First-Party COIN: Approaches of Choice in Peru, and in Strategic Perspective

Marina Miron

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of New South Wales at

the Australian Defence Force Academy Canberra

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

February 2019 Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname/Family Name : Miron Given Name/s : Marina Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar : PhD University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Faculty : Canberra School : School of Humanities and Social Sciences First-Party COIN: Approaches of Choice in Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka in Strategic Thesis Title : Perspective

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE) The current attention towards wars against non-state actors—counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns (e.g. Afghanistan, , Syria)—triggered an immense debate relating to the best approach on the conduct of COIN on the operational and tactical levels, with the current predilection for a population-centric operational approach epitomized by the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This approach is designed for interventionist states’ militaries by focusing on two epitomic COIN campaigns, namely, Malaya and, to a lesser degree, Algeria. First, such narrow focus on colonial campaigns is insufficient for making generalizable inferences. It ignores the bulk of the military history of successful COIN campaigns conducted by indigenous actors—denominated as ‘first-party actors’—without any (significant) direct intervention by other states. These campaigns include Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka, and contain valuable lessons for both first-party actors as well as their expeditionary counterparts. This thesis seeks to broaden the scope of campaigns from which to draw generalizable lessons. Second, the prevalent field manual offers a detailed blueprint on how to conduct COIN anywhere in the world. This is problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, such thinking ignores the hierarchical, but nonetheless reciprocal, relationship between the levels of war, namely, (military) strategic, operational and tactical levels, by overemphasizing the operational approach which in turn would limit both strategic and political choices. On the other hand, such claim to universality contradicts the ever-changing character of war, thus, decontextualizing and ‘destrategizing’ the complex phenomenon and reducing it to a mere tactical interaction between insurgents and counterinsurgents in their struggle for legitimacy in eyes of the key population. Against this background, this thesis shifts the focus from the operational level to military strategic, studying it not in isolation from the other levels, but in conjunction with them. To reach the above aims, this thesis focuses on three case studies: Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka by using both primary (original language) sources and secondary literature. The main findings posit that unlike their expeditionary counterparts, first-party actors use predominantly enemy-centric military strategies. The success of these strategies, however, is always directly related to what the political purpose is and what resources are available.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures……………………………………………………………….....vi Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………….viii

1. Chapter I: Introduction ...... 1 Focus of this Thesis ...... 4 Why is this research into first-party COIN actors important? ...... 5 Methodology ...... 8 Small-N Method ...... 8 Choice of Case-study Campaigns ...... 9 Methods...... 12 Research Design ...... 13 Limitations ...... 17 Thesis structure ...... 18 Conclusion ...... 18

2. Chapter II: Theoretical Underpinnings ...... 20 Theoretical Underpinnings and Definitions ...... 20 What is strategy and what is its importance for so-called ‘irregular warfare’? ...... 20 Levels of strategy ...... 21 Levels of war: Strategy, operations and tactics ...... 22 Relationship between policy, strategy, operations and tactics ...... 23 Definition of irregular warfare and other important terms ...... 24 Irregular Warfare—what it is and what it is not ...... 25 Irregular Warfare, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (COIN) ...... 28 A Look Forward ...... 30 Waves of counterinsurgency thinking ...... 31 Conclusion ...... 34

3. Chapter III: The enemy-centric approach to COIN ...... 35 The enemy-centric approach in history and the literature ...... 35 ii

Two variants of the enemy-centric approach ...... 38 The ‘regular warfare’ view of counterinsurgency ...... 39 The ‘irregular warfare’ approach to counterinsurgency ...... 43 Controlling territory ...... 49 The enemy-centric approach and indiscriminate violence ...... 50 Conclusion ...... 51

4. Chapter IV: The Population-centric approach to COIN ...... 54 Historical background of the population-centric approach ...... 54 The Population-centric approach in Europe and in colonial wars from the 17th century onward ...... 54 The population-centric approach in the 20th century and beyond ...... 59 The population-centric approach in current US doctrine ...... 65 Definitions of the contemporary population-centric approach ...... 66 The population-centric approach in summary ...... 68 Conclusion ...... 70

5. Chapter V: Counterinsurgency in Peru ...... 72 Historical Background ...... 72 Beginning of the SL insurgency: origins, goals, strategies and tactics ...... 75 Sendero Luminoso’s rise and ideological underpinnings ...... 75 Sendero Luminoso’s Organizational Structure ...... 78 Sendero Luminoso’s Strategic Approach ...... 79 Sendero Luminoso’s Operational and Tactical Approaches ...... 83 Peruvian Counterinsurgency from 1980-1989 ...... 85 Overview of the Peruvian campaign against SL ...... 85 Government response: 1980-1985 ...... 85 García’s and the FFAA’s approaches to COIN ...... 89 The Strategic Shift of 1989: El Plan Politico Militar ...... 91 The Estrategia Integral ...... 92 1990 to 1992 and beyond: Fujimori’s approach ...... 93 Economy ...... 94 Security ...... 95 iii

External actors ...... 98 Conclusion ...... 100

6. Chapter VI: Counterinsurgency in Turkey ...... 103 Introduction ...... 103 Historical background ...... 104 The Kurdish issue and repressive policies ...... 104 Phases of the PKK conflict ...... 106 The PKK’s origins, objectives and modus operandi ...... 107 The PKK’s strategic approaches and modus operandi ...... 108 The PKK’s recruitment mechanism ...... 110 Organizational structure ...... 112 Internal and External support ...... 113 Ankara’s countermeasures ...... 114 Countermeasures, 1984-87 ...... 115 Countermeasures from 1987 to 1991 ...... 118 Countermeasures from 1991 to 1999 ...... 119 Village evacuation strategy ...... 122 Cutting off external support ...... 123 Unsuccessful population-centric measures ...... 124 Decapitation of the PKK ...... 126 Conclusion ...... 127 Factors that contributed to Ankara’s ‘success’ ...... 127

7. Chapter VII: Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka ...... 129 Introduction ...... 129 Historical background ...... 129 Ethnic and religious makeup of Sri Lanka ...... 129 Colonization shaping the ground for an ethno-sectarian divide ...... 130 The rise of Tamil grievances in light of political reforms ...... 131 The Language Act (the Official Language Act, no. 33 of 1956) ...... 132 The Educational Reform and Standardization ...... 132 The 1972 Constitution...... 132 iv

Beginning of the armed conflict ...... 133 Conflict Overview ...... 133 and aftermath ...... 133 ’s involvement between 1987 and 1990 ...... 134 Eelam War II and the failed peace negotiations ...... 135 Eelam War III and the ceasefire agreement of 2002 ...... 135 Eelam War VI and the end of LTTE ...... 136 The LTTE ...... 136 The LTTE’s ideological underpinnings ...... 136 Modus Operandi ...... 138 External Support ...... 141 Sri Lanka’s Government Response ...... 144 Eelam War I: from 1983 to 1987 and India’s intervention from 1987-90 ...... 144 Eelam War II: from 1990 to 1995 ...... 146 Eelam III: from 1995 to 2002 ...... 147 Eelam IV: From 2006 to 2009 ...... 148 Rajapaksa’s Road to COIN Success ...... 149 Political Will ...... 149 Military Strategic Changes and the Restructuring and Modernization of the Armed Forces ...... 150 Adapting to Guerrilla Tactics: Doctrinal adaptations and Special Infantry Operations Teams ...... 151 Population-and enemy-centric operations ...... 153 Cutting off external support ...... 154 Defections, internal discord within the LTTE and the Tsunami of 2004 ...... 155 The importance of joint operations ...... 157 Conclusion ...... 160

8. Chapter VIII: Establishing the Dominant Approach in First-Party COIN Campaigns ...... 163 Determination of the dominant approach ...... 163 The Peruvian Case ...... 164 v

Evaluation of the Peruvian approach ...... 167 The Turkish Case ...... 169 Evaluation of the Turkish approach ...... 173 The Sri Lankan Case ...... 175 Evaluation of the LTTE case ...... 178 Conclusion ...... 180

9. Chapter IX: Cross-comparison of enemy- and population-centric measures used across the cases ...... 182 Caveats ...... 182 The International Dimension ...... 183 Domestic Political Dimension ...... 186 The Role of the Political Dimension in the Case Studies ...... 188 Recognition of the problem: the nature of the adversary ...... 190 Adversaries, too, have flaws ...... 191 The Nature of the Enemy in Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka ...... 193 Military Strategies—a Distillation of ‘Best Practices’ ...... 193 Attrition and Exhaustion ...... 195 Dislocation ...... 196 Decapitation and Targeted Killings ...... 196 ...... 198 The enemy-centric approach—the approach of choice in first-party COIN campaigns ...... 198 Can there be a ‘silver bullet’ approach to conducting first-party COIN campaigns? . 199 Lessons for second-party counterinsurgents ...... 202 Concluding Remarks ...... 204 The Approach of Choice—Military Strategies as a part of the broader framework ... 204 Recommendations ...... 206

Bibliography ...... 207 Secondary Sources ...... 207 Primary Sources ...... 241 vi

List of Tables and Figures

Chapter I

Table 1.1: Overview of the independent variables across the case studies

Table 1.2: Determining the Dominant Approach

Graph 1.1: The Enemy-Centric Approach

Graph 1.2: The Population-Centric Approach

Graph 1.3: The Compound Approach (variant A)

Graph 1.4: The Compound Approach (variant B) Chapter II

Figure 2.1: Hierarchical Relationship between Policy, Strategy, Operations and Tactics

Chapter IV

Table 4.1: Tenets of the enemy- and population-centric approaches

Chapter V

Chart 5.1: SL’s mechanism to reach out to peasantry

Figure 5.1: Sendero’s Organizational Structure

Table 5.1: Number of Political Violence Attacks

Chapter VI:

Table 6.1: Measures on the military strategic level

Chapter VIII

Table 8.1: Peruvian Approach from 1980 to 1992 in overview

Graph 8.1: Timeline of the measures implemented between 1980-1992

Table 8.2: The Turkish Approach from 1984 to 1999 in overview

Graph 8.2: Timeline of measures implemented between 1984-1999 vii

Table 8.3: Sri Lankan Approach from 1983 to 2009 in overview

Graph 8.3: Timeline of the tenets implemented between 1983-2009

Chapter IX

Table 9.1: Enemy-centric measures employed throughout the cases at the military strategic level

Table 9.2: Population-centric measures employed throughout the cases at the military strategic level

viii

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor Dr. Deane-Peter Baker for his continuous help and support during my PhD study, for his patience, motivation, and immense knowledge. His guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor for my PhD study. Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my department: Dr. Ned Dobos, Prof. Stephen Coleman, and Dr. John Connor, for their insightful comments and encouragement, but also for their pointers which motivated me to adjust and widen my research from various perspectives.

I would like thank the administrative staff at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, especially Ms. Bernadette McDermott who was kind enough to print and bind this thesis for me and who, together with Mrs. Shirley Ramsay, made my time on campus especially pleasant. I would like to thank Ms. Elvira Berra, the head of the Research Student Union, who coordinated an extremely useful entry course on methods of writing a coherent thesis, and who continued to support me in relation to all enrolment matters throughout my PhD. I would also like to thank my former lecturers, Dr. Bettina Renz, Dr. Rod Thornton and Dr. Andrew Mumford, at the University of Nottingham who have helped me develop my affection for strategic studies and war studies; and the necessary skillset to write this thesis. A special gratitude goes towards my academic and practitioner friends, most notably Dr. Mustafa Cosar Unal and Dr. Simon Anglim, who have provided me with invaluable insights on my research topic; and Dr. Antulio Echevarria II who shared his ample knowledge with me in relation to strategy, in general, and Clausewitz’s writings, in particular. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family and my friends for their support and understanding throughout my academic journey.

1

Chapter I: Introduction

“If you had eighty different insurgencies, there were eighty ways to defeat them.” Gen. Sir Frank Kitson (quoted in Paul Melshen 2007: 667)

The eminent British counterinsurgency theorist, General Sir Frank Kitson, strongly believed that there could be no panacea for countering an insurgency, and that each insurgency requires a unique approach. This assertion originated from his experiences in the Mau Mau Uprising in Kenya, the Malayan Emergency and the campaigns in Cyprus, Oman and Northern Ireland (Bennett, Cormac 2014). The notion that each insurgency demands an exclusive method to counter it implies that there can be no general model for counterinsurgency (COIN). Kitson’s point was that there are so many variables in a counterinsurgency campaign—such as location, time-period, the actors involved, their strategies and tactics and their political stakes, to name but a few—that finding a one-size- fits-all approach would be impossible. But is Kitson right? Can there actually be an ideal approach to the successful conduct of COIN operations that is generalizable? The United States military has developed a doctrine that does seem to claim to offer a common approach to the conduct of COIN operations, primarily encompassing the operational and tactical levels (see below).1 This doctrine—US Army/Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency—was written in 2006 after three consecutive unsuccessful years of US counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. The doctrine’s main purpose, it states, is “to help prepare Army and Marine Corps leaders to conduct counterinsurgency operations anywhere in the world” (FM 3-24 2006: ix. Emphasis added). FM 3-24 thus contradicts Kitson by suggesting that its tenets are, indeed, generalizable. FM 3-24 resulted in a significant revision of how US forces understand and carry out counterinsurgency operations. It was written amid the broader context of (the US) rediscovery of counterinsurgency theory and practice in the post-Vietnam-era (Bacevich 2010: 195-213). The contents of the manual are largely based on a distillation of lessons from the past, using the so-called ‘classic’ works on the study of counterinsurgency written by the

1 FM 3-24 makes an attempt to fill the strategic void by suggesting fixed political/grand strategic objectives (see below). 2

likes of David Galula, Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson himself (cf. Gentile 2009a: 11; Ucko 2010: 24-25). The tenets expressed in FM 3-24 have formed the basis for what has come to be known as the ‘population centric’ approach to counterinsurgency. This approach not only offers principles and imperatives—on how to design operations to achieve strategic objectives—but also outlines those (grand) strategic objectives (see below in reference to ‘grand strategy’). Therefore, it can be said that the approach’s tenets affect military strategies as well as operations and tactics. This aspect will be explained in detail in the section on the different levels of strategy later in this chapter. The central theme of FM 3-24 lies in its focus on establishing the ‘legitimacy’2 of the host government and ensuring that the civilian population is protected in any given area that is under insurgent threat (FM 3-24 2006: 1-1; 2-2, para 2-6). Therefore, “[t]he primary objective of any counterinsurgent”, states the manual, “is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government.” (FM 3-24 2006: 1-21, para 1-113). In other words, the counterinsurgent has to ‘outgovern’ the insurgent.3 This reasoning marks a definitive departure from orthodox US thinking on the conduct of warfare—including counterinsurgency warfare. That is, it is a move away from the traditional highly kinetic ‘enemy-centric’ approach in which the emphasis is on destroying the enemy. Since the War of Independence (1775-1783), the majority of the conflicts engaged in by the United States were predominantly defined—as Russell F. Weigley (1973: xxii; 3-17; 128-166) comprehensively argues in The American Way of War— by strategies of annihilation and, in some cases, attrition. The former approach seeks the complete destruction of the enemy’s military power, while the latter implies wearing down the enemy until they lose the will or the physical capacity to continue fighting (Weigley 1973: xxii). Regardless of whether one subscribes fully to Weigley’s analysis, 4 the general

2 The concept of legitimacy was first based on Max Manwaring’s version underpinned by a model of political participation and Western liberal values. However, it was revised to include factors such as security concerns and religious beliefs (Crane 2010: 62). FM 3-24 (2006: 1-21, para 1-113) offers a somewhat limited definition of legitimacy by stating: “Governments described as ‘legitimate’ rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as ‘illegitimate’ tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion.” 3 Such an emphasis on competition in terms of governance has received some criticism, most notably from Michael Fitzsimmons (2013). In the conflict in the Iraqi city of Ramadi, Fitzsimmons (2013: xi; 63-66) argues that identity politics were more important than governance quality in shaping the progression of events. 4 Again, this view has been subject to criticism. Antulio Echevarria (2014) shows, that this ‘way of war’ has always been driven by politics. This contradicts Weigley. Further, Echevarria’s work rejects the analytical 3

consensus is that, in US military thinking, there has been an almost exclusive focus on the destruction of the adversary regardless of the character of the war in question. In counterinsurgency terms, the US emphasis was thus historically always on destroying the insurgent. FM 3-24 changed this thinking with its shift towards the importance of the allegiance of the population within which the insurgent operated. Since its publication, FM 3-24 has become the capstone US doctrine for combating/resolving insurgencies at the operational and tactical levels. Following its implementation in Iraq and in Afghanistan from 2007 onwards, FM 3-24 has enjoyed a large measure of approval both within and beyond the US military (Power 2007). FM 3-24 was specifically designed for use by US forces acting as an intervening counterinsurgent. That is, it is assumed that US counterinsurgent forces will be using the manual for guidance in conducting COIN operations in a foreign theatre—augmenting host nations’ efforts to tackle their domestic insurgencies. Indeed, FM 3-24 draws its main lessons from the era of decolonization and imperial policing5 where the counterinsurgent was always what has been termed a ‘second-party’6 actor; i.e., an external force acting in an expeditionary capacity. Examples of second-party campaigns today would include those recently conducted by the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the second-party emphasis of FM 3-24, its formulation drew entirely on case studies involving second-party COIN actors. Such actors— from the colonial period—tended to use the population-centric approach (see below). Thus the tenets of FM 3-24—what the US doctrine writers thought would achieve ‘success’ in COIN campaigns—are derived from the study of second-party actors using the population- centric approach. However, what seems to be missing from the input into the formulation of this capstone COIN doctrine, FM 3-24, is an appreciation of the approaches adopted by first- party COIN actors employing the enemy-centric approach. What lessons could have been derived from their activities and their paths to success?

scope, i.e., either annihilation or attrition, adopted by Weigley, and demonstrates that the US actually used a myriad of different strategies; neither limited to annihilation/attrition, nor to the excessive use of force. Compare Echevarria (2014: 18-59; 111-310). 5 These lessons include cases such as the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the French campaign in Algeria (1954-1962). 6 The choice of vocabulary, i.e., first- and second-party is borrowed from Mark O’Neill (2013). 4

First-party COIN actors are indigenous. That is, they are governments involved in a domestic campaign using predominantly their own forces without significant involvement by external forces from abroad. Again, by contrast, second-party COIN actors are expeditionary forces operating in a foreign theatre which augment first-party COIN actors by directly participating in combat operations. In first-party cases, these external actors can offer advice, training and material support, but without deploying their own forces to conduct combat operations. Examples of first-party COIN campaigns include Peru’s campaign against the Sendero Luminoso (1980-1992), Colombia’s campaign against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (1964-2017), the Turkish campaign against the Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party (PKK) (1984-2000) and the Sri Lankan campaign against the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) (1983-2009).7 Both countries did receive some marginal assistance from abroad—i.e., from the US—but this was not operationally significant.

Focus of this Thesis

The focus of this thesis is on such first-party COIN campaigns and the lessons that can be derived from them. These are lessons which FM 3-24 could perhaps have benefited from. The manual could be criticized for focusing too much on deriving its lessons exclusively from the experience of second-party insurgencies. Precisely how first-party actors tackled their own indigenous8 insurgencies—in particular, at the strategic level—is an understudied phenomenon in the current literature on COIN in comparison to the emphasis placed on second-party campaigns. What strategies were used in first-party COIN campaigns in order to achieve the desired outcome? What approach did first-party actors adopt? Did they employ the population-centric approach, the enemy-centric approach, or perhaps some fusion of the two approaches (what I will here call the ‘compound approach’)? In attempting to answer these questions, it must be recognized that all COIN campaigns contain elements

7 In her doctoral thesis titled The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns, Erin M. Simpson (2010) uses the term ‘third-party’ actor to describe the presence of an intervening, foreign force in an insurgency. She implies (without actually saying so) that the first two ‘parties’ would be the host nation’s forces and the insurgent forces, respectively. Simpson (2010: 18), moreover, does not offer any detailed definition of the ‘third-party counterinsurgent’ concept. 8 Indigenous in this sense does not imply that an insurgency cannot spill over the borders of the affected state. Rather it refers to the origin and the main area of operations of any given insurgency. 5

of both approaches, and genuinely compound approaches are not uncommon. Perhaps the most epitomic campaign in the literature on COIN, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), is used widely as a paradigmatic example of the population-centric approach (in the contemporary understanding of the term), but in fact included tenets pertaining to both approaches (cf. Clutterbuck 1966; Hack 2009a: 404; 2009b: 2-3; 2011: 2-3; 2012: 673; Mumford 2012: 46-48; 148; French 2012: 749-754; 757-758; Jones, Smith 2013: 450). In a similar manner, the US campaign in Vietnam was not solely about brute force and massive bombing raids. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was also launched as a pacification tool by the US and the government of South Vietnam. This reinforces the point that there cannot be a mere binary distinction between enemy- and population-centric COIN. In order to gain clarity on this issue going forward it is necessary to carefully establish what defines a particular campaign as being predominantly either enemy-centric or population-centric. I explain this, in some detail, in the methodology section below. The approach I outline provides a way of categorizing campaigns as either enemy-centric or population-centric, while at the same time also identifying those campaigns that are best understood as using a combination of these approaches in such a way that neither approach plays a dominant role. As mentioned, I will refer to this latter variant as the ‘compound’ approach and I will explain its precise characteristics in the methodology section.

Having identified the nature of the approaches adopted in a selection of what have been judged to be successful first-party campaigns, I will then examine the central question addressed in this thesis. This is as follows:

Does a population-centric approach, an enemy-centric approach, or a compound approach best account for successful conclusions in first-party counterinsurgency campaigns?

Why is this research into first-party COIN actors important?

First, this research is important because it is novel. It involves a comparative study of how success was achieved by first-party actors in their COIN campaigns and the degree to which the approach they adopted (population-centric, enemy-centric or a compound of the 6

two) and the strategies inherent in these approaches were influential in this success. This has not been done before and will add to the extant body of literature on COIN. This research is also of contemporary value to COIN practitioners. The current international security environment is dominated by wars of ‘irregular mode’ (Kiras 2008: 230). These have become the prevalent form of conflict certainly since 1946 (Gleditsch et al 2002; Harbom et al. 2009; Paul, Clarke, Grill 2010). But there is a problem. There seems to be a distinct lack of success in such conflicts. The recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, have clearly demonstrated that despite the increasing likelihood of insurgencies, intervening or second-party COIN actors remain inept at achieving desired outcomes, even when considerable material and human resources are put into such campaigns (Belasco 2014). Indeed, out of 30 insurgencies that took place between 1978 and 2008, only eight— less than one third—were, according to Paul et al., resolved in favor of the counterinsurgent forces (Paul et al. 2013). This stresses the need for improving the overall conduct of future COIN operations. This thesis seeks to aid such an improvement. In particular, there is a need to seek out the optimal approach to counterinsurgency at the strategic level that goes beyond a focus on the operational level. This thesis helps to inform this optimal approach by bringing in new factors that can be used to develop and refine it. Fundamentally, I will here be examining the efficacy of the current and favored approach—the population-centric approach (as espoused in FM 3-24) when set against the enemy-centric approach. The fact that the population-centric approach has been adopted by FM 3-24 has been criticized because its tenets, as noted, are seen to have been drawn from perhaps dubious historical interpretation of a narrow range of ‘iconic’ cases, primarily the British Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the failed French campaign in Algeria (1954-1962) (Gentile 2009a: 9, 11-12; Hack 2009a; 2009b; 2011; Sloan 2012; Porch 2013). The most crucial point is that FM 3-24 draws on COIN experiences not only from a very small number of such case studies but also only from campaigns that are second-party in nature. This would appear to undermine the generalizability of this doctrine, since it ignores the domain of first-party actors’ performance in COIN campaigns. Clearly, while FM 3-24 is designed for expeditionary counterinsurgencies conducted by second-party actors (namely the US Army and Marine Corps), the doctrine is also used to influence how first-party actors should 7

conduct their own COIN operations. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, the indigenous armed forces were and are still being educated and trained by the forces of second-party actors on how to conduct COIN operations. Why should it be assumed that the tenets within a doctrine written for second-party/expeditionary actors would work as the basis for a successful approach to be adopted by a first-party/indigenous actor? The first-party actor would, it may be presumed, have its own ideas—often based on cultural awareness, among other factors—about best practice in the conduct of COIN operations in its own country. These ideas may be ignored or dismissed by second-party actors. However, the latter would be able to augment their education and training packages to the first-party actors if they were more familiar with how successes have been gained in the past by such first-party actors. There is scope, therefore, for a greater variety of COIN tenets—measures which underpin a specific (COIN) approach and characterize it—to be considered in the formulation of a more rounded, perhaps more generalizable, approach to COIN (see Chapter II). This thesis aims to highlight more such tenets that could be factored into a contemporary COIN thinking. Finally, the actual nature of this research is novel. It fills a void in the contemporary study of counterinsurgency campaigns by conducting a small-N comparative study of first- party COIN campaigns. Although the current literature is replete with studies of counterinsurgencies, most of them are dedicated to individual case studies with varying degrees of depth (most of which focus on either colonial or outright second-party COIN campaigns). Examples are such as those included in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare9 by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (2008) and the works by Thomas E. Ricks (2006; 2009). Otherwise they tend to be limited comparative studies of second-party campaigns, such as between Malaya (1948-60) and Vietnam (1955-75) (e.g., John Nagl’s (2002) Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam). These works are certainly useful for providing detailed insights on specific campaigns but offer little in the way of comparative analysis across a series of campaigns, and certainly not those involving exclusively first-party actors. The extant studies also tend to be highly descriptive in nature and, given the methodological approaches employed, fall short of producing generalizable inferences.

9 The only first-party insurgencies covered in this book are the German anti-partisan campaign during the Second World War, the Israeli counterinsurgency in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (2000-2005) and the FARC insurgency in Colombia. 8

Moreover, they remain relatively devoid of analysis at the military strategic level. In other words, they are largely concerned with operational-10 and/or tactical-level issues.11 Generally, in these works there is little to no discussion of specific military strategies used as part of a specific ‘approach’ to the conduct of COIN, or of why and how they were implemented. Most importantly, what is missing is a rigorous comparative analysis of the successful conduct of first-party COIN campaigns at the military strategic level. Thus, and to conclude, what is missing from the contemporary literature on COIN is a comparative examination of the successful military strategies adopted by first-party actors. This thesis goes some way to filling this lacuna. What military strategies led to success? Was it those that informed the population-centric approach, the enemy-centric approach or a compound of the two? Although this research is informative in and of itself, it can also provide lessons for future COIN campaigns. This is because, as noted, the current dominant FM 3-24 doctrine is based on a limited research base and, moreover, not all COIN campaigns are being conducted with the support of second-party actors. The research conducted in this thesis should, moreover, and overall, allow for the development of a more refined set of military strategies for the conduct of COIN operations.

Methodology

Small-N Method

The choice of the first-party case studies in this thesis requires careful attention. I will examine the approaches used in selected successful first-party counterinsurgency campaigns by employing a small-N comparative research methodology. While a large-N statistical method can sometimes produce useful generalizations, the results of such studies can be rather superficial in nature, ignoring questions such as why and under what conditions specific approaches were adopted. One potential danger of using the large-N method lies in translating concepts into measurable variables, such as historical context, formation of

10 There is a debate on the usefulness of the operational level; however, it would be beyond the boundaries of this thesis to include it. For proponents of operational level see for instance Kiszely (2005) and Tuck (2010: 80-106). For an opposing view see Owen (2012). 11 Military strategies, operations and tactics represent levels of war organized in a hierarchical way. These and other levels will be discussed in more detail below. 9

strategies, etc. These factors are best addressed by a qualitative approach, which is largely absent from large-N methods. The study of approaches requires a more precise analysis with a closer focus being paid to selected cases, making a small-N method more suitable (Lijphart 1971: 685). The underlying logic in this thesis is to look at successful first-party actor case studies with dissimilar geographical and temporal contexts12 to find out whether there were common tenets within these approaches that led to common military strategies or elements of military strategies that were effective regardless of such differences. Another advantage of using a small-N comparative method is the reduced risk of what Giovanni Sartori (1970: 1034) calls ‘conceptual stretching’. The term refers to an attempt to render one’s conceptualizations value free by expanding their meaning in order to accommodate a large number of cases (usually in large-N methods). So-called conceptual stretching is dangerous in that concept definitions turn out to be imprecise and vague, explaining everything and nothing at the same time. By using a small number of cases I do not need to expand the theoretical concepts, e.g., military strategy and its components, thus avoiding amorphous conceptualizations. A more narrow definition of concepts enables me to meaningfully define measurable variables, thus increasing the conceptual validity inherent in small-N and single case-study approaches (George and Bennett 2005: 19). Furthermore, by using a small-N approach I can avoid the risk of being too descriptive as is often the case with the single case-study method (Lijphart 1997: 693). Instead, the approach used here allows for a cross-case comparison leading to more generalizable statements (see chapters VIII and IX).

Choice of Case-study Campaigns

Selection of cases can be a very subjective undertaking, potentially weakening the explanatory power of any research. Purposive sampling (theory-guided sampling)13—a non- probability way of selecting cases (Palys 2008: 697-698)—has therefore been used to select case studies. The selection of the cases depends upon cases that differ in specific variables as explained below.

12 It is safe to assume that different geographical contexts would inevitably imply different political, historical and cultural contexts, therefore, the latter are not mentioned. 13 See, for instance, Newmann (2007: 173). 10

Most different design approach The main determinants for selecting the cases to be studied are as follows: • The cases in question should deal with the phenomenon of insurgency (this will be explained in detail below) • The counterinsurgent actors should be first-party actors • The counterinsurgent actors should have reached their desired end-state (i.e., they were ‘successful’) • Each campaign should take place in a different geographic location • The campaigns should have been concluded within the past 30 years The rationale for the latter determinant is that in order for the study to remain relevant for the present-day environment, the campaigns selected will be those that were concluded no more than 30 years ago. This timespan ensures that these campaigns took place in an international legal environment not fundamentally different from that of today. This fulfills another significant criterion for choosing the campaigns, namely their resonance with current policy concerns (Van Evera 1997: 77; 83-84). The three dependent variables will be the ‘conflict mode’, ‘first-party actor’ and the ‘outcome’. The remaining variables in which the campaigns differ will be independent. These criteria are chosen in line with John Stuart Mill’s (1973) most different design approach. The underlying reason for choosing such an approach lies in the expectation that variables such as the geographical location and the time period might influence the actor to choose a specific approach. This provides a good basis for a comparison of the approaches used, as the variance in these factors reveals any commonalities between the cases that are not dependent on these variables. In order to reduce the number of variables for comparison I use existing large-N studies to counterbalance the qualitative nature of the present research. For example, Jason Lyall’s (2010) study of 286 insurgencies (1800-2005) is useful in that it indicates that there is no positive correlation between the government type and the outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign. From these findings Lyall (2010: 186) concludes, “democracy appears to exert almost no causal effect on either war outcomes or duration.” This enables choosing a sample of counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by states with largely non- 11

democratic regimes without thereby rendering the results of the study less relevant to democratic states. Selected Cases The method of purposive sampling has been used to select the cases, aiming for maximum variation across the dimensions discussed above. This method of sampling helps to identify recurrent patterns that cut across all cases. The only variable of convergence is the outcome. All of the case studies have been labelled as ‘successful’. In line with the aforementioned criteria for selecting case studies, the three main cases examined in this thesis are: Peru (1980-1992), Turkey (1984-1999) and Sri Lanka (1983- 2009). Below is a brief description of the cases in question. The first case is from South America, namely the Peruvian insurgency which took place towards the end of the Cold War, from 1980 to 1992. Here the counterinsurgent is a first-party actor—the Peruvian state. The campaign against the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) insurgents is a case study drawn from the set of insurgencies studied by Paul, Clarke, Grill (2010a: 14) in a RAND monograph titled, Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, and listed as being one of the few instances where a state actor was victorious against an insurgent group. This campaign can be said to be understudied (Miron 2018 [forthcoming]). This Peruvian case will be examined in detail in Chapter V. The second case is the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) insurgency in Turkey, which took place from 1984 to 2000. 14 As in the Peruvian case, it involves a first-party counterinsurgent. It is another example drawn from the Victory has a Thousand Fathers (Paul, Clarke, Grill 2010a; 2010b) set of studies. This case deserves attention given the nature of the measures the Turkish state used to combat the PKK. Despite the predominant use of enemy-centric (and often repressive) measures by Turkish forces the campaign turned out to be a ‘success’ (or ‘COIN win’) for Ankara (Paul, Clarke, Grill 2010a: 16; 2010b; 2013; Unal 2014b: 425-427). How exactly did the Turkish state arrive at that success will be subject of Chapter VI. The third case is from Asia and is the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) insurgency in Sri Lanka (Hashim 2013: 50). This lasted from 1983 to 2009, with several ceasefires in-between (such

14 See Chapter VI for a detailed explanation as to why the PKK insurgency is considered as concluded. 12

as that from 2002 to 2006). It culminated in the killing of the LTTE leader and with the Sri Lankan armed forces conquering the last insurgent controlled area in 2009. As in the other two cases, the Sri Lankan armed forces were the principal instruments used to defeat the insurgency. However, unlike in Peru and Turkey, the Sri Lankan Navy also played an important role, by defeating the insurgents’ naval capabilities (DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2010: 8; Hashim 2013: 179-183). This case will be examined in Chapter VII. In sum, these three cases satisfy the criteria outlined in the earlier section in that they are geographically different, and involve different actors with different political alignments, campaign durations and time periods—as depicted in Table 1.1.

Independent Variables Peru Turkey Sri Lanka Geographic location Western South Eurasia/Southeastern South Asia America Europe Time Period 1980-1992 1984-1999 1983-2009 Campaign Duration 12 years 15 years 26 years

Table 1.1: Overview of the independent variables across the case studies

Methods

The overall research question— “Does a population-centric approach, an enemy- centric approach, or a compound approach best account for success in first-party counterinsurgency campaigns?”—is tackled by conducting a thorough investigation of the presence (or otherwise) of the central tenets pertaining to either the enemy-centric and/or the population-centric approach across all cases. It will establish which of the approaches prevailed in each case: i.e., the enemy-centric, the population-centric or the compound. The military strategies adopted as part of these approaches by first-party counterinsurgents in each scenario will be examined and evaluated according to the list of tenets that can be said to underpin these approaches. These tenets are the subject of Chapter III and Chapter IV. Establishing a framework for tackling the research question first requires finding answers to a set of questions: • What was the overall goal (end-state) the counterinsurgent aimed at achieving? • What military strategies were employed and how? 13

• How and why did military strategies alter during the conflict? • Which military strategies worked? • In what sequence were these military strategies employed? • Was there a change or an overlap of overall approaches? If so, how did it come about? These questions will be tackled by looking at which tenets of the two contrasting COIN approaches—enemy- and population-centric—were employed across a set of the three noted campaigns involving first-party counterinsurgents.

Research Design

In examining the overall thesis question, two frameworks are applied as filters to examine each case study. These are used to help determine which and how many tenets of the enemy-centric or population-centric approaches were used in each campaign. First, a list of tenets, which characterize each of these approaches will be established. Thereafter, I use these tenets as my filters when focusing on each of the cases. This method helps determine which approach prevailed in each case. If a single case contains tenets from both approaches, then it will be necessary to establish which approach was dominant at any one particular time (or phase of the campaign). Given that the approaches and the military strategies employed change throughout the course of any conflict, the sequencing issue is of great importance (cf. Wylie 1957: 22; Rovner 2014: 303-312), and helps establish the relative impact of the approach used. Those applied later would be the result of the lessons learned and thus would have greater resonance in deriving best practice. As previously stated, there are those cases that do not fall squarely into either the enemy-centric or population-centric camp. Thus, there is a third possibility; to say that the approach used was compound in nature (see below). As an aid to determining which approach prevailed in each case, I plot each campaign on a graph employing the two-dimensional Cartesian system of coordinates. The t-axis will represent time (in years); the y-axis determines the number of tenets used from each approach (i.e., enemy- or population-centric). All positive coordinates on the y-axis represent the number of these tenets. The degree of focus on either the enemy or the population is expressed through the number of tenets used for each respective approach. In order to avoid oversimplifications, this method is supported by qualitative analysis for each respective case in order to give a value to the proportion of effort. 14

Each point on the plane will have two coordinates, which thus represent the time when the approach was launched and the number of tenets used from the respective approach.

For instance, P0 (0; 2) would mean that at the start of the campaign (0 years) two enemy- centric tenets were used (2). Any changes in number of tenets and time are marked through another point (Pn) on the plane. The (horizontal) distance between two points depicts the duration; their position relative to the t-scale accounts for the increase or decrease of focus either on the enemy or the population. This visual representation is designed to show how much of each approach was used and for how long. To determine which approach was used it is thus necessary to look at both the duration and the number of tenets. There are thus four possibilities for each approach, as displayed in the table (Table 1.2) below. Plus and minus signs stand for ‘more’ or ‘less’ in comparison to the other approach.

Tenets Duration Is it the dominant approach? + - No + + Yes - (more than 2) + Yes - - No

Table 1.2: Determining the Dominant Approach

For instance, if the actor uses only one or two tenets from one approach and more than two tenets from the other approach, it will be safe to conclude that the latter prevailed. Another determinant would be the duration of use of a specific approach, which is easily readable from the plane for every campaign. Finally, there is the possibility of having a ‘mixed’ outcome, whereby a campaign would fall into neither category. In such a case two approaches would be running simultaneously. For an approach to be thus defined as ‘compound’, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the time of the two approaches running simultaneously is greater than the sum of time periods when each approach was used in isolation. Second, the sums of the number of the tenets from each approach should be equivalent for the overall campaign. Below are three hypothetical figures that demonstrate each of the possibilities.15

15 This method will be used in those cases in which the correlation between enemy- and population-centric measures is not obvious from the corresponding graph (e.g., Graph 1.4 below). 15

Graph 1.1: The Enemy-Centric Approach

In Graph 1.1 above it can be seen that the number of tenets from the enemy-centric approach is greater than the number of tenets from the population-centric approach. Moreover, as is evident, the enemy-centric approach’s duration exceeds that of the population-centric. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the dominant approach is the enemy-centric despite the presence of some population-centric measures.

Graph 1.2: The Population-Centric Approach

Graph 1.2 above displays a hypothetical scenario in which the population-centric approach is the dominant approach. The same logic applies to Graph 1.2, only in reverse. 16

Graph 1.3: The Compound Approach (variant A)

Graph 1.4: The Compound Approach (variant B)

Graphs 1.3 and 1.4 above display possible scenarios for a compound approach. Especially in the first instance, the exact overlap of the two approaches (denoted by a bold line) can be clearly seen: the number of tenets and their duration are equal for both the enemy- centric and the population-centric approach. Graph 1.4 is a conceivable variant where there is less overlap despite the fact that both the number of tenets and the duration for the aforementioned approaches are equal. The above, therefore, illustrates how using this framework makes it possible to say which approach (i.e., enemy-centric, population-centric or compound) has been used by the first-party actor in question in each of the case studies examined. Sources The research for this study will rely principally on the use of literary sources—both primary and secondary (including in their original languages of publication). These will range 17

from official government and military documents found in archives and libraries, to books, specialist and non-specialist journals, newspapers and magazines. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, large-N studies will be used to support the present research. One of these is the aforementioned Christopher Paul et al. Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, published by the RAND Corporation in 2010. This study examines 30 insurgencies resolved between 1978 and 2008, and looks at different COIN practices—consisting either of those considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’—that were used by different counterinsurgent actors. The data presented in this study enables a rough categorization of the approaches (i.e., enemy- or population-centric) used in all 30 cases, therefore facilitating the choice of campaigns to be examined in this thesis.

Limitations

The limitations of this study here lie in the fact that it deals solely with first-party insurgencies from the past thirty years. Its focus will be only on those that are considered ‘successful’ in their outcomes by the broader academic literature (see Chapter II). Moreover, this study does not assess the legality or moral rectitude of the choices employed. The aim is to determine what was ‘successful’, not what was ‘right’. It merely examines what worked for first-party actors and tries to establish parallels between the cases in terms of the preferred approaches and common military strategies nested within those approaches. This study eschews all legal and ethical discussions on whether the choices made by first-party actors conform to present-day norms or not. Neither does this study evaluate the ethical appropriateness of the ‘end-state’ in each campaign. Last, there are a limitation placed upon the study by the methodology described above in that the methodology does not account for the degree to which each tenet (from either the enemy-centric or population-centric approach) was applied in any given case. The difficulty lies in the fact that it is not possible to access any records of how much the counterinsurgents in each studied case spent on the various lines of effort they had applied. In order to mitigate this shortcoming, however, I access both primary and secondary literature available to reconstruct the grand strategic contexts (see below) of each campaign. This literature helps to make clear that all the lines of effort considered in this thesis had received significant investments from the governments concerned. Therefore, the lack of financial records (and their empirical comparison) can be remedied through qualitative information available. 18

Thesis structure

The thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter II explores the theoretical underpinnings and key terminology in order to establish working definitions of the phenomena studied in this thesis. Chapters III and IV discuss the origins and the meaning of the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches, thus constructing an analytical framework. This framework is used to evaluate and compare the case studies in order to determine the prevalent approach. Chapters V, VI and VII examine the aforementioned case studies (Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka). The main purpose of these chapters is to identify which (grand and military) strategies were used by first-party counterinsurgents to reach their political and strategic objectives. The findings will then form the basis for both a cross-case comparison and a determination of the prevalent approaches, which is carried out in Chapter VIII. Finally, Chapter IX analyzes and discusses the outcomes of the cross-case comparison, and makes recommendations derived from the findings, thus concluding this thesis.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the gaps in the existing debate regarding the present conduct of COIN campaigns. First, I showed that most of the lessons learnt from previous campaigns come from a very narrow set of such campaigns conducted by second-party actors. This is why studying first-party COIN campaigns is to be recommended in terms of filling the gap in the existing literature, especially in light of the likelihood of Western powers participating (mostly as expeditionary force) in such future COIN campaigns. Second, I showed that the literature pertaining to the debate focuses mostly on the tactical and operational levels of war, with insufficient attention being paid to the actual strategies involved. It is important to shift away from the operational and tactical levels and to consider how indigenous governments and their militaries—first-party actors—themselves tackle the problem of insurgents strategically. Given that history is replete with examples of such first-party campaigns, those chosen will only be those that carry relevance to present- day situations. The question of which approach is preferred by first-party actors will be explored in this thesis by focusing on the military strategic dimension by using a small-N cross-case comparison of the Peruvian, Turkish and Sri Lankan campaigns. Before 19

undertaking such a task, it is important to first define the terminology and theoretical underpinnings (Chapter II), and to devise a way of categorizing the campaigns at hand as either enemy- or population-centric or compound (Chapter III and Chapter IV) which will help find an answer to the main question of this thesis.

20

Chapter II: Theoretical Underpinnings

Theoretical Underpinnings and Definitions

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the terminology used throughout this thesis. Such terminology relates to terms such as grand and military strategy, war, warfare and counterinsurgency. It is important to establish clarity as to avoid confusion that is often present in contemporary writings on insurgency and counterinsurgency, specifically, and on war generally (such as the interchangeable use of ‘war’ and ‘warfare’ or the use of terms such as ‘civil war’, ‘revolution’, ‘asymmetric conflict’ and similar to describe the same phenomenon). The theoretical underpinnings of this study will be drawn from Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of war and Colin Gray’s and Arthur Lykke’s contributions to the literature on strategy, especially Gray’s definition of grand strategy and Lykke’s concept of military strategy.16 These are best explained by commencing with the meaning of the concept of ‘strategy’ itself. The following sections will deal with this subject.

What is strategy and what is its importance for so-called ‘irregular warfare’?

In this section I explain what strategy is and how it differs from activities at the operational level and tactics. I point out why it is important to clearly distinguish between those concepts. The difference between strategy and activities at the operational and tactical levels is not a mere exercise in academic hair-splitting. The underlying imperative is to demonstrate why it is crucial to study strategy as the main component of wars (either conventional or unconventional, if such a distinction is to be adopted), and to create an understanding of the import of the matter at hand. Strategy is an ambiguous and much misinterpreted term (Murray 2011: 2). It is nowadays associated not only with military and political matters but it has also now found use in the realm of business, marketing and, indeed, everyday life (Strachan 2006). In its general meaning strategy is best understood as “[t]he direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired ends” (Gray 2010: 18). Such a definition, however,

16 While there is a plethora of definitions of strategy such as those offered by Sun Tzu, Jomini, Liddell Hart, Svechin, Mao, Beaufre, Wylie, Murray and Echevarria, the most suitable for this thesis are the ones by Clausewitz, Gray and Lykke. 21

is rather inclusive, making it applicable to a variety of contexts. The context concerning us here is that of statecraft. Therefore, a more exiguous definition of strategy is required. To that end—to borrow Gray’s analogy from his seminal work on strategic theory, Strategy Bridge (2010)—strategy can be regarded as a ‘bridge’ between policy17 and other tools of statecraft (including but not limited to state’s military), whereby these tools are an instrument of the former. Strategy’s primary function is, thus, to craft a ‘plan’ on how to use all available means the state has at its disposal to reach the desired political goal (Gray 2010: 18). 18 Most importantly, strategy’s utility should not be confined to the conduct of war; it operates both in wars (conventional or otherwise) and inter-war period (Gray 2010: 33; 97; Murray 2011: 6).19 To emphasize this point, Gray (2007: 39) states, “[s]o today we learn, again, how to do COIN; we discover the virtues of cultural understanding; we rediscover that war and warfare is about politics; and we grasp the necessity for an integrated approach, otherwise long known as grand strategy.”

Levels of strategy

The focus thus far has been on a general understanding of strategy. However, strategy eo ipso can be divided into two levels: grand strategy and military strategy. These two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. However, they represent different levels of stratagem and should not be confused. Grand strategy refers to the use of all state resources (e.g., economic, diplomatic, military), as noted above, and operates at the state/governmental level. Military strategy, in contrast, is focused at a level below and solely addresses the use of military forces. Clausewitz’s opus magnum, On War, for instance, defines (military) strategy in broad strokes as “…the use of engagements for the object of the war” (italics in the original). This makes military strategy subordinate to grand strategy (Bowman 2007: 30-31; Gray 2010: 19; Echevarria 2017: 1-5).

17 Policy is understood here as the “political objectives” (Gray 2010: 18) that serve as ends of the ‘ends, ways and means’ formula. 18 This definition refers to grand strategy which is discussed in more detail below. For a more thorough discussion on the theory of strategy see Gray (2010: 16-54; 2018). 19 See examples of grand strategies in war and peace (from ancient Greece to World War II and beyond), see, for instance, Kennedy (1991); Luttwak (2001), Taliaferro, Ripsman and Lobell (2012); and Murray and Sinnreich (2014). 22

For the purpose of this thesis, however, I use a more refined definition of military strategy, i.e., Arthur Lykke’s (1989). Lykke’s (1989: 3) definition of military strategy equates to “military objectives plus military strategic concepts plus military resources” or the interplay between (military strategic) ends, ways and (military) means.20 This definition is mirrored in the US Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of military strategy: “[t]he art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force” (JCS quoted in Lykke 1989: 3). The main components of military strategy, following Lykke’s (1989) reasoning, are objectives, concepts21 and resources.22 Objectives refer to (grand) strategic aims translated into military objectives such as denial of passage, interdiction and full or partial destruction of the enemy, to name but a few. Concepts can be anything ranging from annihilation to deterrence and containment; and resources refer to military forces, war materiel, and available weapons— such as nuclear, among others. These three components must, says Lykke, be in balance in order for the military strategy to work, i.e., for military ‘success’ to be achieved.

It is important to emphasize that the above definitions of strategy’s essence (at both levels) and its subordinate role to policy is valid for all wars regardless of their character— be they conventional (or regular) or unconventional (or ‘irregular’) (see Gray 2010; 19; 2018: 41-66). However, the character of each individual war, the political end-state sought and available means—or at least the means a protagonist is able and/or willing to employ—will determine which (specific) strategies are used. To use Gray’s (2009: 82) words, “…military strategy should be developed and applied in the context of the development and application of strategy for the use of other, nonmilitary, assets, as and when appropriate.”

Levels of war: Strategy, operations and tactics

Having gained a better understanding of the definitions of both grand and military strategy and their respective relation to policy, the aim now is to focus on other levels of war relevant to this study. It is necessary now to examine in greater detail what is subordinate to

20 Lykke’s definition is identical to the one offered by, among others, Colin Gray (2010: 21) and Echevarria (2017: 1). This definition is reconcilable with Clausewitz’s description of strategy, as outlined earlier. 21 Such concepts can also be referred to as specific strategies. See Gray (2010: 21). These strategies are examined in detail in Chapter IX. 22 See also Yarger (2012: 45-51). 23

military strategy; that is, to develop an understanding of the operational and tactical levels of warfare.

Grand Military Policy Operations Tactics Strategy Strategy

Figure 2.1: Hierarchical Relationship between Policy, Strategy, Operations and Tactics

Figure 2.1 shows the linear progression of the relationship between policy, grand strategy, military strategy, operations and tactics.

While the main focus of this thesis will be on the military strategic level, it cannot be examined without proper contextualization. Thus, taking into account the grand strategic, operational and tactical levels is of great importance. The operational level, in Edward Luttwak’s (1987: 69) words, “governs the consequences of what is done and not done tactically”. Put simply, the operational level is concerned with the planning and execution of campaigns—linking tactical actions—in accordance with the military strategic goals. The tactical level is concerned with “the use of armed forces in the engagement” (italics in original) (Clausewitz 1976: 74); that is to say, with actions taking place in the battle theatre, e.g., the likes of force deployment and enemy engagement (Jablonsky 1987: 65-66; 69; Speller, Jordan et al. 2009: 10; 42-45).

Relationship between policy, strategy, operations and tactics

Having defined all the important terms related to strategy and the levels of war it is important to highlight an important aspect of the relationship between policy, strategy, operations and tactics (as depicted in Figure 2.1): while policy, (grand and military) strategy, operations and tactics (in that order) are closely interconnected, their relationship should be strictly hierarchical with a “descending ranking of relative significance” (Gray 2010: 20). For instance, inferior tactical performance, says Gray (2009; 2010: 19-20), can be corrected by an accomplished strategy and a bad strategy can sometimes be corrected by a skillfully crafted policy. The reverse, however, can prove to be disastrous. That is, a poor policy—e.g., 24

one that asks the impossible of the military instrument—cannot be corrected by tactical brilliance on the battlefield. In a similar fashion, bad strategy—e.g., one that fails to align the political goal(s) with the available means—cannot, in most cases, be remedied by battlefield victories (Gray 2009: 54-56; 2010: 20).23

Simply put, tactical victories in sum do not necessarily lead to the desired strategic outcome. A good example of tactical mastery not leading to positive strategic outcomes was in the case of Hannibal Barca of Carthage. He was famous for winning most of his engagements with the Romans—the most prominent being the battle of Cannae in 216 BC during the Second Punic War. However, Hannibal did not know how to create strategic effect through his victories or, in the words of Hannibal’s cavalry commander Maharbal, “You know how to win a battle, Hannibal; you do not know how to use the victory!” (quoted in Livy 29BC/2006: Book XXII, chapter 51, 120). Hannibal never succeeded in compelling the Romans do his own will, and his loss of just one battle—the Battle of Zama, 204-202 BC— led to him losing the entire war.24

Hannibal’s experience thus provides an illustration to support the earlier-made point about the importance of the integral role of strategy to links the means to the ends. The Carthaginian was a great tactician, yet a bad (grand) strategist. Subsequently, his tactical brilliance could not substitute for his lack of strategic agility. The main task of a (good) strategist, as Gray (2010: 252; 256-257) points out, is to decide whether the possible ways and means available to the state can be aligned with policy objectives. Therefore, as Gray goes on, a strategist has to make the optimal use of whatever different tools are at a state’s disposal. These would include, in the modern era, diplomacy, information operations, military and economic factors (abbreviated by the US military as DIME).

Definition of irregular warfare and other important terms

The task now, before embarking upon the forthcoming research, is to further define certain important terms. It is necessary to elucidate what exactly is intended in this thesis by terms such as ‘irregular warfare’, ‘insurgency’ and ‘counterinsurgency’. Clear definitions

23 In his argument, Gray refers primarily to grand strategy. 24 For a more detailed account of Hannibal’s performance during the Second Punic War see Livius (2006) and Chrissanthos (2008: 117-123). 25

and understanding of these terms are important in light of all the multifaceted meanings such terminologies can convey.

Irregular Warfare—what it is and what it is not

Irregular warfare is an umbrella concept which has come to signify a broad spectrum of operations, including, but not limited to, insurgency and counterinsurgency (FM 3-24 1- 1). Given that both insurgency and counterinsurgency (defined below) will be the main subjects of this thesis, it is important to take a closer look at the irregular warfare concept. States engaging in conflict with—conducting ‘wars’ against—non-state actors (see below) are normally said to be involved in ‘irregular warfare’. Before adopting a working definition of this concept, it is perhaps necessary to take a step back in order to understand what is meant by ‘war’ in general and to explain why irregular warfare is a contested descriptor for this particular phenomenon—i.e., conflict between state and non-state actors. There is a crucial distinction between war and warfare. While the latter simply refers to the conduct of war (e.g., irregular or unconventional) the former, as Clausewitz established some two centuries ago, can be defined as an instrument of politics, or in his own words: “War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means” (Clausewitz 1976: 252). Such an instrument, which embodies a complete relationship, i.e., political, legal, social, and military (Gray 2006a: 11), according to the Prussian theorist, has an ‘objective nature’—the nature—that is immutable, and a ‘subjective nature’, or the character, which is composed of variables such as armed forces, battle theater, military doctrines, weapons systems and political objectives to be accomplished, and which can change under the influence of various factors such as time and space (Clausewitz 1976: 26-27; Lonsdale 2004: 19-20). More specifically, the (objective) nature—the paradoxical core of each war—consists of a so-called ‘wondrous trinity’ (‘wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit’), i.e., of violence/hatred, chance and reason (Clausewitz 1976: 30-31; Gray 2007: 24). This ‘wondrous trinity’ is the capstone of Clausewitz’s general theory of war and it is present in all wars regardless of their ever-changing character. To illustrate the trinity in action, Clausewitz (1976: 30-31) ascribes the variables within the trinity to the people, the commander and his army and the government, respectively, thereby creating a so-called ‘secondary trinity’. One should not fall into the trap, though, of thinking that the crux of Clausewitz’s theory of war is valid only 26

for state-on-state wars.25 Non-state actors, too, have political objectives for which they are willing to use force while enjoying support—if marginal—from their supporters among the population. Having defined what ‘war’ is, it is important to next examine the definition of warfare. Warfare, in contrast to war, is merely “[…] the act of making war” according to Peter Browning (2002: 2). In other words, warfare belongs to the realm of character and can have no nature (as per Clausewitz’s description) of its own. For example, psychological warfare is a way of using psychological means in war. From this it follows that ‘warfare’ should always be defined by the adjective preceding it. Therefore, war and warfare should not be conflated, nor used interchangeably. War is a broader set composed of two natures that includes—among other variables—different types of warfare. Having understood what ‘war’ and ‘warfare’ mean, it is now time to turn attention to ‘irregular warfare’—a concept that has undergone numerous normative changes down the years.26 To name a recent example, from the 1990s onwards this term has been subject to numerous conceptual descriptions ranging from hybrid warfare, 4th Generation Warfare (4GW), and ‘wars amongst the people’. These, and similar normative constructs, have arisen in an effort to shed some light on the contemporary conflict environment—yet with only marginal success. The term ‘irregular warfare’ has proved elusive when it comes to finding a precise definition (Smith 2003; Gray 2006; 2012a; Kiras 2009; Jones & Smith 2015). The former Commander of the Colombian Army (2004-2007), General Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle (ret.) (2006: 29), was one who pointed out what he saw as the fallacy of such verbal jousting in developing doctrines relating to Colombia’s war against the FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). He noted that:

We were using American doctrine, where we conceptualized the continuum as “war” and “other than war.” This was absolutely incorrect. There is only war, with the enemy fielding different mixes of the elements of war. (emphasis added) Returning to Clausewitz’s distinction between the nature and the character of war it is worth mentioning that the term ‘irregular warfare’ concerns only the latter, for it tells us something about an adversary’s operational and tactical modus operandi, rather than what

25 See for instance Martin Van Creveld (1991, 2002), John Keegan (1994), Mary Kaldor (1999) who contend that the age of ‘Trinitarian war’ is over. For an opposing view, see Schuurman (2010: 94). 26 For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the concepts, see Heuser (2010a). 27

kind of adversary it is. Usually, non-state belligerent actors who suffer from an asymmetrical disadvantage in terms of the legal monopoly of violence, military forces and weapons, resort to non-traditional means of warfare, including surprise attacks, hit-and-run tactics, subversion and ‘terrorist’ measures to achieve their political objectives (Kiras 2009: 187; Heuser 2010a: 387).27 However, the adoption of such tactics should not necessarily imply that that the actor pursuing them is irregular (Luttwak 2001: 152-154).28 Thus, a word of caution must be made about the binary distinction between regular and irregular warfare. Irregular warfare—as demonstrated above—is associated with guerrilla-style tactics and even . In contrast, as the US Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) of 2007 points out: “Conventional or ‘traditional’ warfare is a form of warfare between states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory…” (7). Yet, regular warfare and irregular warfare are not mutually exclusive, and in wars even between states one can see manifestations of both modes; Special Operations Forces (SOF) are often seen as ‘irregulars’ in tactical terms despite the fact that these form a part of the state’s military force. By the same token, non-state actors (the real ‘irregulars’) can adopt ‘regular’ tactics if their strategy so dictates. This is evident, for instance, in Mao’s phase of the ‘strategic offensive’ (or phase III in Maoist terms), in which the revolutionary force (which has by now evolved into an army) is strong enough to face the state’s army in an open battle.29 Thus, it is more useful to consider who the exponent of irregular warfare is, rather than what such an exponent does (e.g., using guerrilla tactics and/or terrorism). Focusing solely on the modus operandi of the adversary provides a dangerously limited scope for action which calls for military solutions, e.g., countering guerrilla tactics. Simultaneously, the nature of the adversary, their goals, strategies and resources are neglected. The benefit of focusing on the adversary’s nature, therefore, lies in the fact that it provides a better understanding of the character of the war at hand, which in turn helps to formulate adequate counterstrategies. Given the existing

27 Sun Tzu is arguably the first strategist to write on how to turn one’s weakness into strengths when facing a stronger actor. The basics of strategy and tactics are laid down in his Art of War (500-300 BCE). 28 Luttwak (2001) speaks about ‘guerrilla warfare’ rather than using the term ‘irregular warfare’, however, the essence of these terms is identical. For Luttwak (2001: 152), guerrilla warfare can be used by both state and non-state actors; whereby the latter utilize it adjunct to subversion, propaganda and terrorism in an event of revolutionary war. 29 Mao’s three phases described in his On Guerrilla Warfare (1989) are defined as follows: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive. 28

conceptual misconstruction of the term ‘irregular warfare’, it is, therefore, necessary to adopt a term which better describes a war between a state and non-state actor.

Irregular Warfare, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Irregular warfare has, of course, been present ever since the armed forces of political actors became ‘regular’ and were used to deal with rebellious populations who were forced to employ ‘irregular’ tactics. The 20th and 21st centuries have certainly been witness to irregular warfare (Joes 1996), and it began to be the subject of significant intellectual examination. As early as the 16th and 17th centuries, theorists and practitioners in Spain and France such as Don Bernardino de Mendoza, Santa Cruz de Marcenado and Paul Hay du Chastelet were studying the subject of insurrections (Heuser 2010b: 427-433). However, it was not until the second half of the 20th century that irregular warfare started receiving serious attention in military and academic circles. This section is dedicated to a study of violent non-state actors who have resorted to irregular warfare. There are myriad ways to label these groups, ranging from guerrillas to revolutionaries to freedom fighters to rebels and to terrorists. Such descriptors will always be dependent on both context and perception. During the times of the revolutionary movements in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, the term ‘guerrilla fighter’ (or simply ‘guerrilla’) was quite in vogue. However, it is hardly imaginable to come across this label in the contemporary (academic) press in reference to the violent non-state actors in Afghanistan (the Taliban, Al Qaeda) and Iraq (e.g., Al Qaeda in Iraq) or Syria (Islamic State). Regardless of what terminology is employed, though, it is the nature of the actor that has withstood the test of time, while the character has evolved, especially given the availability of new force- multipliers as means of information passage and military technologies (e.g., weaponized drones). So what do these non-state actors aspire to, and what then should they best be called? There can be no politically and morally neutral designation. This thesis, therefore, will employ the term that is most widely used in official documents and in the academic literature, namely insurgents. As non-state actors, insurgents do not have any established state structures and will live among the people, like fish in water, to use Mao’s metaphor. The main aim of insurgents—as distinct from ‘terrorists’—is to gain political power—or in 29

Clausewitz’s terms—to compel the enemy (that is, the target government) to do their own will. That is, through “… a mixture of subversion, sabotage, political, economic, psychological actions, and armed conflict [insurgent groups will seek] to achieve [their] political aims (emphasis added)” (US Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency 2013: I-1).30 Clearly, there are more refined definitions of the phenomenon of insurgency which focus on different aspects such as insurgent motivations (e.g., ethnic and/or economic) (cf. Sambanis 2001; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Herge & Sambanis 2006) and insurgent goals (Fearon 2004).31 Arguably, the most complete set of typologies describing insurgents is offered by Bard O’Neill (2006).32 In essence, insurgents are non-state actors seeking to seize political power who have, as the US Joint Publication 3-24 (2013: I-1) recognizes: “a strategy, an ideology, an organization, a support structure, the ability to manage information, and a supportive environment”. They can also have external support either from states or other non- state actors in the form of sanctuaries, finances, weapons and the like (see Record 2007; Salehyan et al. 2011; Mumford 2013). Applying this definition of insurgency to the ends-ways-and-means formula provides the following result: insurgents seek to displace (and replace) an existing political status quo (ends) through the use of, among other methods, political activism and violent actions— including terrorism33 (ways), carried out by employment of available tools such as (often limited) military resources and media platforms (means). The broader point to derive from this is that insurgents are, as are their state counterparts, subject to the general theory of strategy outlined above. Similar to state actors, they have a political end-state towards which they direct specific strategies to guide their use of resources and tactical action. Ultimately, in any insurgency, both the state actor and their non-state counterparts are competing for

30 The full quote reads: “Insurgency uses a mixture of subversion, sabotage, political, economic, psychological actions, and armed conflict to achieve its political aims.” (JP 3-24 2013: I-1). A very similar definition is offered by Andrew Mumford (2011: 31). 31 Fearon (2004) argues that classifications depend on whether the goal of the insurgents is secessionist (e.g., ETA in Spain, LTTE in Sri Lanka, PKK in Turkey) or subversive (e.g., Sendero in Peru, FLN in Algeria, FARC in Colombia). 32 O’Neill (1990; 2006) classifies insurgencies according to their end goal, strategies, modus operandi, organizational dynamics, types of external support and government response, to name but a few. While useful in their own right, these typologies ensure for a narrow definition of insurgencies, and therefore are not applied in this thesis. 33 In this thesis terrorism will be considered as one of the means used by insurgents to achieve their goals. For a more detailed discussion see Mumford (2011: 31-36). 30

legitimacy and political control, which means that both—if defeated—have their very survival at stake. This can color the activities of both parties.34 Having understood what the term ‘insurgency’ refers to, it is time to now define what the term ‘counterinsurgency’ or ‘COIN’ means. In simple terms, COIN is an effort to prevent the insurgents from reaching their political/strategic objectives. It is, however, important to understand that COIN is neither a strategy, nor a concept, nor an end in itself (Gventer, Jones, Smith 2014: 3-4). COIN, as Gray puts it, is merely “an acronymic descriptor of a basket of diverse activities intended to counter an insurgency” (Gray 2012b: 17-18). In other words, the term COIN describes a set of instruments which strategists have at their disposal and which they can choose to employ or not, depending on what the political, strategic and operational environments demand. For the purpose of this study (see Young 2013) I will use the term ‘COIN campaign’, which will refer to an (armed) conflict between state actors, i.e., lawful combatants,35 and non-state actors respectively (Smith 2003; Gray 2006b: 215).

A Look Forward

Having discussed and clarified the vocabulary pertaining to the contemporary COIN debate it is, therefore, important to augment/broaden our understanding of today’s contrasting approaches, namely, the enemy-centric and the population-centric. Chapters III and IV examine both the historic roots and contemporary publications (official and academic alike) relevant to each approach in order to arrive at the core tenets which provide a better understanding of what each approach entails. This list of core tenets for each approach will not only serve as a main framework for evaluation of the case studies examined in this thesis but also provide for a better comprehension when analyzing the classic works on counterinsurgency.

34 Unless, of course, the counterinsurgent is a second-party actor that does not have their survival at stake as is often evident from the colonial era and present-day COIN campaigns. Similarly, there can be other actors, such as external parties which throw their support behind the insurgent (e.g., the USA and Pakistan supporting the Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War). 35 The definition of lawful combatants is borrowed from Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 43(2). 31

Before commencing this look into the past, it is necessary to briefly discuss arguably the most important current doctrinal document on counterinsurgency, i.e., the US Army/Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, and work backward to look at the origins of the ideas it contains. The main reason for choosing FM 3-24 as the point of departure lies in the fact that FM 3-24 is the most contemporary attempt to offer a solution to present-day insurgencies by the Western military most concerned with their conduct. However, despite the manual’s prominence, it contains problematic aspects. The biggest issue—in the view of the author—is FM 3-24’s attempt to fill strategic voids with its operational framework. As pointed out earlier, such an undertaking can lead to dire consequences by reversing the hierarchical relationship between strategy, operations and tactics (see Figure 2.1).

Waves of counterinsurgency thinking

What might be called the first wave of contemporary thinking on counterinsurgency followed the attacks of 9/11 (2001). Academics and defense planners suddenly came to dedicate seemingly their full attention to outlining ways of understanding, facing and defeating the globalized insurgency inspired by radical political Islam (Kilcullen 2009). This trend was closely followed by a second wave emerging after 2004; that is, in the aftermath of the controversial decision by President George W. Bush to invade Iraq in 2003 (Ward Gventer, Jones, Smith 2014: 1-3; 7). Events on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq increased the need for closer attention to be paid to counterinsurgency theory and practices. This led, in October 2004, to the US Army leadership producing Field Manual (Interim) 3- 07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, after almost forty years of the US military avoiding the topic of counterinsurgency (Crane 2010: 59; Ucko 2009: 33-34). Unlike their British and French counterparts, the US military suffered from what David Ucko (2009: 26-27) calls a “counterinsurgency syndrome”: trying to forget and thus ignore the lessons of their disastrous experiences during the Vietnamese quagmire. At the (grand) strategic level, only by 2006 did terms like ‘irregular warfare’ make their appearance in official documents including the US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Department of Defense (DoD) Irregular Warfare-Joint Operating Concept (2007) and most notably DoD Directive 3000.07 of 2008. These stressed the need to meet “non- 32

traditional, asymmetric challenges” (QDR 2006: 3) and to extend US capabilities for conducting both irregular and traditional warfare (DoD 2008: 2, para 4(a), (c)). These demands served as an impetus for the horizontal and vertical expansion of studies on counterinsurgency, reaching their culminating point in the publication of the aforementioned operational level Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This contains a set of principles laid down by the two main contributors to this document, namely Generals David Petraeus (USA) and James N. Mattis (USMC), who worked together with prominent military personnel and academics such as Conrad Crane (appointed as the lead author), the now retired Lt. Col. John Nagl and David Kilcullen (Crane 2010: 59-69; Taw 2012; Gentile 2013; McLeod 2015: 88- 91). What is notable is the fact that this manual, for the first time in the history of US military doctrine, was designed for use by both the Army and the Marines. This new US military focus on counterinsurgency (and, in broader terms, irregular warfare) signaled a fundamental shift away from the previously dominant narrative of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This RMA stressed an increase in combat effectiveness resulting from the simultaneous and interdependent changes in the domains of the technological military effectiveness of the armed forces, systems development, operational innovation and organizational adaptation (Metz & Kievit 1995: 3; Chapman 2000; Metz 2007). This RMA was underpinned by significant reliance upon new technological assets such as satellites and information technology, and was allied to the ‘Transformation’— dominated thinking that emerged during the 1990s. This reasoning emphasized a light logistical footprint (Ucko 2009: 50-55), and was also allied to the Weinberger Doctrine (Weinberger 1984), which outlined the conditions for the use of US troops, and stipulated that those troops should only be deployed if vital national interests were at stake and only if there was a “clear intention of winning”. Against this background, the importance of the shift towards a concentration on irregular warfare—involving a heavy footprint and no clear point of victory—cannot be understated. Despite the long-existing prevalence of irregular warfare (Gleditsch et al 2002; Harbom et al 2009; Paul, Clarke Grill 2010), recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted both the inadequacy of Western powers’ ability to address threats of irregular character and the tendency to apply operational solutions to strategic problems (Gray 2009; Gray 2012a; Gentile 2013; Ucko 2014). 33

The new manual, FM 3-24, was a distillation of lessons mainly from the Iraq theatre and from studies of French and the British counterinsurgency practices in Algeria and Malaya, respectively. Most notably, the manual was dominated by the past century’s ‘key’ thinkers (or ‘soldier-scholars’) such as David Galula, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson and Roger Trinquier (Crane 2010: 60-62).36 The central objective of FM 3-24 was to “prepare Army and Marine Corps leaders to conduct COIN operations anywhere in the world (emphasis added)” (FM 3-24 2006: xi). Therefore, the manual made its own claim to universality, despite its own recognition that each operational environment (OE) would be different. The underlying implication of this claim was the belief that the principles advocated in FM 3-24 could be employed to successfully defeat any insurgent regardless of the broader strategic and operational contexts. In Clausewitzian language, the manual suggests that all wars against sub-state actors would have an identical character. FM 3-24 was henceforth considered by some to be a silver-bullet solution to the ongoing quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq (Crane 2010). Such high expectations were set despite the fact that, as its name indicates, it is a field manual that does not offer any clear and coherent strategic guidance. This has led to a dangerous conflation of the strategic and operational levels. To be more precise, FM 3-24 has to a great extent penetrated strategic thinking and practice.37 The publication of FM 3-24 stimulated much academic debate on counterinsurgency, predominantly in the British and American academic and military establishments. The debate was mainly concerned with two competing schools of thought, the ‘population-centric’ school and the ‘enemy-centric’. Today, these two approaches compete for dominance both in theory and practice. It is thus important to look at them in some depth and to challenge the outwardly binary distinction between the two. The characteristics of these approaches are discussed in the following chapter. Another important point to note about these two approaches is that they are applied at both the military strategic and operational levels of war against what Clausewitz called the ‘centers of gravity’ (CoG). A CoG is defined as “the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends” (Clausewitz 1976: 610). The concept of CoGs is of vital

36 Roger Trinquier (2006) has, however, not been mentioned in FM 3-24 given his ‘unacceptable’ advocacy of torture as will be discussed later in this thesis. 37 This refers to the US and its performance in Iraq from end of 2006 onwards. 34

importance given that its correct determination and destruction should lead, according to Clausewitz, to the collapse of the enemy system. A CoG once struck with sufficient force would lead to unsettling the opponent’s equilibrium, leaving him incapable of resistance (Echevarria 2003: 90; Smith 2004: 134). Whereas the enemy-centric approach, in terms of the main CoG, focuses on the destruction of the enemy forces as the way to achieve victory in a COIN campaign, the population-centric approach emphasizes that it is the control, protection and support of the (indigenous) population that should most effectively yield successful results. Each approach, thus, focuses on different CoGs leading in turn to adoption of different strategies.38

Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter was to clarify some of common terminology used in the COIN debate (e.g., war, warfare, irregular warfare, COIN) and to establish theoretical underpinnings for the comparative study that will follow, namely the general theory of war devised by Carl von Clausewitz and the supplemental definitions of strategy offered by Colin S. Gray and Arthur Lykke Jr. This helps situate the role of military strategy within the war construct and to better understand why it is important to grant it more attention than it has received in the past. Further, this chapter has addressed the origins of the current thinking on how to counter contemporary insurgencies that is laid out in FM 3-24. This discussion highlights the relevance of the present study which seeks to broaden the scope of the existing approach by examining successful first-party COIN campaigns that were not taken into consideration during the formulation of this presently prevalent doctrine. In the following chapters (Chapters III and IV), I discuss and contrast the existing approaches to COIN–enemy-centric and population-centric—in more detail and devise an analytical framework for the cases which are examined in this thesis.

38 According to Clausewitz, ‘center of gravity’ links military victory to achievement of political aims. In simple terms, a CoG (or CoGs) once correctly determined and targeted should result in the achievement of political aims. See Clausewitz (1976: 272-273). 35

Chapter III: The enemy-centric approach to COIN

This chapter and the next examine in detail the two dominant approaches to conducting COIN. I begin by analyzing the enemy-centric approach. I consider its origins and its historical significance, and I develop an understanding of what is meant by this term. I draw out the tenets that can be seen to characterize this approach. In the chapter following this, I mirror the process adopted here by examining the population-centric approach. Having established the characterizing tenets for both approaches I present a table that depicts the juxtaposition between them. This table will then be used as a framework to help analyze the cases examined later in this work. The discussion of the two approaches presented here will also act as a literature review.

The enemy-centric approach, which was laid out in its basic form in the introduction, is described more fully in this chapter. As noted, the aim here is to establish some tenets that can be said to characterize the enemy-centric approach, in order to establish an analytical framework for the case studies. This undertaking helps in understanding why this approach remains both important and influential to this day when conducting COIN operations. Further, this chapter seeks to draw a line between the enemy-centric approach and what might be seen as ‘indiscriminate violence’, in order to avoid conceptual misunderstandings.

The enemy-centric approach in history and the literature

The idea of focusing on the destruction of the enemy forces as the primary objective is as old as war itself. The population from which the fielded forces of that enemy emerges is traditionally seen as merely peripheral. Methods used to defeat these enemy forces include annihilation on the battlefield; exhaustion through attrition; and the killing of individual leaders or high-profile members of the adversary’s organization (i.e., ‘decapitation’ or targeted killings).39 Once the armed forces of a state—or whatever political entity they fought on behalf of—were defeated then the population of that state invariably accepted subjugation as well. The population itself was only ever a secondary target. However, when it came to suppressing internal revolts involving sub-state actors, historically whole populations were often treated as the enemy. For instance, the first Jewish Revolt from A.D. 66 to 70 in Judea

39 These military strategies are discussed in more detail in chapter IX of this thesis. 36

was—despite its promising start—crushed by the Roman army led by Vespasian and Titus, through the extermination of a great number of people (including noncombatants), the destruction of Jerusalem, and the eventual demolishing of the Temple Mount, the very heartland of the Jewish community (Bloom 2010: 65-147). This harsh approach was to be repeated in many future wars of colonization, ranging from the Spanish campaigns in the Americas (cf. Scheina 2003; Céspedes del Castillo 2009: 265-294; 488-506; Newson 2009: 24-36; 85pp) through the American-Indian Wars (cf. Brumwell 2005; Keenan 1997; Mays 2017: 159-182) and, perhaps most notably, to the German campaign against the Hottentots in South-West Africa (cf. Zimmerer 2008: 51-59; Olusoga & Erichsen 2010: 241-251). Thus, in many early examples of what we now look upon as COIN campaigns, the population was the enemy.

In the current era, of course, whole populations cannot be treated as the enemy in what have come to be called COIN operations. More subtlety is required in delineating an insurgent ‘enemy’ from the population in which it operates. But where should the concentration in COIN operations lie: on the insurgent’s forces—the ‘enemy’—or on the population on which it invariably relies for support?

The first specific mention of the ‘enemy-centric approach’ in relation to current COIN campaigns was made by the anthropologist, security analyst and military practitioner David Kilcullen in 2007.40 In a contribution to the Small Wars Journal Blog, Kilcullen (2007) explains that this approach “understands counter-insurgency as a variant of conventional warfare”. In other words, enemy-centric COIN operations are conducted largely the same way as operations against a conventional enemy, i.e., maintaining the defeat of the enemy— be it in physical or moral terms—as the primary objective. Kilcullen (2007) notes that “[t]here are many variants within this approach, including "soft line" and "hard line" approaches, kinetic and non-kinetic methods of defeating the enemy, decapitation versus marginalization strategies, and so on.” Kilcullen (2007; 2010) does admit that many of the concepts involved in these ideas about this enemy-centric approach actually overlap with those of what he calls the ‘population-centric approach’ (in which the concentration is more on winning over the population than destroying the insurgents, as discussed in Chapter IV.

40 Kilcullen served in the Australian Army, attaining a rank of Lieutenant Colonel. 37

This is because the population-centric approach still, of course, entails fighting against an insurgent enemy (Kilcullen 2010: 10). But, as he contends, it is the philosophy behind each of them that sets these two approaches apart: “Many of these strategic concepts [in the enemy-centric approach] are shared with the population-centric school of counterinsurgency, but the philosophy differs” (Kilcullen 2007). In Kilcullen’s (2007) view, in the enemy-centric approach the mindset is “first [defeat] the enemy, and all else will follow”, while the population-centric approach sees “counter-insurgency as fundamentally a control [of the population] problem, or even an armed variant of government administration.” This is an important aspect that sets the two approaches apart. While in both cases the enemy forces may be targeted, the underlying reasons for the targeting differ. In the enemy-centric approach such targeting would be done in order to physically or morally defeat the enemy. Conversely, in the population-centric approach targeting the enemy is conducted primarily to protect the population.

Here, then, we have the first tenet of the enemy-centric approach: the main focus is on the enemy’s forces and not on the population within which that enemy operates.

Further mention of this enemy-centric approach then appears in official US military publications. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) 41 defines ‘enemy- centric’ as an approach that is “focused on defeating a particular enemy group” (12). The US Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (2012: 16) also makes clear an enemy-centric bias in its stress on the destruction of insurgent fighters and their infrastructure, using techniques like ‘search-and-destroy’ and ‘cordon-and-search’ operations.42 Additionally, the aforementioned and key US Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2013)43 refers to the enemy-centric approach—although not using the term explicitly—simply as “a traditional military force- on-force operation” in contrast to the “population-centric nature of COIN” (I-2) actually advocated in the manual. It can be deduced from an examination of JP 3-24 that the enemy-

41 Kilcullen helped craft the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009). 42 These operations are associated with General William Westmoreland’s ‘Search and Destroy’ operational doctrine used during the Vietnam War (1955-1975), most notably between 1964 and 1968. The operations consisted of three phases: finding, fixing and destroying the enemy’s battalion-size units (or larger); clearing the smaller guerrilla units; and, finally, eliminating local Viet Cong (VC) to create a stable environment for reconstruction purposes (Lewis 2006: 255). 43 US Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2013) provides the doctrinal basis for the US Armed Forces and interagency coordination in COIN campaigns. 38

centric approach is regarded in this document as more suitable for ‘conventional warfare’ rather than for COIN operations. In other words, the enemy-centric approach from the JP 3- 24 perspective is not a COIN approach at all, but an approach used in conventional (or traditional) warfare.

These characterizations of the enemy-centric approach clearly put the focus on defeating the insurgent combatants in military competition rather than on ‘winning the hearts and minds’44 of the indigenous population. It is therefore possible here to draw out the second tenet of an enemy-centric approach: it is a philosophy that stresses the physical and/or moral destruction of the insurgent (based on Kilcullen’s (2007) classification) using military force rather than focusing on undermining the support the local population provides to the insurgent.

We need to go further, though. While the above descriptions of the enemy-centric approach share a common philosophy, they arguably fall short of getting to the core of the enemy-centric approach. When this approach is operationalized there is something of a blurring of the lines between enemy-centric and population-centric COIN. It is often hard to say which approach is being applied. While Kilcullen (2007) has referred to the different ‘philosophies’ separating the two approaches, what he does not mention is the fact that the relevant philosophy is not the ultimate determinant of which approach is used per se, but rather it is more down to the desired political and strategic end-state. In order, therefore, to more accurately characterize the nature of the enemy-centric approach it is necessary to dig a little deeper. In the following analysis the concentration is on the works of a few key thinkers whose ideas form the basis of the enemy-centric approach. The first point to make is that there are two variants of this approach.

Two variants of the enemy-centric approach

It is possible to break down the idea of the enemy-centric approach into two particular variants. Doing so assists in the extraction of further specific tenets characteristic of this approach. As part of this exercise, a brief dive into history is required. This is best done by

44 This phrase was first coined on April 19, 1891 by a British Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman who is known for his service as a Colonial British Indian officer and his tribal pacification during the Second Anglo- Afghan War (1878-1880). See Thornton (1895: v-xi; 253). 39

firstly examining the notion of ‘small wars’. This was a term used by Colonel C. E. Callwell (1914/1996), writing in 1896. By this term he meant the wars of imperial policing that were fought by British forces against armed sub-state actors representing indigenous peoples (see below). Of such small wars, there may be said to be two schools of thought when it comes to how they should be conducted. First, there is the ‘regular warfare’ thinking that ‘small wars’ are really no different from, and therefore should be treated as, ‘big’ or conventional wars. Second, there is the idea that the conduct of such ‘small wars’ actually requires substantially different thinking. These two variants are discussed in more detail below.

The ‘regular warfare’ view of counterinsurgency

The first variant of enemy-centric COIN thinking does not consider small wars as a distinct category of war. Rather it is based on ‘conventional’ thinking about warfare, and most notably on Clausewitzian principles. As part of this discussion, it is probably best to start with this most influential writer on the conduct of war. In his opus magnum On War, Clausewitz dedicated his attention to what we might see as regular conflict, with only minor reference to small wars or ‘den Kleinen Kriegen’ (see below). 45 But he still applied a conventional warfare approach to fighting such ‘small wars’.

One of the most central contentions made by Clausewitz (1976: 196) in regard to ends and means in war (whether ‘large’ or ‘small’ war) is based on the premise that the ‘ends’ concerns “the subjugation of the enemy” while the ‘means’ concerns “the destruction of his fighting forces”. In the historical period in which Clausewitz formed his theory, the indigenous populations of enemy states had only a marginal role to play in the outcome of any conflict, and hence his primary focus was always on the enemy’s army (be it that of a state or of an insurgent variety) and its destruction.46

However, it is necessary to point out that Clausewitz himself acknowledged that the proposed ‘destruction’ of the enemy forces was not the only way to the enemy’s ‘subjugation’. Indeed, the Prussian stated, “… in war many roads lead to success, and … they do not all involve the opponent’s outright defeat” (Clausewitz 1976: 37). These ‘roads’ can

45 Clausewitz devoted only one chapter on ‘small wars’ in On War. However, he explored the topic in his other works discussed below. See Daase (2007); Heuser (2010c) and Kaempf (2011). 46 Clausewitz’s thinking on small wars evolved over time and will be explored in the relevant section below. 40

range from “…the destruction of the enemy’s forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy’s attacks” (italics in the original) (Clausewitz 1976: 37).47 Thus, an approach we can characterize as enemy-centric need not be focused directly on the aggressive destruction of an adversary’s armed forces. It can, as Clausewitz makes clear, involve activities that fall short of active destruction. Varying degrees of passivity can be involved. Here we may include concepts such as deterrence and coercion that may be employed in order to restrict an enemy’s activities and, in essence, negate his actions. Clausewitz’s thinking about ‘regular’ warfare can thus be just as easily transferred over to that involving ‘irregular’ warfare. The underlying logic for this is based on Clausewitz’s classification of war, as discussed in Chapter II. Given that war is “more than a true chameleon” (Clausewitz 1976: 30) with an immutable nature but a variable character, there can be no such thing as ‘normal’ or ‘conventional’ war (Smith & Jones 2015: 4-7). Smith and Jones (2015: 1) compellingly argue that “… classifying insurgency as a separate category or subcategory of war is self-defeating”. Colin Gray (2012a: 41) likewise states that “…new species of strategic or strategically relevant behavior…really are only subspecies, or variants of the one species that is war.” In light of this it is possible then to take it into account in COIN thinking as well. The focus is on the enemy in COIN warfare simply because it is just ‘warfare’. This reinforces the aforementioned first two tenets of enemy-centric approach. But Clausewitz can add some depth to what is meant by the term ‘enemy’ here.

Though he might be viewed as the arch exponent of an enemy-centric approach to the conduct of warfare. Clausewitz—contends that defeating the enemy is not always just about destroying his army. It is wider than this. Effective targets, as Clausewitz affirms, can also be key individual leaders, a state’s capital and an enemy’s allies (Clausewitz 1976: 242).48

It is important thus to point out that talking about an approach—be it military strategic, operation or tactical—as being merely ‘enemy-centric’ can lead to a misunderstanding. The ‘enemy-centric’ adjective often leads to the assumption that the only

47 The aspects related to territory will be elaborated upon later in this chapter. 48 Clausewitz (1976: 242) proposed the following list: 1. Destruction of his army, if it is at all significant 2. Seizure of his capital if it is not only the centre of administration but also that of social, professional and political activity. 3. Delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he. 41

way to success is to annihilate the enemy’s forces (Paul et al. 2016: 1023). However, in the so-called ‘enemy-centric’ spectrum there are a number of strategies involved, including, but not limited to the annihilation, exhaustion and attrition of the enemy forces, as well as more subtle actions such as the ‘decapitation’ of leaders. And while all of these are enemy-centric in that they do not focus on the ‘population’, and can be used either in isolation or in conjunction so as to reinforce the desired strategic effect, they can also be employed alongside less aggressive, less proactive measures—such as preventing offensives by the enemy. The ways of defeating an enemy in so-called small wars can be seen as matching those employed in conventional wars: there is no fundamental difference in approach.

In terms of how this ‘regular warfare’ attitude to the conduct of small wars is discussed in the literature, we can again look to Clausewitz for more detail. Clausewitz addressed the topic of small wars or ‘kleinen Kriegen’ (albeit marginally) in his ‘Lectures on Small War’ [Meine Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg], presented at the Berliner Kriegsschule in 1811-1812, and in his Bekenntnisdenkschrift [Confession Memorandum] (1812) (Kaempf 2011). The underlying motivation behind Clausewitz’s attention to this type of war resulted from what he saw as the dire situation in Prussia at the time. It was actually through guerrilla warfare that Clausewitz hoped to liberate his country from French rule (Hahlweg 1986: 128). He thus analyzed several uprisings, including that in the Vendée (1793-1796) in France, and two against French occupiers: the Tyrolean uprising of 1809, and, most notably, the Spanish insurrection of 1808 (Daase 2007: 183). In his lectures on these small wars, Clausewitz discussed the ‘tactical-organizational’ dimension of guerrilla warfare, i.e., how to fight as guerrillas, not against them, largely focusing on “the use of small troop units in the field” (Clausewitz 49 quoted in Hahlweg 1986: 128). In his Bekenntnisdenkschrift (1812), however, he provides a more comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon (Kaempf 2011: 556), which displays a more thorough understanding of small wars as wars of national resistance or liberation. This understanding led Clausewitz to suggest that the Prussians could emulate the Spanish resistance in order to rid the state of Napoleonic rule (Hahlweg 1986: 129). It was the success of the Spanish guerrillas in wearing

49 See “Meine Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg, gehalten auf der Kriegs-Schule 1810 und 1811” in Hahlweg (1966: 205-588). 42

down the French troops that provoked this line of thought (Kaempf 2011: 556).

In On War, Clausewitz thus did reach a full appreciation of the potential use of guerrilla warfare. In the section dedicated to Defense, Clausewitz included a chapter entitled ‘the People in Arms’ (Book VI). This contribution sheds some light on another important feature of the enemy-centric approach, i.e., the use of guerrilla warfare on the military strategic level.

Clausewitz’s conceptualization of guerrillas is evocative of what T. E. Lawrence— the British military officer who helped engineer the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks in 1916-18 (Freedman 2013: 181-182)—would claim almost a century later (cf. Lawrence 1920; 2008; Liddell-Hart 1934; English 1987; Leach 2006; Arquilla 2011; Freedman 2013: 181-183). 50 Clausewitz asserted that guerrillas were “nebulous and elusive” and their resistance “should never materialize as a concrete body” since its state enemy could easily crush it, taking many prisoners (Clausewitz 1976: 187). This would ultimately undermine any popular resistance. Such a resistance, he pointed out, should have several points of concentration, which would be located “on the flanks of the [state] enemy’s theatre of operations”. This would allow the guerrillas to emulate a regular army in terms of size and organization, and allow them to undertake large-scale operations (Clausewitz 1976: 187). The main rationale behind such formations would be to create the potential to strike the forces of the state enemy at their most vulnerable spot—the rear—and to harass them in order to instil “uneasiness and fear, and deepen[ing] the psychological effect of the insurrection as a whole” (Clausewitz 1976: 187). Such an insurrection would be shaped and accompanied by small regular units (pertaining to the state forces) which would help stiffen the resolve of the irregular forces. Again, though, as Clausewitz (1976: 188) warned, these guerrillas should avoid direct confrontation, for too many could be killed. They should instead disperse when confronted and continue to carry out surprise attacks on the enemy. Clausewitz maintained that an uprising could not survive unless it avoided such confrontations, regardless of the degree of its will and passion.

50 Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1920) is not a mere account of the Arab Revolt, but a significant contribution to guerrilla warfare scholarship. He believed that a guerrilla force on their own could indeed wear down an enemy force—through a strategy of exhaustion—to achieve a victory, despite its asymmetric disadvantages. For Lawrence, such force was not a supplement to the main army, but rather a stand-alone force. 43

The ultimate purpose of such insurrections is two-fold, according to Clausewitz (1976: 188-190). First, it is not to bring about decisive victory (in contrast to Lawrence who played with the thought that guerrilla forces could actually do this on their own (Lawrence 1920; Freedman 2013: 181-183)). For Clausewitz, guerrillas are only to be used as a last resort to win the war once the state’s forces had been defeated, broadening the theatre of operations so as to include difficult terrains such as mountains. Second, he saw guerrillas as constituting an auxiliary force that can be used before the decisive battle—that is, the battle that decides the outcome of the war—between the regular units supplemented by guerrillas and the forces of the enemy state.51 All this would contribute to the goal of wearing down the enemy, thereby adding a psychological strain on the enemy forces (in order to undermine their will to fight/resist). From this it follows that Clausewitz had not envisaged an insurrection as a stand-alone tool to achieve political objectives, but rather as an auxiliary force which would operate alongside the regular army as a part of a strategy of exhaustion (Daase 2007: 186). From this contribution of Clausewitz to thinking about small wars we thus can derive another tenet of the enemy-centric approach: the use of ‘irregular units’ in order to exhaust the enemy force and to exploit its weakest points. Both in the distant past and especially in contemporary times, for example,52 such small elite military units (e.g., Delta Force and Army Rangers in the US; Spetznaz in Russia or Special Air Service in Britain) are trained to operate outside the ‘conventional warfare’ mindset, both alongside regular units or independently (Thomas 1983; Gray 2007: 45; FM 3-05 2008: 1-2).

The ‘irregular warfare’ approach to counterinsurgency

The second variant of what can be labeled as the enemy-centric school of thought does presume a distinction between conventional wars and ‘small wars’. As noted, this was a term first coined by the British Colonel E. Callwell.

In 1896, Callwell conceived of a distinct category of warfare—namely small wars— altering the previously uncontested supremacy of conventional warfare (Porch 2013: 4-5). Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice is regarded by many analysts,

51 This reflected the idea put forward by the French theorist Jean Frédéric Auguste Le Mière de Corvey who concluded, based on his experiences of partisan warfare in the Vendée, Spain, Germany and Belgium, that guerrillas would play an important role once the regular armies were destroyed (Laqueur 2009: 113-114). 52 For examples of deployment of special forces, see for instance Tucker and Lamb (2007: 69-106). 44

including some prominent scholars of irregular warfare such as the military historian Ian Beckett,53 as the starting point for the history of British counterinsurgency thinking (Beckett 2001; 2007b: 89-101). Callwell’s thought laid the ground for future British writings on the subject, such as Charles Gwynn’s Notes on Imperial Policing (1934), and General John Dill’s Notes on the Tactical Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion (1936) (Jones & Smith 2013: 438). During the interwar period, Callwell’s writings came to strongly influence US thinking on the conduct of their own small wars. This was especially reflected in the work of Major Harold H. Utley, USMC (particularly in his “An Introduction to Tactics and Techniques in Small Wars” (1931)) and subsequently in the USMC Small Wars Manual (1940) (Beckett 2007b: 96).54 Callwell’s influence is such that, in his introduction to the re-published Small Wars of 1996, Douglas Porch described him as “the Clausewitz of colonial warfare”. According to Porch, Callwell applied “a rational Clausewitzian paradigm” in that he advised practitioners to “set clear goals, and do a thorough assessment of the enemy’s and your own capabilities before devising strategies to achieve those goals” (emphasis added) (Porch 1996: xii).

Given that conventional wars in the European theatre in the 18th and 19th centuries, including the Napoleonic Wars, received the most analytical attention at the time, conflicts such as those in the Vendée or in remote colonies remained on the margins of military interest. Against this background Callwell sought to tip the balance in favor of the study of small wars, which he defined as “operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces” (Callwell 1996: 21). This difference in emphasis sets Callwell off on a different track to Clausewitz in terms of the way that small wars should be understood. Callwell sees them as a distinct category of war that requires new thinking, while Clausewitz sees than as just a smaller version of ‘conventional wars’.

Unlike Clausewitz, for whom there could be no categorization of war, Callwell sought to draw a clear distinction between small wars or ‘irregular’ wars and conventional or ‘regular’ wars. He argued that the former are quite different from the latter and that their conduct therefore requires different approaches. Callwell (1996: 25-29) classified small wars

53 Beckett (2001: 35) notes that “…Callwell made the only distinctive contribution by any British soldier to the development of military thought in the nineteenth century”. 54 Both works are discussed in Chapter IV as part of the population-centric approach. 45

into three broad categories: those of conquest, pacification and expediency. Campaigns of conquest or annexation take place on a “foreign soil” against some form of government (Callwell 1996: 25). Campaigns of pacification are those directed at the subjugation of an uprising in previously annexed lands (Callwell 1996: 26-27). Finally, campaigns of expediency are those aimed at “punish[ing] an insult” or “chastis[ing] a people who have inflicted some injury” (Callwell 1996: 27). Callwell believed that understanding the type of small war being fought would help practitioners craft the military strategies appropriate to the nature of the campaign, in order to achieve the overarching grand strategic objectives. Callwell’s focus was almost entirely on the nature of the enemy—in the terminology I use here, he was very enemy centric. While in conventional wars the enemy forces would be of one ‘regular’ type, in small wars this was not the case. For Callwell (1996: 29-32), there existed seven categories of opponent, namely “opponents with a form of regular organization”; “highly disciplined but badly armed opponents”; “fanatics”; “guerrillas, civilized and savage”; “armies of savages in the bush”; “the Boers”; and “enemies who fight mounted”. These classifications were intended to help the commander decide which approach would be appropriate for any given case. Of course, the premise upon which such categorizations were made is inevitably Clausewitzian in that Callwell followed the general piece of advice he offered (Clausewitz 1976: 30):

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

Yet, while Clausewitz’s suggestion has a universal validity of application (be it a small war or otherwise), Callwell applied such “judgement” to his particular field of study to devise his own theory: a theory that stated that the template for regular war thinking cannot be applied to irregular (small) wars. In small wars, Callwell (1996: 34) argued, there will in every case be a specific and different end or objective for the regular army to pursue. It might be that in some cases the enemy’s forces should be thoroughly beaten; in other cases, his “capital”, as Callwell put it, would need to be taken, or in others only his property need be destroyed in order to bring about the defeat of the enemy—his subjugation (36-38). Similar 46

to Clausewitz, though, Callwell pointed out that the actual destruction of the enemy force need not be the primary goal in small wars. Of course, if the circumstances permitted, a decisive battle and the ‘moral’ effect emanating from it—that is, the defeat of a large irregular force—can lead to either the suppression of the insurrection or the conquering of the enemy’s territories, or both (Callwell 1996: 37-38). However, given the character of such wars, it might be difficult, Callwell noted, to even find an enemy force—if there is any ‘organized force’ at all—and to bring it to battle. And, in some cases, there will be no ‘territory’ to conquer, and neither a capital to capture, nor population centers to occupy. This is why it is not possible, said Callwell (1996: 40), to fix a definite objective for all small wars. Small wars are thus, he noted, so different that the principles of conventional warfare hardly apply. Callwell argued that the objective would depend not only on the desired goal but also on the type of ‘small’ war being engaged in, for example whether it is a punitive expedition, or aims at the suppression of an insurrection, or seeks the occupation of territories. Thus, what Callwell brings to the understanding of the enemy-centric approach is that there needs to be some subtlety involved. There cannot be a one-size-fits-all way of dealing with irregulars and it must reflect both the nature of the end-state required and of the nature of enemy.

Crucially, Callwell is to be bracketed in the enemy-centric camp because he treats relevant indigenous populations as mere extensions of the ‘enemy’—the population should be chastised if the necessity arises. “The operations”, as he put it, “are sometimes limited to committing havoc which the laws of regular warfare do not sanction”. This is indicative of Callwell’s approach in general: he treats relevant ‘populations’ as mere extensions of the ‘enemy’.

More specifically, Callwell (1996: 40-42; 129-131) suggested, in line with Bugeaud’s practices in Algeria (see Chapter IV), that the destruction of property and livestock possessed by the population would (through food shortages) bring the enemy to battle and, as a consequence, reduce the duration of these small wars. Callwell (1996: 91) went on to stress that the regular forces should not be passive but always aggressive against their rebel enemy. The crux of his theory, and in line with the enemy-centric tenet derived above from Clausewitz’s thinking, is to bring the irregulars to battle as often as the situation permits. Most importantly, the regular force must seek decisive victory, i.e., “…the opposing forces 47

should be beaten so thoroughly that they will not offer further opposition” (Callwell 1996: 106). In such cases, offensive tactics are imperative in generating a “big casualty list in the hostile ranks” (Callwell 1996: 151-152). Such tactics include the likes of enveloping techniques, surprise raids55 on enemy camps and pursuing the enemy. Such offensive actions would have a moral effect, as noted above, upon the hostile forces. Thus the aim is not only to physically defeat them but also to undermining them psychologically (Callwell 1996: 207- 209; 240-245). Even ostensibly in the defense, the regular force can adopt rigorous patrolling methods to hamper the freedom of movement of the enemy force (Callwell 1996: 196-200). For Callwell, having a constantly aggressive attitude towards the irregulars will not only degrade their capabilities but also undermine their morale. This is a central feature of the enemy-centric approach that can be derived from Callwell—applying constant pressure on an insurgent enemy so that his willingness to fight suffers just as much as his ability to fight.

Callwell’s methods were closely followed by the US Marine Corps when it had to consider how to fight its own small wars. For instance, the USMC Small Wars Manual of 1940 includes much of the advice proffered by Callwell (cf. USMC SWM 1940: 6-1; 6-80- 6-81). Notwithstanding the Small Wars Manual’s central contention that military force might not “by itself restore peace and orderly government” because the underlying causes for the insurgency “may be economic, political or social” (USMC SWM 1940: 1-9, 15), it still suggests—in line with Callwell—that enemy-centric operations constitute a core part of the USMC mission. This is described in Chapter VI of the manual entitled “Infantry Patrols” (USMC SWM 1940: 6-1, para 6-1): “During the initial phases of intervention…the tactics employed are generally those … [used] in major warfare.” The main aim is to achieve “the immediate cessation of armed opposition” by inflicting a “crushing defeat” upon the enemy force (USMW SWM 1940: 6-1, para 6-1). This, however, is not always possible as both Callwell and the manual recognized. Only in later phases, does the manual strongly differ from Callwell’s postulates by emphasizing “the maximum protection to the peaceful inhabitants” (USMC SWM 1940: 6-1, para 6-2). Indeed, the Marines were expected to operate within the rule of law (both international and domestic) (USMC SWM 1940: 1-9, 31;

55 Raids of surprise were based on the French concept of ‘razzia’ explained in chapter IV. 48

Corum 2010: 35). But even in those latter phases, the counterinsurgent force had to maintain “the principle of the offensive” (in tactical terms) (USMC SWM 1940: 6-3, para 6-4). 56

The work of Callwell and numerous aspects of the associated USMC Small Wars Manual (1940) 57 —specifically on COIN operations—confirms the enemy-centric tenets already noted and allows us also to derive additional ones:

• Offensive military operations should be conducted which seek decisive battle and the destruction of the enemy force (a strategy of annihilation) • Military operations should be conducted (even in the defense) which seek to have a psychological effect—to break the enemy’s will to resist (a strategy of exhaustion) • The population, if it is thought about at all, is to be targeted as a means to the end of undermining the enemy forces. Thus would involve the physical targeting of a population’s assets (e.g., livestock, property). But little is done to gain the population’s support or to deal with grievances.58

In summary, the two enemy-centric approaches, that is, the ‘regular war’ approach and the ‘small war’ approach regard the phenomenon of war from different perspective. The ‘regular war’ view does not make a distinction between big and small wars. The ‘small war’ view, conversely, suggests that small wars merit a category of their own due to their distinct characteristics (enemy force, terrain, tactics). However, both approaches converge on how to defeat the enemy force; that is, by destroying the enemy forces in a decisive battle or by undermining the enemy force’s will to resist through, for instance, display of force (although sometimes there are other centers of gravity, e.g., enemy’s allies, as described above). Another common feature of both approaches is that the population of an ‘enemy’ state or a state plagued by an insurrection remains ignored in that no protection is offered to it; neither are its grievances addressed. It is worth noting that only the small war view sees an advantage in coercing the population or targeting its property to bring the enemy force to battle. While

56 Other parallels are related to the primacy of intelligence (USMC SWM 1940: 2-15) and the decentralized unit control (USMC SWM 1940: 2-38; 2-39). However, it is beyond the limits of this thesis to discuss them in more detail. 57 While the USMC Small Wars Manual (1940) does not fall into the enemy-centric category, it contains vital suggestions from Callwell. 58 In contemporary context, this tenet, however, is both unethical and illegal under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 and the Customary International Humanitarian Law (e.g., rule 1). 49

this was the method of choice for the time (19th century) when such postulates were written and practiced, this tenet should not be included in the characteristic description of the enemy- centric approach as understood in contemporary times, given existing international legal norms. Such practices would, indeed, be in strong violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.59

Controlling territory

Having established the thoughts of the key thinkers on what may be seen as the enemy-centric approach, there are some more specific points that need to be made in order to flesh it out some more. This section discusses an important, albeit perhaps understudied, aspect of the enemy-centric thinking. This is related to the control of territory, which outwardly might appear as population-centric in tone.

Bernard Finel (2010) looks upon the enemy-centric approach as being one primarily geared to finding and destroying the insurgents themselves. However he also goes further by stating that there must be an actual willingness to control territory in order to control the population that supports the insurgents.60 “A counterinsurgent force”, he says, “can gradually steamroll an insurgency if it can also significantly restrict population movements” (Finel 2010). The aim would be to make systematic attacks on insurgent strongholds in order to undermine insurgent power and, if not to compel the enemy to do one’s will, then at least force him to negotiate (compromise). But this would inevitably involve the coercive treatment of noncombatants (Finel 2010). Thus while this aspect of controlling territory does have a concentration on the population it can still be seen as enemy-centric given that it is not aimed at protecting the population in any way.

The key point to take away from Finel’s (2010) work lies in the fact that he is saying that enemy-centric COIN operations should not be about holding territory—as the population-centric approach and its ‘clear-hold-build’61 variant suggest (see below)—but

59 See, for instance, Art. 12 (I & II Convention), Art. 17 (III Convention) and Art. 32 (IV Convention). 60 The Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (2012: 16) describes such an approach as ‘authoritarian’ due to its commitment to coerce the population. The name implies that only authoritarian regimes have the liberty to resort to such measures. 61 The ‘clear, hold, build’ consists of three components. The first deals with clearing the area of hostile elements to “create a secure physical environment (FM 3-24 2006: 5-18); the second calls for establishment of 50

should rather be about controlling it to prevent the enemy from doing so, or showing that the enemy cannot hold it (e.g., by employing ‘search-and-destroy’ operations).

A more pronounced articulation of the importance of ‘territory’ in an enemy-centric approach is put forward by James Worral (2014: 98-104). Worral (2014: 98) states that “two of the most unpalatable aspects for Western states are the physical and psychological control of populations and the control of territory for long periods.” Put differently, in his criticism of a more liberally oriented population-centric approach, Worral stresses the need to not only control the [key] population, but also the territory upon which it resides. This is not done to protect the population, but to deny the support of the population to the insurgent.

Herein lies a further tenet of the enemy-centric approach: it is seen as important to deny control of the (contested) territory to the adversary. This should enable the counterinsurgent to gain control of both the territory and the key population inhabiting it. This is done by offensive means using force aimed at the adversary and there is no sense that controlling the territory is to work to the benefit of the population on that territory.

The enemy-centric approach and indiscriminate violence

Before moving on to a conclusion it is necessary first to make a clarification. Despite the overall kinetic nature of the enemy-centric approach, its conduct should not be automatically conflated with the practice of ‘indiscriminate violence’. The purposeful use of indiscriminate violence as a COIN method can be described as both a systematic and intentional targeting of non-combatants by the counterinsurgent forces (Kalyvas 2006: 146- 172).

There is a myriad of different explanations for the use of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants, which counterinsurgents have resorted to from time to time (Valentino et al. 2004: 375-376). There are those concentrating on the psychological aspects of the deed (Valentino et al. 2004: 376-377); the tendency (of the counterinsurgent) to terrorize non-combatants (Azam & Hoeffler 2002: 482), and those involving racist ideologies

“government control of the populace and area” by creating bases in the cleared area to identify, disrupt and eliminate “local insurgent leadership and infrastructure” (FM 3-24 2006: 5-18; 5-19 para 5-60); the third element is the final stage of winning “the populace’s support” through protection of the populace in the area coupled with economic, social and cultural projects (FM 3-24 2006: 5-18; 5-20; 5-21). 51

(Kalyvas 2006). But fundamentally the underlying characteristic of the use of indiscriminate violence in COIN lies in the failure to appropriately identify the ‘guilty’ (namely, the insurgent) and accordingly employing such violence widely, including against non- combatants associated with them. The rational calculus of the logic involved here is that the ‘innocent’—in order to stop the violence—will try to influence the ‘guilty’ to change their behavior, or the ‘guilty’ will have to alter their strategy when the source of their support/strength (the civilian population) is lost to them after the exposure to violence (Kalyvas 2006: 150; Lyall 2009: 336-338).62

Notwithstanding this, and despite its occasional success in suppressing insurgencies, the practice of indiscriminate violence as an overall approach to COIN today remains off limits for liberal democracies. Such states are sensitive to domestic and international public opinion and the possible ethical objections of their own military personnel (Merom 2003: 48- 80). Violent practices as outlined above usually incur devastating political effects for counterinsurgent forces—especially if they are second-party (that is, expeditionary)—actors in the conflict (Arreguin-Toft 2005: 221-222). Indeed, for the purposes of this thesis, and in line with the ideas put forward by Kilcullen as to the differences between the enemy- and population-centric approaches, the understanding here is that the use of indiscriminate force will only ever fall within the enemy-centric approach. The current interpretation of the population-centric approach is that all of its tenets are geared to ‘winning over’ the population and, as such, means that involve their intimidation—such as the use of indiscriminate force— cannot be part of it. It should be noted that intentional indiscriminate violence, however, remains a tool of choice for authoritarian regimes (Byman 2016: 73-76).

Conclusion

The enemy-centric approach to COIN warfare consists of a number of different methods, all of which are focused on breaking the enemy’s capacity or will to resist. There are, as noted, two different ways in which an enemy-centric approach can be conceived of as

62 Though morally repugnant, the indiscriminate use of violence might not necessarily be strategically counterproductive. It can drive a wedge between the insurgent group and the population it relies upon, thus demonstrating that the former fails to protect the latter (Lyall 2009: 338). For a contrasting view, which claims that indiscriminate violence helps solve collective action problems for the insurgents, see, for instance, Popkin (1979), Wood (2003) and Kalyvas (2006). 52

applying to ‘small wars’. The first rejects the notion of the peculiarity of small wars altogether, maintaining that ‘war is war’. The other recognizes the special category of ‘small wars’, but still suggests focusing on the enemy as a way of achieving political and strategic objectives. Overall, the enemy-centric approach—regardless of the lens used to view the conflict—can be said to stress the need to concentrate on the enemy through the conduct of offensive operations—such as ‘cordon-and-search’ and ‘search-and-destroy’—to either completely destroy the enemy force, ideally in a fixed battle, or to break its will to resist. In some cases, the approach can include military strategic objectives that fall short of physical destruction of the enemy force, such as holding territory or weakening potential allies, to name but a few. This depends on the result of the adversary assessment (Clausewitz 1976; Callwell 1996). While the adversary remains central to enemy-centric campaigns, there is no significant role assigned to winning the support of the population or to offer it protection.

Having conducted this review of the enemy-centric approach it is now possible to put forward a series of tenets that can be said to characterize this approach. Below is a list of core tenets pertaining to the enemy-centric approach. (Their nature will be expanded upon in the work of subsequent chapters):

• In philosophical terms, the counterinsurgency is viewed as a contest with an insurgent enemy force. It is thus principally military in nature. • Fundamentally, the emphasis is on gaining victory by destroying insurgent forces and their organization militarily or psychologically to undermine the enemy’s willingness to continue resistance. Thus, the main focus is on the insurgent forces and their organization (and not on the population in which they operate). The idea is that once the insurgent forces and organization are destroyed everything will ‘fall into place’ (Kilcullen 2007). Force is used primarily to destroy the enemy (and not to protect the population). Given that the aim is the destruction of the enemy, little care is taken when employing military force against the insurgents and there is a lack of discrimination (and minimum force is not used). • When seeking the control of territory, this is done in order to assist in the destruction of the enemy, not in the protection of the population. Military force is directed 53

towards denying the enemy force control of territory (but not with the aim of protecting the population). • There is little or no strategic regard for the grievances of populations. Little or no effort is made to gain support of the population or to protect it.

54

Chapter IV: The Population-centric approach to COIN

This chapter explores what constitutes a population-centric approach in counterinsurgency warfare. I trace the origins of the approach and explain how it has changed and evolved over time. In the process I draw out tenets which characterize the contemporary version of this approach, in order to be able to juxtapose them against the tenets of the enemy- centric approach. These tenets will then be used in examining the case studies in this research. It is a given that this approach has its focus on winning over the population in which the insurgent operates, not on destroying the enemy insurgent. As an approach it has proved attractive, not merely from a humanitarian perspective, but also because in many COIN practitioners’ eyes it is seen as more effective in achieving political and strategic ends than the enemy-centric approach. Of course, while the two approaches to COIN discussed here differ in several ways, this is not to say that are mutually exclusive. Indeed, in some COIN scenarios tenets of both can be present. This will be demonstrated in the case studies that will be considered in the chapters that follow (Chapters V, VI and VII).

Historical background of the population-centric approach

The Population-centric approach in Europe and in colonial wars from the 17th century onward

Perhaps the first mention of what might be seen as a population-centric approach to the conduct of what are now called COIN operations can be traced back to the 17th century writings of the Spaniard Álvaro Navia-Osorio y Vigil, the third Marques Santa Cruz de Marcenado (Santa Cruz hereafter).63 In his book Reflexiones Militares (Military Reflections) written in 1727, Santa Cruz offered not only general advice on generalship, but also on how to deal with ‘rebellions’64, or insurgencies to use the contemporary term (Santa Cruz de Marcenado/Marzenado 1727; Heuser 2010b: 126-127).65 His suggestions on how to deal with such rebellions may be seen as ‘light touch’, especially compared to some of those which

63 Despite the extensive discussions and guidelines contained in his work, Santa Cruz’s writings are mostly forgotten (Heuser 2010b) with the only English translation first appearing in 1737 (entitled Reflections, Military and Political: Interspersed with Moral and Historical Observations), according to Fernandéz García (2015: 82- 83; 91). 64 The Spanish words Santa Cruz uses are ‘rebelión’, ‘sublevación’ (uprising, revolt), ‘amotinados’ (riot, rebellious, revolting) and ‘motín’ (rebellion, riot). Translations are those of the author. 65 There exist two different version of the name depending on the year of printing. 55

were put forward in later centuries. Santa Cruz advised, first, to try to win over the revolt- prone population before a real insurgency would erupt (Book VIII, Chapter XXVII). This could be done, for instance, through the resettlement of dissatisfied segments of the population to other parts of the country, disarming suspected rebels (Book VIII, Chapter XXXIX, 152-157), or enlisting potential rebels into the army (Book VIII, Chapter XXXII; XXXIII). In the latter two cases, this would separate potential aggressors from the villagers susceptible to rebellion. Only if there is no hope for conciliation should rebel leaders be arrested. If even that proves unsuccessful and an insurrection has started, efforts should be made, contended Santa Cruz, to ensure it does not spread to other provinces, and to attempt to capture some of the insurgents and to punish them publicly (Book VIII, Chapter XXXI, 114pp). This would eliminate the driving force of the uprising and deter the population from supporting the cause. If the counterinsurgent is too weak, Santa Cruz reasoned, he should win time by forcing negotiations and use deception to conceal his weaknesses (Santa Cruz de Marcenado/Marzenado 1727: Book VIII, Chapter XVI; Chapter XVII 325-332; Chapter XXXI; Chapter XXXXV).66 In other words, the resort to violence should take place only when more peaceful means of conciliation have been exhausted (and only when, Santa Cruz crucially points out, the counterinsurgent is certain to secure victory and has probability of success).67

Santa Cruz’s suggestions on dealing with a population closely resemble the benign maxims which strategic thinkers like Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi Minh, writing from the insurgents’ perspective, would arrive at during the 20th century (Mao 1937/1989: 92; Heuser 2010a: 430).68 Santa Cruz also had an emphasis on the need to operate within the rule of law, and his focus upon the humane treatment of both the population and the insurgents alike

66 English translation available in Heuser (2010b: 138-140). This assumption is made once the insurrection has started. Santa Cruz de Marcenado also discusses different methods of detecting rebellious villages and how to treat them before they can start an insurrection. For instance, he suggests recruiting the men under suspicion into the army or disarming them and resettling them, thus robbing the budding insurgency of its main impetus (cf. Vol. III, Book VIII, Chapters XXXIII- XXXV). 67 Santa Cruz’s line of thinking is very similar to that of another, even earlier, Spanish military theorist, Bernardino de Mendoza, who wrote in his Theorica y Practica de Guerra [Theory and Practice of War] (1596) that while insurgencies had to be eradicated as soon as possible, any pacification campaigns should be approached with both justice and clemency. 68 These maxims included, for instance, respect for (local) laws and customs which were essential for guerrillas to survive among the people (cf. Mao 1937/1989: 92-93). 56

arguably reflects the so-called ‘hearts and minds’ approach to be found centuries later in the works of military theorists such as David Galula and Robert Thompson (1966)69 (see below).

Unlike many more contemporary writings on COIN (e.g., those of Galula, Trinquier and Kitson—see below), Santa Cruz’s approach is grand strategic—fit not only for a commander but also for a political ruler—in that it combines both military and diplomatic means to suppress insurrections. At the heart of Santa Cruz’s approach is the foundational philosophy that the government should always act benevolently, ensuring the wellbeing of its subjects through, for example, economic means (Book VIII, Chapter XIV, XV). While this approach could be seen as reflecting a display of humanity rare for the era in which Santa Cruz was writing, it must be mentioned that these writings were linked—to a large extent— to the suppression of domestic (i.e., first-party) uprisings in which Spanish soldiers would be dealing with fellow Spaniards. And while the majority of Santa Cruz’s recommendations for averting an insurrection are largely concentrated on the operational level, what is more central to his oeuvre is the implicit focus on the population, indicating the author’s humanitarian inclination and preference for strategies of accommodation. Herein lies one of the defining features of the population-centric approach as we will see later: a focus on winning over the population through non-military means wherever possible.

The views of this early Spanish writer, with his advocacy of what might be seen as a population-centric approach, did not exactly establish a pattern. By the 19th century, another kind of COIN thinking that concentrated on the population began to emerge, this time in the context of the French colonial war in Algeria (1830-1852). While the focus here was also on the population, the method advocated by the French strongly differed from that of Santa Cruz in that it employed direct coercion and control measures directed at the indigenous Algerian people. This was not the ‘population-centric approach’ that we understand today. This French view was most significantly espoused by Marshal Thomas Robert Bugeaud (Rid 2009; 2010; Porch 2013). During his time in Algeria (from 1836 to 1847) Bugeaud pursued a combination of direct coercion mostly through razzias (or raids) and population control measures through such means as proposed by the bureaux arabes. Razzia refers to a tactic used in mobile desert warfare consisting of a swift and overwhelming surprise-raid to seize livestock and other

69 Operating within the rule of law is one of Thompson’s core principles. 57

goods, in which there would be only minimal (if any) loss of life. The origin of this word comes from the Arab word ghaziya. This tactic is known to have been employed by the Bedouin tribesmen and replicated by Bugeaud (Rid 2009: 618-619). Bureaux arabes, in contrast, were organizations created to address socioeconomic needs and to understand the local political terrain as well as to gather intelligence on the enemy for the conduct of razzias (Sullivan 1985: 151-154; Rid 2009: 618-619; 621-626; 2010: 731-743; Porch 1986b: 380- 381; 2013: 16-29; 31; De Durand 2010: 12-13). Bugeaud sought to elevate ‘petty war’70 into its own category of warfare (Porch 2013: 18-19), something that, as noted, Callwell would try to achieve half a century later (see Chapter III). For Bugeaud, the most important aspects in conduct of colonial warfare were, as summed up by Porch, “mobility, morale, leadership and firepower” (Porch 2013: 20; see also Rid 2009: 624).71 For him, speed and flexibility of small formations (flying columns), with less reliance upon conventional maneuvers designed for the continental theatre, were paramount for countering the rebels. For the reason that the enemy had neither capital cities nor tangible assets it was important to destroy what he valued most in terms of support, i.e., his crops and his villages, thus depriving him of food, shelter and resources (Sullivan 1985: 151; Rid 2009). This approach could be described as a strategy of ‘scorched earth’. This kind of brutality was hardly imaginable on the European continent at that time; however, Bugeaud’s ‘petty war’ warriors considered their enemy to be uncivilized savages, whom they fought in a correspondent manner (Porch 2013: 21). No effort was made to engage, moreover, in acts of benevolence that might win over the population and attract elements of it to provide intelligence against the insurgents which could, for instance, increase the effect of the razzias. Intelligence, if it was gained, tended to

70 Petty War is taken from the German concept of ‘Kleiner Krieg’ or ‘Kleinkrieg’ translated ‘small war’) used by Clausewitz. See Chapter III. 71 Similar suggestions are made by another French practitioner serving in Algeria in 1836-37 in Oran, namely, Georges Nicolas Marc Baron de Létang in his book entitled Ways to Ensure French Rule in Algeria [Des moyens d'assurer la domination française en Algérie] published in 1840. Létang (1840: 40-41) reasoned that it was crucial to show the Arabs the strengths and power of the French: “…we would demonstrate to them force and power” [nous ferions preuve à leurs yeux de force et de puissance]. He believed that the prime way to pacify the Arabs was through the use of force (Létang 1840: 61): “Conciliatory measures alone would not suffice to rally the Arabs. Force will be used to reach this goal.” [Des mesures conciliatrices ne suffiront pas seules pour rallier à nous les Arabes. – La force devra donc être employée pour arriver à ce résultat]. Chapter IV of Létang’s book is dedicated to this discussion (although Létang did not advocate targeting the population). Translations are those of the author. 58

be through the employment of harsher measures (cf. Finch 2013: 52-53). 72 Bugeaud’s ‘population-centric’ method stands in stark contrast to that of Santa Cruz.

However, the end of the 19th century saw a change to this practice. Ideas related to the violent subjugation of the population in counterinsurgent campaigns gave way to a sense that it could be co-opted to help defeat the insurgents. A true benignly oriented ‘population- centric approach’ now emerged. The French thinkers and practitioners, Joseph Galléini and his disciple Hubert Lyautey (Finch 2013), refined this population-centric approach in the colonial context. A new overarching method —tache d’huile (oil spot)—was advocated. It has been referred to as a “Revolution in Colonial Military Affairs” by Christopher Griffin and resembles what is today called the ‘clear-hold-build’ approach (Griffin 2009: 23-25; 35- 36; Rid 2010: 750). This oil spot method was defined by the use of a ‘gridding’ technique in the first phase of pacification, whereby the ‘infected’ region would be divided into various sectors and in each of these the army would construct a network of strong outposts. Mobile columns could stream out from the outposts to hunt down the insurgents. Simultaneously, the army would advance as an ‘organization on the march’ and spread infrastructural and socio-economic development to those regions besieged by insurgents, in order to win over the native population. Additionally, the army would interact with indigenous populations in order to gain a better understanding of their ethnic and religious identities—a practice reminiscent of Bugeaud’s bureaux arabe. Later, tribesmen from these populations would be recruited to form armed units73 and to engage in intelligence gathering. The authority of the colonial power would spread across the region—from pacified regions to rebellious ones— like an oil spot, until the insurgency would be eradicated completely (Galliéni 1908: 45, 47; 324-327; Ellis 1985: 125-147; De Durand 2010: 13-14; Sitaraman 2013: 168). This method was put into practice in Tonkin, Madagascar and Morocco during the period stretching from 1890 to 1925 (Griffin 2009: 2-3; Finch 2013: 117-168).74 It would be resurrected by David

72 It should be noted that in the long run, Bugeaud understood that force cannot subdue the Arabs. He believed that ‘trade’ would be a way for a long-lasting peace in Algeria: “…it is the trade that will subjugate the Arabs…” […c’est le commerce qui soumettra les Arabes…] (Bugeaud 1842: 110). 73 These units were similar to the village defense programs in 20th century COIN campaigns, such as in Malaya and Vietnam. 74 It should be noted that the success of the oil spot approach proved to be transient, failing for instance during the conquest of Morocco, commencing with Lyautey’s arrival in 1903 and forcing him after several years to return to the old and tried method of Bugeaud’s razzia (Scham 1970; Hoisington 1995; Bimberg 1999: 1-26; 59

Galula in the early 1960s, becoming one of the major strands of the French counterinsurgency (or counter-subversion) school (Reis 2014: 54). This operational method—which presents another tenet of this approach—places the population at center-stage whereby the counterinsurgent’s task is not only to protect it but also to understand both the population and the whole cultural context of the operational theatre.

The population-centric approach in the 20th century and beyond

The population-centric approach also came to be evident in early US thinking about COIN. It is important to process-trace American thinking in regard to COIN as this will lead directly on to the formation of the seminal FM 3-24 (2006). In the US military, despite the numerous clashes with Native Americans in the 19th century,75 there was no explicit doctrine for counterinsurgency (or counter-guerrilla warfare, to use the terminology characteristic of the time period) until the publication of the USMC Small Wars Manual (1940). The Marine Corps operated abroad in such ‘small wars’, mostly in the Caribbean and Central America. However, before 1940, several authors had already tried to capture the importance of such operations and their best practice. In 1910, the US Army’s Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bullard, had stressed in his article “Military Pacification” the shift of the role of a soldier (or marine) as ‘war-maker’ to his role as ‘peacemaker’ and ‘peace-preserver’, which at the time of writing had remained a largely neglected area of military study (Bullard 1910: 1-2). Bullard (1910: 3) urged that the subject of ‘pacification’ be taken seriously. He based his opinion on a study of two cases: the US pacification campaigns in the Philippines and in Cuba. In the Philippines, in particular, the US military fought a long and brutal war, the Philippine-American War (1899-1902) (Linn 2000; Feuer 2002; Bert 2011: 55-70; Einolf 2014: 61-77). While the US military, supported by non-Tagalog militias,76 won the war, many atrocities had been committed along the way. For instance, Einolf (2014: 37; 63-64) stresses that the US Army employed various torture methods (“primarily beating and slow hanging,

De Durand 2010: 15; Porch 1986b: 391-398; 2013: 53). For a more detail account of the conquest, see Porch (1986a). 75 For instance, the Creek War (1812-1814), the First Seminole War (1817-1818), the Second Seminole War (1835-1842), the Cherokee War (1839) and the Third Seminole War (1855-1858) (Owsley Jr. 1981; Axelrod 2003: 186-188; 189-191; 196-204; Knetsch 2003; Moore 2006: 261-288). 76 The insurgency was led by Emilio Aguinaldo who belonged to the Tagalog people originating from central Luzon. The US therefore recruited inhabitants belonging to other indigenous groups hostile to the Tagalog to fight on its side. 60

and also… techniques of water torture”) to gain intelligence on the adversary—even if the official policy prohibited torture. Other misconduct included looting and massacres, for example on the island of Samar in the fall of 1901 (cf. Cosmas 1971; Bradford 1993: 153- 155; Linn 2000: 306; Barnett 2010: 11-59; 61; Einolf 2014: 38-39; 80-82). In sum, the conduct in the Philippines was anything but population-centric (in its contemporary understanding). Bullard (1910) felt that the use of such methods was not the best way to achieve success. He raised the question of ‘pacification’. He stressed that the aim of such operations should be to avoid alienating local populations and instead try to address their grievances, win their allegiance and gain their consent to be governed. This would be done, he noted, through “our use of persuasion” for this could not be achieved by the use of force because “we refuse to regard [the consent obtained by the use of force] as consent at all” (Bullard 1910: 5).

In 1920, Colonel Harry Alexander Smith, another US Army officer, published a book entitled Military Government in which he argued that the emphasis in counter-guerilla warfare should be on “the psychology of three peoples”. By this he meant the psychology of the domestic population of the intervening government (i.e., the US); the population of the occupied territory and what he called “the neutrals of the world” (7-8). In essence, Smith recognized the importance of ‘the people’, in particular those in the occupied territory. He was of the view that success in such operations, however, relied not only on winning over indigenous populations but also ‘populations’ elsewhere. Public support—both domestic and foreign—would be of great benefit. Smith (1920: 80) also argued that military actors should not try to “Anglo-Saxonize what cannot be Anglo-Saxonized”. By this, he meant that counterinsurgents (emphasizing American and British) should respect the laws and norms of indigenous actors. In other words, the intervening force should be wary of utilizing tactics based on its own domestic customs and laws. In modern parlance, they should be more ‘culturally aware’. From the above, it is thus possible to note the development of what can be seen as the overriding philosophy of the population-centric approach (in its contemporary manifestation): the fact that attempts should be made to win over the indigenous population.

While Bullard and Smith laid the foundations for the adoption of the population-centric approach in the US military, arguably the most influential articulation of a specific doctrine 61

based on this approach was that offered by Major Earl H. Ellis, USMC, in 1921. Ellis advocated a position which clearly reflects what is understood today as ‘population-centric’ thinking. His article, “Bush Brigades” (1921), which appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, arguably established the normative foundations for the whole population-centric COIN approach as we currently understand it. 77 In giving a very structured description of the difficulties that a US expeditionary force might encounter, Ellis showed a clear understanding of the complexity of small wars. He (2015: 19) suggested an operational approach (which he called a ‘strategy’) designed to deal with guerrillas/insurgents. It would consist of initially securing important sea ports on first landing in an area beset by insurgents (to ‘lock’ the country) and then, importantly, “establish[ing] a line of fortified posts in the interior to cover production areas [and to] steady the … population”.78 Ellis showed that he was aware of the importance of the population for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. He pointed out the need to prevent the creation of any antipathy on the part of local populations towards the intervening forces. Collateral damage, for instance, was to be avoided when operating in a city: “[t]he use of artillery in street fighting against a small nation enemy should be carefully considered” (Ellis 2015: 21). It was the same in rural areas: “artillery should”, he said, “be used with extreme care on account of endangering the lives of helpless innocents”. Mobile columns, displaying discernment, were to be used to pursue insurgents in clearing operations that would allow for the establishment of fortified posts. In a contemporary setting, Ellis’s proposals would be again akin to the ‘clear, hold, build’ operational approach. As Mao (1989: 108-111) would stress some decades later, Ellis (2015: 24) also identified that “[t]he enemy will operate in his own territory, among his own people, and every habitation will be a base of supply.” These factors serve as a force multiplier for an enemy who will himself be unlikely to show restraint in dealing with the local population. Indeed, Ellis (2015: 24) posited that the insurgent “will know no rule of war—he will assassinate, ambush and disperse, and repeat it until destroyed.” Such insurgents would not follow the long- established laws of warfare and would not treat indigenous populations well. While noting the fact that there were no written rules for warfare between regular forces and irregular

77 Arguably, crafters of the USMC Small Wars Manual (1940) will have noted Ellis’ work (Friedman 2015: 15- 16). 78 In certain aspects, Ellis’ insight echo those made by the British Colonel Charles E. Callwell whose work was discussed in the section dedicated to the enemy-centric approach. 62

guerrillas, this did not mean, according to Ellis (2015: 26), that the regular forces should act in the same way: they should exhibit restraint. Ellis criticized specific measures used by other nations in “wars which are not wars”, such as the killing of innocent individuals, destruction of their property, and the burning of whole villages that support the enemy, etc. In contrast to the views expressed by the British Colonel Callwell in his Small Wars—who was not opposed to the above measures should the circumstances require it (see Chapter III)—Ellis stressed that such measures should be avoided at all costs. He maintained that they would only turn the indigenous population against the counterinsurgent and they would lose their ‘friendship’. He warned “That the friendship of the people of any occupied nation should be forfeited by the adoption of any unnecessarily harsh measures is avowedly contrary to the policy of the United States” (Ellis 2015: 27). “[I]t would seem, therefore”, he went on, “that the proper method would be to [only] kill or wound the individuals actually in arms…” (Ellis 2015: 27). Ellis, recognizing what had happened in the Philippines, contended that unnecessarily harsh measures would undermine the very ideals of the United States, and therefore have an adverse strategic effect, alienating not just the indigenous population but also, and most notably, the domestic US population as well.

Here, we can see another tenet of the population-centric approach taking root. This is the idea that, in modern parlance, the insurgent can be separated from his support—can be won over—if the right measures are used.

In this particular effort to win over populations, one factor is crucial— discrimination. Here we can identify another tenet of the population-centric approach—discrimination in the use of force where there is a conscious desire to avoid civilian casualties among local populations. In this regard, Ellis (2015: 28-29) also addresses the issue of legitimacy. If the counterinsurgent forces act in a restrained manner towards the population then (when combined with other measures such as propaganda campaigns) they will gain both the trust and respect of that population and they will thus more likely be treated as the legitimate authority. The counterinsurgent forces have to show that they were using their power to maintain and/or enforce law and order with discrimination and in line with humanitarian considerations. In line with this, Ellis suggested the setting up of a provost service, which 63

would, for instance, include a military court system and would stress that the rule of law was being maintained, as would the nature of the fighting action itself.

Similarly, Major Harold H. Utley, USMC—whose thinking in 1931 clearly influenced the development of the US Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940—put a great emphasis on the need in expeditionary operations to avoid killing non-combatants, destroying their property, and forcibly relocating them. He argued that such actions would turn the indigenous population against the expeditionary forces, stating that “[t]he great disadvantage in the application of these [coercive] measures … lies in the fact that their application will probably exasperate the people as a whole against us…” (Utley 1931: 51). Fundamentally, Utley echoed the principles laid down by Ellis.79

The work of these early French and American theorists who, in COIN campaigns, emphasized gaining the support of indigenous populations rather than on destroying the enemy, was built upon by later writers. The French analyst David Galula (1964/2006b: 63), an influential champion of the population-centric school, is noted for his famous apothegm that “revolutionary war is only 20 percent military action and 80 percent political”. Galula recognized that political purpose should be the main driver of military action. There should be more tools employed—at the grand strategic level—than the military alone (Galula 2006b: 66). In COIN missions, asserted Galula, “[P]olitics becomes an active instrument of operation (italics in the original)” (2006b: 5). Everything the counterinsurgent does militarily has political implications and vice versa. Therefore, “[the] essence [of a counterrevolutionary war] can be summed up in a single sentence: Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward” (Galula 2006b: 95).80 In other words, Galula was an advocate of a bottom-up approach to counterinsurgency (Reis 2014: 49-53) that is contingent upon the support of the population. Such support could only be achieved through the implementation of the aforementioned oil spot method (Galula 2006b: 11-12; 55-70).81 Galula’s approach

79 Utley quoted Lt. Col. Ellis in his article. 80 While Galula advocated the primacy of politics it is worth noting that his understanding of political action was dissimilar to Clausewitz’s. As M.L.R. Smith and David Jones (2015: 22) argue, the “political action” which Galula stressed was perceived as an alternative non-violent measure to combat insurgencies rather than a guiding principle “that lead actors to do what they do”. 81 For criticisms of Galula’s approach, most notably his emphasis on population control, see Reis (2014) and Porch (2014: 179). 64

would later be reflected in FM 3-24 (Alderson 2008: 38).

Others who expressed similar thoughts—emphasizing the central role of the government in COIN campaigns—were the later British writers and practitioners, Robert Thompson (1966), Julian Paget (1967) and Frank Kitson (1971). For Thompson (1966/2005: 58), for instance, the primary goal was to determine a political aim which should be established by a well-functioning government structure. He argued that “[w]ithout a reasonably efficient government machine, no programmes or projects, in the context of counter-insurgency, will produce the desired results” (Thompson 2005: 51). The government must have a “clear political aim” (Thompson 2005: 50) and “an overall plan” that includes “all political, economic, administrative, police and other measures…” along with the military ones (Thompson 2005: 55). 82 Paget (1967: 16) stressed the need for a civil-military understanding, thus departing from a purely operational focus: “Campaigns to defeat insurgents”, he wrote, “require a considerable effort by the Government and the Armed Forces…”. Similarly, Kitson (1971: 49) suggests that the main aim of the government in COIN campaigns is to “…regain if necessary and then retain the allegiance of the population…”. Among these British COIN analysts there was a clear recognition of the role of the government in establishing a legitimate authority that would draw local populations to that government and away— separated—from the insurgent. The insurgent would thus lose support.

There are debates to be had, of course, as to the actual nature of the population- centric approach. This has come out, for instance, in discussions of the way it was employed during the Malayan Emergency which some academics do not view as population-centric at all (Strachan 2007; Bennett 2009; Dixon 2009; Hack 2009a; 2009b; 2012; Mumford 2012a)83, and over whether thinkers like Bugeaud should be considered to belong to the population- centric school despite the fact that his adherents advocated treating the population coercively and as a means to an end (Porch 2013: 51). It appears there is a discord between what the

82 See also, Thompson (2005: 50-58). 83 For instance, Mumford (2012a) argues that the campaign was not the exemplar it is thought to be. Hack (2009a; 2009b; 2012) also stresses atrocities committed during the Malayan Emergency which would contradict the views of Nagl (2002) and (Aylwin-Foster 2005) as far as the epitomic status of the campaign is concerned.

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theories called for and what was implemented in practice. This having been said, it is important to note that this thesis is concerned with the nature of the population-centric approach as it is established in FM 3-24 and other current US doctrine. It is worth noting that the contemporary view of the population-centric approach, as reflected in this US doctrine, takes as given the idea that counterinsurgency should be population-friendly. There is a perception now that this is an approach geared towards protection of the population rather than using the population simply as a means—a tool—to help wear down the enemy.

The population-centric approach in current US doctrine

The works of the likes of Galula are, as already noted, reflected in current US military publications related to COIN, most notably the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (FM 3-24). According to FM 3-24 (2006: 1-1) an insurgency is “an organized, protracted politico- military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government”. By this account, insurgents seek to deprive a government of legitimacy by gaining legitimacy themselves in the eyes of the local populace. Therefore, the main battle between insurgents and counterinsurgents is, as noted, a struggle for legitimacy. From this reasoning it is possible to deduce that the ‘population’ becomes the central element in an insurgency. This is actually spelled out in Joint Publication JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations (2013) (2013: x). Under ‘Approach to Counterinsurgency’ it is stated that: “The joint force needs to adapt approaches based on the following considerations: political control, the population-centric nature of COIN, assessing relevant actors, and understanding the OE [Operational Environment]” (emphasis added).

According to FM 3-24, the majority of a population in question will be passive while two minorities will either be supporting the insurgent or the counterinsurgent (FM 3-24 2006: 1-20, para 1-108). The crucial task of the counterinsurgent is therefore to win over that passive majority using “a combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations” (FM 3-24 2006: 1-19).84

84 Stability operations refer to military operations conducted “in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, 66

Other official US doctrinal statements also reflect the population-centric line of thinking expressed in FM 3-24. The US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), for instance, stresses that:

the intent of a COIN campaign is to build popular support for a government while marginalizing the insurgents: it is therefore fundamentally an armed political competition with the insurgents (12). (emphasis added)

Similarly, Joint Publication JP 3-07, Stability Operations (2011) emphasizes the ‘mixed’ nature of (population-centric) COIN, i.e., the need for the integration of military and civilian efforts required to counter an insurgency, while simultaneously addressing underlying (popular) grievances. This implies that stability operations are central to COIN; they contribute to the ‘build’ pillar of the aforementioned ‘clear, hold, build’ approach (JP 3- 07 2011: vii). JP 3-24 (2013) echoes this assertion, contrasting population-centric COIN measures with force-on-force operations and explaining what ‘success’ looks like: “[i]n COIN success means that the population assents to be governed by the [Host Nation] government and the insurgents have either reconciled through a peaceful political process or suffered a total military defeat” (JP 3-24 2013: I-2). This definition of success in COIN, therefore, points out two possible ways of reaching the desired end-state, i.e., through reconciliation or through inflicting military defeat, although there may be some blurring of the lines between the two approaches in question.85 This issue will be addressed in due course.

This discussion highlights the foundational tenet of the population-centric approach. This is that in COIN warfare the contest between insurgent and counterinsurgent should be viewed as predominantly a political struggle rather than simply a military one.

Definitions of the contemporary population-centric approach

Arguably the most high-profile contemporary academic and practitioner in the current debate over the nature of the population-centric approach is, as I have noted, the Australian

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (ADPR 3-07 2012: 1-1). See also FM 3-07 (2008: viii). 85 It should be noted that such reasoning, however attractive, is fallacious given that a military defeat will not always bring about the achievement of the political end-state in question, as the case of Vietnam demonstrates (Gray 2010: 247-249). This issue will be explored in more detail in chapter IX. 67

soldier-scholar David Kilcullen. He was the first to make a distinction between the named approaches: the population-centric and enemy-centric (Kilcullen 2007). He describes the population-centric approach as ‘countervalue’ in nature (i.e., targeting an enemy’s ability to resist) rather than being ‘counterforce’ in nature (i.e., with a focus on the destruction of the enemy’s actual forces). This ‘countervalue’ (military) strategy is based on “attacking the popular support base or trying to remove the grievance leading to the insurgency” (Kilcullen 2010: 94). In essence, it is about “control over the population, and the environment (physical, human and informational)” (Kilcullen 2007).

The center of gravity (CoG) in the population-centric approach, explains Kilcullen, is relocated from the enemy to the populace (Kilcullen 2010: 144). This means that force can only be used against the insurgents with great restraint, bearing in mind that the overall goal is to win the support of the population. Civilian casualties need to be kept to a minimum in order to preserve the legitimacy of the (expeditionary and indigenous) COIN forces. The real battle is for the so-called hearts and minds of the population, and there must therefore be a focus on the ‘build’ aspect, on measures which capture those hearts and minds and which draw the population away—separate it from—the insurgents. These measures will include the likes of socio-economic reforms; addressing grievances and employing ideological influences, such as propaganda campaigns. (Kilcullen 2005: 603; 2009: xv; Cohen, Horvath, Nagl 2006: 51-52). This is what makes this approach especially appealing for democracies.

Peter Thompson (2014: 96) explains the contemporary population-centric approach in a similar fashion. He states that good COIN practice requires the military (i.e., the expeditionary counterinsurgents) to ally themselves with local forces and populations, with the aim of protecting and winning over that population. This strategy can be carried out through such means as reconstruction projects, to increase the host nation’s capabilities and thereby help establish legitimacy. In other words, eliminating grievances and establishing legitimacy rather than killing the insurgents should be the normative underpinning of the population-centric approach, according to Thompson. His work is archetypically reflective of current thinking about population-centric COIN.

Given the views presented here, the population-centric approach may therefore be defined as an approach that focuses on winning over the allegiance of a population by offering 68

it protection by using force discriminately in order to restore the government’s legitimacy and the armed forces of that government, both expeditionary and indigenous. Once the grievances are addressed and the population is protected the insurgency loses momentum because it is separated from its sympathizers given that its cause is deprived of appeal.

The population-centric approach in summary

Overall, while there are certain distinctions evident in the understanding of the population-centric approach in various academic writings, in current official US documents there seems to be a consensus as to what population-centric COIN should constitute. Despite the fact that this approach seems to be based on the perhaps sanitized colonial pseudo- theories on how to conduct COIN, the contemporary understanding, at least in theory, is different from that envisaged by thinkers like Galula. Let us briefly return to the point made at the beginning of this section, namely that the population-centric approach locates the counterinsurgent’s prime focus on winning over the population, while the killing and capturing of insurgents is an important, but secondary, element.

From an analytical perspective, this particular distinction—based on ‘focus’— between the two approaches is rather unhelpful, because the population-centric approach— as broadly understood—does not really specify how the population is to be treated (cf. Sitaraman 2012: 6). It merely states that it should be the focus or the CoG. For example, punitive measures applied to civilians to prevent them from supporting insurgents can still be seen to fall under what might be looked upon as the population-centric approach. Similarly, the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in putting down rebellions throughout history can also be judged to be a population-centric measure since the population would be a target. It is thus understandable why Douglas Porch (2013: 50-51) considers Bugeaud—who did not shy away from harsh counter-population methods such as razzias— as the father of the ‘population-centric’ approach. In the contemporary era, though, and working off FM 3-24, anything population-centric has to be taken to be synonymous with measures that preclude the punitive; or, to coin a phrase, with ‘winning hearts and minds’. This, as demonstrated above, has been clearly expressed in official documents published by the US Department of Defense; and especially in the principal COIN doctrine of FM 3-24. 69

Although the population-centric approach can in principle be said to involve the use of coercive measures against populations, for the purposes of this work here it will be taken to be non-coercive in nature and thus be in line with contemporary norms guiding the application of the population-centric approach.

Having now set such a parameter and developed a fundamental difference between the enemy-centric and population-centric approaches, it is possible now to established a series of tenets that can be said to characterize these two approaches. They can now be compared and contrasted in tabular form.

Table 4.1 below provides an overview of the two approaches. It is a heavily modified version of a table originally proposed by Peter Kiss (2014: 197).

Enemy-centric Population-centric

In philosophical terms, the In philosophical terms, the counterinsurgency is viewed as a contest counterinsurgency is viewed as a contest of with an insurgent enemy force. It is thus governance. It is thus principally political in principally military in nature. nature.

Fundamentally, emphasis is on gaining Fundamentally, emphasis is on gaining victory by destroying insurgent forces victory by ‘winning over’ population militarily or psychologically to undermine

the enemy’s willingness to continue resistance

Force is used primarily to destroy the Force is used primarily to separate the enemy. insurgent from his base of support (i.e., the population).

The primary objective is the defeat of the The primary objective is establishing the insurgent forces and the destruction of their government’s legitimacy through protection organization. of the population.

Given that the primary objective is to defeat Given that the primary objective is 70

the enemy little care is taken when establishing the government’s legitimacy employing military force against the and hence to win over the population, insurgents. Discrimination might be minimum/discriminate force is used against lacking. insurgents to avoid alienating the population.

There is little or no regard for the Population support is garnered through the grievances of populations. Little or no reduction of grievances (i.e., addressing the effort is made to gain population support. root causes of the insurgency, using propaganda/ ‘hearts and minds’).

Hoped-for result: Once the insurgent forces Hoped-for result: Protected population will and organization are destroyed everything throw its support behind the HN government will fall into place. and therefore restore the latter’s legitimacy.

Table 4.1: Tenets of the enemy- and population-centric approaches

Conclusion

In summary, in this chapter I have outlined the historical evolution of the two prevalent current approaches to counterinsurgency campaigns, and highlighted the main areas of difference between them. Further, I have constructed an analytical framework which will be used to evaluate the forthcoming case studies in terms of determining the prevalent approach to COIN favored by the first-party actors involved in these cases.

The first approach considered—the enemy-centric approach—reflects the classical approach that is normally utilized in wars against regular adversaries, that is, states. The main focus of the enemy-centric approach is the physical and/or moral destruction of the enemy fighting force. This approach, given that it has been transferred to ‘unconventional wars’ from ‘conventional wars’, sees any collateral damage effecting civilian populations as, at best, a necessary evil. The centers of gravity are the enemy’s military and/or psychological capabilities to continue fighting. These must be destroyed in order to the achieve the counterinsurgent’s political and strategic aims. As briefly alluded to, this approach can be manifested through different strategies such as annihilation, attrition, decapitation, denial and the like. This will be addressed further in chapter IX. 71

The population-centric approach, in contrast, is fairly ‘new’, with the first clear proponents emerging in the 17th century in Europe. Despite its newcomer status, the population-centric approach has emerged as the approach of choice for the West’s counterinsurgency wars of the 21st century, most notably those fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. The attractiveness of this approach is two-fold. First, given its explicit emphasis on the population, i.e., on the need to win over and protect the key population in order to establish the host-nation government’s legitimacy, this approach came to be considered as more suitable for democracies to employ when embarking upon expeditionary campaigns. The second reason for a such preference is conceptual. It lies in the fact that ‘unconventional wars’ have been elevated to a category of their own and therefore required an approach different from that used in state-on-state wars (cf. Jones & Smith 2015: 36). The third reason lies in empirical evidence that has been taken to show that the population-centric approach can and did work. In this regard, the campaigns of Malaya and Algeria have received a lot of attention in an attempt to highlight what works and what does not. The population-centric approach is considered to have proven to be successful in the Malayan campaign (albeit the population-centric nature of the approach used in Malaya remains debated), whereas the Algerian campaign demonstrates that an approach not focused on protecting the population can lead to a disastrous defeat of the counterinsurgent. Looking at the two cases, one can make a hypothetical deduction that the population-centric approach is a more promising solution to COIN. This makes it more attractive for military organizations to emulate. The advice from writers such as Galula, Kitson and Thompson was distilled into FM 3-24, with its heavy emphasis on the population-centric approach, and which serves as a blueprint for COIN operations by both US and Western forces more generally in the contemporary era.

Having established an understanding of the enemy- and population-centric approaches and an analytical framework, in the chapters to follow I focus on the first-party counterinsurgency campaigns in Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka in order to examine how indigenous actors conduct COIN.

72

Chapter V: Counterinsurgency in Peru

Introduction In this chapter I analyze the Peruvian COIN campaign against the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), which lasted from 1980 to 1992 This is done in order to evaluate how the Peruvian state managed to defeat this particular insurgency. Here the Peruvian government dealt with a Marxist-Leninist insurgency that drew heavily upon Mao’s principles. This case study contains some valuable lessons for the conduct of COIN operations, especially in light of the fact that, as will be discussed, the government did not receive any significant support from other international actors.86 In order to contextualize the campaign, in what follows I begin by examining the historical context and roots of the insurgency. The strategic and operational approaches of the insurgents are also covered in detail. Together this provides context for understanding the Peruvian state’s responses at different stages of the campaign, and also provides a more complete picture of the adversarial interaction during the campaign. Finally, I discuss what factors contributed to the defeat of SL, looking not only at the changes undertaken by the counterinsurgent but also taking into account mistakes made by the insurgents.

Historical Background

This section looks at the variety of factors which contributed, to greater or lesser degree, to the rise of Sendero Luminoso (SL). While there have been a number of attempts to capture the complexity of international, national and even personal aspects87 of this conflict, there seems to be no consensus on which factors prevailed in terms of the initial success of SL as an insurgent group. Here I offer a brief outline of those that have been postulated.

86 The Maoist paradigm of revolutionary war might see itself outdated when trying to analyze contemporary insurgent groups (such as Taliban, Al Qaeda and Islamic State) that have moved beyond hierarchical and centralized organizational structures (Beckstrom & Brafman 2006; Metz 2007: 12-31; 2012; Schmidt 2010; Freeman 2014). These have adopted a different modus operandi (given the broadened choice of tools in the technological realm) (Black 2016: 233-237) with their goals changing from the more ‘restrained’ (e.g., the overthrow of a government or formation of an independent state) to ambitiously global (e.g., dominance on a global scale) (cf. Kilcullen 2005; 2009; 2010; 2013). Notwithstanding these changes, there are still valuable lessons which can be extracted from a study of past campaigns. 87 In terms of ‘personal’, see the work, for instance, of Santiago Roncagliolo (2012: 38-39; 58) in regard to his analysis of Abimael Guzmán’s life and personality. 73

The last few decades of the Cold War had a profound ideological and geopolitical effect on Latin American countries. The international climate was such that many Latin American countries (including Cuba, Guatemala, and El Salvador) experienced a mushrooming of leftist guerrilla movements (see Armstrong & Shenk 1982; Warren 1998; Wickham-Crowley 2001; Wood 2003; Regalado 2006).88 Peru was no different. Since its independence from Spain in 1824, the nature of politics in Peru has been characterized by a major divide between pre-Colombian Indian (or Quechua) dissidents and the ruling elite descended from Spanish settlers—both pure and mestizos (mixed blood) (cf. Palmer 1986: 140-141). In 1960, both power and the majority of land ownership still remained in the hands of a small minority, while the majority of the population of Indian descent remained poor and confined mostly to isolated mountainous regions (Marks 1996: 257; Lumbreras 2008: 522-528). Peru’s challenging geography, particularly its portion of the Amazon jungle (amounting to 50 percent of its territory) and the Andean mountain range, exacerbated the divide between, for the most part, the rich urban elite and rural indigenous poor. The remote and physically inaccessible regions were difficult to govern (Marallano 2008: 7-36).89 As James Kiras (2013: 177-178) reminds us, such geographical conditions are ideal for insurgent movements, enabling them to exploit difficult terrain to compensate for their military inferiority vis-à-vis state forces. Economically, since the 1940s US commercial enterprises have taken advantage of Peru’s natural resources and have contributed to the country’s industrialization and development. This link, however, has created social tensions, and by the 1960s there was a common perception among many non-elite Peruvians—most notably during the periods of military government—that there was an unhealthy dependence upon the US (cf. Clayton 1999: 209-224; 254). Despite these sentiments however, Peru’s economy continued to flourish until 1976 when it experienced a significant downturn. With economic development came an increasing trend in migration from the countryside to cities like Lima in the 1960s and 1970s, where there were more opportunities for individual benefit (Palmer 1986: 130-131). The wealth disparities created between urban

88 For examples of El Salvador, see Armstrong and Shenk (1982) and Wood (2003). For examples of the Guatemalan case, see Warren (1998). For a general overview, see Wickham-Crowley (2001: 132-181) and Regalado (2006). 89 Certain regions in the mountains had not even been mapped. 74

and poorer rural areas increased the divided nature of Peruvian society. Such disparities, alongside the perceived negative sentiments to foreign (US) influence, developed advantageous conditions for insurgent movements to emerge. In fact, by 1965, there were two insurgencies in the Andean region, namely the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria or MIR) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional or ELN). Both were inspired by the Cuban Revolution of 1962 (cf. Kruijt 2002: 55; Walter 2010: 68-72). These insurgencies were eventually ruthlessly suppressed by Peruvian military by 1965. The ensuing turmoil created the conditions for the military coup of 1968 led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado (Walter 2010: 70). Alvarado was succeeded by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez who held control in Peru from 1975 to 1980. In 1980, however, Peru returned to a civilian democratic government headed by Fernando Belaúnde Terry (a former civilian president). This period of democratic rule lasted until 1992 until Alberto Fujimori’s ‘self-coup’ (i.e., the situation in which the legally elected head of state dissolves or renders powerless the national legislature in order to take complete control over the state).90

After General Alvarado’s coup of 1968, the new Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces nationalized industries and introduced and undertook sweeping agrarian reforms (1968-1980). The latter focused mainly on efforts at land redistribution which transferred large landholdings to peasant91 control (Clayton 1999: 208-209; Heilman 2010: 149). The new policies were aimed at eradicating poverty and preventing new guerrilla movements from arising (Kruijt 2002: 55-56). However, as Cynthia McClintock (1989: 49) argues, these reforms resulted in little of the hoped-for social and economic impact, and instead had significant and unforeseen political consequences, particularly in the growth of the political left. More specifically, these reforms rendered a segment of the nation’s peasantry vulnerable due to the structural dislocations caused by the ending of the hacienda system. Hacienda refers to the institutional arrangement that had formerly linked the

90 Although Palmer (1986: 130-132) argues that there were a number of conditions to defuse revolutionary movements, i.e., economic growth, return to democracy, eased restrictions on voting, legitimization of leftish parties and growth of trade unions, he still felt that the SL insurgency was inevitable. 91 The words ‘peasant’ (campesino) and ‘peasantry’ (campesinos) are used in the original sources and the English scholarship on Peru and thus, will be adopted here. 75

landowners with their peasant communities and which provided the peasants with a large degree of economic security. Despite the advent of the Belaúnde government in 1980, these links were not restored or replaced with a similar structure. This economic and societal dislocation created the basis for a good deal of support for the ensuing SL insurgency which was to break out in May 1980 (cf. Mason & Schwartzfager 1989: 523-526).

Beginning of the SL insurgency: origins, goals, strategies and tactics

Sendero Luminoso’s rise and ideological underpinnings

SL originated at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in the city of Ayacucho in the Ayacucho Department in 1968, and continued to grow in 1970s. Ayacucho, at that time, was ideal for the early stages of SL development. It was one of the most remote regions of Peru and traditionally had suffered from weak governmental control, extreme poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment. It had a significant majority of indigenous Indians (cf. McClintock 1989; Kruijt 2002: 56-57; Heilman 2010: 150). 92 The aforementioned agrarian reforms undertaken during the period of military rule actually only added to the region’s already extant problems.

The main aim of SL was to overthrow the government and replace it with a “nationalistic”, “Indian” and “popular” democracy. Its leader was Abimael Guzmán. He was a university professor who used his position to teach the communist theory thereby laying the foundations of a communist movement which later evolved into a vicious insurgency. Guzmán (1988) described his movement’s ideology as “Marxist-Leninist-Maoist”. SL’s ideological roots reached back to the founder of the first Peruvian Communist Party93 in the 1920s, José Carlos Mariátegui.94 He believed that the basis for Peruvian socialism lay in the peasant—Quechua—community (as in Mao’s teachings), rather than in the proletariat (as in those of Marx and Lenin) (cf. Comité Central del PCP 1970; 1978; Manwaring 1995: 158; CVR 2003: Tomo II, 16-18; Roncagliolo 2012: 33). The main basis of Quechua discontent

92 The situation in Ayacucho province had only been marginally affected by political reforms of the 1960. See Marks (1996). 93 The Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) bore the same name as the Communist party created by Guzmán, thus, Sendero’s party acronym was named PCP-SL to differentiate itself. 94 José Carlos Mariátegui was the most influential socialist thinker of the 20th century in Peru (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 16). For more information on Mariátegui’s thought, see Marchena Fernández (1988). 76

was that their communal system had been destroyed by Spanish conquest and later suppressed by neo-colonial rule from the capital, Lima.95 Hence, SL was heavily influenced by the Maoist theory of people’s war, envisioning a revolution commencing in the countryside and carried out through a prolonged popular war underpinned by peasant support, which would culminate in an encirclement and takeover of the cities (McClintock 1989: 51; CVR 2003: Tomo II, 14).96 Guzmán intended to launch a campaign to establish a state apparatus that would collectivize both property and the means of production (Partido Comunista del Perú 1988). In 1962, plans were laid for SL to establish a political wing, a military wing (i.e., a guerrilla army) and a support mechanism. In the 1960s and 1970s Guzmán established what might be seen as an “intellectual base”, operating from the University of San Cristobál de Huamanga. From here SL’s message spread initially to the surrounding areas of the city of Ayacucho encompassing isolated local villages. What might be termed as the ‘social base’ was built up in the Ayacucho region (department) more generally. This region had not witnessed protests by the Quechua community against land seizure in the 1960s and 1970s, unlike other regions in the Peruvian Andes. Instead, at that time opposition to government policies centered on a movement of students and university professors (Castillo 1974; Degregori 1990). Even though in the Ayacucho Department there was an overall political climate that was left-leaning, there were no political movements as such. This vacuum enabled SL to easily indoctrinate the rural populace with its particular ideology (Degregori 1991: 16-18).

In the 1970s—during the first stage—Guzmán sought to establish a connection with the peasantry through an indoctrination process and using his position at the University de Huamanga. This indoctrination process proceeded as below:

95 In La Guerra de los Tenientes, Claudio Montolla Marallano (2008) depicts a clear cleavage existing between the urban areas and the isolated mountain villages (Quechua community). 96 For SL, the peasantry would be the main force (fuerza principal) while the proletariat would be the directing force (fuerza dirigente). See also, “the Second Meeting of the Central Committee”, [II Pleno del Comite Central], Sol Rojo (May 1991). 77

University Professors University Students

Rural Teachers

School Students

Peasantry

Chart 5.1: SL’s mechanism to reach out to peasantry97

This indoctrination was achieved through the use of radical university students, the majority being from among the Quechua communities, who—once fluent in Guzmán’s theory—took up teaching positions in villages to educate the rural population. Provision of schooling, medical services, and even intermarrying between the revolutionary students and peasants further helped SL establish strongholds in the Andean highlands (Palmer 1986: 28; Wickham-Crowley 1992: 218; Kruijt 2002: 57; CVR 2003: Tomo II; Fishel, Manwaring 2006: 117). Guzmán’s indoctrination and recruitment strategy to spread the message and to gain popular support can be compared to Kilcullen’s (2009: 35) description of what he calls the ‘infection’ stage of insurgency; albeit in a version devoid yet of violence.

The initial non-violent preparatory phase was designed to establish a strong support base for SL (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 218; Degregori 1990; Rochlin 2003: 77; Roncagliolo 2012). Through these efforts, SL’s membership rose from a dozen in 1970 to 520 in 1980 and to 2,782 by 1990 (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 14). In March 1977, during the Second National Meeting of the PCP-SL (La II Reunión Nacional de Organismos Generados), the decision was made to take the initiative and to commence a popular war (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 22). However, despite its indoctrination efforts, by the end of 1970s SL enjoyed only marginal support in the Ayacucho Department.

This situation changed once the decision was taken in 1980 to shift the strategy to one of armed ‘persuasion’. This new strategy included the use of threats, intimidation and

97 This chart is a reproduction of the chart offered by la Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Peru [The Peruvian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation] (2006: Tomo II, 20). The Commission was established in 2001 in order to investigate human rights abuses committed during the 1980s and 1990s. 78

selective killings (Kruijt 2002: 58-60). But it was not until 1983, when the Armed Forces took control of the Ayacucho Department which was SL’s stronghold at that time, that SL benefitted from a considerable boost in support from the rural population in the northern provinces of Ayacucho. Preparations thus began to take over the provincial capital, Ayacucho (Degregori 1990; 1991).

Sendero Luminoso’s Organizational Structure

Before discussing SL’s strategic and tactical approaches, it is important to examine its organizational structure. The nature of SL’s structure—as a revolutionary party with a guerrilla army and support mechanisms—represents a feature of its strategic thinking. According to Guzmán, it was the organization—not so much its operations—that played the central role in achieving the desired end-state (Manwaring 1995: 159). Power was concentrated in what was called the Central Committee, and, above all, in Guzmán himself (la cúpula). This concentration of power was both a strength and a weakness, eventually leading to SL’s demise in 1992, after Guzmán’s capture (Rochlin 2003: 77). The organization had a top-down centralized hierarchical structure divided into cells. These cells formed the basis of a network of provincial and local committees, with military and operational planning taking place at the local level, though the general strategic objective was determined by Guzmán. This decentralization enabled SL to retain significant flexibility (Kruijt 2002: 60-61; Marks & Palmer 2005: 97-98). 79

La cúpula: Politburo and the Central Committee

Popular Guerrilla Party Committee for Army consisting of each of six regions regional, subregional and subregions and local forces

Sectorial organizations under A clandestine network Sympathizers and command of the of party cells activists Revolutionary Front

Figure 5.1: Sendero’s Organizational Structure; based on Manwaring (1995: 159-160) SL thus had a very rigid, hierarchical structure with Guzmán being the sole policy and strategy maker (as depicted in Figure 5.1). Given such power concentration there could be no alternative to the strategic template put forward by Guzmán, which as shown below, did not always work. Additionally, once Guzmán was captured, the organization lost its raison d’être and, thus, its ability to pursue the desired end-state. In the following section, I discuss SL’s strategic approach employed against the Peruvian state during its armed struggle.

Sendero Luminoso’s Strategic Approach

To reach its ultimate goal of overthrowing the state, SL enacted a long-term strategy consisting of five-stages (in contrast to Mao’s three-stages) (see Mao 1989: 20-26). The stages of SL’s strategy were: • Convert underdeveloped areas into solid bases of support • Take the offensive by attacking bourgeois state symbols and revisionist elements • Spread violence and escalate into a guerrilla war, including to urban areas • Seize territory and expand the number of support bases • Ultimately isolate the cities, including Lima, in order to bring about a total breakdown of the state (Palmer 1986: 129) 80

By the end of 1970s, after having gained enough supporters, SL planned to initiate an actual ‘people’s war’ (as mentioned earlier). This part of the strategy was, however, to be somewhat different from that advocated by Mao98 in that SL would be in full control of its units (a cell structure) given its centralized, iron-fist, top-down rule. Such an approach was not without strategic errors. Above all, unlike Mao who saw the need to use violence with finesse so as to win the support from the masses, SL did not shy away from using indiscriminate violence, terrorism and coercion. This, in the long run, came to undermine the popular support the insurgents sought to generate (Degregori 1996: 194-204; Rochlin 2003: 75-78). SL’s second stage, involving taking the strategic offensive, commenced with SL carrying out its most symbolic attack. This was on May 17 1980, the eve of the Presidential elections, in the town of Chuschi, Ayacucho. Eleven ballot boxes were burned as a symbolic gesture, signifying the commencement of the armed struggle. This attack demonstrated SL’s opposition to the state and representative democracy, and above all, marked the beginning of the people’s war. (Kruijt 2002: 57; CVR 2003: Tomo II, 29).99 SL’s ‘armed struggle’ approach at this stage was clearly expressed by Guzmán during the VI Plenum of the Central Committee of PCP-SL on September 8, 1981. He emphasized that attacks that had recently been carried out in Quinua (a town in the Ayacucho Department) were “part of a broader series of armed attacks against Yankee imperialism, the main foreign exploiter of our working class, and the servile government of Belaúnde and his rampant repression and false democracy” (PCP 1981).100 SL was launching its series of violent attacks on what they saw as symbols of the bourgeoisie—especially public figures, public buildings and US targets—to show their opposition to the state and to convince the populace that the state was unable to maintain a monopoly of violence (Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 118). The third stage of SL’s strategy—guerrilla warfare—commenced in March 1982 with a campaign of general violence spread across the northern provinces of Ayacucho. The event that marked the beginning of this stage was an attack on the Ayacucho prison (in the city of Ayacucho) on March 2, 1982, which resulted in the release of all of its prisoners (Fishel &

98 In Mao’s version, subordinate units would have full local control rather than being under central command of the military hierarchy. 99 Despite SL’s effort, the elections took place nonetheless. 100 Author’s translation. See Partido Comunista del Perú (Sept 8 1981). 81

Manwaring 2006: 119). In addition to demonstrating the state’s inability to provide security, the attack was also conducted to obtain weapons to arm the guerrillas in order to be able to launch a full-scale people’s war. In December 1982, SL attacked the electric grid, leaving Lima and other cities in complete darkness. This was a profound way of demonstrating SL’s power. 101 On the same day, Guzmán officially formed his Ejército Guerrillero Popular (People’s Guerrilla Army) (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 58). In light of these events, a state of emergency was declared in May 1983 in five provinces of the Ayacucho Department, enabling the Peruvian armed forces—las Fuerzas Armadas (FFAA)—to take the administrative control of the area (Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 118; CVR 2003: Tomo II, 29). In turn, SL increased the scale of its attacks, expanding from Ayacucho to other regions of Peru in a move consistent with the group’s second and third stages. Subsequently, thirteen other departments were declared to be under a state of emergency in the southern part of Peru.102 SL came under pressure. By end of 1983, for instance, SL was forced to move to the Upper Huallaga Valley in the Huallaga Province (located in San Martín Department in the northern part of Peru). At first, it had tried to enforce prohibitionist policies which outlawed drugs, thus alienating the majority of cocaleros (coca farmers), who were nonetheless opposed to the government due to the threat it presented to the cocaine trade. By 1985, however, the insurgents changed their strategy to offering protection for cocaleros instead. By 1986, SL was in full control of the Upper Huallaga Valley and profiting from the drug economy. SL imposed a 5 percent tax on coca paste exported by traffickers to Colombia, which generated profits amounting to $30 million a year. It became the “middleman” between the cocaleros and the traffickers, thus gaining more money (Felbab-Brown 2010: 41-42). This involvement in the illicit drug enabled SL to expand its military capabilities, enabling procurement of modern weapons such as M-60 machine guns and FAL automatic rifles. Additionally, the group was able to pay high (up to $1,000 per month) salaries to its guerrillas (common salaries ranged between $20 to $500 per month). This, in turn, increased

101 From 1980 to 1985 attacks on electricity grids would gradually increase. There were 9 attacks in 1980 and some 107 in 1985 (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 58). 102 By 1984 seventeen provinces were understate of emergency regulations. 82

the number of attacks SL was able to mount, as shown in Table 5.1, as well as the number of casualties they were able to cause (Felbab-Brown 2010: 43-44).

Number of political violence attacks

3000 2802 2549 2489 2500 2050 2000 1760 1500 1123 891 1000 715

500 219

0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Table 5.1: Number of Political Violence Attacks (DESCO 1989)103 The declaration of the state of emergency by the Peruvian government was not enough to prevent SL from progressing to its fourth stage. This was to seize control of more territory and to expand its base of support into other departments of the Andean highlands,104 to the east of the Andean region and into more northern departments—essentially omitting only the coastal region and the most northern areas and cities. This was intended to lead to the isolation of the major cities as per SL’s fifth stage of the revolution. However, at this stage, the insurgents did not seek to win the hearts and minds of the population given that it was considered too early to start that phase of the strategy. Its five- stage program was not complete given that in order to take the cities SL needed to consolidate its grip of its rural strongholds (Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 118-119). Overall, SL was moving towards its fifth and final stage—initiating collapse of the government—as outlined earlier. By now, SL was increasing its levels of “terrorist” 105 activity and sabotage (especially in the Andean Highlands departments), while maintaining a light logistical footprint and reinforcing its bases of operations. The underlying idea was

103 The chart was created from the data available in DESCO (1989: 24). 104 These were Junín, Pasco, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Cuzco and Puno. 105 To reach its objective, SL was ready to pay any price, as was stated in February 1982 by the Central Committee of PCP-SL (1982): “Somos combatientes y sabemos que la lucha armada demanda su cuata de sangre” [We are fighters and we know that an armed struggle presupposes its toll of blood] (author’s translation).] This attitude would negatively impact the popular support for SL. 83

consolidation until an attack on the isolated ‘center’ could be launched (Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 119). During the first Congress of PCP-SL (which took place at some point between 1988 and 1989), SL proclaimed that it would enter its ‘strategic equilibrium’, i.e., it would allow for a shift from conducting a guerrilla war to one of movement involving SL paramilitary forces, which would conduct a more organized offensive. This new phase would begin by May 1991 (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 71-72). However, despite this and other signs that SL was going to win its popular war, Guzmán’s capture in September 1992 brought the entire strategy to a halt (Stern 1998: 20-21). In sum then, and looking back, SL’s actual goal was to undermine what was perceived to be the main center of gravity of the opponent—the government’s legitimacy. SL wanted to show that it had more right to be the state authority. The methodology it actually employed in seeking such an outcome is the subject of the next section.

Sendero Luminoso’s Operational and Tactical Approaches

Operationally, SL was on the offensive by 1987. The group relied on “armed” persuasion to expand its political, military and support components. This included attacks on state infrastructure, police forces, and symbols of central government and foreign imperialism, with the purpose of convincing the Peruvian people that SL had both the power and the right to rule the country (Kruijt 2002: 58-59; Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 119-120). At the same time, the insurgents avoided direct confrontations with the FFAA. They used displays of force to create a deceptive perception of SL’s power through carefully orchestrated operations (such as assassinations, abductions, attacks on electrical power grids, and attacks on jails). SL’s focus was on attacking the base of state power, i.e., the non- indigenous non-Quechua minority who compromised the governing elite (Kruijt 2002; Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 120). Until the late 1980s when SL did engage in more organized actions using its paramilitary forces, it employed an approach consisting of offensive and defensive actions. It drew on its flexibly structured network of uniformed guerrilla columns (see below) as well as civilian-attired formations who, unlike the guerrillas, lacked a complex hierarchical structure. A commander (el Comandante—either male or female) would control a small, 84

versatile, ideologically loyal, and highly motivated unit. Such a basic cell106 would have the support of local sympathizers and already operating guerrilla groups, and would recruit further members from ‘liberated’ regions of the Andean Highlands departments and metropolitan slum areas. A secondary support structure consisted of sympathetic professionals—lawyers, doctors, etc.—and students (Manwaring 1995: 159-160; Kruijt 2002: 61). SL’s operational approach can itself be broken down into phases. First, its armed columns organized zones of operations (zonas de operaciones) and carried out attacks in these zones to kill state representatives, priests and even some wealthier peasants. The idea was to create a power vacuum. This power vacuum would then be filled by SL personnel to create a perception of restored order. When the police would try to reintroduce government control in these areas, they would compete with SL in what were known, in SL terms, as guerrilla zones (zonas guerrilleras). In a classic Maoist scenario, if the police advanced then SL would retreat; if police held a position, then SL would harass it; and if the police retreated, then the area vacated would become a support-base for SL to expand its influence and control. Thus, in the envisaged final phase, these support-bases (bases de apoyo) would act as launch-pads for new operations, until a point would be reached where, ultimately, SL would control the entire territory of the state of Peru (Roncagliolo 2012: 101). SL primarily employed small units with political, psychological and military objectives to undermine the government’s credibility and creating freedom of movement for SL actions. SL’s tactically independent regional units had centralized command but with decentralized execution (Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 121). Overall, SL activity was focused on what they perceived to be the main center of gravity, the government’s legitimacy, predominantly employing terrorism and sabotage while at the same time avoiding direct confrontations with the FFAA.

106 According to Kruijt (2002: 61), the hard core of SL amounted to approximately 3.000 to 7.000 persons by 1992. Other sources argue that SL numbers did not surpass 5.000 (Manwaring 1995). 85

Peruvian Counterinsurgency from 1980-1989

Overview of the Peruvian campaign against SL

Three different governments under presidents Belaúnde (1980-85), García (1985- 1990) and Fujimori (1990-2000)) confronted the SL threat. Despite the fact that the FFAA had shown themselves capable of defeating uprisings during previous decades,107 by the 1980s various factors—most notably the civil-military divide and the divide within the military itself—greatly hampered the government’s ability to design an overarching grand strategic approach which undermined the overall effectiveness of Peruvian COIN. Moreover, a lack of preparation for and understanding of the threat, along with various constraints108 experienced by the FFAA (see below), coupled with economic downturns and a lack of support from external actors such as the Soviet Union and the United States, further aggravated the situation for the Peruvian authorities. Throughout the whole COIN campaign against SL, the approach was predominantly enemy-centric (including strategies such as annihilation, attrition and decapitation). Only a few population-centric measures were applied—both in grand strategic and in military strategic terms—as discussed below. Despite the aforementioned factors which hindered effective COIN activities, the Peruvian authorities did actually manage to neutralize the SL threat. And once Guzman was captured then they could claim actual victory. The following sections describe how the state dealt with the different phases of the Peruvian COIN campaign against SL, in order to illustrate which strategies were used and what effects they yielded.

Government response: 1980-1985

Taken by surprise by the outbreak of the insurgency in 1980, the government was quick to dismiss SL as a band of criminals and cattle rustlers (“pobres abigeos”),109 which would eventually dissolve. Indeed, at the outset, the then President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985) was reluctant to use the FFAA to handle the threat due to his distrust of the

107 The FFAA successfully suppressed MIR and ELN during the 1960s. 108 These constraints included government distrust, lack of an overarching grand strategy and doctrinal guidance as well as disagreements regarding the approach to be adopted within the FFAA. 109 As in the case of the Shining Path, President Belaúnde dismissed the guerrillas as ‘cattle rustlers’. See Walter (2010). 86

military in light of the coup d’état of October 3 1968. The FFAA was still staffed by the generals who had served in the military government of General Velasco in the 1970s (Tapia 1997: 23; Obando 1998: 376-380; Kruijt 2002: 57-58; Montesinos 2009: 39).110 To avoid granting the FFAA too much power, Belaúnde tasked the police with restoring order. However, the police were ill prepared to tackle an insurgent foe and made little appreciable progress. Indeed, the police did no more than become the first provider of (captured) of arms to SL (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 99-100; 176). Only when the threat from SL increased did President Belaúnde agree to launch a campaign to defeat the insurgents using military means. By 1982, Belaúnde had declared emergency rule in the Department of Ayacucho (CVR 2003: Tomo II; Kruijt 2002: 61). In 1983, troops were deployed to restore control of the area. However, the campaign was flawed. First, given all the instruments of statecraft available Belaúnde used only the military; he ignored other important tools (e.g., economic, social, diplomatic). This behavior led to a vacuum on the grand strategic level. Perhaps, one of the most damaging aspects was the state of civil-military relations, or lack thereof given the reputation of the FFAA. Mutual distrust meant that there was no bridge between the military and its civilian masters, which only exacerbated the grand strategic void. In emergency rule areas—which would amount to 60 by 1990—the FFAA assumed a governing role. While political authority was given to the FFAA by the President, no restrictions were placed upon this authority. Additionally, the FFAA was fully responsible for crafting military strategies, which were formulated in the absence of any dialogue with, or oversight from, the FFAA’s nominal civilian controllers (Mauceri 1991: 90-91). In military strategic and operational terms, the Army’s intelligence capabilities were ineffective throughout the 1980s. The underlying reason for this was the existence of a plethora of ‘anti-terrorist’ (intelligence) units located in different branches of the FFAA and the police leading to both poor coordination and, above all, a strong inter-agency rivalry (cf. Taylor 1998: 46). Moreover, the infamous history of the intelligence services’ implication in the excesses of Velasco’s rule and their use to control political parties led to an additional degree distrust (among policy makers, especially Belaúnde). Additionally, the military

110 Moreover, during the Morales Bermúdez military rule (1975-1980) all documents related to SL were destroyed (Montesinos 2009: 40). For more information on the military government see, for instance, Cleaves and Pease (1985: 233-270). 87

(including the intelligence services—Servicios de Inteligencia Nacional, abbr. SIN) was dependent upon Soviet support (which had been supplied from 1972 until 1989) in terms of both equipment and doctrine but the Soviets were unwilling to support a COIN effort against a leftist group. And anyway, the Soviets had no doctrinal guidance in terms of COIN to offer (cf. McClintock 2000; Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 121).111 In sum, the FFAA were initially ineffective against SL. In the absence of an understanding of SL’s strategy, tactics, and personnel, and without any real knowledge of how to conduct COIN operations, the Army, much like the police, was ill-equipped to deal with the insurgents. The approach adopted was clumsy. Above all, there were no strategic planning, no attempts to win the support of the population in affected regions and little effort was made to avoid human rights violations (Coronel 1996: 29-116). The FFAA’s main problem, however, was the lack of backing from the government given the aforementioned rift in civil-military relations (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 251). The situation was further exacerbated by internal power struggles within both the military and the police and between these two institutions (Gorrití Ellenbogen 1990: 71-76).112 As for doctrine, the FFAA was relying on two US Army anti-subversion manuals written in the 1950s, which were not fit for addressing the SL insurgency. Without appropriate doctrine, it was difficult for troops to coordinate their activities across the various operational areas. This lack of coordination was exacerbated by the lack of an overarching grand strategy. Individual military commanders (in Ayacucho and later in other emergency zones in the Andes) thus tended to operate on their own initiative (Kruijt 2002: 62). As a consequence, the FFAA resorted to conventional war-fighting techniques, namely annihilation (see Chapter IX). It applied large scale and indiscriminative use of force, resulting in over 7,500 deaths (insurgent and civilian alike) in the period from 1983 to 1984. This led to an enormous displacement of civilians, and, in turn, to a striking increase in the number of SL sympathizers and members (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 54; Marks & Palmer 2005: 99). This brutal approach highlighted the long-standing issue of the divide between the indigenous Quechua population and the white and mestizo urban communities. As Tapia

111 The Soviet military could not create COIN doctrine because it would—supposedly—never have to face insurgents given the fact that Moscow was a friend of the world’s dispossessed, not an enemy. 112 For instance, the Air Force refused to provide the police with helicopters. See Gorrití Ellenbogen (1990). 88

(1997: 27-43) describes, both the Sinchis (a special anti-subversion police battalion 113 operating in Ayacucho) and the military were dominated by racist attitudes which triggered high levels of violence against the indigenous peoples. SL exploited the situation by using such actions as a recruiting tool to gain adherents and reinforce its position in the region. The military had adopted what amounted to a ‘scorched earth’ approach. President Belaúnde initially gave the FFAA only 60 days to eradicate the threat, after the police’s failure to do so. The general FFAA attitude was expressed by General Luis Cisneros, a Minister of War (1981 to 1983), in his criticism of the measures then being adopted by the police force: “They [the police] should start killing SL members and non-SL people, because this is the only way to ensure success” (author’s translation) (quoted in Gonzales 1982: 50).114 In other words, there was no attempt to win over the population in the affected region. Notwithstanding, the Army achieved some early successes in Ayacucho. The effects, however, were actually counterproductive in the long run as by end of 1983 SL cells were forced to move into the Upper Huallaga Valley, the biggest plantation area for coca leaves. This became an advantage for the guerrillas (as explained above). General Adrián Huamán Centeno, the military commander of the Ayacucho Department, attempted to convince the government to initiate regional economic projects— in essence, population-centric measures identical to those suggested by Galléini and Lyautey and Thompson—and to place these under his supervision. Huamán crossed a critical line by effectively criticizing the government’s approach and thereby becoming involved in the political realm. In the aftermath of Peru’s 1980 return to a civilian government, this was taboo for a FFAA officer (Mauceri 1991: 93-94; Kruijt 2002: 62). His request was not only declined, but Huamán himself was then replaced by someone who returned to what were termed the “usual proceedings” (la política “normal” de destrucción y “desapareciones” en masa de los sospechosos [the ‘normal’ policy of destruction and mass disappearances of the suspects]) (Kruijt 2002: 62)): i.e., the use of overwhelming and brutal force. The FFAA’s approach was also not without other critics. However, the advocates of a more refined ‘political-military’ approach were associated with the former military government and, given the political climate, they had little credibility (Fishel & Manwaring

113 Sinchis were trained by the CIA and used to suppress insurgencies in the 1960s. 114 The original quote states: “…[las FFPP] tendrían que comenzar a matar senderistas y no senderistas, porque esa es la única forma como podrían asegurarse el éxito.” See Gonzales (Nov-Dec 1982). 89

2006: 121). Overall, the FFAA approach from 1982 to 1985 was largely ineffective due mostly to its lack of proper doctrinal guidance and accurate intelligence (Taylor 1998; CVR 2003: Tomo II) as well as the absence of a clear grand strategic framework, including a healthy civil-military dialogue, which would have helped the FFAA formulate appropriate military strategies. The general aim was to defeat SL as quickly as possible by gaining territorial control (see Finel 2010; Chapter III) through force of arms. Moreover, in its efforts to clear the areas with a heavy SL presence—the so-called zonas rojas (red areas)—the FFAA mistakenly assumed the presence of a homogenous support base for SL in these areas. In fact, the contrary was generally true as, more often than not as noted, SL maintained its ‘support’ through coercion and intimidation rather than persuasion. This misunderstanding resulted in gross human rights violations being carried out by the FFAA. The FFAA’s indiscriminate use of force drove a wedge between the indigenous communities and the state, thereby playing right into the hands of SL.

García’s and the FFAA’s approaches to COIN

In 1985, a left-wing, social-democratic party Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Party or APRA) won the Peruvian elections and Alan García Pérez became President. In military terms, this led to a shift in COIN approach. It became more refined. It now consisted of three main components: efforts to protect key political figures; measures to protect the population from the insurgents (akin to those suggested by USMC Small Wars Manual and FM 3-24); and operations to engage SL on the battlefield. Moreover, in political terms—and perhaps more importantly—the government approach, at the grand strategic level, now included a number of economic measures designed to improve the government’s legitimacy in the Andean highlands (G. McCormick 1990: 31). This strategy resembled what General Huamán had earlier demanded in Ayacucho (as discussed above), and came to be labeled as the “desarrollista (developmentalist) strategy”. This also included social and psychological elements (Mauceri 1991: 93; Taylor 1998: 45-46). García understood that the outbreak of insurgency was linked to economic underdevelopment. As such, these root causes needed to be addressed to win over the peasantry. He thus introduced a number of initiatives such as the Trapecio Andino (Andean Trapezoid) that provided peasants with interest-free loans and technical assistance from the Agriculture Ministry. Additionally, the President emphasized the need to respect 90

human rights and took concrete steps in that direction, such as dismissing military personnel, including, among others, the Politico-Military Chief of Ayacucho, Brigadier General Wilfredo Mori, who was held responsible for the killings of civilians (Rodríguez 1985). García’s overall approach closely resembled the contemporary population-centric approach as discussed in Chapter III.

This approach, however, was not implemented as designed. In practice the political and social aspects of the plan to counter SL were largely not implemented by the Peruvian government or were ineffective. The economic initiatives failed to live up to their promises since the government lacked the resources needed to improve the economic situation. Moreover, an economic downturn in Peru, accompanied by hyperinflation, eroded both government and military capabilities. In 1988, for instance, the Agrarian Bank was left without funds, triggering a cancellation of the Trapecio Andino project (G. McCormick 1990: 32; Mauceri 1991: 95-96).

The FFAA—being fully in charge of formulating military strategies—started to adjust its own approaches to COIN during García’s presidency given that its previous (conventional) approaches had failed to prevent the insurgency from spreading (Mauceri 1991: 94-95). From 1988 onward—when SL’s subversion of Lima intensified—the military approach to COIN witnessed an important change: the role of local military commanders was strengthened. More importantly, the military shifted away from a purely enemy-centric approach by successfully employing Rondas Campesinas (lit. ‘Peasant Patrols’ but more simply ‘militias’)—also known as los Comités de Autodefensa Civil (Civil Self-Defense Committees or CDC) or more simply as rondas—which were paramilitary units of villagers, operating in remote regions where the authority of the Peruvian state was little in evidence.115 Large sections of the effected population could now protect themselves from SL intimidation.

115 Earlier attempts (e.g., in 1983) to use these peasant self-defense committees or rondas proved futile due to the violent treatment of the peasants by the military and their overall lack, on the one hand, of understanding of internal rivalries of peasant communities and the lack, on the other hand, of legal and material state support for the rondas (Degregori 1996: 24-25; 27; Taylor 1998: 48; CVR 2003: Tomo II; 289). The reluctance to support rondas—especially during the 1980s—was a combination of fear that these could turn against the government and/or be infiltrated by the SL, and the general racist stance towards the indigenous peoples displayed by the military (Tapia 1997: 56). For more information on rondas campesinas, see Delgado Vásquez and Rodríguez Barboza (1985). 91

Unlike its purely enemy-centric and desarrollista counterparts employed earlier, the new approach leveraged the autonomy of the local political-military chiefs (Jefes Politico- Militar). These chiefs were members of the FFAA tasked with the governance of departments under emergency rule and in the crafting of strategies and the creation of village defense mechanisms in peasant communities. However, as Mauceri (1991: 98-99) explains, while this decentralization of military authority might have been useful to address specific local conditions in order to prevent popular support for insurgents, it also resulted in inconsistency and instability. Jefes Politico-Militares were rotated every year, some of whom adopted a more population-centric approach and others would return to pure enemy-centric measures. Nonetheless, García’s endorsement of the paramilitary rondas (Mauceri 1991: 101; Bazán Cerdán 2005: 7; Defensoría del Pueblo 2010: 21-22) coupled with peasants’ dissatisfaction with SL’s violent tactics helped increase the number of village guards across the country (Degregori 1996: 194-204).

The Strategic Shift of 1989: El Plan Politico Militar

By 1989, the military realized that there was an urgent need for a dramatic change. In light of the escalating SL threat and failing political measures, it started analyzing its previous experiences and updating its manuals. There emerged a recognition that to prevent any further spread of the insurgency there was a need for both a more refined military approach and, above all, for a healthier civil-military relationship (virtually non-existent during the Belaúnde and García presidencies) (Tapia 1997: 43-55; CVR 2003: Tomo III, 47-48). In August 1989 a new overall ‘COIN policy-cum-strategy’116 entitled el Plan Politico-Militar (The Political-Military Plan) was approved by the leadership of the FFAA. In developing this plan, the FFAA focused not only on the military dimension (discussed below) but also on the political one. This Plan required structural changes in the state apparatus and economic reforms in order to address, for instance, hyperinflation. It also served to regain international credibility, since it was acknowledged that Peru would find it difficult to continue its COIN operations without external support (especially economic and military aid from the US). More specifically, this plan envisaged a shadow military government—as to remedy the long-

116 This is considered to be a grand strategic approach. 92

standing civil-military discord—to enact the necessary reforms (on the grand strategic level) (CVR 2003: Tomo II: 221-223; Tomo III, 55-56).117 The Estrategia Integral

What made this new grand strategic Plan stand out was the introduction of the new military strategy, namely estrategia integral—what can be described as a ‘comprehensive strategy’—into the Plan. While emphasizing intelligence and psychological operations at the operational level, the strategy also sought to reduce human rights violations. It can be said that this new military ‘strategy’ was based on similar premises to those advocated by Kitson (in Chapter III).118

At the time of the Plan’s (and the estrategia’s) introduction in 1989, SL was becoming more and more indiscriminate in its application of violence. The FFAA, in contrast, sought to reduce human rights abuses and to use force more discriminately. In the theatre of operations, the estrategia integral made a clear distinction between “friendly villages” (poblaciones amigas), “neutral villages” (poblaciones neutrales) and “enemy villages” (poblaciones enemigas). The main objective was not to gain territorial control, but instead it was the elimination of SL’s structural core: its political-administrative organization (Organizaciones Político-Administrativas) centered on the popular committees (comités populares senderistas). The FFAA now started, for instance, to engage in targeted killings to eliminate high-value SL targets (CVR 2003: Tomo III, 57). Also important was the growth of FFAA organized self-defense committees, namely the rondas, which created a bridge between the FFAA and the peasantry. This improved the relationship between the two. Moreover, human rights violations decreased (although they did not disappear), because of more discriminate use of military force compared to the earlier stages of the campaign (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 253).

117 Subsequent to the development of the Plan and estrategia integral, a group of military officers and civilians started preparing a clandestine plan to initiate a coup in 1990 and to introduce a system of “managed democracy” (democracia dirigida)—this plan was, however, suspended given the rise of the candidature of Alberto Fujimori, whose political-economic vision was similar to that of the FFAA. The political-military plan sought to create a covert military government with strategic dominance not subject to political erosion, which would de facto govern the country hidden behind the officially elected government (CVR 2003: Tomo III, 55- 56). 118 Similar principles were espoused by a French Colonel Roger Trinquier whose work is beyond the limits of this thesis. See Trinquier (2006: 23-24; 27; 77; 83). 93

While the new strategy of the Political-Military Plan was seemingly having an effect against SL, the political ramifications of the Plan as overall were, however, far-reaching. It implied an attitude of disobedience by the military towards the civilian authorities (President García), as the latter’s power related to COIN was usurped by the FFAA towards the end of the 1980s. For the FFAA, democratic principles were considered a good that was subordinate to a higher goal, namely insurgent defeat (CVR 2003: Tomo II, 253). This ‘radical’ attitude could be explained by the way the system was operating during the Belaúnde and García years: a period of complete discord between political leaders and their military counterparts who maintained a degree of autonomy when it came to strategy formulation. This is an important facet of this Peruvian COIN campaign. This Plan developed—and partially implemented—by the FFAA implied that it had the right to determine, given the exigencies of war, the policies of the state in regard to the actions to be taken against SL. The military had arrogated to itself powers which were legally only within the purview of the civilian government.

1990 to 1992 and beyond: Fujimori’s approach

In 1990, the Peruvian government, and despite the improvements being made by the FFAA, was still under pressure due to the SL threat. That year Alberto Fujimori was elected president. Fujimori would become the key figure to turn the tide in the war against the insurgents. After assuming power, Fujimori, under the influence of Vladimiro Montesinos, the Chief of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), agreed to incorporate the Political- Military Plan of 1989, including the estrategia integral. Unlike the measures adopted in the 1980s, these seemingly ‘new’ measures (explained below) were more than just military- oriented. One of the first major changes was the increase of power of SIN within the structure of the national defense and national intelligence systems in 1990 (CVR 2003: Tomo III, 59). The same year, Fujimori initiated an economic ‘shock’ program to alleviate the root causes of the insurgency. In 1991, Fujimori brought the rondas under the command of the FFAA (Decreto Legislativo No. 740 and Decreto Legislativo No. 741) (Robles Mendoza 2002: 162- 167; Laos Fernandéz 2009: 36; Defensoría del Pueblo 2010: 21-24).119 This augmented the FFAA in its ability to outmaneuver SL in the battle for the peasants’ ‘hearts and minds’, and

119 Previously, the rondas were not formally a part of the armed forces. 94

thus helped, due to lack of popular support, push SL out of rural regions to the cities by the end of 1980s (cf. Del Pino 1993: 53; Starn 1998: 237-238). By the end of 1991, the rondas officially became a buffer zone between the FFAA and SL militants. They would, for instance, resist SL’s attacks until the arrival of the military forces (which could not be stationed in every remote village). This shift signaled the development of increased confidence on the part of the indigenous peasant population in both the President and the military. Above all, there emerged a certainty that the rondas would not align themselves with SL (Starn 1998: 232). However, by 1992, Fujimori’s legislative reforms met with opposition from the Congress.120 This led him seize ultimate power in his ‘self-coup’ (autogolpe) and to dissolve the government, becoming de-facto ‘dictator’. This enabled the president to continue his reforms in line with the Political-Military Plan, including his introduction of the Repentance Law in 1992 and the reform of the whole state security apparatus, which gave more power to the FFAA and SIN (explained below).

The combination of these measures started to show some positive results. The first two years of the 1990s were crucial in neutralizing the SL threat prior to the capture of Guzmán in 1992 and its actual defeat—although the group never completely vanished. This positive turn for the state authorities can be attributed to, on the one hand, an overestimation by SL of its own abilities, the linearity of its strategy and its harsh measures, which managed to turn a large part of the rural population against it. The FFAA was then able to exploit the schism created and to thereby weaken SL. On the other hand, overall success was achieved because of the state’s reforms and the overarching grand strategy implemented during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These reforms can now be summarized in the next section (cf. Degregori 1991: 18-20; Starn 1998: 230; Taylor 1998).

Economy

The first measures on the grand strategic level undertaken by the Fujimori government that affected the COIN campaign were those that related to reform of the economy. Similar to the contemporary population-centric approach (Chapter III), this

120 These reforms envisaged more autonomy for (and less oversight over) the FFAA and thus were at odds with the Congress given the past military coups (e.g., during the 1970s). 95

measures sought to address the existing grievances among the population. Fujimori’s “economic shock program” served to reduce inflation from 2,600 percent in 1991 to 15 percent in 1994. This strengthened the economy, which not only boosted the political legitimacy of the government but also raised the confidence of domestic and foreign investors and increased investment in the country (Marks & Palmer 2005: 107). This helped give more credibility to the government in the eyes of the population which had been lost during the previous decade (Montesinos 2009: 81-84).

Security

The second relevant measure here is Fujimori’s overhaul of the state’s security apparatus. This created a basis for COIN-related initiatives that consisted of security and support measures (discussed below) working in a symbiotic relationship. Both the defense apparatus (Decreto Legislativo No. 743, Ley de Sistema de Defensa Nacional 1992) and intelligence system (Decreto Legislativo No. 746, Ley de Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional 1992) were restructured (CVR 2003: Tomo III, 80). This created a single political and military high command to ensure the coordinated and effective conduct of anti-subversion operations in all areas (Tapia 1997: 75) and thereby—unity of effort. Given the the opposition in the Congress to passing the anti-subversion laws, which would, in Fujimori’s view, help defeat SL, perhaps the most decisive event in this process was Fujimori’s seizure of dictatorial powers in April 1992 in order to bypass the opposition. This move, despite resulting in a loss of external aid (see below), paid off in COIN terms in that Fujimori created a Gobierno de Emergencia y Reconstrucción Nacional (Emergency and National Reconstruction Government). This combined executive and legislative powers in one person, that is, the President himself (CVR 2003: Tomo III, 53-54). This step enabled Fujimori to overcome the decade-long paralysis of the FFAA due to the existing deadlock in civil-military relations. Fujimori was thus able to institute numerous changes and reforms that heavily impacted the campaign against SL; he determined an overall political end-state and directed all tools of statecraft toward that goal. Indeed, in 1993 Guzmán, by now in prison, wrote a letter to Fujimori conceding defeat and asking for peace negotiations. He stated that a systematic and coherent strategy developed in many domains, especially in the domain of intelligence (“una estrategia sistemática, coherente y desarrollada en diferentes planos, en 96

especial en el campo de la inteligencia”) launched under Fujimori’s rule was crucial in SL’s demise (Guzmán quoted in Comas 1993).

The measures that were included in this grand strategy that Guzmán refers to may be summarized as follows:

• The creation of a legal framework. This expedited action against SL. Included here were swifter trials and a Repentance Law (la Ley de Arrepentimiento).121 This Repentance Law was promulgated in May 1992 and offered SL activists protection and reintegration into society in exchange for information (Decreto Ley No. 25499 12 May 1992; Ley No. 26220 18 August 1993). This law was actually not that significant in terms of the numbers of rebels who turned themselves in. It was, however, decisive in that it facilitated the capture of Guzmán himself. This was through information provided by Luis Arana France, a member of SL’s metropolitan leadership, under the terms of the law (Bermúdez 1995).122 • The reform of the intelligence system. This merged eight separate agencies into one and increased efficiency and reduced inter-agency rivalry. The reforms of (police) intelligence meant that the military were provided with more accurate intelligence and that their violence could be more targeted and overall human rights violations reduced. This helped in a ‘hearts and minds’ sense. • Restructuring of special Counterterrorism Units. The police Counterterrorism Office (Dirección Contra el Terrorismo or DIRCOTE) was left in place. However, the Legislative Decree 744 expanded its role to the national level, turning it into the National Antiterrorism Agency (Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo or DINCOTE). This agency was important in that its operations consisting of surprise raids on SL’s urban hide-outs exerted

121 These rebels included not only SL members, but also members of other two significantly less threatening insurgent groups, namely Túpac Amaru II (or Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru abbv. MRTA) and the Rodrigo Franco Movement. 122 According to the Human Rights Watch (1995) more than 5,516 former SL members turned themselves in during the first 30 months of the law’s introduction (cf. Human Rights Watch 1995). 97

a psychological pressure upon the insurgents (strategy of dislocation). It was one of DINCOTE’s Counterterrorism Intelligence Divisions (Divisiones de Inteligencia Contra el Terrorismo) that would later capture Guzmán, having already targeted him as part of the decapitation strategy (CVR 2003: 155- 156).123 • The fact that Fujimori continued to build upon the Political-Military Plan (and estrategia integral) formulated by the FFAA in 1989 gave much more leeway to the FFAA and to the intelligence agency, namely SIN (Obando 1998: 377-378). This included assigning military personnel to serve in their home areas so that these could use their “eyes and ears on the ground” (Marks & Palmer 2005: 107). • Fujimori introduced the necessary legislation to make the rondas the fourth arm of the armed forces. The military employed the rondas since 1988, however, after Fujimori’s legislative reform, the rondas gained a legal status. In 1991, for instance, Fuijmori passed the necessary legislation to train and arm the rondas. Now the rondas were operating under the auspices of the Peruvian military in rural Peru (in the departments of Apurímac, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Junín). Both the rondas and the army succeeded in pushing SL out of its strongholds (Starn 1993; Kruijt 2002: 63).124

One factor not mentioned by Guzman that also proved influential in the defeat of SL was the creation of the political-military Commando Unit of Huallaga Front (el Commando Politico-Militar del Frente Huallaga or simply Frente Huallaga) in the early 1990s.125 This was decisive in regaining control of the Huallaga region. It was the only region where SL remained strong after Guzmán’s capture. Most importantly, the Frente Huallaga engaged in

123 In June 1992, DINCOTE’s division, DIVICOTE-1, finished Operation Huascaura (initiated in August 1990). During this Operation a cell of the Special Working Group—a component of SL’s logistic apparatus— was captured. This enabled DIVICOTE-1 to uncover the trail which led to Guzmán himself. On September 12 1992 DIVICOTE-1 commenced the final phase of Operation Capitán Carlos Verau Asmat, which led to the capture of other another key SL personnel and SL documents and plans related to SL’s people’s war (CVR 2003: 156-157). 124 How to deal with rondas was the main issue discussed at the 1991 meeting of Sendero’s Central Committee in Lima (Starn 1998: 255-256). 125 The Huallaga Front addressed the drug problem in the region where SL moved in the early 1980s to take advantage of the coca production. See Sabrón Garrido (n.d.). 98

projects including various economic, judicial and social components to gain the upper hand (CVR 2003: Tomo IV, 271-272).

In sum, Fujimori’s legislative reforms backed the military’s efforts, integrating them into the grand strategic design (following the Political-Military Plan) and thereby creating a missing bridge between the military and its civilian counterparts. On the grand strategic level, Fujimori pursued some population-centric measures (e.g., economic initiatives) while on the military strategic level the operations—now highly intelligence-driven—remained predominantly enemy-centric, however, reinforced by the use of village guards to protect the population from the insurgent.

External actors

The role of external actors in the COIN campaign against SL in Peru was marginal, therefore, the Peruvian campaign can be considered as a first-party campaign. It consisted of limited military support and some economic support, most notably from the US, and to a lesser degree from the Soviet Union. It is, however, difficult to access in how far this support was influential in terms of Peru’s COIN success. Given the Peruvian stance towards the Falklands War in 1982—Peru supported Argentina—and Peruvian acceptance of Soviet military support, the relationship between Peru and the US deteriorated. The 1985 election of President García and his subsequent declaration that Peru would limit the debt repayment to the US further worsened relations, resulting in the US withdrawing almost all of their aid to Peru (DESCO 1989: 49-50; Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 122-123; Walter 2010). It was only the US military’s Southern Command that recognized the reality of the insurgent threat and attempted to assist the Peruvian authorities as much as its remit would permit. This included staff visits, expert exchanges, and various lectures at senior officer education facilities. Peruvian military personnel were also sent to the US under the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). Additionally, the US Southern Command assisted the Peruvian state in its drug eradication efforts (cf. Select Committee on Intelligence 2001: 3; Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 123).

In general terms, the US sought to focus on drug eradication rather than assist the Peruvian government in eliminating the SL insurgents who were actively involved in and 99

benefitted from drug trade (Felbab-Brown 2010). In September 1989, the US Director of National Drug Policy, or “Drug Czar”, William Bennett, announced a plan to combat the production and processing of narcotics in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Under this plan, the US government would provide, in Fiscal Year 1990, $35.9 million in military aid to Peru, $19 million to the Peruvian Police and $6.8 million to the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) liaison with the Peruvian military. An additional $4 million was to be provided for economic support within the counternarcotics program. However, the García government— in tenure from 1985—accepted only support for the police, rejecting the rest of the counternarcotics package (Brown 1990: 99-100). The US Government Accountability Organization (1991) reported in 1991 that, despite the law enforcement aid for fiscal year 1990, drug trafficking had not been significantly reduced. The underlying reasons related to Peru’s rejection of military aid until fiscal year 1991. The rejection of the military aid was mainly due to the fact the both García and Fujimori opposed the US substantial emphasis on military solutions to Peru’s drug and insurgency problems, as they recognized the importance of other factors, e.g., political and economic (see Human Rights Watch 1991: 241-242; McClintock 2000). Moreover, the government’s inability to assume full control over the military, police and airports, coupled with its politically unstable situation, further undermined its law enforcement capabilities. Finally, it was impossible to create an effective oversight mechanism to ensure that provided aid would be employed as intended, making it questionable how the funds would be used. Apart from these issues, the military’s stance toward the cocaleros frustrated the US. The FFAA, in most cases, would turn a blind eye to coca harvesting and production, focusing instead on eliminating SL elements, with a great degree of success (Mauceri 1991: 99). Perhaps unsurprisingly, many members of the FFAA, given comparatively low salaries, were personally involved in the coca-economy (Mauceri 1991: 100-101; CVR 2003: Tomo II, 241-242). Only after Fujimori came to power did the US extend its aid (to conduct COIN) (McClintock 2000: 4), not limiting it to the aforementioned drug eradication program. Since the Soviets had abandoned their advisory role to the military and the National Intelligence Service (SIN) in 1989 (McClintock 2000: 24), this was the void that had to be filled by the US. This was crucial in light of Sendero’s advances against the almost defeated Peruvian 100

state in 1991 and 1992.126 In early 1990, the CIA started training both military and civilian analysts at SIN while simultaneously supporting psychological operations launched by the Peruvian Army. Similarly, the police received support from the National Intelligence Directorate (Directorado de Inteligencia Nacional) and its subordinate Special Intelligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia or GEIN) which had been created in 1989 within the police’s Counterterrorism Office (Dirección Contra el Terrorismo or DIRCOTE)) (CVR 2003: 145-147). The latter contributed to Guzmán’s capture in September 1992, by initiating a raid on an SL safe house (CVR 2003: 155-156; Palmer 2005: 103-104; Fishel & Manwaring 2006: 123).

Conclusion

In sum, and overall, it proved to be difficult for both the Peruvian government— operating without any significant external support—and the FFAA to effectively respond to the SL threat that began in 1982. It took eight years to come to the realization that the threat could not be stopped through the use of overwhelming firepower (employed indiscriminately more often than not). Other problems were evident. First, there was a significant divide between the democratic government of Belaúnde (and later that of García) and a demoralized military. A lack of trust between the two institutions coupled with a political and strategic void, in terms of fashioning effective COIN measures, from 1982 to 1988, along with an inadequate crippled intelligence capacity, led to the fact that the FFAA’s purely enemy- centric practices were only marginally effective at best in hampering SL’s evolution from one strategic phase to another. While there was a recognition by some that a pure enemy- centric approach was not enough, such voices were often suppressed within the military institution itself. During the period of the García government, there were, on a political and grand strategic level, attempts to introduce new economic measures to alleviate the plight of the rural indigenous Peruvians, aimed at robbing SL of its support base. However, these reforms failed, partly because of Peru’s economic downturn. In the meantime, human rights abuses by the FFAA and the police continued.

126 Although the US suspended its military assistance following Alberto Fujimori’s self-coup in April 1992, it continued with intelligence assistance (Palmer 2005).

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By 1988/1989, SL had reached a point of significant success. The group initiated more frequent attacks on the capital, on the one hand, and, on the other, continued its coercive armed propaganda campaign which generated strong backing from the peasants. The seriousness of the situation provided the impetus for the FFAA to exploit this crucial moment to turn the tide. On the grand strategic level, the military created a new Political-Military Plan ‘comprehensive strategy’ which would address not only the military dimension, but also the political and economic one. This plan sought to restructure the whole government in line with what was perceived as necessary to eradicate the SL insurgency. Put differently, the FFAA sought to create a balance between ends, ways and means. This was a crucial shift when later coupled with President Fujimori’s backing. He not only offered political support but also the necessary legislation to execute the new grand strategy. The role of the FFAA, the police and, above all, the National Intelligence Services was strengthened and expanded. Local militias (rondas) who organized themselves against SL were granted legal recognition and gained support from the FFAA and the police. This greatly improved the unity of effort. In military strategic terms the FFAA employed a number of enemy-centric measures (attrition, mostly in the countryside, and decapitation and dislocation with help of specialized anti- terrorism units, especially in urban settings) underpinned by good intelligence. Though predominantly enemy-centric, the campaign included the use of the rondas—a population- centric measure—which helped improve relations between the populace and the military and defeat SL in rural areas (although not entirely). Above all, it was the decapitation strategy that proved to be ultimately successful, delivering SL a huge psychological blow from which the organization would not recover. Since SL’s organization was highly dependent on its charismatic leader, without him there would be no way forward (Palmer 2005: 104).

Clearly there was more continuity than change as far as the military strategy is concerned. Throughout the campaign against SL, the approach was predominantly enemy- centric, with the exception of the use of the rondas. The main impediments were on the grand strategic level (e.g., a lack of a clear political end-state, dysfunctional civil-military relations, no overarching grand strategic framework to link the ends with the means) which remained neglected until 1988/89. The subsequent restructuring of the entire state apparatus to serve the war’s needs was central to the conclusion of the war. All the tools of statecraft, including the military, were then used towards the goal of defeating SL. Once there was a clear balance 102

between the political end-state, strategies and means, it took no more than four years after the formulation of the ‘comprehensive strategy’ to defeat SL (by 1992) (Tapia 1997: 18). Of course, this new strategy might not have been sufficient to address the insurgency, which reached the last stage of its strategic plan, if it had not coincided with SL’s own strategic mistakes. SL’s linear evolution, bereft of consideration of its opponent’s refined strategies, on the one hand, and defined by its violent methods, on the other, contributed to its own demise.

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Chapter VI: Counterinsurgency in Turkey

Introduction

This chapter analyzes the Turkish campaign against the Kurdish Marxist-Leninist insurgency that emerged in 1984 and which continues, despite several ceasefires, to this day. Given the lengthy duration of the insurgency this chapter examines only the first period from 1984 to 2000 when, after the capture of the organization’s leader, a unilateral ceasefire was enacted by the PKK in 2000 and hostilities came to a halt. The PKK itself was both “decapitated” and virtually defeated. This particular period is considered as a successfully concluded COIN campaign based on Paul, Clarke and Grill’s classification (Paul, Clarke & Grill 2010a: xviii; 2010b: xv; 2013).127 The underlying reasons for considering the campaign as being a “success” are summed up below. First, by 1999 the Turkish state had achieved its desired political end-state. Second, while Ankara continued to face a threat from the PKK after the ceasefire had been broken in 2004, the group had undergone several transformations, and, therefore, this offspring from the former insurgent group bore little to no resemblance to the original PKK. These transformations included its name128 and its overall strategic goal, namely, greater Kurdish autonomy as opposed to a separate Kurdish state (Kocher 2002). Taking these factors into account, the group emerging from the ashes of the “old” PKK should be considered as a new insurgency, which is beyond the limits of this chapter to discuss. In what follows I begin by explaining the historical background to the conflict. I then outline the rise of the PPK and discuss its capabilities, its organizational structure and the evolution of the organization’s overall strategy. I then turn to consider the conflict from the perspective of the Turkish state by looking at different grand and military strategies used. Finally, I conclude the chapter by examining what policies and strategies helped conclude the conflict with the PKK.

127 Paul, Clarke and Grill (2010a; 2010b; 2013) classify the Turkish COIN campaign (1984-1999) as “COIN win”. It can be said that after the end of the first period, the PKK transformed itself, therefore, the “old” PKK ceased to exist, whereby the insurgent group underwent several transformations discussed below. Therefore, the new threat that emerged after the break of the ceasefire in 2004 presents a different insurgency albeit with similar, yet less radical, goals. Operationally and tactically, the “new” PKK shifted its focus from the southeastern part of Turkey and became more focused on terrorism as its main modus operandi. 128 From October 2003 to April 2005 the PKK renamed itself to KONGRA-GEL (The People’s Congress). 104

Historical background

In this section I look at the historical background and identify key issues that led to the emergence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or Parti Karkarem Kurdistan insurgency (PKK hereafter). In order to understand the nature of the problem the PKK posed to the Turkish government it is important to contextualize the issue. Prior to the insurgency that is the focus of this chapter, there were sixteen other Kurdish uprisings against the Turkish state over a period of seventy years, usually confined to the southeastern provinces.129 In each of those cases, the Turkish authorities severely suppressed the uprisings. The seventeenth uprising began on August 15 1984, when the PKK insurgents commenced their military campaign against the Turkish state (Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). This time, however, the event signaled the beginning of a long, strenuous war that encompassed seventeen southeastern provinces. The campaign launched in 1984 was one of the bloodiest, resulting in the deaths of over 36,000 people. This was the first uprising to resonate in Turkey’s metropolises and even in some West European capitals (Nachami 2003: 37; Unal 2012a).

The Kurdish issue and repressive policies

Until 1991, there were, officially, no in Turkey. This indigenous group was referred to as “Mountain Turks”, and the Kurdish identity was completely suppressed. Like other non-Turks, Kurds were “encouraged” to abandon their ethnic identity and undergo a process of turkification (Nachmani 2003: 33; Marcus 2007: 18; Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 96-97). Turkification—also known as the ‘process of assimilation’ initiated by Turkey’s first President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, from 1923 onward—entailed a rigorous enforcement of the Turkish identity to all non-Turks. This included efforts such as the renaming of villages, banning of non-Turkic languages, and the suppression of expressions of Kurdish nationalism (including the Kurdish press). The situation was somewhat alleviated during the 1960s when the country became more democratized, allowing for more freedoms such as the right of

129 The Kurds represent an ethnic minority which amounts to approximately 3 million (or 9.98 percent of the total population) in 1965 and reaching 7 million (or 10.6 percent of the total population) by 1990 in Turkey (Mutlu 1996: 525-532). Kurdish minorities are also present Iran, Syria and Iraq. See also Gunter (2008: 65). 105

association, publishing, and the creation of trade unions. Nevertheless, any attempts by Kurdish activists to push for more autonomy and create a focus on inequalities between ethnic Turks and the Kurds, triggered a violent state reaction. After the coup staged by the Armed Forces on March 12, 1971—which was a response to the rising violence (from Turkish leftist groups) and Kurdish unrests of the 1960s and a reaction to the liberal Constitution of 1961—the new government was quick to clamp down on the Kurdish community, shutting down cultural magazines and Kurdish-language newspapers, while accusing editors of being either separatist or communist (Marcus 2007: 19; 21). During the 1970s, and with a return to civilian government, Turkey found itself in a very vulnerable position both politically and economically. The stagnating economy led to general discontent, not limited to the Kurdish population. This decline and the ongoing violence was the stimulus for another military coup in 1980. The Generals dissolved the government in order to try and mitigate the existing problems (including the violence) and declared Martial Law (Cook 2007: 100-103; Alexander et al. 2008: 15-16; Varol 2013: 730-739; Bardakçi 2013). Concurrently, Kurdish nationalist sentiments were strengthened by external events. The return of the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani to Iraq after the collapse of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 reinvigorated Kurdish nationalism in the region. Barzani was considered to be a hero due to his revolt—albeit a failed one—in Iraq in 1931 and his struggle for the autonomous Kurdish region (Kurdish Republic of Mahabad) in Iran in the 1940s. After his return to Iraq, Barzani launched another rebellion since his demands for Kurdish autonomy were not met. All these factors contributed to Barzani’s inspirational influence upon the Kurds in Turkey. This led to the formation of the first Kurdish underground party in Turkey, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (KDPT), in 1965 (Marcus 2007: 20- 21). It was against this background of regional dynamics coupled with Turkey’s repressive policies against the Kurds that a number of radical groups (e.g., the Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearth abbr. DDKO, the PKK, Rizgari) were formed, each promising to address the unfavorable conditions facing the Kurdish society. However, only one of these groups, the PKK (formed in 1978), succeeded in posing a significant challenge to the Turkish state. The PKK’s strategic employment of violence enabled it to mobilize popular support, and maintain 106

it for several decades (Nachmani 2003: 37; Cornell 2001; Ankara Papers 2004: 22-23; Tezcür 2015: 249; 260-261).

Phases of the PKK conflict

There were three major phases of the PKK conflict (as considered in this study). The pre-war phase commenced when the PKK started in 1978 with just twenty people (Unal 2012a). This was the so-called “incubation phase”130 during which the PKK was trying to assert its power by attracting supporters and organizing the movement. After the military coup of 1980, the PKK started receiving support from the Syrian government. With the help of Damascus, the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and his militants fled to Syria where the PKK reorganized itself, established a more sophisticated organizational structure, and trained its fighters in order to commence a more sophisticated armed struggle in 1984 (Kocher 2002: 4; Unal 2012a). The year 1984 marked the beginning of the first phase of the PKK insurgency. The PKK began using guerrilla attacks against the Turkish state as a means to weaken government authority and, simultaneously to target the population in order to coerce it into supporting the insurgents (Unal 2014: 51; 2016a; Plakoudas 2018: 11). In 1991, following the Gulf War, the PKK moved to its new base of operations in the Safe Zone (the Kurdish Autonomous Zone in Northern Iraq or KAZ hereafter) created in Northern Iraq by invading Coalition forces. The KAZ served as an ideal platform for launching attacks on Turkey. Given these favorable conditions, the PKK grew stronger, increasing both the number of its attacks and the number of rank and file members, which reached some 15,000 fighters by 1994 (Ankara Paper 2004: 28). Notwithstanding these advances, this phase ended with the PKK’s military defeat in 1993/1994. It had failed to secure the control of the southeastern region. This defeat was brought about by a strategy of attrition in form of large-scale offensive operations launched by the Turkish Army, as discussed below (Gurcan 2015: 10; Unal 2016c). The second and final phase (1994-2000) commenced with Öcalan’s adoption of a new strategy, which, as explained below, involved a new political dimension to the struggle (cf.

130 “Incubation phase” refers to insurgents’ preparatory period, when the insurgent organization tries to recruit supporters, establish an organizational structure, etc. For more details, see Walter Laqueur (2009: 393). 107

Unal 2012a: 108-115). The end of the third phase is marked by Öcalan’s capture in 1999 and the subsequent unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by the PKK in 2000.

The PKK’s origins, objectives and modus operandi

The organization was officially established on November 27, 1978 in the village of Fis in Diyarbakır province, where it announced its first party program. This was the beginning of the first (pre-war) stage. The region in question—the southeastern part of Turkey—was principally rural and had a low population density. According to some accounts, the state was repressive in those areas (McDowall 2000), while, according to others (Yalman 1971), the state control was rather weak. However, Kocher (2002: 4) asserts that the region was suffering both from state repression as well as weak state control. Öcalan, who had become proficient in Marxist theory and who had communications with international radical leftist groups such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru, became the leader of this newly formed insurgent group (Ankara Papers 2004: 23-24; Marcus 2007). The PKK’s main political objective—championed by Öcalan—was to achieve Kurdish self-determination through the creation of an independent state of Kurdistan comprised of territories from Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, and underpinned by Marxist- Leninist ideology (Ankara Papers 2004; Marcus 2007; Unal 2014; 2016a). Öcalan proposed to achieve this goal through a revolution. The PKK’s main strategy was, therefore, to initiate an armed struggle in Turkey using the Maoist model of ‘Revolutionary People’s War’. The underlying idea was to create an alliance between workers, peasants and intellectual youths (students) to carry out the revolution. The main reasoning behind this aim rested upon the assumption that this would result in a military coup—given that at that time Turkey had suffered two military coups (in 1961 and 1980) with the military institution remaining a powerful player in the political arena (Varol 2013: 720; 739-743; Sarigil 2014: 176).131 Such a coup, the PKK reasoned, would end democracy within Turkey and thereby isolate the country from the international community. In such a scenario, a foreign intervention on behalf of the Kurds (such as with the later creation of the Safe Zone for the Turkish Kurdsin Northern Iraq in 1991) would be more probable (Nachami 2003: 36). Instead of choosing

131 In the past, Turkey has suffered from four military coups, with the most recent one in 1997. However, after the 1980 military coup and the subsequent return to civilian rule in 1983, the military institution remained a powerful player in Turkey’s politics. Thus, the civilian leaders remained under a strong military tutelage. 108

peaceful means by which to advocate for the rights of the Kurdish people, the PKK heavily relied on the use of violence. As a consequence, the Turkish Constitution of 1982 (during military rule) included tough new counter-terrorist legislation. The PKK then sought to exploit this inherent weakness of the Turkish regime—namely, severe security measures with the military assuming the decision-making role132—through further provocation which would in turn augment its propaganda against the state (Ankara Papers 2004: 58-59).

The PKK’s strategic approaches and modus operandi

When the PKK commenced its actual major armed struggle in 1984, the main military strategic approach focused on securing control of territory. The PKK started from the countryside, positioning small groups of insurgents to control various rural area. The insurgents were aware that the could not possibly create security bases next to every isolated village, and this was a fact the group sought to exploit (Unal 2012a: 51). This approach was consistent with Mao’s first phase (Mao 1965a: 27; 205-268),133 namely to start conquering the countryside before moving into cities: “Every revolutionary comrade should know that the national revolution requires a great change in the countryside.” Moreover, it was not just territory that the PKK sought to control during this stage. The organization also needed new supporters. By establishing itself in isolated villages the insurgents sought to create a link between the organization and the indigenous population (Unal 2012a: 51). This was intended to serve a two-fold purpose. First, the PKK sought to break the link between the government and the population by undermining the government’s credibility in providing security in an already neglected region. Thereafter the PKK would fill the power vacuum created by the lack of governmental control, thus winning over the population by positioning themselves as the de facto government in the targeted regions (Unal 2016b). This approach was largely successful. The PKK effectively undermined government control in the southeastern parts of Turkey during the 1980s and early 1990s. This was the result of a combination of the PKK military strategy and the Turkish military’s reluctance to “take the fight to the enemy” (Kocher 2002: 5-6).

132 The PKK provoked the state to retaliate in a disproportionately violent manner. Tightened security measures adopted by the state, therefore, undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of the key population. 133 For more information on Mao’s theory see, for instance, Mao (1965a; 1965b; 1965b; 1961; 1977), Katzenbach (1995), Freedman (2013) and Heuser (2010b). 109

Modus operandi At the operational and tactical levels, during this stage of the insurgency (from 1984 to the early 1990s), the PKK—supported by foreign actors, such as Syria, Lebanon and the Iraqi Kurds (through the Kurdish Democratic Union or KDP134 hereafter)—was now on the strategic defensive (phase I of Mao’s “People’s War”). Given the organization’s relative inferiority in terms of manpower and military capabilities vis-à-vis its state counterparts, the PKK avoided direct confrontations with the Turkish Army. Instead, the insurgents resorted to acts of terrorism and guerrilla tactics, including attacks on police stations and the killings of government loyalists. Most notably, the PKK tried to undermine the economic development project—the Southeastern Anatolia Project or Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) (Lorenz & Erickson 1999; Acme 2004; 2009)135—which had been launched in 1983 by the Turkish government to improve economic conditions in that part of the country. The aim of the project was to win over dissatisfied Kurds by reducing disparities between them and the rest of the population, and to thereby discourage them from supporting the PKK (Nachmani 2003: 35-37; 41; Khalil 2007: 390-391; Romano 2012: 232-233). Towards the end of the first phase of the PKK campaign (from 1984 to 1993/1994) and especially after the establishment of strongholds in Northern Iraq (in 1991), the PKK could face the Turkish Army on more conventional terms and change its operational and tactical approaches from that of the guerrilla to more direct confrontations. This, however, coincided with the Turkish Army adjusting its own military strategic and operational approaches (Unal 2016c). As discussed in more detail below, at this stage the Turkish Army adjusted its modus operandi, expanding its anti-guerrilla warfare capacity through greater use of its conventional capabilities (e.g., the use of army aviation units). These shifts enabled the Turkish Army to defeat the PKK fighters in conventional battles for territorial control, thereby undermining the PKK’s strategy (Nachami 2003: 35; 37; Unal 2016c). As a result, in 1993, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire (officially lasting from March to June) (Marcus 2008; Gunter 2008; Unal 2012a; 2013).136 In sum, these military setbacks for the

134 The KDP was the ruling party in the KAZ. 135 The origin of the project stretches back to 1920s. However, the new version which was to include the economic development of the Southeastern region was launched during the 1980s. 136 The Turkish state, however, did not reciprocate the ceasefire and it was officially ended in June 1993 with the state’s military operations already underway (Marcus 2008: 212-214; Stanton 2016: 218). 110

PKK were instrumental in the organization adapting its approach and moving (by 1994) into what we now recognize as the final phase of the insurgency. After these setbacks, the PKK’s final stage commenced in 1994 with some substantial changes to its desired end-state and its strategic use of violence. Öcalan abandoned the idea of creating a separate Kurdish state, calling instead for Turkey to become a federation with a semi-autonomous southeastern region (Korn 1995; Criss 1995). Moreover, in light of the high losses in both military terms and in terms of popular support (a consequence of the PKK having killed some 10,000 civilians during village massacres), the PKK limited itself to targeting only Turkish state officials (Unal 2016b) and being more discriminate in its use of violence against civilians (Criss 1995). Overall, the PKK used a myriad of approaches ranging from guerrilla warfare and semi-conventional warfare, to coercion and terrorism designed to exhaust and weaken Turkish security forces, create chaos, discredit the Ankara government, and to internationalize their cause (Harmon 2001).137

The PKK’s recruitment mechanism

In contrast to the Maoist model, which posits that one should mobilize the population through promoting one’s cause, the PKK did so mainly through coercion and terrorism. Prior to the Generals’ coup of 1980, the PKK was one of the most radical Kurdish organizations, one that did not hesitate to use violence not only against Turkish state officials but also against non-conforming fellow Kurds, who were either neutral or loyal to the government (Unal 2016b). Given the PKK’s then weak military organization, terrorism was used as the main method by which to intimidate the population in order to win ‘supporters’ for the organization’s cause. Another reason for the PKK’s heavy reliance on violence was the difficulty they faced in promoting their Marxist-Leninist ideology in the southeastern region, where the population was highly religious, traditional and tribal in nature (Unal 2012a). Öcalan, therefore, believed that the people’s allegiance should be won through generating fear of violence rather than through attempts to elucidate PKK’s aims (Ankara Papers 2004: 24-26).138 Given the difficulty it faced in promoting its ideology, the PKK drew its members

137 These reflect the classic strategies of terrorism as described by Christopher C. Harmon (2001: 39-66). 138 Only in retrospect would Öcalan regret to have failed to respect the religious values of the region where the PKK operated. 111

almost exclusively from the lowest social classes of small towns and villages. These recruits, most of whom wanted to take action against their oppression without the need to understand the insurgents’ principles, lacked any formal education and could be easily swayed by the PKK. Despite its violent nature, the PKK managed to recruit a sufficient number of members (some 10,100 by 1992) and often through coercion—by using, for instance, threats to kill boys who approached the age of military service unless they joined the PKK. Yet, not all support had to be gained through coercive methods. A high birthrate and increasing unemployment rates in the region contributed to dissatisfaction with the government, helping the PKK to increase the number of its rank and file members. The state also facilitated the recruitment process directly: the indiscriminate treatment of suspected PKK supporters by state forces helped turn the population against the state (Criss 1995: 20; Unal 2012a; 2012b). The PKK thus gained more support, in part because it was then the only organization fighting the Turkish state (Bruinessen 1988: 40-41). Moreover, in the mid-1980s, the PKK altered its revolutionary ideology by introducing an ethno-nationalist appeal in order to win over segments of the key population in the southeastern part of Turkey. This helped the PKK to recruit more fighters and expand its logistical support (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 111). Despite this, towards the end of the second stage (1984-1993/1994), and despite the military losses being inflicted on the Turkish Armed Forces, the PKK was losing its ‘appeal’. Thus it had to expand its recruitment techniques. These military setbacks for the PKK were instrumental in the organization adapting its approach and moving into what we now recognize as the third phase of the insurgency. During the final stage (1994-1999) of the PKK insurgency, the organization altered its ideology to appeal to a broader segment of population. It also launched an international, Europe-oriented propaganda campaign against the Turkish state. The foundation for this move was laid before its military defeat in 1993/1994. In its second National Congress in May 1990, for instance, the PKK established the need to create “friendship” with “religious movements” and “to pull Turkish left-wing forces into struggle against the special warfare put into practice in Kurdistan and to propagate for the brotherhood of the two people…” (Ismet 1992: 228). In accord with this resolution, the PKK also broadened its scope of targets, which were previously limited to emergency-rule provinces during the 1980s, to include 112

other urban centers of Turkey and Turkish commercial and diplomatic establishments in European countries (cf. Unal 2012b: 429). In 1994/1995, the PKK abandoned its secular stance, as foreshadowed in the previous section, and embraced a religious rhetoric, proclaiming a doctrine of Marxist Islam. This rhetoric resonated well not only with the Kurds but also, in broader terms, in the Middle East overall (Criss 1995; Kocher 2002). This dramatic shift from Marxism to Islam indicates that during the second half of the 1990s—especially after its military defeat in 1994 (explained below)—the PKK had been considerably weakened and was therefore forced to reformulate its message in order to remain active.

Organizational structure

Upon its establishment in 1978, the PKK was structurally simple—a small group of dedicated members with Öcalan as its leader. However, over the years the organizational structure of the group evolved and became more sophisticated to include a military wing and political apparatuses. Additionally, the PKK developed ties with Turkey’s neighbors (e.g., Syria, Iran, the Soviet Union/Russia and Greece) (Ankara Papers 2004; Cornell 2001). In broader terms, the PKK structure was hierarchical and centralized like other radical left insurgent organizations of that time such as Sendero Luminoso (see Chapter V). In the early stages of the insurgency, the PKK was composed of three main bodies. The first was a politburo or Central Committee under the leadership of Öcalan, the sole decision maker at the political and strategic levels. The Committee included two subordinate committees, namely the Liberation Front of Kurdistan (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan or ERNK) and the Kurdish Liberation Army (Artese Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan or ARGK). The first body served as the political wing of the PKK, and was created on March 21, 1985 (Unal 2012a). It was active both domestically and internationally. ERNK’s main tasks were gathering intelligence, recruiting new fighters, spreading propaganda, and lobbying for the PKK to be acknowledged as a legitimate political representative of the Kurdish people. The second body, the ARGK, served as the PKK’s military wing, responsible for waging armed attacks against wealthy Kurdish land owners and representatives of the Turkish state, including judges, politicians, members of the Turkish Armed Forces, and even teachers (Ankara Papers 2004: 27; Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 110). The ARGK was not the only military unit of the PKK. Various other units were created later, including the Kurdistan Independence Unit (HRK) 113

and the People’s Defense Unit (HPG). Moreover, the PKK used various organizations such as the Kurdish National Parliament (KUM) and the European Kurdish Associations Confederation (KON-KURD) to facilitate propaganda activities abroad and to mobilize support from Kurdish minorities in European countries (particularly Germany, the Netherlands and Italy) to financially support the PKK (Turkish National Police n.d.; Yayla, Ozdemir & Gilly 2008).

Internal and External support

Domestically, the PKK was able to survive due to its reliable supply lines, its recruitment techniques, its good intelligence and by the fact that much of the population of the south-eastern provinces supported them. Throughout its campaign, the PKK enjoyed broad external support, i.e., support from various foreign countries. This was, undoubtedly, one of the most crucial aspects that helped the PKK sustain its campaign against the Turkish state. During the 1980s, the PKK enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union, which shared the PKK’s ideological underpinnings. There were several other states such as Greece, Iran and Greek Cyprus which offered mostly covert support to the PKK, allowing it to operate from their territories (Aktan & Koknar 2011: 269- 270). In the case of Greece, for instance, support for radical Turkish left-wing groups during the 1970s, and later the PKK, was provided due to troubled relations between Greece and Turkey arising from disputes over airspace and the territorial waters of the Aegean Sea, among other issues. Iranian support was also important for the PKK. Turkey did not expect Iran to support the PKK given that the latter had its own Kurdish minority. Nevertheless, the agreement between Iran and the PKK was a quid pro quo: Iran permitted the PKK to set up operations along its border; in return the PKK had to provide vital intelligence on Turkey and to not engage with Iranian Kurds (Khalil 2007: 390). Given this mistaken perception of the PKK, there existed an erroneous assumption that the PKK would use only the Iraqi border as its base of operations, and as a consequence the geopolitically vital Iranian border was ignored. The fundamental reason Russia (after the fall of the Soviet Union) and Iran supported the PKK was regional power dynamics and Russia’s and Iran’s interest in Transcaucasia. Both countries were striving to become a model for nations in the region. Turkey, being a significant regional player, stood in their way. Thus the rationale was to support the insurgents so as to undermine Turkey’s power in the region. Russia’s 114

involvement consisted primarily of sending its military trainers to the PKK training camps in the KAZ and the Beka’a Valley (Ankara Papers 2004: 47). The greatest supporter of the PKK was, however, the Assad regime in Syria. Damascus provided the insurgents with safe havens and enabled them to establish their own training facilities in the Beka’a Valley in northern Lebanon, which was under Syria’s control (Cornell 2001: 41; Ankara Papers 2004: 47-48).139 These sanctuaries enabled the organization to train new fighters without risk of being attacked by the Turkish military. Syria also provided the PKK with financial and logistical support, as well as intelligence (Kim, Yun 2008: 70). The underlying reasons for this were two-fold. First, there was a border dispute between Syria and Turkey over the Hatay province which had been ceded to Turkey by the French colonial power in 1939. Second, Syria feared that Turkey’s economic development program could jeopardize Syria’s access to water from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (Cornell 2001: 41).140 Overall, this external support, especially in the form of sanctuaries and financing, proved to be vital to the PKK’s survival, providing the organization with the ability to regroup and rehabilitate abroad while retaining its operational capabilities in the face of Turkey’s harsh and highly kinetic response (discussed below).

Ankara’s countermeasures

In the following sections I discuss the approach the Turkish state used against the PKK. First, I offer a short summary of the Turkish counterinsurgency approach and proceed to discuss each period of the campaign in detail. These periods range from 1984-1987, 1987- 1991 and 1991-1999. These periods mark important shifts in approaches employed by the Turkish state. In general terms, during every Kurdish uprising the Turkish response was heavy handed. It can be seen as a disproportionate reaction based upon the Kemalist ideology of denying everything Kurdish (Heper 2012; Yavuz 2006; Marcus 2007: 126; Unal 2012a: 427). From the very beginning, as Nachmani (2003: 37) points out, a causal relationship can be

139 The PKK camps were moved to Beka’a Valley in Lebanon after the Mutual Security Accord between Ankara and Damascus of 1987. 140 The GAP project envisaged construction of twenty-two dams as part of the project which would curtail water supply to Syria and Iraq leading to possible draughts and also population displacements and civil unrest. 115

established between these draconian measures and the emergence of the Kurdish uprising in the 1970s. He notes that in the late 1970s the Turkish political left—which served as a venue for the Kurds to peacefully express opposition—was crushed by the military, thus creating favorable conditions for the PKK’s emergence in 1978 as an alternative voice for the Kurds. Indeed, throughout Ankara’s various counter-PKK campaigns, these repressive approaches tended to encourage the Kurdish population to throw its support behind the only viable ruling alternative, the PKK (Heper 2012: 140-143; Isiksel 2013: 716; Hale 1988: 164; Varol 2013; Bardakçi 2013). By 1990, the Turkish state had resorted to “forced evacuations”—i.e., the forced resettlement of the Kurdish population to clear areas of operations. This was coupled with its adjusted military strategy and an increase in diplomatic pressure on external parties (especially on Syria) to abandon support for the PKK. These efforts, along with the PKK’s strategic adjustments resulting from its decreased military capabilities and the capture of the PKK’s leader and mastermind (see below), helped Turkey to force the insurgents to declare a ceasefire in 2000 (Unal 2016a; 2016c).

Countermeasures, 1984-87

During the first six years of the insurgency—from 1984 to 1990—the Turkish forces did not realize the extent of the threat the PKK posed, and thus reacted inadequately. Without understanding the nature of the enemy at hand they could neither correctly assess the PKK’s capabilities nor predict its strategic maneuvers. At the grand strategic level, the Turkish government itself did not take the PKK threat seriously initially, viewing the organization merely as a collection of bandits (Ankara Papers 2004; Ozdag 2004; Unal 2012a; 2014). This perception of the PKK being only a security issue—ignoring the broader political, social and cultural contexts—resulted in an approached based on a military solution using stridently enemy-centric measures. For instance, from 1984 onwards the Turkish state employed ‘security-oriented deterrence policies’, i.e., a repressive nation-building approach aimed at defeating the insurgents through such means as large-scale conventional military operations. From 1984 to 1987, these enemy-centric operations were launched reactively to respond to the PKK violence. Here the armed forces were employing a reactive variant of the classical annihilation strategy (see Chapter IX). In addition, the Turkish military was continuously 116

involved in decapitation strikes—also known as targeted killings141—against the PKK, with differing levels of intensity (Unal 2012a: 96). In 1985, five divisions were sent to the southeast. Turkey also increased the number of (rural) police in that area. Outposts were established near mountain villages that were crucial for the PKK in terms of food supplies, shelter, new recruits and intelligence. Due to the PKK’s disadvantage in manpower and military capacity vis-à-vis the Turkish Armed Forces, (at that point there were only 200 to 300 armed insurgents) the PKK—which also had little popular support at that time—suffered significant losses as a result of the Army’s operations. Politically, however, such harsh approaches tended to play into the hands of the PKK and augmented its anti-state propaganda (Durna & Hancerli 2007: 327; Unal 2012a: 96-98; Unal 2016a). Additionally, at the grand strategic level, a set of repentance laws were introduced between 1985 and 1999 (Unal 2016d).142 These laws offered amnesty and protection to low- and middle-tier PKK members in exchange for abandoning the PKK cause and providing information to the government. However, these laws had little impact on the scale of the PKK’s violence (Unal 2012a: 84-86; Unal 2016d: 130-131). This period saw the introduction, in 1985, by Ankara of a village defense system called the “Provisional Village Guard System” (Geçici Köy Koruculuğu Sistemi, GKKS). Under this, arms and training were provided to Kurdish tribes and villages (cf. the Village Law 442 of 1924: art. 74).143 The GKKS was a legally backed civilian militia operating against the PKK in the Kurdish populated southeastern provinces. The underlying aim was to protect remote villages from the PKK infiltration. These village guards were useful in that they knew the terrain and, therefore, served as a force-multiplier for the Turkish forces in their effort to locate insurgent bases. Moreover, the Turkish forces were not at the forefront of operations anymore, which was in line with what has been referred to as Turkey’s “force protective” (or ‘casualty averse’) sentiments (Khalil 2007: 392-393). 144 From the PKK

141 The strategy of decapitation (and, to a certain extent, targeted killings) refers to targeting command and control centers (in a conventional conflict) as well as key figures in the political and military leadership of the PKK. See Keane (2005: 54-55). 142 Different repentance laws were enacted in the following years: 1985, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999 and 2000. 143 This system was regulated by the Village Law No. 442 (KÖY KANUNU adopted on 18/3/1924), especially article 74. 144 At that time, the Turkish state was casualty-averse and tried to protect its troops. This stance was underpinned by the reactive use of force. 117

perspective, the village guard system was damaging for the organization given that many PKK fighters would not fight against their fellow Kurds. While the GKKS was useful in the effort to prevent the PKK from winning over the population, to separate them from their support base, and provided the military with tactical intelligence, it received a great deal of criticism as well (cf. Gurcan 2015: 7-8). Those villages that refused to participate in the GKKS or were suspected of supporting the PKK were evacuated by force and/or burned down (U.S. State Department 1995; Romano 2012: 233). Later, for instance, the army burned 30 million acres of woodland and destroyed 1,500 villages in order to deny the PKK human and geographical shelter (Nachmani 2003: 47-48; Khalil 2007: 388; Romano 2012).145 Lydia Khalil (2007: 393) argues that the GKKS did more harm than good: the brutal military tactics used by the Turkish armed forces (e.g., destruction of whole villages) coupled with what was often the forceful ‘recruitment’ of village guards, pushed more Kurds to support the PKK, because the PKK was perceived as a lesser evil. The PKK went as far as to offer amnesty to former village guards, which led to a dramatic increase in the PKK rank and file numbers. By 1991 PKK forces numbered some 12,000. Nonetheless, it should not be discounted that the PKK resorted to selective violence in response to the GKKS, especially against various tribes and their respective leaders, who took part in the GKKS (Unal 2014: 426). All this being said, however, according to interviews with Turkish officers and village guards conducted by Metin Gurcan (2015: 14), the GKKS was a critically important strategic approach, since it helped isolate the PKK from the Kurdish population, thereby impeding the organization from gaining popular support and expanding its control in the southeastern part of Turkey. In a broader sense, the GKKS presented a defensive mechanism of the key Kurdish population as their name—village guards—would imply. Thus, despite the criticism of forceful recruitment, the measure itself was population-centric in its primary focus in that it offered (a degree of) protection to the key population. All in all, the PKK could not be defeated. The reactive measures employed by the military fell short of destroying the insurgency. Although the use of GKKS displayed some promising results it was not nearly enough to account for the aforementioned deficiencies on the political, grand strategic and military strategic levels.

145 At this time two of four army corps were stationed in the emergency rule area (about 250,000 soldiers). 118

Countermeasures from 1987 to 1991

The year 1987 saw a significant turning point in the conflict. The martial law imposed by the military government in 1980 was abolished, only to be supplanted by a no less authoritarian law introduced this time by a civilian government led by Turgut Özal (in power from 1983 to 1993).146 On July 19, 1987, a state of emergency was declared in ten eastern and at were under PKK threat (Alexander et al 2008: 110-114; Unal 2012a). The main aim of the state of emergency was to try and restore law and order by introducing tighter security measures. Additionally, the security forces of the region were brought under the command of a civilian, that is, the Governor of the Olaganustu Hal (OHAL or State of Emergency Region), and not a military figure (Alexander et al 2008: 110-114). This amendment in the chain of command was designed to create better force coordination in order to facilitate counterinsurgency operations (Unal 2012a: 56). However, these changes triggered opposition from the military under the state of emergency. Above all, the main fight against the PKK now would be predominantly conducted under the command of the police rather than the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces’ role in controlling the campaign was sidelined. This reshuffling of roles and the disunity created actually decreased the effectiveness of the countermeasures against the PKK, and gave the PKK the opportunity to solidify its position as an insurgent group. This fact can be seen in the increase in the level of PKK attacks from 1987 onwards and an intensification of its recruiting campaign (Unal 2012a). Above all, the tighter security measures meant that the new government lost credibility with the population, which turned instead to the PKK (Durna & Hancerli 2007: 332-333). These factors helped reinforce the PKK’s position in the Kurdish areas where it still continued to attract support from fellow Kurds either through its power of attraction, its own coercive measures or simply because it represented a less draconian alternative than the state itself. From the military perspective, the Army adopted a ‘zone-control’ doctrine in 1987 (in force until 1992) which entailed an establishment of small military bases in affected regions designed to control the territory upon which the key population resided (see Chapter III). However, this measure, too, remained purely defensive in nature and failed to generate the desired outcome—territorial control—as explained in

146 Özal served as a Turkish Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989. In 1989, he became the President of Turkey serving until his death in 1993. 119

more detail below. In general terms, the state actions in this response were part of what can be seen as a ‘deterrence by punishment’ orientation, defined by harsh measures and reactive military operations. Included here were some repressive measures such as the proclamation of emergency rule in the affected region in 1987—that lasted for fifteen years—and a population-centric measure, namely the establishment of volunteer village guards. Again in grand strategic terms—concerning the use of all state assets towards the desired political outcome—the response by the Turkish government had been marginal at best. There were only some isolated attempts to lessen the socio-economic gaps that existed between the Turkish and Kurdish populations. This issue remained largely ignored (Nachmani 2003: 42). Nonetheless, some of the measures, such as establishing emergency rule and augmenting it through special anti-terrorism laws, facilitated the capture, arrest and interrogation of insurgent suspects (Unal 2012a: 96). However, the PKK still had the upper hand. Ankara was not able to thwart the insurgency on the grand strategic level. On the military strategic level, the conventional-style measures employed by the Turkish forces remained reactive, falling short of eliminating the PKK. They were insufficient to take clear the PKK strongholds. The region in question was, to a large degree, still under the PKK ‘rule’. The enemy-centric approach was not yielding the desired results. Something had to change. Ankara had to act— not merely react.

Countermeasures from 1991 to 1999

However, by the early 1990s, the situation started changing in favor of the Turkish state. To start with, a change in the PKK’s strategy and, subsequently, tactics contributed to its demise: in 1990 the PKK—through its military wing, the ARGK—shifted to a strategy called “captured/controlled lands”. This consisted of trying to take control of key territory (that is, southeastern Anatolia). It assembled larger units, thus facing the army on conventional terms (Unal 2016c; Unal 2014: 425). This shift, however, proved to be disastrous for the organization as it enabled the Turkish military to bring to bear its superiority in conventional warfighting ability and its superior mass. But Ankara and the Turkish Army also made changes that helped. To begin with, the importance of not alienating the Kurds was realized and work began to win over this 120

population through more discriminate treatment and measures such as the introduction of an increased number of health and educational facilities in Kurdish areas. Moreover, the military leadership, which had been pursuing its rather defensive and reactive strategy before, started to understand that there was a need for a more proactive military strategic approach. This approach, adopted by the General Staff in 1991, came to be known as the ‘battlefield domination concept’. This meant that the Army units became better organized and trained for counterinsurgency operations. Overall, this new approach called for taking the initiative, seeking out the insurgents and launching proactive large-scale military offensives against them. These operations were supported by aviation assets and the GKKS. This radical shift from deterrence and containment to offensive proactive operations made an important contribution to what was, basically, the military defeat of the PKK after just three years between 1991 and 1994, when some 11,000 PKK fighters were killed or captured (Gurcan 2015: 10). The following sections look in more detail at the changes that Ankara and the Turkish military made to bring about this change in fortunes. Military Strategic and Doctrinal Shifts By 1992 the Turkish Army had gained the upper hand in fighting the PKK through its new, more proactive, stance. An element of this was the implementation of a new, distinctly enemy-centric, ‘cordon and search’ strategy. This replaced the formerly prevalent strategy based on the so-called ‘zone control doctrine’ (in force from 1987 to 1992). The zone control doctrine was defensive in nature and called for small military bases to be set up in the troubled regions to try and gain control of these areas. This doctrine resembled the clear-hold-build approach described in FM 3-24 and implemented in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This approach, however, had its shortcomings. The small bases presented easy static targets for the PKK. Under the new cordon and search strategy, the previous emphasis on the creation of temporary military bases was replaced by large-scale mobile counterinsurgency operations, including cross-border operations. These operations were led by preliminary reconnaissance and conducted on different scales, ranging from company to battalion level. They were executed by cordoning off an area, gradually tightening the perimeter (encirclement) through searches to catch and/or engage and incapacitate PKK militants (Unal 2016c). Additionally, the Army also began conducting 121

operations at night and in winter (Nachmani 2003; Khalil 2007: 394). One important element of this new proactive strategy was the use of air power. Not only were these cordon and search operations for the first time significantly supported by air power (cf. Unal 2012a: 96- 100), but also air strikes were used to strike the PKK at its logistic heart, namely in the KAZ of Northern Iraq where the PKK had its operating bases (Cornell 2001: 42; Romano 2012: 232). Moreover, by the early 1990s the Turkish Army was starting to make more of army aviation units, including those equipped with Bell AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. In addition to engaging in combat with PKK fighters discovered during these operations, the approach also curtailed insurgent mobility, thus placing considerable strain on PKK logistics (Unal 2012a: 96-97; 2016c). These changes proved to be central in significantly weakening the PKK’s military capabilities. Mustafa Cosar Unal (2012a; 2012b) shows that PKK-initiated violence in both emergency-rule and non-emergency-rule areas saw a considerable decline from the second half of 1993. Moreover, this change in fortune on the battlefield made the PKK (which suffered significant losses) realize that it could not reach its goal through military means alone. According to Karen Kaya (2012: 533-534)—whose conclusions were based on interviews conducted by Fikret Bila (2007)147 with top-rank military officials who took part in operations against the PKK in the early 1990s—the development of a revised counterinsurgency approach helped turn the tide in favor of the Turkish state. During this whole process, moreover, the village guards proved to be an invaluable asset to the army in terms of intelligence provision and their self-defense capabilities. In Table 6.1, I present an overview of different military strategic approaches implemented.

Measures on the Military Strategic Level Period

Conventional Approach defined by reactive 1984 – 1987 military operations (annihilation)

Zone Control Doctrine based on area control 1987 – 1992

147 Fikret Bila is a prominent Turkish journalist who published a book titled The Commanders’ Front [Komutanlar Cephesi] that consists of interviews with retired Turkish generals. 122

Cordon and Search Doctrine defined by large- 1992 –1999 scale proactive military operations

Table 6.1: Measures on the military strategic level

In 1994, in the journal Serxwebun—the PKK mouthpiece—the PKK leader admitted “the PKK’s military defeat by the Turkish army” (Serxwebun #148 of April 1994 quoted in Unal 2013: 428).148 In the same issue of Serxwebun, Öcalan contemplated a political solution to the conflict, signaling that the military strategic changes adopted by the Turkish Army had been indeed successful in breaking the backbone of the PKK insurgency. This can be seen further in the decline of violence from 1994 through 2000 (Unal 2012a: 124, Figure 4; 2016c).

Within the overall set of countermeasures adopted by Ankara and by the military as part of this final successful overall approach to defeating the PKK, there are several that bear mention here.

Village evacuation strategy

From 1992 to 2000, the state also carried out resettlement of inhabitants from remote Kurdish villages into larger villages in order to improve its control over the Kurdish population and to completely break the link between the PKK and its supporters. Between 1046 and 2000 villages, and some 380,000 people, were affected by this measure (Unal 2012b: 437). Given the geographic characteristics of the region it would have been impossible to create security bases in every village. Therefore, the best alternative—in conjunction with using the GKKS—was to resettle the inhabitants into larger centralized villages and to physically restrict contact with the PKK (Kocher 2002; Unal 2012a: 61). Undoubtedly, this strategy had a very negative psychological effect upon the population in that forceful relocation of entire settlements entailed leaving behind people’s homes. In some cases, evacuations were carried out forcefully, resulting in accusations of brutality against the government (Kocher 2002: 6). Nonetheless, in terms of the strategy’s effectiveness in

148 After his capture in 1999, Öcalan admitted his mistake (of 1993) “in not seeing and evaluating the preparations the state was making and therefore missing an historic opportunity” (Öcalan quoted in Gunter (2008: 69). 123

curbing the PKK violence, it proved to generate the desired strategic effect. Despite the increasing level of violence until 1994, the aggregate levels of violence149 started declining, reaching the lowest point in 2000. While evacuation cannot be fully responsible for this reduction of violence, it certainly had a positive effect on the decline, because it helped disrupt PKK’s logistical support within the region (Unal 2012a: 63-66).

Cutting off external support

In geopolitical, political and grand strategic terms, the early 1990s proved to be crucial for the Turkish state in its effort to gain the upper hand over the PKK. Serendipity played a role. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 provided favorable conditions for the Turks. Indeed, the end of the Soviet Union meant that the PKK had lost its main patron. This helped Turkey in its campaign against the PKK, by essentially removing a great deal of the external support the PKK enjoyed (Cornell 2001: 42-43; Nachmani 2003: 43-44; 48-49). Another geopolitical factor was the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991. This allowed the Turkish military to conduct more cross-border raids against PKK positions in the KAZ (Gunter 2011: 91). Among the most prominent operations were Operation Northern Iraq (1992), (1994, 1995), (1997) and (1997) (Unal 2012a: 97; 2016c). 150 During Operation Steel, for example, thirty-five thousand Turkish troops were deployed into Northern Iraq to hunt down PKK insurgents (Cornell 2001: 42; Romano 2012: 233). According to the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet (n.d.), approximately 568 PKK insurgents were “neutralized” as the result of the operation. This operational success was also largely indebted to the support of the Kurdish forces of the governing KDP in the KAZ who knew the terrain and whose support was secured by the Turkish government through “compellence and positive inducements”, i.e., Turkey’s threat to end the KAZ and its promise of more open borders (Romano 2012: 234).151

149 The aggregate levels of violence refer to violence initiated by both the PKK and the Turkish security forces. The high levels of violence up to 1994 can be explained through increased numbers of clashes between both parties. 150 For a more detailed account on the legal background and the Iraq-Turkey cooperation, see Keskin (2008: 59-75). 151 After the Gulf War, the Coalition forces protection of the KAZ was dependent upon Turkey. Turkey was the only lifeline to the Iraqi Kurds; and this fact was used as a bargaining chip to get the Peshmerga to assist Turkey 124

As part of its cross border raids, the Turkish Army used small units of lightly armed Special Forces—a tactic suggested in several writings on COIN (Callwell 1914: 142-143)— supported by close air support, which allowed for both flexibility and maneuverability. These units operated both along the Turkish-Iraqi border and inside Northern Iraq, forcing the PKK to fight even in winter, and to abandon their previously protected strongholds (Elik 2012: 87) thereby generating an element of surprise (as part of the dislocation strategy as explained in Chapter IX). Similarly, Syria, which had been the most decisive PKK ally (and also having lost its Soviet patron), was now coerced into cooperation. Diplomatic pressure upon Damascus resulting from Turkey’s new improved relationship with Israel and subsequent signing of the Adana Agreement in 1998 (explained below) helped Turkey convince the Assad regime to abandon all support to the PKK and to expel its members from Syria’s territory the same year (Marcus 2007; Unal 2012a; 2014).

Unsuccessful population-centric measures

On the home front during this period (1991-2000), influential measures were taken. President Özal, who had introduced a state of emergency in 1987, now changed his tune. Beginning in 1991, he brought in some moderate population-centric approaches—such as the lifting of certain restrictions related to the expression of the Kurdish culture and the use of Kurdish language (January 1991) and allowing for freedom of expression (1995). These were implemented to address the ‘Kurdish issue’, taking an important step towards the recognition of the Kurdish identity which had been undermined by the prohibition of everything Kurdish. Özal was now in favor of countering the threat through more than just military means, namely, through a political solution (Efegil 2011: 29-30; Gunter 2011). In addition, these changes at the grand strategic level would improve Turkey’s international reputation among its Western counterparts, especially due to Turkey’s aspiration to join the (cf. Nachmani 2003: 47). The changes were important in that—coupled with the PKK’s military setbacks—Öcalan (March 8 1993 quoted in Gunter 2011: 94) declared a unilateral ceasefire stating: “I am giving up the armed struggle…”.

with the PKK. Additionally, the PKK started to compete with the local political parties in the KAZ. This fact did not resonate well with Iraqi Kurds. For a more detailed account, see Romano (2012: 234). 125

However, after Özal’s death152 in 1993, the moderate efforts came to a halt and the domestic political landscape changed, offering a more favorable political ground to pursue a more enemy-centric approach (Unal 2016a). This view was supported by Özal’s successor, President Suleyman Demirel, who, like the military,153 considered his predecessor’s policies as a threat to the Turkish nation (Gunter 2011: 92-95). The PKK now came to be considered a ‘strategic threat’ (earlier, there was no consensus about the nature of the PKK threat, thus it was merely a ‘security threat’). On the military level, and within the overall ‘cordon and search’ strategy now pertaining, there were several, albeit minor, attempts made to pursue more humane or population-centric approaches, amid heavy enemy-centric operations. By the mid-1990s, for instance, the Turkish Army had realized the importance of winning over the key population in the southeastern region. Efforts to achieve this were made through the enforcement of better discipline within the ranks of the Army while on operations, as well as through public relations campaigns which focused on the introduction of better health and educational facilities in the region (Cornell 2001: 42). Other steps were also taken to improve the reputation of the Turkish Army, e.g., the bodies of rebels were no longer displayed publicly, body searches of women were conducted only by (police) women and Turkish soldiers faced conviction if caught committing crimes against Kurdish citizens (Nachmani 2003: 43; 47). However, despite these measures, human rights abuses still regularly took place, including torture and disappearances. According to Steinvorth (2009), “[t]hroughout the 1980s and 1990s, thousands of civil rights activists, politicians and businesspeople suspected of having ties with the PKK were kidnapped and murdered”. In other words, winning over the key population was not at the forefront of the agenda notwithstanding some steps taken into that direction. The main focus remained on the physical destruction of the enemy.

152 Özal was in favor of amnesty and cease-fire with the PKK. See Can (November 21 2012) and Cohen (February 7 1991). 153 As noted earlier, the military institution still had a strong voice in political circles. Demirel, by the time he became President, had already experienced the power of the military. He was forced to resign his position as prime minister on March 12, 1971 in order to avoid a military takeover of the government (Varol 2013: 741). Disagreeing with the military was still a risky endeavor. Until 1999, the military retained a firm grip on external and internal political affairs (Bardakçi 2013: 413). 126

Decapitation of the PKK

Perhaps one of the central factors which helped conclude the last phase of the conflict was Öcalan’s actual capture in 1999. Emboldened and enabled by security cooperation with Israel, in October 1998 Turkey pushed Damascus to expel the PKK leader from Syria. President Assad had to give in to Turkey’s demands given the geopolitical situation. Syria found itself between the hammer and the anvil, that is, between Turkey and Israel. In October 1998, Turkey signed an anti-terror cooperation act with Syria, the Adana Agreement, after having threatened Syria with a military intervention. When Assad agreed to abandon all support to the PKK, to include expelling its leader, the Turkish military agreed to stop conducting operations—aimed at destroying PKK bases—deep in Syrian territory (the Hatay region) (Nachmani 2003: 44; 48; Unal 2012b: 437). Öcalan’s arrest in Nairobi in 1999 (Wise, Lang: 2013: 19) delivered a heavy blow to the PKK given that the organization was strongly hierarchical with Öcalan being the sole decision maker. The PKK structure suffered greatly, since it relied on a totalitarian-style leadership system (pyramid organization) with a full dependence upon Öcalan’s ironfisted rule (Marcus 2007: 33-51; 89-96). After his capture, Öcalan called on the PKK’s fighters to withdraw from Turkey and to lay down their arms, encouraging the organization to instead pursue its goals via legitimate means. Concerned about the survival of their leader, who initially faced the death penalty, 154 the PKK membership obeyed.

In the same year, the second-in-command, Semdin Sakik, was also captured. This likewise had an extremely negative impact upon the PKK and led to other PKK members having to flee due to fear of being captured (Nachmani 2003: 44). In this case decapitation of the insurgent organization proved to be very effective. The PKK’s unilateral ceasefire then came in February 2000. After a long and costly struggle, the conflict had ended. The Turkish states’ victory meant that the government had successfully achieved the desired political end- state, namely, the removal of the PKK as a threat to the state. From early 2000 onwards, the remainder of the old PKK, now quartered in the KAZ, underwent several transformations and name changes, evolving into a new organization

154 Initially, Öcalan was sentenced to death by the State Security Court under Article 125 of the Turkish Penal Code. However, this decision was not approved given the outside pressure and Turkey’s wish to become a member of the European Union. See also, Parliamentary Assembly (1999: 13-18). 127

which sought to establish the necessary legitimacy to gain both national and international recognition (Cornell 2001: 42; Unal 2016b). While these attempts failed in the long run, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the subsequent evolution of the new PKK.

Conclusion

The conclusion to the PKK insurgency can be attributed to a variety of factors. These are on the political, grand strategic, military strategic and operational levels. It cannot, however, be said with certainty which of these factors was the most decisive in leading to the overall outcome. Below I summarize the most important of the factors that led to Ankara’s ‘success’ in the struggle with its PKK adversary. The judgement here takes into account both the strategic errors made by the PKK as well as the relevant policies and strategies adopted by the Turkish state.

Factors that contributed to Ankara’s ‘success’

As we have seen, the Turkish states’ initial response to the insurgency was enemy- centric: i.e., highly kinetic, centered upon killing or capturing the enemy. In 1987, the government declared a state of emergency in its southeastern provinces. The overall aim was to deny the PKK both geographical shelter and human support (Nachmani 2003: 47-48).155 While this coercive approach at the operational and tactical levels was more-or-less consistent throughout the whole campaign, important shifts in policies and military strategies helped the Turkish state/Army gain the upper hand.

In chronological order, the first factor which was important the introduction of the GKKS. These village guard units were extremely useful in providing a defensive capability for the Kurdish villages, in providing intelligence on the PKK militants and in preventing coercive PKK means to recruit fighters. The inability of the PKK to apply violent recruitment techniques provided the population with more incentives to join the GKKS and thus to support the government.

155 As explained earlier, the execution of this strategy was extremely heavy-handed resulting in destruction of villages. 128

A second important factor which hurt the PKK was the village evacuation strategy adopted in 1992. While this strategy had a significantly negative effect on the population in general and triggered migration from the southeastern region to urban centers (and in some cases, to other countries), it nonetheless undermined the PKK’s active/tacit support base.

A third factor was the adjustment of the military doctrines which underpinned the military strategic approaches adopted by the Turkish military. The first shift was the implementation of the cordon and search doctrine in 1992. This facilitated the state forces in their attempts to capture and ‘neutralize’ PKK fighters. Additionally, in this final cordon and search phase the Turkish Army started employing joint ground and air offensives to better counter the PKK’s guerrilla tactics.

The final factor was Turkey’s effort to dismantle the PKK’s logistical support and safe areas through diplomatic means. This was done by isolating the organization from its strongholds beyond Turkey’s borders (i.e., in Iraq and Syria) Coercive diplomacy against Syria and cooperation with the Iraqi Kurds were important measures which, combined with Turkey’s decapitation strategy employed throughout the campaign, led to the capture of the PKK leader and, subsequently, forced the PKK to withdraw fully from Turkey and declare a unilateral ceasefire in February 2000. At this point Turkey’s desired political end-state was achieved and therefore this can be considered as a successful conclusion to this COIN campaign. The remainder of the old organization underwent several transformations (renaming itself to Kongra-GEL, for instance, in order to distance itself from the old PKK). The evolution of the new PKK, however, remains beyond the scope of this chapter.

Overall, the Turkish approach was predominantly enemy-centric, despite some limited recognition that the population was important (especially during Özal’s leadership in the early 1990s). Through trial and error, the Turkish state came to recognize the nature of the PKK and its modus operandi, and successfully developed an approach through which it could be effectively countered both nationally and internationally. The PKK had no choice but to declare a ceasefire which effectively ended the PKK’s 1984-2000 insurgency.

129

Chapter VII: Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka

Introduction

This chapter examines the final first-party case study, namely, Sri Lanka’s COIN campaign against the Tamil Tigers (or Liberation Tigers of or LTTE). The aim is to elucidate which military strategic approaches the Sri Lankan government forces adopted over the course of the insurgency and which of these led to the overall success of the campaign and the final defeat of the LTTE in 2009. The Sri Lankan case, as mentioned in the introduction, is exceptional in terms of its geography, the resources available to the military, and the capabilities of the insurgents, which largely surpass those discussed in the previous case studies (Peru and Turkey). As will be discussed in Chapter IX, these differences across various dimensions allow for a cross-comparison of the chosen first-party counterinsurgency cases. This chapter begins with a historical background to the conflict. This is followed by an overview of the conflict and an exploration of the LTTE’s organizational structure, its goals, and the strategic and tactical approaches applied in seeking to achieve those goals. Further I discuss the Sri Lankan state’s counterinsurgency campaign, briefly examining the early periods of the insurgency. Finally, I explore in some depth the last period of the insurgency, the Eelam War IV (2006-2009), focusing on the key political, grand and military strategic and operational factors which led to the defeat of the LTTE.

Historical background

Ethnic and religious makeup of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an island located in the Indian Ocean, and shares a maritime border with India to the northwest. It has been characterized by its religious diversity and ethnic pluralism. The island’s population (using 1981 figures) is composed of Buddhists (69.3 percent), Hindus (15.5 percent), Muslims (7.6 percent) and Christians (7.6) percent (Bandarage 2009: 5). The main ethnic group is the Sinhalese, who constitute 74 percent of the total population, followed by the largest minority, namely Sri Lankan (12.7 percent), who originally came to the island from South India. There are also minorities of Indian Tamils (5.5 percent) 130

and Muslim Tamils (7.5 percent). 156

Colonization shaping the ground for an ethno-sectarian divide

Sri Lanka’s history has been dominated by Western colonialism. The Portuguese were the first to arrive in 1505/06 and gave the island the name Ceylon (which remained its official name until the introduction of a new Constitution in 1972). After the Portuguese, the Dutch became the new colonial master in 1640. However, the most lasting cultural and political impression upon Ceylon was left by the British, who seized the island from the Dutch in 1796. They consolidated their rule in 1815 in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, and remained until Ceylon’s independence in 1948. According to some analysts, the ethnic divide between the Sinhalese and the Tamil communities was largely a byproduct of British rule (Bandarage 2009: 28-29; Hashim 2010: 4-5). According to Peebles, the British promoted ethnic competition as part of a divide-and-rule strategy, by instilling the notion that the ‘Dravidian’ Tamils and ‘Aryan’ Sinhalese were actually two distinct races (Peebles 2006: 67). Divided thus, the Sinhalese constituted not only a majority, but a dominant majority. The British also integrated previously separated regions into a highly centralized colonial construct, redrawing the boundaries of ‘provinces’ to fit their administrative needs. For instance, in the northern and eastern areas, the British carved out what might be seen as the “Tamil homeland” from what had been the Kandyan Kingdom (Gosh 2003: 47-51).157 Before then there had never existed a “unified Tamil entity” on the island (Bandarage 2009: 29). The British instituted a liberal and progressive government system, creating a plantation economy that contributed to the emergence of middle and upper classes. Perhaps most importantly, they created a universal education system that began to give minorities the same social advantages enjoyed by the Sinhalese majority. This was especially the case with those in the economically disadvantaged northern region, which was predominantly Tamil populated (Fair 2004: 17; Peebles 2006: 5-7; Bandarage 2009: 29-31; Hashim 2010). The educational opportunities offered gave the Tamils the ability to compete with their Sinhalese counterparts for positions in the colonial bureaucracy and in setting up commercial enterprises in the

156 There is also a small community of so-called ‘Burghers’, i.e., Sri Lankans with European roots. Each of these groups suffers from major rifts. 157 Prior to the British intervention, the Kandyan Kingdom was a unified kingdom inhabited by both Tamils and Sinhalese. Yet, the new colonial master pursued the strategy of “divide and conquer” to avoid a resurgence of Kandyan nationalism. See Gosh (2003: 47-51). 131

capital and beyond. Over time they actually came to be overrepresented in the administrative system and in public life (Bandarage 2009: 30-31; Hashim 2010: 4-5). This new-found influence of the Tamils contributed to the development over the nineteenth century of an ethno-sectarian divide between them and the previously privileged Sinhalese that had not previously existed. This divide and an increasing anxiety and resentment on the part of the Sinhalese majority came to be a major by-product of British rule.

The privileged position of the Tamils, however, was not long lasting. The first setback came with the introduction of territorially based representation and subsequent attempts to introduce democracy to the island in the 1920s, which gave rise to the so-called ‘ethnic problem’. The first elections in 1921 to the Legislative Council—established upon territorial representation—tipped the balance of power in favor of the Sinhalese. The Tamils started to lose their influence and began campaigning against the new regulations that disadvantaged them (Bandarage 2009: 34). By 1923, the Ceylon Tamil politician Ponnambalam Arunachalam had founded the Ceylon Tamil League with the purpose of providing a forum for expressing Tamil demands (Peebles 2006: 84-86). Arunachalam was the first Tamil leader to describe Tamils as an oppressed group, and to envision the creation of a Tamil Eelam; that is, an independent Tamil state in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka.

The rise of Tamil grievances in light of political reforms

The second wave of Tamil disillusionment began after Ceylon was granted independence in February 1948. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam formed the Sri Lanka Tamil State Party (ITAK hereafter) in 1949 (Peebles 2006: 100-101), which called for a federal political structure and, most importantly, Tamil regional autonomy. This marked the beginning of the Tamil separatist struggle. ITAK worked toward creating a unified, island-wide Tamil ethnic identity, which did not exist at that time (early 1950s). Further, ITAK sought to raise a nationalist spirit amongst the Tamils, rejecting any idea of a multi-ethnic state, and stressing the need for separation and the creation of the Tamil homeland. This concept, therefore, predated the outbreak of Sinhalese violence in the mid-1950s and subsequent oppressive government policies, discussed below (Mehta 2010: 41). However, ITAK lacked in popularity at that time. It would become more influential only after the introduction of the language legislation in 1956 (Bandarage 2009: 39-41). 132

The Language Act (the Official Language Act, no. 33 of 1956)

In the 1956 election the People’s United Front (MEP, hereafter), a Sinhala dominated party, promised to make the Sinhalese language the only official language on the island. The act in question was the Official Language Act, no. 33 of 1956. Passing this act without any qualification to protect minority rights caused a growing fear amongst the Ceylon Tamil leaders because the institutionalization of Sinhalese threatened forced assimilation and possible loss of the distinctive Tamil culture. This act came to be the turning point in Tamil- Sinhala relations, causing wide-spread ethnic violence across the country with the exception of the capital where the ITAK initiated non-violent disobedience protest (Bandarage 2009: 42-45; Hashim 2010).

The Educational Reform and Standardization

Widespread proficiency in the English language among Tamils helped them to gain access to university education (especially in science faculties) and attain good employment positions thereafter. Given these advantages, in 1970 the Sinhala-dominated government sought to introduce the so-called ‘standardization policy’ aimed at admitting “a politically- acceptable ratio of Tamil to Sinhalese students” to science faculties of the University of Ceylon (Bandarage 2009: 54). This policy was again perceived as a way of curtailing the advantages of Ceylon Tamils. This served as another motive for unrest among Tamils and helped further mobilize them into a national movement against the Sinhalese. By this stage, the movement was not composed just of the Tamil elite, but also encompassed disillusioned and marginalized youths from other regions (Bandarage 2009: 59-63).

The 1972 Constitution

The final factor that contributed to the formation and the rise of Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and the subsequent insurgency was the Constitution which was adopted in 1972. This new Constitution stated that Sri Lanka was a unitary state that would place Buddhism above all and that the task of the state would be to foster and protect the religion while granting every citizen freedom of thought (Bandarage 2009: 64). Given that Tamils were predominantly not Buddhists and the Sinhalese were, this was regarded as another discriminatory measure that reinforced the need for a separate Tamil state, the idea of which has been occupying Tamil elites for more than fifty years. 133

Beginning of the armed conflict

The combination of Tamil grievances factors led, by the 1970s, to the rise of Tamil groups bent on violence to reflect their sense of discrimination. These came to coalesce around what became the main insurgent formation, the LTTE, formed by its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran (Peebles 2006: 127; Bandarage 2009; Hashim 2010: 7-8). The main goal of the LTTE was a separate Tamil homeland. As Prabhakaran stated in a press conference in Kilinochchi on April 10, 2002, the aim was threefold: “Tamil homeland, Tamil nationality and Tamil right to self-determination” (Prabhakaran quoted in Hashim 2010: 8). However, these demands were more than the Sri Lankan government could agree upon given that, as stated earlier, Sri Lanka was declared to be a unitary state (Hashim 2010: 8). Violence resulted. Formally, the LTTE insurgency commenced with an ambush of police officers in Jaffna on April 1, 1978 leaving four dead. However, the true harbinger of the ethnic conflict came in July 1983 with an LTTE attack on an army convoy in the Northern Province that led to the deaths of thirteen soldiers (DeVotta 2010: 158).

Conflict Overview

Again, in order to evaluate the COIN approaches adopted by the Sri Lankan government it is first necessary to establish the nature of the insurgency itself. Creating a clear understanding of how the insurgent movement evolved during the conflict will facilitate the comprehension of the state response (discussed in latter sections). The LTTE insurgency lasted for three decades and was divided into four phases: Eelam War I (1983-1987), Eelam War II (1990-1995), Eelam War III (1995-2002) and Eelam War IV (2006-2009). Each of these phases is briefly discussed in the following sections to create a structured overview of this protracted conflict.

Eelam War I and aftermath

The attack on the soldiers in July 1983 lead to nationwide anti-Tamil communal violence on the part of the Sinhalese majority, resulting in the death of almost four hundred Tamils. A huge number of Tamils living in Sinhalese areas then had to flee to the Tamil- dominated regions to the North and East. Some took refuge in Tamil Nadu in southern India, 134

while others fled to the United States and Europe. The state itself also began a heavy-handed and enemy-centric response that included large-scale arrests, detentions, torture and extra- judicial executions, and ordinary Tamils were subject to police and military violence. This increased support among Tamils for the insurgents. The LTTE, which only had some 200 dedicated members at that time, benefited from a surge of new recruits as a result of the activities of the security forces (Marks 1996: 185; Bandarage 2009: 123-124). During this first phase, the insurgents had limited capability vis-à-vis the state forces, and were thus restricted to small-scale guerrilla attacks and terrorism. It was actually India’s intervention into the conflict that ensured the LTTE’s survival after Eelam War I had ended. India had been supporting the LTTE from the early 1970s until the signing of what was known as the Indo-Sri-Lankan Accord in 1987,158 which marked the end of Eelam War I (Gunaratna 1993; Mehta 2010; Rajapaksa 2013).

India’s involvement between 1987 and 1990

As Eelam War I broke out India became concerned over the influx of refugees into Tamil Nadu and the possibility of a spill-over, and sought to intervene in order to mediate a settlement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE through peaceful means (Indo- Lanka Accord 1987: para 2-16; Zartman 2008: 158-159; Sengupta & Ganguly 2013; Hashim 2013: 93-94). From October 1987 to 1990, an Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF) engaged in a 30-month-long campaign to try and keep order by disarming Tamil militants. However, the IPKF’s peacekeeping efforts failed. The underlying reason for the failure of the mission was the confusion related to the mission objective of the force. At first, the IPKF sought to ‘protect’ the LTTE while in later stages it had to fight the insurgents in order to keep the peace. However, the IPKF was not suited for COIN operations (Sengupta & Ganguly 2013:

105-106; 109-110; Lalwani 2017: 127). Indian troops left in 1990.

158 This accord served as a truce between India and the GoSL. Prior to signing this accord, India was both supporting the LTTE and engaging in humanitarian support in Sri Lanka. The Accord stipulated that the GoSL would allow for a referendum to decide whether the Northern and Eastern provinces—where the majority of Tamils resided—would be linked as one administrative unit or remain separate. Additionally, the GoSL was to lift its Emergency Rule by August 15, 1987. The implementation of this Agreement would be overseen by India. For more information, see Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987. 135

Eelam War II and the failed peace negotiations

After India’s failed attempt to mediate a peaceful settlement, the LTTE resumed its armed struggle following India’s withdrawal. In 1991, the insurgents assassinated , India’s Prime Minister, thereby totally losing India’s support (Roberts 2009; Bandarage 2009: 129; 133; 147-155; Hashim 2013: 31).159 This, however, did not preclude the LTTE from continuing its armed struggle in order to create a separate Tamil state (Hashim 2013: 98). The brutal fighting continued with atrocities being committed by both sides. In 1994, exhausted by the war, the Sri Lankan government (under , serving as president from 1994 to 2005) initiated peace negotiations, which ended Eelam War II. The LTTE, however, was not interested in settling for anything less than an independent Tamil state. Some of its demands (e.g., free movement of the LTTE cadres in the Eastern part of Sri Lanka) were too much for the government to accept (Hashim 2013: 102). By 1995, the peace talks failed to bring about the desired settlement leading up to the third phase of the conflict: Eelam War III.

Eelam War III and the ceasefire agreement of 2002

The third phase was dominated by fierce conventional fighting by both sides with the Sri Lankan forces seizing control of the Jaffna peninsula (the far north of the island and the Tamil heartland) in 1995. This, however, did not bring the conflict to an end. The LTTE was pushed into the Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka and continued to operate from there. Despite numerous offensives launched by the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE managed to resist and launch counteroffensives (notwithstanding its smaller force numbers), which severely damaged the morale of the Sri Lankan forces. Nevertheless, the LTTE failed at regaining control of the Jaffna peninsula. With both sides exhausted, a stalemate was reached in 2000 (Hashim 2013:105-113). The fighting came to a brief halt in 2001 when the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire which it broke (the same year) through a new series of offensives against

159 The assassination of Gandhi was a calculated move by the LTTE given that there existed a belief that Gandhi would not only stay in the way of the LTTE’s goal to create a new state but also reintroduce Indian troops to Sri Lanka. See Roberts (2009: 126). 136

the government forces. By December 2001, an external actor—Norway—pushed for a permanent ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the warring parties. The CFA was signed in 2002, thus, marking the end of the third phase of the conflict. From 2002 onwards, the LTTE sought to slowly establish a Tamil state through political means. Repeated violations of the CFA, however, took place between 2002 and 2006, setting the stage for the final phase of the conflict which would lead to the LTTE’s demise.

Eelam War VI and the end of LTTE

In 2005, after presidential elections, Majinda Rajapaksa came to power. Unlike his predecessor (Kumaratunga), the new President demonstrated considerable political resolve to eradicate—not negotiate with—the insurgents once and for all. During the 2006-2009 period the government managed to finally defeat the LTTE by creating an effective grand strategic framework and, thus, directing all state assets towards that goal and implementing a broad spectrum approach encompassing all levels of war. By 2009, the LTTE was defeated: its leader had been killed along with other senior cadre members and all the LTTE-dominated areas had been regained by the state forces (cf. Mehta 2010: 43-44; Hashim 2013; Tikku 2016).

How did the LTTE end up losing? What did the GoSL do in terms of COIN activity that brought this about? To answer these questions, I will begin by examining the nature of the insurgent actor—the LTTE.

The LTTE

The LTTE’s ideological underpinnings

Several analysts and academics such as Marks (1996: 186-187; 2005: 174), O’Duffy (2007: 265) and Scott and Roy (2014: 177) suggest that the LTTE’s basic ideology was strongly influenced by Marxism. The solution the LTTE saw to the oppression of the Tamils was the formation of a separate socialist Tamil state, i.e., Tamil Eelam. While the LTTE did flirt with Marxism in its early incubation stage, it had, however, abandoned the ideology altogether by 137

1980 (Steven & Gunaratna 2004: 196). The LTTE is better regarded as an ethnic insurgent group, to borrow from Daniel Byman’s terminology (Byman 1998: 154). The LTTE, like many other insurgent organizations, had a hierarchical structure, with the Central Governing Committee headed by Prabhakaran, who was at the same time ‘Commander-in-Chief’. The Committee oversaw two wings, a military and a political wing. According to O’Duffy, the political wing was subordinate to the military wing (O’Duffy 2007: 265). The military wing had several subdivisions including: the naval group, the ; an airborne wing (led by Prabhakaran’s son), the ; an elite ground (guerrilla) force, the Charles Anthony Regiment; and a suicide squad, the . Additionally, there was also an intelligence group and an International Secretariat (explained in the External Support section). While the political wing became prominent after November 2002 in light of the ceasefire of that year, it clearly remained subordinate to Prabhakaran (O’Duffy 2007: 265).

The LTTE drew its fighters mostly from the lower middle class or poor laborers. Recruits were initially gained mostly through non-coercive measures; although coercive recruitment became more common as the conflict wore on (Lilja 2009: 313-314; Gates & Roy 2014: 178). The LTTE was also heavily reliant on women and children to fill its ranks (Steven & Gunaratna 2004). The women who joined the LTTE underwent rigorous training, similar to that which the men underwent and they played a large role in the suicide squads that the LTTE formed (the Black Tigers—see below). Fair (2004: 29) also estimates that thirty percent of the personnel of the Sea Tigers (see below) were female. From the 1990s onward the LTTE also resorted to abducting children from areas it controlled to increase its personnel strength (Lilja 2009: 316).

Prabhakaran succeeded in creating a cult of personality whereby every member of the LTTE pledged their allegiance not only to the struggle for Tamil Eelam but also to the leader Prabhakaran himself (O’Duffy 2007: 265). A high level of discipline, including the acceptance of martyrdom as part of suicide attacks, was achieved through vigorous indoctrination of the cadres, who had to banish their fear of death. Captured fighters were prepared to consume a cyanide pill they habitually carried around their necks (South Asia Terrorism Portal n.d.; Gates & Roy 2014: 178-179). The LTTE were insurgents of a type that 138

few Western forces had ever faced.

Modus Operandi

Given its numerical inferiority, in the early stages of the insurgency (from its first major attack in 1983 to the early 1990s) the LTTE relied mostly upon the use of terrorism. It enjoyed only marginal popular support and had only around 200 core members. The LTTE employed classic guerrilla tactics, i.e., small-scale attacks on police stations and government supporters (Marks 2005: 174). However, the harsh response to LTTE violence on the part of the state proved to be more beneficial to the creation of a distinct Tamil national identity than did the LTTE violence itself. The heavy-handed approach of the (GoSL hereafter) reinforced the impression that the state and its army were acting specifically against the Tamils and protecting the interests of the Sinhalese majority (Byman 1998: 155).

By the end of the 1990s, and with the support of many Tamils, the LTTE had become a disciplined and highly effective hybrid (semi-conventional) fighting force with over 10,000 cadres with a broad spectrum of capabilities. Suicide attacks were conducted (predominantly in the capital, Colombo) against Sinhalese politicians and intellectuals, and critical infrastructure (e.g., the International Airport and the Central Bank), while at the same time a basically conventional war was waged against state forces in the north and east (especially, in early 2000). The LTTE—unlike virtually all other insurgent organizations—also had air (albeit limited) and naval arms (see below) (Gunaratna 2005: 77-78; Pavey & Smith 2009; Rajapaksa 2013: 142).

Despite the fact that the LTTE did not enjoy any numerical or technological advantages vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan armed forces (which were estimated at over 200,000 personnel in 2010) (Rajapaksa 2013: 143), the group still managed to outmaneuver the latter through skillful use of resources and tactical mobility (Hashim 2010: 15-16). By the end of the conflict (during the last phase from 2006 to 2009) the LTTE was able to hold territory and develop an almost de facto state within Sri Lanka (Hashim 2010: 16).

During the course of the conflict, the LTTE aimed at creating hybrid force structures in the land, air and sea domains. Considering the LTTE’s evolution throughout the conflict, Ahmed Hashim (2010: 16-18) argues, its attempts to create an actual (i.e., non hybrid) 139

conventional force remained mixed. The failure to create an efficient conventional force resulted from the fact that its units were both undermanned and underequipped.160 The LTTE conventional ‘brigades’ were unlike true brigades with 2,500 to 3,000 personnel, instead consisting only of 750 to 1,000 soldiers and lacking brigade-level structures. These brigades suffered towards the end of the conflict due to manpower shortages and LTTE’s heavy reliance on undertrained and inexperienced young fighters who were often recruited by force (this would undermine the LTTE’s image among the Tamil population) (DeVotta 2010: 166). And while the Tigers did try to create a formidable air-wing, all they could acquire, however, were light aircraft which were used to carry out some militarily unimpressive raids around Colombo. The LTTE’s most notable achievement was the group’s success in developing advanced maritime capabilities (see below) (Hashim 2010: 17; Hashim 2013).

The LTTE’s naval capabilities The use of sea power was crucial for the LTTE. This was because most of its supplies had to be transported by sea from Tamil Nadu in India across the Palk Strait and, as explained below, from all over the world. For this purpose, the group had its own international shipping network for arms procurement and logistics (Chandradasa 2012a: 4). In addition to the logistical use of its maritime capabilities, the LTTE engaged in what Hashim (2013: 185) calls “maritime terrorism”. In the early 1980’s, during the first phase of the conflict, the LTTE’s naval wing—the Sea Tigers—under the leadership of Colonel ‘’ was a modest collection of small speedboats and fishing vessels equipped with machine guns that posed little challenge to the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN). The Sea Tigers subsequently sought to modernize their capabilities, increasing both the speed and range of their boats. By 2000, they had a myriad of different types of craft equipped with VHF communications, radar, night-vision gear and GPS. These new vessels could easily challenge the SLN’s Israeli-built Dvora fast attack craft (FAC) (DeSilva Ranasinghe 2010b: 43; Hashim 2013: 168). This LTTE navy had basically two forms of boats for interdiction operations. These were the small and fast attack vessels equipped with machine guns and grenade launchers for conventional operations, along with armored suicide boats loaded with explosive charges which would attack Sri Lankan naval vessels. Both forms (30 of the attack craft and 8 to 10 suicide boats—

160 For an opposing view, see Pavey and Smith (2009). Pavey and Smith (2009: 192) argue that the LTTE, indeed, succeeded in creating a “formidable fighting force”. 140

which obviously reduced over time) operated in swarms during the Eelam War IV (Murphy 2010: 121; J. Smith 2011; Layton 2015). The LTTE also attempted to build its own submarines in Thailand. However, these attempts were undermined since the plot was discovered in 2003 (Murphy 2010: 121). Notwithstanding this, the Sea Tigers constituted, in Martin Murphy’s (2007: 67) words, “the most capable and tactically astute of all the sea- borne insurgency groups”. This fact created a significant COIN problem for the forces of the GoSL.

The LTTE and the use of suicide terrorism Suicide terrorism became the hallmark of the LTTE’s struggle against the GoSL. The first attack took place when a LTTE drove a truck loaded with explosive into an army camp in July 1987, killing 40 soldiers. While the LTTE did not invent suicide terrorism, it became the group’s tactic of choice which it used to significant effect (Waldman 2003; Hashim 2010). The LTTE had a special battalion dedicated to suicide attacks named the “Black Tigers”. The Black Tigers operated both on land and, as noted, at sea. Those operating at sea were, of course, referred to as the “Black Sea Tigers” (Hashim 2013: 167- 168).

Among the more notable suicide attacks were the killings of the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Sriperumbudur (a town in Tamil Nadu) in May 1991 and the assassination of Sri Lankan President in May 1993 (Whaley Eager 2016: 136-137).161 Interestingly, the LTTE targeted both moderate and hardline Sinhalese figures in order to maintain a sense of antipathy towards the Tamils across the whole of the Sinhalese community. Prabhakaran did not want any reconciliation that might lead to a ceasefire or the creation of a federal state (Biziouras 2014: 63). The LTTE targeted not only politicians, but also physical structures—military, economic and religious (Hashim 2010: 12- 13; Hashim 2013: 25; Rajapaksa 2013).

LTTE’s suicide attacks were strategically important to demonstrate LTTE’s resolve to fight for their separatist cause. These attacks served as a component of what can be looked upon as the LTTE’s attrition strategy against the GoSL as well as a coercive instrument which

161 The LTTE was known to use female suicide bombers as in the case of the Indian Prime Minister. 141

sought to exhaust the government and its forces both physically and psychologically in order to undermine the state’s resolve and provoke its forces (cf. Pape 2003: 346). Even after the LTTE took de facto control of the Tamil-dominated Northern province and parts of the Eastern Provinces following the IPKF’s departure in 1990, the LTTE continued to use suicide attacks to demonstrate its determination to push for more gains and to prevent any calls from among the Sinhalese for accommodation with the Tamils. These attacks duly triggered (as desired) a disproportionate retaliation by the Sri Lankan Army on Tamil areas, which played into the LTTE’s hands in terms of gaining support from among the Tamil population (Biziouras 2014: 63, 66).

External Support

This section examines the extensive external support that the LTTE had enjoyed throughout the conflict. This aspect is important to examine given that, as Record (2007) argues, such support can constitute the main lifeline of an insurgent movement. In the Sri Lankan case, it helped the LTTE sustain its armed struggle against the GoSL. This external support would be, as shown later, a critical point that the GoSL would take into account and exploit during the final phase of the conflict (2006-2009).

The LTTE was sophisticated when it came to building a network of external support using the Tamil diaspora abroad which, as Daniel Byman et al. (2001: 54) point out, provided the LTTE with everything it needed to stage a successful insurgency. The LTTE support structure had two main elements, namely propaganda and finance. A third element, which did not rely on the diaspora, was arms procurement. All the activities related to these types of external support were directed by the LTTE’s International Secretariat (Byman, Chalk et al. 2001: 43; Chalk 2008; Fair 2004: 12).

The LTTE’s propaganda structure consisted of pressure groups, media units, charities and NGOs seeking to consolidate political support abroad, from both Tamil expatriates as well as their respective host governments (Jayasekara 2007). By 1998, the LTTE was represented in fifty-four countries across the globe, with a heavy emphasis on Western states with large Tamil expatriate communities (Byman, Chalk et al. 2001: 44-45). However, the LTTE’s use of the internet to disseminate their propaganda is what made them truly global. This was achieved through email and websites. These efforts helped the Tigers to not only 142

increase its world-wide support base, but also to depict the Sri Lankan government in a negative light. In the information war, the LTTE was far more advanced than the GoSL. Thus, despite the atrocities committed by the LTTE both in Sri Lanka and India (Byman, Chalk et al. 2001: 47), the group—portrayed as a national liberation movement throughout the 1990s—was allowed to establish representative offices in various countries. Only by the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, did some countries (such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom) declare the LTTE a terrorist organization. However, these countries were an exception rather than the rule (Byman, Chalk et al. 2001: 46-49; International Crisis Group 2010: 5-7; Jazeel & Brun 2009: 14).

Parallel to its propaganda efforts, the LTTE had an extensive international fund- raising network with the main sources being direct contribution from Tamil expatriates, funds donated to LTTE’s charities, and investments in Tamil-run businesses. While most donations took place voluntarily, in some cases coercion was involved and intimidation of those who refused to contribute (BBC News 15 March 2006). Another motivating force for direct donations from migrant communities was the LTTE’s success on the battlefield. Military advances made by the LTTE sometimes lead to a dramatic increase in donations. Another important source was money donated to NGOs for various social and relief projects, which would be siphoned off by the LTTE. The group was also heavily involved in people- trafficking, charging large sums of money ($18,000 per person) for a forged visa. These people would be smuggled out of Sri Lanka or India to Western countries (i.e., Europe, the USA and Canada). Finally, the LTTE profited from investments made into legitimate businesses, usually covering capital costs and then splitting revenues with the business owners. Overall, the amount of funds from all sources amounted to approximately $50 million a year by 2000. By 1995, when the LTTE lost control of the Jaffna peninsula, some 90 to 95 per cent of its war budget originated abroad (Byman, Chalk at al. 2001: 49-54).

The LTTE was also provided with arms, ammunition and sanctuaries by external supporters (cf. Tompkins 2012: 252). Before 1987, when the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed, India had been extensively involved in supporting the LTTE, despite the existence of its own Tamil minority in the province of Tamil Nadu (cf. Gunaratna 1993; DeVotta 2010: 164; Keethaponcalan 2011: 40-41; Gates & Roy 2014: 176-177). New Delhi had been 143

supporting the LTTE since the end of the 1970s. Given India’s close ties at this time and during this Cold War era to the Soviet Union, there was great concern that Colombo’s close relationship with the (capitalist) West could lead, for instance, to the presence of Western warships in Sri Lanka’s Trincomalee harbor and to Voice of America transmissions being made from Sri Lankan territory. Additionally, Sri Lanka had links with India’s principal regional adversary, Pakistan. Thus, the main impetus behind India’s support of the LTTE was to put pressure on Sri Lanka to reconsider its general geopolitical stance (Hashim 2010: 18-20). The assistance was coordinated by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s intelligence agency, and consisted of arms supply and insurgent training (Byman, Chalk et al. 2001: 117). However, India’s support for the LTTE did not imply an endorsement of the LTTE’s call for a separate state. Indeed, there was a danger that LTTE success could spill over and ignite a secessionist movement in India’s own Tamil Nadu state (Selvadurai & Smith 2013: 563).

Against this background, and following the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 and the emergence of the escalating refugee problem (in Tamil Nadu), India abandoned its support for the LTTE. Instead, New Delhi sent peacekeeping forces to oversee the implementation of the aforementioned accord and to disarm various Tamil groups, thus forcing the LTTE to look for weaponry and sanctuaries elsewhere (Mehta 2009: 157-158; Hashim 2010: 20). In essence, India changed sides. It came to support the GoSL in the final phase of the conflict (Eelam War IV) (Shashikumar 2009; Selvadurai & Smith 2013). Thus, the LTTE was forced to look for alternative sources of weapons procurement—including from such diverse sources as South Africa and North Korea (Byman, Chalk et al. 2001: 118-122).

In sum, the LTTE’s operations were highly dependent on its external support network to account for its asymmetries on the battlefield. This dependence upon external actors for resource mobilization would become one of the centers of gravity that the GoSL would strike, as part of its COIN approach during Eelam War IV. 144

Sri Lanka’s Government Response

Eelam War I: from 1983 to 1987 and India’s intervention from 1987-90

Having gained a better understanding of the LTTE and the threat it posed to Sri Lanka’s internal security and territorial integrity it is thus necessary to examine the other party to the conflict—the Sri Lankan government. In this section I will discuss the GoSR response to the LTTE as a first-party actor, with the main emphasis being on the last phase of the conflict, namely Eelam War IV (2006-2009). This came to be the decisive phase in terms of the ending of the conflict with a victory for the COIN forces. The purpose of this section is to show the learning curve of Sri Lanka’s political and military leaders and to analyze the measures on the grand strategic and military strategic levels implemented throughout the conflict, and to distinguish what ultimately led to victory over the LTTE.

Throughout the first three phases of the conflict, the GoSL in its overall COIN activity lacked consistency and determination on both political and military levels (Hashim 2013: 92; Baruah 2017). During the first Eelam War the GoSL approach was characterized by the indiscriminate use of force coupled with ‘disappearances’ and the torture of suspects. There was certainly no ‘hearts and minds’ campaign and it was heavily enemy-centric in tone and fought as a conventional war. The Sri Lankan forces, though, were too small and ill-suited to counter the LTTE as an insurgent foe.162 This section will thus concentrate on analyzing the approach adopted by the armed forces in countering the LTTE.

In terms of conducting a serious COIN campaign against the LTTE, the first requirement was to be to increase the size of the SLA. In 1983, at the start of the major LTTE campaign, there were only 16,000 service personnel in the Sri Lankan armed forces. These were volunteers, 11,000 of whom were in the army. The Sri Lankan Air Force had a force of 2,000 at its disposal, while the remaining 3,000 served in the Navy. This changed through the institution of a national draft in 1985 and subsequent recruitment campaigns following the 1983 anti-communal violence by the Sinhalese against the Tamils. The Sri Lankan Army increased its personnel to 30,000 by 1986 (O’Ballance 1989: 28; De Mel 2007: 62; Wickremesekera 2016: 35-36), and the GoSL also developed a modest 10,000-strong

162 While the police force was as guilty as the actual military in this regard, it played a minor COIN role over the years compared to the military (Bandarage 2009: 123). 145

auxiliary COIN force to assist the army (O’Ballance 1989: 53). By 1987, the state had increased the armed forces to a strength of some 40,000. Ranged against it was the LTTE consisting of less than 15,000 fighters (Pape 2005: 314-315). Yet, this numerical superiority of the GoSL forces did not necessarily translate into a relative advantage given that these forces were under-equipped and lacked the skills necessary to fight an elusive enemy which was using guerrilla tactics and terrorism. The Sri Lankan Army (SLA), for instance, had limited mobility due to a lack of transport vehicles. The Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) was also short of combat aircraft, having only transports and helicopters at its disposal (O’Ballance 1989: 78-80).

Notwithstanding, despite these underlying weaknesses, by 1987 the GoSL was succeeding in delivering heavy blows on the LTTE through the use of conventional enemy- centric approach in form of annihilation employed on the military strategic level (Hashim 2013). Given the increased defense spending, the Sri Lankan military was soon capable of launching a major campaign (Vadamarachchi Operation) against the LTTE crippling the organization and almost retaking Jaffna in 1987 (Selvadurai & Smith 2013: 554; Rajapaksa 2013: 141). These military achievements, however, were undermined to a large degree by the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July, 1987 and India’s subsequent involvement in the struggle, when the entry of its peacekeeping force froze the conflict in the LTTE’s favor (Marks 2006: 178-179; 183). However, once in place, Indian troops became involved in fighting the LTTE itself until their withdrawal in 1990. Despite deploying some 100,000 peacekeeping troops to Sri Lanka, India’s peacekeeping campaign proved to be a failure. It failed to disarm the LTTE, and it had prevented the GoSL from defeating the LTTE in 1987 (De Silva 2001: 160-161). The Indian withdrawal actually played into the LTTE’s hands given that its forces seized weapons left behind by the Indian troops (cf. De Silva 2001; Mehta 2009; Bandarage 2009; Keethaponchalan 2011).

It thus can be said that during this first phase of the conflict, the Sri Lankan forces started with a purely enemy-centric approach, acting, however, indiscriminately. There was no specific approach to COIN. The war was conducted in a conventional manner concentrating on classical annihilation of the insurgent force. Over time, notwithstanding, as the size of the state forces increased, they managed—maintaining their enemy-centric 146

focus—to gain the upper hand given that the LTTE was still in its early stages of development (as discussed above). Nonetheless, the prospect of defeating the LTTE crumbled due to India’s intervention which prevented the complete destruction of the insurgents. Instead its involvement in Sri Lanka’s war tipped the balance in the insurgents’ favor.

Eelam War II: from 1990 to 1995

The conflict continued with the LTTE benefiting from India’s withdrawal which gave it time to recover (cf. Hashim 2013: 98). Throughout the 1990s, peace talks continued amid ongoing violence between the government forces and the LTTE which was characterized on the LTTE’s side by semi-conventional warfare, hit-and-run tactics and terrorism. The LTTE maintained its control of the Jaffna Peninsula and the Wanni (an area in the Northern Provinces that is mainly overgrown with jungle).

In military strategic terms, the approach pursued by the armed forces remained conventional, however, this time it focused on regaining the territory under the LTTE control. The military had two main objectives: to constrict the LTTE to the Jaffna Peninsula, and to disrupt insurgent operations in the Wanni (Wickremesekera 2016: 85). However, the ends were not aligned with the ways and the means. The number of Sri Lankan forces was insufficient to pursue these objectives given the need to fight on several fronts simultaneously. This overstretched their manpower and resources. There were simply not enough troops to hold every cleared area. Given such a shortage, the SLA could not possibly implement an operational approach like ‘clear, hold, build’. More so, its convectional approach was ill-suited to counter an intangible opponent. While the military, for instance, made some advances in the jungles of the Wanni, they were not nearly sufficient to reach the outlined objectives. Additionally, due to the emphasis on conventional war-fighting, the large and cumbersome scale of their operations (similar to those used by the Turkish forces during the 1980s), the military tended to give the LTTE enough warning time for a tactical retreat (Wickremesekera 2016: 86-92). Nonetheless, government forces were at least successful at this time in relieving the siege of the SLA base at the base (in 1991) (Hashim 2013: 99). The pass was a geo-strategically important point joining the Jaffna peninsula with the mainland (Bandarage 2009: 166-167; Hashim 2013: 108-111). 147

After several more years of fighting in Eelam War II, despite the aforementioned setbacks, government forces finally managed to clear the East. The introduction of deep penetration operations using small groups of commandos helped them achieve this objective. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) were set up to ensure the insurgents’ retreat from the East (Wickremeseka 2016: 96-97). These new measures introduced resonate with principles such as those laid down by academics such as Bernard Finel (2010), who stressed the importance of controlling the territory. The enemy-centric approach at this stage became more refined. Overall, though there was little thinking about applying specific COIN methods—that are resonant in both Europe and the US—to defeating the LTTE. The LTTE could not be defeated.

However, in addition to the military’s intricate task of defeating the LTTE on the battlefield and retaking the territory under its control, the political landscape changed. The involvement of the Western international community led to peace talks with the LTTE which commenced in October, 1994 and resulted in the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities signed on January 5, 1995 (Bandarage 2009: 157; Peiris 2009: 29), thus bringing Eelam War II to an end. This demonstrates a clear discord in civil-military relations whereby the military were pursuing a military solution while the policy makers sought accommodation thus undermining the overall resolve—the resolve that Clausewitz (1976), Callwell (1996) and Mack (1975)163 put a lot of emphasis upon.

Eelam III: from 1995 to 2002

Differences over the way forward in terms of the degree of autonomy the Tamils could have in their areas led to a breakdown of the ceasefire in April 1995. This marked the beginning of the Eelam War III which lasted until 2002. The GoSL made good early progress, managing to drive the LTTE out of the Jaffna peninsula by October 1995. However, the government’s attempt to consolidate its position was thwarted by continued LTTE resistance and by 1998 the whole campaign had to be abandoned (De Silva 2001: 150; Bandarage 2009: 164-165; Hashim 2013). The COIN campaign failed to bring about the desired results.

Additionally, the LTTE then quickly reversed the gains of the SLA in the North. By

163 Mack argues that guerrillas win “from the progressive attrition of their opponent’s political capability to wage war” (italics in the original) (Mack 1975: 177). 148

the end of 1999, the LTTE had retaken over 1,000 square kilometers of territory, imposing heavy casualties on the SLA. This success triggered an even greater one, namely the LTTE gaining control of the military base at the Elephant Pass in April 2000. In addition to its military operations, the LTTE was also launching terrorist attacks across the country, thus, provoking the armed forces to conduct cordon-and-search operations outside the battle theatre (Rajapaksa 2013: 142-143). The SLA’s conventional (enemy-centric) approach to fighting the LTTE did not stand a chance against the LTTE’s hybrid modus operandi reminiscent of Clausewitz’s small wars approach (see Chapter III). The LTTE was winning.

Hostilities came to a halt again in 2002 when the GoSL signed another ceasefire agreement (CFA) with the LTTE under Norway’s auspices (Ganguly 2004; Perera 2005: 183- 191; C. Smith 2011; Rajapaksa 2013: 143).164 However, during this period, isolated terrorist attacks still took place. The CFA thus failed to cement peace between the government and the LTTE, and the latter took advantage of the truce to recover, re-arm and then resume hostilities. The CFA was broken in 2006. The LTTE still had not been defeated. The conventional war-fighting approaches to conducting this war that were being adopted by the GoSL were not working, especially given the lack of an overall coherent strategy and political backing for the armed forces who had to suspend fighting due to various peace negotiations. A new approach was needed. This came with the newly elected President —voted in on a promise to crush the LTTE—who resolved to physically exterminate the LTTE (discussed below) (cf. Peebles 2006: 172-174; Bandarage 2009; Hashim 2013).

Eelam IV: From 2006 to 2009

The fourth and the final Eelam War thus commenced in July 2006. By this time, the LTTE had transformed itself into a conventional force with its own artillery, land, naval and air capabilities, augmented by suicide squads (Hashim 2013). However, this final phase of

164 The CFA was signed in 2002 as a result of pressure created by the international community. Norway was in charge of overseeing compliance with the CFA. However, the CFA was slowly collapsing by 2005 given the LTTE’s assassination of , a Tamil lawyer and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Sri Lankan Government. While the GoSL understood the peace process as being designed to ensure the demobilization and disintegration of the LTTE, the latter never considered this option; neither did it consider a federal solution. By 2003 the LTTE had withdrawn from the peace talks. See Perera (2005) and C. Smith (2011: 77-80). 149

the conflict, in part because of the LTTE’s transformation and its relative strength, led to the insurgents’ demise in May 2009. Rajapaska’s approach was different in that it included defining a clear political end-state combined with an overarching grand strategic framework and military strategic adjustments, led to the conclusion of a decade-long war. The President demonstrated that he had the necessary resolve and political will to win, and allowed the military carte blanche in its efforts to defeat the insurgents. While there was no initial precise plan, the so-called ‘Rajapaksa Model’ slowly evolved throughout the Eelam War IV (Shashikumar 2009). The main aim of the next section is to examine how exactly the GoSL managed to defeat its insurgent enemy, the LTTE, despite all the failed attempts during the previous three Eelam Wars. How did the GoSL now go on to achieve COIN success?

Rajapaksa’s Road to COIN Success

Political Will

One of the main pillars of the Rajapaksa model, as explained by the SLA commander during Eelam War IV, General , was the existence of the political will to crush the LTTE. The objective was, according to Fonseka, “[…] to kill the maximum number of LTTE area leaders and their cadres within LTTE territory” (General Fonseka quoted in Hashim 2013: 51). This thinking resonated with that of civilian leaders. For instance, the Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the President’s brother, supported this claim stating, “It [the aim] was very clear: destroy the LTTE.” (Gotabhya Rajapaksa quoted in Nessman 2009). Like in the previous phases of the conflict, the focus remained enemy- centric, but what changed? One of the central changes was on the grand strategic level. President Rajapaksa instructed the Army to eliminate the insurgency at any cost. The President would handle any political pressures that would result from the adoption of such an approach, both nationally and internationally, while backing the effort of the armed forces. In other words, Rajapaksa linked the ends with the means. His political determination was supported by the Defense Secretary Rajapaksa, who was the bridge between the armed forces and the civilian authorities (Shashikumar 2009; DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2010: 1; Hashim 2013: 180-183), thereby improving civil-military relations. Closely connected to the political will to use harsh measures to tackle the insurgency was President Rajapaksa’s firm stance towards the 150

international community which was pressing for a peace agreement (Rajapaksa 2013: 143). In light of the failed CFA of 2002, which helped the LTTE regain its strength to resume hostilities in 2005/6, Rajapaksa stated that there would be no more ceasefires. Despite the international disapproval of the Sri Lankan approach to dealing with the LTTE—which led Western states to cut military aid to the country—the President did not back down (Shashikumar 2009; C. Smith 2011: 77-78). In order to reduce domestic pressure, he also ensured that media coverage of the conflict would come only from one tightly controlled source—the government itself (Shashikumar 2009).

The GoSL, despite its draconian attitude to the conduct of the COIN campaign, still sought to maintain at least some democratic freedoms in order to try and secure some popular support from among the Tamil community. It was the first time in the conflict (considering all phases) that the GoSL employed a population-centric measure—a measure aimed at the key population segment upon which the insurgent depended. During the presidential elections of 2005, elections in Tamil areas were still held, despite the context of insurgent violence and intimidation. The GoSL’s emphasis on democratic processes helped harness public support in those areas despite the human losses and financial burdens caused by its ongoing campaign against the LTTE (Jalal 2011: 182-183). Thus, notwithstanding the purely enemy-centric focus in military strategic terms, the GoSL, through its actions, came to understand the importance of the population, albeit not to the same degree as stressed in the population-centric approach advocated by thinkers like Galula and Thompson (see Chapter IV).

Military Strategic Changes and the Restructuring and Modernization of the Armed Forces

To underpin the political will to crush the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces needed revamping in a number of ways. Defense Minister Rajapaksa, who took office in November 2005, appointed General Fonseka to command the army. Fonseka could pick the commanders for the task at hand as he saw fit (Shashikumar 2009; DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2010a). Additionally, military spending was significantly increased. By 2006, Sri Lanka’s defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP was the second-highest in South Asia (IISS 2008). From 2005 to 2008 the defense budget saw an increase of almost 40 percent (Smith 151

2010: 43).

The SLA had been growing dramatically for some time before Rajapaska took office. Troop numbers had increased from 15,000 in 1970 to 150,000 in 2005 (Destardi 2012: 71). They then ballooned even further as part of the Rajapaska program, with the recruitment of almost 3,000 soldiers per month (Smith 2010: 43). The new government also ensured that the armed forces would be well-equipped to face the insurgents. In particular, the purchase of new Israeli-built fast attack craft (FAC) increased the SLN’s capabilities (DeSilva Ranasinghe 2010b: 43-45; Smith 2010: 43; Hashim 2013: 165-168), while air force capabilities were also improved with the purchase of four MiG-27 fighters from Ukraine (Ministry of Defence 2011).

Most importantly, the SLA’s military strategic and operational approaches experienced significant changes. The capture of territory, while still important, was no longer the primary goal. Instead, the new strategy was one of attrition, designed to wear down the LTTE, as Callwell would suggested, by launching a series of offensive operations simultaneously along several thrust lines. For example, as part of the Northern offensive commencing in January 2008, the new strategy called for the conduct of several operations in the Wanni while fixing two major LTTE divisions on the Jaffna Peninsula (Hashim 2013: 185). This measure was designed to overstretch the LTTE’s already strained forces, enabling the armed forces to subsequently defeat the organization piecemeal and in detail (DeSilva- Ranasinghe 2010a: 6).

Adapting to Guerrilla Tactics: Doctrinal adaptations and Special Infantry Operations Teams

The effectiveness of the GoSL campaign against the LTTE was not just the result of new thinking at the grand strategic and military strategic levels. Another important factor was the tactical changes which were introduced. Unit and sub-unit commanders were now given full freedom to operate independently in the field. This resembled a mission command doctrine: centralized intent, decentralized execution, which has always proved useful in COIN operations in the past.165 For instance, decentralized execution was espoused in USMC

165 For more information on the Mission Command doctrine and its origins, see Eitan Shamir (2011: 29-56). 152

Small Wars Manual (1940) while unity of effort came to be stressed by many COIN thinkers (e.g., Robert Thompson) and in the prevalent US COIN doctrine: FM 3-24.

There was also a substantial shift from conventional military approaches to the adoption of unconventional methods (Welch 2013; Hashim 2013: 185). This change went down to every soldier in the field from the Defense Secretary who later asserted: “We had a plan. We knew what strength we needed. We knew what equipment we needed ... We gave those to the commanders so the commanders had greater flexibility.” (Gotabhaya Rajapaksa quoted in Nessman 2009). In essence, the aim was to have the SLA acting more as a guerrilla force itself rather than as a conventional army. For instance, infantry training doctrine was updated to include special infantry operations teams (SIOTs). SIOTs consisted of eight-man teams that received special training in jungle warfare, explosives and communications, in order to enable them to penetrate deep into LTTE territory and to disrupt their activities and dominate the jungle where the LTTE felt safe. SIOTs, along with the Special Forces (SF) teams who operated in a similar manner, were a fundamental force multiplier. At the beginning of the Eelam War IV there were some 1500 members of the SIOT teams but by 2008 this number had risen to some 30,000. The number of Special Forces personnel also increased and reached 10,000 by 2008 (Layton 2015). The SIOT teams and SF were very much enemy-centric in their conduct. They could infiltrate behind the LTTE’s front lines and strike high-value targets. They provided real-time intelligence to the conventional forces and disrupted the enemy’s lines of supply and communication. These actions amounted to what can be described as a strategy of dislocation that generated a psychological—or in Callwell’s words ‘moral’—effect upon the enemy force.

Additionally, SIOTs and the SF could call in precision air, artillery and/or mortar attacks. This combination of assaults, i.e., both frontal and in depth, enabled the SLA to pin down the LTTE forces and defeat them in detail (Welch 2013; Layton 2015). The SF specialty was decapitation strikes (or targeted killings) on LTTE commanders such as such as Thamilchelvan who was the LTTE chief negotiator and the head of political wing (Layton 2015). The focused SIOT/SF attacks inflicted much physical and psychological damage on the insurgents while avoiding large-scale casualties (Jalal 2011: 183-184; Hashim 2013: 188- 189; Welch 2013: 30). Overall, the introduction of SIOTs can be said to follow Clausewitz’s 153

suggestion to use guerrilla formations as a force multiplier (see Chapter III). Indeed, the use of SIOTs/SF, in particular at the tactical level, generated significant strategic effect. Their activity tied down LTTE cadres and reserves in the jungles while leaving their forces in other theatres weakened and thus vulnerable to defeat by conventional SLA forces (Hashim 2013: 189; Welch 2013: 41).

Population-and enemy-centric operations

The LTTE’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks on civilian targets and intimidate Tamil communities was also undermined by new population-centric measures. Increased numbers of troops and police were assigned to internal security duties. Their aim was basically to protect the population and to separate the insurgents from their support. In 2006, President Rajapaksa also established the Civil Security Department (Government Gazette Notification No. 1462/20 13 September 2006).166 This department had a supplementary force tasked with assisting the armed forces and the police in safeguarding, in particular, villages and cities in light of the increased possibility of terrorist attacks (Civil Security Department 2015). This new force was referred to as the Civil Defense Committees (CDCs) 167 and consisted of armed villagers from different communal segments guarding their own areas and beyond (similar to the Peruvian and Turkish cases discussed in previous chapters). CDCs played a vital role in the defense of villages during the insurgency, preventing the LTTE from entering them to intimidate or to shelter as well as (in conjunction with the armed forces and the police) impeding the LTTE’s terrorist attacks on high value and civilian targets (Layton 2015). There were more than 14,000 CDCs at the height of the conflict. The system also helped garner popular support in that it put national security into the hands of local civilian populations, both Tamil and Sinhalese (Hettige 2015: 67-68).

These defensive population-centric measures across the conflict zones allowed for greater freedom for the SLA itself to pursue its ongoing enemy-centric approach in the north and the east. In those regions the SLA aimed at attacking the LTTE, capturing its bases and

166 The Civil Security Department was a reformed version of the National Home Guard Services established as a voluntary service in mid-1980s for village and border protection. 167 While a similar construct (Home Guards) was first introduced in 1984, it consisted only of Sinhalese villagers, and later (by 1990) Tamil-speaking Muslims. These, however, were poorly armed and trained to serve the self-defense purpose. See Francis (2005). 154

thus forcing the group onto the defensive (Hashim 2013; Layton 2015). Both in the Eastern province and later in the Northern Province the SLA (with support of the SLAF) conducted offensive operations to take control of key towns controlled by the LTTE and, despite fierce fighting, succeeded in doing so. Further, operations were undertaken simultaneously to stretch the already overloaded LTTE forces. For instance, during the series of battles along the Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil Axis in the North in 2008—when the SLA tried to retain control of Jaffna, the Tamil heartland—the Army managed to pin down the well-trained LTTE units in their defensive positions in Muhamalai, units which could otherwise have been used in another theatres of operations (Hashim 2013: 152-154). There were battles at and Kilinochchi (both located in the North, in the Kilinochchi District) in 2008 which saw a similar outcome. The LTTE forces came to be stretched out over a wide area, enabling the SLA’s 57th Division to threaten Paranthan, Elephant Pass, and Kilinochchi. In this respect the LTTE lacked sufficient manpower to defend its strongholds (Hashim 2013: 148). Neither did it by now have sufficient well-trained cadres. When the Eelam War IV commenced in 2006 the LTTE relied upon forced conscription that further alienated the population. These new conscripts were young and inexperienced, and given the gravity of the situation for the LTTE their training was reduced to merely one day, down from three weeks of training in earlier phases of the conflict (Hashim 2013: 150).

Cutting off external support

As discussed earlier, international support, especially from the Tamil diaspora, was one of the main lifelines of the LTTE. However, international perception had started to shift after the events of 9/11 and the subsequent world-wide antipathy towards any group labelled as ‘terrorist’. As a part of Rajapaksa’s grand strategic framework, Sri Lankan diplomats used this momentum to convince the international community that the LTTE were not ‘freedom fighters’. Thirty-two countries consequently designated the LTTE as a ‘terrorist’ organization. This damaged not only the LTTE’s international legitimacy but it also undermined its domestic legitimacy. Fundraising was made more difficult as a consequence (Jalal 2011: 184; Bandarage 2009; DeVotta 2010; Hashim 2010; 2013; Layton 2015). Thereby, the GoSL managed to weaken the LTTE even more. 155

Sri Lanka’s own use of external support Although the GoSL was definitively a first-party actor in its COIN campaign against the LTTE, it still received some foreign help. But this was limited because of its overall harsh approach to the task.

From 2005 onwards, the GoSL secured vital military support from both China and Pakistan, and had Indian help in disrupting the LTTE’s smuggling networks (Jalal 2011: 184). The United States also shared intelligence with the GoSL and provided it with an important naval command and control system, while both Canada and the European Union outlawed the LTTE’s funding networks (Layton 2015).

However, Sri Lanka began to lose Western support due its indiscriminate use of force during the last phase of the conflict. The U.S. cut its military assistance in 2006, the UK halted its debt relief in 2007, and the EU lobbied for a Human Rights Council resolution on Sri Lanka. However, it did still manage to obtain support in the form of funding and military capabilities from some powers in the region who did not try and restrain Sri Lanka in terms of the methods it used against the LTTE (Smith 2010: 43; Destardi 2012: 73-74; Selvadurai & Smith 2013: 562). China, for instance, continued to provide military support, which from 2006 amounted to over 50 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign financial support and arms imports. China also blocked any UN resolutions to sanction Sri Lanka for its violation of human rights (Smith 2010: 43-44). India—after its military blunder in Sri Lanka in the 1980s—provided intelligence and ‘non-offensive’ weapons,168 such as air surveillance radar equipment, and most notably training (Destardi 2012: 78). Pakistan also played a key role in supporting the GoSL by delivering high-tech military equipment and ammunition worth USD 190 million, training Sri Lankan pilots, sharing terrorism-related intelligence, and even engaging in air strikes against Tamil strongholds (e.g., in August 2008) (Indian Express 2009).

Defections, internal discord within the LTTE and the Tsunami of 2004

While the conduct of COIN operations will always be in the hands of the government/military actor that runs them, they may always be helped by serendipitous acts which suit their purposes. In this regard, the GoSL’s campaign against the LTTE was no

168 Given the fact that India was internally under pressure from its own Tamil parties, it could offer only covert support in military terms, thus, it could officially sell only ‘non-offensive’ weapons. 156

exception. Two particular chance factors did play to the GoSL’s advantage—a significant defection and a tsunami.

Karuna’s Defection

The LTTE also began to be undermined by defections. They began in 2004 with perhaps the most important one: Colonel Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan). Karuna was a military commander in the Eastern Province who, due to internal tensions and discord between the Eastern and the Northern Tamil communities, led his LTTE eastern force (compromising one quarter of the LTTE’s manpower, some 6,000 troops) into rebellion against the LTTE central command. While the main LTTE managed to suppress the Karuna rebellion and regain the eastern territory, it lost many fighters in so doing. This led to its inability to fully control the region again (DeVotta 2010: 166; C. Smith 2011: 78-79; Jalal 2011: 185-186; Selvadurai & Smith 2013: 556; Gates, Roy 2014: 186; Tikku 2016: 56-58).169 This also substantially reduced recruitment from the Eastern Province putting a further strain on the LTTE’s manpower shortage. The LTTE now acted as an occupation force in the Eastern Province, arresting and torturing Tamils suspected to be Karuna supporters, which contributed significantly to its loss of popular support there (DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2010: 3). The GoSL, taking advantage, offered Karuna immunity and protection from the LTTE.

Karuna’s defection was important for two particular reasons. First, he provided important intelligence for the Sri Lankan forces during their military offensive in the Eastern Province in 2007. Second, Karuna formed a political party offering Tamils a democratic alternative to armed struggle. Later, he was named Sri Lanka’s minister for national integration (Smith 2010; Jalal 2011; Hashim 2013: 122-123; Tikku 2016: 58; 62-63).

The Tsunami Disaster of 2004

Another important event—which can be regarded as ‘friction’, to use Clausewitz’s term—was the Tsunami disaster that struck Sri Lanka’s shores on December 26, 2004. It affected two-thirds of Sri Lanka’s coastline, resulting in a high death toll of some 35,322 (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010: 3). An estimated two-thirds of the deceased were from the

169 The LTTE’s manpower shortage was further exacerbated by the December 2004 Tsunami killing some 22,000 people in LTTE areas. 157

Tamil-inhabited parts of the country, the majority of whom were under LTTE control (Tikka 2016: 69- 71).

This unfortunate event benefitted the Sri Lankan government. First, the LTTE’s assets were among the most affected. In other words, the Tsunami added to the already existing manpower shortage that the LTTE was suffering. Second, while the GoSL received an extensive amount of foreign aid—some $7 billion—following the natural disaster (BBC News 27 January 2005), no aid was flowing to the north-eastern part of Sri Lanka, i.e., LTTE areas. The idea of channeling some of the aid to the North-East was met with a great opposition from the (Sinhala-dominated) southern constituency. Subsequently, the initiative to implement a joint structure, namely, Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P- TOMS), designed to distribute aid to affected areas proved to be a failure 170 and only exacerbated the tensions between the GoSL and the LTTE (cf. Goodhand & Korf 2011: 24; Uyangoda 2011: 32; Tikka 2016: 73-76).Ultimately, the already under-pressure LTTE was left to draw on its own limited resources (with some support from the Tamil diaspora) to mitigate the crisis.

The importance of joint operations

The Eelam War IV was not won only by the use of ground forces, that is, by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA). The Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) and the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) also made significant contributions to the defeat of the LTTE in the final phase of the war. It was the first time that the Sri Lankan armed forces acted as a joint force (Hashim 2013: 163).

The Sri Lankan Navy

In the earlier stages of the war, the SLN was only marginally effective in its fight against the Sea Tigers as a result of a lack of adequate equipment and accurate intelligence. During the latter stages of the conflict, however, the SLN adapted to the COIN challenge. It was better in all aspects: technologically, tactically and in terms of intelligence sharing and cooperation with the SLA and with other actors (J. Smith 2011: 451). Indeed, as the conflict evolved, other countries, from the early 2000s, became more willing to cooperate with the GoSL in terms of intelligence sharing (e.g., U.S. provided SIGINT and IMINT, while India

170 P-TOMS’ implementation was blocked by the High Court in 2005. 158

provided HUMINT) (J. Smith 2011: 455). This resulted in successful operations against LTTE vessels, several of which were sunk in both 2003 and 2007. When it came to countering the LTTE coastal craft the SLN abandoned its heavier Israeli-built patrol craft (see LTTE naval capabilities section) and followed the so-called Small Boat Concept.171 That is, in 2008 the SLN established a Rapid Action Boat Squadron with smaller and shallower 14-meter (45 foot) “Arrow”172 boats fitted with 23mm cannon and rapid-firing 40mm grenade launchers, which allowed the SLN to overmatch the weapons used by the Sea Tigers. To mirror the LTTE tactics, these small Arrow boats were thus grouped into units of three to four, directed by a larger 17-meter Arrow or an Israeli Dvora patrol craft equipped with electro-optical devices and radar to serve as the ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ of the formation. The design of the small Arrows allowed them to pursue Sea Tiger boats close to the shore and with less danger of being targeted from land due to their small size (Murphy 2010: 121; J. Smith 2011: 457-458; Chandradasa 2012a: 6-7; Gates, Roy 2014: 180-181).

Additionally, the Navy’s operational and tactical doctrines were rethought to adapt to its COIN role. It introduced a concept of four layers of “defense barriers” to hinder the movement of the Sea Tigers. In the outermost layer the Navy used large offshore vessels; smaller inshore craft in the next layer; then Dvora FAC; and finally Arrow boats as coastal defense in the innermost layer. These layers served both defensive and offensive purposes: preventing attacks, interdicting the LTTE logistical network, and preventing LTTE personnel from escaping from Sri Lanka. These changes worked in that attacks by the Sea Tigers gradually decreased from 21 in 2006 to 12 in 2007 and to less than 5 in 2008 (J. Smith 2011: 459; Chandradasa 2012a: 8). The long-term impact of this success became evident as the overall COIN campaign evolved (DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2010a: 4). While the SLA was delivering heavy blows to the LTTE on land at this time, the SLN prevented the LTTE from both receiving reinforcements in personnel or armaments from abroad their escape by sea (DeSilva Ranasinghe 2010b: 43-45; J. Smith 2011: 461).

Overall, the maritime interdiction strategy and Small Boat Concept developed by the

171 The concept was introduced by Vice Admiral Karannagoda to counter maritime terrorism and piracy. It involved copying the Sea Tigers’ tactics on a larger scale. 172 The Arrow boat was created through reverse-engineering using a recovered Sea Tiger boat as a point of departure. 159

SLN were key components in helping to dismantle the LTTE’s maritime logistical network, to disrupt its sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and to counter the Sea Tigers’ attacks. The insurgents were thereby forced into facing the superior SLA on land with little possibility of escape and lacking outside support. The SLN was thus very effective as a COIN actor.

The Sri Lankan Air Force The Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) proved to be another crucial factor in the victory equation of the GoSL. It was adapted to become focused on a COIN role. At the beginning of the conflict (during Eelam Wars I and II and III), the SLAF was weak and could not even gain air superiority against the LTTE (Brown 2001). The SLAF’s air support to the ground forces was also marginal at best, given that the LTTE could employ surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The SLAF was reactive rather than proactive, and slow to adapt to the circumstance of a COIN campaign (Chandradasa 2012b: 9). However, as the conflict evolved, especially after the collapse of the CFA in 2005, the SLAF did come to better take on the tasks of close air support (CAS), precision bombing, intelligence-gathering, reconnaissance, surveillance, and search and rescue and evacuation operations (Chandradasa 2012b: 10). To help gain air superiority—which at first proved to be difficult—the SLAF purchased six Chinese F7G interceptors to engage LTTE aircraft. The GoSL relied on Pakistan to train SLAF pilots (to operate the Chinese fighters) and to procure weapons (J. Smith 2011: 452; Chandradasa 2012b: 10-11).

In terms of its offensive capabilities, the SLAF now acted as a significant force multiplier for the ground troops. The SLAF’s purchases of Russian Mil Mi-24 helicopter gunships, as well as Israeli-built Kfir and Russian MiG-27 multirole combat aircraft, reinforced its close air support capabilities (Chandradasa 2012b: 10; Hashim 2013). Furthermore, and crucially, the SLAF’s bombing raids became more discriminate and precise given better coordination with the ground troops who could help guide in precision-strike munitions. Collateral damage was thus reduced, and consciously so. Additionally, deep penetration units of the SLA (e.g., the SIOTs) and personnel of the SLN were specifically trained to direct precision strikes. Prior to 2005, such raids had been conducted without any prior air surveillance or ground support, leading to counterproductive results and raising international criticism of the GoSL approach (Chandradasa 2012b: 10-11). 160

Another important developing domain for the SLAF was logistical support to COIN operations. The purchase of two Lockheed C-130 Hercules and two Chinese Y-12 aircraft enabled the SLAF to enhance the SLA’s logistical capabilities and, importantly in a hearts- and-minds sense, its humanitarian relief and casualty evacuation operations during the final phase of the conflict (2005-2009). (Chandradasa 2012b: 11-12).

In sum, while the SLAF did not play a central role during the final phase, the improvement in its capabilities certainly played a large part in ensuring the success of the Eelam War IV.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the GoSL’s campaign against the LTTE. Despite its promising outlook for the insurgents at the beginning of the conflict, the state managed to prevail after a decades-long struggle. It took a long time for the GoSL to adapt its armed forces to conduct an effective COIN campaign. Once it has adapted, and with some serendipitous help, it proved decisive in ensuring victory in Eelam War IV. By 2009, the SLA had managed to recapture every square kilometer of land once occupied by the LTTE. Its leader, Prabhakaran, and many of his top officials such as the Sea Tigers Commander, Colonel Soosai, and its intelligence chief, Pottu Amman, were dead. (CNN 2009). Below I sum up what contributed the GoSL’s success. Despite representing a significant departure from the approach favored in recent Western thinking on counterinsurgency (e.g., in FM 3-24), the Rajapaksa model was central in helping conclude the decades-long war against the LTTE. As discussed, despite its predominantly enemy-centric focus the GoSR engaged in some population-centric measures, most notably the use of CDCs to protect the population from insurgents. Overall, the specific Sri Lankan approach was underpinned by a strong political resolve, a grand strategic framework including non-military means and a willingness to engage in the brutality characteristic of its (enemy-centric) operations. The GoSL was willing to create high casualty levels to achieve its goal while withstanding the pressure from the international community. Limiting media coverage and maintaining a firm stance towards Western diplomats pushing for another peace process was one of the ways to achieve this. Rajapaksa was not willing to be coerced into enacting more ceasefires. In order to defeat the insurgency both offensive 161

and defensive measures (such as CDCs) were enacted. The President gave the armed forces full operational freedom and ensured they would have political backing at all times. Externally, the government worked to cooperate with its regional backers (in terms of weapons procurement and intelligence sharing) while also using diplomatic efforts and improved maritime capabilities to cut all outside support to the insurgents. Additionally, all three arms of the military underwent dramatic changes in terms of their training, doctrine and recruitment in order to address the threat. The army successfully adapted to jungle warfare. The Navy developed a maritime interdiction strategy to defeat the Sea Tigers and to dismantle their logistical network. The Air Force provided crucial CAS, ISR and evacuation missions. The combined efforts of, and intelligence sharing between, the SLA, SLN and SLAF enabled these forces to work synergistically to achieve the prime objective. The Police and CDCs also worked in concert with the armed forces. Most importantly, there emerged a vital link between the political end-state and military strategic objectives, respectively, reinforced by Rajapaksa’s grand strategic design.

However, the defeat of the LTTE should not be solely attributed to the GoSL and the factors mentioned above. Both international and domestic dynamics, coupled with mistakes committed by the LTTE itself, contributed to the defeat of the insurgency. The LTTE, as discussed earlier, had been suffering from shortages of manpower. Colonel Karuna’s defection and the Tsunami disaster of 2004. The attacks of 9/11 helped the GoSL exploit the situation in its favor by denouncing the LTTE as a terrorist organization. This, in turn, led to an undermining of the Tamil Tigers’ international reputation and had negative ramifications for external support. Further, the LTTE, given its manpower shortage, started forcibly recruiting more children and youths and thus both reduced the quality of its fighters and made itself unpopular among the Tamil population. Indeed, the LTTE could be considered brutal towards the very people it represented, killing more Tamils (between 1983 and 2006) than members of the armed forces (DeVotta 2010: 166). The LTTE’s adaptation of a more conventional military strategy by 2004 (especially in the Eastern Province) was also disadvantageous for the group since it had then to face a superior army which was better at such a strategy. Thus, the LTTE was partially to blame for its own demise. 162

The defeat of the LTTE came about due to a confluence of internal and external factors. On the one hand, the LTTE made strategic mistakes. On the other hand, the GoSL’s political resolve and full support of a sound military-strategic approach predominantly consisting of enemy-centric measures contributed to the success of the campaign. Although the country has been plagued by different hardships, eleven years after the defeat of the LTTE it has remained free of insurgent activities. In other words, the success has, indeed, been long- lived (unlike in places such as Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan, to name but a few).

163

Chapter VIII: Establishing the Dominant Approach in First-Party COIN Campaigns

In this chapter, I determine the dominant approach used to counter insurgencies in the case studies discussed in this thesis. To this end, I use the earlier established methods. First, I evaluate the case studies against the list of tenets for each approach (established in Chapter IV). Second, I plot the number of tenets from the enemy-centric and population-centric approaches employed during each campaign. This method helps to break down each case study into the use of different tenets in chronological order, and allows for a comparison of the number of tenets used from either the enemy-centric or the population-centric approach.

Once the overall approach for each case is determined (either enemy-centric or population-centric), in chapter IX, I proceed with a cross-case comparison to draw parallels and lessons in terms of the different military strategies used at different times across all the case studies, analyzing their positive impact as well as possible caveats these might imply. Additionally, I examine the context in which these military strategies were implemented. This helps to elucidate best practice in terms of achieving COIN ‘success’ in the case of first- party actors. I then make recommendations based on the list of best practices in order to enhance COIN operations today.

Determination of the dominant approach

Table 4.1 from chapter IV (see below) will be used as a framework to determine which approach was dominant in every campaign examined in this thesis. Additionally, I use the Cartesian system of coordinates to clearly depict when, and how many, tenets of each approach were implemented to facilitate the process outlined above.

Enemy-centric Population-centric

In philosophical terms, the In philosophical terms, the counterinsurgency is viewed as a contest counterinsurgency is viewed as a contest of with an insurgent enemy force. It is thus governance. It is thus principally political in principally military in nature. nature. 164

Fundamentally, emphasis is on gaining Fundamentally, emphasis is on gaining victory by destroying insurgent forces victory by ‘winning over’ population militarily or psychologically to undermine

the enemy’s willingness to continue resistance

Force is used primarily to destroy the Force is used primarily to separate the enemy. insurgent from his base of support (i.e., the population).

The primary objective is the defeat of the The primary objective is establishing the insurgent forces and the destruction of their government’s legitimacy through protection organization. of the population.

Given that the primary objective is to defeat Given that the primary objective is the enemy little care is taken when establishing the government’s legitimacy employing military force against the and hence to win over the population, insurgents. Discrimination might be minimum/discriminate force is used against lacking. insurgents to avoid alienating the population.

There is little or no regard for the Population support is garnered through the grievances of populations. Little or no reduction of grievances (i.e., addressing the effort is made to gain population support. root causes of the insurgency, using propaganda/ ‘hearts and minds’).

Hoped-for result: Once the insurgent forces Hoped-for result: Protected population will and organization are destroyed everything throw its support behind the government and will fall into place. therefore restore its legitimacy.

Table 4.1: Tenets of the enemy- and population-centric approaches The Peruvian Case

The Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgency was a leftist revolutionary movement that emerged in 1968. Despite its growing strength, the government was unable to correctly 165

identify the issue at stake. More specifically, at the onset of this insurgency in 1980, the ‘problem’ was viewed through a purely criminal lens, and it was the police who were tasked with dealing with the ‘criminals’. Yet the situation worsened as the insurgents grew stronger. Once the army took over the mission in 1982, the military strategic approach—devoid of an overarching political end-state—shifted to highly kinetic conventional operations against the enemy. In addition, the government declared emergency rule in Ayacucho, the province where the insurgency commenced. These responses satisfy the first criterion of the enemy- centric approach: the focus was clearly on the enemy and its organization, whereby the main objective was to destroy the said enemy. Nonetheless, the army was failing in achieving its aims given that it lacked not only political aegis but also an adequate understanding of the enemy it was fighting. This was coupled with the fact that there was no doctrinal support, i.e., the army did not have a clear concept of action by which to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

After the presidential elections in 1985, the new President, Alan García Pérez, sought to ‘fix’ the insurgent menace by trying to address the root causes of the insurgency. His approach went beyond military operations; political and economic initiatives were created to tackle the deteriorating situation on the ground. These reforms sought to win over the population in the Andean Highlands (McCormick 1990: 31). Thus, the García government employed population-centric approaches at the grand strategic level. These, however, proved to be ineffectual given the lack of an overarching strategy linked to the desired political end- state.

In military terms, the military had to stop its human rights abuses, on the one hand, and to try to prevent the insurgency from spreading, on the other. The latter was achieved by assigning in 1985 local military commanders to take the role of de facto governors in their respective provinces. Moreover, in 1988, the military started employing ‘Village Guards’— the volunteer villager force—who would serve as eyes and ears on the ground for the military and who would defend their villages from the insurgents and prevent the insurgents from winning over the local population. This measure can be classified as population-centric, as force was used more discriminately and the main focus shifted to the population. The issue with the approach, however, lay in the fact that it lacked consistency. Military commanders 166

were rotated every year and some of them tended to employ more population-centric approaches while others adopted purely enemy-centric ones (Mauceri 2002: 94-95).

Until the late 1980s, the enemy-centric approach prevailed, with only some elements of the population-centric approach being applied. These efforts, however, were falling short. In 1989, the armed forces (FFAA) judged that its strategy needed a complete overhaul in the wake of the growing insurgency. It assessed that its approach had to be more intelligence- driven and, above all, that the civil-military divide had to be resolved in order to align the political ends with the available ways and means. At this point, the country was facing a military coup because García was reluctant to support the armed forces’ plan (Mauceri 2002).

Not until 1990—the year when Alberto Fujimori became president—did any of the changes proposed by the armed forces take place. Fujimori was firmly committed to defeating the insurgency, however he also understood that in order to do so, it was not merely a choice of the right military strategies, but rather a complete restructuring of the state and security structures to serve the war’s needs (Starn 1993: 5-9; Kruijt 2002: 63).

The majority of reforms took place on the grand strategic level, such as the restructuring of the state defense and intelligence structures and the creation of a single politico-military high command. Additionally, the National Antiterrorism Agency was created. In legislative terms, Fujimori put forward ‘anti-subversive’ legislation which would remove accountability from soldiers who committed human rights abuses. While all these reforms took place on the grand strategic level, they were aimed at effectively neutralizing the enemy, i.e., the goal was to defeat the forces of SL, which is in accord with the enemy- centric view. On the military strategic level, both the armed forces and the police were pursuing an enemy-centric, albeit more intelligence-driven, approach. Most notably, the decapitation strategy was successfully implemented to capture the organization’s leader, Abimael Gúzman. This brought an end to the insurgency in 1992.

The only significant exceptions to the enemy-centric focus of the Peruvian approach (on all levels) were the economic ‘shock’ program enacted in 1990 to address the root cause of the insurgency and the Repentance Law of 1992. The economic program was a population- centric policy designed to reduce grievances among the key population, with the goal of 167

increasing the government’s perceived legitimacy. The Repentance Law was designed to target SL members by allowing them reduced sentences or repeal thereof in exchange for information on their comrades. While the law’s main focus was upon the insurgents, the law was of accommodative nature because it sought to reduce or lift punishments if insurgents gave themselves up and collaborated with the government by providing information on other SL members. Therefore, this measure falls into a gray area between the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches (designated as ‘miscellaneous’) given that it has elements of both, i.e., focus on the enemy combined with accommodation.173

At the military strategic level, there was only one measure from the population-centric approach, namely the continuing employment of village guards which continued from the past decade and whose primary role was to defend their villages (i.e., the use of force in this scenario was reactive and to separate the insurgents from their support). No other efforts on the military-strategic level were made to pursue a population-centric approach.

Evaluation of the Peruvian approach

In this section I focus on determining the overall dominant approach used by the Peruvian state relying on the data from Table 8.1 and Graph 81.

Overall, the measures pursued throughout the duration of the insurgency fall most in line with the list of characteristics of the enemy-centric counterinsurgency approach established in Table 4.1. The findings are summed up in Table 8.1. which displays the means used throughout the campaign. Earlier attempts to implement more population-centric measures—dealing with the protection of the population—were either harshly dismissed (from 1982-1984) or failed due to lack of funding (from 1985-1988). During the last phase the focus shifted towards a more coherent and balanced approach to counterinsurgency with the use of measures from both the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches across different levels of strategy. However, as can be seen from Table 8.1 and Graph 8.1 the enemy-centric approach was the dominant approach used in the Peruvian case.

173 The miscellaneous category is present in all of the cases given that some measures include both enemy- and population-centric elements. Therefore, it would be erroneous to draw a binary distinction between the two approaches. 168

Period Enemy-centric Population-centric Misc. 1980-1984 1. Offensive 1. N/A 1. N/A operations (for territorial control) (military strategic level) 1985-1989 1. Offensive 1. Introduction of economic 1. N/A operations (military reforms (grand strategic strategic level) level) (1985-1988) 2. Decapitation 2. Village Guards (1988) strategy (1989) (military strategic level) (military strategic 3. More discriminate use of level) force 1990-1992 1. Overhauls of the 1. Introduction of economic 1. Introduction of an State Security reforms (grand strategic ‘Emergency and apparatus (grand level) National strategic level) 2. The use of Village Guards Reconstruction 2. Legislation to back Government’ (1992) the military efforts 2. Introduction of the (grand strategic Repentance Law (grand level) strategic level) 3. Creation of politico- military high- command (grand strategic level) 4. Implementation of the Political- strategic doctrine el Plan Politico- Militar (1989) (grand strategic level) 5. Destruction of the enemy (military strategic level) 6. Employment of specialized anti- terrorism units (National Anti- terrorism Agency) (military strategic level) 7. Intelligence-driven offensive operations 8. Decapitation strategy (military strategic level) 169

Table 8.1: Peruvian Approach from 1980 to 1992 in overview

Peruvian COIN: 1980-1992

8

7 7

3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Enemy-centric Population-centric

Graph 8.1: Timeline of the measures implemented between 1980-1992

The Turkish Case

In this section I will discuss how Turkey managed to defeat the PKK, which proved to be one of the longest insurgencies in the country’s history. This discussion shows which approach was dominant. Turkey’s struggle against the PKK started as early as 1978, but only in 1999 could Turkey achieve military victory over the insurgents (Khalil 2007: 388). Through trial and error, the Turkish government managed to find a combination of approaches that finally led to the defeat of the insurgents.

The PKK insurgency was not the first insurgency in the country’s history, yet it was the most challenging to curb. From the very onset in 1984, the Turkish government lacked the necessary understanding of what was at stake, and regarded the issue as a security threat but without paying adequate attention to the nature of the enemy. The threat response was highly kinetic, focusing on obliterating or capturing the enemy. Such thinking strongly 170

resonates with the enemy-centric school of thought. Moreover, the operations conducted by the military were primarily reactive in nature, which played into the insurgents’ hands.

In 1987—after several years of unsuccessfully attempting to curb the insurgency— the government declared a state of emergency in seven provinces in the southeastern part of the country. The goal was to rob the insurgents of physical shelter and to separate the insurgents from their support. Militarily, this goal was pursued through burning some 30 million acres of land, resulting in the destruction of 1,500 villages (Nachmani 2003: 47-48; Khalil 2007: 388; Romano 2012). Not only was this measure devastating for the Kurdish population, but also highly counterproductive given that its destructive consequences undermined the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In operational and tactical terms, such coercive (i.e., enemy-centric) measures continued throughout the entire duration of the campaign against the PKK. Some important changes did take place on the grand and military strategic levels, however these measures also fall into the enemy-centric category given the way in which they were executed. The focus remained primarily on the enemy, with little regard given to winning over the Kurdish population (with a few exceptions as discussed below).

The first truly population-centric military strategic measure introduced in 1985 was the employment of the GKKS (village guards). Due to the fact that the insurgents were operating in a geographically challenging region famous for weak government presence (i.e., the southeast), the GKKS proved to be an indispensable element that provided defensive capabilities to the villages, intelligence on the insurgents to the armed forces and helped separate the insurgents from their support. This village-protection mechanism made it difficult for the PKK, whose propaganda was not popular among the population, to sway it in its favor. This measure is defensive in nature and falls into the population-centric camp given that the main aim was to protect the population from insurgent influence in both physical and psychological terms.

In addition to the positive effect gained by the implementation of the GKKS, the government sought to gain more control over the population. The ‘village evacuation’ measure introduced to that end in 1992 was clearly detrimental to the population, although it did have a negative impact upon the PKK. This measure was designed to regain control over 171

the key population (that of the southeastern part of the country) and to break the vital link between the PKK and its support base. It targeted the PKK’s weak spot, namely its popular support base. Because it was not possible for the government to install security bases in each village, the alternative was to (forcibly) move the population in question into centralized villages reminiscent of ‘strategic hamlets’ (Kocher 2002; Unal 2012a: 61). Notwithstanding its success in terms of the denial of access to the PKK, this measure was rather costly in terms of the physical and psychological impact on the population. Due to the fact that these evacuations took place by force, they undermined any perception by the Kurds that the government was acting on their behalf (Kocher 2002: 6). Although the focus of this measure was the population, this measure does not fall into either of the approaches—enemy- or population-centric. While the stated philosophy behind this move was to ‘protect’ the population from the PKK, its execution was utterly heavy-handed. This illustrates that—as discussed above—not all measures can be classified as either enemy- or population-centric by definition. There exists a gray area between the two schools of thoughts which merits attention, and deserves a category of its own when examining COIN cases.

The second important population-centric measure adopted by the government was the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi or GAP). It was a “multi-sector social and economic development program” designed to achieve regional development, i.e., the improvement of living standards, social stability and economic growth. While the groundwork for the GAP was laid in the 1970s, the project came to fruition in the 1980s (Lorenz and Erickson 1999; Acma 2004: 167-169; 171; 2008: 663-664). The GAP slowly evolved from being focused on augmenting Turkey’s water and irrigation needs, into a social project targeting the key Kurdish population in the southeastern part of the country. It can be said that this project, coming from the grand strategic level, constituted a population-centric measure given that it sought to increase employment and the development of infrastructure in the Kurdish rural areas it targeted and improve socio-economic conditions. The GAP was ongoing and did not stop after the insurgency had been defeated in 1999. Additionally, the project was used as a foreign policy bargaining chip by Turkey, as explained below.

The third and final population-centric measure— also enacted on the grand strategic level—was President Turgut Özal’s lifting, in 1991, of the ban on speaking the Kurdish 172

language. This had been enforced by the military government in 1983.174 This policy was one designed to gain currency with the Kurdish population both domestically and internationally (Cohen 1991). Reduced constraints on everything Kurdish was a step into the right direction to ease the ‘Kurdish problem’. These measures were supported by not only those of Kurdish descent but also Turkish intellectuals and businessmen (Efegil 2011: 33). However, the moderate measures envisaged by Özal reached a dead-end after his death in 1993 (Gunter 2010: 92-95; Efegil 2011: 27). The status of the PKK then shifted from a ‘security threat’ to a ‘strategic threat’, creating politically favorable conditions for the continuation of more enemy-centric measures (Human Rights Foundation Turkey 2000).

In addition to the population-centric measures discussed above, the Turkish governments enacted a set of different repentance laws throughout the duration of the conflict (between 1985 and 2000). These laws sought to attract low- and mid-tier PKK militants by offering them amnesty with reduced sentences and full protection in exchange for collaborating with the authorities. However, this policy did not have the intended effect, i.e., the reduction of violence (Unal 2012a: 84-86; Unal 2015: 3; 21-22). These laws, similar to the Peruvian case, fall into the miscellaneous category given that they do not fall squarely into either the enemy-centric or population-centric category.

Between 1990 and 1994, the Turkish Army exploited the opportunity to face the PKK on ‘conventional’ terms given the fact that the PKK had shifted its modus operandi from isolated terrorist attacks and ambushes towards ‘regular’ warfare (Mao’s strategic offensive). This gave the Army the opportunity to gain the upper hand over the PKK, given its numerical superiority and military capabilities. This measure reflects one of the core principles of the enemy-centric thinking, namely, kill the enemy and everything else will fall into place. However, everything did not ‘fall into place’. Despite the fact that the PKK declared a cease- fire in 1993, it used the cessation of hostilities to adjust its strategy and subsequently its propaganda in order to appeal to a broader segment of the population.

In addition to trying to bring the PKK into conventional engagements, some other important changes were enacted at the military strategic level. In 1992, some significant

174 The overall ban on the language, i.e., on television and in educational facilities, remained in place. 173

changes took place at the doctrinal level, such as the new ‘cordon and search doctrine’, underpinning the military strategy. In operational terms, the approach remained purely enemy-centric, whereby the Army aimed at capturing or killing the PKK members by conducting sweeps in cordoned areas. The military made some significant adaptations at the tactical level, too, by adopting tactics similar to those used by the guerrillas, e.g., operating at night and in winter and employing small Special Forces teams which enhanced the Army’s maneuverability and reduced its logistical footprint. Additionally, closer coordination with the Army’s aviation units helped to restrict insurgent mobility. All in all, the new military strategy became more agile, ensuring the insurgents were constantly harried. Ultimately, this contributed greatly to the military defeat of the PKK in 1994—yet not the overall defeat.

During the final years of the insurgency, the Turkish state employed coercive diplomacy to undermine the PKK’s logistical support and to turn the PKK’s allies against them. The government pursued political coercion against Syria and forced the Iraqi Kurdish leaders (who were growing dissatisfied with the PKK) into cooperation. The PKK thus lost its strongholds in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, the fall of the Soviet Union, a key PKK supporter, left the PKK without a strong ally. This combination of geo-political factors was exploited by Turkey. A decapitation strategy was now also implemented in parallel to Turkey’s political and diplomatic efforts with great success. Through Öcalan’s capture in Kenya in 1999, Turkey delivered a final blow to the PKK. This classical enemy-centric strategy worked in large part because the PKK was a hierarchical organization with great reliance upon Öcalan’s political and strategic guidance, and without a clear line of succession. The PKK was forced to withdraw from Turkey and to declare a unilateral ceasefire in February 2000. However, it needs to be noted that this military strategy did not work in isolation, but rather in conjunction with coercive diplomacy on the grand strategic level. This should serve as a caution when it comes to the analysis of specific military strategies taken in isolation from their context.

Evaluation of the Turkish approach

In this section, I determine the dominant approach used by the Turkish state using data from Table 8.2 and Graph 8.2. Further, I briefly discuss the measures which led to the ‘successful’ outcome of the campaign. 174

In sum, Ankara pursued a predominantly enemy-centric approach during all stages of the campaign against the PKK. It can certainly be argued that this led (in Ankara’s eyes and in line with Paul et al. (2010a; 2010b; 2013) classification) to a successful conclusion of the conflict. During the first part of the insurgency, the enemy-centric measures on the military strategic level were reactive in nature due to a lack of understanding of the nature of the enemy, i.e., the enemy was perceived as a ‘security threat’ rather than a ‘strategic’ or ‘political’ threat. Table 8.2 displays the findings in relation to the approaches employed, dividing them according to the period of employment and including all measures (on the grand strategic and military strategic levels) in order to create a complete picture. Despite the prevalence of enemy-centric measures, some attempts were made to pursue a political (non- military) solution that took into account the wishes of the Kurdish population. But these measures were undermined by the political conditions characterizing the early 1990s. Once the Turkish state recognized the problem that the PKK was posing, it was able to successfully develop multiple lines of action encompassing all of the assets of statecraft in order to counter and neutralize the threat. A number of different strategies contributed to the PKK’s demise and its unilateral declaration of a ceasefire in 2000. Domestically, these included attrition and the use of GKKS on the military strategic level and a development project on the grand strategic level. Internationally, Turkey employed coercive diplomacy and a strategy of decapitation combined with military operations beyond Turkey’s borders.

Period Enemy-centric Population-centric Misc. 1984-1990 1. State of Emergency 1. Village guards (military 1. Denial of (grand strategic level) strategic) everything Kurdish 2. Operations are reactive 2. GAP project (grand strategic (enacted in 1983) rather than proactive level) 2. Repentance Laws (annihilation) (military strategic level) 3. Doctrinal shifts (territorial control) (1987-1992) 1990-1999 1. Coercive diplomacy 1. GAP project (grand 1. Village Evacuation (grand strategic level) strategic level) 2. Repentance Laws 2. Curtailing external 2. Lifting restrictions on support (grand strategic Kurdish language level) 3. Village guards (military 3. Military operations strategic level) outside Turkey (military 4. Enforcement of better strategic level) army discipline (operational level) 175

4. Large-scale military operations in Turkey (military strategic level) 5. Decapitation strategy (military strategic level) 6. Employment of Special Forces (military strategic level) 7. Doctrinal shifts (cordon-and-search doctrine)

Table 8.2: The Turkish Approach from 1984 to 1999 in overview

Turkish COIN: 1984-2000

7 7 7 7 7 7 7

6

5 5

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Enemy-centric Population-centric

Graph 8.2: Timeline of measures implemented between 1984-1999

The Sri Lankan Case

The Sri Lankan case demonstrates that from the very beginning the main goal was to destroy the enemy using kinetic means. For the underequipped and undertrained—at least for the kind of enemy they faced—Sri Lankan armed forces, the objective was pursued by each branch individually. The approach used was clearly an enemy-centric one with little to no regard to the civilian population, friendly or otherwise. This was especially true for the period from 1983-1987 (the First Eelam War) when force was used indiscriminately, playing directly into the insurgents’ hands. 176

During the Second Eelam War (1990-1995), the measures (on the military strategic level) remained strictly enemy-centric, focusing on restricting the LTTE to the Jaffna Peninsula and clearing the Wanni region. Notwithstanding the existing force shortage, the latter objective was achieved with the assistance of deep penetration operations conducted by the Special Forces in the East. At the political level, the government was looking for a political solution to the conflict. Aided by the international community, peace talks between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the LTTE commenced in 1994.

In 1995, a peace agreement was forced upon the GoSL stopping all military operations. Notwithstanding the fact that the GoSL also adopted a more population-centric and accommodative measure in releasing the so-called ‘devolution package’ that would create political autonomy for the Tamil areas in the North and East, this proved insufficient to curb the insurgency. The LTTE was not willing to accept anything less than a separate state.

After the ceasefire had ended, from 1995 to 2002—during the Third Eelam War— the main approach remained enemy-centric, albeit with little success for the GoSL given that its armed forces were not strong enough or coordinated enough to defeat the LTTE. Another halt in hostilities then came in 2002, this time leading to a cease-fire agreement which gave the LTTE the opportunity to recover, regroup and return to hostilities. It can thus again be said that the GoSL implemented another accommodative measure which proved to be a failure.

After his election in 2005, President Rajapaksa voiced his resolve to use kinetic force to physically defeat the LTTE, which falls in line with enemy-centric thinking, as discussed in chapter III. In light of the long history of failed peace negotiations and cease-fire agreements, Rajapaksa stood firmly against international pressure to seek a peaceful settlement. This was an important step towards the creation of a clear political and grand strategic end-state and the revival of the political will—which, according to Clausewitz, is one of the most important attributes for achieving a victory175—among both military and

175 According to Clausewitz, to effectively counter an enemy one has to take into account their power of resistance and the strength of their will (Clausewitz 1976: 18), for a victory does not necessarily entail a complete physical obliteration; a broken will (to continue resistance) can produce the desired effect. Conversely, 177

government actors. Physical destruction of the enemy took priority, hence all resources were channeled to create the necessary “military effectiveness”176 to attain this goal (Hashim 2013: 180). This meant that civilian and military leaders worked in concert towards a common and clearly formulated goal. For the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the ends were aligned with the ways and the means in a coherent manner.

First and foremost, all efforts now by the armed forces were backed by the GoSL. The President had to sacrifice international support and withstand external pressures to pursue this goal. However, the approach adopted was not purely enemy-centric. Despite the ongoing hostilities, Rajapaksa sought to uphold democratic freedoms and hold elections, so as to win over popular support in Tamil areas. The enemy-centric measures on the military strategic level therefore needed refining.

Second, the focus shifted from territorial dominance to breaking the enemy’s will by ensuring that the LTTE forces were stretched and weakened by the reformed and newly equipped Sri Lankan forces. Additionally, while the unity of effort to defeat the LTTE remained, the centralization of command was abolished and a mission command doctrine employed. The SLA moved away from conventional thinking to adopt unconventional methods, which came as a surprise to the LTTE. The coordination between the Army and the Air Force, paired with timely intelligence, helped them to pursue a decapitation/targeted killings strategy to eliminate the LTTE cadre members.

Third, to achieve the aforementioned goal of stretching the LTTE’s capabilities, another important military strategic measure was added to the SLA’s toolbox. Before 2005, the SLA was limited in its effectiveness due to its inability to launch more than one major operation at a time to destroy LTTE bases. Operations launched by the Army were merely reactive in absence of a clear end-state. As General Fonseka put it, “we were always planning for limited objectives, either to capture a particular town or capture a particular road” (Gen. Fonseka quoted in Hashim 2013: 186). After 2005, this changed. The SLA could implement

this logic can be applied to either party. In our case, a weak or a non-existent (political) will would hinder the government’s attempts to defeat the insurgents. 176 ‘Military effectiveness’ is a process that entails a conversion of existing resources at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. This process calls for creation of new approaches on those aforementioned levels (Hashim 2013: 179). 178

a comprehensive military strategy consisting of launching several operations simultaneously (e.g., in the Wanni (Mannar, Vavyniya, and Weli Oya)), thereby fixing the LTTE infantry and support units on the Jaffna Peninsula and preventing them from deploying to the Wanni theatres (Hashim 2013: 185).

Yet, not all measures were purely enemy-centric. Rajapaksa created Civil Defence Committees (CDCs) which played an integral role in village protection. These, on the one hand, protected the villages from the insurgents and, on the other, prevented the insurgents from infiltrating these villages (Hettige 2015: 67-68).

Evaluation of the LTTE case

In this following section I will determine the dominant approach used by the Sri Lankan state which ended the decades-long conflict, for Colombo, successfully. Further, I will list the measures pertaining to both enemy-centric and population-centric measures which were implemented during the war.

As can be seen from Table 8.3 and Graph 8.3, from 2005 onwards the GoSL and its military implemented nine measures (excluding those in the miscellaneous category), which can be classified as either enemy- or population-centric to attain their objectives. This lead to the ultimate defeat of the LTTE in 2009. Despite the fact that the measures used were from both approaches, the enemy-centric approach dominated given that six enemy-centric measures were implemented, i.e., twice as many as population-centric measures. Moreover, two of the population-centric measures took place on the grand-strategic level (upholding elections and mobilization of the population), while only one, namely the employment of CDCs, was on the military strategic level. Enemy-centric measures, however, proved to be dominant on all levels: grand strategic, military strategic, operational and tactical.

As the earlier discussion of the case specifics demonstrates, once all these measures were implemented, the GoSL defeated the LTTE, which leads to the conclusion that it was an enemy-centric approach with only a few population-centric measures (implemented across 179

all levels) that led to the overall victory of the Sri Lankan state by generating the desired strategic effect.177

Period Enemy-centric Population-centric Misc. 1983-1987 1. Enemy-centric 1. Indo-Lanka 1. N/A operations Agreement (1987) (annihilation) (military strategic level) 1990-1995 1. Large-scale 1. Peace 1. N/A operations Negotiations (territorial control) (1995) (military strategic level) 1995-2002 1. Large-scale 1. CFA of 2002 1. N/A operations (territorial control) (military strategic level) 2005-2009 1. Destruction of the 1. Upholding 1. Media enemy at any cost democratic restrictions; (grand strategic freedoms: holding Battlefield level) elections; coverage 2. International (political level) would come support from (2005) only from the regional players 2. Mobilization of government (China, Russia, the population to sources Pakistan, India, support the goal (Hashim Japan, Israel, and to increase the 2013: 183) Malaysia, Thailand SLA (2005 and Middle Eastern onwards) (grand countries) (grand strategic level) strategic level) 3. Employment of 3. Offensive CDCs (2005 operations in onwards) multiple theatres (military strategic designed to level) overstretch LTTE’s capabilities (military strategic level) 4. Employment of SIOTs (military strategic level)

177 Military strategies, while very important, cannot be the sole reason for success given the fact that adjustments were made at the political and the grand-strategic levels. It, thus, would be a fallacy to attribute success to isolated elements of a complex system. 180

5. Targeted Killings & Decapitation (military strategic level) 6. Maritime Interdiction Strategy (military strategic level)

Table 8.3: Sri Lankan Approach from 1983 to 2009 in overview

Sri Lankan COIN: 1983-2009

6 6 6 6 6

4

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Enemy-centric Population-centric

Graph 8.3: Timeline of the tenets implemented between 1983-2009

Conclusion

My aim in this chapter has been to establish the dominant approach used by the first- party actors in the cases examined in this thesis and to determine a list of measures (at the grand and military strategic levels) used in each case. Evidently, these first-party actors—in contrast to their contemporary second-party expeditionary counterparts—preferred enemy- centric measures, although the grand strategies used did include population-centric measures such as economic reforms and social mobilization. It should be noted that despite the use of 181

enemy-centric measures these had to be aligned with the overall political goal in order to prove effective. A cross-case comparison of specific measures on the military strategic level and their context of implementation are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

182

Chapter IX: Cross-comparison of enemy- and population-centric measures used across the cases

In the preceding chapter I both established which enemy-centric and population centric measures were used in all the cases studied, focusing on those that led to the conclusion of the conflicts in question, and identified which overall approach was dominant in all cases. The next sections will focus on a cross-case comparison with an emphasis on the measures used to establish a list of tenets that ultimately led to a successful outcome (desired ends) in all cases.

Caveats

Despite the discrepancies existent in the current COIN debate (briefly discussed in Chapter II and in more detail in chapters III and IV), it should be noted that any approach should be situated within a broader picture encompassing the grand strategic sphere, which will be influenced by both the domestic and international realms. In other words, circumstances (sometimes serendipitous), time, and place will matter greatly (Cimbala 1998: 3; Gray 2010). That is not to say the role of military force should be underplayed. Instead, what should be stressed is the fact that regardless of the military strategies adopted in any given counterinsurgency campaign, the measures employed as part of them have to be fully integrated into and must cohere with the political end-state. As Clausewitz (1976: 20) noted, “[t]he political object––the original motive for the war––will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.” The military objective inevitably determines which measures as part of which military strategies are to be used to reach that objective and subsequently the political objective. Military strategy, in general terms, forms but one part of the broader toolset of statecraft, sometimes encapsulated in the acronym DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (Bowman 2007: 30-31; Gray 2010: 19). Let us briefly reiterate the definition of military strategy which should be at the forefront of this analysis. As established in the introduction, military strategy—to use Gray’s (2010: 19) analogy—can be described as a bridge between grand strategy and military operations and tactics: the use of military means in specific ways to achieve political ends. According to Lykke (1989), there must be a balance between the ends, the ways and the means. The ends will always have the determining role in which ways are used and with which means 183

they are pursued.

All the campaigns studied in this thesis display a clear lack of balance between the ends, the ways and the means at the onset; they all started as purely enemy-centric campaigns, and the issue at stake was viewed by decision makers in purely military terms. The military strategies employed throughout the span of the insurgencies in all the studied cases did not change significantly, as can be seen from tables 8.1 to 8.3 (see previous chapter). Neither did these strategies substantially differ from the approach typical of so-called ‘conventional wars’ (Metz 2012: 35; Smith & Jones 2015: 1-6). More changes were enacted on the policy (ends) and grand strategic levels (ways) to augment the military strategies (ways), which falls in line with the general theory of strategy (see Gray 2018) and the hierarchical and interdependent relationship between policy, grand strategy, military strategy, operations and tactics. Put differently, the military strategies that proved to be successful should not be considered in isolation from the broader strategic and political contexts.178 Taking this into consideration, the research was designed in such a way as to select the ‘most different’ campaigns for analytical purposes, namely campaigns that differ across various dimensions: geographic location, and time. It should be noted that two of the case studies (Peru and Turkey) overlap on the timescale given that the insurgencies had to be concluded within the last thirty years to retain their relevance. This design is helpful in determining the common strategies at both grand strategic and military strategic levels used across the cases in order to create a comprehensive, yet not exhaustive, list of what can be seen as ‘best practices’, especially on the military strategic level—that is, the overall approach used by military organizations themselves in their COIN tasks.179

The International Dimension

Today, in a more globalized world, the international dimension plays a significant role in the way that states deal with their own domestic conflicts, their own ‘wars’. This is because, as Hedley Bull (2014: 188) suggests, war is perceived as “a manifestation of

178 Geographic location is equally important, however, it is beyond the limits of this thesis to discuss the point in detail. For a thorough discussion of the role of geography, see Gray (2013: 89-91) who contends that geography along with other important factors such as culture, technology and economy is important for strategy formation. 179 Consult the introduction for the delimitations of this study. 184

disorder” to international society while at the same time it is a tool that “international society itself feels the need to exploit so as to achieve its own purposes” (emphasis added). By the same token, sovereign states have both national and international obligations to fulfill (Ramos 2013: 13-17). On the one hand, external international actors (whether states or non- state actors) can exert coercive pressure upon governments (e.g., diplomatic or economic) to enact specific measures within their own conflict situations, such as ceasefires or peace agreements. Conversely, they can offer help (e.g., intelligence sharing, military equipment and military advisors) to governments involved in COIN campaigns (Quirk 2017: 9-14).180 Alternatively, they can support the insurgents by offering safe havens, training, equipment and intelligence (Innes 2012; Mumford 2013).181 To paraphrase Boaz Ganor (2011: 2-3),182 insurgents cannot be addressed successfully as long as there are ties between them and international actors (states or otherwise) which collaborate with them. This point is very important, albeit understated in writings on counterinsurgency from the 19th and early 20th centuries because such writings related to campaigns conducted in colonial settings, where the actors partaking in such campaigns were actually first-party actors.

While international influence played a limited role in the Peruvian insurgency, especially when it came to supporting the Sendero Luminoso (as discussed in chapter V), in the cases of Turkey and Sri Lanka the international context played a prominent role. The insurgents there enjoyed significant international support from the Kurdish and Tamil diasporas respectively as well as external state actors. At the same time, both states, especially Sri Lanka, found themselves under much diplomatic pressure to adopt certain measures, such as ceasefire agreements. Therefore—in line with Jeffrey Record’s (2008) theory183—both Turkey and Sri Lanka had to engage in diplomacy, coercive or otherwise, to curtail that external support and to attract allies for their respective causes. This was instrumental in defeating the respective insurgencies. Turkey used coercive diplomacy to

180 This phenomenon of foreign engagement on behalf of either side as to influence the strategic outcome is otherwise known as ‘proxy-warfare’. For a detailed account, see Innes (2012), Mumford (2013), and Quirk (2017). 181 Even seemingly neutral actors (e.g., UN Peacekeeping force or disaster relief NGOs), as Luttwak (1999: 37- 44) argues, can have disastrous effects upon countries plagued by wars. 182 While Ganor (2011) discusses terrorism, a similar logic is applicable to insurgencies. 183 Record (2008: 23-66) posits that the main lifeline of insurgents lies in external support due to the fact that insurgents usually face a more powerful state actor. Such external support can help offset the imbalance between the two adversaries in favor of the insurgents. 185

undermine both Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish support to the PKK and to ensure their cooperation with the Turkish state. In Sri Lanka, President Rajapaksa had to withstand extensive pressure from the West when formulating and pursuing his political goals, so as not to be coerced into another ceasefire. Rajapaksa followed Edward Luttwak’s (1999) logic by resisting international pressure for another ceasefire by “giving war a chance” (37) and using the military instrument with “bold resolve” (Peters 2007).184 At the same time, Sri Lanka received international support from several countries (such as India) that acted as a force-multiplier in its efforts to eliminate the LTTE. Particularly in today’s environment, policy formation (to eradicate an insurgency, in this case) requires taking into account not only such issues as the domestic political environment, (one’s own and the host country’s) strategic culture, available resources, geography, the adversary’s end goal, resources and capabilities, but also how such policy will be perceived in international society in an environment when there is a heightened risk of alienating possible allies. 185 This demonstrates how important the international dimension (and often with serendipity involved) is—both as a constraint and as an enabler—in crafting state policy and in selecting appropriate ways and means in COIN situations. These ultimately affect both grand strategic and military strategic designs. If we accept the premise, as purported by FM 3-24, that the ultimate goal in COIN campaigns is to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the key constituent population, we can reasonably expand this claim to include international (predominantly Western) actors. It is not only domestic legitimacy that is of concern here but also international legitimacy. The formulation of a political end-state, especially one envisaging the use of an instrument as blunt as the military, is constrained by international legal and ethical norms (e.g., the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or Chapter VII of the UN Charter). Should such norms (i.e., jus ad bellum and/or jus in bello) be disregarded, international actors might employ a range of punitive measures which could potentially include diplomatic coercion, economic sanctions and active support of the non-

184 In his criticism of FM 3-24, Ralph Peters (2007) asserts that such use of the military is the only way, as history demonstrates, to conduct a successful COIN campaign. 185 The list presented above is not exhaustive, however, it is beyond the limits of this thesis to discuss each element in depth which it certainly merits. 186

state adversary.186 First-party COIN actors are rarely totally immune from restraints imposed by international influence.

Domestic Political Dimension

The domestic political climate provides another crucial context from which, as established earlier, everything flows: (grand and military) strategy, operations, and tactics. What is important to reiterate is the balance between ends, ways and means. If ends are not clearly defined or absent altogether, even a well-formulated and equally well-executed military strategy cannot—in most cases—substitute for a bad policy or for a lack thereof. Given the hierarchical and interdependent relationship outlined earlier (see Chapter II), it is easier to correct a poor military strategy through a good policy and a sound grand strategy than vice versa (Gray 2010: 19; 29-30). As Gray (2009: 25) persuasively argues, “[…] although warfare has a grammar and dynamics of its own, it is wasted effort and sacrifice unless policy retains a grip on strategy.”

To illustrate the subordinate role of the military strategy, let us recall one of the greatest battles in military history: the battle of Cannae, 216 BC. In military strategic terms, Hannibal Barca’s employment of annihilation brought him success on the battlefield, devastating a force some 70,000 Roman soldiers. Yet, in political and grand strategic terms, this victory fell short of coercing the Romans to the negotiation table (Bradford 1999: 115- 117). A similar fate was met by the French Army in Algeria during its campaign against the FLN. While the French forces delivered a significant tactical blow to the FLN in the Battle of Algiers in 1956-1957, the subsequent political isolation of the military, triggered in part by the dissatisfied population in France, pushed the new President, Charles De Gaulle, to put an end to the Algerian War (Porch 2015: 185-187).187 Military theorists such as Clausewitz and Callwell, to name but two, have long recognized the primacy of politics in the conduct of war. For Clausewitz (1976: 36), “war should never be thought of as something autonomous

186 While this discussion merits more attention, it is beyond the limits of this thesis to explore this angle. For a more thorough discussion of the ethical concepts and the right to self-defense, see Moir (2010: 5-40) and Friman (2017: 99-142). 187 It should be noted that the French population created pressure upon its political leaders (e.g., Mollet’s government was discharged through a vote of no confidence) in light of the brutal tactics such as torture and executions used by the military in Algeria (Porch 2015: 187-189). 187

but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us” (italics in the original). Indeed, every war has its own grammar, but the logic to that grammar is provided by policy for “war is only a branch of political activity” (italics in the original) (Clausewitz 1976: 252). The understanding of this relation between policy and war is critical for the conduct of war because warfare, as Gray (2010: 31) puts it, “is not self- referential”. Policy, in other words, provides war with the necessary purpose and direction.

Despite this, military strategies can be—and in certain cases, such as Peru, are— formulated and executed in the absence of a functioning relationship between the military and the political leaders (see Gray 2014: 41-42; Echevarria 2017: 2-5). This is largely a byproduct of flawed civil-military relations that creates a vacuum at the grand strategic level;188 or as Hew Strachan (2013: 66) puts it, “The consequence of politicians pretending that policy is strategy and of soldiers focusing on operations has been to leave [grand] strategy without a home”. Such military strategies, bereft of political meaning, are more often than not insufficient to achieve the desired outcome in light of this damaged relationship, resulting in discordance between ends, ways and means. In this regard—despite its shortcomings briefly discussed in Chapter II—FM 3-24 contains an important truth. It has been criticized for paying inadequate attention to the persistent problem of the lack of integration between the political and grand strategic domains with the military strategic one, even being described as a ‘strategy of tactics’ (Gentile 2013). Yet the manual is correct in drawing attention to the following:

Military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power (FM 3-24 2006: 53).

In other words, military strategy or strategies have to be nested within the broader grand strategic framework that is directed towards achievement of the political goal. As discussed in previous chapters, the political dimension is, therefore, undoubtedly the most important one, and cannot be eschewed when examining military strategies employed during

188 This flawed relationship can result from distrust, (e.g., Peru) the desire to exercise rigid control over the military, or an unwillingness to exert control over the military (as in Turkey). In other cases, it can be due to the overall lack of a clear policy and/or grand strategy (e.g., Turkey and Sri Lanka). 188

the COIN campaigns in question (or any wars, for that matter). Below is a brief analysis of what occurred in the political realm in each of the case studies.

The Role of the Political Dimension in the Case Studies

In each of the cases studied substantial changes at the political level, which significantly affected the overall course of the respective campaigns. In the Peruvian case, for instance, attempts at executing a military strategy in a political vacuum during the early years of the insurgency (1982-1990) were counterproductive. The shift from one political leader to another (i.e., from Balaúnde to García) affected both the military strategies implemented and the relationship between the military and civilian leaders. While some attempts were made to establish a connection between the political and the military realms (especially during García’s presidency from 1985 onward), these efforts were largely unsuccessful. The insurgency continued evolving in line with its doctrinal principles based on Mao’s concept of People’s War. The vital civil-military connection was missing until Fujimori’s presidency. Only in 1991 did the situation change: Fujimori undertook a complete restructuring of the state and security apparatuses to achieve a balance between the ends, the ways and the means.

In the Turkish case, there were two pronounced issues at the political level. First, from the onset, there was no clear political end-state because both the government and the military did not understand the enemy they were facing. This led to the employment of predominantly reactive (and highly kinetic) measures. Second, despite the change from dictatorial military rule to civilian rule in 1983, the military remained a power player in the political arena, constraining (because it favored a heavily enemy-centric approach) the range of options available to civilian leaders.189 In 1991, for instance, President Özal attempted to pursue a more population-centric approach, especially on the grand strategic level, by lifting the Kurdish language ban and seeking a so-called political solution—a solution that entails other non-military measures. The removal of the language ban—despite being at odds with the Kemalist convictions held by the military—was enacted. This attempt to seek a political

189Sarigil (2014: 176) describes Turkey (especially during the 1980s) as a political system “with double executives”. As discussed in chapter VII, Demirel was well aware of the possibility of a coup by the military. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the safest way to create a modus vivendi was not to contradict it. 189

solution, however, ceased with Özal’s death in 1993. Initiatives such as Özal’s created a tension between the grand strategic and the military strategic levels given that the armed forces continued conducting enemy-centric operations against the PKK. Only from 1993 onward did the situation return to a ‘normal’ pattern, i.e., a civil-military modus vivendi, with a new President—Süleyman Demirel—assuming power and endorsing the enemy-centric approach on the military strategic level, combined with extensive diplomatic efforts on the grand strategic level.190 The coherence between the two levels helped achieve the ultimate demise of the PKK. Both the PKK’s morale and its physical capabilities to fight were effectively broken by 2000.

In the Sri Lankan case there was no balance between the ends, ways and means until Rajapaska’s presidency (2005). Regardless of the approaches implemented, this link was vital in establishing a sound overall approach in which the military efforts would always be backed by the political leadership. Rajapaksa’s political resolve was central in that the President garnered the support of the population through popular mobilization, at the same time giving the armed forces carte blanche to employ whichever means it deemed to be necessary to destroy the LTTE.

It can thus be said that in all the cases, especially in Peru and Sri Lanka, substantial changes took place on the political level during the course of the respective campaigns. The civil-military relations in both instances reached a degree of ‘normalcy’, not previously present, akin to what Samuel P. Huntington (1957: 80-85) described as ‘objective’ control: control aimed at maximizing military professionalism in its function to the state by separating the military from the political sphere and by giving it a free rein in its own (military) domain. 191 Once established, such control helped balance the ‘ends, ways and means’ triptych. Turkey, however, presents an outlier case in this regard in that the relationship between the military and its civilian counterparts was reversed (with the former playing the

190 One should not discount the broader context, that is, the military setbacks of the PKK and the (short-lived) cease fire agreement. 191 Proper civil-military relations, Huntington argued (1957: 2-3) would prevent nations from wasting their resources and thereby increasing the odds of reaching the desired end-state. The preferred type of civil-military relations is “objective” control as opposed to “assertive” and “subjective” types of control which assume the civilian leaders meddle in the military’s affairs or, in the latter case, interfere with the military’s organizational structure (Huntington 1957: 80-85). For a contrasting view, see Janowitz (1960). 190

dominant role). As long as the civilian leadership could peacefully coexist with the military institution and find a way to work together (e.g., from 1993 onward) the balance between ends, ways and means could be achieved.

In each of the case studies (except Turkey) at least eighty percent of the whole campaign duration were conducted without any clear balance between end, ways and means. In Peru it was 8 years (80% of the overall duration); in Turkey—7 years (46,6% of the overall duration); and in Sri Lanka—23 years (88% of the overall duration). During these years the military strategy was conducted in discord with the political goal (or in its absence). This demonstrates the notion that regardless of the military strategies employed during those years, the lack of a balance between the key variables (ends, ways, means) rendered the military efforts ineffective at best, or counterproductive at worst.

Recognition of the problem: the nature of the adversary

In terms of choosing the best measures for conducting an effective COIN campaign, closely related to the alignment of ends (political end-state), ways (grand and military strategies) and means (capabilities) is the need for a clear understanding of the problem. Undoubtedly, a clear political end-state is important. However, formulating an end-state in light of the desired outcome requires, among earlier discussed matters, a thorough inquiry into the nature of the adversary and into one’s own capabilities and resources. In order to find a viable solution to a problem one needs to have a clear grasp of what the problem is in the first place. Is it an actual insurgency or perhaps just a law enforcement problem? Correct identification of the problem is indispensable to formulating a clear and achievable end-state, to selecting proper tools to address it, and to allocating the necessary resources to do so.192 The end-state should always be weighed against what is feasible to achieve and what the available ways and means are. Sun Tzu’s famous maxim is a case in point: one should understand both the enemy and one’s own capabilities (Sun Tzu 2009: 20).193 Only when

192 Resource allocation is crucial in a sense that it can strengthen the military instrument, thus enabling it to efficiently pursue the political end-state. 193 Sun Tzu’s maxim posits: “If you know both yourself and your enemy, you can win a hundred battles without a single loss”. 191

such an understanding is achieved can a sound political end-state be formulated. Clausewitz, too, cautioned his readers that one should be aware of the kind of war one is engaged in:

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. (emphasis added) (Clausewitz 1976: 30)

Clausewitz offered a very clear warning that erroneous identification of the problem could cause perils. As demonstrated below, by initially underestimating the threat and reducing it to a mere law-enforcement matter all the governments in the cases studied in this thesis violated Clausewitz’s cardinal rule. In a similar fashion, earlier COIN theorists and practitioners such as Bugeaud, Callwell and Thompson (see Chapters III and IV), to name but a few, understood this crucial step. Callwell, for instance, devised a set of typologies of the adversary (e.g., “opponents with a form of regular organization”, “fanatics”, “guerrillas, civilized and savage”, etc.) in order to be able to select the correct ways and means to address them, always bearing in mind the overarching goal (Callwell 1914: 29-32; Porch 1996: xii).

Adversaries, too, have flaws

With armed hostilities under way, it is worth noting that adversaries are beset by a similar set of problems to those faced by counterinsurgents. They, too, make mistakes, be it on the political, grand strategic or military strategic levels. In the cases studied such mistakes included, for instance, the insurgents’ ill-advised shift to ‘conventional warfare’, as happened in Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka. Though such a progression was in line with Mao’s notion of the strategic offensive (which is the concluding stage of an insurgency, leading to the government overthrow) in these cases the shift was premature and opened a window of opportunity for the stronger counterinsurgents to either significantly weaken the insurgents (Turkey) or defeat them fully in military terms (Peru, Sri Lanka). Another crucial mistake is hubristic behavior. For instance, the PKK strove for dominance of the KAZ which caused dissatisfaction among its Kurdish allies in Northern Iraq and compelled the Iraqi Kurds to cooperate with Turkey, though it was not the only reason for such cooperation. In Peru, SL’s strategy unfolded in a linear fashion without taking into account the fact that the government 192

was adjusting its strategic approaches in line with the political end-state (during the Fujimori years).

In light of the above, it can be safely deduced that war is a continuous interaction, or a ‘reciprocal activity’ (Smith & Jones 2015: 23), between two or more warring parties. There is, therefore, a need for both strategic and tactical responsiveness to the adversary’s behavior. It is a constant dialogue which does not consist of a binary interaction but can instead unfold in many directions—directions which a good strategist must be able to foresee and account for. For instance, as evident from the case studies, the insurgents evolved throughout the conflict, assuming a ‘regular’ modus operandi in conjunction with guerrilla tactics. However, such an evolution, or lack thereof, will always remain case specific and is something counterinsurgents must be prepared for. Such preparedness can be achieved through careful observation of the adversary’s actions and reactions throughout the conflict in light of the overall end-state the adversary seeks to achieve, which can also be altered at any given point of time.

Adherents of both the enemy-centric and the population-centric schools of thought risk being too closely focused on modus operandi and on the respective perceived CoGs (i.e., enemy or population) thereby ignoring the broader context of the war and the vital interaction between adversaries. For example, as Gray argues, the ‘fixation’ on the insurgent enemy (in the enemy-centric approach) and the idea that ‘favorable’ politics will simply follow from the physical destruction of the enemy on the battlefield is mistaken at best (Gray 2012b: 24). Another example is the current US COIN doctrine which claims to be universally applicable regardless of time and space (FM 3-24 2006: li). Such a claim, however, makes a dangerous assumption, namely, that all insurgencies are wars of similar character. Such thinking ‘destrategizes’ conflicts and thereby limits political and strategic choices by simply prescribing a set of rigid operational and tactical approaches (Smith & Jones 2015). In broader terms, this reductionist view depletes and decontextualizes a complex phenomenon—war—by fixating upon only one dimension: the tactical. It thus overlooks other important tangible and intangible factors including, but not limited to, the nature of the adversary and their objectives. To return to the dialogue analogy, a war does not follow a predetermined script. The script for every war will be unique to its context, as Clausewitz 193

(1976) explained.194 Therefore, regardless of the set of measures adopted—be they enemy- centric or population-centric or both—what remains important is the overall effect such rigidity imposes on political and strategic choices. As history shows, this can prove detrimental for the overall campaign (such as was arguably the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan).195

The Nature of the Enemy in Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka

From the outset, what the governments and militaries in each of the cases studied were missing was a recognition of the nature of the respective adversaries in question and, consequently, a sound political end-state could not be set which could be aligned with military strategic initiatives tailored to address the specific problem. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of Peru. Here there was a complete government and security system overhaul once the nature of the adversary became apparent. In a similar fashion, the Turkish government underplayed the PKK threat from the very beginning, reacting passively at best. Understanding the problem remains essential to choosing the appropriate political end-state, and grand strategic and military strategic tools, in order to mitigate or eliminate it. Achieving this recognition and understanding, especially at the level of policy, took the governments concerned at least a decade, and even longer in the case of Sri Lanka. However, once a clear appreciation of the threat emerged, grand strategic calculations were made (in line with the prevalent political goal) and military strategies adjusted accordingly.

Military Strategies—a Distillation of ‘Best Practices’

Having discussed the caveats and the contributing factors to the COIN cases in this study (the list of which is not exhaustive) I proceed now to draw parallels between the various

194 Refer to the introduction for a more detailed discussion of the nature and the character of war. Conversely, refer to the discussion regarding a silver-bullet approach below. 195 There exists an ample amount of literature on the campaign in Afghanistan in general and on the COIN aspect, in particular. For instance, Rashid (2008) offers a critique of the Bush Administration’s venture into nation-building in Afghanistan. Bird and Marshall (2011) offer another critical account of the US policies in Afghanistan (from 2001 to 2010), dedicating some considerate attention to the COIN ‘strategy’ that has been set in motion and leading the fact that “the West had truly lost its way” (248). For a more detailed critique of the COIN doctrine in Afghanistan, see Eikenberry (2013). For a perspective on the British engagement in the Afghanistan conflict, see, for instance, Dixon (2012: 26-38) and Catignani (2012). For a general overview of the conflict, see Schofield (2010). 194

measures employed as part of the overall military strategies (rather than grand strategic) used at various times, as depicted in Tables 9.1 and 9.2.

Enemy-centric Peruvian Case Turkish Case Sri Lankan Case Measures

Offensive Military Operations Offensive Military Offensive Military (attrition & exhaustion) Operations (attrition & Operations (attrition & exhaustion) exhaustion)

Decapitation Decapitation Decapitation

Doctrinal overhaul Doctrinal adjustments Doctrinal adjustments

Intelligence-driven Intelligence-driven Intelligence-driven

Employment of Specialized Employment of SF Employment of SIOTs Anti-Terrorism Units (dislocation) (dislocation) (dislocation)

Table 9.1: Enemy-centric measures employed throughout the cases at the military strategic level

Population-centric Peruvian Case Turkish Case Sri Lankan Case Measures

Village Guards Village Guards Village Guards

Table 9.2: Population-centric measures employed throughout the cases at the military strategic level

In the early stages of each insurgency, the respective governments each relied on a reactive variant of the annihilation strategy, which aims to destroy an adversary’s physical capability to fight in a decisive battle by striking the enemy’s centers of gravity (CoGs), such as their sources of command and control. The aim is not to physically destroy the enemy through the combination of superior numbers and fire power, but rather to make them incapable of (physical) resistance and to leave them “demoralized” and “disorganized” (MCDP 1-1 1998: 54-55; Gray 2010: 67-68; 91; Echevarria 2017: 13-15). This strategy, however, works poorly against an elusive enemy dispersed among the civilian population. The reason for this lies in the fact that it is overly difficult to determine the CoGs of an insurgent group. Often one CoG could be the key population which would respond poorly if subjected to military treatment, as illustrated in the case studies. Another problem with this 195

strategy is the challenge of bringing insurgents to a decisive battle given that, per definition, these live among the population. This is especially true in the early stages of an insurgency when the insurgents lack manpower and, thus, go to great lengths to remain elusive, resorting mainly to isolated attacks and avoiding the superior government army at all costs. In both Peru and Turkey, the insurgents benefited from rugged terrain, which enabled them to avoid direct military confrontation with the armed forces, resorting instead to indirect attrition through the employment of isolated surprise attacks. Thus, annihilation is ill-suited for such cases due to the elusive nature of the adversary coupled with a heightened risk of creating collateral damage. Additionally, the ‘clear and hold’ strategy was implemented to a degree, yet this failed given the inadequacy of deployed forces to hold the cleared territories, making them easy targets for the insurgents.

Having set the stage and briefly discussed what (military strategy) did not work in each particular case, I now proceed to an in-depth discussion of what worked by grouping the findings in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 into classical—or conventional—strategies (or components of military strategy as per Lukke’s definition).196 It should be stressed, however, that the overall success cannot be attributed to a specific military strategy. Rather it is important to ensure that the strategies employed are aligned with the desired political end-state of each particular case. Any strategy, be it enemy- or population-centric, requires judgment in application which will always and invariably depend on the desired political objectives (and, albeit to a lesser degree, on available resources, military or otherwise).

Attrition197 and Exhaustion

Attrition and exhaustion are aimed at the destruction of an adversary’s physical (in the case of the former) and moral (in the latter case) capability to fight through raising the enemy’s costs in continuing resistance. This is achieved through the erosion of the enemy’s assets, particularly his personnel. Overall, both of these methods are time consuming, unlike

196 While other aspects from Lykke’s definition such as resources are integral (see Chapter II), these cannot be meaningfully compared across the cases given the lack of necessary data. See Limitations in Chapter I. 197 The term ‘erosion’ is used by Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-1 to denote as what is commonly referred to the strategy of attrition. To avoid confusion, I will use only the term attrition. 196

annihilation, and require ample resources, both military and otherwise (MCDP 1-1 1998: 55- 56; Gray 2010: 68; Echevarria 2017: 30-31).

Attrition was employed to a great extent in all of the cases studied. At its most successful, this strategy appeared in the form of offensive large-scale military operations underpinned by sound intelligence. These operations were important in undermining the enemy’s military/physical capabilities. In Sri Lanka (2006-2009), for instance, operations were launched simultaneously across different operational areas to overstretch the LTTE forces, leading to the loss of many rank and file members as well as LTTE’s territorial dominance. In Turkey, large-scale operations—guided by the cordon and search doctrine enacted in 1992—launched against the PKK were successful in breaking the PKK’s physical capability to resist by1993/4, forcing the insurgents to retreat.

Attrition was combined with exhaustion—that is, the destruction of the enemy’s will to fight—in all of the cases studied. The two measures were employed in concert, thus undermining the enemy’s physical and psychological capabilities.

Dislocation

Dislocation was another important strategy executed through the use of specialized forces, e.g., SIOTs (Sri Lanka) and Specialized Anti-Terrorism Units (Peru). This strategy revolves around maintaining strategic surprise. In Turkey, for example, the forces started operating at night and in winter which surprised the PKK, while at the same time preventing the PKK from preparing for their offensives. In Sri Lanka the specialized units adopted guerrilla tactics which came as a shock to the insurgents. In Peru, such units—though pertaining to the police rather than the military—operated in urban areas seeking out the insurgents which created an additional psychological pressure upon SL.

Decapitation and Targeted Killings

Decapitation, that is the elimination or capture of the insurgent adversary’s leaders, was used to great advantage with great success in all of the cases examined. In Peru and Turkey, the aim was to capture and later imprison the leaders of the respective insurgent organizations so as to cause organizational paralysis, which proved successful in both cases. In Peru, Guzmán’s imprisonment led to the downfall of the organization due to its rigid 197

hierarchical structure. In Turkey, Öcalan’s imprisonment and the initial threat of applying the death penalty gave the government a bargaining chip. Through the use of deterrence (i.e., the threat of executing Öcalan) Turkey could coerce the PKK to withdraw from its territory to its strongholds in Northern Iraq and subsequently forced it to declare a ceasefire (which lasted from 2000 to 2004).

In Sri Lanka, decapitation was combined with a strategy of targeted killings, i.e., preplanned selective targeting of the leaders and so-called “High-Value Targets” (Byman 2006; Bachmann 2013; Dear 2013; Layton 2015). The Sri Lankan Air Force launched strikes to eliminate high-value targets such as the LTTE chief negotiator and the head of LTTE’s political wing in 2007. In 2009, Prabhakaran and many of his top officials were killed, leading to the demise of the LTTE.

While there is an extensive debate regarding the effectiveness of decapitation and targeted killings and their legality (Byman 2006; Bachmann 2013; Dear 2013),198 this strategy can indeed increase the odds of success (Johnston 2012: 63). A decapitation strategy (possibly combined with targeted killings) can prove decisive if dealing with an adversary who relies on a rigid hierarchical structure. As Echevarria (2017: 94) notes, “[d]ecapitation works best against a centralized foe.” The organizational structure of the adversary is, therefore, important when launching a strategy of decapitation. Yet, even in cases where the insurgent organization has a highly centralized structure without a clear line of succession, decapitation will not necessarily destroy the organization (Echevarria 2017: 95-96). It will, however, create a window of opportunity which can be exploited. Implemented in the right context—as in all three cases—and combined with other tools of statecraft in accordance with the political end-state, it can lead to the desired outcome, or at least strengthen the position of the government vis-à-vis its adversary (Owen 2011: 14-15).

198 The first debate revolves around the legality of targeted killings (especially, employed in peacetime) and the strategy’s effectiveness (as in the case of Israel), and especially when used against terrorist organizations. For studies that demonstrate the strategy’s effective use, see, for instance, Byman (2006) and Wilner (2010). For an opposing opinion, see Jordan (2009), Dear (2013) and Abrahms and Mierau (2017). For studies that seek to bridge the gap in the debate, see Frankel (2010), Carvin (2012), and Lehrke and Shomaker (2016). 198

Village Guard System

A village protection system was applied in all of the cases studied. The underlying purpose of this was three-fold. First, using local villagers for sustained protection of their settlements in geographically remote areas extended government control where it was previously weak. This not only shielded villages from infiltration by the adversary, but also provide a first line of defense that gave the armed forces time to reach villages under attack. Second, this system meant that the adversary was denied popular support, i.e., the enemy forces would receive no shelter and no intelligence from the population. Simultaneously, villagers under protection were less likely to join the insurgent organization thus hampering the insurgents’ recruitment process. In essence, they were ‘separated’. Third, the armed forces could receive support and intelligence from village guards who were familiar with their respective areas. The village protection strategy is reminiscent of fortified villages employed during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1969) by the British, and the US ‘Strategic Hamlet’ initiative in Vietnam (1961-1964). Notwithstanding the benefits for the population and the armed forces, reprisal killings by the insurgents can and did take place, a risk for those partaking in the program. Conversely, as was apparent in cases such as Turkey, a dilemma is created for the insurgents, for they often are called upon to kill the very people they seek to represent.199 While the use of a village protection program can be beneficial, it is necessary to ensure that the efforts of the village guards are coordinated with those of the armed forces and the law enforcement (i.e., unity of effort) whereby the role of each actor is defined with clarity and directed toward an overarching end-state.200

The enemy-centric approach—the approach of choice in first-party COIN campaigns

In this section I examine the approach of choice of first-party actors. To this end, I reiterate the central question of this thesis:

199 It needs to be taken into account that the use of Village Guards might create legal issues which will depend upon the specific jurisdiction. Arming civilians might could be at odds with local regulations. In Peru, this matter was overcome by making the Village Guard a fourth arm of the armed forces. Another important issue is related to the ambiguity of the role of Village Guards after the end of armed hostilities. It is, however, beyond the limits of this work to explore each of them in more detail. 200 In Peru, for instance, the Village Guard System (rondas) were not very effective until their incorporation into the Armed Forces in early 1990s. 199

Does a population-centric approach, an enemy-centric approach, or a compound approach best account for successful conclusions to first-party counterinsurgency campaigns?

Evidently, the successful first-party actors studied, despite their different contexts, chose to employ military strategies that were predominantly enemy-centric in tone but with the addition of some population-centric measures. It was this combination along with a clear political end-state, proved to be successful in all of the cases in that they led to either the demise or incapacitation (in the case of the PKK) of the insurgents. Such a military strategy strongly differs from what today has come to be regarded as the optimal solution to the COIN problem as prescribed in FM 3-24. The main recommendation was that the focus, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, should fall on the key population and with the military force directed at protecting that key population. The military strategies adopted, however, by the first-party actors examined here borrow elements from the theorists and practitioners of the past, such as Bugeaud and Callwell, rather than from those whose thought influenced FM 3-24, such as Galula. The main focal point of first-party counterinsurgents remains on the enemy organization. However, that is not to say that the population was completely ignored. The first-party counterinsurgents in the cases discussed understood the importance the population plays in intrastate conflicts and enacted policies and strategies—after a long learning curve— in an attempt to mitigate the grievances of the respective populations.

Can there be a ‘silver bullet’ approach to conducting first-party COIN campaigns?

In the previous passages, it has been established that first-party actors have employed predominantly enemy-centric military strategies. But can there be a common approach to guarantee success in COIN campaigns (be it first-party or otherwise)? Frank Kitson, as alluded to in the introduction, was wary of panaceas. He questioned the premise of a common approach to countering insurgencies. Instead he contended that every ‘small war’ required a unique approach. This is an important matter that merits further consideration.

From Kitson’s perspective, and in line with Clausewitz’s theory of war, every instance of war is unique. While the nature of war is immutable, the character of war, however, will always be context specific. Against this background, it is necessary to recall 200

Clausewitz’s (1976: 30-31) trinity consisting of enmity and primordial violence; chance and probability, and reason. These variables are present in every instance of war, however the value of these variables will be different for each scenario, depending on the context. The values of each of these variables in any given case will be determining factors when selecting the appropriate ends, ways and means. Thus Clausewitz (1976: 89) himself expressed a degree of healthy skepticism towards doctrines, stating, “it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time”.

Such an outlook might sound rather pessimistic, as it would suggest that war preparation and the selection of strategies, operational plans, and tactical maneuvers, which would not survive first contact with the enemy (to paraphrase the Prussian Field Marshal Graf Helmuth von Moltke the Elder), is a self-defeating exercise. But is this so? First, it is important to clarify that applying Kitson’s and Clausewitz’s statements to the operational and tactical levels would indeed render them correct. In Clausewitz’s (1976: 90) case, the Prussian was referring to a tactical doctrine or a ‘manual for action’ (italics in the original) given the ‘fog’—uncertainty and chance—that dominate war’s hostile environment. 201 Arguably, it is thus close to impossible to predict an adversary’s behavior given this context. This is precisely why it is difficult to devise a tactical plan in an adversarial contest where the adversary takes his own actions, which can be considered as part of the aforementioned ‘fog’. It is plausible to argue that the above serves as the underlying reason for Clausewitz’s, Moltke’s and Kitson’s assertions. Nevertheless, as Gray (2010: 250) persuasively argues, while military doctrine is essential, it should, however, be permissive rather than restrictive in nature.

Military strategies—occupying an often overlooked space between grand strategy and operations/tactics (Gray 2009: 82)—are important in this context in that they allow for much more flexibility when designing operations and tactics. Strategies of attrition and decapitation, for instance, provide a general structure intended for specific objectives such

201 Clausewitz (1976: 88-90) explained that wars are peculiar entities in that every (tactical) action in war takes place in a so-called ‘fog’ which impairs one’s perception, therefore one has to rely on (commander’s) “talent or luck” (88). This is why the second element of the trinity, namely, chance and probability, is ascribed to the military’s domain. 201

as enemy’s physical/moral exhaustion, in the earlier case, or selective elimination, in the latter. Moreover, these strategies can be employed in conjunction (either sequentially202 or simultaneously), in isolation, or in combination, so as to retain a high degree of flexibility. The general structure they offer serves more as a guide than a panacea given that these strategies, as Gray (2009: 82) suggests, “should be developed and applied in the context of the development and application of strategy for the use of other, nonmilitary, assets, as and when appropriate.”

To illustrate this point, let us recall when and in what combination (sequence) the military strategies were used in the final stages of the respective campaigns. The use of coercion on the grand strategic level (to undermine the insurgents’ logistical networks, to dismantle their safe havens, and to rob them of their allies), for example, and the use of village guards (to gain vital intelligence while offering protection to settlements where state control was weak) increased the likelihood of success for the employment of a decapitation strategy. Simultaneously, the use of attrition and dislocation—which included not only ‘regular’ units but also Special Forces units mirroring guerrilla tactics—generated strategic surprise, thus affecting the adversary’s physical and moral capability to resist. The main focus remained on the enemy, but both kinetic and non-kinetic means were used to weaken the adversary’s will to resist. It is, however, necessary to reiterate an earlier point, namely, that the use of the above strategies and matters concerning their sequence and time of employment will depend—in line with Clausewitz and Kitson—on a specific case at hand.

The list provided above merely recommends possible courses of action, without placing any rigid restrictions on operations and tactics. This is because such restrictions (e.g., those imposed, arguably, by the current US COIN doctrine) can have deleterious effects, as the recent history of COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq would suggest. Not only do they constrain operational and tactical approaches—by imposing a “predetermined response”—but also, naturally enough, policy choices that can lead to military aggravation (Smith & Jones 2015: 26). The political and tactical domains are enhanced so as to fill the strategic void (Gray 2010: 247). The triptych of ends, ways and means, nevertheless, loses

202 This term is borrowed from Joseph Wylie (1957: 22) for who defined the term as a series of sequential steps with each depending on the preceding one. In this thesis, however, ‘sequential’ refers to application of strategies in any sequence whereby there can be an overlap between the link (strategies) employed. 202

its balance if ways are entirely removed. Analogous to an algebraic equation, the expressions on both sides have to remain equal. That is not to say that conciliatory (population-centric) approaches are necessarily ill-advised. As demonstrated, enemy- and population-centric approaches are not mutually exclusive (Paul et al. 2016: 1020).203 Indeed, the lines become blurred especially at the tactical level because both approaches call for the use of force, albeit, with a different underlying logic. Their suitability to the task at hand, however, is contextual. In the current milieu, the essential fallacy lies in resorting to the approach in vogue that is treated as a universally valid solution once the problem has been identified as an ‘insurgency’; or to use Abraham Maslow’s (1966: 16) famous expression: “[i]f the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail.” The problem, however, should not be reduced to a simple ‘if-then’ statement. To reiterate an earlier contention, strategies, military or otherwise, should always be determined in accordance with the desired political outcome(s).

Against this background, and returning to military strategies, one must abstain from making any rigorous guidelines related to the time, the order and the quantity of those employed. The fundamental reason for this lies in the risk of violating the hierarchical relationship between policy, strategy (both grand and military), operations and tactics. To risk stating the obvious, the use of these (recommended) strategies will remain highly dependent on the context, that is, on the character of the war in question, and therewith on one’s available resources and the political outcome one desires to achieve.

Lessons for second-party counterinsurgents

Having determined and discussed the preferred approaches (and the military strategies that fall within them) employed by first-party actors, it is necessary now to return to the question posed in the introduction (Chapter I): What lessons can second-party counterinsurgent forces derive from the examined case studies? Perhaps the most important lesson for an intervening party lies in the fact that there should always be an overarching and commonly held end-state. It is worth noting that second-party counterinsurgency campaigns are fundamentally different from first-party campaigns given that second-party

203 The conclusions reached in this study are in line with what Paul et al. (2016) contend, namely, that most campaigns display attributes from both approaches. 203

counterinsurgents, once they intervene, will ultimately pursue an end-state defined by their respective home governments rather than that of the indigenous government, such as in case of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This is an important issue which, on the political and grand strategic levels, might negatively influence both the course and the outcome of the campaign. The underlying reason for this lies in the fact that two kinds of actors find themselves pursuing not necessarily mutually inclusive goals and seek to generate different strategic effects. At the military strategic level, it is important to consider that indigenous governments might refuse to act according to the intervening party’s playbook. Especially in cases where the first-party actor is an authoritarian regime, the methods employed (e.g., repression, deportation and similar) often do not align well with Western democratic ways that seek to, to use the hackneyed phrase, ‘win hearts and mind’ (Byman 2016: 88-89).204

While today both theorists and practitioners alike tend to have a predilection for the population-centric approach, a few clarifications should be made about the enemy-centric approach. To risk banality, the center of gravity in the enemy-centric approach is on the enemy. However, as illustrated above, a military strategic measure—be it enemy- or population-centric—does not necessarily have to be one dimensional. The enemy-centric approach, for instance, can consist of a myriad of military strategies such as attrition, dislocation, and decapitation, as demonstrated in the case studies. The combination and the degree of employment of these strategies will always be context-specific—in line with the character of war—and oriented towards the desired political end-state. A similar logic applies to the population-centric approach. In the 1840s, Bugeaud employed a ‘population-centric’ approach, in the form of razzias and the work of the bureaux arabe,205 designed to coerce the population by punishing those who supported the insurgents and by rewarding those who supported the French. Unquestionably, the focus was on the population. Yet, Bugeaud’s approach stands in stark contrast to what has come to be a known as the ‘population-centric’ approach in contemporary parlance (see Chapter IV). This leads one to conclude that neither

204 Byman (2016) identifies a host of issues which the intervening party faces, such as methods used, and politicized militaries which stand in stark contrast to the Western militaries. Thus, Byman contends, liberalization efforts, even done in good faith, can backfire by turning authoritarian regimes into anocracies that have a statistically poor record of defeating insurgencies. 205 Refer to Chapter IV for a more detailed account of this practice. 204

enemy-centric nor population-centric approaches should be considered as homogenous. These two approaches can and more often than not do, appear in combination, whereby tenets pertaining to each approach can be implemented simultaneously (e.g., the ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach implemented in Malaya in the 1950s). In all the examined cases, for instance, there were population-centric measures such as the employment of village guards (comparable to Bugeaud’s bureaux arabe), tasked primarily with protection of their respective villages. These measures were implemented in unison with the ongoing attrition and decapitation strategies. But, as discussed earlier, they only worked when integrated into the broader grand strategic framework with a clear political end-state.

Concluding Remarks

In light of the ongoing debate related to counterinsurgency approaches (sparked by the Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq), this study sought to infer which approach was dominant in first-party COIN campaigns. Further, it sought to discern which measures as part of which (military) strategies are preferred by successful first-party actors when facing a sub-state actor who seeks to (in some cases, partially) overthrow the existing regime. In so doing, I have sought to distill a set of measures at the military strategic level that have contributed to successful outcomes. To this end, I examined three successful COIN campaigns in Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka to determine what was the favored approach, enemy- or population-centric, and how it was reflected on, in particular, the military strategic level. The studies demonstrated some important lessons, not only at the military strategic level but also at the grand strategic level. In what follows I offer a summary of the key findings to conclude the thesis.

The Approach of Choice—Military Strategies as a part of the broader framework

First, the key finding of this study is that the preferred approaches to the conduct of counterinsurgency used by the successful first-party actors studied were to a large degree enemy-centric in tone. A primarily enemy-centric focus on the military strategic level was maintained throughout the span of each respective COIN campaign, with the exception of one population-centric strategy, namely, the village defense system. In each of the case studies there was more continuity than change at the military strategic level. What did, however, change was the purpose towards which these strategies were employed and the 205

overarching grand strategic framework directed towards that purpose. That is, the major changes took place on the grand strategic level, often broadening the set of tools used to counter the opponent in every studied case.

Second, the determining factor for the success of the aforementioned strategies was the identification of a clear goal which they served. This was achieved by gaining a proper understanding of the adversary at hand. Arriving at this understanding proved to be a lengthy process which sometimes took more than a decade. Only with such understanding could a corresponding political end-state—which would provide the studied COIN campaigns with the ‘meaning’, to use Clausewitz’s terminology—be formulated. This understanding was arguably the most challenging and the most decisive task to undertake (see Clausewitz 1976: 30). In all of the cases it came about with the change of the ruling party or form of government. Once established, such an end-state provided the necessary ‘purpose’ and ‘direction’ for the use of state instruments, including but, not limited to, the military.

Third, the military instrument—among other tools from the DIME spectrum—was integrated into the grand strategic framework and directed toward that end-state. The ways in which the military instrument was employed, as demonstrated, stand in stark contrast to contemporary Western COIN doctrine and practice. Instead of resolving the problem at hand through a set of strict operational and tactical approaches devised to win over the key population (akin to those advocated by FM 3-24), the first-party actors examined here used a myriad of measures—encompassing all levels of strategy—ranging from classical strategies such as coercion and accommodation (on the grand strategic level); to attrition, dislocation, decapitation (on the military strategic level); to population-centric strategies, such as village defense, to achieve their goals. While the enemy forces were considered as one of the main CoGs, they were not the only one.206 In each of the case studies, several CoGs had to be struck in order to neutralize the foe, for instance, the adversary’s extensive external support network (e.g., with Turkey and Sri Lanka). In short, the military strategies— deploying both enemy-centric and population-centric measures—used by the first-party actors in question here were not the (only) deciding factors leading to the successful conclusion of the COIN campaigns. Rather it was the correct integration of military strategies

206 For a more detailed discussion, see Clausewitz (1976: 242-243), Echevarria (2003) and Friedman (2014). 206

into the broader grand strategic design that helped achieve the critical balance between ends, ways and means in their respective contexts. Thus, while the use of certain military strategies may remain case dependent—which would be in line with Clausewitz’s and Kitson’s contentions— the general recognition of the need to integrate the military instrument into a wider grand strategic framework remains valid for any given scenario.

Recommendations

The current overemphasis on finding universal solutions to the challenge of irregular warfare, as exemplified by FM 3-24, should perhaps be replaced with a narrower focus on the grand strategic level and a better understanding of the nature of the enemy and their political goals, not merely their operational and tactical approaches of choice. We have seen that, rather than applying an overly prescriptive COIN doctrine, the ultimately successful counterinsurgent actors studied here used, for the most part, classical military strategies throughout the respective campaigns. But these military strategies worked only once there was a clear understanding of the character of the war, of their adversary and his goals, of the broader context (including but not limited to one’s own capabilities and resources), and of the necessity of a clear political end-state. All such understandings—which in some cases called for a state system overhaul—would serve the development of an overarching grand strategic framework. Within this framework all tools of statecraft would be employed. Despite its seeming banality, this is an important point which second-party counterinsurgent actors should pay closer attention to. Not only is it important to ease the current doctrinal restraints but it is also vital to take into account the context in which military strategies of choice are implemented so as to ensure that these are properly aligned with the desired outcome.

Lastly, the current schism between the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches (discussed mostly at the operational and tactical levels) does not provide us with any valuable insights in regards to the better conduct of COIN. The way out of this conundrum is to broaden the analytical scope by employing, for instance, strategic theory as an analytical construct of choice. This would help to better discern and contextualize strategies used in wars, conventional or otherwise.

207

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