British Politics Review Journal of the British Politics Society, Norway Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012

The Major years Reflections on a quiet premiership CONTRIBUTORS Bruce Pilbeam • Jan Erik Mustad • Ragnhild V. Nessheim • Kevin Theakston Philip Cowley • Kristin M. Haugevik • Øivind Bratberg • Steven Kettell British Politics Review Editorial Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012 A Major reassessment ISSN 1890-4505 At the time when this issue of British Politics Review is released, twenty years have passed since John Major secured a Conservative victory in the first post- is a quarterly British Politics Review Thatcher elections in Britain. Against all odds, he did so in a most impressive journal issued by the British Politics way. With a popular vote of 14.05 million, it was the highest score ever obtained Societ y, Norway. With contributions at a British general election; higher too than what New Labour obtained in 1997. from academic and journalistic sour- ces, the British Politics Review is aimed The election result captures an essential characteristic of Major’s premiership. at everyone with a general interest in Seldom praised, he is more often castigated for pereceived failures leading to political developments in Britain. electoral disaster in 1997. In reality, his accession to the post of prime minister had been given the worst of conditions to begin with. Margaret Thatcher’s eleven British Politics Society, Norway is years in Downing Street had not only earned her many personal critics, but the politically neutral and has no collec- government was held responsible by voters for the economic difficulties which tive agenda apart from raising the were starting to become evident in Britain (as in many other European countries) interest and knowledge of British poli- by the start of the 1990s. Against Major in 1992 was a Labour Party on course for tics among the informed Norwegian modernisation, and within the Conservative Party itself, “the evil of faction” had public. taken root, with central figures holding the Prime Minister in distrust.

Editorial team The challenges awaiting Major following the election victory were immense. Øivind Bratberg [Editor] Domestically, his essential task was one of implementing ”Thatcherism with a Kristin M. Haugevik [Associate Editor] human face” while regaining strength in the British economy. Internationally, Atle L. Wold the major undertaking was no less than the re-formulation of Britain’s foreign Jannike Elmblom Berger policy for the post-Cold War era. Unmerciful critics have concluded that Major was a weak leader, wavering where stern leadership was needed and heading a government unable to deliver on anything but cheap slogans and political Postal address scandals. More sympathetic observers might note that during the Major years P.O. Box 6 Blindern Britain worked its way out of economic recession, brought the Irish Republican N-0313 Oslo, Norway Army (IRA) to the negotiating table and secured taylor-cut arrangements for Britain in Europe within the frames the Maastricht Treaty. Email [email protected] In this issue, we have invited contributors to reflect upon various aspects of John Major’s premiership. They range from observations on his leadership style, via Website internal party dissent and economic policy to Major’s difficult relationship with www.britishpoliticssociety.no the press - and more.

Print It would be wrong to say that, twenty years later, Major’s premiership is a Reprosentralen, Oslo, Norway celebrated one. Still, the reading of his government is generally more sympathetic, as commentators and observers wonder whether Major, looking back, may have Cover photo been a somewhat misunderstood and underestimated prime minister. “Where The Rt Hon Sir John Major, British there is discord, may we bring harmony”, stated Margaret Thatcher on becoming Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, pho- prime minister in 1979. Her words, quoted from the Prayer of St. Francis, would tographed at the memorial service for perhaps have been a more appropriate portrayal of the quiet premiership which Lord Weatherill, former speaker of the succeeded her; John Major’s spell in 10 Downing Street. House of Commons, 23 October 2007. Photo: Steve Punter. [Published under Creative Commons Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik, editors Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic Licence].

Manuscripts Contents Within a relatively broad framework, British Politics Review welcomes arti- John Major: a compassionate Not as bad as you thought? John cles on British politics and society, Conservative? Major’s parliamentary party preferably related to the thematic area Bruce Pilbeam p. 3 Philip Cowley pp. 10-11 set for each issue (announced in the previous issue and on our website). John Major as prime minister and Austerity is not enough: the coalition political leader government and the lessons of the ERM Please contact the editors at Kevin Theakston pp. 4-5 Steven Kettell pp. 12-13 [email protected] An underrated prime minister? Major and British foreign policy Jan Erik Mustad pp. 6-7 in the post-Cold War era Subscriptions Kristin M. Haugevik & Øivind Bratberg p. 14 100 NOK pr year The press vs. John Major Please contact us at mail@britishpoli- Ragnhild V. Nessheim pp. 8-9 ”A Britain unamendable in all essentials”: ticssociety.no or visit our website. speech to the Conservative Group for Europe, 22 April 1993 John Major pp. 15-16

2 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012 John Major: a compassionate Conservative?

Ever since the end of vision sought to reconcile a commitment to social unity and justice, that had been Margaret Thatcher’s to free markets with a belief in the value of marginalised during the aggressively premiership in 1990, historic communities and a sense of social individualistic Thatcher years. Conservatives have obligation. struggled with the In terms of concrete policies, probably the question of whether to The idea that a more socially minded strongest evidence that Major’s guiding embrace or distance conservatism might even be caring or philosophy was not just a continuation of themselves from her compassionate has probably become best Thatcherism is that the Major government legacy, controversial as known as a result of George W. Bush’s adoption was willing to listen to the protests and much of it remains. In of Compassionate Conservatism, which he criticisms of the poll tax introduced by Bruce Pilbeam is a the case of John Major’s Senior Lecturer in Poli- espoused during his 2000 presidential election Thatcher. Consequently, this was abolished government, there has tics and International campaign, and continued to refer to at least and replaced in 1993 by the council tax been great debate as Relations at London during the early years of his presidency. The (though it may be noted that this, too, is a to whether it sought to Metropolitan Univer- central policy prescription of this doctrine regressive tax). depart from the policies sity. His main research is to devolve responsibilities for delivering interests are within of the Thatcher years, or contemporary American welfare services to groups like churches Yet the abolition of the poll tax aside, in to continue them. One and British politics, and charities, since they are believed to be most other areas any talk of embracing a way in which it has been with a particular focus much better vehicles for compassion than is more caring credo appeared to be not much argued that the Major on ideologies, social a bureaucratic state. In Britain, Conservative more than rhetoric. In particular, Thatcherite movements and political administration may have parties. Dr Pilbeam is the Party leaders William Hague and Iain Duncan neo-liberalism was far from abandoned, been very different is the author of Conservatism Smith expressed interest in this philosophy, as shown by the Major government’s notion that it was a more in Crisis? Anglo-Amer- and it has found echoes in David Cameron’s similar enthusiasm for privatisation, which caring or compassionate ican Conservatism after notion of the Big Society. Yet in terms of it extended most notably to the railways. the Cold War (Palgrave, one. This is what will be 2003) as well as numer- the Major years, the main idea behind the Indeed, in many respects rail privatisation addressed in this article. ous articles and book suggestion that his was a more compassionate advanced the idea even further, since the chapters in recent years. government is simply that it sought to move sale of the railways took place despite Leaving aside the away from the harsh, ”unfeeling” policies there being very little in the way of clear many difficulties involved in trying to associated with Thatcherism. economic or social benefits. It was, in other define Thatcherism, for present purposes it words, undertaken largely as an ideological will be sufficient to note that it focused on After Major took over as Prime Minister, project. Furthermore, many policies showed promoting, in the characterisation of Andrew there was a conscious effort to project a very limited compassion for ordinary families. Gamble, ”the free economy and the strong state”. different image to Thatcher’s. Whereas she For example, VAT was extended to domestic The contention that the Major government’s had been strident and combative, Major was fuel, which had previously been zero-rated, philosophy may have differed from this presented as a more consensual, caring figure, hitting lower-income groups hardest of all. centres on the belief that it possessed more a depiction that was strongly emphasised of a social doctrine, being concerned less during the 1992 general election campaign. Similarly, many pronouncements emanating with a dogmatic commitment to free-market Major himself had talked, on becoming Prime from the Major government hardly fitted economics or buttressing the power of the Minister, of building a ”genuinely classless the idea of a more caring Conservatism. state, and more with the wider good of society. society”, which was intended to suggest For example, Peter Lilley, Social Security This would also stand in sharp contrast to a more inclusive and socially concerned Secretary – and ardent Thatcherite – launched Margaret Thatcher’s notorious declaration Conservatism. Even his later, much-derided a scathing attack on single mothers, many that ”There is no such thing as society.” Back to Basics campaign was supposed to of whom he accused of being benefit cheats, be about finding common values the nation at the 1992 Conservative Party conference. At the intellectual level, the passing of as a whole might share. For such reasons, Yet Major himself also at times displayed at the Thatcher era clearly provoked a wave the essence of Major’s philosophy was often best indifference, at worst hostility, towards of self-reflection on the Right, including seen as seeking to revive the tradition of One the poor. Thus, in 1994 he publicly attacked various responses to the criticism that the Nation Conservatism, with its commitment beggars as being an ”eyesore” on British untrammelled market streets, and subsequently forces released in the 1980s proclaimed that homeless had greatly damaged the people chose to live rough, social fabric, destroying rather than because they communities and had no other choice. undermining the values that bind society together. Ultimately, then, although Notions such as the social in some regards the Major market and caring capitalism years represented a shift began to be advanced – in style and tone from the supported, for example, by Thatcher era, attempting Chris Patten, Conservative to put a more human Party Chairman from face on Conservative 1990-1992. However, one policies, there was not a of the most significant great deal of substance Conservative attempts to behind this effort. The answer critics’ charges Major government failed was articulated by David to articulate a coherent or Willetts (who also served consistent alternative to in the Major government) Brixton, 1981. Police officer barring access to the rioting in Brixton, April 1981. The riots, Thatcherism, and in the largely seen in the context of racial discrimination and public cuts, took place in an area of in his notion of Civic London which the later Prime Minister, John Major, knew well. It was one of the events of end, mainly delivered Conservatism. Willetts’ the Thatcher premiership he would work hard not to see repeated. Photo: Kim Aldis simply more of the same.

3 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012 John Major as prime minister and political leader By Kevin Theakston The British Conservative He had won the leadership by not taking a Political Skills and Style Party’s leadership strong ideological line and because of his No one would or could look to Major for culture has sometimes chameleon-like appeal. In practice he was visionary or innovative leadership. His been characterised far from being an instinctive Thatcherite, skills were primarily those of a political as a system of tending to the left of centre on social issues manager. His approach was reactive, autocracy tempered by though a free-marketeer on economic issues. tactical and problem-solving. He had won assassination. Margaret his reputation as a political technician: a Thatcher’s style of His government completed the Thatcher details man, good on short-term tactics, leadership and her agenda in many areas, privatising the ”micro” politics, one-to-one negotiation, Kevin Theakston is Pro- brutal and dramatic fessor of British Govern- coal and rail industries, for instance. conciliation and man-management. As a overthrow in 1990 ment and the Head of But uncomfortable with ideological or former whip in the House of Commons, certainly fit that model. School of Politics and conviction politics, Major did not have the he practised a politics of negotiation and International Studies, political space to articulate and pursue a deals, rather than Thatcher-like drive and Thatcher was University of Leeds. distinctive agenda of his own. Thatcher momentum. He showed some skill in He has a long-standing toppled because the research interest in Brit- scornfully derided his ”wavering around ”high” politics - dealing with Kohl, Yeltsin, Conservatives feared ish prime ministers and all over the place”. He Clinton and other world leaders that they would go down the civil service as well did not project a clear ”His government and in the handling of complex to election defeat with as constitutional issues. ideological position completed the Thatcher European negotiations (as seen Theakston is the author her as leader. Crucially, of After Number 10: or strong sense of agenda in many areas, in his Maastricht success). But however, the party did Former Prime Ministers policy direction. He privatising the coal he was not so good on long- not seek or intend an in British Politics (Pal- backed off attempts and rail industries, term strategy and objectives. ideological break with grave, 2010) and British to define ”Majorism” In contrast to Mrs Thatcher, Foreign Secretaries for instance. But Thatcherism. Tory MPs Since 1974 (Routledge, or to come up with Major was furthermore a leader wanted a change of face 2004). a ”big idea”. Neither uncomfortable with with a grey public image. and a softer or more the ill-fated ”back to ideological or conviction There was little sense of prime emollient public image: ”Thatcherism with a basics” theme nor politics, Major did not ministerial presence, he was a human face”. John Major was elected leader the Citizen’s Charter have the political space poor communicator, a stilted because of his perceived capacity to bridge programme had to articulate and pursue and indifferent performer divisions and unite the party through a much purchase in on television and the public consensual style of leadership. Major was this respect. Even his a distinctive agenda of platform, and he hated the initially backed by Thatcher and by the right rhetoric often seemed his own.” ”packaging” of modern media- (and Eurosceptic) wing of the party. Later, backward looking driven politics. however, they were to feel betrayed and to and nostalgic (the England of ”warm beer, turn against him when they discovered that invincible green suburbs, dog lovers . . . old Major did not cut a presidential figure and he was not in practice either very right-wing maids bicycling to communion through ran his Cabinet in a collegiate and inclusive or an out-and-out Eurosceptic, but instead the morning mist”) rather than mobilising style, trying to carry colleagues with him, more of a pragmatic party loyalist. support for a new agenda and new goals. reconciling differences and teasing out a consensus. He was very dependent on the Major seemed instinctively to take a Cabinet’s ”big beasts” – such as Ken Clarke, middle position on most issues. But the Michael Heseltine and Douglas Hurd - Conservative divisions in the 1990s proved who were powerful ministerial ”barons”. to be too deep for his preferred method of At first Major’s brokerage approach accommodating dissent - balancing the worked well, but in time his unwillingness factions and tactical manoeuvring, rather or inability to assert himself led to charges than risking open confrontation. Over of weakness, dithering, and letting time, his grip on the leadership seemed circumstances and the push and pull of increasingly insecure and there were other people determine issues. The drift regular rumours of plots to challenge and indecision in the Major years – the and unseat him. With various rivals lack of a firm personal lead from the top – marking out positions for the future, Major was acutely felt by experienced Whitehall seemed almost like a caretaker leader, insiders, who complained about ”a hole at which weakened his authority. In 1995 the centre of the machine”. he triggered a surprise party leadership election aiming to face down his critics. As a political operator, Major excelled at But a third of Conservative MPs refused networking, the deployment of charm, to back him and the manouevre did not cultivating personal relationships and heal the factional divide. Originally elected friendships. In good times, his public leader mainly with the votes of the right, character as a decent, reasonable and Major paradoxically survived because the capable man, with more of a common centre and left of the party propped him touch than the imperious Thatcher, was up. His critics and opponents in the party undoubtedly an asset. But his background were never strong enough to remove him seems to have left a personal insecurity from office, but were strong enough to and a thin-skinned over-sensitivity to limit his capacity for independent action. criticism (media pummelings knocked him off balance). This meant that when Ideology and Aims the political going got harder (as it did Major arrived in Downing Street with Kenneth Clarke MP, presently the Secretary of State after 1992) he did not have the inner very little ideological baggage - a for Justice. Clarke played a pivotal role throughout resources and confidence to provide steely John Major’s government and was one of the key pragmatist who could not be ”labelled”. ministers sustaining his premiership. leadership.

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Strikingly, the qualities that made a desperate of the Opposition in modern British politics divisions to grow, is the argument that party turn to him in 1990 were those for (Tony Blair) and a rejuvenated Labour Party. anything other than a balancing act (and which he was later most fiercely criticised. any other possible leader) would have split He had won the leadership after a decade of The Conservatives’ civil war over the the party even more. assiduous parliamentary networking, but European issue tested to destruction Major’s after 1992 his parliamentary base became conception of politics and his skills as a Major’s 1992 election was something of increasingly fractious and unreliable, and by political leader. For him it was not a ‘gut’ a hollow victory because it left him with the end, the dominant feeling was virtually issue - he described himself as agnostic, a an overall parliamentary majority of only one of mutual contempt. His ”Honest John” ‘Europragmatist’. It was a 21 (compared to the 100 image - that he was trustworthy, likeable, question of practicalities, ”Major is not seen as a plus majorities which had competent, sensible, sincere, unflashy - had clever negotiation and successful leader and bolstered Thatcher in the been an asset for the first few years, the realism, going for the best prime minister. But 1980s), and this was steadily perceived contrast to both Thatcher and possible deal. However, whittled away by by-election Labour’s Neil Kinnock registering with the his approach of trying to his leadership style defeats. Backbench rebels public. But the broken promises on tax rises; bridge the party splits by could be argued to could be ignored by the ERM disaster (see below); the apparent keeping options open could have been just about Thatcher’s steamroller. But inability to deal with the ”sleaze” issue; the never be a viable long-term the only one possible Major’s room for manoeuvre way in which Major would try to hang on policy. The Eurosceptic in the situation he was limited and he was to ministers in trouble only to let them go right mistrusted him massively vulnerable to when the pressure mounted; his tactical because they felt that there faced.” disruption and blackmail contortions and vacillations - all these made were no firm personal or by dissident backbenchers, him seem incompetent, ineffective, weak, a political convictions behind the negotiating the fact that many of the new MPs first loser. positions. The pro-Europeans feared that elected in 1992 were on the Eurosceptic his instinct was always to trim and to reach right (”Thatcher’s Children”) adding to his Context a compromise to buy off the sceptics. problems. Beyond the differences of personality and style that made Major appear to be a Factionalism between Eurosceptics and pro- Conclusion weaker leader than Thatcher, is of course Europeans weakened the foundations of the Major is not seen as a successful leader and the fact that they were prime ministers in government and drained Major’s personal prime minister. But his leadership style very different contexts. Major often seemed authority. The fact that he would talk tough could be argued to have been just about the trapped by events, not on top of them - ”in (as over qualified majority voting, or the only one possible in the situation he faced. office but not in power”, as Norman Lamont ”non-cooperation” tactic in the BSE crisis The circumstances of his premiership were put it after being sacked as Chancellor in over British beef exports) but then back particularly difficult and constraining, and 1993. down, further underlined his apparent the limitations of his scope were acute. Tony weakness. But against this critique that Blair’s comment that ”John Major isn’t the It is sometimes forgotten that Major his emollience and prevarications allowed Tory Party’s problem. The Tory Party is John enjoyed a political honeymoon Major’s problem” emphasised period, helped by his successful Major’s key weakness - an low-key leadership during the Gulf undisciplined, disloyal, War, and that in 1991 opinion polls, divided (even anarchic) and he registered as more popular than Euro-obsessed parliamentary Thatcher had ever been. He then party. The situation he was in won the 1992 election against the provided few opportunities economic odds, amassing a higher or resources for heroic or vote total (14 million votes) than any decisive leadership and prime minister in British history. But offered little scope for much after the forced ejection of sterling beyond crisis management from the Exchange Rate Mechanism and fire-fighting. (ERM) on ”Black Wednesday” in September 1992, he was weakened Through three terms of by the Conservatives’ nose-diving office (1979-90), Thatcherism electoral fortunes, rapidly becoming had maintained a sense the least-respected prime minister of purpose and a radical in polling history. The Tory press momentum, and had shown turned hostile and was never won a capacity to renew itself in back; the bitter and sustained media office. Major consolidated and attacks keeping him always on the entrenched Thatcherism but defensive. during his premiership, the Conservatives increasingly Major had inherited an economy appeared directionless, tired, moving into recession but derived accident-prone, and doomed little electoral benefit from the to defeat. Given the situation, economic upturn after 1994. The probably only an exceptional ERM debacle, together with the leader could have done much imposition of massive tax increases, better and imposed him or shattered the Conservatives’ herself on the Conservative reputation for economic competence. Party and on events. Major This was a key factor in boosting could not, and so his Labour’s poll ratings, and after leadership ability was tested 1994 a Tory election defeat seemed The future... once. As youthful Labour leader, Tony Blair, celebrates victory at in the harshest possible way the 1997 election with his wife Cherie. The election marked the punctuation of inevitable when Major was faced by 18 years of Conservative dominance. in the 1990s. Ultimately, it was one of the most formidable Leaders Cover from 1997 magazine for Labour party members, kindly reproduced from labourarchive.com found to be wanting.

5 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 |Spring 2012 An underrated prime minister? By Jan Erik Mustad In the refrain on party philosophy. Interestingly, the party 1989 withdrew their support for Thatcher. modern British politics united behind Major in the leadership battle, Approximately a year later, he challenged John Major and his as he was the only candidate the various for the party leadership in round two of the political achievements groups could agree on, clearly indicating contest, the round Thatcher withdrew from. are often spoken a desire and need for unity. Even though about in parentheses. the anti-European right wing of the party With this short background in mind, it is not Squeezed in between continued to cause problems for Major, as difficult to envisage the many questions that two of Britain’s longest they had done for Thatcher, they embraced were posed after his successful challenge for serving Prime Ministers, party discipline and united behind him in the leadership. Was Major the right leader to Margaret Thatcher the run-up to the general election in 1992. succeed Thatcher? Did he have what was (1979-1990) and Tony Jan Erik Mustad is required to heal the party divisions and Senior Lecturer at the Blair (1997-2010), Major’s Dept of foreign lan- To many Conservatives, and indeed to many at the same time grapple with the national premiership is often guages and translation, members of the electorate, Major was a and international political issues that lay in a forgotten chapter. University of Agder. He blank sheet with a short political career and front of him? And not least, was the choice His early years were is also a regular com- a very different background from many of of Major as leader intended to restore the dominated by coming mentator in Norwegian his predecessors. He was neither a public state of the party or that of the nation, as the media on British politics to terms with the and society. His latest school boy nor was he educated at Oxbridge, new leader would also be appointed PM.? postscript of Thatcher book, co-authored with but rather “a man of the people” who picked And who was Major to believe that placing while his later years Ulla Rahbek, Jørgen up an interest for politics himself in the ‘position were overshadowed Sevaldsen og Ole when his family moved to of death’, after eleven Vadmand is Modern by Labour’s Britain. Developments Brixton in London in the ”To many Conservatives, years of Thatcher, the modernisation process in Contemporary British late 1950s. Groomed by his and indeed to many greatest election winner and the increasing Society (Cappelen, 2012). mentor Jean Kierans, Major members of the electorate, in modern British politics, popularity of the Prime slowly began to make his Major was a blank sheet could ever turn out to Minster (PM) in waiting, Tony Blair. way into Conservative his advantage? Under circles in the 1960s, but with a short political the circumstances, there Major, however, deserves credit for a had to wait until 1979, the career and a very different were many questions number of political initiatives as well as year Thatcher was elected background from many of and few answers. for the way he handled a strongly divided PM, to become an MP. his predecessors. He was (if not suicidal) Conservative party in the neither a public school Retrospectively, and with wake of the Thatcher era. He was Prime After filling a handful the benefit of hindsight, Minister for seven years from 1990-1997, of junior minister jobs boy nor was he educated it seems fair to claim that winning, although marginally, the General between 1981 and 89, at Oxbridge...” Major proved many of his Election in 1992 under highly adverse Major, ironically enough, sceptics wrong. Serving circumstances. Assessed on this victory, took over two departments for seven years is a sole fresh policies and tenacious balancing of vacated by Geoffrey Howe (Foreign Office) proof of that, let alone winning the election the party’s factions, it seems fair to contend and Nigel Lawson (Chancellor) who in in 1992, an election dubbed by many as that Major was an underrated PM who unwinnable for the Conservative party. perhaps would have attracted more Furthermore, he resigned as party credit and attention had he not, by leader in 1995 to confront his critics, chance, been in power when he was. especially those critical of his policies in The Aftermath of Thatcher Europe, claiming it was time “to put up The fall of Thatcher has been recorded or shut up”. The likes of John Redwood, in numerous films, TV series, articles Michael Portillo, Michael Howard and and books. Hence, it is beyond the Peter Lilley, all with blatant comments scope of this short article to go into about Major’s policies, were asked to detail about the issues that brought challenge him for party leadership. about the end of the Thatcher period. Only Redwood came forward and Nevertheless, there is no doubt stood against Major, but Major that inheriting Thatcher’s prime brushed all the sceptics aside, beating ministerial mandate from the election Redwood soundly in the first round. of 1987 placed certain confinements on Major and he was left to “pick up The Soapbox Election the pieces” both internally in the Despite a declining economy, Major divided party and in an electorate had made some political initiatives that that had grown discontent with went down well with the electorate prior Thatcher and the Conservatives, to the election. In the “The Citizen’s particularly after the introduction of Charter” the government’s aim was to the much detested Poll Tax in 1989. create a “classless” society by forming a pact between the state and the citizens Major was internally regarded as the of the UK as to what kind of public leader candidate who could patch services the state could provide for the things up within the party and individual. After years of public sector build bridges between the different neglect under Thatcher, Major wanted factions that had evolved during the to give people better services that they Thatcher years. Firmly grounded in could rely on. Moreover, Major replaced Thatcherism with a human face. John Major enjoyed a the middle, Major tried to reach out honeymoon with the voters in his first two years as prime the controversial Poll Tax with a Council to all Conservatives in a mild and minister, softening the edges of Thatcherism and balancing the Tax, a property tax that did not hit the moderate way and be inclusive in his emerging conflicts within his own parliamentary party. poor in the same way as the Poll Tax.

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Even though the polls in the month ahead But on the other hand, the numerous economy in recession, internally in the of the election were tight, few predicted political challenges ahead tore the party party with huge divisions and politically that Major would win the election on 9 even further apart, enhancing division lines in the House of Commons where his April 1992. However, with the lack of trust that would not have been equally exposed majority was gradually slipping. Despite in Labour and Neil Kinnock combined had the Tories lost the election. These being up against impossible odds, Major with Major’s very targeted efforts during divisions had arisen under Thatcher, but it hung on until the election in 1997. Battered the election campaign, the Conservatives was Major who was left to deal with these by Blair in the Commons after he became won their fourth successive election tensions in a tough political landscape. On Labour leader in 1994, Major increasingly victory. It was widely held that the victory “Black Wednesday” 16 September 1992, saw himself at the receiving end of hard- was secured because the electorate did the Major government had to withdraw hitting punch lines from the rising Labour not trust Labour’s economic policy while the pound sterling from the European leader. Blair’s mocking remark from 25 Major, on his soapbox, had managed to Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as the April 1995 – “I lead my party, he follows reach out to people. He travelled around pressure on the pound became too strong. his” – stuck to Major until his election with his box and addressed smaller groups Major and his Chancellor of the Exchequer defeat in 1997 and to some remained an of people warning them against Labour’s Norman Lamont were determined to keep appropriate summary of his premiership. proposed tax regime and assuring people the pound in the ERM with the other that they were safe with the Conservatives. European currencies, but had to give in Conclusion The Tories, as had been a long tradition in as the pound had fallen under the agreed John Major was to a large extent a Britain, were also supported by most of the lower limit. Economically, this was a blow political moderator rather than an national newspapers, and the Sun regarded to the UK while it politically was a blow innovator. Much of this comes down to its own front page as a clear election decider to Major, who in fact adverse circumstances on election day. Carrying the headline – “If had written his letter of ”Major battled on three throughout his tenure. Kinnock wins today, will the last person resignation in the wake fronts: nationally with However, despite to leave Britain please turn out the light” of the inevitable decision. an economy in recession, allegations of “balancing – the paper claimed to have secured Major Ultimately, both Major for the sake of it”, he the victory. and Lamont remained internally in the party succeeded in accelerating in their positions as the with huge divisions and several important As it turned out, the victory was a massive national crisis was severe politically in the House policies. Restoring the personal triumph for Major, who had been enough without them of Commons where his Northern Irish Peace written off both as party leader and Prime resigning. majority was gradually Process in the early 1990s Minister. Major and the Conservative represents one notable Party polled over 14 million votes, the A brave Major never slipping.” and honourable part largest ever popular vote in British political managed to come of his epitaph as prime history and 500,000 more votes than Tony back in pole position. Even though the minister, an initiative which represented Blair and Labour polled in their landslide economic situation improved somewhat, a prelude to the successful peace talks victory in 1997. But biases in the electoral the Conservative Party, with a reputation conducted in the following years . system translated Major’s victory into a of always being on top of the economy, small overall majority of only 21 MPs while was broken and divided. Moreover, with As British politician Enoch Powell once Blair in 1997 secured a majority of 179 MPs. the scarce parliamentary majority of 21 said, “All political lives end in failure”, a The result was nevertheless a confidence MPs, it was only a matter of time before remark relevant for many politicians. It boost for Major who proved to be his the government would be in minority with can be argued though that Major found own man while avoiding by lengths the by-elections and defections continuing to himself in a position any leader would find electoral abyss that many, particularly in dilute the parliamentary party. Thus, Major it impossible to navigate themselves out of. Conservative circles, had anticipated. battled on three fronts: nationally with an Although Major Unfortunately the moderator is though, the small often remembered overall majority for non-visionary signalled difficult terms such as years ahead for “back to basics” Major and his and “decency”, divided party as his reputation Britain stumbled has also been on in their rocky unfairly blamed relationship with for dysfunctions Europe. in his party and u n f a v o u r a b l e The beginning of electoral tides. the end The other side of In retrospect, that argument winning the is of course that election of 1992 if the times had turned out to be not been like they a double-edged were, Major would sword. On the one probably never have hand, remaining ended up as party in governmental leader and Prime control was Minister. positive for a party used to be From steady march to electoral abyss. The general election results from 1987, 1992 and 1997 illustrate how Major in government. at his first election as Prime Minister in 1992 managed to consolidate the party’s electoral standing, only to see that relative success completely overshadowed by the Labour landslide five years later.

7 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012 The press versus John Major By Ragnhild Vindhol Nessheim When the Conservatives make do with this bemused little man and his In retrospect it is easy to see that certain unexpectedly won the mousy wife from some godforsaken part of south sections of the Conservative Party 1992 election, the Sun London.1 regarded the 1992 election victory as boldly announced: proof that Labour would never raise its ”IT’S THE SUN WOT John Major got his own back when he wrote head again, and that Tory mistakes and WON IT”. The claim in his autobiography: misbehaviour would not matter in the long was disputed at the run. But the decision to close unprofitable time, but for years to Moore, a clever but foppish figure…, adored coal mines had been presented so clumsily come, many politicians Margaret Thatcher and was heavily influenced that it triggered off the first backbench and large sections of Ragnhild Vindhol by her. He was a convinced Euro-sceptic and rebellion, and the Government was blamed Fleet Street acted as if Nessheim is Associate threw the weight of the Telegraph … behind our for inaction and worse as interest rates Professor (Emeritus) 2 they believed that the of British Civilisation rebels and against our policy. remained high and the recession showed newspaper press, and Studies in the Depart- no signs of abating. “The Chancellor is even individual papers, ment of Literature, The Telegraph, The Times, the Daily Mail and wrong. The government is wrong”, said had the power to make Area Studies and the Sun appeared to be edited and staffed the Express, and the Sun asked: “Is Major a or break governments. European Languages, by Thatcherites who, like an increasingly goner?” It is hardly an exaggeration to say University of Oslo. vociferous faction of the Conservative that between 1992 and 1997, tabloid editors It was only incidentally parliamentary party, were inclined to gave him front page coverage only to that the Sun’s election coverage had regard Euro-scepticism as the litmus test castigate him, and otherwise concentrated amounted to active championship of John of Conservatism itself, and to treat every mainly on sex and sin in high places. Major, however. It could more aptly be attempt at bridge-building with contempt. described as a sustained rubbishing of In 1993, Conservative papers came out in 1992 had witnessed the first of a series of the Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, which favour of Major’s challengers when he scandals which probably did more than culminated in an outrageous front page put his leadership on the line to secure the anything else to prevent the Tories from illustration and caption on Polling Day. passage of the Maastricht bill. winning their fifth consecutive victory. In Since the Sun, like the rest of the tabloids, its two aspects, ”sleaze” referred to lack tended to describe the election as a battle From the mid-90s onwards, New Labour of financial probity and to adulterous, between the Good Guys and the Bad Guys, ran a brilliant, though hardly principled, promiscuous and/or deviant sexual its recurrent theme – ”which man do you operation to discredit him. It was started by behaviour. The Tory MPs whose (trans) trust?” – was often put across in juxtaposed Alastair Campbell, then Political Editor of actions were denoted by this term were pictures and captions: ”Honest John Major” the Mirror, but it soon became fashionable not many; nor were they, with one notable versus ”Crafty Kinnock”, etc. But in view for journalists of the left, right and centre to exception, holders of high office, but after of its subsequent turnabout, it is significant imitate John Major’s voice and mannerisms, 13 (let alone 18) years the Tories were that the Sun had made few references to the and to portray him as ineffectual and cack- infinitely more vulnerable, and more easily Conservative Party and its leader during handed. Cartoonists had initially despaired damaged, than they would otherwise have the 1992 campaign. From the Sun’s point of Mrs Thatcher’s ”grey” but ”nice” been. The anti-sleaze campaign against of view, the glorious age of Conservatism successor, but, as Kenneth Baker observes, specific politicians in the run-up to the 1997 had come to an end in December 1990: the although the Iron Lady had a rough time election, which was largely spearheaded paper’s absolute adulation of ”Maggie” at their hands, John Major the consensus by the Guardian, was brilliantly executed meant that it suffered a great loss when its politician got even harsher treatment: and did great harm to the Government’s heroine was replaced by John Major. image. The cartoonists have been unrelenting in their Mrs Thatcher’s successor had not been depiction of him as indecisive, grey, stubborn The Hamilton case, which was a media issue one of her challengers, and initially got off and hapless. His personal success in Northern in more than one sense4, attracted so much more lightly than those who were dubbed Ireland and in securing the economic recovery attention that it threw the Tory agenda out her ”backstabbers”, but he had never been were [sic] either ignored or attributed to factors of joint at two crucial stages of the election good copy. As cabinet minister he had beyond his control. The press and cartoonists campaign. The report of the Commons made no allies in Fleet Street; as PM he have hunted him like a pack of hounds in pursuit Standards and Privileges Committee was had bestowed no favours and got none in of a fox.3 not due until after the election, but was return, and when his expected to confirm political position could that Hamilton was as be seen to be weakening, guilty as those MPs the Tory press soon who had already turned against him, confessed to sleaze. having never been truly for him. His biographer For John Major this suggests that a certain was a no-win situation type of newspaper, like in which no possible some of his colleagues, counter-attack was despised him for likely to have any snobbish reasons: effect. It certainly was not possible to score Mr Moore of the Daily points against the Telegraph wrote an Guardian by querying astonishingly patronizing the probity of its piece effectively intimating informant, Mohamed that the Tories, having al Fayed. rejected the godlike Douglas Hurd, must Superman. Copyright © Steve Bell 1991 8 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012

The Guardian and the Independent looked it had employed to little avail in 1992. Its And for more than a decade after 1997, forward to Polling Day 1997 as the ”historic anti-Conservative campaign was hard- the Major Government continued to chance for change”, not because they hitting, person-oriented and scurrilous. get a bad press, a state of affairs which espoused Tony Blair and what he stood Systematically and with an insouciant lasted until popular opinion had swung for – the challenge to the Conservative disregard for facts, the PM was presented well away from both Blair and Brown. regime was coming from a man who had as gutless and gormless: ”what a dope box!” taken care not to distance himself from etc. Realising that cries of ”sleaze” were an In early 2010 Peter Oborne, a vociferous Conservative policies – but because the effective stick with which to beat the Tories, right-wing journalist who had joined New Labour election machine seemed the Mirror wielded it happily from the the anti-Major claque in the 1990s, was most likely to bring about a change of beginning of the campaign. That sleaze was probably one of the first to concede that government. Both papers carried on a endemic in the governing party (”the biggest it was time for a re-think. In an article spirited advocacy of constitutional and collection of philanderers, adulterers and amounting to a generous apology for social reform, more women MPs, etc., love-cheats in political history”) might not having swallowed ”the narrative of John positioning themselves, in these and other be an irrefutable claim. It is nonetheless Major’s hopelessness”, Oborne argued matters, well to the left of New Labour. typical that not even those few organs that people should celebrate John Major which came out for the instead of deriding him, The Guardian’s fight was with Conservatives Conservatives made much ”[I]n the absence of a for his government was and Conservatism, not with John Major of an effort to refute it. ”stunningly radical and either as a person or as Prime Minister. clear indication of the initiated most of Blair’s While the Independent frequently contained The Labour landslide country’s mood, the so-called reforms”: he articles which were remarkably intemperate, in 1997 marked Sun had contented itself kick-started the Northern the Guardian was conspicuously even- an unprecedented with rubbishing all three Ireland peace process, handed, even generous, towards the Tory re-alignment of the party leaders. John Major restored the economy, leader: in fact, it was one of the few papers national press. New and implemented that did not say, or imply, that John Major Labour was endorsed by tended to get the worst of important public sector was stupid, or weak, or a complete failure. a majority of daily and it –[...] – but the Sun had reforms. And his party Sunday papers; The Times not fallen in love with was actually less sleazy The Sun’s defection, which ”knocked advised readers to vote Tony Blair prior to his than New Labour. [Major] off his soapbox” according to the Euro-sceptic irrespective landslide victory.” Mail5 but which almost certainly did no of party6; the Telegraph, John Major was good at such thing, came at a stage when the Tories the Mail and the Express7 substance, but wretched were trailing 25 points behind Labour in came out for the Conservatives, but with at spin. New Labour was the opposite. … the polls. For more than a year, the Sun no great show of enthusiasm. The sheer [Over] time I believe that John Major will had been positioning itself for being on size of the Labour majority took everybody come to be regarded as a more honest, decent the winning side in the next election, but by surprise, and actually changed people’s and competent prime minister than either in the absence of a clear indication of the perception of what had happened. As of the Tony Blair or Gordon Brown. He left Britain, country’s mood, it had contented itself with day after the election, Tony Blair had always as he might himself have remarked, a not- rubbishing all three party leaders. John been the People’s Choice and a certain inconsiderably better place than he found it.8 Major tended to get the worst of it – in early winner; the electorate had not just tired of 1996 he was called a ”No Notion Tory” – the Conservatives but had actively hated Notes but the Sun had not fallen in love with Tony them ever since the fall of Mrs Thatcher. 1. Edward Pearce, The Quiet Rise of John Major Blair prior to his landslide (London: Weidenfeld and victory. (The general drift of Nicolson, 1991), p. 167. its front-page headline and 2. John Major, The Autobiography (London: photo caption on Polling HarperCollins, 1999), p. 359. Day was that it must be HIM, 3. Kenneth Baker, The Prime because it so obviously Ministers: An Irreverent Political was going to be HIM.) History in Cartoons (London: Thames and Hudson, 1995), The Mirror had the p. 189. satisfaction of having 4. The Guardian claimed stuck to its principles, and to have evidence that Neil conducted a pro-Labour Hamilton, MP for Tatton, had campaign that was in most received ‘cash for questions’ from the owner of Harrods, respects better and more Mohamed al Fayed. When convincing than that of the Hamilton refused to stand Sun. (Since Rupert Murdoch down, the Guardian was did achieve what was instrumental in persuading probably his main aim – to Martin Bell of the BBC to stand make the Sun the largest- as an independent challenger. selling tabloid on the 5. 18 March 1997. winning side – this fact was 6. There was nonetheless a probably one that he viewed marked contrast between the content of its editorials and with complete equanimity.) that of its signed political Faced at long last with a columns, notably those written Labour leader who spoke by Matthew Parris and Simon the Mirror’s language Jenkins. when he talked about his 7. The Express changed sides aspirations for a better and shortly afterwards. more caring Britain, the 8. Peter Oborne, ‛Time for a paper now put to good use Major re-think’ (The Spectator, the sort of rhetoric which Will he fall? Copyright © Chris Riddell 1993 30 January 2010), 17.

9 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012 Not as bad as you thought? John Major’s parliamentary party By Philip Cowley It was once said that the probably for the first time, the majority of was his ”real problem”. ”Don’t overlook Conservative Party’s the party were now either Eurosceptic or that”, he argued. ”I could have [sic] all secret weapon was had Eurosceptic leanings. these clever decisive things which people loyalty. It was always wanted me to do – but I would have split a dubious claim, and Second, and just as significant, the the Conservative Party into smithereens”. for most of John Major’s peculiarities of the electoral system premiership it seemed meant that, despite receiving the largest Yet despite the small majority the Major an absurd one. During number of votes cast for a party in British government had not initially anticipated parts of 1996 opinion political history, the Conservatives began significant problems with its legislative polls found that the Philip Cowley is the 1992 parliament with programme when percentage of the Professor of Parlia- a majority of just 21. ”The Maastricht rebels parliament resumed after public considering the mentary Government By-election losses, coupled were not as one in their the 1992 election. First and Conservative Party to at the University of with the withdrawal of, foremost, they anticipated Nottingham. Amongst beliefs. Some were be united had fallen other works, he is or resignation from, the die-hard opponents of small, but manageable to single figures. ”Not author of The British party whip were to whittle difficulties with the since polls asked the General Election of that away even further British membership legislation required to ratify question in the early 2010 (with Dennis and by 1997, Major was of the EU per se. the Maastricht treaty. But 1970s,” remarked Ivor Kavanagh) and The to finish the Parliament Some objected to the result of the Danish Crewe, ‘has the party Rebels: How Blair with a ”majority” of -3. referendum in June 1992 – in Mislaid His Majority. further integration on been so widely regarded The article draws on More than one study of constitutional grounds, which the Danes narrowly as split”. some of the material this period describes voted against the treaty in his ‘Chaos or Cohe- Major as ”weak” without others on economic – forced a postponement The blame for this has sion? Major and the once acknowledging the grounds.” of the legislation, and been laid largely at Conservative Parlia- difficulties of governing hardened resistance within the feet of the party’s mentary Party’, in P. with a majority that was often in single the parliamentary party. Rather than Dorey (ed), The Major parliamentarians and Premiership (Palgrave, figures, if not lower. being shuffled through parliament by the their behaviour. Just 1999). summer of 1992 as the whips had initially before the 1997 general These were difficulties of which the Prime hoped, the European Union (Amendment) election John Major confessed to his Minister was well aware. The supposedly Bill did not receive its Third Reading until biographer, Anthony Seldon, that he loved off-the-record (but in fact recorded) more than a year after its introduction the Conservative Party, but he added: ”I do conversation in April 1993 in which he into the House of Commons, with the not love my parliamentary party”. A few appeared to label three members of his Prime Minister facing the most sustained months later, writing in the The Times after cabinet ”bastards” was also noticeable for backbench rebellion in post-war history. his massive defeat in the 1997 election, his acceptance that the size of the majority he was to claim that ”divided views The Maastricht rebels were not as – expressed without restraint – in one in their beliefs. Some were the parliamentary party made our die-hard opponents of British position impossible” (8 October 1997). membership of the EU per se. Some objected to further integration on One of the ironies was that seven years constitutional grounds, others earlier, things had started so well. As on economic grounds. But their well as experiencing a honeymoon disparate membership did not with the electorate – overnight prevent them making coming cause John Major had transformed the against the treaty, reinforced by Conservative Party’s standing in the their own whipping system. The opinion polls – he was initially to government suffered two Commons enjoy a similar relationship with his defeats during the bill’s passage, and own parliamentary party. For the avoided others only by a series of first two years of his premiership retreats and U-turns. backbench opposition was extremely limited. Prior to the 1992 election, The Prime Minister required support the largest rebellion Major’s whips from the Liberal Democrats to win had to face – during the passage one crucial vote and only finally of the Dangerous Dogs Act in June managed to get the treaty ratified 1991 – consisted of just 19 MPs. For after making the vote in July 1993 a government with a majority of on the social chapter (from which around 90, this was small fry. UK government had gained an opt- out) a formal vote of confidence. The election of April 1992, however, Conservative rebels were then changed things. It had two confronted by a stark choice: if they significant effects. First, it shifted the supported the government they centre of gravity in the parliamentary got the Maastricht treaty, but if party. A sizeable number of MPs the government fell, any incoming left, through retirement or defeat, Labour government would both and were replaced by a new cohort ratify the Treaty and opt-in to the of markedly more Eurosceptic MPs. social chapter. ”The Prime Minister” Division and dissent. The House of Commons was one arena for This altered the balance of power Conservative disunity to be displayed, yet the internal strife often said one rebel, ”has got the party by in the parliamentary party because, took other forms than voting against the government. t h e g o ol ie s”.

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Maastricht was the first, but certainly not did break, the number of Conservative MPs the last, of whips’ problems. A broad range ”There was no collapse in party dissenting was usually fewer than ten. Even of policies met with backbench dissent from discipline during John Major’s the most rebellious MP was loyal in more eclectic – and often inconsistent – parts of premiership. More than four out than nine out of ten votes. In this, the voting the parliamentary party. Plans announced of every five divisions saw all the behaviour of the Conservative party in the in October 1992 to close 31 coal mines and Conservative MPs present enter 1992 parliament was of a type seen regularly make over 30,000 miners redundant had since 1979. to be postponed when it became clear that the same lobby. enough Conservative MPs would rebel This is not to argue that Conservative MPs to defeat the government. Plans for the This is not to argue that were not behaving rebelliously during privatisation of Royal Mail were shelved in Conservative MPs were not Major’s premiership, and especially after 1994, again after it became clear that there behaving rebelliously during 1992. By 1995, things had got so bad that was sufficient backbench opposition to Major’s premiership... But what Major felt forced to resign as leader of defeat the scheme. In November 1994, the his party, triggering a leadership contest government was forced to make the passage was unfolding took the form in an attempt to reassert his authority. A of the European Communities (Finance) of stealthy conversations with full third of the parliamentary party did Bill another issue of confidence to ensure its journalists or sniping at the not support him in the subsequent ballot. passage. Eight Conservative MPs still failed leadership rather than votes His premiership could not, therefore, be to support the government and had the party against the government in the described as one where there was harmony whip withdrawn as a consequence. (A ninth within the Conservative Party. But what then resigned the whip in protest at their House of Commons.” was unfolding took the form of stealthy treatment). Conservative cohesion. More importantly, conversations with journalists or sniping in relative terms this figure is not especially at the leadership rather than votes against The government then lost a vote on its high when compared to other parliaments. It the government in the House of Commons. planned increase in the level of Value Added is of roughly the same level as that seen in the In the seven years of his premiership, and Tax on domestic fuel in December 1994, parliaments of 1979 and 1992 – or that of 1959. despite a small majority for five of them, when seven Conservatives (three of whom And the 1992 parliament was less troublesome Major suffered just four defeats on the floor were without the whip) voted against the than Mrs Thatcher’s middle (1983) parliament, of the House of Commons on whipped government. A further eight – five without and it was noticeably less troublesome than votes, and managed to pilot all but one of the the whip – abstained. The government were two of the parliaments of the 1970s: Edward 195 government bills introduced in the 1992 also defeated on a ”take note” motion on the Heath saw his backbenchers defy the party parliament onto the statute book. By contrast government’s handling of the Commons whips in 19 percent of divisions and between the Labour government of the late-1970s Fisheries Policy in December 1995. In late October 1974 and 1979 Harold Wilson and suffered 23 defeats in five years because of 1995, the government withdrew its Family James Callaghan saw their MPs revolt in 21 its own MPs voting with the opposition. Homes and Domestic Violence Bill and in percent of divisions. And compared to some Even Edward Heath, despite being Prime April 1996 it allowed free votes on the key of the parliaments that were to follow, it looks Minister for a shorter period and enjoying a parts of its Family Law Bill, in both cases quite peaceful with hindsight: both the 2001 larger majority than Major, suffered six. because it was clear that (yet again) sufficient and 2005 Parliaments would see higher rates MPs would rebel against the Bill to defeat it. of rebellion than that endured by Major. And The data also show that it is possible to at the time of writing, the current coalition be mesmerised by the legislative battles April 1996 saw 66 Conservative MPs support government, formed in 2010, has seen a rate of that occurred over Europe, most notably Iain Duncan Smith’s private members bill to rebellion by government backbenchers more Maastricht, and thus to miss the consensus give Parliament power to overturn rulings than three times that of the 1992 Parliament. that existed among the parliamentary of the European Court of Justice, while June Even the rate of rebellion by Conservative party on many other issues. Over 60 per witnessed 76 Conservatives vote for Bill MPs alone is more than double that seen cent of the dissenting votes cast during Cash’s bill requiring a referendum before any under Major. the parliament by Conservative MPs took change to the relationship between Britain place during the passage of the Maastricht and the EU could take effect. Although There was, then, no collapse in party Bill. Dissent in the parliament, therefore, private member’s bills such as these are discipline during John Major’s premiership. was heavily frontloaded. The first session – traditionally unwhipped, the government More than four out of every five divisions saw which saw the Maastricht rebellions – saw whips advised MPs to abstain. Over 90 all the Conservative MPs present enter the 93 Conservative rebellions, some 23 per cent rejected that advice and voted for one or same lobby. When the government’s ranks of divisions; the remaining four sessions both of the bills. The largest combined saw just 81 rebellions, rebellions took place in the final a rate of 9 per cent. Those that session of the parliament when did occur were either extremely up to 95 MPs – over a quarter of limited (almost half of those the parliamentary Conservative in the final four sessions of the Party – voted against parts of parliament consisted of just one the Firearms (Amendment) Bill. lone MP) or sporadic (such as over firearms). They also tended It is important to put these to reflect policy at the periphery rebellions into some perspective. of the political debate in Britain There were 1294 divisions – such as divorce or gun control (votes) in the 1992 Parliament. – rather than core debates about In total Conservative MPs cast public expenditure or the role dissenting votes in 174, or 13 of the state. Concentrating on per cent, of those divisions. In the sizeable doctrinal splits over absolute terms, this is clearly Europe, while important, can not a high figure, with only one therefore obscure the relative in every eight votes witnessing Government plans to privatise Royal Mail had to be withdrawn in 1994, when it harmony that existed on much any Conservative dissent. became evident that Conservative backbenchers would reject the scheme. It is an else – even if that is not quite The other seven saw complete instructive example of how internal disunity under Major was not only about Europe. how it seemed at the time. Photograph: Ross Holdway.

11 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012 Austerity is not enough: the coalition government and the lessons of the ERM By Steven Kettell The UK’s recent local bust. Wage demands, bankruptcies and that departing from the rigours of the election results have unemployment were all rising, profits, ERM, as an ”external” set of constraints brought home the output and productivity growth were bound up with broader European scale of the political, as in decline, the value of the pound was commitments, would be far more costly well as the economic weakening, and inflation and interest for participants than abandoning a challenge that currently rates were both at a five year high. domestically framed policy. bedevils its Coalition Alongside this, the political popularity government. In office of the Conservative party was also in For government officials, these conditions for just two years, and serious trouble. Public approval ratings were expected to produce a number of amidst a backdrop of Steven Kettell is an both for the government and for the benefits. First, by effectively removing recession and stringent Associate Professor Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, had (or, at best, severely limiting) their austerity measures, in Politics and Inter- collapsed to record levels, and a reforming ability to exercise discretion in the use national Studies, Uni- ostensibly designed to versity of Warwick. His Labour party had moved ahead in the of economic policy instruments, officials rescue the country’s main research interests are polls. believed that ERM membership would finances, both the centred on Britain’s role significantly enhance the government’s Conservatives and the in the “war on terror” and In this context, senior government figures anti-inflationary credibility, sending out the relationship between Liberal Democrats have politics and religion. (with the exclusion of Thatcher, who a clear signal to domestic producers that suffered heavy losses, He has also written was replaced as Prime Minister by John continued poor economic performance compelling the party extensively on political Major in October 1990) began to look would no longer be accommodated by leaders to publicly economy. Kettell’s latest towards membership of the more flexible economic ”relaunch” their book is New Labour and Exchange Rate Mechanism policy measures, but the New World Order: ”The govern ment’s political union in an Britain’s Role in the (ERM) as a potential means would instead result in attempt to reinvigorate War on Terror (Manch. of dealing with these reputation for falling profits, growing the government’s sense Univ Press, 2011). difficulties. The central economic competency, unemployment and rising of purpose. feature of the ERM was that a central element in bankruptcies. Economic participating governments its electoral success conditions, then, would But with three years still to run until were required to maintain have to adjust to the the next general election (assuming that the value of their currency since 1979, was in an constraints of the policy, the Coalition manages to hold for the w i t h i n a p r e - s p e c i fi e d r a n g e increasing state of and not the other way duration), with both parties struggling of all other ERM currencies, disrepair.” around. These pressures in the polls, and with the full force of thereby subordinating key were compounded by the austerity programme yet to bite, economic policy decisions the eventual choice of a the electoral omens do not appear to be to the maintenance of the exchange rate. relatively high exchange rate for sterling’s auspicious. In these circumstances, it may participation in the ERM, with this (at well be an opportune moment to reflect Moreover, since the ERM was underpinned DM2.95) being selected on the grounds on some of the key lessons from the last by the German Deutschemark (DM), and by that it would, at least initially, require Conservative administration, and its Germany’s constitutionally independent interest rates to be held at relatively experience of austerity during the early Bundesbank, the ERM effectively imposed stringent levels in order to maintain it. 1990s. anti-inflationary discipline on all its members. Anti-inflationary pressures Another anticipated benefit of being part The central governing dilemma facing were further enhanced by strict rules of the ERM, however, was that it would the Conservatives at the end of the precluding devaluation, and by the fact ultimately enable a lowering of interest 1980s contained rates, and that this, in both economic and turn, would deliver a political quandaries. boost both to economic On the one hand, growth as well as the government’s the political fortunes r e p u t a t i o n of the Conservative for economic party. While cutting competency, a central rates outside the ERM element in its electoral would be a dangerous success since 1979, endeavour, not least was in an increasing since it would lead to state of disrepair. An a fall in the exchange initial experiment rate and create further with rules-based, inflationary pressures, monetarist austerity membership of the during the early ERM, by providing part of the decade the government had been long since with a credible abandoned in favour anti-inflationary of a politically flexible commitment, would approach to economic allow interest rates to policy, resulting in be gradually reduced an economic boom with no (or at least that by the end fewer) destabilising of the 1980s was The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, with the Prime Minister, John Major, at the effects. sharply turning to European Bank Conference in April 1991. Photographer: Graham Turner

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At the same time, just as the confines of secure an improbable fourth consecutive the ERM would preclude the discretionary ”The lessons of the ERM were not general election victory in April 1992. use of economic policy, the same constraint lost on the Conservative’s eventual would provide officials with an effective successors. Upon gaining power in The lessons of the ERM were not lost on means of shifting the responsibility for any the Conservative’s eventual successors. unpalatable consequences that might result 1997, New Labour moved swiftly Upon gaining power in 1997, New from it. This depoliticisation of economic to establish a new framework of Labour moved swiftly to establish a new conditions would be all the more effective depoliticisation based on Bank framework of depoliticisation based on for the fact that ERM membership enjoyed of England independence and a Bank of England independence and a the support of the main political parties, series of fiscal rules, a regime that series of fiscal rules, a regime that proved along with the majority of the media, public largely effective before the onset of the opinion and all sides of finance, commerce proved largely effective [until] the financial crisis from 2008 led to extensive and industry. onset of the financial crisis from state bail-outs and transformed economic 2008.” policy into a key political issue once more. While joining the ERM was seen by The Coalition government put together government figures as the keystone for would not have been possible had Britain after the 2010 general election, however, reducing inflation, lowering interest rates, remained outside the ERM. has sought to re-establish a means of revitalising the government’s popularity displacing responsibility for economic and displacing responsibility for economic The political dividends of ERM membership management, although the key features of policy-making, the conventional view of also proved to be considerable. Just as the this, without an institutional framework Britain’s participation in the ERM, which regime enabled interest rates to be reduced, such as the ERM to turn to, have centred on lasted from October 1990 to September so its constraints also provided ministers rhetorical mechanisms. The primary focus 1992, is that it was an unmitigated disaster. with an effective justificatory device for here has been an unremitting emphasis on According to received wisdom, the decision resisting calls for larger or swifter cuts in the external constraints imposed by the to join the ERM at an overvalued exchange order to alleviate the effects of the recession. international market, and on the absence rate, and at a time when the economy was The persistent declaration from ministers, of any feasible alternative to austerity entering recession, forced the maintenance when faced with calls for measures. of excessively high interest rates and thus ameliorative measures, was exacerbated the effects of the downturn. that the primary objective was ”The government’s But while an economic As a result, the poor state of the economy to maintain the value of the claims about the policy rooted in the eroded the credibility of the government’s pound, a policy that continued lack of a credible institutional constraints commitment to the constraints of the ERM, to attract broad support from alternative are of the ERM may have leading to an enforced withdrawal from all sides of finance, commerce themselves without provided an effective the regime on ”Black Wednesday” amidst and industry. Similarly, the framework for shifting a speculative attack on the pound. The displacement effect of the ERM credibility.” blame for the unpalatable political fallout from these events is seen was also noticeable in electoral consequences of recession, to have fatally undermined the economic terms too. Although the overall popularity the approach willed by the Coalition credibility of the Conservative party, and of the Conservatives remained weak, with has few such virtues. One problem is to have played a key part in its own ejection polls putting them behind Labour on that membership of the ERM, for all its from office in 1997. virtually every single issue, their continued faults, continued to attract wide levels of lead in terms of economic management (for support in a way that bending to the will The actual effects of Britain’s ERM which their ratings improved after joining of ”the market” – a term often taken to be membership, however, were more the ERM), along with the fact that most synonymous with the financiers, bankers beneficial (at least for the Conservatives) people placed the blame for the recession and speculators that many consider to than is typically imagined. Although it on the international economic situation be the real cause of the economic crisis – is certainly true that domestic economic or the policies pursued by the Thatcher simply does not. conditions deteriorated markedly, governments during the 1980s, proved with large falls in production, rising crucial in enabling the Conservatives to A second dilemma is that the government’s bankruptcies, record home claims about the lack repossessions and chronic of a credible alternative levels of unemployment, are themselves without other key economic indicators credibility. Recent elections were more positive. Prior to in Greece and France have its ungainly exit from the shown that a rejection of regime, sterling had been austerity remains entirely more stable than at any time possible, and with the in the preceding decade, government’s economic while inflation, a central policy to date failing even problem for most postwar to deliver on its own terms, governments, declined by having produced a predictable almost 6%, reaching its lowest double-dip recession and level for thirty years in 1993 still-rising levels of debt, the and remaining consistently rhetorical underpinnings low thereafter. Successfully of the austerity programme reducing inflation also look far from secure. Should allowed the government the Coalition’s attempt to to gradually lower interest displace responsibility for the rates, which fell from 15% consequences of its actions to 10% (notwithstanding a fail, then the results of the brief reversal immediately local elections may well prove Lessons to learn? Failing to steer the economy safe through an international prior to Black Wednesday), downturn may bring a government away from the rose garden, in 1992 as today. to be the precursor to a wider, a reduction that arguably Crown copyright / the Cabinet Office national change.

13 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012 Major and British foreign policy in the post-Cold War era By Kristin M. Haugevik & Øivind Bratberg Flanked by the two political imprint, preferring a consensual solidly planted in the British tradition of longest-serving decision making style both at the domestic pragmatic internationalism: Britain would and probably most and international arena. play an active part in European affairs, while contested British at the same time securing reservations on Prime Ministers A softer style, however, should not conceal sensitive issues related to foreign, security in modern time, the fact that Major governed Britain through and defence policy and the single currency. John Major tends international waters which were in many Kristin M. Øivind to be devoted Haugevik Bratberg is a ways as stormful as those of the Thatcher His attempt to placate both sides of the less attention is a PhD post doctoral era. Under Major as under Thatcher, Britain political argument in Britain met with little in international researcher at researcher sought to maintain its basic foreign policy enthusiasm. Major was faced with harsh relations history the Norwe- at the Dept identity as a hands-on player “punching critisism from the opposition parties. The gian Institute of Political books than one for interna- Science, Uni- above its weight” in world affairs, a privileged then leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy might expect from tional Affairs versity of Oslo, partner of the United States and a cautious Ashdown, concluded that it was “a bad a six and a half year (NUPI) and and Scholarly participant in the institutional cooperation agreement for Britain”, while the Labour long premiership. President of Responsible of structures of Europe. The new Prime Minister leader at the time, Neil Kinnock, claimed that British British This is of course Politics Soci- Politics Soci- may have brought the British government the Major governent had “sidelined” Britain partly due to the ety, Norway. ety, Norway. fewer admirers than in the preceding decade; in European affairs. Despite considerable fact that Major – however, despite intransigence over Europe, casualties, Major succeeded in landing the for better or worse – was a less colourful the government also acquired more friends. Maastricht ratification from the House of politician than both his predecessor Margaret Commons. There is reason to doubt whether Thatcher and his successor Tony Blair. British Euroscepticism, at least rhetorically, any alternative Prime Minister at the time Indeed, his political legacy cannot as easily had reached a high towards the end of could have achieved better. be summed up under memorable headings Thatcher’s premiership. Under Major, such as “Thatcherism” or “the Third Way”. the rhetoric was toned down, and a more When it comes to the Major government’s cooperative approach deployed, one which in relations with the United States, they were, in This does not, however, mean that Major’s a sense mirrorred how the British government different ways, coloured by two of the major premiership was an uneventful one, or that had operated in the successful negotiations wars of the 1990s: the First Gulf War and the it was marked by political tranquility. Quite for the Single European Act in 1985-86. There War in Bosnia. the contrary: Major served as prime minister is little doubt that Britain played a tough hand during a time when key international changes in negotiations over the Maastricht Treaty. The In the First Gulf War, Britain committed the were in process. While Thatcher’s name, along Treaty, which established the European Union largest European contingent to the US-led with Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, with all its supranational connotations, was combat operations. In this period, US-British became inextricably linked with the Cold understandably controversial, representing relations appeared rock-solid both at the War, Major’s premiership began with the both a turning point in the history of state level and at the personal level between dissolution of the Soviet Union, marking European integration and a defining moment Major and George Bush Sr. In contrast, the end of the Cold War. Consequently, for Britain’s relations with Europe. disagreements between the British and US in the early years of his tenure, Major’s governments over the the Bosnian War gave government was faced with the challenging Major, it could be argued, was faced with the the impression of an alliance under pressure. task of identifying the post-Cold War path same balancing act as British Prime Ministers While the rhetoric about “the special for Britain’s foreign policy and revising the both before and after him: Ensuring British relationship” was maintained also during country’s relationship with external partners. influence over developments in Europe and this period, personal relations between A question of key concern was what kind of the EU, while at the same time safeguarding Major and Bill Clinton were reportedly less relationships Britain should now seek with national interests and territorial integrity. heartfelt. its main Cold War allies – the United States He returned from the Maastrict treaty and its partners in Europe. Moreover, what negotiations, proclaiming ”game, set and Major’s foreign policy unfolded in a tense vision should be promoted for the European match” to Britain. Major’s approach was and challenging period, navigating through continent as a whole? the debris of the Cold War and trying to strike out a When it comes to the de facto new path for Britain in an contents and manifestations of emerging multipolar world. British foreign policy, it could When Blair’s New Labour be argued that there were few came to power in 1997, the obvious differences between the assertion was that British two Conservative governments. foreign policy too would Indeed, Major himself had seen be subject to modernisation a brief spell as Foreign Secretary and change. Yet, while the under Thatcher, and his successor, foreign policy of the Major Douglas Hurd, remained in place years served as a useful “Old until 1995, when he was followed Britain” cliché for Blair, it by Sir Malcom Rifkind. The may well be argued that the loyalty and competence of both old-fashioned pragmatism Foreign Secretaries matched the of Major’s foreign policy Prime Minister well, and behind was precisely what Britain them he relied on his own strategy needed to clear the path of ”caution with a purpose”. While through the post-Cold War Thatcher’s bold, confrontational years. way had earned her the nickname Partnership. John Major with President George H.W. Bush, Camp David, 7 June 1992. “the Iron Lady”, Major left a milder Photograph: David Valdez.

14 British Politics Review Volume 7 | No. 2 | Spring 2012 ”A Britain unamendable in all essentials”: speech to the Conservative Group for Europe, 22 April 1993 computers to the world. We hear a great deal [But] we have reformed the Common The text below about the industries we’ve lost. I would like Agricultural Policy after years of is a speech given to hear more about the industries we have squabbling. At Edinburgh we put a ceiling by John Major as gained. (…) on EC spending until the end of the Century. prime minister to At Edinburgh too we reached out to the Investors like our welcome. They like our new member nations. The Scandinavians the Conservative tax structure. They like our industrial now; and in time the Central European Group for Europe, relations. They know that our workforce is nations - Hungary, Poland, the Czech an association for Conservatives flexible and adaptable. And we have English Republic and Slovakia. We won agreement promoting constructive British - English, the world language. We should against all the odds that those old friends engagement with the EU. The do well with such strengths. But outside would join. Not tentatively or in the future speech was given at a time when the Community? Doing our own tiny thing, conditional tense, but “join” meaning splendidly adrift? It’s just not on. Outside “join”. That was always Britain’s wish; and Major was struggling to obtain Europe Britain can survive; inside we will it will be fulfilled. ratification of the Maastricht Treaty thrive. in the House of Commons. It is an Like Douglas Hurd, I know that the eloquent defence of the European We take from the Community. And we put Community has become too intrusive project on the basis of a free-trade into it. Europe needs Britain just as Britain in our national life. Where this is so internationalism characteristic of needs Europe. We have just completed we must correct it and the Maastricht the biggest free trade area in the world. A Treaty provides a way of doing so. But British foreign policy. Yet more than British initiative, started by a British Prime some intrusion is necessary and is in our anything, the speech is known for Minister, driven by a British Commissioner, interests. For example, if we are to make the Major’s reference to ”long shadows and brought to fruition under a British Single Market work, there has to be some on county grounds, warm beer, Prime Minister. A single market that makes body of common law. It is we, British, who invincible green suburbs, dog full use of the Treaty of Rome as a charter have pressed hardest for a true common for economic liberty. A single market that market - a slogan made flesh. If we are lovers and pools fillers” - a quaint helps us capitalise on the things Britain to have that, it needs to be enforced and reference to the patriotic instincts does uniquely well - our financial services, someone must have the authority to do so. of the Conservative Party. our transport and aviation and our The Commission and the Court have that telecommunications companies. (…) authority. For all its quirks and quiddities, when the Commission Two years ago I said I wanted to put Britain Thirty years ago the battles against vested at the heart of Europe. And the heart of ”We have also led the economist, James Meade way to bringing in our interests and for Europe is where I still want us to be. wrote a famous pamphlet. competition, it is on our An outward-looking old EFTA partners and side. (…..) It is now 20 years since we joined the Europe was good, he said, friends Austria, Norway, European Community. Since then, a whole an inward-looking Europe Sweden and Finland. Of course, the Brussels generation has grown up. A generation should make us flee to centralisers haven’t all free of the legacy of the old animosities. They share our instincts the hills. We are fighting as global free traders. gone away. But they are A generation which takes for granted and winning the battles now running against co-operation between the Member States. he identified. Historically Many of the traditions on the tide. A tide that some of our partners are which our Parliamentary will flow ever more Yet in 1973 all you would take to the protectionist by instinct. democracy is based come strongly in the enlarged Continent was a limited amount of foreign But Britain with her from the Scandinavian Community we ensured currency and £25 sterling. Today, we go to outside links, American part of our heritage.” at Edinburgh. The France much as we might go to Yorkshire. and Commonwealth, will idea of a centralised Last year we made a trifling 24 million trips always thrust Europe Europe had resonance to Europe. outwards. in a Community of the 6. But for 12, soon 16 and eventually 20 plus nations it is a It is no longer an oddity for British students We have also led the way to bringing grandiose doodle. It is not what the people to spend a year in France or to see a in our old EFTA partners and friends of Europe want. We Conservatives, must German student rowing in the boatrace Austria, Norway, Sweden and Finland. have the confidence and the sharp-edged for Cambridge. For the manager or the They share our instincts as global free determination to stay in the heart of the professional it is becoming as normal for a traders. Many of the traditions on which our European debate to win a Community of career to include two years in Mannheim Parliamentary democracy is based come free, independent members. The nations as a posting to Manchester. Little England from the Scandinavian part of our heritage. must be free-standing - a colonnade, not a steps out. But as we have been stepping A rugged, independent-minded legislature set of bars. (…) out for more than 20 years now we hardly can sometimes be uncomfortable. Believe notice that we do it. me, it can. But it is a good and healthy thing. The Single Market was a British idea; They share that with us. breaking open state monopolies was a There is also the minor question of profit. British idea. CAP reform and enlargement We British are traders. Our trade with the Like us, too, they will be net contributors. have been British goals. If we tried to rest of the Community has risen thirteen- They will be watchful how the Community huddle back into some private yesterday we fold. (…) And the fact that we do compete spends its citizens’ money. Only a cloud- wouldn’t have any alliances we could make. makes inward investors flock here. Two out borne idealist would deny the debits to our Others would make the rules. And t h e y ’d of every five who come to the Community membership. We joined late. We didn’t make impose the rules on us. That’s what our come to Britain. Now we export cars to the rules. A lot of them didn’t suit us. (…) EFTA partners have learned. It’s one reason Japan, television sets to Germany and why they are queuing to join.

15 ”A Britain unamendable in all essentials”

I know there are those who have many Community is a handful of threads for objections to the Community. But I notice the pursuit of our domestic and foreign they offer no satisfactory alternative. interests. What are the theoretical options? There are three: We hear a lot about principled opposition to Europe. Let’s not forget that there is - to leave altogether. Put that bluntly, they a great deal of principled support too. shrink away from that choice; Looking around, I see a great many - to form some kind of association with an who have been principled supporters of American free trade area. That is a sugar our place in Europe for as long as I can coated turnip and the economic hole that remember. leaving Europe would open up cannot be filled with turnips; The sly argument that to be a principled - third, to stick at “a Common market supporter of Europe is somehow to put and no more”. That’s such a narrow, Britain’s interests second needs dismissing unexalted vision. Britain has long argued for the nonsense it is. It’s precisely because for a more coherent foreign policy for the we put Britain’s interests first that we need Twelve. Because it makes sense for us to to be in there shaping the new Europe. work together as we did in providing safe A new Europe that is larger, more open havens for the Kurds of Northern Iraq. and less intrusive. That’s not throwing away history, that’s not knocking down So what really moves the opponents of traditions. We are digging straight Britain’s full participation in the EC? As ditches and putting layers of bricks into much as anything it is them - what builders call frustration. Frustration ”If we tried to huddle a foundation. (…) Let’s not that we are no longer a forget, that when we joined Fifty years from now Britain will still be world power. Frustration back into some private the Community, Spain yesterday we wouldn’t the country of long shadows on county that nowhere is the Portugal and Greece were grounds, warm beer, invincible green nation state fully have any alliances we still governed by men in suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers sovereign, free to could make. Others sunglasses and epaulettes. and - as George Orwell said - “old maids conduct its policies would make the rules. The dictators were booted bicycling to Holy Communion through without concerting And they’d impose the out. Stability and democracy the morning mist” and if we get our way with ruddy foreigners. have been locked in - rules on us..” - Shakespeare still read even in school. There is frustration that by membership of the Britain will survive unamendable in all some of the fixed and Community. essentials. treasured aspects of our national life are subject to seemingly relentless change. The tragedy in Bosnia on our borders Surely we trust our own integrity as a They practice a sort of phantom grandeur, is a terrible reminder of the loss of that people quite enough to fear nothing in a clanking of unusable suits of armour. blessing we here take too much for Europe. We are the British, a people freely granted. It is an irony that many who living inside a Europe which is glad to see I understand these feelings but I cannot protest most loudly that ”Britain only us and wants us. After 20 years we have share them. The world has moved on. joined a common market” are the first come of age in Europe. One Conservative Britain has to take its rightful place in to complain that the EC has not secured leader put us there. This Conservative it. Though no longer a global power we a political or military settlement to the leader means us to thrive there. So let’s still have global interests and we need to conflict in Bosnia. Our long term purpose get on with it. defend them with determination but also must be the whole continent of Europe with subtlety. We cannot afford to subject with free democracies and without trade The full text of the speech can be accessed at http:// ourselves to the despotism of nostalgia. barriers. We are backing freer trade www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1086.html. The web We need to use cleverness and shared with more aid. A great swelling tide of domain provides access to thousands of speeches and strength. We must operate a network humanitarian and technical aid flows to statements relating to both Sir John Major and the of little threads to make most use of the Russia and central Europe. The EC is by 1990-1997 Conservative government. influence we do have. And the European far the largest donor. (…)

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