“Doesn’t Feel Warmer to Me”

Climate Change and Fear in American Public Opinion

Clara DeHart Honors Thesis in Political May 2020

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INTRODUCTION

Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence supporting the existence of anthropogenic change, a significant minority of the American public continues to deny this reality. There are a variety of explanations for this denial, the most obvious being the concerted effort made by companies to intentionally mislead the public. But beneath this overt manipulation of public opinion, there are also undercurrents of emotion, especially fear, guiding Americans towards a skeptical outlook on climate science and pushing them from being opposed to policies to denying its existence. Not only is there a fear of economic decline and job loss that could arise from emissions regulations, but also a more existential fear of losing America’s place in the world and the individual’s place in American society.

This paper begins with a theoretical assessment of the nature of emotions and their influence on , especially in the context of in the . From this assessment of the power of “emotional logic” on opinion formation, I argue that emotions, especially fear, have an important role in climate change denial in the United States. After addressing the potential sources of this fear, namely support of ideology and a desire to prevent changes to the “American way of life,” Section II approaches this relationship from an empirical perspective using 2016 American National

Elections Studies (ANES) survey data. Methodology is examined as I determine how best to operationalize the feelings of fear I anticipate to be related to climate change denial. For the purpose of this analysis, I attempt to measure fear and concern about climate change from a variety of angles. With belief in climate change as my dependent variable, I examine this measure alongside free market ideology, financial and personal insecurity, and belief in the American “way of life” as a unique lifestyle.

In relation to this research, my predictions are that both support for free market values and a desire to “protect” America from societal changes will be positively associated with climate change denial, that those who hold these views will as a whole be more likely to ignore the realities of climate change. These hypotheses are made on the basis that fear, which seeps into economic ideology and American identity, will predispose individuals to follow a sort of emotional logic, rather than making 2 a fact-based decision, that pushes them to rationally deny the existence of climate change. These variables are obviously approximations of the deeper question of fear I am attempting to understand, and are therefore used as proxy measures that may be able to pick up various facets of the more intangible feelings of fear I am addressing. As a result, the conclusions drawn from this analysis are not definitive proofs of relationships but rather exploratory efforts meant to initiate discussion on the potential role of fear, as well as other emotions, on environmental attitudes and climate change denial. While many scholars have examined climate change denial in the U.S., few have focused in this way on the role of emotion and ideology, making this research an important step towards understanding the way emotion especially fear, plays a role in political decisions and attitudes. In the final section, I discuss my results in the context of my earlier hypotheses and offer suggestions relating to the of climate science based on my results, in the hopes of coming to a better understanding of how the reality of climate change can be communicated in a way that reduces individuals’ fear and as a result their denial of climate change.

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SECTION I

BACKGROUND ON CLIMATE CHANGE

To understand the phenomenon of climate change denial in the United States, it is first necessary to establish that scientifically speaking, it is clear that climate change is a real threat. According to the

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “warming of the climate is unequivocal” and humans are largely to blame (IPCC 2014, 2). Reputable scientists definitively conclude that since the Industrial

Revolution, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (and the Earth’s temperature) have increased at a rate unprecedented in human history. Climate change has already impacted weather patterns, and chances of severe weather are expected to increase as a result of further warming (IPCC

2014, 8).

Despite the scientific consensus on the reality and threats of global climate change, the American public continues to be skeptical. Based on the Yale program’s research, 67% of

Americans currently “believe climate change is happening” (Marlon et al. 2019). This proportion has been steadily rising over the years, but is still markedly lower than the percentage in other countries, and much lower than the nearly universal consensus held by climate scientists (Poushter and Huang 2019).

When the survey questions were refined to ask whether respondents believe climate change is caused mainly by human activities, the percentage of believers drops to 53%, and those who are concerned that climate change will personally harm themselves is reduced to a minority of 42% (Marlon et al. 2019) .

Only 12% of Americans estimate that there is at least a 90% consensus among scientists that climate change is happening (Van der Linden et al. 2015, 1). In reality, more than 97% of scientists agree that it is not only happening but is caused primarily by human actions. This problem is confounded by the recent 4 trend of influential politicians dismissing the views of experts as elitist, increasing the perception of that members of the public see in regards to climate change. Once exposed to this false notion of uncertainty, many Americans simply accept the views of their political group leaders on the issue

(Beles et al. 2019, 118). Given these statistics, it becomes clear that there is a significant discrepancy between the realities of climate change and many Americans’ recognition of these risks.

WHY DENY CLIMATE CHANGE?

MISINFORMATION AND BIASES

Americans are prone to climate change denial for a variety of reasons. The most obvious source of uncertainty is the plethora of (and ) available. This is especially seen in publications from conservative media sites and think tanks, which aim to sow doubt about climate science and shift the public narrative on climate change (Lewandowsky et al. 2019, 125). In the last few decades, the Internet has allowed for an even greater proliferation of material relating to climate change, creating an information-rich environment that “place[s] information under the forces of cognitive selection” (Hills

2019, 323). Individuals who are initially skeptical of climate science find an abundance of information online that reinforces their doubts. Through a process known as “belief-consistent selection,” they are prone to select this information over other information that would lead them to question their beliefs

(Hills 2019, 324).

The media’s portrayal of climate change has also muddied the debate around global warming.

While climate change has become more present in mainstream news and media organizations, it is continually in flux along with other news topics demanding network’s attention. When the media devotes a large amount of attention to climate change, for example following ’s An Inconvenient , public concern for the issue increases, but quickly dissipates as soon as the media loses interest and begins to focus on other things (Mazur 2019, 619). The also perpetuates uncertainty about the reality of climate change through the journalistic norm of balance. While giving equal time to both sides of an issue is both admirable and necessary when discussing questions of public policy or opinion, it is 5 not beneficial when discussing an issue of fact. For many years, media organizations have addressed climate change as a debate, giving a voice to both believers and deniers. Although the reality of climate change is something that has been all but proven by scientists, this “balanced” reporting that considers both the scientific and denialist side of the issue is in fact promoting a form of information bias (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 126). By promoting the conception that climate change is not a settled fact, this effort at balance contributes to the public uncertainty around climate change and makes it easier for individuals to deny climate change.

Initial is further enforced by fossil fuel companies, politicians, and other public figures who have an interest in delaying actions to prevent climate change. When individuals see those they identify as leaders rejecting climate change policies, they often use these cues to determine their own beliefs (Beles et al. 2019, 119). This issue is magnified by some industries’ and politicians’ intentional efforts to sow doubt about the science behind climate change. Sometimes referred to as the “ strategy” (named after the misleading campaigns and manipulation by tobacco companies trying to hide the dangers of ), these companies cherry-pick data on climate change to fit their platform and created the impression of controversy by demanding that their (knowingly false) understanding of the issue be given press coverage (Dessler 2016).

FEAR OF ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE

While it is easy to come to the conclusion that climate change deniers are either misinformed or simply too stubborn or stupid to accept reality, this conclusion would miss the deeper emotional and ideological forces that guide deniers’ decision-making processes. Instances of fear are likely part of any understanding of climate change, since even those who accept its existence must recognize the catastrophic consequences it may entail (Reser and Bradley 2017, 22). For deniers, fear approaches from a different angle, instead drawing from the social, political, and economic changes necessary to adequately address these threats. Endangering their ideology, identity, and the so-called American way of 6 life, responses to climate change have come to be viewed by some as more dangerous than climate change itself.

To assess this fear, more must be understood about what exactly drives this aversion to climate policy. The most broadly accepted method to mitigate climate change is to reduce emissions, which can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Transitioning to greener sources of , such as wind or solar, provides one option, while simply reducing our energy consumption would also be effective. To accomplish these goals, some form of energy policy would be needed that puts a greater priority on emissions reductions so as to effectively implement these changes1 (Dessler 2016). Some argue for the establishment of a cap-and-trade program, where emission reductions are incentivized through emitters’ abilities to buy and trade emissions allowances. Others advocate for more direct government control of emissions, which could be accomplished through direct regulations. Dealing with climate change on a global scale raises even more complications, since it is uncertain who should pay for the costs of adaption and mitigation. This short summary provides a quick overview of the many options available to curb global warming, all of which require some form of societal change to occur: transitioning to greener energy requires a shift in the energy sector, and reducing energy consumption would require us to all make sacrifices in how we live our day to day lives. Policy to address climate change necessarily involves government regulations of some kind, and international solutions force the

U.S. to cooperate with other nations.

In other words, any effective response to climate change will require some form of social and economic change, including lifestyle changes for the average American. This is a fact that ought to be seriously considered by anyone developing climate change policies, as they will inevitably have cascading effects on society. For some Americans, these potentials for change are viewed as a threat rather than an opportunity – something that ought to be feared. From this perspective, transitioning to

1 Some would argue that geoengineering – which would in some way or another keep the Earth’s temperature from changing through technological processes, for example mechanically removing from the atmosphere – would not require a significant decrease in emissions. But we do not yet have feasible ways to engage in this process, and most people are not willing to wait to see if anyone can figure this out in time. 7 renewable energies is synonymous with vast unemployment and lost opportunities. Reducing energy consumption implies removing electricity from American households and requiring the use of public transportation. Perhaps more importantly, this would go against the conception of “American identity,” as many climate change advocates argue that society must shift its away from consumerism and towards a more eco-centric perspective (Washington and Cook 2011, 119). This can be viewed as a direct challenge to goals of continued economic growth and prosperity, considered to be a central aspect of what it means to be American by many. Government intervention in the economy to reduce emissions is viewed as a veiled threat to undermine American’s ideology and liberty, as seen in Laura Ingraham’s claim that climate policy is “really about government controlling almost every aspect of your life” (Fox

News 2019). Supplying international aid to address climate risks or otherwise abiding by any sort of international climate treaty is just as concerning, since it would “hurt the competitiveness” of the U.S., according to President Trump, and demote the U.S. to a lower place in the global hierarchy (Brady 2019).

Some of these opinions are rather extreme and not necessarily representative of most conservative

Americans’ fears, but they nonetheless demonstrate the many aspects of climate change responses that can inspire concern, and even fear in some Americans.

Despite these concerns, many observers have come to recognize that the potentially catastrophic impacts of failing to take action on climate change ought to outweigh these other concerns about economic decline and the loss of American consumerism. While this assertion may in fact be valid, it can be very difficult for individuals to truly come to fear climate change itself. Even for people who generally accept the science behind climate change, it is easy to relegate these concerns to the back of our minds, either to deal with more immediate concerns or to avoid becoming so frightened by climate change that it disrupts our lives. For those who are more skeptical towards climate change, it is even harder to establish a real sense of fear. Individuals’ perceptions of risk are influenced by social, cultural, and psychological conditioning, and are therefore dependent on how we individually relate to the environment (Hulme 2009,

184). For people who already hold values that prioritize economic growth, for example, over environmental protection, the real risks of climate change do little to incite fear. Despite the fact that we 8 are already experiencing some consequences of a changing climate, the most devastating impacts will be felt decades if not centuries into the future. This creates a problem because most people’s time horizons are relatively short, and we consequently have trouble taking threats seriously if they will occur in distant times. While risks of , excessive heat waves, and mass extinction are certainly concerning, it is easy for concerns about unemployment, current government actions, and personal decisions to be viewed as more pressing.

While it is understandable that individuals of a more conservative ideological would be opposed to many of the policies available to address climate change, and these people may also fail to be moved to act by its distant threats, some Americans manage to take these opinions even further. In these cases, fear of climate change policy appears to trump all other considerations, and can even make the factual risks of not addressing climate change seem irrelevant. At the intersection of misinformation, personal and ideological biases, and fear, all too many Americans have come to deny the realities of climate change even in the face of overwhelming evidence. The question becomes how otherwise rational individuals are able to self-inflict ignorance on themselves – and the answer in the powerful influence of emotion, most notably fear, and its ability to hijack fact-based decision making and allow individuals to rationally deny the existence of something that is right in front of them.

FEAR, EMOTIONS, AND POLITICS

The role of fear in climate change denial is rooted in the broader function of emotions and their influence on our perceptions of the world. In this way, fear and emotions in general play a part in the political beliefs and opinions we hold, as well as our interpretation of the outside world. A key to understanding this relationship lies in recognizing that fear is not simply a reaction to some external situation that scares us, but a construction that we shape based on our culture and past experiences.

Because of fear’s subjective and malleable nature, the possibility is opened for politicians and other public figures to exploit fear for their own political gain, and for fear to manipulate our perceptions of the world around us. 9

FEAR AS AN EMOTION

To understand the important role of fear in climate change denial, it is first necessary to take a step back and understand how fear, and emotions in general, interact with ideological and political beliefs.

While we often pride ourselves on our ability to make rational, unbiased decisions that are uninfluenced by our feelings, modern neuroscience suggests that this is an unattainable goal. Affect is involved in every decision we make, whether consciously or not, and in many instances these feelings produce instances of emotion. Even though it often feels like emotions are reactions to the outside environment, they are actually a series of predictions made by the brain, based on past experiences and sensory input (Barrett

2017, 31). Because emotions are influenced by a person’s own history, they are learned through emotional expressions and connections displayed in his or her culture (Barrett 2017, 39). People’s interactions and relationships with one another are likewise influenced by their backgrounds, expectations, and beliefs (Barrett 2017, 233).

When dealing with emotional instances of fear, all of the above applies; it is impossible to guide one’s decisions purely with objective reason. This means that in situations such as the climate change debate, where the emotion of fear is involved, this fear influences one’s beliefs. If we are afraid of something, we cannot understand this something without allowing our fear to color our perspective.

Taking another step back, fear is itself shaped by an individual’s past experiences and cultural norms.

Emotional associations are malleable and evolve according to one’s experiences, background, and social situation. This means that over time people’s fears change and evolve, and that an individual’s fear of something like climate change is constructed by the society which surrounds him or her at a given time.

Although specifically dealing with fear of immigrants and religious minorities, Nussbaum’s work

(2012) provides insight into how fear can be used as a political device. Agreeing with Barrett’s conclusion that emotions can sometimes be misleading, Nussbaum recognizes that fear can sometimes

“produce unreliable and unpredictable conduct, and it can be exploited by politicians” (Nussbaum 2012,

20). In some situations, blindness to the facts can be evolutionarily beneficial, for example allowing us to not be so afraid of the multitude of ways we could die in any given second that we refuse to leave our 10 houses. But in light of society’s growing complexities and challenges, our instinctual fears are not always able to keep up. This increases the chances of “potential dissonance between appearance and reality”

(Nussbaum 2012, 27).

Nussbaum concludes this based on her understanding of the creation of fear, which suggests that more modern, abstract fears are developed through complex thought processes. These processes are in turn influenced by culture, politics, and (Nussbaum 2012, 31). Although approaching emotions from a different perspective than Barrett, Nussbaum comes to a similar conclusion that our perceptions of the world are shaped as much by our own imagination and biases as the facts in front of us. Nussbaum takes this a step further, suggesting that the rhetoric of fear specifically has a tendency to make the truth unimportant, bringing to the forefront one’s own imagined situations. Regardless of how well these mental scenarios match up with reality, narratives of fear can alter our thought processes so that beliefs shape our reality, rather than the other way around (Nussbaum 2012, 31).

FEAR AND POLITICS

Because of fear’s pervasive influence on our decisions and ideology, this emotion concept is a powerful tool that can be used to shape personal and political beliefs. When fear intersects with politics, it opens the possibility for politicians and other influential public figures to exploit this emotion for political gain. Fear, when used strategically, provides a means to guide public opinion in the direction desired by the one exploiting this emotion (Nussbaum 2012, 20). When politicians take advantage of a “narrative of fear” in any context, the focus of the debate shifts from what is true to what is imagined, pushing individuals away from the facts of the situation and towards their own perceptions (Nussbaum 2012, 31).

This perception in itself can also be shaped by fear narratives, so that the people in control of this narrative are also in control of their followers’ reality. By manufacturing feelings of fear, political leaders are than able to justify political positions and situations that would otherwise appear unnecessary or even dangerous (Lane and Rosenblum 2017, 6). 11

In the context of the climate change debate, politicians can use fear to shift the debate from how climate change should be addressed to whether climate change exists in the first place, allowing them to avoid making the hard decisions about how government ought to deal with this crisis. This strategy has been taken up by a variety of conservative media outlets and think tanks, specifically aiming to push the public to underestimate the amount of scientific consensus on climate change (Lewandowsky et al. 2019,

125). It is important to recognize that the fear of complex social and economic policies reported by these organizations is not something humans are born with, but is an emotional connection that is fostered and encouraged by influential actors in a society, as well as society’s social and cultural norms (Nussbaum

2012, 30).

Another element of the fear narrative is that it can be framed in a way that makes those who are afraid feel like they have somehow outsmarted those who they are afraid of; because they were afraid of something before most others, they interpret this to mean that they have seen through the lies of whatever establishment they feel is manipulating them (Nussbaum 2012, 24). Applying this to the climate change debate, it would follow that climate deniers view themselves as having greater insight into the apparent lies and manipulation of the scientific community, and believe that they must sound the alarm to the rest of the American public so that they can stop this “.” Much of the public discourse of climate deniers takes up this mentality, and it is important to recognize that this feeling stems from fear.

THE EMOTIONAL LOGIC OF DENIAL

Recognizing the importance of emotion in the brain’s decision-making process makes it clear that even when we try to make rational and objective political decisions, our emotions and biases inevitably have an influence. When individuals are confronted with information on climate change their emotions play an important, if unrecognized, role in whether facts are accepted or denied. Acknowledging the affective pressures in this decision begins to explain the seemingly irrational denial of climate change held by some Americans. Every decision involves emotional affect, whether we recognize it or not, and it is a false dichotomy to argue that decisions are either rational or emotional. Especially when faced with 12 strong emotions, facts can lose their significance. Rather than adjusting their mental predictions to fit the realities of climate change, powerful instances of emotion can force the brain to perceive the outside world as matching up with the erroneous predictions. In other words, the brain is able to adjust perceptions of external facts to agree with their beliefs.

It is important to recognize, though, that just because a belief is shaped by emotion does not mean that it is irrational. As discussed earlier, every decision involves some level of affective response, so there is no point in drawing a clear distinction between supposedly rational and emotional decisions. While denying climate change may objectively be a completely unreasonable decision, the emotional influences behind this decision make it, at least from the denier’s perspective, a reasonable choice. Decisions to deny the existence of climate change follow an emotional logic, where facts become irrelevant in the face of strong emotional and ideological justifications for a given opinion. With this in mind, climate change denial can be seen in a more nuanced light, where both objective facts and strong affective are in play. In the case of the climate change denier, emotions came out on top.

It is also necessary to recognize that concern over climate change policy is not a feeling unique to deniers; it is a question that any engaged individual should take into consideration. While progressive strategies may be necessary to prevent the Earth’s climate from reaching a dangerous tipping point, there is no doubt that any such policy will require some degree of change in what we value and how we live our lives. The competing interests of fear and scientific necessity are captured in Norgaard’s analysis of climate change denial, which may be more aptly called climate change avoidance. Examining citizens in

Norway, a country already experiencing warmer winters as a result of climate change, Norgaard found that the lack of public urgency and interest in climate issues does not match up with the reality of the situation. Among the individuals she interviewed, many demonstrated a resistance to acknowledging the tough changes necessary to mitigate climate change. These people were not necessarily climate change deniers, because they recognized that climate change is a real risk, at least in an abstract sense. But once they were faced with making real decisions to reduce emissions, such as driving less or using public transportation, they tended to shift responsibility onto government or other countries in order to avoid 13 incurring personal costs (Norgaard 2011, 404). This “dual reality” is explained by Norgaard as a form of cognitive dissonance, where individuals recognize abstractly the threats of climate change while also continuing to live in a collectively constructed “normal” life (Norgaard 2011, 408). They are able to deflect responsibility for addressing climate change through the use of social narratives that argue climate change does not warrant a strong response (Norgaard 2011, 406). This tendency has also been identified in the United States, where many Americans are at least moderately concerned about the environment but strongly oppose any realistic attempt to take action to achieve this goal because of the negative impact it would have on them personally (Leiserowitz 2006, 56). This tendency is not a lack or rejection of information, as is sometimes argued, but a “failure to integrate this knowledge into everyday life or transform it into social action” (Norgaard 2011, 404). In other words, they are driven to employ an emotional logic so that they can avoid confronting the realities of climate change. This is not an illogical and uninformed decision to reject the facts in front of them, but rather a sort of coping mechanism that allows them to avoid these facts so that they can escape the fear-inducing responsibility for societal changes required of them. Denial helps people deal with the threats facing the world as a result of climate change.

This example demonstrates how even among individuals who accept the science of climate change, there is an incentive to push these facts to the background and avoid necessary changes.

Returning to an American context, the emotional logic allowing for the avoidance of facts is potentially even more powerful. When already skeptical, often conservative-leaning Americans are brought into the picture – paired with a wide array of misinformation available to reinforce their doubt – the power of emotional denial becomes even stronger. These individuals often hold ideological beliefs that would encourage them to be suspicious of any government intervention in the economy or their private lives.

Since responses to climate change almost always involve some form of economic or social changes, it can be expected that these individuals would experience even greater instances of fear than the citizens of

Norway. Understanding the nature of emotion, especially fear, in our decisions and beliefs helps to 14 explain why some Americans can rationally deny climate change even when the abundant evidence of its existence would seem to contradict them.

IDEOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL REASONS FOR DENIAL

With a fuller understanding of fear and its influence on political beliefs, it is possible to reexamine the various sources of fear contributing to responses to climate change This analysis will demonstrate how this fear can overcome the objective facts of the situation and allow emotional responses to take control. More specifically, responses to climate change are seen as a threat to economic development and the free market, the United States’ international standing, and the American identity and way of life. in the ways described below, these areas of fear can hijack scientific evidence and instead deploy emotional logic as a way to cope with fear.

FREE MARKET IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC PROTECTION

The strong influence of liberalism in the United States casts economic freedom and individuality as essential elements of democratic society. Especially for American conservatives, the free market and freedom from government intervention are held high in their political priorities (Ball, Dagger, and O’Neill

2017, 80). Since responses to climate change almost always involve some sort of government involvement in the private sector, it is not surprising that these individuals (most often Republicans) are on average less supportive of climate policy than the public as a whole. Some of these individuals are inclined to take their skepticism a step farther and reject the science of climate change altogether, as shown in research demonstrating a positive association between support for free markets and climate change denial (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, and Gignac 2013, 623). While an ideological aversion to government regulations provides a reasonable explanation for the tendency to disapprove of climate policies, it does not explain why some of these individuals are able to turn their disapproval into denial.

Not supporting a policy is one thing, but denying the existence of a problem because you do not like the policy proposed to address it is quite another. 15

At this point it is necessary to draw a distinction between those who oppose government policies addressing climate change and those who deny the facts around climate change. There are certainly some

Americans who recognize the realities of our changing climate, but simply believe this problem should be remedied by the market mechanism and by actions of the private sector rather than by government intervention. This situation is about political disagreement rather than emotionally-induced denial, and is therefore not directly relevant to the current discussion. On the other hand, individuals who are able to use their fear of government intervention to convince themselves that climate change is a hoax are worth consideration. It is these people who demonstrate emotional logic, especially the logic of fear, in action.

To understand the influence of this fear, it is first necessary to establish its source. As already noted, American conservatives generally support small government and believe the government should stay out of the private sector as much as possible (if not entirely), and that government involvement will only cause economic downturn and unemployment. In the context of climate change, this ideological perspective suggests that government should rarely, if ever, involve itself in the various strategies implemented to mitigate and adapt to climate change, as this will result in more harm than good for the country. Since excessive regulations are something to be feared, it then follows that climate change should be feared (even if the risks of environmental destruction and mass extinction weren’t enough to inspire fear). This relationship between free market support and climate denial has been documented by

Heath and Gifford (2006), who use survey data to demonstrate that “those who value the free market system over environmental quality tend to believe that global climate change is not occurring” (64). A potential explanation offered by these scholars is that for free market supporters, it is simply “more convenient” to ignore the realities of climate change (65).

But this fear goes beyond a fear of regulations to a more profound concern that the free market may not be the solution to all of the world’s problems. Subscribers to free market ideology base their belief on an underlying sense of optimism, where the free market can take care of itself without any reliance on government actions or policies (Heath and Gifford 2006, 52). Acknowledging the existence of anthropogenic climate change requires one to admit that since the Industrial Revolution, private 16 companies have been engaging in an irresponsible and harmful practice. In other words, capitalist enterprise is to blame for much of climate change. This conclusion requires one to accept that the free market has not led to optimal results, in essence realizing that a market failure has occurred (Collomb

2014, 6). For the firm believer in the free market, this is an unsettling and threatening proposition, suggesting that one of the tenets of this ideology is not always correct. With this in mind, climate change policy is not only threatening greater regulations and government intrusion, but also calling into question the ideological foundations of the American conservative.

Along with the view that climate policy poses a threat to the free market is the concern that responding to climate change would harm the United States’ international influence. This perspective stems from the belief that taking action to mitigate climate change would harm the country’s economy, allowing countries such as to gain greater power in the international economy (Collomb 2014, 8).

According to the logic of this concern, the U.S. would be busy curtailing economic development through sustainability mandates while other nations continue to pollute and grow their economy. International climate agreements are also a contentious subject in this area, since they are seen as potentially undermining American sovereignty. By forcing Americans to abide by international agreements, the U.S. would in effect become subservient to other countries’ demands (Collomb 2014, 8). The merits of this argument may be questionable at best, but that is beside the point. What matters is that some Americans view this as a threat, and a source of fear, and it is this perception that influences their beliefs and how they interpret the realities of climate change.

Accepting climate change as a reality then creates an identity crisis for free market supporters, proving to be even more fear-inducing than the prospect of government regulations. This underlying fear sets the stage for emotional logic and denial to enter the picture. As an individual unconsciously evaluates this situation, the brain may find it easier to simply pretend climate change is some sort of conspiracy rather than subject his or her self to the possibility that American dominance may be waning and the

American conservative identity may be unsound. Encouraged by fear, the evidence for climate change may be manipulated so that it is not evidence at all, and can be recast to match up with the internal 17 decision to stand by one’s ideological beliefs. In this way, individuals are motivated by their political beliefs and worldview to achieve “cognitive closure,” in this case by denying climate change to avoid the uncertainty created by the acceptance of this issue (Borick and Rabe 2010, 779).

THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE

Probably one of the most impactful threats posed by climate change policy is its requirement that we in some way alter how we go about our lives, most commonly through decreased and/or more use. At the personal level, this proposition includes minor changes such as remembering to turn off the lights when we leave a room, to more extensive and costly changes, such as buying an electric car or avoiding airplane travel. In order to convince people to actually make these changes, a larger shift in cultural norms is required, so that we as a society come to prioritize sustainability over our own immediate satisfaction.

This cultural shift would be dramatic in the United States, where traditions have for so long supported belief in the concept of “the unlimited and ever expanding ability of all Americans to indulge in material consumption” (Collomb 2014, 9). Whether one approves of these norms or not, material consumerism is a deeply-ingrained habit in American culture. For many Americans, consumerism is seen as a hallmark of the American way of life, something that ought to be protected and maintained in order to retain our country’s identity. Shifting away from this norm would be viewed as reducing living standards and quality of life in the U.S. (Lane and Rosenblum 2017, 6).

From this perspective, proposals for climate change policy appear to threaten America’s identity by limiting the ability to buy and use at will, and it is understandable that this prospect would induce fear.

Keeping in mind that even the most objective-sounding beliefs are colored by our emotional perceptions, this existential threat to the American way of life can influence perceptions of climate change to avoid these feelings of uncertainty. In this way, even those faced with convincing evidence that climate change is really happening, can be pushed by the pressures of fear to claim these facts are incorrect, engaging in a 18 sort of cultural denial (Norgaard 2011). This is not an uninformed or irrational decision, but a reasonable use of emotional logic to avoid the threat of losing one’s sense of place in the world.

Looking at the economic and social changes necessary to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the perceived threats of these policies emerges. At least from some American perspectives, this fear stems from the restructuring of the economy through government regulations, and involves admitting that the free market will not correct environmental issues on its own. It also requires lifestyle changes that push us to be part of a more sustainable and less consumerist society, changing long-standing American social norms and in effect altering American identity. These changes brought on by efforts to halt climate change are part of a larger cultural shift occurring in the 21st century, which some Americans – most often older white men, but encompassing all sorts of individuals – view as an assault on American culture as well as their personal identities. From these individuals’ perspectives, modern society is a frightening place where reducing emissions or energy use is just another attempt to erode American values and the American way of life, along with various liberal policies supporting immigration, LGBTQ+ rights and protections, affordable health care, gun control, etc. Added to this is the perceived threat of job loss that would be caused by climate change policies, so that these individuals feel threatened in both a social and economic sense.

This is the deep-rooted fear that underscores much of the fear around climate change policy, and I believe it is this fear that allows deniers to convince themselves that climate change is a hoax. Opposition to economic or social policies is not in itself enough to circumvent facts, but when decisions and beliefs are made subject to the underlying fear of uncertainty, change, and not knowing one’s own identity, it becomes much more powerful. Exasperated by misinformation and political manipulation, the innate fear of losing one’s concept of place in the world opens the door for emotional logic to avoid the realities of climate change, because on a certain level it makes more sense to ignore climate change than to subject oneself to this kind of emotional and ideological upheaval.

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SECTION II

In order to more definitively analyze this proposed relationship between climate change denial and fear, the following section contains an empirical analysis based on survey data, which can hopefully help to either validate or refute this hypothesis. While it is not easy to quantify and measure affective responses such as fear, previous work has addressed to some extent the behavioral and psychological side of political beliefs and offers insight into how to pick up facets of this emotion. Based on research conducted by Dietz et al. (1998), environmental attitudes have been shown to be less determined by structural or political environments and more by the attitudes and of individuals (450). This research demonstrates that when dealing with any political belief, it is important to consider measures of worldview, ideology, and perceptions of human nature into the analysis in order to gain a fuller understanding of the belief.

Affective responses in the context of climate change have also been evaluated, especially when communicated through emotive imagery (Leiserowitz 2006). Focusing on the feelings evoked by select images relating to climate change, this research focuses on the importance of underlying worldviews, values, and feelings of the individuals when attempting to address how members of the American public determine their attitudes towards climate change and environmental policy (Leiserowitz 2006, 63).

Hahnel and Brosch (2018) have also noted the importance of considering affect in analyses of beliefs about climate change, suggesting that an individual’s personal affective tendencies may account for some of the variation in environmental attitudes (94). In other words, there is evidence that demographic factors and party affiliation are not enough to explain climate change denial; psychological and emotional factors must also be considered in order to make sense of these attitudes (Beiser-McGrath and Huber 2018, 337). 20

Based on these and numerous other studies considering public opinion on climate change, I attempt to replicate and expand upon these studies in a way that directly examines the role of fear, inspired by both economic and social concerns, in perpetuating climate change denial in the United States.

METHODOLOGY

SAMPLE

For this analysis, I use American National Election Studies data from 2016. This survey poses a broad range of questions to respondents, including questions about climate change, free market ideology, and feelings about the American way of life, as well as a variety of demographic variables. That being said, the ANES survey does not ask the more in-depth questions about emotional and affective responses that were utilized by many of the researchers in my literature review. Because of this, my research does not provide the more nuanced analyses conducted by other scholars, but can still offer valuable insight into the influence of affective responses, especially fear, on climate change denial through the use of various proxy measures identified in relation to this fear.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

For the following analyses, the variable of interest is belief in climate change, since it is from this question that levels of denial can be measured. The ANES survey directly addresses this attitude by asking respondents whether they believe climate change “has probably been happening” or “probably isn’t happening.” It is important to note that this question is asking respondents whether they think climate change is “probably” happening or not happening, rather than asking explicitly whether they believe it is true or false. Compared to others surveys (for example the Yale Climate

Survey cited earlier), the question wording used by the ANES tends to offer a more generous assessment of climate change belief, since it may capture some individuals who are still rather skeptical but believe that climate change “might” be happening. This variable is dichotomous, with two possible responses 21

(excluding those who refused to answer or were not asked the question), which I recoded with belief in climate change signified by a value of one, and denial coded with a value of zero.

This variable was used in Shao’s (2017) analysis of ANES time series data, where the influence of local weather patterns, religiosity, and political orientation on attitudes towards global warming was measured. Shao incorporated two other survey questions into his dependent variable, asking respondents what they view as the cause of global warming and how they evaluate the impacts of global warming

(83). These two variables provide greater insight into how Americans view climate change, since they allow for a more nuanced picture of attitudes to be drawn from the survey. Levels of support for taking action to address climate change can be measured through the survey question asking respondents whether they believe that government should “regulate business to protect the environment and create jobs,” or if there should be “no regulation because it will not work and will cost jobs.” Responses were scaled from 1, meaning strong support for environmental regulation, to 5, indicating strong opposition to these policies. This question addresses the issue of individuals’ ideological perspective on climate change, gauging how they prioritize taking action to mitigate climate change versus avoiding any regulation as it would only have negative results. I also incorporate a variable asking what respondents view as the cause of climate change; responses included belief that it is “largely caused by human activity,” largely the result of natural causes,” or a combination of both.

While the first question, asking respondents whether or not they believe climate change is happening, is used as my primary dependent variable, I also incorporate these secondary climate change questions into some of my analyses when possible. In this way, I can provide a more in-depth understanding of some of the relationships between my variables. I had initially planned on possibly combining these three variables into a single composite variable, but this became unfeasible as the

COVID-19 pandemic forced me to leave campus for part of the semester. So instead, I will be relying on the single question about belief in climate change, while supplementing some of my analyses with these other relevant variables to examine how the influence of fear may or may not impact these different levels of belief in climate change in different ways. 22

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Economic and Financial Fears

As addressed earlier, I hypothesize that fear of economic decline and the risk of unemployment is a factor that influences climate change denial. By inspiring realistic concerns about one’s financial situation, as well as threatening the ideological foundations of those who adhere to traditional liberal support for the free market, climate change can produce emotional and ideological fear. These feelings of fear and uncertainty can in turn push individuals to deny climate change as a means to avoid the emotional turmoil brought about by these concerns. The connection between free market ideology and environmental attitudes has been well documented by researchers and scholars. Heath and Gifford (2006) suggest that “those who value the free market system over environmental quality tend to” oppose taking action against climate change (64). In other words, these individuals are motivated by their political beliefs and worldview to achieve “cognitive closure,” in this case by denying climate change to avoid the uncertainty created by the acceptance of this issue (Borick and Rabe 2010, 779).

To measure individuals’ levels of fear arising from economic concerns or support of the free market, a variety of ANES survey questions were examined in an attempt to accurately operationalize this concept. Fear, or any emotion for that matter, is inherently difficult to measure quantitatively, as it is largely subjective and operates differently for different people. One way to approach this fear of economic uncertainty is to look at individuals’ feelings of concern or worry about their own financial situation. Americans who feel this way may be more susceptible to emotions of fear and hopelessness as a result of their own situation in life, and hence be more resistant to accepting any policies, such as climate change mitigation, that are viewed by many as a threat to the economy. Transitioning to , for example, is often viewed as destructive to the industry and therefore a threat to many

Americans’ jobs. Those who find themselves in a more precarious economic situation would be expected to be more receptive of these concerns, and the subsequent fear brought about by these feelings may play a role in climate change denial. This relationship is suggested by Yang, Chu, and Kahlor (2019), who argue that individuals’ risk perceptions in response to climate change are influenced in part by their 23 feelings of lack of control over their situation and lack of information on the issue (743). In other words, those who feel like they are not in control of their own situation in life process the realities of climate change in a different way than those who are living in a less precarious state.

One type of survey question that may hint at individuals’ sense of fear or desperation at their own economic situation is based on respondents’ assessment of whether economic mobility has improved or become more difficult in recent years. It is expected that those who believe their chances of moving up in social class have diminished find themselves in a more worrisome and fearful financial situation, and would therefore be measuring this sense of individual economic uncertainty discussed above. In a similar way, individuals who are very worried about their financial situation may experience similar feelings of fear. This question is measured in the ANES survey with the question asking participants how much, if at all, they worry about their financial situation. Reponses to this question are scaled from one to five, with one signifying that the respondent is “extremely worried,” and five indicating that they are “not at all worried” about their financial situation.

A different angle from which fear of climate change can be examined involves individuals’ ideological approach to the economy, rather than their personal feelings towards their own financial situations. This hypothesis is based on the fact that those who oppose government intervention in the economy are expected to be more resistant of efforts at climate change adaption or emissions reduction, and that some individuals who hold this view may be pushed by their feelings towards this issue to deny the existence of climate change altogether. These feelings may arise not only from a fear that a government response to the would cause widespread unemployment and economic decline, but also that accepting climate change as a problem means admitting that a market failure has occurred.

Because of the perceived practical threats as well as the unsettling ideological upheaval this would cause, support for free market ideology is predicted to have an important impact on whether or not individuals choose to deny or accept climate change.

Previous research has suggested a significant connection between ideological beliefs and belief in climate change, with many scholars suggesting that support for the free market has a significant 24 association with the rejection of climate science present in America (Lewandowski, Oberauer, and Gignac

2013, 623; Heath and Gifford 2006, 51; Collomb 2014). Collomb (2014) also indicates that American conservatives who tend to favor the free market may be more likely to deny climate change, not only because of the potential threat of economic decline but also because of the ideological implications of accepting it as an issue (6). The egocentric bias of free market ideology, as well as its inherent optimism in the ability of the market to deal with social issues, has also been shown to be a contributing factor in denial (Heath and Gifford 2006, 52).

The 2016 ANES survey asks multiple questions that capture tendencies of support for this ideology, including questions about government involvement, government size, and regulation of private industry. The main variable I examine asks respondents whether they believe the country “needs a strong government to handle complex economic problems,” or that the “free market can handle [these problems] without government involvement.” In other words, this question is discerning who favors government involvement in the economy and who believes the economy ought to be free from government intervention – in essence, whether or not they support the free market. This question is followed by two other questions on the same issue, asking respondents whether they favor big or small government and whether they believe the government should play a role in regulating business. Along with the previous question, the results of these questions help reinforce respondents’ level of support for various facets of free market ideology, and allow for an in-depth comparison between these attitudes and belief in climate change.

The American Way of Life

The other factor hypothesized in the previous section to be relevant in predicting beliefs in climate change stems from individuals’ fear that they will lose their “American identity” to climate change. Americans who feel threatened by societal changes may be more likely to also experience fear due to climate change and the existential shift it would initiate in the American way of life. Inspired by 25 this fear, these individuals may be more susceptible to follow an emotional logic, choosing to deny climate change rather than accept it and face its difficult implications.

One aspect of this fear stems from the perceived threat to the American way of life, which some

Americans see as being destroyed by responses to climate change such as reducing energy consumption or changing the ways we travel. By altering the values held in American society, individuals who identify this as a threat may be more likely to deny climate change (Collomb 2014, 9; Leiserowitz 2006, 50).

Another approach to operationalizing this sense of fear is based on more individual concerns, such as a person’s degree of happiness or satisfaction with their own life, as well as more general personality traits that may make them more apt to experience fear.

Using 2016 ANES survey data, a variety of questions were asked that help gauge this sense of existential fear that many Americans are currently experiencing. That being said, it is necessary to acknowledge that this type of affect is not easily operationalized, and that no single survey question could address the many nuances to this feeling. Even in my own review of previous literature, little was found to suggest accepted measurements of this factor, requiring my own work to be rather exploratory in nature. Because of this, I cannot draw any definitive conclusions from my research, but rather can use it to come to a better understanding of the factor of fear I am researching. While my analyses are therefore limited, this section of research can still be beneficial in understanding how various feelings of fear and anxiety may intersect with individuals’ perceptions of “American values,” and how these emotional responses may relate to climate change denial.

By requiring society to move away from a culture of never-ending material consumption, climate change and responses to it may inspire significant amounts of fear in individuals, and could subsequently prompt them to deny climate science. This is part of a larger trend, where many individuals feel that their traditional values and ways of life are under attack by modern society. Some scholars argue that fear inspired by changes in the so-called American way of life can prompt Americans to deny climate change

(Lane and Rosenblum 2017, 6). As demonstrated by Yang, Chu, and Khalor (2016), this sense of uncertainty and fear is more common among American conservatives, and may be part of the reason that 26 the Republican party as a whole is often skeptical of climate science (749). Leiserowitz (2006) also found that individual values may play an important role in determining climate change belief (50).

To measure this relationship, I use a series of ANES survey questions that gauge respondents’ support for traditional values and new ways of life in America. These questions measure how respondents choose to respond to a changing world, the emergence of new lifestyles and new morals, and the decline of traditional family values. Based on my research and review of the literature, I hypothesize that individuals who wish to preserve traditional ways of American life and feel threatened by new ones are more likely to deny climate change, as a result of the fear aroused by climate change and its relationship with the larger shift in American society and values we are seeing today.

This series of ANES survey questions was structured so that respondents were read a particular statement and then asked to rank their degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement on a scale of one to five, with one indicating that he or she “agrees strongly” and five indicating strong disagreement. The first question of this type examined is based on the statement: “The world is changing and we should adjust.” The second and third questions relating to traditional values asks respondents whether or not they agree with the statement that “new lifestyles are breaking down society” in America and that “we should be more tolerant of other moral standards.” The final question asks respondents whether they agree with the statement that “this country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.” While this series of questions was included in the ANES survey as a way to gauge respondents’ level of support for traditional values and ideals, they may also serve as a proxy for the sense of fear some Americans are experiencing due to the perceived threat to traditional values. Those who support these morals likely feel more threatened by the social changes that would result from addressing climate change than those who are welcoming of new values and ways of life.

Another approach to measuring individuals’ sense of existential fear at losing one’s place in the world is to look at Americans’ personal fear about how the world is changing. One way to measure this is based on whether respondents are satisfied with their lives – in other words, whether they believe they are 27 personally doing well, whatever that may mean, or not. As noted by previous scholars, an individual’s sense of self-satisfaction and self-efficacy can have an important impact on beliefs towards climate change, as these factors influence whether an individual believes that they can make a difference to address this problem (Heath and Gifford 2006, 53). I hypothesize that this sense of helplessness may relate to the fear experienced by some Americans that could encourage denial of climate change, although

I am not certain how it will be related.

Those who feel they are currently in a bad place may also be more likely to face this deep-rooted fear about changes in society values and norms, as their personal social struggles may predispose them to experience emotions of fear, and may subsequently push them to deny climate change as a way to avoid this fear. Conversely, it is also possible that those who are most satisfied with their life would be most likely to experience fear, since their current position of success would be viewed as at risk by a changing world and society. And those who are not currently satisfied may have less concern about a changing world, because they have nothing to lose. Because of these speculations, I am uncertain how this trend will materialize when compared with measures more explicitly addressing American values and roles, as well as the dependent variable, belief in climate change.

Another measure that may pick up on this sense of fear and helplessness relates more broadly to respondents’ general sense of anxiety. This variable asks respondents to rank on a scale of one to seven whether they identify as an anxious person or not, with seven being the most anxious and one representing those who identify as not at all anxious. While this measure deals with a broader sense of fear than what I am measuring, it could be beneficial in determining where the fear and anxiety of climate change deniers comes from in relation to this issue. Those who experience higher levels of anxiety across the board may be more prone to also experience fear induced by the threats of climate change, which could make it easier for them to deny climate change. At the same time, general anxiety may be a different feeling altogether from the sense of fear induced by climate change in some Americans, which would be evident if there was no relationship between general anxiety and fear about a changing society.

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Control Variables

Along with my key independent variables, there are many other factors that have been shown to influence how individuals form opinions on climate change. These include demographic variables, of which I utilize education, income, age, and gender. In general, those who are better educated tend to be more likely to believe in climate change, while younger generations are also more likely to accept climate science as reality (Whitmarsh 2011, 698). In terms of gender, females are less likely to deny climate change than males, although this difference is relatively small (Whitmarsh 2011, 698). Political partisanship is also an important determinant of belief in climate change, as many Americans base their opinions on this issue largely in terms of partisan cues they receive from party leaders. Members of the

Republican party have been shown to be significantly more likely to deny climate change than those in the Democratic party, while independents are often between these two extremes (Shao 2017, 90).

Especially for conservatives, questioning climate change is viewed as acceptable and necessary to maintain certainty and protect existing social structures from new threats that would arise from addressing climate change (Yang, Chu, and Kahlor 2019, 749).

ANALYSIS

BELIEF IN CLIMATE CHANGE

To begin my analysis, I first examined the frequencies of responses in my dependent variable, belief in climate change. A large majority of respondents stated that they believe climate change is most likely occurring (3,459 respondents), although a significant minority believed otherwise (756 respondents). Overall, 82% accepted the belief that climate change is likely a reality, while 18% stated that it was likely not happening. These numbers are generally in agreement with previous studies, although the proportion of deniers is slightly lower than in some other polls. This is likely due to the fact that the ANES question asks whether climate change is “most likely” happening, while other surveys ask more directly if respondents definitively know that climate change is occurring. Because of this slight 29 difference in question wording, participants in the ANES survey are less likely to be recorded as denying climate change because there is still room for uncertainty in the response showing belief in climate change.

While belief in climate change is the main dependent variable in the analyses below, it is also beneficial to look at the frequency tables of other variables that capture a similar opinion. As discussed earlier, the variable asking respondents what they believe to be the cause of climate change provides a fuller picture of how Americans feel towards climate change (Figure 1). In terms of climate change cause, respondents were relatively split between believing that it is caused mainly by humans or by a combination of human and natural causes, with those who believe it is caused largely by natural influences making up a relatively small minority. It is interesting to note that nearly 18% of respondents chose this option, which is essentially equal to the proportion of respondents who do not believe climate change is occurring. At the same time, even though most respondents reported belief in the occurrence of climate change, these individuals were clearly divided as to the cause of climate change, as many believed that even though it is happening it is caused in part by natural pressures.

Figure 1: Belief in Climate Change Cause

Cause of Climate Change Proportion

Human activity .3919

Natural causes .1773

Both human and natural causes .4308

Source: ANES 2016

Respondents’ opinion on how climate change should be addressed is picked up more explicitly in the survey question addressing the perceived tradeoff between environmental protections and job security.

Examining this variable alone, it is clear that most Americans support at least some degree of government regulations aimed at protecting the environment (nearly 75%). That being said, there is a clear split 30 among party lines in regards to this variable, as those who oppose environmental regulations are largely

Republicans, while those in support of these regulations are mainly Democrats.

When the dependent variable, belief in climate change, is incorporated into the analysis, a more startling trend appears. Perhaps unsurprisingly, those who oppose environmental regulations and believe it will cost jobs are significantly more likely to deny climate change than their regulation-supporting peers

(Figure 2). The differences, though, are startling, with a nearly forty-point difference in climate change belief between those on opposite ends of the spectrum. This difference demonstrates that link between perceptions of how the country ought to address climate change with belief in climate change itself.

Figure 2: Belief in Climate Change x Attitude Towards Environmental Regulation

Belief in climate change: Probably been happening Probably hasn’t been happening 1. Regulate business to protect 95.3% 4.7% environment 2. 93.5% 6.5%

3. 90.3% 9.7%

4. 76.5% 23.5%

5. 68.5% 31.5%

6. 58.4% 41.6%

7. No regulation because it will 55.6% 44.4% not work and will cost jobs Source: ANES 2016

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL FEARS

One way to gauge respondents’ level of concern in regards to their own financial situation is to measure this sense of individual fear based on respondents’ view on how economic mobility has changed in recent years. As already discussed, my hypothesis is that those who find themselves in a more worrisome and fearful financial situation may experience a level of economic uncertainty that would 31 inspire fear and could predispose individuals to deny climate change. However, my results show that this factor of financial worry lacks a clear trend when compared to climate change denial. Respondents who believed economic mobility was “the same” as twenty years ago turned out to be the most likely to deny climate change, and those who believed it had gotten easier were the least likely to deny climate change.

This relationship was only significant at a level of .1, and does not demonstrate a clear relationship between perceptions of economic mobility and climate change denial. In theory, those who view mobility as the same, meaning they view the economy as stagnant, may possess a different sense of desperation than those who view it as worse, which may lead them to be less likely to accept climate science. At the same time, this measure may simply be unrelated to belief in climate change, calling into question my hypothesis that these variables are interrelated.

A different approach to measuring economic concern and values relates to respondents’ ideology, especially their views on the role of government in the economy. The ANES survey offered three questions that examined this category of values, all of which had statistically significant associations with belief in climate change. Comparing individuals’ level of support for free market values to my dependent variable, belief in global warming, the results were as expected from both my own hypothesis and other scholars’ work on the subject. As seen in Figure 3, 87.9% of respondents who believe in strong government recognize that climate change has most likely been happening, while only 72.2% of those who oppose government intervention in the economy believe so (a difference of 17.7%). This result is statistically significant and suggests that support for free market ideology may in fact be an important determinant in climate change denial. When this free market variable is examined in the context of respondents’ beliefs of the cause of climate change, rather than simply its occurrence, significant variation also exists (Figure 4). While the percentage of respondents believing it is caused by both human and natural causes is relatively similar among both free market supporters and supporters of strong government, free market supporters were significantly more likely to believe climate change is caused purely by natural forces, while those who favor strong government were more willing to accept that it is caused largely by human actions. 32

Figure 3: Free market Ideology and Belief in Climate Change Occurrence

Figure 4: Free Market Ideology and Belief in Climate Change Cause

These results are reinforced by the related survey questions discussed, which also gauged respondents’ economic and political ideologies. Those who support small government were more likely to deny climate change than those who favor big government, with a difference of 14.1 percentage points.

Similarly, support for business regulation also has a significant positive relationship with belief in climate change, as those who support the restriction of business activity are more likely to believe climate change is occurring (p-value = .000). The results from these two variables demonstrate the relationship between 33 adherence to free market ideology and climate change denial, validating the earlier result and hypothesis that these values have a significant relationship with climate change denial.

AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE

To examine the influence of so-called American values, and the fear that these may incite in regards to climate change, I examined respondents’ degree of support to the statement that “the world is changing and society must adjust.” In the context of belief in climate change, a clear trend emerges that supports my initial hypothesis (Figure 5 and 6). Only 7.6% of those who agree that we should adjust to a changing world deny that climate change is occurring, while 30.8% of those who strongly oppose adjusting to these changes deny this reality. This trend is solidified by its gamma coefficient, .4 and a p- value of .000, demonstrating that there is a statistically significant association between opposition to adapting to a changing world and climate change denial. The other variables addressing this concern over

American values, which deal with new lifestyles in America, toleration of different moral standards, and traditional family values, yield similar results in the context of climate change denial. Taken together, these results demonstrate that those who feel more threatened by new ways of life, morals, and values are significantly more likely to deny the existence of climate change than those who welcome these changes

.

Figure 5: Changing World x Belief in Climate Change

Belief in climate change: “The world is changing and Has probably been happening Probably hasn’t been we should adjust” happening Agree strongly 92.4% 7.6%

Agree somewhat 88.8% 11.2%

Neither agree nor disagree 78.1% 21.9%

Disagree somewhat 81.8% 18.2%

Disagree strongly 69.2% 30.8%

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Figure 6: Changing World and Belief in Climate Change

Source: ANES 2016

This fear of a changing American identity can also be approached from a more personal angle, dealing with individuals’ life satisfaction and anxiety. Comparing these variables with belief in climate change, significant results also emerged for the variable measuring respondents’ predicted satisfaction with their lives twenty years in the future (Figure 7). This trend was in the hypothesized direction: those who see their lives improving are most likely to believe in climate change (85.4%), while those whose lives are anticipated to be “much worse” are more likely to deny the existence of climate change (with only 77.0% believing in climate change). While the gamma value for this relationship was relatively small (.091), it did prove to be statistically significant, indicating that there is a real association between the projections of one’s future and belief in climate change.

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Figure 7: Life Satisfaction and Belief in Climate Change

Source: ANES 2016

The other measure dealing with this personal sense of fear, based on respondents’ general feelings of anxiety, yielded different results. While those who experience more anxiety in general were hypothesized to be more apt to experience fear in response to the various threats of climate change, this analysis demonstrated that this feeling of anxiety has no significant relationship with belief in climate change. Those who considered themselves moderately anxious people (ranking themselves in the middle of the anxiety scale) were the most likely to deny climate change, while those who were not at all anxious and extremely anxious both displayed lower levels of denial. The relationship between this variable with belief in climate change was not statistically significant, suggesting that a general propensity towards anxiety and stress does not correlate with increased fear and denial of climate change.

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SECTION III

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

By examining ANES survey responses on climate change and comparing these results to a variety of independent variables, I was able to come to a better understanding of the potential relationship between fear and climate change denial. While my research was exploratory in nature, the relationships I found provide possible explanations for the abundance of denial in the United States, namely the strong support for free market ideology and values, as well as the desire to protect the “American way of life” from a changing world.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONERNS

First, economic and financial fears both proved significant in determining belief in climate change among respondents. Those who felt that their prospects in the economy were stagnant, and who likely held a greater individual fear about this situation, were significantly more likely to deny climate change than others. While the results of this analysis were not quite as expected, as those who viewed economic mobility as declining were actually not the most likely to deny climate change, they still indicate that a person’s perception of their own precariousness in the economy is related in some way to belief in climate change. Perhaps, as my hypothesis suggests, this has something to do with the emotional instances of fear incited by a lack of good financial prospects. The influence of this fear may play an important role in pushing Americans to deny climate change, as denial is viewed as a way to alleviate the economic concerns that are brought about by addressing climate change. 37

It was also surprising that respondents’ level of worry about their own financial situation did not prove to be a relevant determinant of climate change denial. While it was anticipated that those who experience greater stress about their financial situation would be more open to feelings of fear inspired by the economic changes required to mitigate climate change and hence more likely do deny its existence, the results of my analysis demonstrate that this sense of worry has little relationship with climate change denial.

From an ideological perspective, economic concern in the form of free market values was shown to have a very strong relationship with belief in climate change. Respondents who prioritized small government and a free market system were significantly more likely to deny climate change, and were more willing to accept negative environmental consequences or concerns in order to preserve the free market and foster economic growth. As hypothesized, this relationship may be due to the fear inspired in free market supporters by the possibility of government regulations in response to climate change, which would prompt these individuals to deny climate science in order to avoid these concerns. In a similar way, the fear of admitting that a market failure has occurred, which is evident when one acknowledges the realities of climate change, may encourage those who adamantly support the free market to deny climate change as a way to avoid the ideological upheaval that would result from this admittance.

These results demonstrate that while individuals’ sense of financial worry or concern over their own economic situation has little to do with belief in climate change, ideological concern over the impacts of addressing climate change has a strong relationship with denial. The ideological factor of free market support on climate change is undoubtedly in part a reflection of partisanship, but it is necessary to acknowledge that the Democratic and Republican party are not split entirely on economic grounds; there are plenty of Democrats who prefer a free market, capitalist system. As a result, this relationship between free market support and climate change denial is not simply a reflection of party attitudes, but captures a deeper relationship between the ideological beliefs associated with the free market and the various concerns these beliefs raise in response to climate change. While there are many reasons this may be, the 38 prospect of fear, both of economic decline and ideological upheaval, maintain their validity as a plausible explanation for this association.

AMERICAN VALUES AND WAY OF LIFE

The hypothesis that fear of a changing society influences climate change denial was also validated to some extent by this analysis. Respondents who desired to protect American society from modern changes were much less likely to believe in climate change than those who were accepting of societal changes. In a similar way, those who supported traditional values and opposed new moral standards or toleration towards those who are different were disproportionally more likely to deny the existence of climate change. While there are certainly a variety of complex reasons for this relationship, these results support the suggestion that fear plays at least some part in determining these attitudes towards climate change. For Americans who already feel threatened by the changes occurring in modern society, climate change acts as another threat to their desired way of life. Addressing climate change would require that we as a society rethink how we use energy and resources, and this potential for change is certainly enough to incite fear among those who already feel threatened.

While respondents’ fear associated with personal concerns about life was a weaker predictor of climate change belief than ideological values, my analysis also revealed a statistically significant association between satisfaction with life and climate change denial. These results follow the predicted relationship between those who are concerned about their own place in society and denial, with those who are more concerned being more likely to ignore the realities of climate change. One potential explanation for this relationship is that those who view themselves to be in a more precarious place in society face stronger emotions of fear, especially when faced with the of addressing climate change, hence making them more susceptible to the emotional logic that makes climate change denial feel rational.

On the other hand, respondents’ general levels of anxiety had no association with belief in climate change, deviating from my hypothesis that this sense of anxiety may make individuals more fearful and 39 more likely to deny climate change. However, this result is not entirely surprising since this general sense of anxiety is so much broader than the feelings of fear I intended to measure in response to free market ideology and the changing way of life in America. While those who hold these views may in fact experience anxiety about them, there are certainly many Americans who experience anxiety for a variety of other reasons. In fact, those who believe in climate change may be just as anxious as those who adamantly deny it, as the potentially catastrophic consequences of inaction on this issue can certainly be a source of fear and anxiety as well. These results suggest that the specific form of fear I am measuring – based on perceived threats to the economy and society – is a unique response that is not simply a reflection of respondents’ general levels of anxiety and fear. The people who are denying climate change are not simply fearful people, but are experiencing a specific emotive response to the threats of climate change.

Based on these results, there is again some evidence to support my initial hypothesis. While individual levels of worry or anxiety demonstrated little relationship with climate change denial, the more existential fear of changing norms and values in American society proved to covariate strongly with climate denial. In this context, fear may play an important role in denial by making those who feel threatened by changes in society more likely to ignore the realities of climate change so as to avoid the uncomfortable consequences it would entail. While the source of this relationship may not have been proven in this work, there is no doubt that those who hold these views view climate change and the resulting cultural shifts as a threat to their way of life. In this way, fear may be a factor in their decision making, opening the doorway for emotional logic to hijack how they think so that this fear is avoided, convincing these individuals to rationally deny what is right in front of them.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

While the above analysis and discussion provides an important starting place to examine the influence of fear on climate change denial, it is by no means the final product of this exploration. Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming of the present research is that the relationships examined were all simple 40 bivariate associations, which were helpful in exploring potential factors relating to denial but fail to rule out the potential confounding influence of other variables, such as political party, age, race, etc. In order to control for these other variables, multivariate analysis would be needed so that the possible influence of these factors could be accounted for, and the influence of my independent variables would be more realistic. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic required that I leave campus for the rest of the semester, making it impossible for me to access the SPSS software necessary to complete these multivariate analyses that I had initially planned on pursuing.

Due to these limitations, my results are lacking in their ability to produce any clear conclusions about the influence of fear on climate change denial, but they nonetheless help to initiate a better understanding of the role of fear in this phenomenon. My analysis demonstrated that free market ideology and traditional values are strongly related with climate change denial, while more personal feelings of worry or anxiety have much less of a relationship. This exploratory research lays the groundwork for future study into these influential factors, so that the real impact of ideology, values, and fear on climate change denial can be better understood and addressed.

IMPROVING CLIMATE COMMUNICATION

Considering the potential influence of fear on climate change denial, the real importance of this research is in its ability to improve how we communicate climate science and policy so that denial can be reduced. In order to combat denial, it is necessary to understand the role of fear in individuals’ decision making process, and adapt how we communicate climate change so that these fears are reduced. As noted above, simply providing accurate information is not enough to convince many Americans that climate change poses a real threat. Fear appeals are often used when communicating climate change, despite strong evidence that this strategy is an ineffective form of risk communication (Gialt-Jorn, Ruiter, and

Kok 2014, 72). Those who draw on threatening communications are generally motivated by the belief that these appeals will evoke emotions of fear that draw attention to an issue and encourage self-reflection, thereby effectively promoting change (Gialt-Jorn, Ruiter, and Kok 2014, 77). Politicians also gravitate 41 towards fear appeals because they generally prescribe clear and simple strategies to address the source of fear, which can be more politically advantageous (although less effective) than fully addressing an issue.

Recognizing the deep-rooted fears that contribute to climate change denial, the failure of these fear appeals makes sense, as it is often fear that encourages individuals to ignore the realities of climate change. Instead, confronting the emotional logic of denial requires a reframing of the issues that climate deniers fear, and more generally a movement away from fear as the primary means of communicating climate change. Rather than promoting a fear of climate catastrophe, it may be more effective to instead address the fears held by many climate change deniers that lead them to deny climate change in the first place, namely the threat of economic insecurity and the destruction of the American way of life. As already demonstrated, both of these sources of fear have significant associations with climate change denial, and it is worth considering that addressing these concerns may have a positive impact on levels of acceptance of climate science. In other words, climate change should be addressed not as an independent issue to be feared but within the context of positive social and economic policies that will benefit

Americans. Presenting the threats of climate change in this way would deemphasize the fearful aspects of the topic and instead focus on the benefits that can be gained by effectively addressing climate change.

For example, rather than lamenting the catastrophic results of continuing to use fossil fuels, we could stress the job creation and economic competitiveness that we as a country could gain if we put more effort into developing renewable energies. This strategy pushes the public discourse away from fear appeals while also addressing the fears often held by climate change deniers, such as the fear that mitigating climate change will result in unemployment and economic failure.

There is certainly a place for fear appeals in the climate change debate, as the realities of inaction are truly something to fear, and it is also necessary to continue pushing back against the misinformation and manipulation of fossil fuel companies and conservative politicians. But when communicating climate risks through the media or popular culture, fear of environmental destruction is unlikely to be persuasive when compared with these individual’s fears of economic and social changes that they believe will directly affect them. Polar bears might be nice, for example, but for people who believe they are losing 42 their financial standing and place in American society as a result of climate change efforts, the wellbeing of these animals likely fades into the background. Climate change may not be the real cause of these people’s perceived problems and fears, but to assuage their fear requires that we confront some of the real issues facing many Americans today. Unemployment and economic uncertainty are a serious issue, especially in some regions of the country, and modern society’s focus on individuality and personal responsibility can make it difficult for anyone to feel like they have a coherent identity that fits in community with others. This does not mean that we should protect economic and social security by preserving jobs in the coal industry and preventing greater inclusion and equality for marginalized groups, but that the people who feel threatened by these changes should be included and willing to participate in the process of societal change occurring today. If climate change deniers can escape their perceived fears, the emotional logic of fear loses its ability to control people’s beliefs and climate change, as well as a variety of other social and economic issues, can be more effectively and responsibly addressed.

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