10 November 2014

CCS COMMENTARY:

The factor in the 2014 Mozambican general elections campaign

As many African countries face shortages of funds to finance public infrastructure construction, the relationship with Beijing is increasingly important for many elected African politicians, especially those seeking to remain in power. The recent elections in , won by Frelimo (with approximately 56 per cent of the vote) and (57 per cent), are no exception, and highlight the growing role of China, however indirectly, in domestic politics. As in some other African countries, the campaign for the elections held in Mozambique on the 15 October 2014 brought to the fore the China factor. The three main political parties, Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, in power since independence in 1975), Renamo (National Resistance of Mozambique, the main opposition party) and MDM (Democratic Movement of Mozambique, the third biggest party), in their quest for wooing voters, presented different discourses on the role of China in the country.

In the first discourse, Frelimo and its presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi reminded Mozambicans that economic growth depended, among other factors, on the flow of foreign direct investment and construction of externally-financed public infrastructure. The recent inauguration of, variously, the first car assembly factory in Mozambique, Matchedje Motors, a subsidiary of the Shanghai-based China Tongjian Investment Co., Ltd; the on-going construction of the 74km -Matola ring road and the Maputo-Katembe bridge (the later two financed by the Chinese Source: reuters.com government, at the value of about US$ 1 billion) assured Frelimo voters and sceptics of the benefits of Sino-Mozambican links. On the other hand, Filipe Nyusi added that the foreign policy of his future government will continue to be defined by the non-interference policy in the domestic issues of other countries. This is a significant statement by Nyusi and Frelimo, one of the main political organisations that firmly support the “One China Policy”, which will evidently please Beijing, especially if one considers the current situation of the pro-democracy protests in SAR Hong Kong and the recent refusal of the South African authorities to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama. The second level addresses Renamo and MDM’s concerns over the lack of desks in a considerable number of primary schools, mainly in rural areas, versus massive exports of timber to China. This is because the desks are made from wood and that the timber is being exported rather than being used to build school infrastructure. The two parties, as well the general public, blame the government for not controlling the export of timber, especially to China, a considerable portion of which is imported illegally. The electoral discourses of the opposition parties emphasised that Frelimo’s policies usually benefit a minority, the political and economic elite. It is worth noting that in early 2013, the London-based Environmental Investigation Agency implicated certain Frelimo senior members associated with Chinese traders in illegal logging and timber smuggling. The story was immediately reproduced and discussed in the local media. In the third, the MDM’s candidate for presidency, , defended that only a few (implying Frelimo members) reap the benefits of externally-financed public construction projects. Quite often, the pundits of the Maputo-Katembe bridge, mainly opposition politicians, as well as some economists and journalists, view this infrastructure as not as important as the government claims but rather as a channel to enrich a handful of well positioned people. For instance, during a televised debate among the three major contestants, a Renamo representative defended that Mozambique presently needed more schools and health facilities, rather than an “expensive” bridge. Lastly, , Renamo’s president, was clearly thinking of Frelimo’s formal ties with the communist parties of countries such as China, and when he told many thousands of people at a rally that Frelimo was a communist party in contrast to his democratic party. However, the current Frelimo- linkage cannot be viewed in ideological terms as Frelimo renounced - Leninism in 1989. In fact, Contemporary Frelimo-CCP and Mozambique-China relations are mainly dominated by an official narrative stressing historical ties, Chinese multiple aid, Frelimo’s/government’s support toward the “One China Policy” and Frelimo’s/government’s discourses on the need to emulate the Chinese development model. In previous similar experiences in other African countries, such as , and , opposition parties played the China card to win votes by threatening to recognise Taiwan, accusing Chinese constructors of maltreatment of the local workers and blaming Chinese business support in helping to rig the polls. Though in a previous election, there were allegations that a Chinese trade company supported Frelimo and that the CCP financed the tenth Frelimo congress in 2012, public discussions of the Mozambican opposition parties during this year’s general elections do not seem to denote any sort of anti-China sentiment. Generally, opposition parties and the critics of certain government policies demand that the lawmakers and civil society are engaged in the discussion of some major projects, like the Maputo-Katembe bridge. This may reflect a general consensus among the Mozambican elite and the general public regarding the importance of China in the development of Mozambique – a role China has been playing since the years of the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in the 1960s/70s.

Jorge Njal Institute of African Studies Zhejiang Normal University

“Commentaries are written by Research Analysts at the Centre and focus on current and topical discussions or media events with regard to China or China/Africa relations. Occasionally, the CCS accepts commentaries from non-CCS affiliated writers with exper- tise in specific fields. Their views do not necessarily reflect those of the CCS. Commentaries can be used freely by the media or other members of the interested public if duly referenced to the author(s) and the CCS.”

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