id: 144234 date: 3/4/2008 19:06 refid: 08CARACAS293 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: SECRET//NOFORN destination: 08CARACAS283 header: VZCZCXYZ0259 OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHCV #0293 0641906 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 041906Z MAR 08 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0727 INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
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S E C R E T CARACAS 000293
SIPDIS
NOFORN SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2018 TAGS: MCAP, MOPS, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, VE, CO SUBJECT: MINIMAL BRV ARMED FORCES RESPONSE TO DEPLOYMENT ORDER
REF: CARACAS 283
Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.4(d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Nearly 48 hours after Chavez ordered ten battalions to the Colombian border, there has been only small scale movements of troops or equipment from major combat units. Less than 12 light tanks or armored fighting vehicles have been seen preparing for movement at Carora in the western state of Lara and at Fuerte Mara in the border state of Zulia. Despite confident interviews by the commanding general in the local press, no units of the IV Armored Division - including the presumably highly mobile 42nd Parachute Brigade - have deployed. END SUMMARY.
Fuerte Mara, First to Fight? ------2. (S) Fuerte Mara in Zulia is 55 kilometers from the Colombian border. Local press reported seeing six light tanks on flatbed trucks entering Fuerte Mara on the afternoon of March 3, followed by a convoy of soldiers in trucks a few hours later. Maracaibo contacts also reported OV-10 Bronco aircraft flying over the city. Other sources identified the armor as French AMX-13 light tanks. Fuerte Mara is home to the "Apure Braves" Armored Battalion, the 112 Mechanized Infantry Battalion and the 105 Engineering Battalion of the First Infantry Division.
Carora ------3. (S) The Carora barracks are 300 Km from the border in the western state of Lara. Sources report five French-made AMX-30 main battle tanks and accompanying cargo trucks were being made ready for transport. The front page of a Venezuelan tabloid showed two British-made Spartan Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFV) with "Lara" markings on a commercial trailer. (Note: Modern tanks and AFVs are trucked to the front, saving fuel as well as wear and tear on the vehicles treads. A shortage of Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET) in the Army will restrict their ability to move units quickly. End Note)
Other Units ------4. (S) According to the local press, units of Venezuela's IV Division in Valencia and Maracay have executed a recall order bringing troops in from leave. Although General Tineo Pena told the local press that "they are on alert" he said they were awaiting further orders. Other sources report about 30 tanks and AFVs are being prepared for movement. There has been no indication of movement at the 42nd Parachute Brigade.
5. (C) Comment: A lack of training, rehearsal and failure to invest in unglamorous military equipment like trailers and cargo planes has slowed the Venezuelan military's mobilization. This may explain the lack of patriotic visuals, from this otherwise propaganda savvy leader, of troops marching to the front. End Comment. DUDDY
======CABLE ENDS======id: 144644 date: 3/6/2008 22:12 refid: 08CARACAS319 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: SECRET destination: 08CARACAS308 header: VZCZCXRO7686 OO RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHCV #0319 0662212 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 062212Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0752 INFO RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
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S E C R E T CARACAS 000319
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2028 TAGS: MCAP, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, CO, VE SUBJECT: BRV DEPLOYMENT CONTINUES TO CREEP FORWARD
REF: CARACAS 308
Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.4(d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: The deployment of Venezuelan troops to the areas near the border of Colombia continues with some movement being reported in local press at Fuerte Paramaracay in Valencia and Fuerte Mara in the border state of Zulia. This included, for the first time, reports of helicopter movements. There is no indication of the activation of any new units and the 42 Parachute Brigade still appears to remain in garrison. Available open source and sensitive reporting does not support the BRV's claims of 9,000 troops. END SUMMARY.
Getting a Lift ------2. (S) Local press observed five heavy equipment transports (HETs) entering Fuerte Paramaracay in Valencia, home of the 41st Armored Brigade on the morning of March 5. Although they were not seen leaving, earlier photographs show that the HETs are capable of carrying either one AMX-30 main battle tank or two AMX-13 light tanks configured as armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). This would concur with other sensitive reporting that showed seven AFVs awaiting transport in Valencia. The press also reported and photographed a helicopter (possibly an MI-17 HIP or an MI-26 HALO) making two brief landings, presumably to pick up troops or command elements on March 5.
Front Pages From the Front ------3. (S) Regional newspapers from the border state of Zulia ran photographs of a military column (presumably from the 1st Division in Fuerte Mara) made up of olive drab buses and trucks. The front page also carried a photograph of an MI-25 HIND gunship circling the highway interchange near La Chinita airport, which confirms sensitive reporting of a HIND. A contact at La Chinita airport told PolOff that the Venezuelan Air Force was paying to fuel the helicopters and not commandeering supplies.
4. (C) COMMENT: Although not every troop movement can expect to be reported in the open press, available open source and sensitive reporting does not support the BRV's claims of 9,000 troops. END COMMENT. DUDDY
======CABLE ENDS======id: 144916 date: 3/7/2008 21:26 refid: 08CARACAS326 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: SECRET destination: 08CARACAS293|08CARACAS308 header: VZCZCXRO9160 OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHCV #0326 0672126 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 072126Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0763 INFO RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
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S E C R E T CARACAS 000326
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018 TAGS: MCAP, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, CO, VE SUBJECT: NO NEW TROOP MOVEMENTS REPORTED
REF: A. CARACAS 000293 B. CARACAS 000308
Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.4(d)
1. (S) No additional troop movements have been reported in the March 7 open press. Considering the distances from major bases such as Fuerte Paramaracay in Valencia and Carora barracks in Lara state, it is reasonable to assume that elements of the 41st Armored Brigade, such as the 413th "Pedro Leon Torres" Armored Battalion and the 412th "Bermudez" Armored Battalion are still en route to their forward garrison positions near the Colombian border. Wire service photographs indicate that AK-103 assault rifles, from the consignment of 100,000 purchased from Russia, have been issued to Army units. Based on open source and sensitive reporting, the Venezuelan army remains far from reaching its stated deployment of 10 battalions since numerous tanks and armored vehicles are still awaiting transport. There are unconfirmed rumors that there may be a public display of more troops deploying over the March 8-9 weekend. DUDDY
======CABLE ENDS======id: 145258 date: 3/11/2008 14:47 refid: 08CARACAS338 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: SECRET destination: 08CARACAS328 header: VZCZCXRO1591 OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHCV #0338 0711447 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 111447Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0778 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T CARACAS 000338
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018 TAGS: MOPS, PGOV, PREL, CO, VE SUBJECT: CHAVEZ STRIKES CONCILIATORY TONE, RESTORES RELATIONS WITH COLOMBIA
REF: CARACAS 000328
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN LAWTON, REASON 1.4 (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez abruptly changed roles from Field Marshal to Peacemaker after returning from the Rio Summit in Santo Domingo. During his March 8 International Day of the Woman speech, Chavez struck a conciliatory tone toward Colombia by reopening diplomatic missions, recalling troops from the border, and reiterating his call for the release of Franco-Colombian hostage Ingrid Betancourt. Chavez's most recent constructive rhetoric, however, belies his implicit admission that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) operates in Venezuela or the reality that the bulk of Venezuelan forces never made it out of garrison after being ordered to the border. END SUMMARY.
OPEN FOR BUSINESS ------
2. (SBU) On the occasion of the International Day of the Woman March 9, Chavez announced the immediate restoration of diplomatic relations with Bogota and invited the recently expelled Colombian Embassy personnel to return to Caracas. The Foreign Ministry released the same day a communiquQ celebrating "the victory of peace and sovereignty" in Santo Domingo and the immediate return of Venezuela diplomatic personnel to Colombia. The dispatch also urged expelled Colombian diplomats to return "as soon as possible."
3. (SBU) Venezuelan media reported that the Venezuelan legation would be headed by Commercial AttachQ Gregorio Flores and staffed by 11 other diplomats. Sources at the Foreign Ministry told the press that Venezuelan Ambassador Pavel Rondon, who had been recalled in November following Colombia's decision to remove Chavez from his role as humanitarian exchange facilitator, would not be returning to Bogota and a female candidate was being sought to replace him. Those same Foreign Ministry sources expressed hope that Colombian Ambassador to Venezuela Marin Valencia would not return to Caracas. However, March 11 press reports that Marin plans to return to Caracas that same day.
HOME FOR HOLY WEEK ------
4. (S) Chavez also announced during the March 9 speech that the ten battalions he had ordered to Venezuela's border with Colombia would withdraw on March 11. Chavez thanked the defense forces for their service to the fatherland and announced that all soldiers sent to the border would receive a special leave during Holy Week (starting March 15). Open and sensitive source estimates indicate that only about a third of the estimated manpower and equipment had completed the approximately 260-mile journey to the border area since the order had been given seven days earlier.
WHY NOT CALL ------
5. (SBU) During the same address, Chavez stood next to Yolanda Pulecio, the mother of Ingrid Betancourt, and publicly appealed to the FARC chief for Ingrid Betancourt's release. "Manuel Marulanda, send us Ingrid," Chavez said. Adding fuel to the rumor that Betancourt's release via Ecuador had been imminent until the March 1 cross-border raid, Chavez added, "When you can, when conditions make it possible, liberate Ingrid Betancourt. It doesn't make sense to keep her in the jungles of Colombia."
6. (C) Comment: Chavez's decision to send troops to the Colombian border never appeared to resonate politically except among the Venezuelan president's most ardent supporters. In addition, Chavez's warning to Colombia not to repeat what it did in Ecuador, and his ostensible rush to prevent any Colombian cross-border military operations against the FARC in Venezuela were implicit admissions that the FARC is operating inside of Venezuela. Moreover, Chavez's mobilization order appeared to confirm that Venezuela's armed forces are not exactly mission capable. Nevertheless, Chavez is once again exhibiting his tremendous political agility by seizing the opportunity the Rio Summit provided to transform from a Field Marshal into an advocate of peace and fraternity. DUDDY
======CABLE ENDS======id: 233901 date: 11/9/2009 15:41 refid: 09BOGOTA3335 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: SECRET destination: 09BOGOTA3313|09CARACAS1426 header: VZCZCXYZ0013 OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #3335 3131541 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O R 091541Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0786 INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0008 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0161 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0633 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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S E C R E T BOGOTA 003335
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/09 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KJUS, MOPS, OAS, CO, VE SUBJECT: URIBE HEARS WAR DRUMS IN VENEZUELA
REF: A) BOGOTA 3313; B) CARACAS 1426
CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (S) Just after meeting with President Uribe and the military high command, Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva called the Ambassador on the evening of November 8. They believe that Venezuelan President Chavez' public declarations earlier that afternoon represented a major ratcheting up of war rhetoric. The GOC regards the rhetoric as threatening. Silva acknowledged that the GOC and USG analyzed Chavez' intentions differently, but he asked for two actions by the USG:
-- First, an immediate analysis of Venezuelan military movements toward the border, and accelerated real time intelligence on such movements in the future.
-- Second, some sort of USG public comment on Chavez' warlike rhetoric.
The Ambassador said he was unaware (at that time) of Chavez' latest declarations; he would work to accelerate our analysis of possible military movements on the Venezuelan side of the border; and he would consult with Washington on any USG public response.
2. (C) Immediately after the MOD call, President Uribe called the Ambassador. Uribe repeated most of Silva's points about Chavez' latest rhetoric. He said the latest uptick was something he could not ignore, as Colombian public opinion would not permit it. He had to respond in some way. Uribe planned to release a communique that evening (Note: It was released and covered in the morning press. End note.) making four points:
-- GOC did not seek armed conflict with any other nation.
-- Colombian military efforts were directed against narcotrafficking and terrorism.
-- GOC supported resolving differences by dialogue through international law.
-- But in light of Chavez' latest declarations, GOC would submit this matter to the UN Security Council and the Organization of American States (OAS).
3. (S) Uribe asked what the Ambassador advised. The Ambassador asked if he had spoken to Brazilian President Lula. Uribe said no, but he would do so. The Ambassador suggested that Uribe ask himself what Chavez would want him to do, and then do something different. If Chavez wanted him to respond with heated rhetoric that would help him conceal internal problems in Venezuela from his own people, then Uribe should not fall into that trap. Uribe agreed. He asked for any further advice the USG might offer.
4. (S) AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: This is further evidence that the Colombians are working themselves into a sweat over the potential military threat from Venezuela. We will work directly with SouthCom and ORA on the GOC request for accelerated intelligence on military movements in Venezuela. We do not regard Chavez' latest blast as a significant increase over what he has already said, and do not necessarily recommend that Washington treat this as a genuine crisis. Obviously, we will have to determine our posture should the GOC submit this issue to the Security Council or OAS. Equally obviously, we should factor into our thinking the fact that the GOC has become almost neuralgic about the Venezuela threat. Correct or not, it is something we must consider as we make our own policy decisions in the region. End Comment. BROWNFIELD
======CABLE ENDS======id: 234042 date: 11/10/2009 11:11 refid: 09CARACAS1443 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: SECRET destination: 09CARACAS1351|09CARACAS1367|09CARACAS1376|09CARACAS1419|09CARAC AS1426|09CARACAS1430 header: VZCZCXRO4253 OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHCV #1443/01 3141111 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 101111Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3968 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001443
SENSITIVE SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2029 TAGS: PREL, PINS, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, VZ SUBJECT: CHAVEZ LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR CONFRONTATION WITH COLOMBIA
REF: A. CARACAS 1430 B. CARACAS 1426 C. CARACAS 1376 D. CARACAS 1367 E. CARACAS 1351 F. CARACAS 1419
Classified By: Acting Pol Counselor Rolf Olson, for reason 1.4 (d)
1. (SE) Summary: On November 8, President Chavez called on Venezuelans to "prepare for war" due to the threat posed by Colombia and the United States. Chavez again hammered the Colombian government for "shamelessly delivering its sovereignty to the U.S." through the recently signed U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Chavez's comments followed dual announcements on November 5 by Vice President Carrizalez and Foreign Minister Maduro that the Venezuelan government (GBRV) was deploying 15,000 National Guardsmen and ramping up its intelligence-gathering activities in states that border Colombia to "track down and neutralize irregular groups" in the aftermath of several violent incidents. These announcements were made against a backdrop of serious domestic problems for the GBRV. Venezuelans are unhappy about widespread water shortages, increasing power blackouts, and spiraling crime rates. Chavez has a well-established track record of using external threats to shift attention away from the GBRV's shortcomings. No meaningful movement of National Guard troops has been noted since the Carrizalez announcement, and post does not/not believe a full-scale war between Colombia and Venezuela is looming or even conceivable at this point. But as Chavez stares down the bumpy road that leads to the 2010 National Assembly elections, he appears willing to run the risk of a more serious incident on the border than we have so far witnessed. End Summary.
2. (U) During his November 8 "Alo, Presidente" television broadcast, President Chavez charged his military leaders to prepare their forces and the Venezuelan public for the possibility of armed conflict with Colombia and/or the United States. Chavez asserted that through its signing of the DCA, "Colombia has delivered its sovereignty to the Empire... the Government of Colombia is no longer in Bogota, it's been transferred to the United States." Concluding that the presence of American soldiers in Colombia would inevitably lead to an attack against Venezuela, Chavez urged: "Let's not lose a single day in our principal mission -- preparing ourselves for war and helping the people prepare themselves for war, because it's the responsibility of all.... Revolutionary students, workers, women: everyone together..." Reinforcing the point that this call to arms was simply a reaction to the nefarious intentions of others, he pondered: "If we lived in a world in which the sovereignty of the people and international law were respected, we could dedicate ourselves to something other than war." Chavez claimed to be paraphrasing President Lula saying that "the only thing he had seen from Obama was the coup in Honduras and the military bases in Colombia."
3. (SE) Chavez's comments follow dual announcements on November 5 by GBRV officials of an increased Venezuelan military presence and intelligence-gathering along the border with Colombia. Vice President and Minister of Defense Ramon Carrizalez stated that 15,000 National Guard troops were being deployed in the border states of Zulia, Tachira, Barinas, Apure, and Amazonas "to identify, track down, and neutralize irregular groups that are trying to destabilize our government." While stridently accusing the USG and Colombia of seeking to undermine the Venezuelan government (Ref A), Foreign Minister Nicholas Maduro stated that the GBRV would "increase intelligence efforts" along the border, as well as "continue strengthening our political and military capacity... so that not even one U.S. soldier can set foot in this country." Border tensions have heightened in recent weeks in the aftermath of the killing in Tachira of ten kidnapping victims alleged by the GBRV to be paramilitaries, as well as the November 2 murder of two National Guard officers at a Tachira checkpoint (Refs B and C). However, in the three days since Carrizalez's announcement of the National Guard "deployment," no significant movement of forces has been observed, and a simple redeployment of forces already based in the areas in question may constitute the extent of the mobilization.
4. (SE) The recent events near the Colombian border and the GBRV's reactions come at the same time that Chavez's Bolivarian political project faces diminished popular support due to deteriorating public services and a crime problem that the GBRV has been unable to contain. Caracas-wide water
CARACAS 00001443 002 OF 002
rationing commenced on November 2, leaving entire neighborhoods without water service for two days each week for the foreseeable future. Diminished capacity to meet electricity demand has led to frequent blackouts across the country (Ref D). On November 8, local daily El Universal reported that according to projections, the number of homicides in Venezuela will grow by 48 percent between 2008 and 2009 -- from 13,129 in 2008 to an estimated 19,400 by the end of 2009. Even among Chavez's traditional political supporters, frustration about the lack of progress on such issues has begun to set in (Ref E).
5. (SE) Comment: Coupled with these serious domestic challenges and the recent violence in the border area, Chavez's rhetoric suggests he is willing to run the risk of -- and perhaps even sees opportunity in -- a low-level military incident of some sort with Colombia. Such an incident could have several potential benefits for Chavez: it would help distract domestic and international critics; serve to rally his followers around the flag; facilitate the further militarization and centralization of Venezuelan society; and create a more favorable security environment on the Venezuelan side of the border for friendly Colombian rebels (contact with whom he may still deny). It could even serve as a possible pretext for postponing next year's AN elections, should the political climate remain unfavorable. Finally, he may see value in bloodying Colombia's nose as talk of a possible third Uribe term continues, or of playing the victim of a Colombia-originated incident. Chavez appears to recognize the stiff internal political headwinds he currently confronts, and the announcement last week that the AN elections will take place on September 26 (Ref F) provides him a timeline with which he can map out an electoral strategy that minimizes the fallout from his government's shortcomings.
6. (SE) Comment Continued: Post does not/not believe a full-scale war with Colombia is looming or even conceivable at this point. While Chavez is manipulating the DCA issue at least in part to justify certain internal measures, some local observers think that he really believes a U.S.-Colombian move against him is possible -- or even in train. If true, this belief could propel him to take reckless actions both internally and/or abroad. End Comment. DUDDY
======CABLE ENDS======id: 234175 date: 11/10/2009 20:46 refid: 09CARACAS1444 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: SECRET destination: 09CARACAS1144|09CARACAS1207|09CARACAS1430|09CARACAS1443 header: VZCZCXRO4996 OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHCV #1444/01 3142046 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 102046Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3970 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001444
SENSITIVE SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2029 TAGS: PREL, PINS, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, VE SUBJECT: GBRV STRATEGY ON COLOMBIA-DCA DISPUTE BECOMING CLEARER
REF: A. CARACAS 1443 B. CARACAS 1430 C. CARACAS 1207 D. CARACAS 1144
Classified By: Acting Pol Counselor Rolf Olson, for reason 1.4 (d)
1. (SE) Summary: Following President Chavez's November 8 urging that the Venezuelan public "prepare for war" to defend the country against anticipated Colombian-U.S. cross-border aggression (Ref A), the Venezuelan government (GBRV) and its local allies issued a series of supportive and similarly bellicose statements that nonetheless affirmed that Venezuela is the aggrieved party in this dispute. Vice Foreign Minister Francisco Arias Cardenas, the most senior GBRV official to speak publicly on November 9, sought to steer the narrative away from a bilateral showdown between Colombia and Venezuela. He focused instead on the threat posed by "the elephant in the china shop" -- the United States -- and asserted that the quality of future Colombia-Venezuela relations would "hinge on the status of the bases." In response to the Colombian government's (GOC) stated intention of taking the matter to either the U.N. or the OAS, Arias instead demanded that the GOC address fellow members of UNASUR in order to provide "the security guarantees the other members have demanded." The shape of the GBRV strategy on this subject is becoming clearer: portray Venezuela as the victim, cite the U.S. as the ultimate source of conflict, put the onus on Colombia to withdraw its support for the DCA as a way to forestall regional conflict, and attempt to do all this in a forum that would likely be friendlier to GBRV arguments. End Summary.
2. (SE) On November 9, the Chavez administration and its local supporters issued statements defending President Chavez's November 8 rhetoric regarding a possible war with Colombia. The President of the Foreign Relations Commission in the National Assembly (AN), Roy Daza, stated that the threat posed by the "North American military bases" in Colombia "obliged" Chavez and all Venezuelans "to take appropriate measures" in response. Fellow AN Deputy Iris Varela affirmed that Colombia had already committed "acts of war" ("ataques de guerra") against Venezuela through support of paramilitary groups along the border. The ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) called on its members to "join the militia" ("convertirse en milicianos") to defend "against a U.S. attack from the occupied bases in Colombia." The Chavez-allied Fatherland For All party (PPT) echoed these sentiments: "We are convinced this Colombia-based strategy is aimed at disrupting and destroying the united advance of our peoples and our governments." (Comment: The statements of the PPT spokesman, Simon Calzadilla, were disappointing since just days earlier he had participated as one of four PPT deputies in a cordial meeting with Embassy Poloffs, in which Poloffs had explained the DCA and what its provisions did and did not contain. Calzadilla had seemed satisfied by this explanation at the time, and in fact had asked: "Why haven't you explained this so well before? This doesn't seem like such a big deal when it is laid out in detail." End Comment.) The country's Communist Party (PCV) struck a similar chord, arguing that "it is the United States that is fostering this war. Such a war would be convenient for the Empire, not for the Colombian or the Venezuelan governments."
3. (SE) The GBRV's Foreign Ministry added its voice to the mix by issuing a rebuttal to the GOC's November 8 Presidential statement, blasting it as "immoral" and "hypocritical." Referring to Colombia's March 1, 2008 attack on FARC camps in Ecuador, the statement accused the GOC of committing "the only act of war registered in the recent history of our continent." While ridiculing Colombia for having "ignored the regional bodies responsible for this subject" in previous opportunities, the statement relayed the GBRV's willingness to discuss the issue in an international forum, citing the South American Defense Council (SADC) as one possible venue.
4. (SE) Vice Foreign Minister for Latin America Francisco Arias Cardenas has been the most senior GBRV official to speak publicly since President Chavez's November 8 remarks. In separate media interviews on November 9, Arias placed blame initially on President Uribe for having played politics with regional security: "The call to war was made by Uribe in order to win a new term." But Arias also emphasized that the GBRV ultimately assigned blame to the U.S.: "We are neither looking for a war provoked by Venezuela, nor for a war provoked by Colombia or the Colombians." Arias added: "The true provocation and cause of such a war would be" the DCA itself, by virtue of the U.S. presence on the bases. Signing
CARACAS 00001444 002 OF 002
the DCA with the U.S. was, Arias added, "like bringing an elephant into a china shop." He asserted that the quality of the Colombia-Venezuela relationship would "hinge" on the issue of the bases. ("La relacion depende de las bases militares.") In response to the GOC's stated intention of taking the matter to multilateral bodies such as the U.N. or the OAS, Arias instead demanded that the Colombian government "should respond to UNASUR in order to provide the security guarantees that the other member countries demand." (Note: Per Refs C and D, Chavez publicly portrayed the August UNASUR deliberations on the DCA issue in Bariloche as a victory, and in mid-September challenged President Obama to meet with UNASUR leaders to explain the DCA. Additionally, GBRV-friendly Ecuador currently holds the rotating Presidency of UNASUR. End Note.)
5. (SE) Comment: The GBRV appears to have chosen its strategic path as this issue appears headed for some sort of international hearing. First, reiterate that Venezuela is the aggrieved party in this dispute, and is only preparing itself for a conflict brought on by others. Second, assail the U.S. as the dark force behind Uribe's ill-advised policies, and use the USG's own documents as proof of "the Empire's plans." (Ref B) Third, take advantage of the region's distinct aversion to armed conflict; this involves putting the onus on Colombia to renounce its support for the DCA as the most neighborly action possible, as well as the easiest way to forestall a potential military confrontation. And fourth, if possible, have the public debate on this subject take place in an environment that is more likely to have GBRV allies echoing these arguments, such as UNASUR/SADC. End Comment. DUDDY
======CABLE ENDS======id: 235936 date: 11/20/2009 16:41 refid: 09BOGOTA3421 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: SECRET//NOFORN destination: 09BOGOTA2449|09BOGOTA3313|09CARACAS1443 header: VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #3421/01 3241641 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 201641Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1112 INFO RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0215 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0002 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
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S E C R E T BOGOTA 003421
NOFORN SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/11/20 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KJUS, ETRD, OAS, CO, VE SUBJECT: COLOMBIANS SEE UBIQUITOUS VENEZUELAN THREAT
REF: CARACAS 1443; BOGOTA 2449; BOGOTA 3313
CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
SUMMARY
------
1. (C/NF) Colombian officials and observers are increasingly concerned about the long-term threat Venezuela poses to their country. Experts inside and outside the government worry that any small incident along the tense border could spark a costly confrontation, given the decrease in communication and increase in tension between the two countries. Most believe the main risk comes from an unintentional incident, although influential GOC advisors claim to be equally worried that President Chavez could start a war to distract Venezuelans from their economic woes. Still, most of our interlocutors perceive a broader threat that transcends the current crisis -- they believe Venezuela has isolated Colombia, that its arms purchases will allow it to defeat Colombia militarily, and that Venezuelan trade restrictions will cause significant economic damage. Real or not, the perception of the threat posed by Venezuela has widespread implications for Colombian society. The perception that the USG is not supporting Colombia is becoming an issue in public commentary and private conversation. End Summary.
NEAR-TERM WORRIES: BORDER FLARE-UP,
CHAVEZ'S UNPREDICTABILITY
------
2. (C/NF) Few in Colombia assess that Venezuelan President Chavez plans a full-scale attack on Colombian territory, but officials and commentators alike see a much greater risk that the heightened tension and increased Venezuelan military presence along the border could spark an unintentional armed border conflict. Top Uribe security advisor Paola Holguin told us that even though it was clear the GBRV could not move 15,000 troops to the border as announced (ref A), she worried that what she called the "poorly trained and undisciplined" state of Venezuelan troops could cause them to open fire without provocation. An analysis in leading newsweekly "Cambio" pointed out that the lack of communication between the two countries -- along with the atmosphere of mutual recrimination and doubt -- could cause such an incident to spiral out of control. The analysis concluded that although war is not imminent, it is much closer now than during any previous bilateral crisis.
3. (C/NF) These concerns are multiplied by what many here see as Venezuela's unpredictability. Presidential Communications Director Jorge Mario Eastman told us this volatility made it particularly difficult toQredict the Venezuelan leader's reactions in crises like the current one. Similarly, Carlos Morales, MFA Acting Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, expressed frustration over the difficulties his ministry had experienced in trying to predict the GBRV's decision-making. Holguin cautioned us that "a dictator like Chavez" calculates risk and reward differently from that of democratic governments like the USG and GOC --making his moves hard to foresee. Colombian media frequently portray Chavez as mercurial or even clownish, but our GOC interlocutors believe he is quite rational -- just not predictable.
4. (C/NF) Still, Holguin told us she and other Casa de Narino insiders worry about a full-on Venezuelan invasion, even though the current conventional wisdom predicts otherwise. She argued Chavez was desperate to distract his people from Venezuela's economic crisis, likening the situation to Argentina's 1982 seizure of the
Falklands/Malvinas Islands from the United Kingdom. Holguin contended the GBRV had killed the nine Colombians, one Peruvian, and one Venezuelan whose bodies were discovered on October 24 in the Venezuelan border state of Tachira (ref B) and argued the act proved the Venezuelan regime's ruthlessness in attempting to provoke a war with Colombia.
5. (C/NF) Virtually all local observers assess Colombia would dominate Venezuela in any armed conflict, as its years of experience and better-trained personnel would outweigh any Venezuelan hardware edge gained from its recent spree of arms purchases. Nevertheless, many worry about the havoc Venezuela could inflict in even a short conflict. General Gustavo Matamoros, commander of the Colombian military's Joint Caribbean Command (which includes long stretches of border territory in the northeast), told us earlier in the year that Colombian armed forces in the area are far superior to those of the GBRV, but conceded that the GBRV could inflict unacceptable physical and political damage in border areas before being defeated rapidly. Similarly, Eastman noted that given the relatively short distances involved, a single Venezuelan bomber could easily drop a bomb on a major Colombian city -- an outcome the GOC could not tolerate. Holguin argues that Chavez -- whom she called "a soldier who has never fought a battle" -- simply does not understand these human costs of combat the way that Colombians do, or else he would not risk it.
LONGER TERM WORRIES: REGIONAL ISOLATION,
MILITARY IMBALANCE, ECONOMIC DECLINE
------
6. (S/NF) Beyond the current crisis, we hear similar perceptions about the broader threat Venezuela poses to Colombia. First, officials and observers alike worry Chavez's regional diplomacy (fueled in equal measures by oil and ideology) has left the GOC alone in the region and surrounded by unfriendly countries. The MFA's Morales told us of GOC concern that this has left Colombia isolated, with few regional powers willing to speak out against Chavez's aggressive rhetoric. Holguin said the region's current silence only emboldened Chavez to continue to speak and act aggressively -- and to keep generating crises. Although she credited the Brazilian Senate's November 11 vote to delay Venezuelan entry into Mercosur with Chavez's newly-toned down rhetoric, she hoped other countries would be more willing to stand up and actively denounce Chavez. Professor Sandra Borda of the Universidad de los Andes, an international affairs specialist and member of the GOC's Mission on Foreign Policy, told us that President Uribe had told a recent Mission meeting that he believed this was a deliberate GBRV strategy aimed at spreading Bolivarianism and isolating Colombia as one of the few remaining opponents of the ideology.
7. (C/NF) Second, GOC officials in particular are worried about Chavez's recent arms acquisitions from Russia, Iran, and other countries outside the hemisphere. Morales told us the hardware increasingly allowed the GBRV to back up its hostile rhetoric, while Holguin conceded that the improved weaponry would eventually overwhelm the GOC's current advantages. This is creating political pressure on the GOC to respond in kind. According to local press, the lower House of Congress will hold hearings in early December to determine whether the GOC is adequately prepared to face the Venezuelan threat, while U Party Senator Juan Carlos Velez publicly insisted the GOC needed to purchase upgraded air defense systems to counter the Venezuelan threat. Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva told the Ambassador the GOC was also interested in discussing the acquisition of anti-tank systems. Professor Borda noted this dynamic could spread into a dangerous bilateral arms race, given that neither country finds credible the other side's claims to be focusing on defensive capabilities.
8. (C/NF) Finally, Colombians worry about short- and medium-term damage to their economy caused by sharply decreased trade with their number-two trade partner. September exports to Venezuela dropped by 52%, compared with September 2008 numbers. For the first half of October, Colombian exports were down 77% compared to the same period in 2008. Colombian imports from Venezuela are down 56% for the first nine months of 2009. Given the high degree of interdependence in border areas, such as Cucuta, trade restrictions and temporary border closings take a tremendous toll on the border region, and the GBRV has taken other punitive steps that will continue to drive down trade (ref C). Paradoxically, many in the GOC and Colombian business community see potential long-term benefits for Colombia in the drop off in bilateral trade, as it will put greater pressure on Colombian exporters to diversify their markets.
9. (C/NF) Alfredo Ramos, Director of Economic Integration at the Ministry of Trade, described the two countries as natural trading partners, noting that neither can readily replace the other. Nonetheless, he said it was entirely possible that Chavez could drive bilateral trade down to virtually zero in the coming months, suggesting continued downward pressure on Colombian economic growth against a backdrop of increasing unemployment and stagnant economic activity. In a letter to President Obama dated October 29, 2009, President Uribe presented this same argument as a reason to push forward on the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement.
USG BECOMING AN ISSUE?
------
10. (C) On November 17, Foreign Minister Bermudez summoned the Ambassador to express concern about the USG position in the dispute with Venezuela. He suggested that helpful neutrality was not the position the GOC was hoping for, and predicted Uribe would drive this point home in the upcoming visit by Deputy Secretary Steinberg. Perhaps not coincidentally, the lead editorial in leading Colombian paper "El Tiempo" on November 20 focused on the issue of USG neutrality.
COMMENT: LEGITIMATE CONCERN OR PARANOIA?
------
11. (C/NF) We can argue the extent to which Colombians have a legitimate reason for concern or are simply paranoid. The point, however, is that worry about Venezuela abounds in Colombian society. It affects politics, diplomacy, the economy, and, increasingly, military doctrine. We are confident that Colombian leadership will maintain calm in its immediate dealings with Caracas, but there will be increasing pressure to demonstrate that Colombia is prepared to deal with its volatile neighbor to the east. BROWNFIELD
======CABLE ENDS======id: 235956 date: 11/20/2009 17:39 refid: 09STATE120006 origin: Secretary of State classification: SECRET//NOFORN destination: header: VZCZCXYZ0006 RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #0006 3241743 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 201739Z NOV 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4922
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S E C R E T STATE 120006
NOFORN SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2034 TAGS: PINR, PREL, BR, CO, VE SUBJECT: (S/NF) BRAZIL'S INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA (C-AL9-02389)
Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN THE DEVELOPING CONFLICT BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA. AS TIME AND RESOURCES ALLOW, WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INSIGHT POST COULD PROVIDE ON BRAZIL'S POTENTIAL INVOLVEMENT AS A MEDIATOR IN THIS CONFLICT. MANY THANKS FROM WASHINGTON.
A. (S/NF) WHAT IS THE LULA GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY ON ENGAGING URIBE AND CHAVEZ TO REDUCE TENSIONS?
B. (S/NF) WHAT SPECIFICALLY DOES BRASILIA INTEND TO OFFER AT THE 26 NOVEMBER CLIMATE CHANGE SUMMIT IN MANAUS WITH RESPECT TO THIS BILATERAL SPAT?
C. (S/NF) WHAT ARE THE DETAILS OF THE REGIONAL NONAGGRESSION AGREEMENT THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY IS LOOKING TO NEGOTIATE? HOW IS BRASILIA ENGAGING QUITO TO PUT THIS NONAGGRESSION AGREEMENT ON THE UNASUR AGENDA?
D. (S/NF) DOES BRASILIA FAVOR UNASUR, OAS, OR UN HANDLING OF THIS MATTER? HOW DOES BRASILIA PLAN TO RESPOND, SHOULD BOGOTA APPEAL TO THE UN?
E. (S/NF) WHAT IS MOTIVATING THE BRAZILIAN RESPONSE TO REGIONAL TENSIONS ARISING FROM THE U.S.-COLOMBIA DCA? WHAT IS BRAZIL'S OWN POSITION ON THE DCA, AND HOW HAS IT EVOLVED OR BEEN AFFECTED BY ITS INTERACTIONS WITH COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA?
2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-02389 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS. CLINTON
======CABLE ENDS======
id: 145435 date: 3/12/2008 12:45 refid: 08STATE25671 origin: Secretary of State classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: VZCZCXRO2655 PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHC #5671/01 0721252 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 121245Z MAR 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5546 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8099 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 7560 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 5253 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 4658 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 025671
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018 TAGS: PREL, PTER, CO, EC SUBJECT: COLOMBIA-ECUADOR DISPUTE: OAS RESOLUTION 930
Classified By: Acting PermRep Bob Manzanares; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Summary. The OAS Permanent Council approved Resolution 930 on March 5 regarding the Colombia-Ecuador dispute stemming from the Colombian attack on a FARC camp on the Ecuadorian border on March 1. Resolution 930 reaffirmed the inviolability of national sovereignty, established a commission headed by OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza to travel to Colombia and Ecuador and propose resolutions to the dispute, and convoked a meeting of OAS foreign ministers on March 17 to receive SYG Insulza's report and "to examine the facts and make pertinent recommendations." Colombia met its key objective of avoiding condemnation (aided by USG refusal to join consensus on any document condemning Colombian actions); but Colombia accepted language indicating that its actions on March 1 violated international law. The preambular language of the resolution asserted that Colombian forces carried out an incursion into Ecuador's territory and that this constituted a "violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law." USOAS disputed the assertion that Colombia had violated international law through its actions, sought unsuccessfully to obtain modified language, and submitted a statement for the record noting the USG's disagreement with that component of the resolution.
2. (C) The OAS tradition of consensus (as opposed voting) complicated Ecuadorian and Venezuelan efforts to secure a condemnation of Colombia. Ecuador, prodded by Venezuela, adopted an agressive stance at the outset of the Special Permanent Council session, derailing a tentative agreement among South American delegations to quickly adopt language acceptable to Colombia. Colombian Permanent Representative Ospina shot back, distributing information from the captured FARC laptops to all delegations and accusing Venezuela and Ecuador of aiding the FARC. Brazil sought to play a role as honest broker, though Brazil joined most other major Latin delegations in pressing hard to condemn Colombia's alleged violation of Ecuador's national sovereignty. Venezuela, joined by Argentina and Nicaragua, sought to keep the focus solely on Colombia's incursion into Ecuador and dismissed Colombia's arguments as an effort to distract from that attack. Argentina adopted a lower profile on the second day, evidently as a result of Embassy Buenos Aires requests to the GOA to rein in its delegation. Venezuela's bullying tactics and open encouragement of a hard line by Ecuador triggered sharp reactions among other delegations and undermined their attempts to obtain a condemnation of Colombia. The easing of tensions stemming from the Rio Group Summit in Santo Domingo came as a surprise to OAS delegations and generated uncertainty as to the OAS role in managing this crisis. End Summary.
//ECUADOR LAUNCHES BROADSIDE, COLOMBIA FIRES BACK//
3. (SBU) The Special Meeting of the OAS Permanent Council was requested by the Ecuadorian delegation to discuss Colombia's March 1 attack on a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory. As the OAS meeting began on March 4, the Colombian delegation informed USOAS that the ALADI Group (South American Latin delegations plus Mexico) had negotiated draft language that would avoid condemnation of Colombia and would call for an OAS mission to Colombia and Ecuador to encourage a diplomatic solution to the crisis. That tentative arrangement fell apart immediately as Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Salvador used her opening remarks to accuse Colombian President Uribe of lying to Ecuador, of killing the FARC members in their sleep, and of carrying out an unjustified violation of Ecuador's sovereignty. She noted that the events had compelled Ecuador to break diplomatic relations with Colombia and said that an apology was insufficient. Minister Salvador called upon the Permanent Council to condemn Colombia's violation of Ecuador's sovereignty, establish a fact-finding committee to investigate the events surrounding the alleged violation of Ecuador's sovereignty, and call for a consultative meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers. At several points, she emphasized Ecuador's condemnation of the FARC's methods, and Ecuador's cooperation with Colombia to control the border.
4. (SBU) Colombia's response was equally heated. Permanent Representative Ospina reviewed the March 1 incident and reiterated Colombia's apology for entering Ecuador's
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territory, but then attacked Ecuador and Venezuela for their coordination/cooperation with the FARC, "in violation of international law." Ospina discussed Colombia's plan to bring Venezuelan President Chavez to the International Criminal Court for alleged links to the financing of terrorists. He cited Colombian efforts at the UN as well as the OAS to condemn terrorism and cited UNSCR 1373 (2001) provisions on the "duty of states to deny refuge to those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit acts of terrorism and to impede... the use of their territory for those purposes." For his closing sound bite, Ospina mockingly lauded the "Presidents of Ecuador and Venezuela for expelling our Ambassadors, dignified representatives of a legitimate democracy. Hopefully, they will display similar valor by expelling terrorists from their territory."
//OTHER OAS MEMBERS JOIN THE FRAY//
5. (C) Nicaraguan PermRep Moncada spoke next, issuing a condemnation of Colombia for its "murder" of Raul Reyes who was "on a political and diplomatic mission to establish talks between the Colombian Government and the FARC." Bolivia called for an unequivocal apology by Colombia and said the "aggrieved party should not be transformed into the aggressor." Venezuelan PermRep (and Vice FM) Valero spoke later, claiming the support of "around 25 delegations" for a condemnation of Colombia's actions. Valero urged the OAS to issue a condemnation, establish a fact-finding mission to report to a meeting of the OAS Consultation of Ministers no later than March 11. He said the Colombian charges of Venezuelan and Ecuadoran complicity with the FARC were "lamentable... diplomatic pyrotechnics based on lies" and that Colombia's action in Ecuador demonstrated that Colombia was engaged in a "genocidal war." Valero claimed that Venezuela advocated a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Colombia and said that Plan Colombia was a USG effort to involve Colombia in a continental war. He closed by reiterating Venezuela's full support for Ecuador's efforts at the OAS, rejected terrorism "in all its forms," and encouraged efforts to establish a group of friends to aid the Colombian peace process.
6. (SBU) Argentine PermRep Gil expressed Argentina's full support for Ecuador's draft resolution and said the focus of the OAS should be on the "flagrant violation of international law" carried out by Colombia in "unilaterally according itself the right to violate the territorial sovereignty of another state." Gil warned against heeding the "dangerous arguments" made by Colombia to justify its actions. (COMMENT: Argentina adopted a much lower profile on the second day, clearly the result of Embassy Buenos Aires' efforts to rein in Ambassador Gil. END COMMENT). Brazilian PermRep Chohfi expressed the view that Colombia's action constituted "prima facie" evidence of a violation of national sovereignty, but that there were conflicting views of what had happened, requiring the formation of a committee to look into the matter. At several points, Brazil reiterated the importance of a negotiated resolution and Brazil's readiness to facilitate such a process. Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Peru, and Honduras each emphasized the principle of territorial sovereignty while urging a peaceful resolution. Costa Rica, Canada, and Bahamas (speaking on behalf of CARICOM) focused more on the need for restraint and for a rapid, peaceful resolution, while also advocating respect for territorial integrity.
7. (SBU) USOAS Acting PermRep Manzanares expressed U.S. friendship for both Colombia and Ecuador, strong USG support for Colombia's fight against terrorism and narcotics trafficking, and called for a prompt resolution of the crisis through the OAS in a manner acceptable to both Ecuador and Colombia. The USOAS statement focused on the FARC's pernicious role in the region and on previous OAS consensus agreements condemning the FARC and calling on all member states to honor their obligations to deny safehaven to terrorists. Manzanares said it was regrettable that Venezuela and Nicaragua sought to expand the scope of the matter before the Permanent Council and urged that Ecuador and Colombia be given an opportunity to resolve the matter expeditiously.
//VENEZUELA THROWS ITS WEIGHT//
8. (C) Given the lack of progress, the Chair of the Permanent Council then called for a smaller working group chaired by Panamania PermRep Royo and attended by OAS SYG Insulza to work on language for an OAS consensus resolution. This
STATE 00025671 003 OF 004
"smaller" group was attended by most of the 34 permanent representatives and their staffs and foundered as each delegation insisted on presenting its view. When the Paraguayan delegation suggested that the Colombian and Ecuadorian representatives engage in direct negotiations with only SYG Insulza and Panamanian PermRep Royo present, Venezuela briefly resisted this arrangement, but grudgingly acceded. However, the Colombian delegation informed USOAS that Venezuelan PermRep Valero used a side door to enter the negotiation room and urge Ecuador's delegation to force a vote by the Permanent Council on Ecuador's draft resolution. (NOTE: Given the OAS tradition of consensus decisions, calls to vote on an issue are considered highly polemical. END NOTE). A senior OAS official denied that Valero had managed to get into the negotiating room, but Valero was observed hovering near the discussions throughout the evening.
9. (SBU) Shortly after midnight, the Chair of the Permanent Council reconvened the session and announced that progress had been made by Ecuador and Colombia, but that there was no final agreement. He suggested that the session be suspended until the next morning to give the two sides time to conclude a text; Grenada took up that suggestion and moved that the session be suspended. However, just before the session was gaveled to a close, Venezuela interrupted and asked for a clarification of what specific points separated the two sides. Valero warned that the failure of the OAS to act would lead Venezuela to question the value of the OAS, particularly when Cuba had done much less than Colombia and had been suspended by the OAS as a result.
10. (C) Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Salvador seized the moment to propose an amended resolution and ask why Colombia refused to match Ecuador's concessions. Honduran PermRep Sosa aimed barbed comments at the Venezuelan delegation and suggested that Ecuador and Colombia continue working towards compromise language. After several other delegations joined Honduras, the Chair suspended the session until the next day. (COMMENT: Rumors that Venezuela was urging a vote on Ecuador's draft resolution -- and Valero's machinations that kept the session open until 1:30 a.m. -- irritated other delegations and undermined support for Ecuador's positions. Several delegations reported that Valero had misinformed Ecuadorian FM Salvador that she had at least 20 votes on her side and did not have to compromise further on the text, which encouraged Ecuador to take a tougher line. END COMMENT).
//WORKING GROUP ACHIEVES DRAFT TEXT//
11. (C) By late morning on March 5, the Colombian and Ecuadorian delegations had hammered out compromise language. In the preambular language of the resolution, Colombia accepted that its actions on March 1 had violated international law, though the document did not condemn Colombia for doing so. More importantly for the Colombian delegation, the resolution termed the visit by SYG Insulza an effort to broker a resolution of the dispute rather than a strictly "fact finding mission to investigate Colombia's violation of Ecuador's sovereignty" (which was the language sought by Ecuador).
12. (C) After reviewing the draft text, USOAS expressed concern to the Colombian delegation about Colombia's apparent acceptance that it had violated international law and urged Colombia to consider alternative language and/or cite OAS articles and other international instruments permitting action taken in self defense. USOAS noted that the USG did not agree that Colombia's actions constituted a violation of international law. The Colombian delegation indicated that its hands were tied because President Uribe had already acknowledged and apologized for the incursion into Ecuador. Moreover, Colombia feared that if it cited self defense, this could open the door for the FARC to gain belligerent status. Also, the Colombian delegation was pleased that it had succeeded in eliminating much of the Ecuadorian language that had proved unacceptable to Colombia; therefore Colombia was reluctant to reopen the text for further changes. For its part, the Ecuadorian delegation refused to consider any modification to the text, considering it the least Ecuador could accept in view of the absence of a condemnation of Colombia. USOAS therefore opted not to block consensus on the Ecuadorian/Colombian text and to instead make a statement for the record (see para 14).
13. (SBU) The Chair reconvened the Permanent Council, at which point Ecuador and Colombia reiterated their respective
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positions, but expressed support for the compromise text. The operative paragraphs of Resolution 930:
-- Reaffirmed "the principle that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever." (NOTE: This is the first sentence of Article 21 of the OAS Charter. END NOTE).
-- Called for the formation of an OAS commission headed by SYG Insulza, accompanied by four ambassadors, to visit both Ecuador and Colombia, to submit a report to the Consultation of Ministers, and to "propose formulas for bringing the two nations closer together."
-- Convoked a meeting of the Consultation of Ministers on March 17 to receive the report of the OAS commission headed by Insulza and to "examine the facts and make pertinent recommendations."
14. (SBU) Other delegations announced their support for the resolution, with the exception of Nicaragua, whose PermRep announced that he had just been instructed by President Ortega to draw attention Colombian maritime actions that challenged Nicaragua's borders. He said that these new facts made it impossible for Nicaragua to support the language in the text. This objection was essentially ignored (though Colombia disputed the facts presented by Nicaragua) and the resolution was passed by consensus. USOAS asked that the following statement be read into the record of the session:
-- "The United notes that Colombia and Ecuador have reached conclusions reflected in 'Considerations, Paragraph 2.' Such conclusions are highly fact specific and the United States has not reached an independent judgment on the issue."
The Colombian delegation thanked the USG for its support during the negotiations, and for the U.S. Embassy's work in Buenos Aires to tone down Argentine Perm Rep Gil's support for Venezuelan positions.
//OAS COMMISSION ESTABLISHED, BUT WITHOUT CONSULTATION//
15. (C) Shortly thereafter SYG Insulza informed USOAS that his Commission would include the PermReps of Panama, Brazil, Peru, and Argentina. USOAS voiced objection regarding the selection of Argentina's PermRep (given his strong personal support for Venezuela's positions), the lack of consultation with all OAS regional coordinators in forming the Commission, and the absence of either a North American or Caribbean representative on the Commission. The Mexican, Canadian, and Dominican Republic delegations expressed similar dismay regarding the narrow makeup of the Commission. Insulza added the Chair of the Permanent Council (Bahamas), but did not otherwise change the makeup of the Commission.
//RIO GROUP DECLARATION//
16. (C) The March 7 announcement of a diplomatic breakthrough caught OAS delegations by surprise, but did not alter plans for either the visit of Insulza's commission or the March 17 meeting of the Consultation of Ministers. Insulza told reporters that the crisis required "tight closure" and to "have a collective opinion" regarding what took place on March 1. The Rio Group Declaration is likely to impact the agenda for the OAS ministerial session as there will be strong pressure to endorse the Rio Group's document, particularly a reaffirmation of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. The Department is studying the Rio Group Declaration and planning for the March 17 OAS Consultation of Ministers. RICE
======CABLE ENDS======id: 237713 date: 12/2/2009 18:09 refid: 09CARACAS1517 origin: Embassy Caracas classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: VZCZCXRO5702 OO RUEHAG RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHROV RUEHRS RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTM DE RUEHCV #1517 3361809 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O R 021809Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0085 INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001517
SIPDIS HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/12/02 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PREF, CO, VE SUBJECT: Ambassadors Discuss Expulsion of Colombian Miners/Colombian Venezuelan Bilateral Relations
CLASSIFIED BY: DUDDY, AMBASSADOR, DOS, AMB; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: On December 1, Ambassador met with Colombian Ambassador to Venezuela Maria Luisa Chiappe at the residence of Mexican Embassy Political Counselor Maria Elena Alcaraz, at the former's request. Ambassador Chiappe confirmed reports that late last week approximately 500 miners - mostly Colombian but also including some Brazilians - who were operating illegally at a mine in Venezuela's Amazonas state near the border with Colombia were expelled by Venezuelan security forces into Colombia. She also said that there were reports that approximately 1,000 miners working in the same location had managed to evade the security forces and were likely hiding out nearby, but required assistance from an international body such as the Red Cross to ensure their health and welfare. Regarding Colombian-Venezuelan bilateral relations, Ambassador Chiappe expressed concern over the deleterious impact that the current crisis has had on the previously robust trading relationship. She also noted the deterioration of the security situation along the border, alluding to the unfettered access of many armed groups to the Venezuelan side of the border. End Summary.
2. (C) As a result of not wanting to be seen entering the U.S. Embassy, Ambassador Chiappe directed her request for a meeting with Ambassador Duddy through mutual acquaintance Maria Elena Alcaraz of the Mexican Embassy, who hosted the informal conversation at her residence. Ambassador Chiappe began by confirming reports that late the previous week, Venezuelan armed forces helicopters descended on a mine near the border with Colombia in the western part of Venezuela's Amazonas state. (Note: while she did not specifically cite the date or location, other information available to post indicates these events took place at the Yacapana mine near San Fernando de Atabapo on September 26. End Note.) Of the 1,500 miners reportedly working there, the security forces expelled into Colombia approximately 500 miners who did not possess legal status to either live or work in Venezuela. Ambassador Chiappe affirmed that most of the miners were Colombian, although some were Brazilian. The other 1,000 miners managed to escape the security dragnet and flee into the surrounding countryside, where most likely remained.
3. (C) Ambassador Chiappe expressed the view that Venezuela had the right to deport foreigners who were living and working illegally in the country, but also noted that the GOC expected the GBRV to "respect the human rights" of any individuals subject to forced repatriation. She highlighted the GOC's preoccupation with the well-being of the miners who were hiding out, stating that an International Red Cross team had tried to enter the area to check on them, but were apparently denied access to the area. In the current bilateral political environment, Ambassador Chiappe observed, the GOC feared that the GBRV might attempt to accuse the miners of being "paramilitaries," or of having some other nefarious intent.
4. (C) Regarding Colombian-Venezuelan bilateral relations in light of the ongoing dispute, Ambassador Chiappe identified trade and insecurity along the border as the GOC's primary worries. She confirmed widely circulated data that a precipitous drop in cross-border trade had transpired in a short period of time, and that this drop was particularly harmful to the Colombian communities living near the border with Venezuela, who depended on such trade for their livelihood. She also asserted that the Venezuelan side of the border area had become a haven for armed groups of all kinds, including but not limited to the FARC and ELN. DUDDY