Third Quarter FY 88 Report, 30 Jun 1988, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, 16Feb 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Light Automation Update, 6 Apr 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, 8 Nov 1988, HRDC; Memorandum for TSM FSC3, 7 Jul 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Lightweight TACFIRE, 17 Sep 1991, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Lightweight TACFIRE, 17 Sep 1991, HRDC; "Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Dee 1990, pp. 51-52; "Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Dee 1989, pp. 65-67; "Light Division Artillery Automation," Field Artillery Magazine, Jun 1989, pp. 37-38; "IFSAS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1995, p. 44; "Interim Fire Support Automation System," Field Artillery Magazine, Jun 1992, pp.47-48. . 30Memorandum for~ec.ord, subj: LTACFIRE Status for Dr. Dastrup, undated, HRDC; 1990 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 246. 31 Interview, L. Martin Kaplan with Cpt Nolls, TSM FS~3, DCD, 28 Jan 1991, HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Office, Command and Control Systems, subj: User Urgency of Need Statement for the LTACFIRE, undated, HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Office, Command and Control Systems, subj: User Urgency of Need Statement for the LTACFIRE, 26 Feb 1990, HRDC; rv1emorandum for Program Executive Office, subj: User Urgency Statement to Support Conditional Release ofLTACFIRE, 29 Mar 1990, HRDC; Disposition Form with Enclosure, subj: Version Eight LTACFIRE Software, 13 Feb 1989, HRDC. 51 that TACFIRE was not sufficiently mobile.32 In 1991 the Field Artillery School responded with a program to correct fire direction automation deficiencies identified in Operation Desert Storm. Approved by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans-Force Development on 14 August 1991, the school's program, known as the Interim Fire Support Automation System (IFSAS), renamed the Initial Fire Support Automation System (lFSAS) in 1993, consisted of a Light TACFIRE Briefcase Terminal and a Lightweight Computer Unit (LCU) which was part of the common hardware for Army Tactical Command and Control System. According to the program, the Light T ACFIRE Briefcase Terminal and Lightweight Computer Unit with the ability to process a fire mission faster than the Battery Computer System would replace the Light TACFIRE Briefcase Terminal and the FIST DMD in the light division, while the Lightweight Computer Unit and the Light T ACFIRE Briefcase Terminal would replace the Variable Format Message Entry Device and battalion TACFIRE in the heavy division. Ultimately, this action would enhance mobility by moving the battalion fire direction center from a five-ton truck to a M577 vehicle, decrease operational and sustainment costs, get the obsolete TACFIR~ out o~the field at least f?ur years soone.r th.an i?itially plan~ed;permit the early use of the LIghtweIght Computer Umt, and allow dIstnbutlve processIng.'- Equally important, the plan would not require any new procurement and would improve fire support . command, control, and communications in the heavy and light forces.34 At the same time Desert Storm highlighted the Army National Guard's lack of automation beyond the Battery Computer System that hurt unit readiness and complicated communicating with active Army units. In light of this, the National Guard Bureau and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Army agreed in August 1991 to field IFSAS to the Army National Guard beginning in 1993 until AFATDS could be fielded in 2002. As planned, the program would adapt current Battery Computer System software to run on the Lightweight Computer Unit that would be given to all platoon or battery fire direction centers in Army National Guard units in 1992, while the battalion, brigade, and division fire direction centers would receive two Lightweight Computer Units with appropriate software. For the Army National Guard, the IFSAS program would allow converting to AFATDS five to seven years earlier than currently scheduled by simply changing to AFATDS software on the computers obtained for IFSAS and by adding hardware selectively, would ease the

32Briefing, subj: Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications Overview, 1991, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Rick Dies, Cpt Nolls, Maj Gerhart, and Maj Scott, TSM FSC3, 21 Feb 1992, HRDC. 33Briefing, subj: Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications Overview, 1991, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: TACFIRE Replacement Program, 10 Jul 1991, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Dies, Nolls, Gerhart, and Scott, 21 Feb 1992, HRDC; Issue Papers for Gen Frederick M. Franks, Jr., CG, TRADOC, 13-14 Dee 1991, p. 30, HRDC; "TACFIRE Alternjltive Provides Interim Automation," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 19Mar 1992, p. la, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Fire Direction Data Management, 14 Jan 1993, HRDC; "Goodbye, BCS and BUCS--Hello, LCU," Field Artillery Magazine, Apr 1993, pp. 38-39; "IFSAS Update," Field Artillerv Magazine, Feb 1995, p. 44. )4Msg, Cdr, USACAC, to PEO Command and Control Systems, subj: IFSAS, 181020Z Feb 1992, HRDC. 52

transition to AFATDS, and would totally automate its fire support for the first time.35 Testing IFSAS in 1993, however, indicated the existence of problems. Although the first testing conducted in April and May 1993 basically showed that the software worked, it, nevertheless, locked up on occasion, forcing the contractor to correct the deficiencies over the next several months. Subsequent testing in November and December 1993demonstrated the elimination of the "bugs" and led to releasing IFSAS software for fielding beginning in 1993 to Army National Guard units, heavy and light active Army units, and the U.S. Marines with fielding to be completed in 1996.36 Even before the deficiencies had been eliminated, the need for better strategic and tactical mobility to support power projection from the continental United States, an emerging concept after the Cold War had ended with its emphasis on reducing the number of United States' military forces overseas and stationing them stateside and decreasing budgets encouraged the Field Artillery School to recommend expanding IFSAS software capabilities beyond battalion-level functions to brigade, corps, and division levels.37 With a minor investment major software improvements could be achieved to permit replacing TACFIRE in the brigade, corps, and division with IFSAS and enhance mobility. Supporting upgrading the software for echelons above field artillery battalion, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Fred F. Marty (1991-1993), dispatched a message to the Army on 30 March 1993. "IFSAS is a real coup d'etat in system development. Will take less than two years from inception to begin fielding of first true automation of the total force fire support system," Marty enthusiastically wrote.38 Continuing, he explained, "[The] Concept will continue to expedite the upgrade of fire support automation to overcome shortcomings from Desert Storm .... [It is] important that we take this next step quickly.to insure near term readiness. Request authority to proceed with the toral replacement of BCD [brigade, corps, and division] TACFIRE. ,,39 As might be expected, Major General Marty found instant backing from the Program Executive Officer for Command and Control. In a message to the Army in April 1993, the Program Executive Officer stated, "The concept of a BCD interim fire support automated

35FactSheet, subj: Interim Fire Support Automation System, 17 lan 1992, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: AFATDS, 30 Sep 1991, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: IFSAS-National Guard, 31 Mar 1992, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: IFSAS-Active Units, 31 Mar 1992, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: The Evolution of Fire Support Tactical Automation, 18 Aug 1994, HRDC; Msg, DA to Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Replacement of Brigade, Corps, and Division TACFIRE, 181140Z Aug 1993, HRDC; "IFSAS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1995, pp. 44- 45. 36Interview, Dastrup with Nolls, TSM FSC3, 11 Feb 1994, HRDC; "IFSAS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1995, pp. 44-45. 37Msg, Cmdt, FASCH, to HQDA, subj: Replacement of BCD TACFIRE, 301500Z Mar 1993, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: Staff Input from IFSAS Subject Matter Expert in FSC3, 23 Mar 1995, HRDC. 3xMsg, Cmdt, FASCH, to Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations-Force Development, subj: Replacement of Brigade, Corps, and Divarty (BCD) TACFIRE, 30 1500Z Mar 1993, HRDC. 391bid. 53

system (lFSAS) is technically sound and doable. Procurement of BCD IFSAS to replace BCD TACFIRE would allow all TACFIRE assets to be removed from the Army's logistics system.,,40 In addition, the Program Executive Officer clarified, "If this effort is approved, work should be initiated as early as possible to avoid overlapping with AFATDS fielding, and match the timelines for active Army IFSAS fieldings .... Recommend HQDA approve this project and provide 3.7 million dollars to fund the required work.,,41 After careful consideration the Army approved expanding IFSAS software capabilities to include brigade, corps, and division field artillery functions in January 1994. Fielding such software beginning in 1995 involved upgrading units already with equipped with IFSAS software, eliminating T ACFIRE even before AFATDS was introduced, improving automated tactical and technical fire direction capabilities for the total force, overcoming fire support command, control, and communications shortcomings identified during Operation Desert Storm, and introducing distributive processing rather than relying upon a main computer to conduct automated date processing as had been done with TACFIRE.42 Introducing IFSAS therefore represented a significant breakthrough. It automated fire support for the Army National Guard and light forces, improved fire support command and control for the heavy forces, and permitted moving TACFIRE from the Army's inventory . sooner than initially planned. AUTOl\IATING THE HEAVY FORCES 'VITI I AFATDS As the dcbate over automating fire support in the light forces and the Army National Guard and expanding the capabilities oflFSAS beyond battalion-level functions unfolded in the 1980s and 1990s, the Army pushed forward with plans to dcvelop AFATDS for the heavy forces and thc high-intensity conflict. On 31 May 1984 the Army awardcd Magnavox a contract to produce the AFATDS concept and evaluation program software for testing in 1987 to dctermine its ability to perform fire support tasks, assess its interoperability with T ACFIRE, and decidc if full-scale development was reasonable.43

40 Msg, PEO Command and Control, to HQDA, subj: Replacement of BCD T ACFIRE, 151400Z Apr 1993, HRDC. 41/bid. 42/bid.; DA to PEO Command and Control, subj: Hardware Distribution to Support IFSAS, Jan 1994, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: IFSAS and Lightwcight T ACFIRE Software Intcrfaces,5 Jan 1994, HRDC; Memorandum for Project Manager, Field Artillery Tactical. Systems, subj: IFSAS BCD Software Requirements, 4 Mar 1994, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: The Evolution of Fire Support Tactical Automation, 18 Aug 1994, HRDC; Bricfing, subj: IFSAS, undated, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with David R. Schuckert, TSM FSC3, DCD, 13 Mar 1995, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: Staff Input from IFSAS Subject Matter Expert in FSC3, 23 Mar 1995, HRDC; Msg, HQDA to Cdr, TRADOC, et ai, subj: Hardware DistriQution to Support IFSAS, Jan 1994, HRDC; "IFSAS Update," Field Artillery Ma~azille, Feb 1995, p. 44; Memorandum for Record, subj: Staff Input from IFSAS Subject Matter Expert in FSC3, 23 Mar 1995, HRDC. 4JMemorandulll for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS Third Quarter FY 89 Report, 30 Jun 1989, HRDC; Mcmorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Letter of Transmittal: Report of the Concept Evaluation of the AFATDS, 18 Jul 1989, HRDC; 54

Technical problems and climbing costs, however, delayed testing the concept and evaluation program software until 1989. Analysis of the test conducted by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Test and Experimentation Command Field Artillery Board at Fort Sill, participants' comments and observations, and questionnaires validated the AFATDS concept. The AFATDS concept and evaluation program software would work with TACFIRE, the Battery Computer System, and other fire support systems. These capabilities led the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Raphael J. Hallada (1987- 1991), to write the commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in July 1989 about the AFATDS's ability to satisfy the Army's need for automated fire44 support command and control and prompted him to recommend full-scale development. Over the next several months, several key Department of Defense agencies also reached the same conclusion and approved acquiring AFATDS. In July 1989 the Army System Acquisition Review Council endorsed AFATDS and urged moving it into full-scale development subject to approval by Defense Acquisition Board. Based upon the council's backing, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army then advocated full-scale developrnent. Subsequently in September 1989, the Defense Acquisition Board which was the final approving authority directed the Army to move AFATDS software into full-scale development, to integrate it with selected Army Tactical Command and Control System common hardware and software, and to test and field it as soon as possible to meet the urgent need for a new automated system for technical and tactical fire direction for the heavy forces.45

Evaluation Report, AFATDS Concept Evaluation Executive Summary, Jul 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager AFATDS Third Quarter FY 90 Report, undated, HRDC; Report, subj: Early user Experimentation of AFATDS, Nov 1994, p. 1-2, AFATDS File, HRDC. 44Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS Third Quarter FY 89 Report, 30 Jun 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Letter of Transmittal: Report of the Concept Evaluation of the AFATDS, 18 Jul 1989, HRDC; Evaluation Report, AFATDS Concept Evaluation, Executive Summary, Jul 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager AFATDS Third Quarter FY 1990 Report, undated, HRDC; Report, subj: Early User Experimentation for AFATDS, Nov 1994, p. 1-2, AFATDS File, HRDC; Report, subj: FDTE for AFATDS, Jul 1994, Executive Sumn1ary, AFATDS File, HRDC. 45Report, subj: FDTE for AFATDS, Jul1994, Executive Summary, AFATDS File, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS Fourth Quarter FY 89 Report, 3 Oct 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for AFATDS, 11 Oct 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Command and Control Systems, subj: AAE Decision Memorandum-AFATDS, 21 Jul 1989, HRDC; Ltr, The Under Secretary of Defense to Honorable John P. Murtha, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 11 Oct 1989, HRDC; Ltr, The Under Secretary of Defense to Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, Subcommittee 'on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 11 Oct 1989, HRDC; Report, subj: Early User Experimentation for AFATDS, Nov 1994, p. 1-2, AFATDS File, HRDC. 55

To this end the Army signed a contract with Magnavox on 27 April 1990 to develop AFATDS software through a series orversions with each providing more capabilities than its 46 predecessor. Scheduled for fielding in 1992, version one software would update the software created for concept evaluation program testing, automate about 50 percent of the 321 fire support operational requirements, provide initial functionality for fielding at all echelons of fire support from the platoon to the corps, and furnish the ability to integrate field artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, and close air support into planning and execution. Version two would incorporate enhancements to version one capabilities, automate additional operational requirements, and be introduced in 1994, while version three software would be the objective software, automate all 321 fire support operational requirements, and supply complete fire support command, control and communications capabilities with an initial operational capability in 1996.47 ' According to the Field Artillery School in 1990, AFATDS embodied a complete departure from T ACFIRE and represented a significant technological breakthrough. While AFATDS would offer decentralized processing using office computers and computer networks and employ menus from which to pick tasks, TACFIRE depended upon centralized command and control at major field artillery command posts: battalion, division, and corps artillery. TACFIRE also taxed training because the operator had to memorize many formats' and legal entries and had to use them frequently to remember them. In comparison, AFATDS would be user friendly and would require less initial and sustainment training than TACFIRE.48

46Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS Fourth Quarters FY 89 Report, 3 Oct 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for AFATDS, 11 Oct 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Command and Control Systems, subj: AAE Decision Memorandum-AFATDS, 21 Jul 1989, HRDC; Ltr, The Under Secretary of Defense to Murtha, 11 Oct 1989, HRDC; Ltr, The Under Secretary of Defense to Inouye, 11 Oct 1989, HRDC; Evaluation Report, AFATDS Concept Evaluation, Executive Summary, Jul 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS First Quarter FY 90 Report, 4 Jan 1990, HRDC; ~1emorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS Third Quarter FY 89 Report, 30 Jun 1989, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC System Manager AFATDS Third Quarter FY 1990 Report, undated, HRDC. 47Evaluation Report, AFATDS Concept Evaluation, Executive Summary, Jul 1989, pp. I-I- 1-2, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS First Quarter FY 90 Report, 4 Jan 1990. HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADO,C, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS Third Quarter FY89 Report, 30 Jun 1989, HRDC; 1999 USAFACFS ACH, p. 153; Maj (Ret) Edward J. Stiles, "AFATDS: It's Not a New TACI1IRE." Field Artillery Maga:ine. Fcb 1992. pp. 39-41; Col Steven W. Boutelle, and Lt Col Ronald Filak, "AFATDS: The Fire Support Window to the 21 st Century," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1996, pp. 16-21. 48Interview, L. Martin Kaplan. Assistant Command Historian, with Roy Pennepacker, TSM AFATDS, 28 Jan 1991, HRDC; Stiles, "AFATDS: It's Not A New T ACFIRE," pp. 39- 41. 56 .

Almost immediately, technological complications slowed down development. Problems with version one software during technical testing in 1993 caused the first force development test and experimentation to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures to be moved from October 1993 to February 1994 and the initial operational test and evaluation to determine the system's effectiveness and suitability in an operational environment to be pushed back from May-June 1994 to July-September 1994. Additional software problems emerged in 1994, causing the initial operational test and evaluation to be moved back once again to mid-1995 to give the contractor sufficient time to fix them.49 After technical and operational testing in 1996 had indicated the resolution of the shortcomings, the Army fielded version one (renamed AFATDS 96 in 1996) in 1996-1997 to three division artilleries, three corps artilleries, two army fire support elements, three battlefield coordination detachments, an enhanced deep operations coordination cell, and Command Post Tango in Korea. Version one software furnished initial functionality at all echelons of fire support from the platoon to corps level and integrated field artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, and close air support into the planning and execution functions.5o To accommodate growing fire support requirements, the Army simultaneously revamped the AFATDS software fielding schedule in 1996. The Army decided to introduce AFATDS version two in three releases between 1997 and 1999 as AFATDS 97, AFATDS 98, and AFATDS 99, also called A99, and opted to field version three in 2000 as AFATDS 00, renamed AFATDS Version 7 that year to match the Army Battlefield Control System (ABCS), formerly called the Army Tactical Command and Control System, numbering convention of which AFATDS was a part. Fielded in 1998 to the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, 82nd Airborne Division Artillery, the 101st Airborne Division Artillery, and the 2nd Battlefield Coordination Detachment after software developmental delays, AFATDS 97 . provided corps and echelons-above-corps deep operations functionality, modified Multiple- Launch Rocket SystemJArmy Tactical Missile System command and control procedures, and enabled the Field Artillery to plan and execute deep battle operations faster and safer than ever before.51 After completing developmental work and correcting deficiencies, the Army introduced AFATDS 98 two years behind schedule in 2000. AFATDS 98 concentrated on

491995 USAFACFS ACH, p. 151; John Clancy and Maj Daniel P. Hughes, "New Technology for Force XXI Artillery," Army, Feb 1996, p. 52; Report, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, subj: AFATDS, FY 1995, AFATDS File, HRDC; Report, subj: AFATDS, 15 Dec 1995, p. 1-2, AFATDS File, HRDC. 50"AFATDS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 1998, p. 34; FY 1995 Report (Summary), Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, subj: AFATDS, HRDC; FY 1997 Report (Summary), Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, subj: AFATDS; Report, subj: Assessment Report for the Division XXX AWE, Ian 1998, HRDC. 51"AFATDS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 1998, p. 34; Msg, subj: Annual History Report, 2 Feb 1999, HRDC; Lt Col Douglas G. Beley, "AFATDS and the Task Force AWE," Field Artillery Magazine, lan-Feb 1998, p. 4; "AFATDS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, May-Iun 1998, p. 17; FY 1997 Report (Summary), Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, subj: AFATDS, HRDC; FY1998 Report (Summary), Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, subj: AFATDS, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: AFATDS, 1999, AFATDS File, HRDC. 57

U.S. Marine Corps/joint functionality, met Department of Defense computing standards, and facilitated greater interoperability among the armed 'services. Scheduled for release in 1999 but not fielded until 2002 to eliminate deficiencies that had appeared in testing, AFATDS 99/A99, renamed AFATDS 6 in 2002 to match the Army Battlefield Control System numbering convention, enhanced AFATDS's ability to compute tactical and technical fire direction. Specifically, AFATDS 6 reorganized and simplified menus and windows, streamlined plain text messages, enhanced alerts, created shortcuts, and incorporated technical fire direction. The new capabilities allowed eliminating the Battery Computer System for cannon artillery and. Fire Direction System for the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) because AFATDS 6 could pass mission requirements directly to the guns or !\1LRS launchers which would compute the technical fire direction solution. Also, this version demonstrated its interoperability with several allied fire support systems, including the French ATLAS, the German Adler, the Italian SIR, and the United Kingdom Bates, as a part of the Artillery Systems Cooperative Activity in 2002.52 As fielding AFATDS 6.3.1 that was designed to work with the Effects Management Tool, a notebook computer designed to hook into AFATDS to facilitate access and end manually inputting Excel spread sheets and powerpoint slides from target acquisition people into AFATDS and to replace AFATDS 6 progressed in 2003-2004, the Army moved forward, with AFATDS 6.4, formerly called AFATDS 7. Pushing to automate all Army units, the Chief of Staff of the Army made Army Battlefield Control System 6.4 the minimum standard. To ensure full integration with Army Battlefield Control System 6.4, the Field Artillery School started working on AFATDS 6.4 in 2003-2004 with the goal of fielding it in 2005.5~ . In the midst of fielding AFATDS, the Field Artillery School reaffirmed the system's significant contribution to fire support. In 1998 the assistant TRADOC System Manager for

52Lt Col John L. Haithcock, "AFATDS Effects Management Tool," Field Artillery MaKazille, Nov-Dec 2003, pp. 40-43; Briefing, subj: Fire Support's Center of Gravity, 31 Oct 2000, HRDC; "AFATDS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 2000, U.S. Army Weapon Systems (Extract), pp. 19-20; FY2001 Annual Report (Extract), Director of Evaluation and Testing, HRDC; Maj Alford J. Williams, "AFATDS Gunnery: Technical Fire Direction," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 2002, pp. 24-28; Beley, "AFATDS and the Task Force AWE: Insights for Fire Support Leaders," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 1998, p. 4; Msg, subj: Annual History Report, 2 Feb 1999, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: AFATDS, 29 Oct 1998, HRDC; Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2000 Annual Report (Extract), sub]': AFATDS, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Fire Support's Center of Gravity, 31 Oct 2000, HRDC; Col James G. Boatner, Jr., "\Vhat the Commander Needs to Know about Guidance in AFATDS," Field Artillery Jrfagazine, Mar-Apr 2002, pp'. 24-28; Interview, Dastrup with William Sailers, Dcp Dir, TSM FATDS, 13 Mar 03, HRDC; 2000 USA~ACFS ACH, p. 155; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; Email, subj: ABCS and ATCCS, 14 Jun 2005, in AFATDS File, HRDC. 5JInterview with atch, Dastrup with William D. Sailers, Dep Dir, TSM FATDS, 23 Peb 2005, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: FDIC Input to CG Semi-Monthly Update for 22 Dec 2004, 28 Dec 2004, HRDC; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113,2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101. .58 .

AFATDS, Lieutenant Colonel DouglasG. Beley, cogently described the impact. Based upon existing and future capabilities, Lieutenant Colonel Beley postulated a paradigm shift in fire control. With TACFIRE or IFSAS the fire direction center where the fire direction officer was located served as the nucleus for planning and delivering fires. In AFATDS units the fire support officer's role expanded to "focus the artillery fight during both planning and execution. ,,54 The brigade fire support officer who served as the principal advisor to the force commander on fire support matters could orchestrate the field artillery battle using AFATDS fire support tools.55 "Many activities and, more importantly, fire support decisions traditionally expected of the fire direction officer [would] become the FSO's [fire support officer]. Decisions to modify attack guidance and priority of fires now can be made and implemented at the brigade FSE [fire support element]," Lieutenant Colonel Beley wrote in the January-February 1998 edition of Field Artillery Magazine.56 Ultimately, the key to massing battalion fires and focusing fires to support the brigade commander would be the responsibility of a well-trained brigade and battalion fire support officer and not the fire direction officer in the fire direction center who often was the operations officer (S-3). The fire direction officer not only supervised the fire direction center but also served as the fire direction officer. That individual decided when and where to mass fires, selected the firing units, and determined or approved the number of rounds for a mission. With AFATDS the fire support officer could make those decisions as required and tie fire support more closely to the needs of the maneuver commander.57 Meanwhile, training soldiers on AFATDS proved to be more challenging than initially anticipated. Under the AFATDS development and fielding concept, the unit received the complete hardware package just prior to new equipment training. However, the Army did not deliver the objective software. It delivered AFATDS software in a series of versions with each building on the previous one.58 This fielding format produced training challenges. Units had to train and qualify operators at fielding, had to furnish sustainment training on existing software, and then had to provide training on each software version as it was deli vered. Just as they were becoming accustomed to a particular version, they recei ved new software.59 After receiving initial training, the unit then had to furnish sustainment training. The TRADOC System Manger for Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems recommended sixteen hours of such training a week because TACFIRE training had taught the necessity of consistent weekly training; and AFATDS was no different. The AFATDS operator had to know every nuance of the computer to employ the system effectively in combat. This level of proficiency could only be attained through command emphasis and scheduled training.

54Beley, "AFATDS and the Task Force XXI AWE," p. 5. 55Field l\lanual 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, 1984, p. 2-10. 56Beley, "AFATDS and Task Force XXI AWE," p. 5. 57 Ibid.; Field Manual 6-20-1, Field Artillery Cannon Battalion, 1983, pp. 1-I2, 1-17, 1-18; Field Manual 6-20, Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques, 1958, p. 190; Cpt Gary B. Griffin, "Wanted: Battalion FDO," Field Artillery Jounzal, Jan-Feb 1980, pp. 59-60. 5HBeley,"AFATDs and the Task Force AWE," p. 4; Memorandum for Command Historian's Office, subj: Access to Oral History Materials, 13 Apr 1998, HRDC. 59Beley, "AFATDS and the Task Force AWE," pp. 3-4. 59

Given the operational tempo of the Army and U.S. Marine corps, Major Alford J. Williams of the TRADOC System Manager of Field Artillery Tactical Systems explained early in 2000 that sustainment training would be challenging because of the difficulty of finding the •• • 60 reqUisite tIme. Just before leaving as Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General David P. Valcourt, reiterated Major Williams's concern. In June 2005 Major General Valcourt found AFATDS to be laborious and difficult to use. AFATDS was supposed to be user friendly and reduce initial and especially sustainment training in contrast to T ACFIRE that was not user friendly and required extensive initial and sustainment training. AFATDS failed to reduce sustainment training time. Much of this stemmed the decision to deliver the software in versions. Everytime that a soldier had just learned AFATDS, a new software version was delivered; and this meant more training.61 To augment AFATDS, to improve mobility that was becoming increasingly n10re important as it moved into the twenty-first century, and to improve the capabilities of early- entry forces, the Army, meanwhile, pursued hand-held devices. Beginning in 2002, the Army began investigating the Palm Forward Entry Device (PFED) and the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (LWTFDS) for fielding.62 A small, one-channel communications capable, portable computer for the forward observer in all divisions, the Palm Forward Entry Device which was compatible with AFATDS allowed the forward observer to request or coordinate fire missions, provide combat information, receive orders and information, and interface with laser devices. Initially, the Field Artillery and the Army planned fielding the Palm Forward Entry Device beginning in March 2004 or April 2004 but moved up that date to February 2004 to equip the 3-7th Field Artillery before it deployed to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).63 Designed to support airborne, air assault, light fighter units, and rapid deployment forces, the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System, also called Centaur, used palm-size computer hardware similar to the PFED, furnished redundancy to AFATDS and the Battery Computer System, was scheduled to replace the Battery Computer Systen1 hosted on the Lightweight Computer Unit, and was a stand-alone device. Upon being fielded in 2004 starting with the 3-7th Field Artillery and 7-25th Field Artillery, both from the 25th Infantry Division, Centaur provided early-entry automated fire support capabilities, technical fire control for light fire direction centers and cannon firing platoon leaders, and computed automated safety.64

6°"AFATDS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 2000, p. 9. 610ral Histroy Interview with Maj Gen David P. Valcourt, 21 Jun 2005, p. 9, BRDC. 622002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113. 6J2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 113-14; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Sailers, 23 Feh 2005, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: PFED, undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Effects Systel\ls, undated, HRDC; TRADOC News Service, "Field Artillery Fielding Preps 25th Infantry Division for Operation Iraqi Freedom Rotation 3 Deployment," 16 Mar 2004, HRDC. 642003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 114; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Sailers, 23 Feb 2005, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Effects Systems, undated, HRDC; Cpt Curtis Hill, "Centaur Lightweight Technical Fire Direction System," TSM FATDS Quarterly, Mar 2004, HRDC. 60 .

Although the Army and Field Artillery were introducing technology to augment AFATDS and had not yet fielded the objective AFATDS 6.4 software to the entire force as of early 2005, the introduction of AFATDS culminated years of effort to provide decentralized, automated tactical and technical fire direction. Army and field artillery officers of the mid-1950s initially envisioned using computers to calculate tactical and technical fire direction, wanted to link them into a fire support system, and hoped to tie field artillery computers with other computers. In the 1960s they tried to make this dream a reality with FIELD ATA software and hardware that would automate and bind various army functions, including fire support, into a system to improve command, control, and communications. However, the FIELDAT A concept was never implemented because the Vietnam War diverted funding and energy and because the state of technology in the 1950s and 1960s precluded linking computers into a network. As a result, the Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer and the Tactical Fire Direction System only provided stand alone capabilities and could not be tied into a network of computers. Tactical and technical fire direction as part of an integrated computer system did not become a reality until the technology and funding became available in the 1970s and 1980s to create a system of compatible computers and software, such as AFATDS and the Army Tactical Command and Control System/Army Battlefield Control System of the 1990s. With AFATDS and the Army Tactical Command and Control System/Army Battlefield Control System automated technical and tactical fire direction and a system of computers became a reality for the first time, but AFATDS never reduced the training time required to be proficient and therefore did not live up to one of the key reasons for developing the system-- making automated tactical and technical fire direction more user friendly. This gave AFATDS a mixed legacy of enhancing fire support command and control but failing to reduce initial and sustainment training. 61

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is limited to commercially published books and articles. For government reports, messages, fact sheets, interviews, and other forms of primary source material please see the footnotes. Articles "A Report Card-Making," Field Artillery Journal, November-December 1986, pp. 14-15. "ADPS," Artillery Trends, September 1960, pp. 3-7. "AFATDS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, March-April 1998, p. 34. "AFATDS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, January-February 2000, p. 5. "AFATDS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, March-April 2000, p. 9. Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Armed Services and American Strategy, 1945-1953," in Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds., Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986. Antoine, Valerie, "FADAC Zeroes In," Army Information Digest, January 1965, p. 55. "ArnlY Backs AFATDS Bid," Defense News, 10 August 1987, p. 1. Arn, Lt Col Robert E. "The Electronic Gun Data Computer, T-29," Combat Forces Journal, November 1953, pp. 27-28. "Automated Fire Direction Instruction in USAF AS," Field Artillery Journal, September- October 1985, pp. 18-19. Beley, Lt Col Douglas G., "AFATDS and Task Force AWE: Insights for Fire Support Leaders," Field Artillery !'tlagazine, January-February 1998, p. 4. Beverley, Cpt William W., "T ACFIRE," The Field Artilleryman, August 1971, pp. 25-34. Boutelle, Col Steven W. and Lt Col Ronald Filak, "AFATDS: The Fire Support Window to the 21 st Century," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1996, pp. 16-21. Brown, Maj Gen Charles P., "T ACFIRE," Artillery Trends, May 1968, p. 20. Brown, Richard F., "The Battery Computer System," Field Artillery Journal, March-April 1979, pp. 42-46. "BUCS As Backup," Field Artillery Journal, February 1988, pp. 2-3. Cahalane, Lt Col Robert E. "Field Artillery Gun Data Computers," Trends in Artillery for Instruction, February 1958, p. 32. Campbell, Col Charles T. "Rapid-Fire Answers," Army Infonnati01l Digest, December 1958, p.55. Cathcart, K. Patrick, "T ACFIRE Deployment and Training," Field Artillery Journal, January-February 1981, pp. 8-13. Chancy, Cpt John M., Don Giulano, and Dean Johnson, "The Hand-Held Calculator: A Status Report," Field Artillery Jounwl, ~1arch-April 1979, pp. 30-32. Clancy, John and Maj Daniel P. Hughes, "New Technology for Force XXI Artillery,''' Army, February 1996, p. 52. "Computer Code by the Numbers," Artillery Trends, September 1960, p. 91. Crosby, Maj Gen John S., "On the Move," Field Artillery Journal, January-February 1985, p. 1. Daun Van EE. "From the New Look to Flexible Response, 1953-1964," in Kenneth J. Hagan and William B. Roberts, eds., Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American 62 .

Military History from Colonial Times to the Present. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986. Diggs, Col Jack F., "The White Plan," Artillery Trends, March 1961, p. 10. "Electronic Computer," Combat Forces Journal, November 1951, p. 43. Ellis, Maj John A. and Maj Daniel J. McCormick, "AFATDS Future: Fire Support C2 for the Next Generation," Field Artillery Magazine, September-October 1996, p. 16. "FADAC Maintenance," Field Artillery Journal, September-October 1980, p. 35. "Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Updates," Field Artillery Magazine, December 1989, pp. 65-67. "Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update," Field Artillery Magazine, December 1990, pp. 51-52. "Field Artillery Gun Data Computers," Trends in Artillery, February 1958, pp. 32-33. "Fieldata Aids for the Command Post of the Future," Army lnfonnation Digest, March 1962, p.19. "First Round Hits with FADAC," Artillery Trends, September 1960, pp. 8-9. Flint, Roy K. "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," in Charles E. Heller and William E. Stofft, eds., America's First Battles: 1776-1965. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986. Fox, Cpt Donald C. Fox, "Automatic Data Processing Systems," Trends in Artillery, February 1958, pp. 14-15. Fritz, Maj Martell, "Common Mistakes with FADAC," The Field Artilleryman, November 1969, pp. 63-66. "Future Shooting: Automated Artillery," Artillery. Trends, September 1.960,pp. 56-57. "Gadget Wanted," Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dee 1939, p. 552. Gahagan, Cpt Larry D. and Donald J. Giuliano, "Computer Set, Field Artillery, General," Field Artillery Journal, July-August 1980, pp. 15-16. Gilbert, Maj Robert E., "FADAC," Artillery Trends, May 1968, p. 45. "Goodbye, BCS and BUCS- Hello, LCU," Field Artillery Magazine, April 1993, pp. 38- 39. Griffing, Cpt Gary B., "Wanted: Battalion FDO," Field A rtillery Journal, January-February 1980, pp. 59-60. Hallada, Maj Gen Raphael J., "The Field Artillery State-of-the-Branch Address," Field Artillery Magazine, December 1988, p. 3. Hibbs, Maj Gen Louis E. "Report on the Field Artillery Conference," Field Artillery Jounuzl, July 1946, pp. 407-13. Hill, Cpt Curtis, "Centaur Lightweight Technical Fire Direction System," TSM FATDS Quarterly, Mar 2004. "How FIELDAT A Computers Achieve Tactical Capabilities," Artillery Trends, Septembe.r 1960, p. 42. "IFSAS Update," Field Artillery Magazine, February 1995, p. 44. "Incoming," Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1978, p. 4. "Interim Fire Support Automation," Field Artillery Magazine, June 1992, pp. 47-48. "In With the Old," Field Artillery Journal, September-October 1986, pp. 3-4. James, Cpt Gerard G., "TACFIRE," Field Artillery Journal, July-August 1975, pp. 28-33. "Journal Interviews Major General Albert B. Akers," Field Artillery Journal, March-April 63

1978, p. 14. Karabell, Zachary, "Cold War: External Course," in John Whiteclay Chambers II, editor in chief, The Oxford Companion to American A1ilitary History, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Kempf, Karl, "Electronic Computers within the Ordnance Corps," extract, November 1961, HRDC. Lanza, Col Conrad H. "Perimeters in Paragraphs," Field Artillery Journal, May 1946, pp. 297-305. Laudati, Cpt Roger C. and Cpt Theodore B. Patterson, "Artillery Support: Push Button Style," Infantry, May-J une 1964, p. 71. "Light Division Artillery Automation," Field Artillery Magazine, June 1989, pp. 37-38. Ludvigsen, Eric C., "Harnessing the Computer," Army, June 1974, p. ,II. Manus, Michael ~1., "Manual versus Automatic," Field Artillery Jounzal, May-June 1980, p. "..... Martin, Maj John E., "T ACFIRE: Where Do We Go From Here," Field Artillery Journal, January-February 1979, p. 13. Merritt, ~1aj Gen Jack N., "On the Move," Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1979, p. 2. Milden, Lt Gen Frank T., "From Mekong to DMZ: A Fighting Year for the U.S. Army's Best," Army, November 1968, p. 88. Miller, George E. "TACFIRE: An Innovation in Artillery," Armor, July-August 1972, pp. 9- 10. Mitchell, Cpt Randall A. and Cpt Al Cunniff, "Bringing BUCS to Battle," Field Artillery Journal, July-August 1985, p. 29. "National Guard AFATDS Fielding and Training," Field Artillery Magazine, July-August 2000, p. 35. Myers, Cpt Reed E., "Progress Report: FADAC," Artillery Trends, February 1962, p. 55. "Need for Electronic Computers," Trends in Artillery for Instruction, June 1957, p. 19. "News of the Services," Combat Forces Journal, November 1951, p. 43. "No 'Magic' Still Fiscal," Artillery Trends, September 1960, p. 93. Ott, Maj Gen David E., "Forward Observations," Field Artillery Journal, July-August 1975, p.6. Patrick, Cpt John F., "The Lost Art of Tactical Fire Direction," Field Artillery Journal, October 1989, pp. 29-31. Ray, Edward D. "T ACFIRE: A Quantum Leap in FA Data Processing," Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1979, pp. 54-57. ' "Response to 'In With the Old,'" Field Artillery Journal, August 1987, pp. 2-3. "Response to 'The Battery Commander's Method of Fire Direction,'" Field Artillery Magazine, February 1988, pp. 2.,). Ringer, Ltc Matthew J. and ~1aj rv1artell D. Fritz, "FADAC Computations versus 'Manual Computations," The Field Artilleryman, April 1969, pp. 40-43. "Road~to Good Decision Through Computer," Artillery Trends, September 1960, pp. 16-17. Rogers, Ltc Henry M., "The Role of Electronics in Warfare," A1ilitaryReview, July 1949, pp. 23-27. Slater, Col Paul A. and Col John A. Seitz, "Backup for Survival," Field Artillery Journal, September-October 1982, p. 25. 64 .

Spiragelli, Maj Raymond and Maj Martell Fritz, "Here Comes TACFIRE," The Field Artilleryman, November 1969, p. 67. Stiles, Edward J., "AFATDS: It's Not A New TACFIRE," Field Artillery Magazine, February 1992, pp. 39-41. Stratman, Cpt Henry W., et ai, "The Hand-held Calculator: rvteeting Today's Needs Today," Field Artillery Journal, January-February 1980, pp. 8-13. "TACFIRE," Signal, November 1973, p. 32. "TACFIRE Alternative Provides Interim Automation," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 19March 1992, p.la. "TACFIRE to be Issued," Field Artillery Journal, January-February 1977, p. 22. "TACFIRE Update," Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1980, p. 29 "The Computer Story: Speed and Accuracy," Artillery Trends, September 1960, pp. 30-31. "The World Situation and the Preservation of Peace," Field Artillery Jounlal, July-August 1947, pp. 212-13. "Transition to BCS," Field Artillery Journal, March-April 1979, p. 38. Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. "Report on the United Nations," FieldArtillery Journal, May 1946, pp.279-82. Stuart, Cpt Douglas B., "Computer, Gun Direction, MI8," Artillery Trends, October 1962, p.16. Urna, Ltc Henry D., "AFATDS: Its Closer Than You Think," Field Artillery Journal, May-J une 1987, pp. 32-33. Van de Velde, Ltc Louis R. "Computers for Artillery," Army, April 1960, pp. 52-58. Velton, Maj Michael E. and Donald J. Giuliano, "BUCS: A Backup Computer System for Technical Fire Direction," Field Artillery Journal, March-April 1983, pp. 30-22. Voigt, Cpt Suzann W., "Lightening Up On TACFIRE," Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1987, pp. 32-33. . Warner, Maj James I., "The Next Step: Automatic Data Processing," The FieldArtilleryman, March 1971~pp. 55-59. __ . "Automatic Data Processing," Field Artilleryman, March 1971, p. 55. Weik, Martin H. "The ENIAC Story," Ordnance 45(1961): 471-75. White, Glenn L. "An Introduction to Digital Computers," Military Engineer, May-June 1964, pp. 168-73. Wilson, Col Leland A and Col Kenneth S. Heitzke, "The Computer on Future Battlefields," Army, June 1974,pp.15-17. Wurman, Col James W., "Fire Direction Center and FADAC," Field Artillery Joun1al, May- June 1980, p. 2. Books Adler, Irving. Thinking Machines: A Layman's Introduction to Logic, Boolean Algebra, and Computers. New York: The John Day Company, 1961. Bacevich, Andrew J. The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1986. Dastrup, Boyd L. King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992, reprinted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994. Hewes, James E. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900- 65

1963. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975. Kempf, Karl. Electronic Computers lvithin the Ordnance Corps. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Aberdeen Proving Ground, 1961. Matloff, Maurice. American Military History. Washington DC: The U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985. Patterson, James T. Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Perret, Geoffrey. A Country Made by ~Var:From the Revolution to Vietnam, The Story of America's Rise to POl1:er.New York: Random House, 1989. Raines, Rebecca R. Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S.Anny Signal Corps. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996. Stenvsaag, James T., ed., Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1998. Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1998. Thomas, Shirley. Computers: Their History, Present Applications, and Future. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1965. Vetock, Dennis J. Lessons Learned: A History of u.s. Army Lesson Learning. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988. Ward, J.W.D. and G.N. Turner. Military Data Processing and Microcomputers. New York: Brassey's Publishers Ltd., 1982. Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984. 66

INDEX

A

Aberdeen Proving Ground, 13 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60 Akers, Maj Gen Albert B., 31 Army Tactical Command and Control System, 43 Arn, Lt Col Robert E., 8 Automatic Data Systems within the Army (ADSAF), 25, 26, 32

B

Balmer, Brig Gen Jesmond D., 2, 3 BASICPAC Computer, 20, 22 Backup Computer System, 35 Battery Computer System, 29, 30, 34, 35,42,45,46,47,53 Battery Display Unit, 25, 28, 29,.31 Beley, Lt Col Douglas G., 57, 58 Brachman, R.J., 14 Brown, Maj Gen Charles P., 25 c

Cahalane, Lt Col Robert E., 8, 12 Conahan, Frank C., 44 Crawford, Maj Gen A.B. Jr., 27, 28

D

DePuy, Gen William E., 28 Devers, Lt Gen Jacob L., 3 Diggs, Col John F., 21 Digital Communications Terminal, 42, 46, 47 Digital Message Device, 30, 31, 38 Downer, Col John W. 2

E

Echelberger, Brig Gen Donald E., 17 Eckert, J. Prester, 6 Electronic Numerical Integrator Computer (ENIAC), 6 67

F

Fancher, Col Louis C., 34 FIELDAT A Computers, 19, 20, 21, 22, 59 Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer (FADAC), 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,20,21,22,23,24,26,28,29,60 Fire Support Team Digital ~1essage Device, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50 Fixed Format Message Entry Device, 25, 30 Flint, Roy, 1 Fort Sill, 2 Forward Entry Device, 49 Frankfort Arsenal, 11 Fritz, Maj Martell, 15, 16

G

Gloriod, Lt Col John A., 36 graphic firing table, 4

II

HaJlada, Maj Gen Raphael J., 37, 54 Harris, Cpt Walter R., 30 Harrison, Maj Gen \ViJliam H., 46 Heath, Col H.T., 4 Helmick, Brig Gen Charles G., 4 Hennessey, Col Bruce L., 31 Hibbs, Maj Gen Louis E., 5

I

INFORtv1ER Computer, 20, 22 Initial Fire Support Automation System (lFSAS), 50, 51, 52, 57 Interim Fire Support Automation System (lFSAS), 50

J

Jenkins, Maj P.T., 34 Johnson, Gen Harold K., 25 Joulwan, Maj Gcn George A., 36

K

Kane, Maj R.A., 3, 4 Keith, Maj Gen Donald R., 31 68

Kenney, Brig Gen John J., 16 King, Lt Col William I., 8, 9 Kleypas, Col Kenneth A., 33 .Koethe, Cpt Richard D. III, 36, 37

L

Lautadi, Cpt Roger C., 14 Lightweight Computer Unit, 51 Light Tactical Fire Direction System (Light TACFIRE), 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51 Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System, 59

M

Manus, Michael, 17 Martel, Maj Fritz, 26 Marty, Maj Gen Fred F., 52 Mauchly, Dr. John W., 6 McCallister, Maj Gen Robert C., 29 McCarty, Col Douglas W., 33 Merritt, Maj Gen Jack N., 32 MOBIDIC Computer, 20, 22 M15 Gun Data Computer, 1,8,9, 10, 11 o

O'Donnell, Lt Gen James D., 19 Ott, Maj Gen David E., 27, 28 p

Palm Forward Entry Device, 59 Patterson, Cpt Theodore B., 14 Pearson, Col Paul F., 28 Pickard, Maj A.D. III, 15, 33 Porter, Maj Gen Bobby B., 45

Q

Quayle, Sen Dan, 44

R

Ray, Edward D., 24 Ringer, Lt Col Matthew J., 15, 16 69 s

Seitz, Col John A., 17 Sperry-Rand Corporation, 10, 11 Spigarelli, ~laj Raymond, 26

T

Tactical Fire Direction System CTACFIRE), 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,36,37,38,39,40,41,43,52,53,55,57 Tyler, George W., 27 u

United States Army Electronics Proving Ground, 19,21 United States Army Field Artillery School, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16,21,24,35,36,37, 55,57 U.S. Army Field Forces, 8 United States Army Ground Forces, 6, 7 United States Continental Army Command, 11, 13, 19,20 United States Forces, European Theater, 1,3,6 v

Valcourt, Maj Gen David P., 58 Van de Velde, Lt Col Louis R., 12, 21 Variable Format Message Entry Device, 25, 38, 45, 51

\V

White Plan I and II, 21 Williams, Maj Alford J., 58 Wurman, Col James W., 17, 18