Major Political Crimes in Kuwait

Najeeb Al-Wagayan, Lawyer

Sabah al-Shemmari, Journalist

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Major Political Crimes in Kuwait

Najeeb Al-Wagayan, Lawyer Sabah al-Shemmari, Journalist

First edition, 1996 Second edition, 1997 All copyrights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the publishers.

Dedication to late lawyer Faris Ibrahim Al-Wagayan

Introduction Perhaps, it is the first time to issue a book that documents and chronicles most famous crimes and trials bearing on violent and terrorist acts against Kuwait. Such acts include assassinations, bombings, hijacking of Kuwaiti planes, forced deviation of aircraft to the Kuwait International Airport and even "revengeful" acts in retaliation for Kuwait's trial of people who committed previous crimes, or as leverage on Kuwait's position on certain issues. We were keen on writing this book so objectively, accurately and honestly and covering facts in detail. We sought to uncover unknown facts that required a stupendous effort to find. However, this book is not meant to expose certain people, parties, organizations or countries in as much as it aims to illustrate a set of acts and violations between 1968 and 1995. This book contained crimes and trials that were fully published for the first time, given the fact that most trial sessions were not public. But, they became public only in 1990 before the State Security Court was scrapped as pursuant to Law 55 for 1995 in order to ensure more justice, thus referring all cases to ordinary courts. The entire world monitored all such violent acts covered by the book, but ever since many facts and backgrounds have been unknown. It is noteworthy that on the first day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, all prisoners escaped. But, when the country was liberated, an amnesty was issued for all citizens who were jailed in connection with state security cases. Although the State Security Court issued several capital punishment sentences, no-one was hanged. The operations in question are linked to regional developments or "climates" and political, social and doctrinal shifts that swept the Middle East since the Arab defeat in the 1967 War, the oil ban that followed the 1973 War, the developments of the Palestinian cause, conflicts among Arab and regional "axes" and reflections of the Iraqi-Iranian War. Kuwait was a field for retaliation against foreign rivals. The concepts of "violence" and "terrorism" diversified at ancient and modern times according to the nature of every era of political and societal development. However, some terrorist acts, with their diverse manifestations, have been used as alternatives to conventional war or as an expression of a certain group's desire to strike terror into people's hearts. Analysts and specialists are concurrent that the psychological impacts of violent acts are mostly more targeted than the infliction of human or material losses. So, mass media are required to play a role in "delivering" the message which the perpetrators of violent or terrorist acts want to give to a certain people or a certain agency. However, regardless of the political and media, and sometimes personal, motives of hijackers, bombers or hostage-takers, their techniques are notably identical. Bizarrely enough, a man who hijacks a plane for personal purposes is sometimes weak and faint, being driven by an integrated mechanism and series of acts and behaviors by which he "manages" hijacking, hostage-taking, negotiation, conditions, responses, calls and threats…etc. By doing so, he merely tries to assume the method and techniques of organizations or countries that have been versed in this domain!! Thank God, we publish this book at a time when the State of Kuwait enjoys security and prosperity at all levels and the "Kuwaiti and Gulf eye" is vigilant and careful for safeguarding security and stability in the region. Finally, we'd like to thank and appreciate all judicial, security, diplomatic and media references, authorities and institutions for their valuable efforts and cooperation in the provision of information and givens mentioned in this book. We also wish this part of the world permanent security and stability, hoping that all potentials could be harnessed for the common good of generations to come. The writers,

Popular Revolutionary Movement The Popular Revolutionary Movement is an organization that seceded from the Arab Nationalist Movement in the second half of 1968; following the June 1967 Catastrophe. This new organization managed to build its structure and have affiliated agencies, including one that was responsible for violent acts, an ideological committee and a treasury fund for financial affairs, together with members who used to meet regularly. When the organization completed its formation, it decided to hold its institutional congress to handpick its leaders. Caretaker leaders were chosen until the congress would be held. They included five people who were in their twenties and mostly in study age. They were zealous at this hectic period. The constitutional congress was held at al-Juliaa area along the Arabian Gulf beach on November 10, 1962. It was attended by the organization members, a delegate of the politburo in the Gulf and another delegate of the so-called the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf as well as three others whose names were not disclosed. During the congress, several decisions were taken; including one that envisioned liaison to the politburo in the Gulf and commitment to the strategic, organizational and ideological trend and revolutionary violence of the bureau as well as the election of leaders. As the organization lived an intellectual crisis over a specific ideological identity or social doctrine, scientific socialism was suggested as an ideology to be abided by. The organization's members had code-names in order to ensure confidentiality; such as Majuid, Faris, Jadaan, Saud, Walid, Sulyman, Yussef…etc. They also contributed money to the organization either in the form of monthly payments or according to their financial potential. When it was announced that Iran's Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi would visit the State of Kuwait, the organization's leaders convened to discuss how they could express their sentiments against this visit and Iranian infiltration and threats against Bahrain at that time. A decision was taken to launch explosions and to hand out flyers on this occasion. The organization asked one of its members to buy the necessary explosives and the treasurer paid him 300 Kuwaiti dinars out of the members' contributions for the purpose. The explosives were hidden in the desert, but then taken to a hut at al- Shadadia area and finally to a hen farm at Salwa area, as the members began to train in using weapons and explosives theoretically and practically. Just a few days ahead of the Iranian Shah's visit, a member of the organization, while returning from cinema early October 29, 1968, he passed by a municipal store where ornamental items were kept for decorating the main streets and squares on the occasion of the visit. Having decided to set the store ablaze, he brought a tin of petrol from his car and poured some petrol on a piece of wood and then threw the tin into the store before he set the wooden piece afire and threw it too. The fire flared up and caught useless wood next to the store wall. The guard of the store immediately called the firemen, who came soon and managed to put the fire out before it caught ornamental items. On the eve of November 14, 1968, two members of the organization prepared an explosive device and then went to the Iranian embassy situated on Al-Istiqlal Street in the capital city of Kuwait. They planted the device on the pavement along the southern direction of the building at the entrance of one of its gates at 11:30 p.m. It was timed to explode within one hour. It did blow up at 12:30 a.m., but caused slight damage to the entrance. The following day, the Iranian Shah visited the country and stayed at Al-Salam (Peace) Palace. The organization planted an improvised bomb containing pieces of pipes filled with gunpowder just 150 meters away from the palace. It exploded at 1:30 a.m., but caused no damage. Another bomb planted along the road from the airport to the palace did not explode. Furthermore, the organization members handed out flyers at some areas by throwing them on the streets, inside stationary cars, through the windows of houses and at the doors of buildings. Three months later, when the date for the National Assembly (parliament) election was approaching, the organization leaders convened to discuss how to protest the polls which they viewed as unfair. They decided to launch explosions at the Interior Ministry, Interior Minister's house and the National Assembly building, and to circulate leaflets. Three improvised time bombs were planted at places in a way that could lead to no public casualties. The first bomb detonated at around 10:00 p.m. on January 25, 1969 at the garden of the Interior Ministry at al-Shammia suburb, shattering the windows of most nearby houses. Financial damage amounted to 45 dinars. The second device exploded at around 11:00 at the National Assembly building opposite the capital governorate, dashing one of the building windows, which cost 30 dinars to repair. A man, who was going to the minister to implore him not to demolish his hut, was injured in the bombing. The bomb was planted in the hole of a wall built for passing an electric wire to the house. Following these incidents, police investigations concluded that the bombs and leaflets were hidden at a plot at Salwa suburb. The undersecretary of the interior ministry went to the scene on May 21 st , 1969, to find a wooden yard for hens with no housing utilities. But, there was a locked room where an iron box was found. It contained weapons, explosives and 17 documents. Having been arrested, the tenant turned out to be a member of the organization, a clue that led to the identification of all the other members; 21 young citizens and a Palestinian. Seventeen members were detained and sent to trial while four others ran away. The State Security Court examined the case in its session on September 16, 1969, as it seemed to be uneasy to arrest the four fugitives at that time. The court issued a release, including the required role of the press in the case in line with the constitution, which states that the trial should be public. It noted that the law and judicial traditions required that the role of the press as to judicial trials should have been restricted to a mere narration of facts, incidents and testimonies. The court demanded the press to refrain from commenting on the trial in order to ensure the public interest, even though the Kuwaiti penal code does not contain any item that may safeguard judicial privacy. The court listened to eyewitnesses' statements and defendants' confessions, examined pieces of evidence from investigations and technical reports and other documents, and listened to the defense. At its session held on November 29, 1969 under Counselor Salah Eddin Moussa Zekri as chairman and counselors Mohamed al-Saif Yussef al- Refaai and Abdullah al-Issa as members, the State Security Court pronounced its decision on the first state security case, sentencing seventeen defendants to imprisonment ranging between four months to seven years. But, it declined to pronounce the punishment against one defendant and acquitted three others. Later on, an amnesty was issued for them.

What can you do if you are arrested?!

The documents examined by the court included one entitled "What can you do if you are arrested?" handling secrecy as a core principle in a successful revolutionary organization, together with necessary caution and vigilance. It concluded how a member should have done if he had been arrested. This included several stages. The first stage handled members' behavior during detention. It demanded a detained member not to miss any chance to escape even if this could lead to a clash with men of the authority who arrested him, but if he was not convicted, he needed not to flee as this could have cast more doubts about him. It also required a detained member to get rid of anything that could have been considered a piece of evidence against him. It also urged him to be audacious during the detention period. However, members were ordered not to keep anything in their offices and houses that could have convicted them. They were also asked to use symbolic writing. The second stage dealt with behaviors during investigations, pointing out that the investigation period was the hardest detention phase since investigators resort to every means to snatch confessions and information to unravel new threads in the organization. But, at the beginning of investigations, they resort to decent methods and good treatment and promises in a bid to obtain confessions. But, if this comes to no avail, they resort to physical and psychological torture. So, the members were advised to endure any torture and to try to fabricate names of fictitious persons or people who were abroad in order to avoid any conviction. They were also asked not to be so talkative. As per the third stage, the members were urged to hold fast to their testimonies at court, if they did not make any confessions during investigations. But, if they admitted in spite of no available evidence, they were advised to backpedal on confessions at court under the pretext that they were subject to torture and intimidation, in the hope to hold new investigations or at least secure a light sentence. As to the members, who were confronted during investigations with pieces of evidence and confessed willingly, they were asked not to retreat at court as they would gain the respect of fair judiciary and even enable them to defend their doctrine strongly and rhetorically. The fourth stage required jailed members to continuously follow up on events and be close to the inmates in order to appear as strugglers who could solve problems. They were also asked to bear in mind that there was an agency that catered for their families and that the movement was continuing.

(picture of page 15) State court chief justice counselor Salah Zekri

Storming Saudi embassy in Paris

Five militants stormed the Saudi embassy in Paris in the afternoon of Wednesday on September 5, 1973, having found no immediate obstruction from anyone in Andre Pascal St., where the embassy is headquartered. But, the telephone operator promptly called the police, who appeared soon; armed with guns and wearing bulletproof vests and steel helmets. The militants held fifteen people hostage, belonging to seven nationalities and including five Saudi diplomats who were tied up. But, the then Saudi ambassador Sheikh Mohammad Ali Reda was not in the embassy. Meanwhile, a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit was being inaugurated in Algeria. Immediately, negotiations with the militants kicked off, having been undertaken by Kuwaiti Ambassador in Paris Faisal Saleh al-Metawa in his capacity as chief Arab diplomat in the French capital, as well as the Saudi ambassador. A microphone was used in the negotiations, in which the kidnappers demanded the releasing of a Palestinian leader called Abu Dawoud, who was arrested by Jordanian authorities in February 1973, together with his comrades, as they tried to cross into Jordan with a view to launching acts aiming to disrupt the state security, according to Jordanian authorities. They were sentenced by the State Security Court in Amman to capital punishment, sparking a wave of protests in some Arab countries. So, King Hussein made instructions commuting the sentence to imprisonment for life. It was the second operation against a Saudi embassy in the same year. On March 1, 1973, eight gunmen belonging to the so-called Black September Organization stormed the Saudi embassy in Khartoum and took five diplomats hostage notably; the Saudi and US ambassadors, chief of US interests in Sudan, the Jordanian charge d'affaires and the Belgian charge d'affaires. They also demanded Jordan to set free the leader Abu Dawoud and his 16 comrades as well as two Jordanian officers. On the eve of the following day, the gunmen killed the US diplomat and the Belgian charge d'affaires, but freed the Saudi and Jordanian diplomats. On March 4, they surrendered to Sudanese authorities. Let's go back to the storming of the Saudi embassy in Paris. At the beginning of negotiations, the militants turned down an offer allowing them to leave France peacefully in exchange for releasing the hostages. They even threatened to bomb the embassy unless their demands were fulfilled, having emphasized that they were not killers, but just advocates of an issue. They stated they had nothing to fear, and claimed that they belonged to a jihad organization called "Iqab" or "Punishment". A Palestinian spokesman in Beirut said there was no organization carrying this name on the Palestinian arena. Thus, the situation became complicated amid the perplexity of parties and quarters concerned over this emergency and bizarre violence act, having put the embassy staff and others present at the site at a loss. Only two workers could escape. Anwar Hassan from Egypt threw himself out of the window at the beginning of the incident, while the protocol chief waited until 7:30 before he jumped out of a window on the first floor. Tension grew when night was beginning to fall. When a car came with big lights spotlighting, the militants threatened to blow up the embassy, while the newly recruited young French clerk Natali, who was married to the geologist Michel Sepher screamed out of the window "save us". At that time, a militant shouted "can't you remember the Munich operation?!" The Munich operation happened on September 5, 1972 when eight activists of the Black September Organization attacked the Israeli pavilion of the sports games village in Munich and killed two men, including the wrestling team coach, and took nine others hostage. They demanded the releasing of 100 Palestinian prisoners in Israel. While they were on the way to the Munich military airport with their hostages, they came under attack by snipers. Five activists, nine hostages and a German policeman were killed and the other three activists were arrested in the attack. In response to this incident, Israel shelled two sites of the organization and civilian targets in Syria as well as three bases in Lebanon, leaving some 17 people dead and over 200 others injured. Let's go back to the Saudi embassy incident. On the following day; Thursday, the militants asked for an Arab plane to take them to an Arab capital. But, when it was difficult to find an Arab plane, Arab ambassadors asked the French police chief to rent a plane to find a way out of the crisis as soon as possible, especially as the French government was seemingly reluctant to provide a plane carrying the French flag to the militants and hostages. But, the Syrian government managed to put a Caravelle at the gunmen's disposal. Afterwards, an agreement was reached with the gunmen, who made over 11 warnings in 24 hours, to leave the embassy and go to the airport. Immediately, the militants freed three French women and another Tunisian woman, and asked for paving the way for them through the street where the embassy building is seated. But, they threatened that they would shoot anybody to be found standing near the embassy, pushing the French police to request the onlookers and curious residents through a microphone to keep away from the site and not to stand on their balconies overlooking the embassy. It was a very hard time to wait for the kidnappers and hostages to go out of the building, having been reassured by several agencies that Arab diplomats would join the "terror motorcade" towards the airport. The militants did leave the building with their hostages to the "Le Bourget" airport in a small curtained car just behind a police vehicle with two Arab ambassadors inside and chased by several diplomatic cars. There was not any remarkable presence of French forces at the airport. The militants released the hostages, excluding four Saudi diplomats, before the plane took off to an unknown destination, causing more concerns over the fate of the remaining hostages. The captain proposed to the militants Libya or Algerian as a destination, but the chief militant warned: "We do not play with you, captain. Do not try to deceive us. If you fail to do what we order you, then we will all die." They flew through the Egyptian airspace. As soon as the plane landed at the Cairo airport just 100 meters away the runway, ambulances and police vehicles arrived. The captain, who switched off the internal lights of the plane, including the cabin, demanded that no-one should have approached the plane, saving a fuel car. Egypt's then deputy prime minister and interior minister Mamdouh Salim talked to the militants through the observation tower, and representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) tried to go onto the plane, but they were stymied by the gunmen, who asked if Abu Daoud and his comrades were freed; the goal for which they stormed the embassy. Seemingly, they received no official response, with harbingers having shown that the operation would not come to a close in Cairo as it was expected to see further complications. After their plane was filled with fuel, the abductors flew at ten o'clock p.m., but did not reveal their next destination. The plane then entered the Syrian airspace at 11:30 p.m., as Syria's then air force commander Gen. Naji Jamil contacted the militants and persuaded them to land at Damascus airport safely, especially as the Caravel couldn't fly long distances. But, they said they would fly to Kuwait. At once, Damascus airport officers informed their counterparts at the Kuwait airport, where necessary measures were taken in order to prevent the plane from landing at the airport so the lights of runways were switched off and the captain's messages were not responded to even though he warned that the militants would bomb the plane over the sky of Kuwait. Excitingly, while the passengers were awfully concerned over their fate, an Indian plane, whose captain could hear the calls of the Syrian plane captain with no response from the Kuwaiti airport, had just landed at the Kuwait airport. He sent a signal to his Syrian counterpart, telling him that the airport did not want to respond and showing him how to land safely. When Kuwaiti officials realized that they were unable to deny the plane access to the airport, they ordered the lights be switched on again and asked the captain to land at the end of the runway. The watch tower asked the militants if they wanted something. They answered that they were fatigued and short of fuel so they asked to stay there for several hours and leave on Friday morning. The captain and his colleagues went to the airport terminal and talked with Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah, who was the then minister of interior and defense, about their flight from Paris to Kuwait and concomitant incidents. For his part, Sheikh Saad talked with the militants, having told them they would be allowed to fly to any country they chose provided that they free the hostages. On Friday morning, the observation tower called the militants to tell them that the fuel car was on the way to them and that they would be given food and drink. But, the gunmen asked for a Kuwaiti plane instead of the Syrian one in order to take them to an Arab capital which they initially declined to reveal. The Kuwaiti government was reluctant to put the plane at their disposal, but it responded positively under appeals from the hostages, who implored the government to help save their lives. It did give them a Boeing 707 with a Kuwaiti crew who was given some instructions by Sheikh Saad. Kuwaiti official milieus expected that this compliance with the militants under the hostages' appeals and the government's humanitarian behavior would alleviate disgruntlement and anxiety and hopefully resolve the crisis. However, as soon as the Kuwaiti plane took off, the militants sent a message calling on the Kuwaiti government to intervene to set Abu Dawoud free otherwise they would take the Kuwaiti crew as hostage. The chief militant said: "We are flying to Riyadh and we will call on Saudi authorities to contact Jordanian officials to persuade them to release Abu Dawoud. Otherwise, we will throw a Saudi hostage over the city of Riyadh." Thus, the scene moved to Riyadh as part of this long-running and laborious operation. The Saudi authorities responded to the abductors by asking them to land at the Riyadh airport or any other Saudi airport they chose, but they rejected and flew back to Kuwait to the surprise of everyone. The plane landed back at the Kuwait airport just three hours after it had taken off from the same airport. The militants announced this time that they would stay at the Kuwait airport until their demands would be met or they would blow up the aircraft. In spite of scorching heat, continuing anxiety and the deteriorating conditions of the hostages, the Kuwaiti government could deal with the situation so sensibly and wisely. Following hard negotiations, the hostage-takers agreed to free the Kuwaiti crew provided that they should return to the plane once more. But, the crew declined to return as long as there were explosives and weapons aboard the aircraft. To tackle the situation, Ali Yassin, chief of the PLO office in Kuwait, was called to help end the crisis. He responded immediately and roamed between the plane and the airport building. In the morning of the fourth day – Saturday – the militants declined to take food, saying: "We don't like to eat as long as we'll die." The high temperature that reached 46 degrees at one o'clock p.m. turned the plane into a natural sauna that forced the gunmen to take off their shirts…why not? The air-conditioner was idle and the doors were closed. But, when Ali Yassin went to the plane, carrying a small kettle of water and a wirelesses set, they held him hostage too, warning that they would not free him unless Abu Dawoud was released. Such a move sparked public outcry, prompting Sheikh Saad to stop responding to their calls after they insisted that Yassin would not be allowed to leave the aircraft unless he was swapped with a Kuwaiti official. But, they freed him a few hours later, as the hostages felt increasingly exhausted and their health and psychological conditions increasingly deteriorated. When night fell, the Kuwaiti army cordoned off the plane and took offensive positions. Apparently, the situation reached its climax and a decisive step, be it peaceful or violent, was required. All those concerned over this marathon saga held their breath, while security measures were reinforced at the airport and its runways. Kuwaiti authorities, including high-level officials, closely monitored the situation minute by minute. Under pressure, the abductors released the Saudi embassy's secretary Yehia al-Qarmali and showed readiness to give up. When he turned up at the site where some officials stood, there were apparent traces of ropes, with which he was tied up, on his wrists. This showed that the hostages, including the diplomats, were maltreated on board. When it was just seven o'clock p.m., the chief militant shouted through the microphone: "The leader of the operation of the Saudi embassy in Paris…we have decided to go out (of the plane) peacefully…can you hear me?...I'll shoot myself…we are ready to go out." The kidnappers implemented their decision one hour later, having left the plane with their hands up with no weapons. They were carefully searched as they stepped on the stairs of the plane. They were then taken to the airport building for investigations, while the hostages stepped out of the plane one by one. Thus, the 81-hour five-adventurer operation was over, during which the militants stormed a Saudi property, took Arab hostages, used a Syrian plane and landed at an Egyptian airport, just to demand the releasing of a Palestinian in Jordan, and finally surrendered in Kuwait in a happy end of a miserable operation. For its part, the Kuwaiti government decided to extradite the five adventurers to the PLO for trial. On September 19, 1973, King Hussein issued an amnesty for all political internees, including, of course, Mohamed Abu Dawoud and his comrades. Who is Abu Dawoud? Mohammad Abu Dawoud Ouda was a member of the Fatah Movement Revolutionary Council. His code-name was Abu Dawoud. He was born in a Jerusalem suburb in 1937. He began his career as a teacher in Jordan and Saudi Arabia and then an employee at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Justice. He then joined Fatah. In 1968, he returned to Jordan for studying law. Afterwards, he became a Fatah security and political leader, thus having risen to fame on the international arena. When Israel put his name on the "blacklist" for chasing and physically liquidating him for alleged involvement in the Munich Operation in 1972, he traveled between Jordan, Syrian and Lebanon until he was arrested in Jordan in 1973 for having allegedly masterminded an operation to storm the Cabinet. Accordingly, he was sentenced to capital punishment, but it was later commuted to life sentence. But, King Hussein then pardoned him under three operations aiming to pressure the Jordanian government to free him. In 1977, Abu Dawoud, who held an Iraqi passport, was arrested at the Orly airport in Paris, where he wanted to attend a Fatah ceremony for eulogizing a Fatah member who was killed in the French capital. The Israeli intelligence agency, which informed against him to French authorities, called on Paris to extradite him to Israel, and so did Western Germany in connection with Munich massacre. But, the French court acquitted him due to inadequate evidence and extradited him to Algeria, where he was released. Then US President Jimmy Carter raised his eyebrows at freeing him. The Time put a portrait of Abu Dawoud on its cover with a caption saying "Too Hot to Handle". In 1981, Abu Dawoud came under an attempt on his life at a Polish capital hotel when he was hit by five bullets in his jaw, neck, chest and stomach. Although he was seriously injured and profusely bled, he tried to catch the attacker, but he couldn't and fell unconscious. The would-be assassin ran away in a car that waited for him outside the hotel. Abu Dawoud was then taken to hospital, where his condition improved. The Polish police discovered that he entered the country with an Iraqi passport carrying the name "Tareq Shaker Mahdi". Afterwards, he did his duty at the PLO in his official capacity and traveled to several countries, including the ones which were members of the Interpol.

(picture of page 27) (a recent photo of Abu Dawoud)

Seizure of Japanese embassy This time, we have a dual operation of hostage-taking and abduction whose events happened in Singapore, Japan, Kuwait and Yemen. Four gunmen planted four small plastic bombs near four oil reservoirs of Shell company in Singapore. The bombs exploded, but caused a slight fire that was easily put out before gutting the reservoirs that contained inflammable black oil. The perpetrators rushed to the Singapore port near an oil refinery and seized five seamen, threatening to kill them and then commit suicide unless they were allowed to leave safely to a destination they would set later. Sea workers and the Singaporeans were stunned at such an anomalous act on such a land that is far away from the Middle East conflict arena. At the first night of the operation, two hostages managed to escape by swimming as far as the shore, capitalizing on moments of perplexity gripping the gunmen. Negotiations went on between the gunmen and the Singaporean government through loudspeakers. The gunmen, who turned out to be two Japanese people and two Palestinians, demanded to be allowed to leave Singapore safely, a request that was granted by the Singaporean government. It even offered them to travel by air provided that they should give up their weapons or to travel by sea with a promise to keep the hostages unharmed. But, the gunmen turned down both offers, and stayed aboard the boat with their hostages. Complicated and intermittent negotiations took place between both sides; including Singaporean officials, but to no avail. Following five days of tension and anxiety, they were offered resorting to a foreign embassy until they would be flown to any country they could choose. A list of 42 ambassadors, including their addresses and telephone numbers, was given to them so they could contact an ambassador and agree with him about relevant details. In the meantime, anomalously, someone was heard shouting at the Japanese embassy in Kuwait in the morning of February 6, 1974 that some militants seized the Japanese embassy, which was situated in a large flat on the third storey of a building in al-Sour St., where the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry and several other international and local agencies were headquartered. Having held the Japanese ambassador and other workers hostage, the six militants demanded a Japanese aircraft to airlift their four comrades from Singapore to Kuwait and then all of them would fly to a destination to be set later. They intimidated the embassy staff for fear of resistance, and separated the Arab and Japanese hostages. They forced them to sit on the ground in the hall, warning "woe betide our enemies"! The Kuwaiti cabinet convened an emergency meeting under the chairmanship of Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, who was the then crown prince and prime minister. Some decisions were taken during the meeting to tackle the situation. Those people who rallied around the Japanese embassy saw a hand extending out of the window, showing the V sign. Three papers were then thrown, including the first report, written by a militant, on the operation. It said: "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in collaboration with the Occupied Land Sons Organization and the Japanese Red Army, announce that they have seized the Japanese embassy in Kuwait. We call on Kuwait not to intervene or use force. We also demand a Japanese plane to come to Kuwait. The ambassador, the first and second secretaries and all other embassy workers are in good health." There were then moments of silence and watching, which were only broken by a militant shouting through the loudspeaker: "We call on the government not to intervene or we will shoot all the hostages dead. We have contacted the Japanese government. We are waiting for reply…we wish that the Kuwaiti government won't intervene." Meanwhile, the Democratic Front in Kuwait condemned the operation, saying that it openly denounced such a pattern of operations based on terrorism and anarchism. Kuwaiti security measures were tightened up through army reinforcements and an engineer with a map of the building was called to thrash out a plan to storm the building if necessary. When a ladder- equipped fire engine approached the embassy, a militant looked out of the rear window of the embassy, surprisingly watching the fire engine while extending the ladder towards the building. He irritably asked security men to pull back the engine or he would open fire. An officer replied: "Open fire and do as you want. The engine will remain at its position!" Afterwards, the militants pushed the second secretary at the window and threatened to throw him out. The second secretary, using classical Arabic, said: "Please, I wish you would pull back the fire engine and would not shoot. I appeal to, and ask, you to do so in the name of the Japanese government." "Call the ministers…they are at the Foreign Ministry," the officer replied. The fire engine then pulled back the ladder and moved a little far from the site as officials made several phone calls with the militants, who kept on watching the outside scene out of the embassy windows sporadically. The abductors called the Reuters correspondent in Kuwait, who asked them what they would do if Kuwait refused to meet their demands. They answered: "Kuwait will accept this time. The government of Japan, which is a non-Arab country, will fulfill our demands. Unfortunately, only Arab countries disappoint us every time. But, this time we will show them that we will act when we speak…we will act." The gunmen stayed in the embassy, with a clerk having served them glasses of tea and coffee until they were short of sugar. Apparently, they received information from their leadership center in Beirut as their phone conversations were recorded. Kuwait made it certain that it would allow the militants to leave the country for any destination they could choose provided that the hostages would be freed safely, but it denied the Japanese plane access to its airport in order to avert potential concomitant complications. The Kuwaiti government informed Japanese officials, militants and PLO about its position. Long hours passed with no quarters having taken any action that could lead to a way out of the dilemma. But, the then state minister Abdel-Aziz Hussein said due to two successive appeals by the Japanese government, Kuwait agreed to give the Japanese aircraft access to its international airport to take the militants, who promised to leave the country and release the hostages as soon as the plane would touch down. The Japanese ambassador in Tehran came to the Foreign Ministry to have talks with Kuwaiti officials. It was agreed that the six gunmen would leave the embassy by the time the Japanese plane would land at the airport provided that the ambassador would stay in the building and be given an apology. On the following day; Thursday, the militants made a fresh warning that they would kill the first secretary unless the embassy phone lines, which were disconnected, were rejoined. Afterwards, they set free some Arab workers at the embassy notably; Feryal Khouri, a secretary, Ali al- Baloushi, a correspondent of the embassy, Najwa Khalil, the ambassador's special secretary, and Mariam Mohamed, a secretary. The remaining hostages; ten Japanese clerks and two Arabs, were kept in captivity. In Singapore, the four gunmen left the airport aboard a special Japanese plane after they had replaced the seamen, whom they held hostage, with workers of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, including the undersecretary of the ministry for Middle East and Singaporean governmental representatives. On Friday morning, the militants asked for a meaty meal and boxes of cigarette, pieces of red material, and they were really served a meat from Sheraton Hotel. Cameramen were asked to move away from the embassy building. Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah left the Foreign Ministry for the Kuwait airport. At two o'clock p.m., the six militants left the building out of the rear door of the Foreign Ministry and got onto two cars, which were waiting for them. They swiftly drove to the airport. Cameramen failed to take photos of the militants, who were masked with the red material At one o'clock p.m., the planes were turned on, but turned off soon. Three hours later, they flew to Aden as the then Yemeni foreign minister Mohamed Motea announced that his government had agreed to give the plane access to Aden airport upon request of the Japanese government. The militants called the Japanese embassy seizure operation "Patrick Argolo", the name of a young man from Paraguay, who was killed during a hijacking of an Israeli aircraft in 1970. The hijacking was carried out by the Paraguayan youth and Palestinian woman Laila Khalid, who was arrested in London, but was later released by British authorities as her comrades hijacked a German passenger plane.

Trial of "Arab Communist Organization" In the early 1970s, some small-sized organizations emerged. They adopted "revolutionary" orientations based on the use of violence, but failed to have clear-cut plans. They mostly emerged in a desperate reaction to the 1967 defeat (Arab-Israeli June war) in the form of calls for toppling ruling regimes, scrapping political parties and bodies even the "non-ruling ones" and replacing the "revolutionary" elite action with the popular, union and parliamentary struggle…etc. In the meantime, a clandestine organization, called "Arab Communist Organization", came to the surface, aiming to set up a "Communist state in the whole Arab region". It shouldered the responsibility of fighting all parties and trends, including existing Communist and Marxist parties, which it slammed as lacking in revolutionary orientation, struggle, armed struggle and revolutionary violence. The organization adopted methods similar to those of "cowboy" gangs, especially in terms of bank and corporate robbery. The following are the key goals of the Arab Communist Organization: -Acting to remove Arab regimes by force by means of instigating "popular cadres" through clandestine action. -Striking US interests in Arab countries. -Adopting Marxist-Lenin philosophical approach and thinking. -Moving the clandestine organization on the basis of the Argentinean Popular Army plan; through gangs or Tupamoros. -Financing the organization through the robbery of stores and banks, calling it "seized", rather than "stolen" money. -Liberating Palestine after the liberation of the Arab world from their ruling regimes. In other words, the liberation of Palestine was not a priority of the organization. Concerning the organization's formations, at the top of the hierarchy there was a general commission at the level of the Arab world and a regional commission in each Arab nation. In every region, there was a sector that consisted of units, which were composed of groups that comprised between three and five people each. On how people joined the organization, at every meeting, a member proposed a new candidate without mentioning his name, saying that he was impressed by the candidate's ideological and psychological willingness to join the organization, let alone his scientific qualifications. He also had to mention if he was trained in shooting and not talkative…etc. Finally, his comrades would voice their approval of the new member, who would be then notified of the organization's goals and action. The organization used not to move unless a storm of crises came to a close, leaving other parties and organizations to "consume" the crisis and then coming up with a revolutionary statement just to draw public attention. Both female and male members had joint tasks. There was no discrimination between them, saving loyalty to the organization. According to instructions, girls were allowed to go down the street and to do any task, having a muffler-equipped pistol in their bags. They sometimes had to wear fake hair. Coordination between Syrian and Lebanese authorities played a key part in the arrest of most members of the organization and even its leader and founder called "Al-Ghadban", who was held in al-Mazeh Prison in Damascus. The Lebanese guy, identified as Mohamed, considered as a "striking force", mastermind and theoretician of the movement, was also arrested. Kuwait commission group: The Kuwait group was composed of Palestinian young men who were still students at secondary schools. This group adopted the organization's main goals and its members were given Communist teachings and lessons. Some of them were interested in thinking, while others were specialized in weapons and explosives. Having been taught the organization's statute, they were told that it was a Communist Marxist revolutionary combat organization aiming to replace the bourgeois system with a proletarian dictatorship, to destroy bourgeoisie in all Arab countries and to build up an Arab socialist society. The organization's statute obliged its members to be fully ready to wage revolutionary guerrilla wars against local authorities in the Arab world, to master military science of guerilla warfare and to get trained in shooting in what it called "its revolutionary war against ruling regimes". The organization used an emblem in the shape of a fivefold star with a map of the Arab world inside, having a drawing of a sickle and a hammer with an engraved phrase "Arab socialist republic and triumph for the march of the class of workers". The organization in Kuwait brought in weapons and explosives from abroad and then began its maiden bombing in the British Council. One of its members, called "Nazek", came up with a middle-sized bucket and said to his colleagues: "I thought of doing it…so, I have to do it at the British Council…I have to do it." Another colleague Khalil said to him: "Have you received any orders from the leadership?" "No, I haven't…I want to carry out this operation in order to prove to them that I can do everything." Nazek answered. They connived to launch the operation and go to the council as new students. On the following day; November 17, 1974, they went to the council, with Nazek having planted an improvised bomb under the air-conditioner of the reception room and then lit the fuse. But, it did not explode as only one capsule, in lieu of three capsules, was put in the explosive device. Nazek called a local newspaper through a telephone line next to Andalus Cinema, saying: "Hello, a clandestine organization in Kuwait claims that it planted a bomb in the British Consulate a while ago. We inform you just out of keenness on the safety of people." He wanted to repeat his talk, but a colleague of his disconnected the phone and called on him to leave the place promptly for fear of recording or tapping. Afterwards, he went to a US life insurance company in order to study its location as a prelude to another operation, which he found so easy to carry out. He told his colleagues about that. They decided to launch the operation on Friday so that there would be no workers in the company, which housed a large number of the building apartments. Nazek then traveled to Syria, where he agreed with the "Syria Commission" to abduct the son of a senior Syrian official and then demand the releasing of some followers of the organization jailed in Syria in exchange fore freeing him. They also agreed that the "Kuwait Commission", once receiving a certain cable, would bomb the Syrian embassy in Kuwait, and issue a release claiming responsibility for the explosion as leverage on the Syrian government to set the detainees free. The organization members went to inspect the location of the Syrian embassy, opening and closing periods and number of guards. They found out that only one guard was at the embassy, where he stayed with his wife. They recorded such information on a scheme. Afterwards, they received a cable, saying: "Adham will visit you next Friday, April 4." So, having had the explosive bomb, they took their Datsun and drove to the Syrian embassy. It was seven o'clock a.m. when they stopped at the embassy. Surprisingly, Emad said he had changed his mind and, thence, began to drive back. But, Nazek told him to stop as he insisted on launching the operation. Emad stunned him that he would not drive the car and would even go back if they insisted on the bombing. When Nazek did not change his mind, Emad really stepped out of the car. But, eventually, they agreed not to go ahead with the operation. It turned out later that they misunderstood the cable, which did not mean an order to bomb the Syrian embassy. Rather, it was only a message by Mohamed, alias Adham, to tell them when he would arrive in Kuwait in order to inspect the "commission". On Friday evening, they went to the US company for carrying out the operation, with a two-kg improvised nitroglycerin explosive device, a gallon of petrol, gas and grease in order to set the building ablaze. Nazek and another comrade went upstairs to the floor where the company was situated to plant the explosive and the petrol gallon while the third man waited outside the building for watching. While they were planting the explosive, someone called them. Perplexed, they answered that they were looking for somebody, but he told them that nobody was there. They then used the elevator to go downstairs to the ground floor. Just a few minutes later, they repeated the attempt and went upstairs to the floor of the company, having carried the explosive. As they were merely a simple step away for launching the operation, they heard the footsteps of the man who had called them in the first time, who was going upstairs. They promptly used the elevator and left the building, having decided to defer the operation to the following Friday. At four o'clock p.m. on the following day; April 11, 1975, they went to the company. With a pistol in his possession, Khalil waited outside the building, while Nazek and Ahmad went upstairs to plant the explosive device, with only one of them having carried a fountain pen-shaped pistol. They planted the device at the company headquarters and lit the fuse before they ran away. It detonated and caused material damage worth 1,000 dinars. The windows and doors of the company and the opposite apartments were smashed in the bombing. Panicked, a neighbor woke up to find the door of his apartment pulled off and pushing towards him. Funnily, the company director, during investigations, accused a laid- off company worker of being behind the incident. The organization handed out flyers in the streets, cars and at houses and halls and library of the commerce and science colleges at various areas. Afterwards, Mohammad came to Kuwait to inspect the "commission", having brought with him a muffler. He met the commission members and roamed the Kuwaiti streets. During a meeting with the members, they proposed a bank robbery in order to steal four or five million dinars in order to provide a long-term financing for the main organization. It was agreed that the robbery would take place at the end of a month as the bank safe would be full of money's worth of workers' pays so that they could get much funds. They decided to use machine-guns in the robbery as suitable tools in such crimes. They also determined that Khalil would travel by a car to be bought by the organization in order to bring the weapons, using a girl as his wife and two young men as his friends. Mohammad, in his turn, would travel and return to the country, bringing with him another girl and several young members of the group from Lebanon and Syria. They decided to award the group brought from abroad the task of carrying out the operation thanks to their experience in this field as they had previously launched bank robberies in Lebanon. They were careful that the group should not call the organization members, having agreed that if the group was arrested, the organization members would leave the country in order to avoid being caught too. They also decided that it would be better to ask the two girls to go and inspect the banks ahead of the operation. Khalil then drew detailed schemes of the bank sites and the vicinity on three sheets of papers; including the rooms of safe officials, the managers, workers and their number, as well as entries and rear doors. At another meeting, they decided to plant an explosive device at the American school and drew three detailed schemes of its site and all its rooms and internal units. They decided to put the device in the school library or lab by infiltrating into the school at night during a party that the schools used to throw. But, the operation was later put on the back burner due to new plans for the Syrian embassy operation. Clues unraveled: But, after a while, Mohamed was arrested in Lebanon, a clue that led to unraveling the organization in Lebanon, Syria and Kuwait. A state security investigation officer went to the organization flat where Ahmad and Emad were arrested. Having searched the flat, a locked box was found; including a silencer and four pistols, among them a fountain pen-shaped pocket pistol usually used in assassinations but may miss the target if a bullet is fired at a distance of more than two meters. A large cache of ammunition, explosive devices, Communist books and documents were also found in the flat, including a document on the organization's program, meetings, goals, messages and plans. Invisible ink was used in their messages that used to be sent to the Beirut-based organization. The document contained a call made with a newspaper, saying: "The TV has failed to announce such operations even though it transmits trivial incidents. Cameramen were prevented from taking photos." The page 13 said under the title "Omani Embassy: "It was noted that the ambassador had no car parked in front of his house. The main gate of the villa was open. He was monitored between five to seven o'clock a.m. on May 31, 1975." The page 14 read: "In the supplement of Al-Qabbas newspaper dated June 2, 1975, it was reported that the wife of the Omani embassy's advisor and the charge d'affaires is leaving with the family to Austria where the advisor will move for work." The page 15 read: "In the supplement of Al-Qabbas, it was reported that the wife of the Syrian embassy's minister plenipotentiary and charge d'affaires leaves in early August after having furnished her new house." All this showed that the organization was interested in monitoring, watching and reading newspapers. State security court: The state security prosecution charged the five defendants; Ahmad and Emad, in presence, and Nazel, Khalil and Mohamed, in absentia, of having a network aiming to illegitimately dismantle basic systems in the country, seeking to establish a Communist state, distributing leaflets, possessing weapons and explosives and sabotaging. The state security court held a public session on Tuesday; October 21, 1975, as the two defendants appeared in the courtroom, having looked cheerful and worn trimmed beards. They complained to their lawyer about bad conditions in jail and inability to read books they chose. The defendant Emad whispered to his father, asking him for something he could use to warm his head, together with a toothbrush. As soon as the judges took to the platform, the courtroom fell in complete silence. The presiding judge went through the case dossier. The trial proceedings then commenced. Confessions by defendants Ahmad and Emad: The defendant Ahmad was 18 years old. He was a student in secondary two. He used to spend free time in selling "ice cream" in order to help his father, who was an office boy at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Education. He received 45 dinars in salary. He confessed at the court that he had joined the organization and involved in incidents. He said: "I joined the organization in late 1974 through my accused colleague Khalil, who persuaded me that the goal of the organization was to liberate Palestine, something which could be achieved only by removing all Arab regimes and establishing a Communist state. I began to prepare for their meetings and lectures that handled Communism, dialectical materialism, historical materialism, bourgeoisie, proletariat, private property and development of the inter-class conflict since the creation began. I can remember that Nazek once talked to me about human development. I think he promoted infidelity as he told me that man was created by nature and man developed by nature. I rejected that and told him that if man was created by nature, then who created the nature? He replied that it created itself." Although Ahmad was still young, he was so smart and cunning that the presiding judge asked him: "Can you say now that what you confessed at the prosecution represented reality or not?" "What I said at the prosecution may represent reality, and may not, but I can't remember," Ahmad replied. The defendant Emad denied his link to the organization or involvement in incidents. He said: "I got acquainted with the group in Lebanon, including Mohammad. I learnt later that it was not a sacrifice organization. Rather, it was an organization of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian young men acting against imperial interests in the Arab world. Originally, I know nothing about Communism. I refused to get involved in the bombing of the Syrian embassy as I was opposed to any act against any Arab target and that is why the operation was not carried out." The prosecution: The chief prosecutor said the law bars the National Assembly members, who are lawyers, from defending defendants in cases pertinent to state security and public funds, prompting one of the lawyers present at the court to quit in observance of the law. The defendant Ahmad looked anxious when his lawyer walked out. But, he looked cheerful when the court called a lawyer to defend him. The chief prosecutor continued his pleading, which turned into a cultural and ideological lecture, saying: "Communism is a political, economic and social system that is based on absolute belief in Communism and dismissing any other system. It refuses to be discussed or partitioned by anybody. Marxism calls for changing the world and rebuilding it as per the party plan through a set of steps that begin with destroying capital and capitalist relationships by dispossession, production means and control over distribution and mass media, and ends in the class of workers, which is the interested party, declaring the so- called 'proletarian dictatorship', and creating a society where there are no classes and sovereignty goes to the workers. Marxism denies the existence of Almighty God just as it dismisses and fights all heavenly religions. The Communist Declaration deems the constitution and morality as a bourgeois deception devised by the bourgeoisie for the sake of their ambitions." He went on to say: "The big Communist Lenin says 'We don't believe in God, and we are well aware that the lords of the Church, feudalists and bourgeoisies address us in the name of God only to exploit us. Marx considers religion as opium used to anesthetize and steal people. The Russian astronaut 'Gagarin' said he had not seen God when he was flying on the space. The Red Guards in China said: 'Listen, Muslims, destroy your mosques, dissolve Islamic organizations, burn Qaura'n, scrap your ban on mixed marriage, stop prayers and study Mao's thoughts. Unless you regret, we will expel and destroy you. We have to crush and destroy the holes of religious rats just as we'll do with you. A Communist said in a presentation on Lenin's book on religions that atheism is an integral part of Marxism." The chief prosecutor added that the criminal law of the Soviet Union, before its breakup, prohibited religious teachings at schools, especially at Islamic areas. He added that Communism is based on absolute belief in materialism whose philosophy gives material precedence over mind, and that material emerged first and then developed with its respective laws into a botanical and then human life. He also quoted Stalin as saying: "The world develops as per material movement laws and it needs no absolute mind." The chief prosecutor continued: "Engels says thinking was created by material, not the opposite. Lenin says we have to be ready for all spectra of sacrifice and if necessary we have to practice everything possible since tricks, craftiness and all illegitimate methods as well as acquiescence and denial of facts are permissible. Lenin wrote to the Russian writer Maxim Gorky that to destroy three quarters of the world is nothing, but more importantly the remaining fourth quarter should be Communist. Marx said to his followers: 'The world is in front of you so you have to win it…etc." Court decision: As the court interrogated the defendants Ahmad and Emad, listened to eyewitnesses and arguments of the defense and prosecution and read the case documents, it sentenced Nazek and Khalil to life imprisonment in absentia and Mohamed to 15 years in jail in absentia, as well as Ahmad to seven years (in presence) and Emad to three years (in presence), at the session dated December 28, 1975. Ahmad and Emad looked satisfied with the court ruling as they expected tougher decisions.

Execution of an operation against a company…English dated…Ahmad's passport number…issued at date… Jordanian – Hussein Kuwaiti – Mahmoud French – Yussef Iranian – Faris Japanese – Moussa German – Hamdan Syrian – Ali An operation against an embassy…dated…passport number…issued at date… Assassination to be carried out…American dated…Jamal's visit permission number…my brother's number…dated… The person who was assassinated constitutes an intelligence element – word (with out greetings) added to the cable The person who was assassinated is influential in power – the word (and peace) added to the cable The person who was assassinated is representative of a monopolistic company – the word (writ to us) added The operation successfully carried out – I'll visit you on the day… The operation not implemented for personal reasons – tell me how my father is The operation not launched and he was arrested…I'll visit you on the day…(the undersigned is the detainee's name) The operation carried out and he was martyred…I'll visit you with the father the day…(the undersigned is the martyr's name) He'll visit you…on the day…I'll visit you on the day…(the undersigned is the comer's name I've arrived safely – I've arrived safely We need weapons – send us medicine… 1-machine-guns: stomach medicine 2-fuses: hear medicine 3-pistols: ulcer stomach 4-detonators: liver medicine 5-explosives: asthma medicine 6-a silencer: Ahmad's medicine We need a comrade – come soon for health reasons Address change is clearly referred to We saw it was better not to carry out – we were grieved at the injured and may God take our deceased to the paradise Implement the embassy operation…dated…the father's passport number…issued by date… (The code of the Arab Communist Organization) Just like other clandestine organizations, the Arab Communist Organization invented its own cipher in writing messages between its leaders and diverse commissions in Arab countries, including the Kuwait Commission.

(pictures of page 49) The defendant Ahmad smiling The defendant Emad leaving the court

A crippled man hijacks a Lebanese plane This is an incident that forced a choice between death due to hunger and desperation or death in a midair bomb blast. The writer of these pages can't allow himself to put this story on the list of terrorist crimes and aggressions on civil aviation safety. But, he begs the pardon of relevant laws and regulations and tries to look into the human depth of the problem and the real reasons that pushes a young man to get nowhere…the point of the crisis option that ends to death as if it is the gloomy fate which covers the horizon of childhood with its dark clouds and rains of catastrophes and crises pour over the boy after childhood. He eventually cries in a loud voice that is heard by the entire planet Earth, saying that there is a boy suffering unredeemable pains and woes and that a mother is heartedly grieved over her son since she is unable to find a remedy for his melancholy or to provide him with a decent livelihood. We did not know him when he was a child, boy, teenager or youth. We only knew him through his case after the mother's sharp pains on the earth shook the sky and after the ill-fated mother's sad voice was heard worldwide through news agencies, TVs, radios and press…why not…the Job of this age hijacked an aircraft in midair! What we will narrate through these lines has not been cited from horrible tales that grandmothers used to narrate to their grandchildren to make them fall asleep so quietly, nor has it been a dramatic imaginative story. Rather, it is a realistic presentation of a genuine, but unbelievable, tale that could constitute an example for millions of stories submerged in the territories and regions of this third world that is misery-stricken in spite of its underground resources. Now, let's go into the facts. Name: Nasr Mohammad Walid Birthday: 1959 in Tripoli, northern Lebanon His childhood was full of suffering and poverty as well as early responsibility, let alone subsistence. Nasr turned over the papers of the calendar as if he urged years to fly in the hope that he might find a job in order to help his young daughters, while gazing at his mother, who had just returned from hard work at houses. He felt conscience-stricken due to failure to find a dignified livelihood. But, the fate stood against him and his good dreams, thwarting such a quick jump into the larger life experiment domain. More seriously, something came to the surface to cripple him and push him onto the brink. In 1973, when he was still 14 years old, a militant, while there was some insecurity in Tripoli and some other Lebanese areas, shot him with four bullets in his back. He was then taken to hospital in a bid to save him, while the mother prayed that he would recover. She could not sleep for long days. Anxious, she was sent a shocking letter from the hospital that her son had died! She could not believe at first, having unconsciously rushed to the hospital, where she had almost fully stayed, but only returned home briefly just to see her young children in the house. God's will had to be accepted. An ambulance was called to take the corpse to the city. That moments…the mother gazed at her for whom she sacrificed everything to bring him up, and a few days back he implored her to allow him to go out for working, even though he was still young, in order to help his daughters, prompting her to pull him from his shoulders and to hug him just as she used to do when he was a child, and asking him to only care about his study as she was still in good health. It was heavily raining on the road from the hospital to the city when the mother remembered those cold nights during which she used to search for wood to burn it so as to warm her child Nasr and to narrate to him happy tales to enchant him in spite of subsistence. Suddenly, the ambulance veered off the main road due to strong storm, as the mother unbelievably watched the corpse of the body moving, or she could have imagined that in a minute, or this could have happened due to shaking sight owing to her eye tears and evaporation of rainwater on the windscreen. But…no, no…it is not a matter of imagination. Please, stop, stop! The mother screamed at the driver at a twist that divided between the main road and a subway along the Tripoli Castle. Please, stop! I implore you to look with me at what I'm seeing now! The driver stopped to ask here why she cried. She told him that her son was moving. "He is not dead. Please, do something," she implored. The driver tested the son's pulse, having been surprised to find him alive. He promptly drove back to the hospital. Preparations for the funeral halted, women stopped crying and wailing and joy tears began to appear, even if hardly, on exhausted eyes. Efforts were made to save Nasr from paralysis in his leg. Little by little, a series of suffering reemerged in the family's life. The young man was unable to sleep day and night due to sharp back pains because the four bullets were still settled in his back after everyone had supposed that his life came to an end and the dust would cover the tormented and pains altogether. Having done her utmost to spare him pains and woes, the mother used to carry him on her back from one hospital to another in pursuit of medical treatment. She served at houses day and night so as to buy medicine for him and food for his young daughters. Although he was still only 14 years old, he frequently asked her: "Until when you will carry me on your back?! I wish I would die in order to spare me and you more trouble. However, she did not feel desperate. She sent calls through newspapers to heads of state, businessmen, politicians and embassies, but the return was not enough for medical treatment, surgeries, long stay in clinics and sophisticated appliances. By the help of the Libyan embassy in Rome, Nasr was airlifted to a hospital in Rome, where just one bullet was taken out of his back, but three bullets were still rested in his body. When the allocated sum for his treatment was used up, he returned to Lebanon. He returned to his mother who was unable to provide food to her young children who used to go to bed while their stomachs were empty. They used to cry due to hunger and so did she owing to having not any piece of bread in the house. If the hungry children cried, she would put a pan of water on fire in order to give them an impression that delicious food was being cooked until they slept with dawn breaking. A tenderhearted mother can invent when necessary. When Nasr was 18 years old, his suffering and envy increased, especially when he read daily news reports showing how ministers, businessmen and heads of states were medically treated at plush hospitals while he was still crippled and suffering. He once thought of traveling to the State of Kuwait as one of the rich Arab countries in the hope of finding someone who could afford his medical treatment costs. Unfortunately, he failed to get an entry visa from the Kuwaiti embassy in Beirut. However, he insisted on traveling to Kuwait by any means even if this would cost him his life, saying that either he would live just like other people do or he would die and, thence, spare himself and his mother more trouble. On June 6, 1977, he collected his documents, medical papers and clothes and booked a flight ticket to Baghdad. He entered the airport on his wheelchair, having had two bags; one was big and the other small. He gave the big to an airport officer while putting the small one on his leg. The small bag contained a pistol and a bomb, which were covered by rolls of cotton and medical drugs. Due to his condition, he did not have to check in. Airport officers even helped him and carried him into the aircraft. All of a sudden, he found himself in the plane, having shrugged off the fact if there would be security men on board. As soon as the Middle East Airlines plane Boeing 707 took off, he compelled the pilot to fly to Kuwait after he had taken hostage some 100 passengers from various nationalities and ten crewmen. He threatened that he would blow the plane up with a grenade with which he brandished at the panicked passengers. It was initially believed that the crippled young man had other aides on board! As the plane entered the Kuwaiti airspace, the pilot told Kuwait airport authorities about the hijacking, but they told him that landing was not possible. The situation was very difficult. The plane made a forced landing near the observation tower at nearly nine o'clock pm. Immediately, special security units cordoned off the aircraft and ambulances and fire engines arrived in case of emergency. The hijacker Nasr announced his demand through a host who conveyed it to the pilot, who, in his turn, informed the watch tower. He demanded 1.5 million US dollars for his medical treatment costs. Kuwaiti efforts began under the supervision of Sheikh Saad Al- Abdullah Al-Sabah, who was the then interior and defense minister. Seven hours later, exactly at four o'clock a.m., security forces stormed the plane, arrested the hijacker and freed the passengers, who faced no harm, saving just one who broke his hand when he jumped out of the emergency plane door. After Nasr left the investigation room at the airport, the passenger, who jumped himself out of the emergency door, asked him: Do you know that you caused my arm to be broken? Nasr: I did not break your arm…you are to blame for jumping out of the plane. -Did you want me to wait until you would bomb the plane?! Nasr: I did not aim to bomb it. -Are you conscience-stricken? Nasr: I know things which you don't know. -Why didn't you comply with the passengers' appeal to you to throw the pistol and the bomb? Nasr: And why didn't anybody respond to my plea to afford my medical treatment costs? -You weren’t even moved by children's and women's cry?! Nasr: Don't talk to a crippled man about women's and children's cries. -How do you want me to talk to you? Nasr: Just talk to me about my medical treatment. -Can such an act ensure your treatment? Nasr: It is enough that the entire world has listened to my issue. In the meantime, world and Arab newspapers highlighted the bizarre hijacking story. Some newspapers even sympathized with the young man and vied for carrying his detailed story and reasons for such a serious adventure. The Lebanese press played a key and influential role in highlighting the suffering of Nasr and his family in a way that could lead to Arab and world public sympathy with him. Nasr was taken to the Amiri Hospital in Kuwait for medical treatment. The prosecution accused him of hijacking a plane, exposing its passengers to risks and possessing weapons and explosives. His mother got an entry visa to Kuwait from its embassy in Beirut. She met Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah, who listened to her story. Having made sure that there were no partners with him and understood the circumstances of the event, Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah issued a decree closing the books on the case. Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah also granted Nasr's mother a sum of money in order to enable her to continue his medical treatment. Nasr and his mother returned happily to their country, with the public opinion everywhere talking about the unbelievable tale. (picture of page 58) The hijacked plane from Lebanon to Kuwait The ambulance standby near the plane

Tripoli – "Al-Nahar": The mother of the crippled hijacker Nasr Mohammad Abu Khalid made the following the call: I'm the mother of Nasr Mohammad Abu Khalid, who hijacked the plane and took it to Kuwait. I beg the Muslim conscience in particular and the Arab conscience in general, the conscience of the Kuwaitis and of His Highness the Amir Sabah Al-Salem, the Amir of the State of Kuwait, to forgive my son, who has been doomed to be crippled and unable to enjoy life. Having been desperate and melancholy due to failure to find help from Arab countries and his motherland Lebanon to travel to the Soviet Union for a surgery in his backbone which was hit by four bullets, he decided to help himself by hijacking the plane and taking it to Kuwait. Allah said in the Holy Qura'n that sick and insane people couldn't be blamed for what they do. So, it is unfair to punish a crippled young man who had been doomed to have no money for medical treatment. He is the supporter of a mother who has got four young daughters. O, Muslims, Christians and Arabs, don't deprive me of a flower that ornaments the house. Don't deprive girls of their brother's kindness. He is their supporter. Don't deny the plant a drop of water to live. My son is not a criminal. He only wants to live just like other people do. Judge him wisely as real wisdom is to fear God. Judges should decide justly and fairly among people. This is my call to your consciences, my call for pity, my call for every mother who has lost her only child. O, people, Your Highness the Amir, Arab judges, you have to bear in you mind a mother's heart. Nasr Mohammad Abu Khalid's mother Tripoli – Lebanon

(pictures of page 60) The crippled hijacker Nasr Nasr and his mother at hospital

Hijacking of a Kuwaiti plane for "rehabilitation" On July 8, 1977, led by "Abu Said", seven gunmen, who were armed with machine-guns, pistols and grenades, hijacked a Kuwaiti passenger Boeing 707 during its flight from Beirut to Kuwait. As many as 47 passengers, including then Kuwaiti ambassador in Lebanon Abdulhamid al-Baijan, were on board. The plane put down at the Kuwait airport at 10:30 pm. Sheikh Saad Al- Abdullah Al-Sabah, the then interior and defense minister, went to the airport immediately, having called on the hijackers through the watch tower to release the women and children whom they took hostage. They really freed seven women and two children as well as one of the ten crewmen. Abu Said made diverse demands. He initially demanded several Arab ambassadors to come and 17 detainees, allegedly held by the Palestinian Liberation Army in Damascus, to be set free. With dialogue going on, he laid it bare that he had hijacked the plane in order to be rehabilitated by Fatah Movement and to refund his money blocked by the movement leadership. But, the Fatah leadership said Abu Said had been given the axe from the movement and, therefore, he sought to rejoin it. His name was Abu Hamad, and was 43 years old. He was born at Khorb Al-Hamama Village. He moved to Kuwait in the early 1960. During negotiations with him, Abu Said said his group had no demands to embarrass the State of Kuwait, but if his demand was unmet, he would take the plane to Abu Dhabi. The hijacker went on to say: "We want Mohammad al-Adasani to come with us on board…supply us with fuel and food and consider us hirers of the plane to make an Arab tour in order to deliver our demands to the Arab presidents. When we hijacked the aircraft, we were not aware that the ambassador al-Baijan was aboard the plane. Twenty-five hours later, the hijackers said they would release all the passengers and some crewmen provided that they would be allowed to take the public security chief, the Yemeni embassy's charge d'affaires and deputy director of the Fatah office in Kuwait to Aden aboard the aircraft. Their demand was met, and they did release the hostages. The plane then took off from the Kuwait airport, but the hijackers reversed their destination and asked to land in Bahrain, but Bahraini authorities denied them access. So, they resorted to Dubai, but their demand was not granted either, forcing them to fly to Damascus, where the hijacking incident came to a close 43 hours later.

(pictures of page 63) Sheikh Saad making remarks to reporters following the incident The hijacked plane

Assassination of Ali Yassin (chief of PLO Office in Kuwait) In the morning of Thursday, June 15, 1978, while Ali Yassin, chief of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Office in Kuwait, was woken from a deep sleep by a phone ring by a PLO employee, who told him that a delegation from the West Bank had arrived and would meet Kuwaiti officials on ways and means of supporting the National Al-Najah College in Nablus. Yassin told him that he would put on his clothes and go to the office immediately. No sooner had he finished talking on the phone, then the bell of the house rang, having been unconscious that it was his last phone call in his life and that he would go to face his doomed destiny. As soon as he opened the door, unknown visitors fired a barrage of bullets from silencer-equipped pistols on him, with seven bullets having hit his body and head. The professional criminals ran away and drove their car promptly, having left behind the body sprawling in blood near the inner door of the villa. The assassination took place so quickly to the extent that it was not seen by anyone. At eleven o'clock a.m., his wife Maisar Yassin returned home from a visit to the dentist's. Unusually, she found the inner door of the house open with a couple of feet coming out of the door. She entered through another side door and contacted the PLO Office to speak to her husband, who used to be at work at that time. But, she was told that her husband had not gone to work and therefore they would visit him at home. When they arrived, they found him crumpled and lying on his right side, with his face having been blood-covered and his hands convulsed on his chest. His face seemed to be in a position that matched the last phrase he had written, saying: "What will a man earn, if he wins the entire world but loses himself?!" Security agencies were informed about the assassination incident, followed by official contacts. Following the detailed examination of the scene, the corpse was taken to the forensic examiner. The chief prosecutor Ismail Zazoa ordered the house to be put under guard until investigative procedures would be completed. Tranquility that prevailed Kuwait at that time was broken by the assassination incident, which was given much attention in spite of the fact that if it had taken lace in another country, it would have been deemed an ordinary incident, but Kuwait was not familiar with such shooting incidents. The press called for fighting those elements who chose Kuwait to be a field for settling scores and vengeance. It was the second assassination incident in Kuwait where Hardan al- Tekriti, the then Iraqi vice-president and minister of defense, was assassinated in 1972. The finger was pointed at the Iraqi intelligence agency. At four o'clock p.m., the Kuwait Radio announced in a release that Ali Yassin was killed. The PLO issued an eulogistic release, saying: "The agents who have perpetrated their heinous crime against the martyred hero Ali Nasser Yassin are aware that he has practiced his responsibilities for the sake of the Palestinian people." Salim Za'noun (Abu al-Adeeb), the regional chief of the Fatah Movement in the Gulf region, pointed the finger at Palestinian agents who collaborated with an Arab intelligence agency that protected them and paid them to physically liquidate the Palestinian Revolution. The Iraqi government denied any involvement in the assassination incident. An Iraqi government spokesman said: "Accusations that Iraq is a party in the incident, are untrue and unfounded." The unknown criminals didn't only perpetrate the crime, but they also made several provocative contacts to threaten the families of the PLO workers that their turn would come after Ali Yassin. Ali Yassin's corpse was wrapped in the Palestinian flag during the funeral procession, which was attended by thousands of people, mainly Kuwaiti and Palestinian officials and some ambassadors. He was buried in Al-Sulaibikhat cemetry. Arafat was not present in the funeral (reportedly due to security reasons). Salim Za'noun addressed the mourners saying: "Death is true, the graveyard is true, but death is not an excuse and the traitors and agents who sold themselves to Israel and Arab intelligence agencies are going ahead with their criminal plans. We say to the traitors whose followers are still contacting some of our youth to congratulate them on the killing of Ali Yassin and threaten to kill them too, the people will find them even if official authorities fail to do so. They are struggling to impose the US solution on the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. It is shameful to the nation that Ali Yassin has been killed in this century. People can remember how Omar bin al-Khatab was killed by a Magian, how Ali Ibn Abi Talib was killed by Al-Khawarij (dissidents) and how Al-Hussein Ibn Ali was killed by a deviant group…" The Kuwaiti cabinet issued a decree that the State of Kuwait would support Ali Yassin's family. The organization called on Iraq to extradite it Sabri Khalil al-Banna (Abu Nedhal) in a memo sent on June 28, 1978. On July 1, 1978, the magazine "Palestine Revolution", which was issued by Abu Nedhal group in Iraq, blamed Fatah Movement for the assassination as a result of inter-PLO disputes. It asked about the phone call received by the victim and how it was made shortly ahead of the incident, especially as the phone speaker was found dangling and he was shot at a point blank range. The criminals knew him very well as he was not apparently taken aback when seeing them at the door. He didn't even try to retreat or escape. It was reported that Yasser Arafat, having learnt the news, battered his head against the wall and said: "We have caused you to lose your life, Abu Nasser, just for covering up the issue." The magazine wondered how to accuse an agency without having enough evidence. It even accused Kuwaiti newspapers of helping the circulation of different charges. As soon as the media war between both organizations was over, war of secret assassinations and inter-Palestinian physical liquidation operations began abroad, even including Iraqi diplomats. Warring parties traded charges of treason, conspiracy and connection with Zionism. The year 1978 was considered the year of political assassinations among those parties. Said Hamami, the PLO representative in London, was assassinated on January 4, 1978. A former Iraqi prime minister came under an attempt on his life in London on July 9, 1978. Hana Moqbil, chief editor of the Palestine Revolution was injured in an attempt on his life in Beirut on July 25, 1978. The then Iraqi ambassador in London was targeted with an assassination attempt on July 29, 1978. A Palestinian gunman stormed the Iraqi embassy in Paris on August 1, 1978. An Iraqi diplomat was wounded in an attempt on his life in Karachi. Ezz Eddin Qalaq, the PLO representative in Paris, was assassinated on August 3, 1978, not to mention an attempt to assassinate the then Iraqi ambassador in Paris on August 3, 1978…etc. Apparently, the number of inter-Palestinian physical liquidation victims largely doubled that of Palestinians victims as a result of Israeli attacks. Who is Abu Nedhal? Sabri Khalil Al-Banna (Abu Nedhal) was born in Java in Palestine. His wealthy father was a fruit merchant who married 13 women. Abu Nedhal was born to the eighth wife. He had got 17 brothers and eight daughters. His family members scattered all over the world following the Israeli occupation of Palestine. He was married with several children. He joined Fatah Movement in 1967. In the early 1970s, he differed with Yasser Arafat for having rejected the peace process. He seceded from the movement in 1974 and set up a new group called "Revolutionary Council of Fatah Movement" based in Iraq. He had ever since been Arafat's key foe, having traded secret assassinations and inter-Palestinian physical liquidation operations around the globe. In 1974, Arafat issued a decision hanging Abu Nedhal in absentia. Abu Nedhal's group included several hundreds of Palestinians, mostly students in most European capitals. They were supplied with weapons and explosives by all means, including through diplomatic portfolios. In the early1980s, he opened offices in Damascus, Libya and Yemen (the then Democratic Republic of Yemen). In 1987, Damascus deported all the group members. The finger was pointed at Abu Nedhal when every bombing happened in a major capital, or if a diplomat or a political leader was killed in a shooting by unknown gunmen on the grounds that he was designated as the terrorist number one and his criminal record was bulging with crimes. He set a record in secret operations; some on the account of his group and others for some states that provided care and protection for him. So, he was atop the list of the wanted in most western countries, and chased by international intelligence agencies. The press called him several appellations; including the "most serious man in the Middle East" and "Carlos of the Arabs". Those who knew him termed him as a hard man who lived his clandestine intelligence private world based on violence, misleading and intimidation. Abu Nedhal said: "Has anyone in the Arab world been given swear words over the last ten years just I have been given? If you want to memorize all swear words in Arabic, then you can just get the file of Abu Nedhal…only two people were verbally offended in Arabian history; Abu Nedhal and his opposite called Moawia." Abu Nedhal applied the strategy of the mole, a small animal which digs a thousand holes under the ground and can't be found in one hole. If it is monitored hither, it suddenly appears thither. He was versed in disguising and deception, and had stupendous organizational capabilities. He regarded Chinese leader Xuen Ly as his ideal political pacesetter. He used to move freely among world airports with forged passports. He disguised as a Christian clergyman, a Bedouin and a Western policeman. Interviewed by the German Der Spiegel in Libya in 1985 following repeatedly fervent attempts, provided that no photos would be taken of him, Abu Nedhal said: "I have never been seen in public as I would put myself in jeopardy or I would go to my graveyard on my foot, if I did so. No-one knows my whereabouts, even my group members. I can travel to any country in the world so freely. I toured the entire world. I traveled to America for a surgery in 1977 under the name of a Saudi dignitary with a forged passport." He went on to say: "My group cooperates with the Direct Action organization in France, communist combat cells in Belgium, the Irish Secret Army, Basque ETA Organization in Spain and the Red Army Organization in Germany." In his book "Abu Nedhal…a gun for renting", the British journalist Patrick Sills said Abu Nedhal led operations on the account of the Iraqi regime since 1974. He was given hospitality and material, logistic and security support from Iraq and some other Arab countries. He assassinated some Palestinian leaders upon frank orders from Baghdad. Israel failed to take revenge on him, his facilities or his movement in spite of his operations against Israeli interests in the world. He earned over 400 million US dollars' worth of blackmailing operations. He obliged some countries to pay him millions of dollars in order to ensure the safety of their diplomats and embassies. Abu Nedhal demanded Kuwaiti authorities to divide money they collected from Palestinian residents among all Palestinian factions. He admitted to that when he was interviewed by Al-Qabbas then chief editor Mohamed Jassem al-Saqer in Libya by chance just a couple of months after the so-called massacre of cafés. He said: "We proposed that Kuwait would fairly distribute a five percent tax on Palestinian residents among all Palestinian factions, including the ones with which we disagreed and fought with weapons, as long as matters happen in such a manner, it is our right just as it is the right of others. But, it is unacceptable that such a thing happens with Arafat only, rather than Abu Nedhal…what is the difference?" However, Kuwait and other countries recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The State of Kuwait could not escape his terrorist operations, partly mentioned in this book. (picture of page 72) Abu Nedhal, leader of dissident Fatah group in Baghdad

(pictures of page 73) Ali Yassin addressing Abdullah Al-Salem Secondary School, with Yasser Arafat sitting next to him A crowd of Kuwaitis, Palestinians and Arabs carrying coffin of Ali Yassin (Abu Naser), wrapped in Palestinian flag following assassination in Kuwait

(picture of page 74) Counselor Ismail Zazoa between lawyer Najeeb al- Wagayan and journalist Sabah al-Shemmari…photo taken in 1995

Al-Hamraa Cinema bombing threat Who is that young man who threatened to blow up Al-Hamraa Cinema in Kuwait? What are the motives of such a horrible act? "He must be an appallingly serious terrorist". One of the audiences present in the state security courtroom whispered to someone who sat next to him, saying: "Such a sort of acts can be carried out only by a team trained on massive sabotage and criminal acts." "The matter does not seem to be as such," the man said. "He does not seem to be one of those who have serious criminal records. It could be just a fit of mania or a desperate way to express some psychological premonitions." The Iranian young man Yadullah Ali Kiani, a 20-year-old mechanic, stood in the dock, having tried to shift the attention of the court to another trend of thinking and to slim the case from a serious crime to a mere ploy. "Ploy?! It is unreasonable," the man whispered again. "I'm confident that it is deception! Many criminals designedly pretend to be maniac or naïve." "Don't prejudge him, don't…all possibilities are on the cards." The audiences had mixed jokes and expectations. It was the first time for the state security court to examine a mostly funny case, but this did not mean that the defendant could be acquitted if he turned out to be a convict. The penalty could reach several years in jail. As soon as the court began proceedings and the judges sat at the platform, murmuring among the audiences stopped. The prosecutor accused the defendant of hoax call and disrupting authorities, but he denied any wrongdoing through an interpreter. Rescue officer narrates the story: The court listened to the testimony of a rescue officer on threats of bombing Al-Hamraa Cinema, which showed the Iranian movie "Laila and the Maniac". With everyone having listened carefully, he began to speak: "Someone called us on the emergency phone number 112. As the caller was speaking in Persian, the receiver could only understand the words "bomb" and "Al-Hamraa cinema". He told me about the matter so I promptly went to the operation room and talked to the caller, who threatened angrily that if the Iranian film, which was on show in Al- Hamraa Cinema, was broken off before the end of its set period, which was supposed to close on Friday, then he would bomb the cinema. So, I asked an operation room worker to call the Ministry of Communications through a direct phone line to track down the caller's phone number and address. I tried as much as possible to prolong the call by asking him who would bring him the bomb. He told me that his friends would bring it to him. I continued talking to him for nearly half an hour until he disconnected. I immediately informed the boss and the police station concerned as well as the cinema administration in order to take necessary precautions. A rescue and emergency squad, ambulances and bomb experts rushed to the cinema. The viewers were evacuated and bomb experts found nothing in the cinema. In its turn, the Ministry of Communications contacted to give us the caller's phone number and address, which turned out to be a garage. A couple of days later, the defendant was caught. Having seen him for the first time, I asked to talk to him on the phone so I was sure that it was he who made the hoax call. He had a husky voice and seemed to be from Isfhan where people don't speak smoothly." The audiences were impressed by the rescue officer, wondering how the defendant dared to do such a serious act for having just admired the movie heroine and gone to the cinema everyday. Was it a ploy…just a ploy…or a naïve expression of a desire to keep the movie on? At the beginning, the court asked the defendant through an interpreter where he exactly lived in Iran. The defendant: I'm from Al-Ahwaz. The court: Aren't you from Isfhan? The defendant: No, I'm not. When a confrontation took place between him and the officer, who gazed at him for a while, the officer said: "If he is really from Al-Ahwaz, then he should be able to speak Arabic, Mr. President." When he gazed at the officer, he mumbled unclear words.

Witnesses face a barrage of 92 questions:

This point still needed to be clarified…why not…it was necessary for identifying this man who was in the dock. Perhaps, he had really nothing to do with that case, including the bombing threat and even the location of the Al-Hamraa Cinema, and only wanted to go out of this black distress that hit him due to the Iranian film and for just vocal similarity. The task of the jury was not so easy that they had to examine the case so carefully and accurately in order to reach a conviction that could match their consciences and visions. So, they had to open a barrage of 92 questions to the nine eyewitnesses. No buts, it was a laborious, but inescapable, task so that the ship of justice could take the case to the shore of safety. Bizarrely enough, the witnesses faced a barrage of successive questions, while the defendant was asked just three queries. Perhaps, this was due to the fact that the defendant had no much to say, or at least that was according to his claims. The lawyer called for clearing the defendant due to incompetent curt on the basis that the case did not happen during war so that it could be considered just a misdemeanor. But, the court turned such arguments as irrelevant as Kuwait issued a decree on June 5, 1967 whose Article One stated: "We announce and decide that the State of Kuwait is in a defensive war with Zionist gangs in the occupied Palestine as of today morning." The court said the decree was still in effect. At the session of November 26, 1979, the court, presided over by counselor Salah Eddin Zekri, acquitted the defendant for inadequate evidence. As soon as the ruling was pronounced, the depressed defendant woke up, holding his head high. The court pointed out that the officer's recognition of the defendant's voice on the phone was an inadequate proof, saying that the officer did not study phonetics, nor did he realize any basic characteristics on the phone, except for a note that the defendant had a dusky voice, something that could be shared by many people. More importantly, the officer was not tested to recognize the defendant's voice among similar voices, putting the case into question. Thus, the curtain fell on the Al-Hamraa Cinema case. Ironically, the case was the best free propaganda for the movie, which turned out later to be watched by many people, who wanted to know if it really deserved such an adventure made by the defendant.

Bombing of "Al-Rai Al-Am" newspaper Al-Rai Al-Am was the first daily newspaper to be issued in Kuwait in 1961. In 1980, someone suddenly thought of stopping the issuance of the daily and killing the largest possible number of its workers owing to motives related to the newspaper's press practices. This man, who could escape investigations, asked three Fatah members notably; Rawhi, Aref and Nader, to help him. Rawhi was the guard of the PLO Office in Al-Jabriya. He offered 2,600 Kuwaiti dinars to be paid to them following the operation. They accepted it. He told them that he would provide them with two bombs for the purpose, having ordered Rawhi to plant one in the color printing section, and Aref to plant the other bomb in the commercial printing section. He also ordered Rawhi to put the bomb next to petrol tins. But, he asked them to go to the newspaper to inspect the entries and exits of the building ahead of the bombing. Rawhi did visit the building in order to see how everything was going on there, including status of the guards. He then met with Aref and Nader in the guard room of the organization at the sunset of Monday, July 7, 1980, where they stayed up late until two o'clock a.m. Afterwards, they went to the newspaper building where they inspected the color printing and commercial printing sections and its ordinary door, which they opened. Rawhi stood outside while Aref and Nader entered the section for inspection. They stayed there for three minutes before they left the place. At two o'clock p.m. the following day, they went to the man who asked them to commit the crime, and told him that they had inspected the newspaper just as he had ordered. He asked Rawhi to find a fourth man to be in charge of watching until he would plant the bomb in the color printing section. Rawhi chose Wael Abdel-Latif, whom he had known. He visited him at his home at al-Farwaniya area and asked for his help in the operation, but he declined to do so. So, he went back to the man to tell him. In his turn, he gave Rawhi a six-bullet pistol and ammunition, and told him to force Wael to help him in the operation by threatening him with the pistol, which was one of ten pistols, 250 bullets, five machine- guns and ammunition given by the Interior Ministry to the PLO according to a bill of delivery dated July 11, 1978. In the evening of the following day, Thursday, July 10, 1980, Rawhi drove Adel and Nader to Wael's home and took him away, threatening to kill him unless he helped them in the operation. But, he insisted on rejection so Rawhi decided to tempt him with money, offering him 650 dinars. Thereupon, Wael agreed soon. Afterwards, they devised a plan to carry out the crime, including the distribution of roles. Rawhi was asked to put one of the two bombs in the color printing section, with Wael watching, while Aref was entrusted with putting the other bomb in the commercial printing building, with Nader watching. Rawhi and Aref went to the man to tell him that they were ready to carry out the operation. In his turn, he set the morning of July 12, 1980 as a date for implementation, and gave them two highly explosive bombs. He also asked Rawhi to set the timer of the bomb to be detonated in the color printing section at nine o'clock a.m., and Aref to detonate his bomb briefly following the first one, thus killing the largest number of workers there. On Saturday, July 12, 1980, they all moved to the incident site at around five o'clock a.m. and roamed around the building twice in order to make sure that no-one was watching them. Afterwards, Rawhi parked the car at the parking lot opposite the paper building and opened the trunk to take out two bags containing the bombs, having given one to Aref and kept the other. They then entered the newspaper through the main door. Rawhi was armed with the guarding pistol. Aref and Nader went to the commercial printing building, while Wael waited at the printing section door for watching. Rawhi infiltrated into the color printing facility through its main door, timed the bomb at nine o'clock a.m. and then planted it under the table next to petrol tins. He then returned to Wael, waiting for Aref and Nader. Aref planted the bomb amongst inflammable material next to a printing machine near the packaging section. Finally, they left the site in Rawhi's car. At nine o'clock a.m., the bomb planted at the color printing section exploded, followed by the other bomb explosion just a couple of minutes later, causing a huge fire. The printing machines and the entire building were devastated, material losses hit millions of dinars, two workers were killed and 23 others injured. On Tuesday; July 15, 1980, they met in the security room, and then Rawhi and Aref went to the man. They gave him the pistol and asked him for the money, but he said he had no money for the time being and asked them to give him more time. The prosecution investigated the incident and interrogated the injured workers and their workmates. A bomb expert examined the scene, but, unfortunately, initial investigations led to no clues. On October 29, 1980, the undersecretary of the Interior Ministry informed the public prosecutor that Rawhi and Wael were arrested. On August 1, 1980, the police summoned Hossam Idris, Rawhi's friend, to ask him if he had information on the incident. He said that on July 6, 1980, Rawhi told him that he had had two bombs. When Rawhi was confronted with such information, he insisted on denial. But later, he confessed that he had committed the crime with the help of his friends upon request from someone called Faras, who was working with Fatah office, in exchange for 2,600 dinars. He also claimed that Faras was the military official of Fatah Office. The police arrested the man who turned out to be really named Jihad Mazied. On September 6, 1980, the public prosecutor referred the case to the state security court, which set September 27, 1980 as a date for examining the case. The court retained three lawyers for the defendants, in addition to a lawyer for defending Jihad Mazied. At its hearing on September 29, 1980, the court stated that due to necessary considerations, it would hold a secret session for looking into the motives of the criminal act. Two secret hearings were really held on October 7 and 11, 1980. At a session held on October 12, 1980, the court said in a release that the press played its role in covering the public trial as per the constitution. But, it maintained, on account of recent developments, the court would like to inform that pursuant to the law and judicial traditions in the country, the press role in judicial trials should be restricted to covering reports, facts and incidents and citing statements voiced at the court, rather than commenting on court proceedings and circumstances just for the public interest. Defendants' confessions: The defendant Rawhi confessed at the court by saying: "I joined Fatah Organization in 1976, and fought in Lebanon after I was trained in fighting and making and exploding bombs for three months. I came to Kuwait a year and eight months ahead of the incident. I guarded the organization office at Al-Jabriya area for 140 dinars in pay. At the beginning of the shift, I used to carry a 9-mm Webley pistol, but I gave it back to the office at the end of the shift. While I was guarding the office one day, Jihad Mazied came and offered me and some other person to bomb the Al-Rai Al-Am newspaper in return for 2,600 dinars to be paid to us following the operation. We accepted the offer so he told us that he would give us two bombs for the purpose. He ordered me to plant one in the color printing section, and Aref to plant the other bomb in the commercial printing building. He also advised us to go and inspect the building in order to examine its entries and exits and where we would exactly plant the bombs." The defendant went on to say: "Accordingly, I met my colleagues Aref and Nader in my security room, where we stayed up late until two o'clock am. We then drove to the newspaper building where we sneaked through its main door at around 3:30 am. We saw the security man sitting in a small room on the left of the door. We went through the main entry. We felt like hearing footsteps, but we did not see anybody. We then went to the color printing section which had a big main door made of glass and iron. We saw the table around seven meters opposite the main door. Afterwards, we went to the commercial printing facility at the end of the newspaper building, where we found no-one either. We also saw a dim light there and found the door closed, but not locked. We opened the door and Aref and Nader infiltrated into the section, while I waited outside for watching. Just three minutes later, we left the building and returned home. On the following day; Tuesday, July 8, 1980, at around eight o'clock p.m., we met the person who asked us to carry out the incident, and told him that we had already inspected the building and its printing sections. He asked us to find a fourth person for watching. I chose Wael Abdel-Latif whom I had known. He was fond of such acts and was yearning for doing anything. On the following day, I and Aref went to ask him to help us in the operation, but we did not tell him the name of the man. But, he turned down the offer. When we returned to tell the man, he gave me a pistol to threaten Wael. On Thursday; July 10, 1980, I, Aref and Nader went to Wael, threatening him unless he would join us, but he insisted on rejection. When I tempted him that he would be paid 650 dinars in return for the operation, he accepted at once. Accordingly, we devised a plan and determined each one's role. Afterwards, we went to the man at eight o'clock p.m. to tell him that we were ready for the mission. He set the morning of July 12, 1980, as a date for that, and gave us two bombs. He asked me to time my bomb at nine o'clock a.m. and Aref to time his bomb just a few seconds later. Rawhi continued saying: "At the dawn of the incident day, I drove the three persons to the newspaper and roamed around it twice to make sure that no-one was there. It was nearly five o'clock am. We parked the car at the parking lot opposite the building. We took the two bags containing the bombs out of the car trunk. I gave one to Aref and kept the other. We then sneaked into the building through its main door. We watched the guard sitting on the ground in his room situated on the left of the door. Wael stood at the door for watching. I infiltrated into the color printing section; armed with the pistol which I received, while Aref and Nader sneaked into the commercial printing facility. We carried out the mission and left the site immediately. At 6:30 p.m. on Tuesday; July 15, 1980, we went to the man to ask him for the money which he promised to pay us, but he said he had no money for the time being and thereupon he asked for more time. Rawhi said the explosives were quasi-round time bombs of the same kind, containing two nails each on their upper ends and two wires linked to the timers. "When I rejected, he took out a Webley pistol, just similar to pistols held by Kuwaiti policemen, and aimed it at me. He threatened to kill me if I insisted on rejection. When he offered me 650 dinars in return, I accepted the offer as I was locked in financial trouble. I was unable to fulfill my needs due to my little pay, including the costs of my successive visits to Basra, where I used to stay up late at night enjoying and drinking alcohol. Three days following the operation, when I asked Rawhi to give my share of money, he ordered me to shut up or they would kill me!" Court decision: The case was examined during two sessions on September 27, 1980 and October 15, 1980. But, it was then adjourned to November 15, 1980, when the state security court sentenced Rawhi al-Nemr to capital punishment and Wael and Abdel-Latif to life imprisonment, but cleared Jihad Mazied. However, an Amiri decree was issued later, commuting the capital punishment decision against Rawhi to life sentence. (pictures of page 89) Sheikh Saad inspects the building Fire caused by the explosion

(pictures of page 90) The defendant Jihad One of the defendants

Deported from Kuwait, a man hijacked a Kuwaiti plane Who is that man who hijacked a Beirut-destined Kuwaiti Boeing 737 plane on July 27, 1980, and forced the pilot to fly a whole night in the Gulf sky before the operation was unprecedentedly over. Who is the hijacker?! We pose this question before asking about facts, developments and circumstances due to the "privacy" of this hijacking incident. It was personally motivated and articulately aimed to demand personal rights from Kuwait. Yussef, 42, first came to Kuwait in 1962, but then left it and joined the Palestinian Liberation Army where he was promoted to captain. He returned to Kuwait in 1966. This time, Yussef settled in the country where he found a safe shelter and a suitable place for livelihood. He stayed in Kuwait for around 11 years. He worked as a wireless controller at the Ministry of Public Works, opened a garment shop, a car renting office and finally a construction company. In one of his travels, he met a Kuwait merchant by chance. They agreed together to found a joint trade firm in Kuwait. But, later, the partners were locked in financial disputes. Four court rulings were issued against Yussef, imposing a fine on him, for having written dud cheques. He was then deported from the country. So, he traveled to Beirut. Yussef thought of a way to demand compensations from Kuwaiti authorities because of deportation until he decided to launch a violent act targeting the country. He braced for hijacking a Kuwaiti plane. He "bought" a couple of passports, pistols and grenades for him and for his friend Othman who would help him in the operation, with his brother staying at home in order to receive a ransom from the Kuwaiti embassy. If his brother received the money, then he would send a "code" message to the hijackers. Meanwhile, someone identified as Abu al-Lail vowed to take necessary weapons and bombs aboard the aircraft in exchange for a 1,000 Lebanese pounds. It was on July 24, 1980 when Yussef and Othman went to the Beirut International Airport and boarded a Kuwaiti Boeing 737 plane that was destined to Kuwait. As soon as the plane took off on that sunny day, Yussef stormed the cabin and asked the pilot to obey his orders and announce a hijacking operation, while his friend Othman pushed the passengers together to the rear of the airliner. The crewmen and the passengers did not know what they had to do under such circumstances. The passengers, who were preparing themselves for Kuwait's awfully hot weather, lived hotter and more horrible events in midair, especially as they were not aware of the identities, destinations and motives of the hijackers. The hijackers tried to gain time and control the situation inside the plane until it would put down at the Kuwait airport. During the flight, they did not announce any demand or goals. The plane landed at the furthest runway of the Kuwait International Airport and the hijackers released most women and children, together with another passenger to whom they gave a written release including their financial demands. Many believed that the operation would be over in Kuwait, but the crewmen were taken aback to see the hijackers asking the pilot to take off. Afterwards, the plane put down at the Bahrain airport where it was fueled, and then flew to Dubai, but UAE authorities refused to receive them, pushing them to fly back to Kuwait to the surprise of everyone inside and outside Kuwait. The plane then flew to Abadan airport where it put down without any notice. There, they were supplied with water, food and fuel, and then flew to Tehran, but Iranian authorities denied them access, and threatened that it would use force through its warplanes. Therefore, the hijackers asked the pilot to fly to Kabul, but he told them the plane was short of fuel. The plane, thence, flew back to Kuwait after it spent all night in the Gulf sky, with the passengers having been concerned over their fate. Negotiations began to focus on the necessity of freeing the passengers. But, all of a sudden, the pilot managed to jump out of the emergency window and ran away to the airport building. Having been perplexed, the hijackers did not know what they had to do following the runaway of the pilot. Therefore, they desperately surrendered themselves. Everyone finally breathed a sigh of relief following the end of the operation in a way that went beyond upbeat observers' expectations due to deep panic on board. The passengers returned to their countries and families, while the hijackers were taken to the state security court where public hearings were held. They were charged with hijacking, hostage-taking, planning to kill the pilot, other crewmen and passengers, threatening security men and possessing weapons and bombs. Trial proceedings: The court interrogated the hijacker Ahmad Yussef. Question: When did you come to Kuwait? And when did you decide to hijack the plane? Answer: I came to Kuwait in 1962. I stayed here for a couple of months and then left to join the Palestinian Liberation Army. But, I returned in 1966. I was deported from Kuwait so I went to Beirut where I decided to hijack a plane. Question: Why did not you resort to court to restore your rights? Answer: I am to blame for that. Question: Your previous partner Mubarak filed a lawsuit against you and your brothers Khalaf, Khalifa and Asmar for having failed to pay him off 72,294 dinars. Whey did not you defend yourself? Answer: I was not notified of the case, and he helped us to travel. Afterwards, he lodged the case. Question: How did you carry out the operation? Answer: Anyone can hijack a plane as long as he is armed. Question: How did you get weapons? Answer: I bought three pistols and four bombs from someone in Beirut whom I did not know. There, weapons are sold just as tomato. I asked Abu Al-Lail to help me take the weapons on board in return for 2,000 liras. Question: Concerning the code, what does this code mean: "The bird has flown…return to Beirut"? Answer: It means that we will return to Beirut. Question: What does this code refer to: "The bird has fallen…delivery to Abu Al-Zaaim"? Answer: It means that Abu Al-Zaaim will come to Beirut to take us. Question: Who is Abu Al-Zaaim? Answer: He is the Fatah military intelligence chief , but he has nothing to do with the operation. Question: What does this code mean: "The bird is in the cage…going to Tanzania"? Answer: It means that I have to take the aircraft to Tanzania and surrender myself there to Fatah office chief Fouad al-Baitar. Question: Does Fouad have something to do with your project? Answer: No, he does not. Question: Why did you choose him? Answer: He has been my friend for a long time, and I expected him to help me. Question: What does this code mean: "Hovering…continue with the operation". Answer: It means that we should not end the hijacking operation. Question: What does this code refer to: "Ending the operation…happy"? Answer: It refers to ending the operation and our money in return has been paid in Beirut. Question: With whom did you exchange such codes? Answer: Such codes were given by Khalifa through the airport. Question: Does Khalifa have a wireless set for sending and receiving? Answer: No, he does not. He only contacts Medhat, who, in his turn, contacts the Kuwaiti ambassador al-Baijan to tell him the code. Question: Why were you armed with two pistols? Answer: Because if one became idle, then I would use the other. Question: The passenger Ahmad said you had asked the pilot to hit cars and then take off or you would shoot him in his head, had not you? Answer: The passenger Ahmad is mad as he jumped out of the plane and left his wife behind. Question: How many bullets did you fire at the pilot when he jumped? Answer: I opened fire after he jumped and ran away as the passengers stormed the cabin so I tried to calm them down by firing in the air. Question: But, the pilot said you had aimed to kill him, had not you? Answer: No, I had not…what for?! Question: He also said you had threatened to kill him and bomb the plane, and you even began to move the bomb valve with your thumb while holding the pistol with the other hand. You also asked him to land at an uninhabited area in order to evacuate the passengers before blowing it up, claiming that the value of the plane was higher than the ransom you had demanded? Answer: Do you mean that I wanted to bomb the plane just to be happy?! Question: The deputy chairman of the deportation department said you and your brother were deported from Kuwait in connection with dud cheque cases, were not you? Answer: Deportation decisions should be made by court. Question: Why did not the deportation decisions include your brothers Asmar and Khalifa if there were really other dimensions for deportation? Answer: Asmar can neither read nor write. Question: According to your criminal record, you were fined 200 dinars on February 27, 1978, in connection with a beating and swearing case, were not you? Answer: Someone assaulted us in the office…is not this a crime? Question: Four court rulings were issued against you for writing dud cheques, were not you? Answer: I paid the fine, and my partner Mubarak was late for payment. I launched the operation in order to restore my right from my partner Mubarak. Question: How could this happen while the plane was hijacked? Answer: I offered to end the operation if some people came and promised to help me restore my right. Question: The passenger Ahmad Abdullah stated that while you were opening the plane door to surrender, you said: "We have failed this time, but, God willing, we will succeed next time." Answer: No, this did not occur. Afterwards: The court called Othman, 31, to interrogate him. Question: Did you help in setting the hijacking plan? Answer: The operation was unplanned. We did not aim to steal the plane, which is totally different from a car which could be dismantled and sold in parts. Question: How did you take the bombs and pistols aboard the plane? Answer: I do not know. Yussef was responsible for that. Question: Why do not you have a real passport? Answer: I have joined the resistance for 13 years. Due to problems in Jordan, I have failed to get Jordanian nationality. Question: The passengers witnessed that in the last minutes when military vehicles cordoned off the plane, you shouted: "Shall I throw the bomb? The vehicle is approaching. Shall I explode it? Answer: No, this did not occur. The pilot: For his part, the Irish captain Marc Edwin, 35, said at the court: On July 24, I flew the plane from Beirut to Kuwait. We left Beirut at 2:55 pm at GTM. At 3:30, I felt that the door of the cabin was open. All of a sudden, the hijacker Yussef, who was holding a pistol, said that the plane was hijacked and then left. I turned back to see that all the passengers were pushed together in the middle of the plane. At once, I contacted a Damascus-destined Kuwaiti plane which I had just flown past. I asked the crew to inform the Kuwaiti Airways in Kuwait that the plane was hijacked. We then flew on to Kuwait until we put down at the end of the runway. The hijacker released most women and children and a man whom they gave a statement including their demands. Yussef asked me through the chief female guest to fly to Dubai. As I had no enough fuel, we decided to fly to Bahrain. I had fuel enough for only 20 minutes. The plane fueled up in Bahrain and we then flew to Kuwait. On the way, he asked me to fly to Dubai airport, but it was shut down and its lights were off. I tried to get permission to land at Sharjah, Ras al-Khaima or Abu Dhabi, but they were all shut down. We had to return to Kuwait where some vehicles gathered around the plane and the runway was partly sealed. So, Yussef asked me to take off quickly, but I told him that we couldn't take off due to insufficient fuel and the runway closure. Therefore, Yussef aimed the pistol at my head and warned me to try to fly or he would kill me. I tried hard to take the plane away from the runway and then returned to it soon. The engines operated and the plane began to fly at a low height over the airport. For me, it was a very serious adventure, albeit miracle, as we took off without permission. Some lights of the runway were consequently smashed and contact between us and the watch tower broke off as the aircraft was flying at a low height. It was aimed to take the plane to an unknown place and to evacuate the passengers and crewmen before bombing it. In mid-air, he asked me to fly to Tehran, but there was no sufficient fuel so we decided to land at Abadan airport where we had no permission in order to avoid potential airport closure. When we landed at the airport, military vehicles and troops gathered around the aircraft, but they pulled back upon my request. They supplied us with food, water and fuel and even allowed us to leave. We left Abadan for Kuwait once more, escorted by an Iranian fighter aircraft. While flying over Failaka Island, Yussef asked me to send a message to Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei, but I can't remember the content of the message. After a while, we received a response that all Iranian airports were sealed off and that we had to leave Iran immediately or Iranian warplanes would force us out. Yussef, accordingly, decided to go to Kabul, saying that as long as the Muslims failed to help them so he would go to the communists. When I told him that we were short of fuel, he asked me to fly on until the last drop of fuel eve if the plane would explode. Afterwards, we flew back to Kuwait where there were trucks on the runway. Negotiations began with five passengers having been freed. By the way, two passengers were freed at Abadan airport. Security forces besieged the plane so Yussef shouted and aimed the pistol at the passengers, threatening that he would throw the bomb. He asked me to fly back and push all trucks and vehicles. But, if I just tried to fly, the aircraft would explode and that is what I explained to Yussef, but he did not believe me. He stepped a little out of the cabin to see fuel trucks so I seized the opportunity and jumped out of the emergency window. He fired bullets at me, but he missed the target." The public security chief: Speaking at the court, he said: "The plane stopped at the end of the runway so that the aviation movement would not be affected. Negotiations began with the hijackers having sent a message demanding 424,000 dinars, together with 200,000 dinars in damages for his deportation from the country. The plane flew to Bahrain but returned to Kuwait after the UAE denied it access. It then flew to Abadan airport without permission. The pilot contacted us to apologize for taking off as the pistol was aimed at his head. We then received a cable from the Kuwaiti Embassy in Tehran saying that Iranian authorities asked the Iranian government about what to do with the aircraft. We answered that it was up to Iranian authorities to deal with it as it wanted. The airliner returned to Kuwait where negotiations began, with the hijacker having told the watch tower that he would set five passengers free in order to show goodwill and asked for part of the demanded sum. At eight o'clock, the fatigued pilot managed to escape and came to us at the airport building. The plane was completely surrounded. I asked Yussef through a loudspeaker to surrender and I told him that if he really had rights, then he would restore them by legal means. Eventually, the hijackers gave themselves up. All the passengers and crewmen were safe. When we searched the bag which they threatened to bomb, we found only a box of their pistols. Before he was deported from Kuwait, Yussef was given enough time to liquidate his business. Having had his air ticket, he went to the deportation administration volitionally. Court decision: The state security court decided at its hearing on September 24 to sentence the four defendants to life imprisonment; the hijackers Yussef and Othman in presence and their partners Khalifa and Abu al-Lail in absentia. (pictures of page 103) Alert ahead of receiving hijackers The hijackers leaving court

Attempt to bomb Social Reform Society

His name is Fawaz. He came to Kuwait 20 years back. He worked as a driver and then an office boy at public schools. But, later, he illegally changed his profession in his passport from a worker to a mosque imam in order to show that he was a clergyman. He acquired a driving license according to his forged profession. Fawaz frequently visited the Social Reform Society, a public benefit society supervised by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and was established in 1963. It issues the religious-oriented Al-Mujtama' magazine, which represents the views of the Muslim Brotherhood. The magazine launched a campaign against some Arab countries so it was repeatedly suspended. One of these criticized countries decided to punish it by threatening and intimidating its officials. Fawaz, together with another two people, went to the society at 2:30 pm on November 7, 1980, having had a time bomb to explode at nine o'clock. With his colleagues watching, he sneaked into the society and planted the shirt-covered bomb in a rose bed along the building, some five meters away from a magazine perforation room, and then ran away promptly. However, nothing happened in the building as a frequent visitor of the society, called Mosaid, saw the shirt as he passed by. Having found the shirt-covered bomb, Mosaid picked it up, took off its battery and put it in the middle of the society playground. Afterwards, he informed the society where people were evacuated and the police was immediately notified. Having examined the bomb, an explosive expert found out that it was Russian-made and contained ten bars weighing 200 grams each. He pulled the capsule off the timer and defused it. He also searched the site, but found nothing. Meanwhile, the police arrested Fawaz and two others called Qattawi and Dergham. Fawaz initially denied any involvement in the crime, but later he collapsed and admitted that he had frequently visited the society for spying on its papers and reports, and that three people asked him to plant the bomb on the basis that he was bearded, frequently visited the society, had knowledge of Islamic affairs and wore popular garments, thus dispelling any doubts about him. He also confessed that Qattawi and Dergham helped him. But, his accomplices dismissed charges press against them so they were held in custody and then referred to the prosecution. But, Fawaz backtracked from his earlier confessions and said they had nothing to do with the incident. Qattawi was released, Dergham, who was recognized by a sniffer dog, and Fawaz were sent to the state security court. State security court: Having appeared at the state security court, Fawaz denied any wrongdoing and said: "I'd like to talk about what happened to me. While I was sleeping at home, investigation policemen came and took me to the police station. They then took me back to the house which they searched, but found nothing. Having been sent back to the police station, I asked why I was arrested. They replied by accusing me of having planted a bomb in the Social Reform Society. I told them 'I don't know. I have heart, lung and kidney problems, rheumatoid and hemorrhoids. I was so afraid that I admitted to planting the bomb. They then brought another two people and said they helped me. I told them that I had known Dergham as he visited me once, and I met Qattawi at the clinic. Concerning the forgery charge, as I am poor, I took goods from Kuwait and sell them in my country Syria. When customs officials find that I am a mosque imam, they gave me and my goods easy access." Court opinion: The court went through the case dossier and noted that Fawaz denied at the beginning but then admitted, involving Dergham and Qattawi. He claimed that he was forced to plant the bomb without knowing what it was exactly. He sent a message from prison saying that Dergham and Qattawi had nothing to do with the crime. But, he dismissed any wrongdoing at court. The court opined that Fawaz willingly confessed before the police and prosecution after the police stunned him in his house, where he stayed comfortably imagining that no-one would be able to find and expose him. So, his confessions were written in three statements. He also repeated his confession in the prosecution as he did not deny his knowledge of the shirt with which the bomb was covered. The court also saw that he showed the police the place where the bomb was planted and even told them about its weight and size, refuting his claims that he was not aware of the content. It also stated that if he was really obliged to plant the bomb, then it was better for him to inform the police. It also refuted his claims that he had changed his profession in the passport in order to be able to easily cross into his country, together with his goods, as his wife belied him and said he used not to carry any goods while returning to his country. However, it cleared him of murder planning charge on the basis that surely he only aimed to destroy, intimidate or show protest, rather than to kill. The bomb expert's report showed that in case of explosion, no-one would be killed in the perforation room which was five meters away from the bomb site, not to mention the concrete pillar of the room that could thwart potential jolts or fallouts. If he aimed to kill, then he would plant it inside the room or at least at a place near to its entry, especially as the near meeting room was empty at the night of the incident. At the previous night, it was peopled with over 500 conferees, the court believed. It added that Dergham denied any wrongdoing during initial investigations. The sniffer dog recognized him after it sniffed at the seized shirt, but I also recognized another prisoner who had nothing to do with the crime. Thus, the dog's recognition could not be a piece of cogent evidence. Court decision: At the court session on May 2, 1981, Fawaz looked scared and concerned over his fate, but Dergham looked quiet and self-satisfied and looked around steadily and confidently. As soon as the counselors sat at the platform, the presiding judge acquitted Fawaz of the murder planning count. Fawaz breathed a sigh of relief, but his joy was broken when the presiding judge sentenced him to 15 years in jail for bomb possession and forgery. So, he looked down while his wife and daughter were in tears. When Dergham was cleared of all charges, Fawaz hastily hugged and kissed him. Fawaz was then fettered and taken to prison, while legal procedures got underway to free Dergham.

(picture of 110) The defendant Fawaz taken to court

Bombing of Kuwaiti-Iranian Co.

At 9:00 p.m. on March 28, 1981 a huge bombing demolished the premises of Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. at the third floor of a five-storey building on Fahad Al-Salem St. downtown Kuwait city. The Iranian guard of the building, entrapped by fire at the elevator, lost his life. An explosive expert of the Kuwaiti army who inspected the scene of the explosion verified that the blast resulted from an improvised terrorist charge weighing five kilograms. Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. started operation in 1969 with an initial capital of KD 10,000 of which 51 percent were owned by a Kuwaiti national and the remaining 49 percent were owned by the Iranian government. One of the suspects, named Tawfiq, was arrested at Kuwait International Airport while trying to leave the country. When the authorities searched him they found several military ID cards issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). One of the cards, carrying Tawfiq's photo but a different name, indicated that he served as lieutenant at the PFLP. The investigations with him led to the arrest of five other members of the cell namely; Marawan – the chief of the group in Kuwait, Ahmed Mohammad, Wasfi, Medhat and Abdullah. One of the suspects, overcome with the sense of guilt, confessed to committing the crime. He said: "After I suffered maltreatment in Israeli jails under the charge of militancy, I came to Kuwait in 1976. I kept moving from one career to another till I met Medhat and a deep friendship developed between us. "Medhat helped me find a job, a taxi driver at an office owned by his father. Later I knew that he was a member of the PFLP. I told him of my desire to join the organization. He welcomed the news and took me to Tawfiq's. Tawfiq started inquiring about my living affairs and my family then he gave me an application form. I became a member under test. "As members of the organization, we used to meet in the morning on Fridays to study the ideology and objectives of the organization as well as the political affairs of the Arab world and other Palestinian organizations. "In the evening of Saturday, March 28, 1981, Marawan called by phone to meet him. When I arrived on time I found Tawfiq and Abdullah waiting for me with him. Abdullah had a grenade in his hand but he covered it with tissues as soon as he saw me. "Abdullah asked me to meet him at a parking lot of a cooperative store at 7:15 that evening. He said that I should go there with my taxi pretending that he was ill. "I went there on time, parked my taxi and got on his car. He headed for the premises of the company. He asked me to plant the bomb at the building and promised to give me KD 5,000 in exchange. The offer was attractive to me as I had to get money to pay the expenses of my family in Palestine and my brother who was studying in Yemen. "At the premises of the company I found Tawfiq, Medhat, Abdullah and Ahmed watching the site to cover my back. I went up to the third floor of the building and placed the explosive charge beside the power panel. I got down quickly and Marawan took me home by his car. "In the following day Tawfiq called me and asked me to take him to the airport where he was arrested. Upon seeing his arrest I hurried to Medhat and informed him. Both of us headed quickly for Tawfiq's to get an Italian pistol of Astra brand and a suitcase. "I phoned Marawan and told him of the arrest of our fellow. Police forces were able later to arrest me and the other fellows." Wasfi added. After investigations the six culprits were referred to the State Security Prosecution (SSP) where Wasfi confirmed his earlier confession. The five others persisted in denying involvement in the crime but admitted to membership in the PFLP. On May 26, 1980 two bombs knocked down the office of Iranian Airways Co. The case was suspended as the perpetrators were not identified. The two incidents clearly targeted the Iranian transport companies. On June 6, 1981, the SSP referred the culprits of the bombing of Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. to the court which slated June 20 as date for hearing the case in two settings; one open and the other in camera. Standing the trial, Wasfi backed down on his earlier confessions and the five others persisted in denial. Representative of the prosecution deemed the case a political one that targeted stability of the country and undermining its public peace. The crime had a new nature namely that of organized crimes which posed a real challenge even to the world's major powers, the prosecutor asserted. He noted that the culprits could represent neither the Palestinian volunteers nor the PFLP. On the other hand, the defense lawyers stressed that all culprits were at different places at the time of the blast, overturning Wasfi's confessions. The attempt to involve the Palestinian organization in the case was absolutely far-fetched, they claimed. Angered by the arrest of their fellows, Abdul-Bari, chief of the PFLP office in Baghdad, and his assistant Sedqi deliberated how to force the Kuwaiti authorities into releasing them. They arrived at the conclusion that carrying out some bombings in Kuwait could be an effective way. The two men contacted the PFLP members in Baghdad and Kuwait City to specify the sites of the planned five bombings, namely; the power plant of Al-Fintas area, tourist resort of Al-Salmiyah, a deserted building close to the State Security Department (SSD) in Sharq, a refueling station in Al-Shuwaikh area, and a rubbish bin near the Ministry of Interior in Al-Shamiyah area. On June 22, 1981, the PFPL sent to Kuwait three of its members in Baghdad with fake Bahraini passports by land. They had suitcases containing explosive materials. They were tasked with assembling the explosive charges and delivering them to their colleagues in Kuwait. In the morning of Thursday, June 25, 1981, the three men left Kuwait for Iraq and their fellows planted the bombs at the specified sites. The bombs went off as planned and resulted in some material damage. The Kuwaiti authorities managed to arrest three of the suspects and referred them to the State Security Court pending trial as was the case with their colleagues. The investigative officer made a statement to the court, saying: "In March, 1981, a bombing rocked Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. and a punch of PFLP followers was rounded up. During investigations Al- Sharq police station received a threat call from an unknown person warning of bombing the station unless Wasfi was not released. Accordingly, Director of Public Security charged me with tracking down the possible perpetrator of imminent sabotage actions countrywide. "My investigations revealed that Hamza, the key suspect, Ahmed Ali and Abullatif brought to the country weapons and explosive charges in a bid to force the release of their colleagues. We have also received tips from abroad to the effect that they also planned to abduct the Kuwaiti football team ahead of the military tournament due in Qatar and bomb the SSD and Kuwait Towers. "I kept watching the movements of suspects who were very cautious. I was able to know that they postponed their terrorist plan pending the trial of their fellows. "After the bombings suspicion focused on the three men and I managed to specify their dwellings. I knew also that Abdullatif was not in Kuwait. I headed to Ahmad's to arrest the man and search his apartment. I found a paper in his suit with some charts and data. The data included eight items beginning with "collective responsibility" and ending with "as soon as possible." "I arrested Hamza and found in his apartment four detonators, a timer, and wires. There was a printed message from the PFLP to newspapers warning them against carrying any photos of the bombers of the shipping company to spare them the trouble of Israeli manhunt. "I escorted Ahmed and Hamza to the General Department of Criminal Investigations where Hamza admitted of collaborating with Ahmed to plant the five explosive charges. "Hamza also confessed to visiting Baghdad ahead of the bombing at the request of the PFLP and of being tasked with doing something to intimidate the Kuwaiti government. "On June 22, 1981, Khalil and Khalid came from Iraq with fake Bahraini passports. They brought explosive materials and returned to Iraq after tasking Hamza and Ahmed with planting the bombs at the specified sites. "When Hamza had confessed to his involvement in the crime, I faced Ahmed with the confession and the latter confessed too. Upon searching Ahmed's car, we found in the trunk a plastic bag containing some materials that could be used in bomb making. They included wires, eight timers, explosive materials and two welding tools. "Abdullatif was unaware of the arrest of his two colleagues when he returned. We arrested him and he denied his involvement but admitted to it later on. He said he was a member of the PFLP and a student at Al- Basra University. He confessed to being tasked with conveying messages and information to the organization members," the officer added in his statement to the court.

Hamza's Confession:

Hamza admitted to his involvement saying: "I came with my family to Kuwait in 1967. I continued my schooling in Kuwait till the second grade of the high school, and then I resumed my study in Egypt where I got my high school certificate. I joined the PFLP in 1968 and became a principal member of its branch in Kuwait in 1976. "When the chief of the branch Marawan was arrested under the charge of perpetrating the bombing of Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co., I assumed his post in the organization. During that time chiefs of the PFLP branches in Beirut and Baghdad contacted the Kuwaiti Ambassador in Beirut to secure the release of Marawan and his men but the talks entered a blind alley. "Therefore, the organization decided to do something to prove to Kuwait its ability and determination to release its men. The leadership of the organization told me to send the warning message to the Kuwaiti government through detonating concussion bombs in various parts of Kuwait. "As time was slated for the trial of our fellows, three members of the organization namely Khalel, Khalil and someone whom I had known with only his nickname Abu-Fahmi, came from Iraq. The three men assembled the five explosive charges. On June 25, 1981, they left for Iraq by bus via Al-Abdali route. Ahmed arrived with a rented car an hour later. He put the bombs on the backseat. We headed to the five specified locations and placed the bombs there. We heard the news of the bombings from the radio. I visited some of my detained fellows before going to my aunt's to sleep. The policemen awakened me and took me to jail. During interrogation I confessed to my role in the incidents," Hamza concluded.

Confession of Defendant Ahmed Ali: Ahmed Ali admitted to joining the PFLP and involvement in the incident. He said: "I was in charge of one of the PFLP cells in Kuwait. I got my high school certificate, the scientific branch, in Palestine. I came to Kuwait on October 28, 1975. I worked as an assistant pharmacist before joining work at a company. After the arrest of some of our fellows, the command of the PFLP in Baghdad called me in. "I headed to Basra to meet the chief of the organization Abdul-Bari, and his assistant Sedki at Hamdan Hotel (the same hotel were defendant Wali Al-Ghazali lived on the expense of the Iraqi secret service ahead of coming to Kuwait to take part in the attempt on the life of U.S. President George Bush during his visit to Kuwait in 1993). "We talked about what happened to our detained fellows and the affairs of their families. Abdul-Bari told me about the decision not to allow any of the organization members in Kuwait to leave the country or make any move that could arouse suspicion of the Kuwait authorities during that time. 'The PFLP respects all deals between the Kuwaiti authorities and Hani Al-Hassan as well as the results of the talks with Kuwait ambassador in Beirut," he said to me. "I returned from Basra and continued my ordinary life till the afternoon of Monday, June 22, 1981, when Khalil, Khaled and Abu-Fahmi arrived from Iraq. They made the bombs and I collaborated with Hamza in distributing them as planned."

Abullatif's Confession:

Defendant Abdullatif said: "I studied at the Faculty of Education, Basra University before joining the PFLP in 1980. I had the cover name of 'Fuad.' When our fellows were arrested, the chief of the organization there tasked me with conveying messages to Hamza and Ahmed in Kuwait. So, I came to Kuwait, delivered the messages and took part in surveying the proposed sites of bombings. Upon completion of my role, I decided to return to Iraq so Hamza gave me a message to the command of the organization.

Letter of PFLP Bureau Chief:

The court was briefed on the letter of PFLP Baghdad bureau chief to Hamza. Following is the text of the letter: "Dear Brother Hamza; I hope you are stronger than steel. Please facilitate Fuad's mission and give him all possible help without specifying. Provide him with phone guide 80 – 81 and send details on the affairs of our men and the date of their trial. Tell us clearly whether the colonel was ready to meet any demand or not. We need a clear answer. Don't care of despise of people, they will definitely clap to us long. Unless Beirut airport was closed down, everything would be alright. But it is not in our hands. Any way, we together, will do the best within our powers. "Again, make Fuad's mission as easy and fast as possible. When he needs booking to leave Kuwait, do your utmost to at once. Convey my regards to all our comrades. I'll be waiting here until Fuad returns or writes to me and then I go abroad. If you need any money take whatever you need from your boss. We are ready to pay anything. "Goodbye. "Signature; "Abu-Dawood"

The Verdict; On August 15, 1981, the State Security Court adopted rulings in the two cases of the bombing of Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. and the five subsequent blasts. In the first case Wasfi was handed life sentence. The court exonerated the five other defendants but sentenced Tawfiq to two years in jail for carrying an unlicensed pistol. The six defendants in the second case were sentenced to life imprisonment. Two of them namely; Hamza and Ahmed Ali, stood trial while Khalil, Khaled, Abddul-Hadi and Sedqi were tried in absentia. The court sent Abdullatif to seven years in prison for his limited role in the five bombings.

Kuwaiti Airliner hijacked to Al-Sadr's cause

A Kuwaiti airliner was hijacked on its route from Tripoli, capital of Libya, to Kuwait City, via Beirut on February 24, 1982. The incident, coupled with the then civil war in Lebanon, made it very difficult to identify the perpetrators. The hijacking started outside Beirut International Airport when a car carrying gunmen entered the airport. The car came close to the bus carrying the passengers of the flight and a series of tragic events developed quickly. First of all, let us shed light on the background of the incident. It took place as part of successive violent acts against the Libyan targets to press for the release of Imam Moussa Al-Sadr. Al-Sadr's disappearance, reportedly in Libya, triggered dramatic reactions in Lebanon particularly in the mainly Shiite areas as well as in other Arab and non-Arab countries in the Middle East. Al-Sadr is a renowned Shiite cleric of Lebanese origin. His family immigrated to Iraq in 1850 then they moved to Iran. Many of his kinsmen were highly-respected Shiite clerics and some of them hold senior posts in Iraq at present. His father, a famous historian and poet, was dean of Qom Islamic College. Born in Qom City in 1928, Al-Sadr studied Islamic jurisdiction at Qom Islamic College before studying law at Tehran University. In 1960, he returned to Lebanon in response to the desire of Abdul- Hussein Sharafeddin, the then Shiite spiritual leader in Tyre, South Lebanon. Sharaf-Eddin passed away in the same year. In 1969, Al-Sadr pushed for launching the Higher Islamic Shiite Council (HISC) and was chosen as the first chairman of the council. In 1975, Shah of Iran withdrew Al-Sadr's Iranian passport as a result of his full support for the Iranian Islamic revolution led by Khomeini who was kin to him. Al-Sadr got a Lebanese passport later on. Al-Sadr's disappearance started on August 25, 1978, when he, his advisor Dr. Mohammad Ya'qoub and Abbas Badr-Eddin, a journalist, left Lebanon for Libya in response to a formal invitation to attend the celebrations marking the anniversary of the Libyan revolution. Al-Sadr resided at Suite No. 351, the second floor of Beach Hotel, in Tripoli. His two companions resided in two rooms close to his suite. His scheduled meeting with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was cancelled for some reasons, so he and his fellows had to leave on August 31, days ahead of the celebrations. He planned to head for Paris to visit his sick wife and his four children. On that day, he disappeared and suspicions focused on Libya and Italy. While Tripoli confirmed he left for Rome on an Alitalia flight No. 881, Rome asserted he and his companions did not enter Italy. The Italian authorities, meanwhile, acknowledged they found Al-Sadr's passport and luggage as well as those of his companions at a hotel in Rome. Sadrists accused Libya of perpetrating the obscure incident. After a whole year of search and investigation the HISC issued a statement formally holding Libya responsible for Al-Sadr's disappearance. The mass media reported different stories on the incident including one to the effect that Al-Sadr had already booked a ticket on August 31 but a few hours ahead of departure he was told to stay to meet Gaddafi. Another report carried by the Republica, an Italian daily, pointed to "Savak," the Iranian intelligence agency, whereas another local daily accused the Israeli secret service. Two Lebanese dailies, "Al-Amal" and "Al-Bairaq," reported that Al- Sadr and Gaddafi got at odds when the latter asked Al-Sadr to fuel the tension between the Shiites in south Lebanon and the UN peacekeepers. Other stories said Al-Sadr was detained in Libya on the backdrop of 30 million Libyan dinars he received from Gaddafi to back the then National Lebanese Front and help settle the Palestinian refugees in south Lebanon but he failed to honor his word. Regarding the arrival of Al-Sadr's passport and luggage and those of his companions in Rome, reports said three persons disguised as Al-Sadr and his fellows had left Libya. When they arrived in Rome, they checked in a hotel, booked two rooms for one week. They left Al-Sadr's passport, turban and luggage and those of his companions and then returned to Libya using different passports. During that time the Libyan embassies and other interests abroad were targeted by several bomb attacks and Al-Sadr Brigades organization claimed responsibility for the bombings. Some airliners were also hijacked. On January 16, 1979, a Lebanese teacher and his students who claimed to be "Sadrists" carried machineguns and grenades and kidnapped a Lebanese flight from Beirut to Amman. The incident came to a close when the Lebanese authorities agreed to arrange a press conference at the airport and allow them explain Al-Sadr's cause and slam Libya. In midday of September 7, 1979, three gunmen kidnapped an Alitalia airliner half an hour after its take-off from Beirut airport. They ordered the pilot to head for Havana where they held a press conference again to draw the world's attention to Al-Sadr's disappearance. The plane flew afterwards over Nice. As the French authorities did not allow it to land, it headed for Tehran where the kidnappers surrendered to the Iranian authorities. On January 18, 1980, Fuad Hamada, an 18-year young man, commandeered a Lebanese airliner after it left Beirut airport for Cyprus. Two hours later the plane returned to Beirut and Hamada surrendered to the Lebanese authorities.

The Hijack; As part of the wave of violence, a Kuwait Airways flight coming from Tunis to Kuwait City via Tripoli and Beirut was hijacked in Beirut airport on February 24, 1982. On board of the airliner were 96 passengers mostly Libyans, Tunisians, Algerians and Indians along with a nine-member crew and four security men. The plane landed at Beirut airport at 5:30 pm. While the passengers were getting down to take a bus to the arrival terminal, a black Mercedes approached one side of the plane and two gunmen came close to the other side. The pilot thought the two men were security personnel but they suddenly brandished their weapons and fired several shots at the plane and the bus. A stray bullet hit the pilot cabin. The gunmen ordered the passengers to get down of the bus and ascend the plane again. In the meantime, two heavily-armed young men, aged 18 and 20, got out of the Mercedes and broke into the plane. They were carrying machine guns, pistols and grenades. As they entered the plane, one of them, named Hamza, shouted "God Is Greatest. We are sons of Al-Sadr. The plane is in our hands. Anyone who fails to obey our orders is doomed to death." Hamza asked for the IDs of the British captain, the Kuwaiti co-pilot and the Danish aeronaut. "Are you Indian?" Hamza asked. "No, I'm Kuwaiti. My name is Hussein Al-Salem as you see in the ID," the co-pilot answered. "That's right. I want to talk to you flatly because you are an Arab and can understand me better. The plane is under our control now. We don't want to kill anybody. But if any of you act wrongly, you will be definitely regretful," he warned. "So, what do you want?" the co-pilot wondered. "Imam Moussa Al-Sadr," Hamza said. "What should a Kuwaiti airliner do with the issue of his disappearance?" "We will use this plane for two months to tour capitals of the world - Europe, America, the United Nations and the Arab League," Hamza disclosed. "Why all this fuss?" the co-pilot asked. "To explain Al-Sadr's issue to the international public opinion," he replied. Al-Salem started to interpret the conversation to the pilot and the Danish engineer, who were totally stunned, and then he turned to Hamza and said: "Well, as you like. But I hope things will not develop into violence." "So, start the engines of the plane and go as I told you before," Hamza ordered. "God willing, but we do not have enough fuel." "Isn't this the fuel indicator? This quantity is enough to take us to Kuwait where we'll refuel and then fly to Tunis," Hamza said. Tunis was then the seat of the Arab League. "It's OK," Al-Salem said. "Go ahead," Hamza ordered. "How can I go ahead when there are cars in front of the plane?" the co- pilot wondered. "We can not move a single meter believe me." "Do this brother, ask the airport authorities to give way to the plane," Hamza said furiously. "OK, as you like. But the control tower does not answer," Al-Salem said. "Well, they mean it. They don't want to respond to us. Tell them we will bombard the tower unless they take these cars away." "Let's wait for a while. They could respond to us," the co-pilot suggested. After a while, Hamza said: "So, they don't respond. Let me contact them my way." He pointed his machinegun from the window of the cabin at the tower and showered it with a volley of bullets. The captain and aeronaut were further stunned and abhorred. "Let me get down and move the cars away myself," Al-Salem said to Hamza. "You want to run away. Don't you?" "No. Believe me. I can by no means leave the plane and passengers this way," the co-pilot assured. "I'll not let you out." "Can I get assured on the state of the passengers?" Al-Salem appealed. "Surely," Hamza said. They were told that the passengers were extremely frightened and want desperately an early end of the tragedy. "Our problem must be solved first." Hamza said. "The passengers have nothing with what is happening. What is their guilt?" the co-pilot asked. "And what is ours? You have a 15 minute ultimatum to remove the cars from the plane's way or we'll blow off the plane. Tell this message to the tower." Hamza said. The ultimatum passed and Hamza had to give the authorities another 15 minutes and warned that he would kill a passenger every minute afterwards. The tower answered and asked to extend the ultimatum to 30 minutes instead. At that time contacts were underway on the highest levels of all concerned parties. The Lebanese leaders were aware that the kidnappers belonged to an influential political party that had a powerful militia. As the second ultimatum elapsed, the hijackers brought forcibly a passenger, a 24-year old Libyan man, to the cabin. Hamza tightened the man's hands and pointed a pistol at his head. The miserable man was shivering out of panic but the pilot managed to mediate and save the man's life. The kidnappers untied his hands and let him go back to his seat. One of the passengers, George Hawi, the then secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Party and deputy chairman of the politburo of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), tried to use his good offices to put an end to the tragedy. Hawi's presence on board of the plane caused embarrassment to the kidnappers who realized that the Lebanese political leaders and the Arab public opinion could focus on Hawi's safety rather than Al-Sadr's cause. The problem was further complicated and could deepen the differences among LNM partners. Hamza gave the authorities a third ultimatum for 20 minutes. The co-pilot suggested contacting Kuwait airport instead and Hamza nodded his approval. When Al-Salem called Kuwait airport Captain Abdul-Ghaffar Al-Awadhi replied and asked to talk to Hamza in person. Al-Awadhi assured Hamza he would contact the Lebanese authorities to remove the cars from the plane's way. But he advised Hamza to set the passengers free as a gesture of goodwill. Hamza shunned the advice and insisted that nobody should get in or out of the plane. The co-pilot asked Hamza about possible negotiators the latter could trust to solve the problem. Hamza mentioned three personalities namely Al-Ja'fari Mufti Abdul-Amir Qabalan, Mrs. Rabab Al-Sadr, and Mohammad Abu-Shaqra, mentor of the Druze sect. The co-pilot contacted Kuwait airport and Captain Nawwaf Al-Othman replied to him. Al-Salem informed Al-Othman about the developments and the latter contacted Beirut airport to inform the authorities there of the possible negotiations. An hour later, Qabalan arrived at Beirut airport and talked to the kidnappers from the control tower. He asked them to release all passengers unconditionally. After a while, a bearded man ascended to the plane and was let in. He talked to Hamza for 15 minutes then left the plane. Qabalan and Mrs. Rabab got on the plane and the two kidnappers kissed Qabalan's hands as a sign of respect. However, the two young men refused to release the passengers and surrender to the authorities lest they should be detained. Qabalan asked them to release at least Hawi who greeted him warmly when he entered the plane. While the two young men approved this request, Hawi refused to leave alone and expressed gratitude to Qabalan for his friendly gesture. "I have moved to the back of the plane and will not leave it except after the last passenger," Hawi insisted. After making sure of the failure of their bid, Qabalan and Mrs. Rabab decided to leave the plane. But Qabalan made another last-ditch attempt when he talked to the bearded man and asked him to go back to the plane to convey a message to the hijackers. The bearded man told Hamza and his fellows to hold hostage nine passengers; six Libyans, two Sudanese and a Tunisian on the black Mercedes and leave the airport for a secure place and then leave the bus and hostages. The hijackers approved the plan and the co-pilot informed the tower of the development. No sooner has the door of the plane been open than gunmen inside the airport opened fire at the plane. Hamza was furious and accused Hawi's followers of the shooting. The co-pilot did his utmost to pour oil on the troubled water and the shooting stopped. Then Hamza called his fellows outside the airport and asked them to pave the way for him, his teammate and the nine hostages. He told them he planned to take the western way of the airport. They reminded him of disarming the four Kuwaiti security men aboard the plane who gave in their weapons otherwise carnage would take place. Hamza asked the crew not to move before he would call them from outside the airport. Then he, his fellow and the nine hostages left the airport and he called the co-pilot 15 minutes later to announce the end of the tragedy and the release of all hostages. The entangled incident did not only bring Al-Sadr cause to the limelight but also highlighted the political and security problems of Lebanon. It was the first time heavily-armed men driving a car get into the airport in such a blatant way. Libya was the original target of the operation although the targeted aircraft was a Kuwaiti one. The Libyan authorities were aware of this fact as well as of the accusations leveled at them by Al-Sadr's followers. Ironically, residents of Beirut and its suburbs were able to hear all contacts and negotiations between the hijackers and concerned authorities live by radio. It was the first time in the history of violent acts against aircraft that the tragedy seemed to be face-to-face debate or a thrilling movie on Al-Sadr's disappearance followed by thousands of people.

Photo 1 page 137 Imam Moussa Al-Sadr

Photo 2 page 137 Photo of Al-Sadr's passport

Photo 1 page 138 Sheikh Qabalan talking to the hijackers

Photo 2 page 138 The hijacked aircraft

Attempt on UAE Diplomat's Life

Husam Al-Hamdan was just seven years of age when he and his family reunited with his father who had been in Kuwait since 1956. He was schooled and got his high school certificate in Kuwait. Then he traveled to Iraq where he joined Abu-Nedhal group, a violent militia which seceded from the mainstream Palestinian Fatah movement. As member of the violent group he moved to Turkey to receive higher education when he was 22 years old. The group, angered by the arrest of some of its members in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), decided to launch a violent campaign to press for their release. It targeted the overseas UAE diplomats and tasked Al- Hamdan with assassinating the UAE Charge D'affaires in Kuwait Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Jowai'id. The overseas UAE diplomats led a peaceful life and had nothing to worry about as their country enjoyed excellent relations with almost all world countries. There was no reason to adopt extraordinary security precautions at the overseas UAE facilities and interests. Al-Hamdan and his family had valid residency in Kuwait, so it was easy for him to travel to and from Kuwait without arousing suspicion. According to the assassination plan, Al-Hamdan was scheduled to book an air ticket to Spain and flee after the crime. The group assigned one of its member, who was unknown, to hand Husam a pistol and a silencer at a public park in Kuwait. Al-Hamdan disguised as a reporter and headed to the UAE embassy. He told the receptionist there he wanted to interview Al-Jowai'id. The embassy staffers, unaware of his ill-will, allowed him in and a secretary led to Al-Jowai'id's office. He greeted Al-Jowai'id and waited for the secretary to leave. He started talking with the senior diplomat on the situations in Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps and then delivered a fake letter to the diplomat to keep him busy for a while. While Al-Jowai'id was reading the letter, Husam took pistol out of his bag and fired at Al-Jowai'id's head. The first bullet hit the diplomat's upper jaw. Al-Jowai'id unconsciously used his hands as a shield against the volley of bullets so he sustained several bullets in the hands. As he shouted for help, the embassy staffers hurried to him and managed to subdue the terrorist. Al-Hamdan made another bid to escape but he slammed into the glass door of the reception hall.

The Defendant's Confession During initial interrogations, Al-Hamdan disguised as a different character. He said the atrocities in Lebanon led to the perishing of his family and made him believe that the Arab countries were responsible for what was happening. He said he decided to avenge for his family's death from Arab officials. However, he backed down from these statements and said: "My name is Husam Al-Hamdan, 22 years. I'm a student at Ankara University. I live with my family in Al-Sulaibkhat Area, Kuwait. In 1967 I came to Kuwait and got my high school certificate in 1979. Due to low marks I was barred from Kuwait University and Baghdad University. I stayed in Iraq for four months during which I joined the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah – the General Command of the Revolutionary Council). I got to know that Fatah had two trends; a hardline armed one and a more peaceful political one. Baghdad office of the organization followed the first one. "After I had filled a form to join it, I was interviewed several times. I was admitted as a "friend." I received a "culture course" and a "military course" over three weeks before becoming an active member of the group. All that took place in 1979. When the admission results of Baghdad University were announced and my application was turned down, I returned to Kuwait where I knew that I could join the engineering college of Ankara University. I headed for Turkey and started my study and was in contact with the group office in Baghdad. "In 1992 I came back to Kuwait and my family told me they were against my study abroad, so I dropped out of the college after one year of study. I traveled to Baghdad to inform the group of the development. The group tasked me with the assassination attempt. The plan of the attack was drawn by Mohammad Youssef, a leading member of the group, who specified 10:00 a.m. on August 23, 1982, as the timing of the attack. "Youssef told me the weapon and silencer to be used in the operation, as well a camera and bag similar to those of reporters, would be handed to me by someone in a public park. "As planned I went to a phone booth at Fahad Al-Salem St, downtown Kuwait, to receive these things from a tall well-built ugly man with dark trousers and a white shirt. I did not know the man's name. "Then I headed to the UAE embassy and arrived there in time. I used the fake name of Adnan Ali and disguised as a reporter of the Lebanese Al-Majales magazine. I was able to meet Al-Jowai'id and carry out my mission. I kept him busy till I fixed the silencer to the pistol and shoot at him twice or thrice, I don’t remember exactly. "Youssef asked me to carry out the mission in retaliation for the arrest of some of our comrades in the UAE under the charge of smuggling arms to European countries then to Palestine. "Another group member was executed in the UAE for involvement in the attempt on the life of the then Syrian vice premier and Foreign Minister Abdul-Halim Khaddam at Abu-Dhabi airport. The attempt led to killing of the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs," he added. Obaid Ibrahim, the third Secretary of the UAE Embassy in Kuwait, linked the attempt on Al-Jowai'id's life and the letter of threat the embassy received from the Fatah few months ahead of the attack. Similar threats were received by other UAE embassies after Abu Dhabi extradited some Fatah activists to Jordan. The UAE consul in Bombay, India, narrowly escaped an assassination bid but UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sayf Bin Ghobash lost his life in 1977, Ibrahim recalled. The tribunal received reports of the Public Prosecution charging the defendant Al-Hamdan of attempted murder and possession of unlicensed weapon. The defense lawyer said Al-Hamdan had political motives and was a university student who felt frustrated due to the state of the Arab world. So, he had to be treated as a political criminal not an ordinary criminal. "Al-Hamdan was pushed by his seniors to adopt a violent trend which is totally different from the original line of his political affiliation," the lawyer asserted. "He was misused and victimized by his seniors. He was not a professional killer as his victim managed fortunately to survive although he was just one meter away from Al-Hamdan." The lawyer finally pleaded to the court for mercy.

The ruling The court, replying to the statements of the lawyer in its ruling, said law did not distinguish between political and ordinary crimes. Both kinds of crimes lead to the same punishments. "The political affiliation of the defendant can not exempt him from responsibility for his actions," the ruling underlined. "The defendant had the intention and strong determination to kill. He used an illegal weapon premeditatedly to perpetrate his horrible crime. He kept planning the crime for a long time while he was in Iraq and after he came back to Kuwait. The crime did not result from an instant dispute between the criminal and the victim," it added. Thereby, the court chaired by Justice Mohammad Khairi sentenced Al- Hamdan to life imprisonment on December 4, 1982. The Court of Cassation upheld the verdict, asserting Al-Hamdan's full responsibility for his actions regardless of the influence of the leaders of the armed group on him. It also rebuffed the claim that the crime was a political one as the victim had the right to live like any innocent person.

Photo 1 of page 147 Al-Jowai'id's, the UAE diplomat

Photo 2 of page 147 The defendant Al-Hamdan facing the camera

Photo 1 of page 148 An Appeal from Abu-Nedhal Group to UAE President Sheikh Zayed Bin- Sultan Al-Nahayan to step in and release the detained activists in his country

Murder of a Kuwaiti diplomat

Everything seemed ordinary in Alcasiata district of Madrid, capital city of Spain, when Najib Al-Sayed Al-Refa'i, the acting ambassador of Kuwait, finished work and was going back home at 2:00 p.m. on September 16, 1982. The then Kuwait Ambassador Mohammad Qasem Al-Baddah was on holiday in Kuwait. As the door of the car was open for Al-Refa'i to get in, a middle-aged man wearing a blue suit approached the car. He suddenly brandished a pistol with a silencer and fired at the diplomat who tried to hide inside the car but in vain. The gunman followed him and kept firing till the diplomat succumbed to three fatal injuries; two in his back and another in his skull. The driver who tried to avoid the volley of bullets by lying on the ground was seriously injured. The attacker tried to flee the scene and headed to San Francisco St. but a Spanish police patrol managed to track him down. He was so inexperienced that he fell at the hands of the police within a few minutes. Another driver of the embassy rushed the diplomat and the injured driver to La Paz Hospital where the diplomat was confirmed dead. The then Spanish foreign minister Jose Perris Yreka headed to the hospital as soon as he was informed of the attack. The murderer was referred to the Public Security Office in Portuel Al- Sol area, Madrid, for interrogations. He said his name was Ibrahim Hassan Al-Hamdan. He was illiterate and belonged to several clandestine organizations. While the body of the Kuwaiti diplomat was flown to Kuwait for a funeral on September 12, 1982, a senior French investigator headed to Madrid to join the investigation and probe whether Al-Hamdan had anything to do with the bombings of a Jewish synagogue and a restaurant in France. In the meantime, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) issued a statement condemning the assassination of the Kuwaiti diplomat and urging the Arab countries not to use the Palestinians as a tool to settle their own disputes. The assassin said in an interview with a Spanish TV station that he had come to Spain originally to kill Ambassador Al-Baddah and that he had mistaken Al-Refa'i for Al-Baddah. European media deemed the crime a political one while international laws deemed it an ordinary murder even if the perpetrator had political motives. On February 24, 1983, Al-Hamdan stood trial in Spain as there was no agreement on extradition of criminals between Spain and Kuwait. The Kuwaiti embassy tasked Jose Thogasti, a Spanish lawyer, with the case. The Spanish prosecutor and the lawyer asked the tribunal to send the defendant to 51 years in prison although the maximum punishment according to Spanish laws at that time was 30 years for murder crimes. They justified their claim on the grounds that Al-Hamdan committed more than one crime, thus deserving a 30-year prison term for murder, 18 years for attempted murder against the driver and three years for possessing unlicensed weapons. They also pressed for fining him 10 million pesetas (some 100,000 U.S. dollars) as compensation for the diplomat's family, 400,000 pesetas for the driver and 15,000 pesetas as remedy for the damage to the embassy. For her part, the defense lawyer Isabel Viscid pleaded for a commuted 12-year prison term on the grounds that the defendant was deranged and had some political obsession. The murderer admitted to belonging to Abu-Nedhal group which broke away from the Palestinian mainstream Fatah movement and was active in Iraq and Lebanon at that time. Al-Hamdan elaborated on the crime saying: "I left Sidon, south Lebanon, after receiving 2,500 U.S. dollars from the group to carry out my mission. I headed to Iraq to get a visa to Spain, and then I came here and kept watching the Kuwaiti embassy for one month before the incident. "A fellow of my group who I don't know came from Germany days ahead of the incident, gave me a passport and asked me to kill the diplomat. "In the morning of September 16, 1982, I had a breakfast and coffee at a Madrid restaurant and kept walking on streets till midday when I had my last lunch in the world of freedom. In the afternoon the targeted person finished work and got out of the embassy while I was waiting for him. I shot at him three times and killed him on the spot. I fired three other bullets at the driver before attempting to flee the scene. I had no bullets to resist the policemen who rounded me, so they arrested me," Al- Hamdan added. He tried to accuse the Kuwaiti authorities of preventing volunteers from heading to Lebanon to fight Israel, but the Spanish justice interrupted him saying: "I totally refuse any attempt to turn the court into a propaganda platform for any political parties." The Spanish judiciary was apparently uninterested in the political background and minor details of the case as long as the defendant confessed to the crime. The court sentenced Al-Hamdan to 30 years in prison for murdering Al- Refa'i and three years for injuring the driver and possessing unlicensed weapons. Although the court drew the curtain on the case, some questions remained relating to the organization that pushed Al-Hamdan to commit his crime. It was known that Sidon was under Israeli occupation during that time, so what kind of organization that could pay 2,500 U.S. dollars to one of its members and push him to fight Kuwait instead of fighting the occupation forces? In what way could such operation serve the Palestine cause? The Kuwait Consul in Karachi Hamad Al-Geteili sustained a bullet injury in his arm in an aborted assassination bid few hours ahead of the Madrid incident. Another question has to be raised on whether the timings of the two incidents resulted from mere coincidence! In its issue of Friday, October 9, 1982, the Economist magazine linked the assassination of Al-Refa'i in Madrid and Karachi incident to the arrest of Ibrahim Al-Hamdan in Kuwait in connection with the attempt on the UAE diplomat life.

Photo of page 154 Al-Refa'i, the Kuwaiti diplomat

Bombings of U.S. & French embassies

On December 12, seven bomb blasts ripped through the capital city almost simultaneously. They apparently targeted the embassies of the United States and France in Kuwait, the control tower of Kuwait International Airport, a refinery of the National Oil Co. in Al-Shu'aiba industrial zone, the control center of the power grid, the headquarters of a U.S. Co. and a barracks housing U.S. experts.

The First Bombing:

A suicide bomber drove a car laden with some 30 kilograms of explosives and a number of gas cylinders and broke into the U.S. Embassy. The door of the embassy and the guards tried in vain to stop the car. The driver broke the gate into the embassy towards the services suite and blew up the car. The explosion triggered several blasts as a result of detonation of the gas cylinders thus destroying the building almost completely. Three persons were killed and 59 others were inured including staffers of the embassy and visa applicants.

The Second Bombing:

A booby-trapped car parked near the control tower of Kuwait International Airport went off causing several casualties and heavy damage. It was carrying an estimated 15 kilograms of explosives. The explosion left six persons injured, one of them, an Egyptian worker, succumbed to his injuries later on. Thirty-six cars were also destroyed. However, the incident did not affect the air traffic at the airport as it did not disrupt any of the equipment of the control tower. Only the glass and some decorations of the tower were destroyed. The incident drew curiosity of the passengers.

The Third Bombing:

Only few hours after the two previous bombings, a car parked six meters away from France Embassy went off. The car was carried 10-15 kilograms of explosives. The explosion triggered panic among schoolchildren and residents of Al-Jabriya neighborhood were the embassy was located. Shortly ahead of the explosion a schoolgirl of Voltaire Institute who happened to hear about the bombing of U.S. embassy asked her teacher about the possibility of the nearby French embassy being hit by a similar attack. The teacher tried to reassure her but the loud explosion cut him short. Another hairy coincidence was that the consultant of the French embassy survived two bombing attacks. In the morning of that day he headed to the U.S. embassy for a meeting but he arrived minutes after the bombing there. When he went back to his embassy he found the wreckage resulting from the other bombing.

The Fourth bomb attack:

A yellow Mercedes truck, carrying some 100 kg of explosives, 200 gas cylinders and an unspecified quantity of petrol blew up close to the hydrogen unit of Al-Shu'aiba refinery of Kuwait Oil Co. The botched attack injured ten workers but did not disrupt the operation of the refinery. The bomber failed, fortunately, to start one of the two main detonators, thus resulting in a limited explosion. He was apparently worried about his own safety.

The Fifth Bombing:

A Suburban with an explosive device and 20 gas cylinders on board exploded just 25 meters away from the control center of the power grid, the key power facility in Kuwait. The center controls all processes of power generation and distribution nationwide. It also detects all faults or defects in the power grid and analyses data of emergencies and voltage. Fortunately, the bomb attack neither resulted in any casualties nor damaged the control center.

The Sixth Bombing:

A van carrying three kilograms of explosives and a number of gas cylinders went off near a U.S. company in Salwa area. The bombing of the explosive charge triggered several explosions by the cylinders with the door of the van being slammed open and shut by each explosion. A crowd of passersby kept watching the door in panic and curiosity. The attack left only two persons slightly injured.

The Seventh Bomb Attack:

The barracks of U.S. experts in Al-Beda' area overlooking the Arabian Gulf saw a double bombing the first of which, a limited one, was apparently aimed to dra attention of policemen in order to claim more lives. It was followed by another but more powerful car bomb attack ten minutes later. The second car was laden beside the explosive device a quantity of rubber in a bid to inflict more human losses. The twin explosion injured only one person.

The Total Number of Casualties:

The seven bomb attacks left five persons dead, all were Arabs and injured 86 others.

The attacks prompted the police agencies to tighten security precautions around all state departments and foreign facilities and embassies. Roadblocks were set up nationwide, thus resulting in traffic jams for several hours. Helton Hotel, located near the U.S. embassy, was evacuated and its visitors were distributed among several other hotels. The façade of the hotel and the glass of its windows were destroyed as a result of the bombing of the embassy. Its losses were estimated at KD 500,000. The United States advised its 3,000 nationals and the 65 staffers of its embassy as well as their families against going out of their homes till further notice. It also advised the U.S. nationals against traveling to Kuwait. The U.S. authorities also put on hold all visa applications temporarily. A spokesman of the U.S. Department of State said his country received some threats ahead of the attack but did not issue a security alert. They were worried after the bombing of the premises of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, in April and the bombings of the U.S. Marines and the French paratroopers in Beirut in October. But they could not turn the embassy in Kuwait into a military base, the spokesman said. The U.S. Department of State formed a five-member panel of advisors to follow up the results of investigations into the bomb attack. The panel worked round the clock to analyze reports and information about the attack. In the meantime Agence France Presse (AFP) office in Beirut received a phone call from an unknown person who claimed the responsibility of the Islamic Jihad Organization for the bomb attack. However, the IJO refuted the claim in an official statement. It said it was fighting the Americans in Lebanon only. Investigators confirmed that the wave of bombings was well-planned a long time ago as the perpetrators were able to define targets of strategic importance such as these. Analysis of the finger of the left hand of the suicide bomber who broke into the U.S. embassy led to identification of its owner. He was Raad Moten, a 24-year old Iraqi. He was born in Najaf city, southwest Baghdad. All the cars used in the attacks were registered under his name. He and his brother Raad were sentenced to death by the Iraqi judiciary in 1980.

Arrests & Prosecutions: The security services arrested 24 suspects of various nationalities and found in their possession large quantities of munitions including explosive materials, machineguns, pistols, rifles of different caliber, RPGs and hand grenades. While investigations were underway, hundreds of students who reportedly belonged to the Islamic Union of Iraq Students demonstrated in front of Kuwait Embassy in London in protest against the arrests. The protesters handed the embassy a request for releasing the suspects. They demonstrated again just one day ahead of the trial. On February 11, 1984, the State Security Court held the first hearing of the case under heavy security measures. Armored vehicles had queued around the court and large number of policemen had cordoned off the building before the arrival of a military armored personnel carrier arrived with the defendants on board. During the hearing, the defendants kept whispering and smiling to show they were composed. After a while, the smiles faded away and gave way to signs of horror on their faces when they heard the prosecutor charging them with premeditated murder and pressing for capital punishment. The charges also included illegal possession of munitions and using them for illicit purposes, affiliation to a terrorist group, and wreaking havoc in the country. "The criminals killed innocent persons in cold blood," the prosecutor said in his statement to the tribunal. "They had no grain of mercy in their heart, so they have no right whatsoever to seek your mercy," he asserted. The case fell in 2,000 pages covering the police minutes, interrogations, technical reports and testimonies of witnesses. Forty-six witnesses, belonging to different nationalities and some of who were injured in the attacks, testified in this case. The court realized that the defendants were opposed to the regime of Baghdad and sought to establish an Islamic republic in Iraq. They perpetrated the horrible crimes in order to discourage Kuwait from supporting Iraq in its war against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The defendants brought the munitions to Kuwait by sea and stashed them away at different places including their home. They were able to recruit Elias Fuad - a Lebanese explosive expert who the prosecutor branded as a "Death Merchant." He used this fake name to enter Kuwait at the pretext of visiting a company. Muften and Fuad inspected the targets of the terrorist attacks several times ahead of the attacks. Muften bought seven used cars and a truck from Al-Hiraj market in preparation for the attacks. The terrorist group managed to buy some 260 gas cylinders from various gas stores as well as 35 gallons of petrol, a number of batteries, wires, timers and detonators. Fuad booby trapped the cars and fitted two detonators to hexogen bombs on the truck so that it could explode twice with a five-minute interval but the bomber was able to start only one detonator. Fuad's only mistake was that he did not know that gas cylinders in Kuwait were made of thicker steel than those produced in Lebanon. Thereby they did not explode as a result of the first weaker bomb blast. After rigging the cars and truck, Muften and Fuad defined the timing of the attacks. All perpetrators, except Muften, the suicide bomber, survived the attacks that were carried out as planned.

The Ruling:

After 20 hearings in camera the court held an open session on March 27, 1984, to announce its verdict against the defendants in the presence of 250 persons. Before the jury entered the court session the audience could hear nothing but the sound of a helicopter hovering over the building and each defendant could hear nothing but his own heartbeat. At 9:30 a.m. the prosecution got underway. Each defendant was asked to stand up to hear the court verdict. The justice read the verdict sentencing five Iraqi defendants - three of who were at large - and Fuad to death. The court gave seven others, including five Iraqis, a Lebanese and a Kuwaiti, life sentences. Three other Iraqis and a Lebanese were handed fifteen-year prison terms. Two other persons, an Iraqi and a Lebanese were, sentenced to imprisonment for ten years. An Iraqi and a 'bedoon" (a stateless person living in Kuwait) were imprisoned for five years. Two Iraqis, one of who was at large, two Kuwaitis and a bedoon were cleared of involvement in the case.

After the court had adopted the ruling, the true name of Ilias Fuad was identified as Youssef Bader-Eddin.

The then U.S. president George Bush said he would exercise any pressures on Kuwait to release convicted members of the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) in exchange for the release of U.S. hostages in the hands of the IJO in Lebanon. Former Kuwaiti deputy prime minister and foreign minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah said his country was not open to blackmailing. He was reacting to press reports claiming that there were behind-the- curtain bargains to release the U.S. hostages. Two Kuwaiti airliners, Kazma and Al-Jabriya, were hijacked by IJO members to press for the release of their fellows in Kuwait. Yet, Kuwait resisted the mounting pressures. However, the convicts as well as all other convicts in Kuwaiti prisons managed to flee upon the advent of the Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait in 1990.

Photo 1 page 165

Ilias Fuad (Sentenced to death)

Photo 2 page 165 Raad, the suicide bomber

Photo 3 page 165 Hussein Qassem Hassan (Sentenced to death)

Photo 4 page 165 Baqer Ibrahim Abul-Redha (Sentenced to death)

Photo 1 page 166 The (Sentenced to death) The Seized weapons

Photo 2 page 166 Al-Shu'aiba bombing

Photo 1 page 167 The bombing of the U.S. embassy

Photo 2 page 167 The booby-trapped car near U.S.-occupied barracks

Kazma Hijack

It as 10:00 p.m. on Monday December 3, 1984 when the Kuwaiti Airways asked the passengers of its flight from Kuwait to Dubai then to Karachi to go to gate No. 6 and prepare for takeoff. Passengers of various nationalities started boarding including four Americans; William Stanford, 52, Charles Caper, 57, and Charles Hagen, 50, who worked for the USAID and John Costa, 50, who was a salesman of a medical equipment company. The Kuwaiti passengers included Ambassador Khalifa Hussein Al- Mesallam, Foreign Ministry diplomat Ibrahim Al-Mehanna, Deputy Consul in Karachi Hamad Al-Gteili who narrowly survive an assassination bid in Karachi in 1982, Chief Investigator of Al-Ahmadi Governorate Mahmoud Al-Enezi, representative of Kuwaiti Red Crescent Society in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, Dr. Mohammad Al- Sharhan and his family as well as Nabil Aman - a Kuwaiti security guard who took the front seat of the first class cabin close to the pilot cabin. At 10:30 p.m., the plane started to leave for Dubai. Its pilot was Henry Clark, a 40-year old British and co-pilot was Mohammad Al-Jassar, a 27 year-old Kuwaiti. After an hour and a half of flying above the Arabian Gulf waters, the aircraft approached Dubai airport and the passengers were able to sea the lights of the airport and feel the warmth of Arab hospitality. The plane took a lower altitude and started landing at the airport where 18 new passengers mainly Pakistanis joined the flight at 12:00 midnight. The passengers noticed that one of the new comers picked a black handbag apparently left for him on the corridor of the plane by another passenger during the two-hour stopover. At 2:00 a.m. December 4, the plane was set to take off, heading for Karachi with 151 passengers on board. After half an hour of flying, some passengers fell asleep while others were reading reports on newspapers about the ongoing bloody war between Iraq and Iran. All of them were totally unaware of the looming danger and the impending horror.

The First Shot:

Two passengers of the fist class left their seats and went suddenly to the Kuwaiti security guard Aman to assault him. He tried to pick up his pistol but they shot a bullet at his leg and seized his pistol. They were apparently aware that he was the only security guard on board of the plane. The loud sound of the shot stunned the passengers and triggered untold panic among them as well as among the crew. The three gunmen shot several times to silence them. One of the gunmen rushed to the pilot cabin brandishing a hand grenade. He kicked the door open and ordered the pilot to head for Mehrabad Airport in Iran. The pilot noticed that the gunman had drawn the ring of the safety valve of the hand grenade, so he had no choice other than obeying the latter's orders to avoid a real disaster. He asked the co-pilot to tell the gunman they would obey his orders. He, in the meantime, switched the radio frequency of the plane calmly to the vibration 133.4 to alert the Iranian air defense systems in Shahbandar city. The aviation rules in the 1960s used to oblige the pilots not to resist kidnappers. But in the 1980s they were amended to give the pilot the authority to decide on each emergency. Tehran was 800 miles northwest of the location of the aircraft at that time so the captain called Bahrain's Manama airport as well as the Iranian aviation authorities to inform them of the mid-air plane seizure. Israel's early warning systems were also able to pick the call of the British pilot. They heard him saying to the Bahraini authorities: "This is an emergency. We want to call Kuwait, we must call Kuwait." The Bahraini airport official told him he was trying to contact Kuwait airport. One the hijackers ordered the passengers through the microphone to remain seated and keep quite while a Pakistani passenger who worked as a surgeon tried to offer first aid to the injured security man. Another hostage, Mahmoud Al-Eenzi, suffered breathing problems and the Pakistani doctor was also able to help him. At 3:00 a.m., the plane entered the Iranian airspace. Two Iranian fighter planes intercepted it but the pilot told them the plane ran short on fuel. Thereby, they allowed the plane to land at Mehrabad airport in Tehran. The doomed plane was refueled amidst heavy security.

The Bloody Stage:

Meanwhile, the chief hijacker Abul-Hassan who kept aiming his pistol at the pilot and co-pilot asked for an Arabic-Persian interpreter. He and his men segregated the Americans and Kuwaitis from other passengers. They relocated them to the first seats after taking their passports. Abul-Hassan seemed moody. He sometimes shouted at the passengers and in other times tried to keep them calm. Sometimes he reassured a hostage and in others he aimed at the head of another for intimidation. He started interrogating the American hostages. He asked John Costa about his job. He suspected the job of the salesman and tried to force him into admitting that he was a diplomat working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He kicked Costa in his abdomen shouting: "American Imperialist." He shackled Costa's hands behind his back and ordered him to sit down. He summoned Charles Hagen and asked him some questions before shooting him dead. The bloody scene heightened the horror of the passengers. The gunmen threw the body out of the plane some three hours after landing. The Charge D'affaires of the Kuwaiti Embassy in Tehran Kazem Ma'rafi headed for the airport to follow up the developments of the tragedy. He asked the hijackers to release the injured security man and women and children on board of the plane. The gunmen insisted on refueling the plane first due to the suspension of heating systems and the severe cold at that time. The children were almost frozen due to horror beside the biting cold. An Iranian negotiator ascended the plane and kept talking with the hijackers for 15 minutes and secured the release of 53 women and children in two groups. Talks between the Iranian authorities and the hijackers kept going on in coordination with Kuwait. A hotline was established between Mehrabad and Kuwait airports. The then Kuwait Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah was in constant contact with the Iranian leaders to follow up the dramatic developments of the tragedy. He cabled Iranian prime minister twice to ensure the safety of all passengers and find a peaceful solution.

The Second Day of Talks:

On Wednesday December 5, 1984 the hijackers set free 23 women and children as well as the injured security man. The tragedy of the released persons was not over. The husbands and fathers of the released women and children were still on the plane. The released parsons said the American hostages were in a distressful condition. The hijackers trod on them and shouted "Death for America," an eyewitnesses said. Food was allowed for the first time on the plane. As reports from Beirut said the hijackers traveled from Lebanon to Dubai with forged passports, the identity of hijackers started to be known by demands of the group. Abul-Hassan asked for releasing 17 prisoners in Kuwaiti jails who were indicted in connection with the wave of bombings against the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and other key facilities in Kuwait a year ago. They threatened to blow up the airliners unless their key demand was met. The Kuwaiti government, on the other hand, insisted on releasing all passengers unconditionally AFP office in Beirut received a phone call from an unknown person claiming to be a member of the Islamic Jihad Group. He called on the hijackers to take the plane back to an Arabian Gulf country. He disapproved killing "the U.S. spy" on Iranian soil and involving Iran in the dispute. "The hijackers are not members of the Islamic Jihad but we approve the operation," the caller claimed.

The Third Day of the Crisis:

On Thursday December 6, 1984, Kuwaiti Minister of Interior Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah talked by phone with the hijackers and a Kuwaiti private plane carrying an official delegation and a medical team arrived at Mehrabad Airport. Thirty more hostages mostly Pakistanis were released. The hijackers limited their threat to killing the American and Kuwaiti passengers. Faced with Kuwait's insistence on not giving in, the hijackers took the two Kuwaiti diplomats, Khalifa Al-Mesallam and Ibrahim Al-Mehanna, to the cabin and tried to force them into appealing for release of the 17 prisoners in Kuwait to save their own lives. The diplomats protested against such humiliation and refused the orders to read a statement via the pilot's microphone containing an appeal for help. So the hijackers kept torturing them and the noise of a volley of shots was heard. The hijackers asked the authorities to send a photographer to the plane to take photos of the bodies of the two diplomats they claimed they had killed. In fact the two men were still alive as the hijackers fabricated the story and poured some tomato juice on their bodies and let the photographer shoot them lying on deck to intimidate the authorities and press ahead with their plan.

Stanford read a statement and breathed his last:

Faced with the composure of the Kuwaiti government, the hijackers started to act nervously. They wrote a statement and ordered William Stanford to read it. He read: "I'm William Stanford, a U.S. citizen working at the White House …." As he finished, they escorted him to the door of the plane, shot him dead and threw him to the ground. Abul-Hassan read a statement, saying: "We have executed Charles Hagen for involvement in the CIA crime and killed Stanford for failure of the Kuwaiti authorities to meet our demands. Now it is Charles Caper and other criminals." Late leaders, Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah of Kuwait, Hafez Al-Assad of Syria, Fahad Bin-Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, and Sheikh Zayed Bin- Sultan Al-Nahayan of the United Arab Emirates sent cables to the Iranian president urging him to step in and find and end to the tragedy.

The Fourth Day:

On Friday December 7, 1984, an atmosphere of optimism started to prevail when the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that the hijackers intended to release more hostages and that Mehrabad airport was instructed to study the offer. IRNA was the only source of news about the incident as all foreign reporters were barred from covering the tragedy. The airport supplied the plane with fuel to keep the engines on, and foods and medicines were also provided to those on board of it. Suddenly the hijackers cut contacts with the airport and maintained contacts with Kuwaiti airport. At midday Tehran radio broadcast a statement by the hijackers saying that they killed two Americans on Tuesday and Thursday "to prove to Kuwait" they were "serious" in their threats and to let the world witness "this heroic epic." Fire shots were heard after a while, contacts stopped for a short time and then the hijackers set free eight Iranian hostages and six Pakistanis. The Kuwaiti government decided to cut contacts with the hijackers for the latter's intransigence and held Iran responsible for dealing with the crisis. The hijackers intensified torturing the American passengers. The crisis triggered widespread angry reactions across the world. The United Nations Secretary General received Iran's and Kuwait's permanent delegates to the organization twice to discuss the crisis. The United States intensified its diplomatic campaign against Iran to press for an early solution of the crisis but excluded the military option against Iran.

The Fifth Day:

On Saturday December 18, 1984, the hijackers released 40 other hostages. There were only 17 persons on board of the plane including four Kuwaitis, two Americans, the seven-member crew and the four hijackers. The hijackers asked for refueling the plane and recharging its batteries but the airport authorities refused to do so. The hijackers brought Charles Caper to the cabin and asked him to appeal for the authorities to meet their demands. Then, they shot at the windows of the plane rendering it technically unfit for flying. They kept torturing the two American hostages – Caper and Costa - to the extent that they put out cigarettes in their ears and faces. They lit a lighter and burnt Caper's hair and nose. In the evening they set free the crew and kept the Kuwaiti and American hostages. In the meantime, the Islamic Jihad Organization issued a threat from Beirut that the hijackers would kill a hostage every half an hour if Kuwait failed to release members of the group in Kuwaiti jails. For its part, the Kuwaiti National Assembly (parliament) called on the UN to make more efforts to solve the crisis in cooperation with the Iranian authorities. It asserted that Kuwait's sovereignty and dignity could not be compromised.

The Sixth Day:

On Sunday December 9, 1984, the hijackers asked Kuwait to send another plane to take them and the hostages to an unknown destination but Kuwait shunned the demands. The airport authorities were put on maximum alert when the cries of the Kuwaiti hostages were heard on the wireless speakers. Tehran radio said the situation was still tense. Deputy President of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council in Lebanon Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shams-Eddin appealed for putting an end to the standoff. He also urged those who were sympathetic with the hijackers to use their good offices and release the hostages.

The Breakthrough:

The Iranian authorities used the spent time to prepare for breaking into the plane. At 11:00 p.m. (Tehran time) IRNA announced the long-awaited breakthrough saying: "At 10:30 p.m. (local time) the hijackers asked for more fuel, food and recharging of the batteries of the plane. They also asked for a doctor and cleaning staff to clean the aircraft. "Twenty-five minutes later Iranian commandoes hid behind the charger and approached the plane. One of them disguised as a doctor and two other disguised as cleaning staff and the three men managed to break into the plane. They stripped one of the hijackers off his gun and threw him out of the door of the plane. "They blew up smoke bombs inside the plane and managed to subdue the three remaining hijackers after an intensified gun battle. The three hijackers were brought down alive and escorted to jail." IRNA justified the late military action on the desire to minimize the human losses, exhaust the hijackers and get as much information as possible. The successful military operation drew large applause from world capitals. Kuwait's NA issued a statement expressing satisfaction of the Kuwaiti Amir, government and people at the happy end of the saga. On Tuesday February 1, 1984, a Kuwaiti private plane arrived in Kuwait from Tehran with Al-Musallam, Al-Mehanna, Al-Enezi, the copilot Al-Jassar, the security man Aman – of Kuwait, Caper and Costa – of the U.S., the pilot Clark and aeronaut Nell Piston – of the UK, and two crew members on board. They received a red carpet reception with a large number of politicians and public figures welcoming them. On top of dignitary welcoming them were Crown Prince Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, many ministers and sheikhs, the NA speaker and MPs as well as Arab and foreign ambassadors in Kuwait and some 250 reporters. His Highness the Amir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah received the survivors of the tragedy at his office and said to them: "Kuwait as a state and people felt for you." On the same day, a U.S. military plane took Caper and Costa and the bodies of Stanford and Hagen to W. Germany then to the U.S.

Iran, the US engage in a war of words:

The United States accused Iran of failure to save the lives of the two American victims. U.S. President Ronald Regan expressed dismay at the slow reaction of the Iranian authorities and sought extradition of the hijackers to the USA, the White House spokesman Larry Speakes said. For his part, Iranian prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi said the United States should extradite to Iran the most-wanted terrorist for Iran Massoud Rajavi before thinking of the extradition of the hijackers. Rajavi was the president of National Council of Resistance of Iran and the leader of People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI, also known as the MEK), a militant group active outside of Iran . He left Iran in 1981 for France before moving to Iraq and the United States. Late Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Al-Khomeini made his first statement on the incident five weeks after it took place. He said all Iranian leaders condemned the attack in the strongest terms. Similarly, former Iranian president Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjan lambasted the terrorist act in his Friday sermon. He said the perpetrators of the attack would be tried in Iran and be handed the most proper punishment. The U.S. Administration hailed Rafsanjani's statement but asked that the trial should be an open one. The identities and nationalities of the hijackers were not made public. The U.S. Administration allocated a U.S.D. 250,000 award for information that could lead to the arrest of the hijackers of Kazma airliner. It had reportedly drawn plans for sending Special Forces to rescue the hostages in case the plane left Iran.

Hostages Speak:

Caper elaborated on his misery, saying: "I had been tied all the time even when they tortured me. I suffered several comas. The hijackers had never believed I was just a civil servant not an intelligence officer. I asked them to kill me if they did not believe me but they did not. They kept torturing me and threw lit cigarettes inside my shirt on my chest or my back." Costa said he had got the lion's share of torture. "I had been beaten, kicked and scorched in all parts of my body." "The hijackers sought confession of working for the CIA. They were deranged. When they were angry, they tortured me severely. When things went smoothly they offered me a cup of juice," he added. Henry Clark, the captain of the plane, agreed with Costa that the hijackers were deranged beasts. "They were so violent that all passengers believed nobody would survive the tragedy," he noted Unlikely, Mohammad Al-Sharhan, a professor of law, said he was not tortured by Al-D'ouq, the most violent hijacker who used to intimidate and humiliate the hostages all the time. "On Wednesday William Stanford came to me. He was very awkward and nervous. I tried to reassure him. He said: 'I wish if I were a Muslim like you. You look so calm as if we were not held hostage and there were no bombs, weapons and killings.' I told him he has to be a Muslim. "At 3:00 pm Abul-Hassan, the chief of the hijackers, came to me and asked me to go with him to the cabin. We were told that two Kuwaitis were shot dead. I thought they had mischievous will against me. I went with him but before I got into the cabin he whispered to me saying 'Look, you are a good man and we aren't going to kill you. We'll just use you to threaten them. It is just acting.' "He then took me to the cabin, aimed the pistol at my neck and shouted: 'You work at the Foreign Ministry, don't you?' I said "yes.' He turned to the pilot and said: 'You see, this man is a diplomat; we are going to kill him if the authorities did not send us two pilots.' "Al-Jassar, the co-pilot was not there at that time, so I had to interpret to the British pilot. The pilot was ordered to open the door of the plane while Abul-Hassan took me to the stairs. Abul-Hassan reassured me again saying 'Don't scare it is just acting.' "You promise?' I asked. 'Yes, I do,' he replied. "I had to obey and kept standing with my hands up as he aimed the pistol at my back. The hijackers shifted watching me in that position. One of them whispered to me: 'Don't panic, a believer's blood is sacred.' I thanked God that they deemed me believer. "After a while they decided to bring an American person to kill him instead of me. They picked up Stanford and dictated on him to shout for help and say he worked at the White House. He felt nobody heard him and was so frightened that he decided to flee. "Stanford descended the stairs quickly so the hijacker who was watching him shot at him. He rolled down the stairs before Abul-Hassan fired two fatal shots at him. "Abul-Hassan set me and some Pakistanis free."

Photo 1 page192 The doomed aircraft

Photo 2 page192 Sheikh Saad receiving the survivors

Photo 1 page193 The former hostages with traces of horror still on their faces

Photo 2 page193 Al-Jassar, the Co-pilot

Photo 1 page 194 Al-Gteili on an Armchair

Photo 2 page 194 The hostesses

Assassination of Iraqi Diplomat & His Son

Hadi Awwad Said served as an assistant cultural attaché of the Iraqi Embassy in Kuwait a year and a half ago. He lived in Meshref area with his family consisting of Atiyyah Shinba – wife, Hassan – a 19-year old son, Ghaidaa – a 12-year old daughter, and Saad the youngest son. They used to spend every Friday evening outdoors but on March 1, 1985, he apologized for not accepting the invitation of one of his friends and stayed at home. He drank a lot till he fell asleep. At 1:30 a.m. four gunmen broke into the house from the backdoor of the kitchen. They asked Atiyyah, according to her statements to the police later on, whether her husband had finished drinking. She said: "Yes." They were so neatly dressed that she thought they were Said's guests. One of the gunmen went to the diplomat's room while another one went to Hassan's. The two other gunmen kept an eye on Atiyyah who headed to Ghaidaa's and Saad's room. She asked the daughter and the youngest son to hide inside a cupboard before hearing a stifled sound of two shots. Then the two gunmen emerged from Said's and Hassan's rooms, got out of the house with their colleagues composedly, and fled the scene. They drove a red car without a number plate. Atiyyah hurried to her neighbors to seek help. Their driver drove her car and went to Abdullah, the diplomat's friend whose house was not far from Said's villa. Upon reaching the villa Abdullah fired several shots from his pistol in the air lest any of the gunmen could be still hiding there. As he found Said's and Hassan's heads bleeding heavily, he called the police. Said was rushed to Mubarak Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries a few hours later. The police officer found Hassan's body covered with a bed sheet near the door of the room sprawling in a large pool of blood; his bed was also stained with blood. The officer verified Hassan's death but noted that somebody had moved the victim from the bed to the door and covered the body with the bed sheet.

Technical Reports:

The autopsy reports revealed that two fatal bullets were shot from very close range at Said's and Hassan's left ears and pierced their skulls. The two bullets were fired from one pistol of 7.65 mm caliber, according to the microscopic analysis conducted on the bullets. The fingerprints lifted from the handle of the kitchen door were identical to Atiyyah's. The investigators raised questions on the contractions between the testimonies of the wife and the police officer. As part of investigations into the crime ten suspects were arrested. Eight of the suspects were referred to the Criminal Court. The defendants protested their innocence, while the defense lawyers asserted illegality of the arrest and investigation procedures. The court cleared them of the charges for insufficiency of evidence. The Court of Cassation approved the ruling of the Criminal Court. Although the case was shelved, the question remained: Who were the perpetrators of the crime? . Atiyyah's Testimony:

In her testimony, Atiyyah said the murderer of her husband was not the murderer of her son. She said she tried to help her son and moved him from the bed to the door. However, the police officer said he found no blood stains on her dress. Although she said she had never seen any of the gunmen before, she described them accurately. Later she said she could not describe them because the light was dim. All lights of the villa were off except the light of the TV screen, she told the prosecution. When the prosecution showed her some of the suspects, she backed down on her earlier statements and claimed she could recognize the gunmen. She was aware the perpetrators were being prosecuted definitely. Atiyyah said the crime took two minutes at most to complete. Investigators could not imagine that two minutes were enough for gunmen to break into the hall, ask her whether Said finished drinking, go to Said's and Hassan's rooms without Atiyyah guiding them, kill the two victims, and run away, or enough for Atiyyah to go to Ghaidaa's room bring the daughter and the youngest son to the hiding place inside the cupboard, lock the door of their room, and go to Hassan's room to help him. How could she hide her children while two gunmen were assigned to watch her as she claimed? Investigators weighed the possibility that the crime was perpetrated by only one or two gunmen at most as the microscopic analysis suggested. The behavior of the perpetrators inside the villa showed that they went there frequently before the crime, contrary to Atiyyah's testimony. Atiyyah said one of the killers went to Said's room and the other went to Hassan's without her guidance which meant that they were not strangers to the place. She said also the murderers entered the apartment from the backdoor of the kitchen which was left open by her husband by chance. It was illogical that they could come after midnight to carry out such a high profile crime by mere chance. It was also illogical that they knew that Said would spend that night in particular at home, not outdoors as usual. The investigators raised questions also about the killers being well- dressed not masked and about whey they treated Atiyyah gently and allowed her to hide her youngest son and daughter inside the cupboard of the daughter's room and close the door of the room. They noted that the killer or killers were so professional that they were sure that one shot was enough to kill the victim. The investigators reached the conclusion that the crime was perpetrated by the then Iraqi political leaders because Said deviated from the political line of the Iraqi Baath Party. They also realized that Said was originally the only target of the assassination.

Pursuit of Truth Returns to Square One:

In his book "Death Stopover," Captain Mozher Al-Dulaimi, a former officer of the Iraqi secret service who defected the service and lived in exile, said the Iraqi intelligence founded "the Women Branch" in 1979. The branch recruited women in all state departments, companies, hotels and night clubs. The recruits of the department included prostitutes who were assigned to target important figures whether Iraqis, Arab or foreigners and facilitate their liquidation if need be, Al-Dulaimi revealed. He went on to say: "I knew someone (apparently referring to the victim without revealing his name) who dreamed of wealth and was imprisoned several time under charges of offering bribes to senior Iraqi officials. The man used to live in a simple house but turned to be an important element of the intelligence. He carried out several liquidations against opposition figures before joining the diplomatic carrier. "When the secret service received information that he deviated from the political line of the Baath Party and divulged some classified information, chief of the secret service Barazan Al-Tekriti decided to get rid of him. He assigned the task to one of the closest persons to the victim namely, his wife who was recruited at the Women Branch of the service. She used to offer reports to her bosses betraying his secrets. "Al-Tekriti talked to her in person in the presence of the would-be assassins. He asked her to leave the door open for them to enter the house and not tell the police soon after the operation. The unfaithful wife did her job well and facilitated the assassination. She let the assassins flee the scene safely. When the prosecution summoned her in the following day, the Iraqi secret service intervened and pressed for her release. "Rumors were raised by the family of the victim about the role of the wife, so the Iraqi intelligence service summoned her and arranged a meeting between her and (President) Saddam Hussein personally. She was dictated to pretend to be a poor widow seeking the president's help to identify the killers. He welcomed her with his notorious smile and praised her for her courage in serving the Baath Party. He gave her a handsome sum of money as a gift to her children. The president also told her that he instructed deeming the killer unknown and shelving the case." The author of the book raised his eyebrows at the fact that when the family of the victim accepted the fait accompli and held a funeral party, the assassins were among those attending. Photo 1 page 203 The slain

Photo 2 page 203 The widow

Photo 3 page 203 Relatives of the victim

Attempt on Al-Jarallah's life

The two brothers Mustafa and Samih left Kuwait for Baghdad in 1983 to join the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), the revolutionary council, Abu-Nedhal faction. They were driven by the admiration of the stated targets of the organization including the fight against Zionism and the liberation of Palestine. As they failed to meet their uncle Mojahed, a key member of the organization in Baghdad, to facilitate their membership, they had to return to Kuwait. They knew later that the command of the organization was moved from Baghdad to Damascus after relations between Iraq and Jordan - the arch foe of the organization - improved. The two young men were able to join the organization with another man called Akram a year later. However, the organization pushed them to acts that ran counter to their original aspirations. They were devoted to national struggle but turned to be committing crimes that had nothing to do with that struggle. The command of the organization decided in March, 1985, to murder Ahmed Abdulaziz Al-Jarallah, the owner and chief editor of Kuwaiti daily newspaper "As-Sseyassah." It deemed the man's political line running counter to its objectives. His views angered the armed group to the extent that it believed he had connections with the CIA and the Israeli secret service. He advocated a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict and had nothing against Jordan; the two charges were enough to justify killing him in the eyes of the group. The group sent several death threats to Al-Jarallah but he paid little attention to them. He just changed the time schedule of his agenda. Mustafa flew to Damascus to meet leaders of the organization who tasked him with leading the death squad in Kuwait. The young man, who was just 17 years old, returned to Kuwait with full enthusiasm to prove his allegiance to the group and his ability to lead the men. As part of preparations for the crime, the death squad kept watching the premises of the newspaper to record Al-Jarallah's movements. Under orders from the organization Samih left Kuwait and Mustafa and Akram were ordered to pursue the assassination plan. During surveillance of the premises of the newspaper, the two young men knew that the target leaves the place at 8 o'clock every night in a golden Mercedes. One day while watching the place, Mustafa and Akram noticed by chance a gray Caprice whose driver left its keys in the keyhole of the trunk. They quickly decided to steal the car and use it in the operation. They picked the keys, coined them at the nearest key workshop and returned to the place to throw the original keys beside the car. After finalizing all arrangements in the evening of April 23, 1985, they brought the machinegun and revolver in a black bag and went to the Caprice. Mustafa took the wheel and Akram sat down beside him. They were wearing dark clothes and colored hats. They headed for the premises of the newspaper in Shuwaikh Area. As they saw the golden Mercedes there, they realized that Al-Jarallah was at his office. They lurked for Al- Jarallah in the stolen Caprice some 50 meters away from the building. Mustafa switched off the lights but kept the engine on. Some workers of a nearby company suspected the car and ventured to come close to it. Mustafa and Akram shunned them and tried to hide their faces. Al-Jarallah did not leave his office at 8:00 p.m. He was in a meeting with some prominent journalists discussing the reality of the Arab journalism. He pursued the discussion till after 9:00 p.m. and then emerged from the meeting and got into the car with three other men including the Editing Manager Mohammad Zain. Mustafa drove the car towards the entrance of the building. He stopped it across the street to obstruct Al-Jarallah's car. Akram got down with the machinegun lauded with 25 bullets in his hands. He was running as a member of Special Forces in a military parade. Mustafa kept waiting inside the car with the revolver in his hand set for covering Akram. As Akram came face to face to Al-Jarallah he fired several bullets in the air to disperse those around the target. He started shooting at Al-Jarallah. He shot Al-Jarallah in the hip and shoulder. Al-Jarallah staggered backward while Akram kept advancing and shooting and was just one meter away from his victim. Al-Jarallah sought refuge inside his car and used its door as a shield against the volley of bullets. Akram kept shooting. Al-Jarallah who felt his doom was approaching closed his eyes and read the two Muslim testimonies. At that time Akram ran out of ammunition but had not to worry about as he believed his target was finished. He returned to the stolen Caprice quickly. Mustafa set off to flee the scene. He drove quickly through the streets of Al-Shuwaikh till he reached Al-Ghazali Highway which leads to Shuwaikh Seaport. He turned to the right-hand way leading to Kuwait City. When he stopped at a crossroad he and Akram saw the golden Mercedes apparently carrying Al-Jarallah to hospital. Mustafa and Akram parked the car in an open area close to Kuwait Municipality in Al-Merqab Area, got rid of the car and their hats and took the weapons inside the black bag. They went back to their dwelling in Al- Nugra area by taxi Al-Jarallah was rushed to a nearby hospital by his driver. He was still conscious although he was seriously injured. During the way to hospital he asked the driver repeatedly whether his hands were still there. The driver assured him they were. Within seven minutes after the attack Al- Jarallah was settled at the ICU of Al-Razi Hospital, Al-Sabah Area. The minister of health assigned the best surgeons to take care of him. Al- Jarallah underwent an urgent surgery that lasted for four hours and a half. All bullets that hit him pierced his body because they were fired at very close range. He was lucky because none of the shots hit a vital part of his body. Reports about the attack were carried by all local and regional mass media. Prominent statesmen flocked to the hospital to visit Al-Jarallah. His room seemed to be a flower shop due to the large number of visitors. Khalil, the owner of the stolen Caprice had to report to police when he did not find it anywhere. Akram, who was able to identify the owner of the car and his address through the documents of the car, sent a letter to Khalil apologizing for stealing the car and guiding him to the place where it was. As soon as Khalil got the message he hurried to the same police station where he reported on the theft. He accompanied a police officer to Al-Mergab where they found the car. The so-called Revolutionary Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack. In the evening of the first Thursday after the attack Mustafa and Akram took the weapons inside the bag and went to Al-Andalus Cinema to return the firearms to a certain member of the organization as planned. Investigation got underway soon after the attack took place but they failed to identify the perpetrators.

Al-Shu'abia coffee-shop bombings

Seventy-eight days after the bid on Al-Jarallah's life, Abu-Nedhal group ordered its members in Kuwait, particularly Mustafa Mahmoud and Akram Hussein - who carried out that attack against Al-Jarallah - as well as Ibrahim Saado and Samir Suleiman to deal a strong blow to Kuwait's security authorities. The planned operation targeted as many civilians as possible. After deliberations, the militants picked up a number of coffee- shops overlooking the Arabian Gulf. Al-Andalus Cinema was also the location of delivering explosives to the militants. The ordnance included this time 14 kg of explosives, two pieces of aluminum, two timers, two dry 9-volt batteries, and some wires. Mustafa and Akram carried the components of the explosive devices to the roof of the building where Akram lived. Two days ahead of the operation, the two men bought new 'dishdashas' (long local garments) and two shopping bags to disguise as hikers. On Wednesday July 10, 1985, they decided to make some surveillance of the targeted places. They put on the dishdashas, went to one of the coffee-shops and stayed there for half an hour at night. It happened that a TV program was being shot at the place at that time. Mustafa and Akram shunned appearance in front of the camera. They left after agreeing on carrying out the operation in the following evening. At 5:30 p.m. on Thursday, July 11, 1985, Mustafa, Akram, Ibrahim and Samir went to the roof of building where Akram lived. They assembled the explosive charges and divided them into two parts. They set the timers at 9:00 p.m. Mustafa and Ibrahim took an explosive device in a shopping bag and got down while Akram and Samir were tasked with taking care the other device. The four young men headed for Mustafa's green Corolla. Mustafa took the wheel and dropped Ibrahim and Samir off at the area where they lived. He and Akram pursued their way to a restaurant on Tunis St., Hawalli Governorate, to buy some sandwiches then to a coffee shop at Al-Salmiyah area. They entered the coffee shop at 8:00 p.m. with each one wearing a dishdasha. Their disguise seemed bizarre and aroused the curiosity of some Kuwaitis inside the coffee shop. Mustafa was carrying an explosive charge inside a bag while Akram put on dark glasses. They stayed there for a while then left the bag in the place and got out of a different door. They drove to Al-Sharq Coffee Shop, left the second bag of explosives on a seat and went out. They parked the car in an open area opposite to the Amiri Hospital where they changed their clothes. At 9:00 p.m., the time specified for the synchronized bombings, while visitors of the two coffee shops were enjoying the fascinating clam scene of the Gulf water, the two bombs went off and turned everything upside down. The loud noise of the two explosions was followed by screams of children, women and men alike. The two coffee shops turned into bloodbaths. Police men and medical teams hurried to the scenes while Kuwait radio interrupted its programs to air the news of the catastrophe. Ten people were confirmed dead and 74 others were injured in the two bombings. The Kuwaiti cabinet held an extraordinary meeting and issued a statement condemning the barbaric attacks. Thousands of people responded to the call for blood donation. The Blood Bank of the Amiri Hospital received donations from 3,000 persons in the day following the attack.

Investigations:

The investigations revealed that each bomb contained 5 kg of the highly-explosive RDX. The State Security Prosecution focused suspicions on Mustafa as they received information on his connections with terrorist groups. So he was put under police surveillance. An officer of the State Security Investigations Department managed to establish a close relationship with Mustafa and his father without revealing his real identity. He met them regularly at a restaurant close to their home. In the evening of April 2, 1986, the police officer saw Mustafa, his brother Samih, and his friend Rafe' driving a car. He followed them to Al- Sulaibkhat Area. He saw the car disappearing in a dark desert area. He got down and kept tracking them down on foot. The weather was very bad at that time but he was able to see what they were doing. They noticed that the three men were digging in five places under telephone posts. They unearthed firearms from there, got into the car and went back to Al-Nugra area. In the following morning (on April 3, 1986) the officer accompanied a team of criminal investigators to the desert place while Mustafa traveled abroad. The SSID decided to arrest Mustafa and informed the security authorities of Kuwait International Airport (KIA) and all border crossing points that he was wanted. On May 23, 1986, Mustafa was arrested at KIA under the charge of affiliation to the terrorist group Abu-Nedhal. In the beginning Mustafa denied the charge, but he confessed to it later when the investigators questioned him on the affairs of Al-Sulaibikhat desert. He confessed that he went to the desert place along with Samih and Rafe' and unearthed the firearms from there. Mustafa admitted also to involvement in the attempted murder of Al- Jarallah. He led investigators to other members of the organization who took part in the attempt on Al-Jarallah's life and the bombings of the coffee shops. To justify the crimes, he alleged that Kuwait deducted 5 percent of the salaries of Palestinian employees and gave them to Yasser Arafat's faction.

The Criminal Court hears Al-Jarallah's case:

Ahead of the clerk's declaration of opening the Criminal Court session, the defense lawyer Faris Al-Wuqayyan talked to his client Mustafa. "Have you any conscience about what you did?" the lawyer asked. "No, I haven't," Mustafa answered arrogantly. "I've received the news of my appointment for the mission as if I were told of fathering a male baby after long sterility. It was the happiest moment in my life." "How did they turn you to be cold-blooded killer? And how could you kill innocent people without remorse?" "I'll tell you in a nutshell," Mustafa said, adding: "In the training camps of the group fighters took great pride in carrying out militant operations against enemies of the group whether they were regimes or individuals. Some members were proud of killing prominent figures in a pro-imperialism country and others were proud of blowing up institutions which were hostile to the group. "As for me and the organization in Kuwait, we were despised by other members of the group. They called us 'playboys' because we carried out no operation since joining the organization more than a year ago." "Haven't you discussed the operation with your leaders beforehand?" the lawyer inquired. "As a member of the organization, I don't look for motives and justifications; it is enough that the leader Abu-Nedhal orders and I obey." "Well, the court assigned me to defend you, I hope you will show cooperation and do what I ask you to do," Al-Wuqayyan suggested. "Willingly, thank you before anything." "Regarding your confessions of involvement in the attack against Al- Jarallah, we have no option but seeking Al-Jarallah's pardon, so you have to show some apology. "It's O.K.," the defendant replied. When the court session got underway, Mustafa seemed to be careless about the indictment. He repeated his earlier confessions, taking pride in his crimes. Al-Jarallah who attended the session, kept listening to the appeals of the defense lawyer for pardon. Then, he decided to forgive, saying: "Mustafa is a teenager who was misled and manipulated by his leaders. He was just a tool at their hands. So, I pardon him." The court informed Mustafa of Al-Jarallah's decision but the trial took a dramatic turn when the defendant tuned down the pardon. "I don't want pardon, I don't regret may acts. If I'm out of prison, I would not hesitate a moment in killing him (Al-Jarallah)." Angered by Mustafa's arrogance, Al-Jarallah said: "I put it clear, I tried to help him although he tried to kill me. But as he chose his way, I withdraw my pardon." Al-Wuqqayan was greatly embarrassed. His defendant blocked all ways out of the dilemma. The lawyer had to focus in his statements on the political aspects of the case and the social background of the defendant instead. Mustafa who seemed composed during the court hearing, collapsed when he saw his mother weeping. He burst into tears. On November 12, 1986, the court adopted a softened stance in the case given the voluntary confessions Mustafa made since his arrest. It sentenced him to 20 years in prison instead of a life sentence. The confessions were very helpful in uncovering the identities of other perpetrators Akram and Samih. Akram was handed a life imprisonment in absentia while Samih was imprisoned for 10 years.

The Ruling on Bombings:

On January 7, 1987, the State Security Court, chaired by Justice Mohammad Abdul-Hai Al-Bannay, sentenced Mustafa to death for his role in the coffee shop bombings and cleared Rafe' of all charges. It sentenced Ibrahim to life imprisonment in absentia and Samih to three years in prison for involvement in the same case. As the tribunal came to a close and the jury and people were going out, Mustafa said to Al-Wuqqayan: "I'd like to assure you, the leader (of Abu- Nedhal group) promised me not to worry about death sentence because I will be set free after less than five years." Surprisingly, Mustafa and all other inmates in Kuwaiti jails were set free on the first day of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was actually less than five years of Mustafa's imprisonment. Had the defendant and his organization been aware of the design of invasion at that time or it was a mere coincidence?? Nobody has been able to answer this question so far.

Photo 1 page 219 Justice Mohammad Abdul-Hai Al-Bannay

Photo 1 page 220 Al-Jarallah at the ICU

Photo 2 page 220 A cartoon by Naji Al-Ali showing a chief editor saying to a journalist: "Your article is good but you need to write your will at the end.

Photo 1 page 221 Wreckage of the coffee shop

Photo 2 page 221 Belongings of the coffee shop guests

Blowing up the Amir's motorcade:

The motorcade of His Highness the Amir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al- Sabah, was as usual heading from Dasman Palace toward Al-Seif Palace on the Arab Gulf Road at 9:15 a.m. on 25/5/1985, the 16 th of Ramadan, 1405 AH. The Amir's car was escorted by several vehicles. A car of the Amiri Guards led the convoy, followed by two cars, and then that of HH the Amir, where His Highness used to sit in the front seat beside the driver, Jawhar Merjan. It was protected by two cars of the Amiri Guards, one to the right and the other to the left, followed by a car boarding a unit of the special security of the Guards and the alternative car of His Highness, with an ambulance at the rear. Security authorities took precautions before the motorcade started moving from Dasman Palace, shutting the traffic lights on the two sides of the road, halting traffic in the two directions, except for some turning points. Security personnel charged with protecting the motorcade observed the road where it would pass, ready for any suspicious bid to intercept it before reaching its final destination. The Amir's motorcade, on that day, Saturday, proceeded in the direction of Al-Seif Palace. While it was approaching a fuel station, driver of the front police traffic car spotted a white Nissan approaching from the other side of the road. Its blinking light showed the driver's intention to cross the middle exist point of the road to reach the right side of the motorcade. Rapidly, the front car sped toward the exist point to intercept the suspicious incoming vehicle. Another car, driven by Corporal Mohammad, also sped in its direction blowing the warning sirens. The Nissan pulled up at the turning route, and as the motorcade was passing, its driver attempted to ram it into the convoy, slamming into the left rear of a car of the Amiri Guards, setting off a fiery blast that triggered fires, creating a scene of billowing smoke with the asphalt ground littered with pieces of human flesh and debris. The blast hurled the Guard car into the left side of the Amir's vehicle, tossing it into the right side of the road, yards from the center of scene and the scorching blazes, settling close to the right side of the road close to the fuel station. A corporal of the criminal inspection squad, who was stationed as part of the precautions for the motorcade, recognized the Amir in the damaged car. He hurried to his aid, along with First Lieutenant Abdel Wahab, Captain Jaafar, Sergeant Suleiman and the soldier, Hussein. They whisked His Highness in the car of the corporal to the Amiri Hospital, where he underwent emergency treatment. He survived the blast upon His Almighty's might.

His Highness' Address to the People:

Deep concern and worries that gripped the citizens and residents of Kuwait were only assuaged when His Highness appeared on television, appearing with bruises on his face and his head uncovered. The television and the radio broadcast HH the Amir statement from the intensive care ward of the Amiri Hospital. Starting the address with the Koranic verse, in the name of God the compassionate the merciful and prayers for Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), His Highness assured the people that he was not seriously hurt in the attack, affirming that such attacks "will not stop us from proceeding on the march of goodness for all and for sake of our citizens, the Arab and Islamic nations. "I thank you all for the cordial sentiments and pray to His Almighty to protect you against any evil." His Highness also expressed appreciation to all leaders who inquired about him, prayed to Allah to bestow his mercy souls of the victims of the painful incident and wished quick recovery for the injured.

Damage resulting from the attack:

The scorching heat and fire of the blast gutted a car of the Amiri Guards. An officer, Mohammad Qabalan Al-Enezi, 25, and the soldier, Hadi Hamad Al-Shemmari, 20, were burned beyond recognition. The blazes turned their bodies into charred human skeletons. An Indian, named Biaji Kilimoto, who happened to be passing behind the motorcade when the attack occurred, met the same destiny. His charred watch stopped at 9:20 a.m. A worker at a nearby house was badly wounded with shrapnel. Raki Dikosta, 50, was rushed to the Amiri Hospital, but passed away only a few hours later, succumbing to the serious cuts. His skull was also broken. The blast set another car of the Guards alight, injuring the leading occupant and other passengers. Five other members of the Guards were wounded, in addition to a pedestrian. Security personnel, medics, criminal inspectors and forensic personnel hurried o the scene, where the badly damaged car of His Highness lay close to the middle part of the road, with the left wheel onto it. It was said that the driver left the gear on the "D" while hurrying to aid HH the Amir. It skidded off to the middle of the road before settling up onto the center. While moving without a driver the car damaged the fuel station, nearby houses, smashing glass facades, along with cars parked off the side walk.

Report of the scene of the crime:

The forensic report stated that the sand beach along the Arab Gulf Road, a kilometer-long stretch of land, was littered with pieces of human flesh and bones, such as head skin, teeth, a left hand with one missing finger, a disfigured hand palm and four separated fingers. The report stated that all these pieces belonged to a single person, identified as 25 years old, of blood type B. Prints were picked up from some torn fingers. Upon investigation, it was determined that the disfigured person had no criminal or civil records. A report prepared by the officer who inspected the scene estimated the volume of the explosives at 75-100 kilograms, attached to two fuses, one for detonation and the other for safety, linked up with a battery and a clock.

Investigations of the security authorities:

The state various security networks exerted intensive efforts to determine circumstances of this dangerous security event. Preliminary efforts resulted in identifying the car that was used by the attacker in ramming into the motorcade. It was established that the vehicle was a white Datsun Cherry model 1982, in the name of a Pakistani, Mehdi Ramadan Shah, who had bought it at popular car market. Contract of the car sale stipulated descriptions of the car, cost of sale, which was 320 Kuwaiti dinars, that the buyer carried an identity card NO. 521356 dating 12-6-1983 and expiring on 12-6-1986, with a photo of an alleged worker at a company. The investigators, later, revealed that this ID was a fake, and that no one had worked at a company with such a name, and that the vehicle had not been registered at the traffic department.

Detaining Alaa:

Initial investigations, conducted by the prosecution, were restricted to a limited circle of some material proofs. But on 3/7/1986, a detention warrant was referred to the state security against the prime suspect, named Alaa, a member of the Islamic Jihad organization, an opposition group of the Iraqi regime. The warrant also stated that he intended to resign from his job as a pharmacist and leave the country for good. In interrogations that followed his detention, he confessed that he was a member of the organization and that he had links with the elements that blew up the American, French embassies and other installations in 1983.

Alaa's confessions:

Papers and minutes of Alaa's confessions were submitted to the state security prosecution. He acknowledged that he had made these confessions without duress, and that he was aware that he was being interrogated by the state prosecution. Alaa, during the interrogations, repeatedly admitted that he was involved in the attack on the motorcade, along with accomplices. He told the interrogators that after the court sentence against culprits of the 1983 blasts, he agreed with the other Jihad members, the university professor Abed Al-Hussein, the dentist Mehdi, the pharmacist Wadee, the engineers Abdel Ameer and Hussein to address a message to the Kuwaiti Government warning that they were a group of suicide attackers of the Islamic Jihad in Kuwait with explosives in their possession and that they would carry out bombing attacks similar to those that had been launched against the American Marines, the French paratroopers and the Israeli military command in Lebanon in case the authorities proceeded with the execution of the bombers. The message, written by Mehdi, whose house hosted the meeting, carried the name Islamic Jihad Organization, dated 4-4-1984. The group sent a message to the chief of the organization requesting approval to attack the motorcade of His Highness the Amir. The chief answered back with his consent, with the sentence, "welcome of the motorcade," a code known by the members of the clandestine cell. Serious steps followed; Abed Al-Hussein resigned from his work as professor and vacated his apartment and moved to a basement house in the same building for camouflage. His wife traveled to London, accompanied by engineer Hussein. Abed Al-Hussein started observing the convoy as of October 1984, to determine the time of its passing, its formation, the strength of the escorting security force and guards. He continued observing the convoy sporadically, but he intensified the observation in the fourth month of 1985. He used to park his car at a spot close to the roads where the convoy would pass, pin pointing the points of weakness in the security precautions. Abed Al-Hussein and Wadee agreed during a meeting to buy a car and it rig for the attack. They thought that they would need a vehicle in good condition and powerful enough for the ramming. They bought soap, coal and benzene as well as other materials, prepared a cocktail of explosives linked with wires, to be laden into the engine of the car, in the seat beside the driver and the rest in the benzene tank. Abed Al-Hussein did the rigging without linking the wires to the battery of the car. They set the date for the attack on 25-5-1985, falling on Ramadan 6-1405. At 08:45 a.m. of that day, Abed Al-Hussein parked the rigged car close to deserted old houses close to the road. He and Alaa wired the explosives to the battery so the bomber could set them off with a fuse. Alaa remained watching from a distance, trying to boost morale of Abed Al-Hussein, the attacker, who sped off to the other side of the Arab Gulf Road toward the turning point, ramming the vehicle into the car of the Amiri car, setting off the horrific blast, the huge fire and dense smoke. Without determining result of the attack, Alaa hurried to his work, a pharmacy at Al-Ardiah clinic. He heard about the incident on Riyadh radio at 1 p.m. He headed to the hideout of Mehdi and Wadee to inform them about it, but they had already known about the attack. He later sent the message to the chief, informing him that the mission had been accomplished as planned. Elaborating further during the interrogations, Alaa said that most members of his family had been deported from Iraq to Iran and that their properties and belongings were confiscated. He stated that he had been infuriated with what he perceived as Kuwait's support for Iraq in its war against Iran, and that this prompted him to join the Islamic Jihad Organization that was founded in 1979, as an offshoot of the mainstream party. Alaa added that he decided to join it with influence from Baqer, his three-month room mate in Khaitan. The latter was a convict who had been sentenced to death for the explosions in 1983. Alaa argued that he believed the sentences against those who blew up the embassies were unfair and that what they had done was permissible on the basis of his religious beliefs, and that this doctrine prompted him and his accomplices to send a message of threats to the Kuwaiti Government. They believed that it would subjugate to the threats, and if not, they would press ahead with the attack on the motorcade. He also told the interrogators that Mehdi and Wadee had finalized their work in Kuwait and left the country via its international airport to pursue studying in Germany, and that he stayed in the country till he was detained. Alaa showed the interrogators how the attack was launched. He drew a sketch of the scene and shapes of the explosives.

Examining the files:

The interrogators compiled the information about the culprits. Alaa started working as a pharmacist with the ministry of health in 1981. Abed Al-Hussein was appointed as a professor of sciences at Kuwait University, Faculty of Physics, in 1980, and resigned in 1984. He had previously worked for the nuclear power authority in Baghdad and had full knowledge about the making of explosives. Mehdi was employed by the ministry of health in early 1981 and resigned in 1986. Wadee served as a pharmacist with a company in the middle of 1983 and quit his job in the middle of 1986 to continue studies abroad. Abdel Amir was appointed as an engineer for sophisticated equipment at the ministry of electricity and resigned in the end of 1983. Hussein had served as a civil engineer at a company since 1982 and resigned in 1984. All were identified as Iraqis. The state security prosecution pursued the investigations thoroughly. A prosecutor questioned Baqer at the Central Prison. The latter had been convicted of blowing up the American and the French embassies as well as industrial installations in Kuwait in 1983. He confessed to joining the outlawed, "regional," opposition party in 1972. Its members, some based outside Iraq, had held secret meetings. A branch of the party was established outside Iraq with the proclaimed objective of spreading the Islamic Shariaa. He denied that he had connections with Alaa, but claimed that the face in the photo looked familiar to him.

The state security court:

Alaa was re-questioned in front of the state security court. He denied the charges. He also denied that the data in the passport were a fake and claimed that he had given it to Wadee to extend its validity and that the latter did so. He denied hat he had connection with the attack, that he had accompanied Abed Al-Hussein to buy the car from the auto popular market. He claimed that when the explosion occurred he was at work at Al-Ardiah clinic and that he was there between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. He claimed that Abed Al-Hussein was still alive and that he had left the country along with his wife and children.

The ballistics department:

A sergeant at the ballistics department of the public department for criminal evidences acknowledged that explosives could be made from materials available locally. He also affirmed that a bomb could be made from soap, coal and benzene. That the cocktail could be attached with wires to a power source with a fuse. The explosives could be much more powerful with P.E.T.N. It was also established that the explosives used in the attack weighed 75-100 kilograms and that the electric spark provided by the battery of the car was sufficient to set off a bomb.

The car dealer:

The car dealer said that he had been approached by two men, an Iraqi and an India or a Pakistani. The Iraqi negotiated the deal on behalf of his mate who remained tightlipped for he apparently could not speak Arabic. The deal was done and the Iraqi bought the car for 320 dinars.

The fake passport data:

The Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry in a memorandum addressed to the court acknowledged that the residency extension in the passport was not genuine, that the passport belonged to another person, and that the ID was also a counterfeit.

The encounter:

Alaa, during the interrogations, insisted that he was acquainted with Baqer, however the latter denied that. Maha, a mate of Alaa at the clinic, told the interrogators that she could not specify date of his show-up at work during the day of the attack, partly because there was no book for recording the time of arrival and leave of the staff.

Examining the prints:

The court ordered comparison of the finger prints at the scene with those included in the employment record of Abed Al-Hussein and the accused peers. The criminal report established the prints did not match, and that there was no matching between style of writing in the letter with that of the other documents. The court listened to testimonies by the security officers, Amiri Guards , driver of the car of HH the Amir, the inspection corporal and the officer of the state security inspection.

Video-taped confessions:

The court during a session held on 19-10-1986 displayed a two-hour videotape presented by an inspection officer including full confessions by the accused Alaa, with the presence of his lawyer Adel Aziz Taher who had been designated by the tribunal for the defense. Alaa admitted that it was him who appeared in some of the shots of the film.

The court opinion:

The court stated that identity of the person who rammed the explosives-laden car into the motorcade of HH the Amir remained unknown, on ground that the inspection of the prints did not lead to specific results. It confirmed that Alaa was involved in the crime despite some contradictions in the testimony, that he tried to frame others in the operation in a bid to appear as a victim of a plot. He confessed that he counterfeited the passport and that Wadee was involved in the purchase of the car and had a hand in preparing the explosives that were planted in the vehicle.

The sentence:

The state security court chaired by justices Mohammad Abdel Hai Al- Bannai, Ahmad Taher and Saad Al-Safran, ruled at a session held on 29- 11-1986 that Alaa to be sentenced to death, while Wadee to be punished with imprisonment behind bars for life. It acquitted Mehdi, Abdel Amir and Hussein.

Photos :

His Highness the Amir addresses the citizens via the television.

Damaged car of HH the Amir after the attack.

Scene of the attack.

Sketch of the plan of the attack.

Photos of the martyrs Qabalan and Lavi, member of the national guards.

Scorched body of a pedestrian.

Damaged car of the guards.

Another car of the guards and the senior officer.

A sketch of the court and the accused.

A popular rally in condemnation of the attack.

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Oil installations blasts:

A group of youth, following prayers at a local mosque, used to hold conversations on some religious issues, as well as intellectual and political affairs. The Iraq-Iran war and stance of some super powers toward the Arabs and Muslim was often the main topic of the post prayers discussion. Leader of the group gradually prepared his mates for involvement in some action, and used to ask one of them sometimes to keep a weapon for him.

Facts of the case:

This case started developing in 1984, when the chief of the obscure band traveled to the Iranian city of Qom, an ancient city regarded by many Muslim Shiites as second in terms of holiness after Nejev, in 1984. It is also a pilgrimage site for the Shiites, for it hosts mausoleum of Sayeddah Maasouma, the sister of the Shiites' eighth Imam, Ali Al-Rida. It had appeared as a large Arab city after many Iraqis settled up in it, fleeing suppression of the Iraqi regime. The chief held a meeting, in Qom, with an activist of the Iraqi opposition, whom he had been acquainted with since the times when the latter worked in Kuwait. They talked about various religious and political issues namely conditions on the Gulf arena and role of the Iraqi opposition in and outside Iraq. They later met another leader of the opposition, named Dr. Ahmad, discussing plans for relieving the Iraqi people. The doctor asked him to prepare a hideout for keeping arms and explosives, that would be dispatched to him on trucks. They agreed on codes to be used in telephone contacts as part of the delivery operation. They agreed that a messenger, with whom he would be introduced with the code sentences, would visit him at home and take the arms to Iraq. Weapons were transported to Iraq across the Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders five times during 1984-1985. In the last operation, the middleman was worried for the regime in Baghdad intensified measures at the border exits and routes. The chief of the band traveled anew to Iraq in 1985, and met with Dr. Ahmad who escorted him to a place close to the naval base of Bader Brigade, a military wing of the Iraqi opposition. They discussed possibility of carrying out action to coerce Kuwait halt assistance to Iraq. Ahmad argued that the substantial aid and media support for the regime in Baghdad aggravated hardships of the Iraqi people. They debated plans for attacking some Kuwaiti military or economic sites, the Iraqi embassy or Iraqi Baathists. The leader agreed to the plans but opposed the assassination notion for he was not in favor of spilling blood. They agreed on smuggling the arms and explosives via the sea to a spot close to the deserted Kuwaiti island of Kubbar, located 19 nautical miles off Al- Zor beach, south of Kuwait city. The chief returned to Kuwait and listened for many hours to a radio station, as agreed upon to learn about arrival of the cargo, which fell in the morning of one of the days in April, 1986. He hurriedly sailed in the direction of the spot at sea aboard a small boat, with escort of a mate, but he did not find the explosives. He after returning empty handed visited the site several times to no avail. But on one night during Ramadan, he and his fellow activist of the secret organization spotted the boat at sea and took delivery of the cargo, two large bags, two handbags and two radio empty boxes. They brought the cargo to the leader of the group who hid it at the workshop of his house. It included 100 kilograms of C-4 material, 30 kg of TNT, six machine guns, 10 pistols, six hand-grenades, 20 fuses, a cache of ammunition and four silencer-equipped pistols. He met Abu Yousef, a member of the Iraqi opposition, late May. The latter took part of the cargo for shipment to Iraq. He also reminded him of the agreement with Dr. Ahmad on blowing up some oil installations. He handed over the rest of the cache of explosives to a mate, for later usage in limited and bloodless sabotage operations, with minimum impact on the national economy. Two members of the clandestine cell, on 17-6-1986, loaded six boxes of explosives into a van of Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), and joined three other fellow saboteurs waiting in a jeep. They proceeded to Al-Ahmadi Governorate for carrying out the operation. They placed a box of explosives near the northern oil tanks, another close to an oil well, a third near a network for oil mixing adjacent to the southern tanks, two others in the distribution network and a sixth box close to Al-Ahmadi causeway that leads to Al-Shuaiba. At 6 p.m., the explosives went off starting huge fires, where residents in nearby districts could clearly see the high tongues of fire above the scene. Firemen, security forces and inspectors hurried to the place of the fires that were put out hours later with participation of 30 engines and 300 firemen. The blazes, fortunately, did not spread to the nearby tanks, thus the region was spared a devastating catastrophe. Losses were estimated at one million Kuwaiti dinars, but the oil operations were not affected. British insurance companies were relieved for the limited losses, while the GCC states expressed readiness to put out extra oil to make up for any possible shortage of crude production from Kuwait, in line with a previously agreed upon agreement. A state prosecutor questioned, at Ibn Sina Hospital, driver of a van who was fetching milk from the farm of his employer in the region, as he used to do. While returning home, his car reached a road soaked with leaking oil that quickly caught fire. When his car was set ablaze he hurled himself outside the vehicle amid the inferno, to be rescued by the firemen. He survived with some injuries. The prosecution questioned executives and workers at the KOC, security and fire men, but there was yet no clue as to the identity of the arsonists. Abu Youssef, in December 1986, met the chief of the band, and talked to him about conditions in Iraq. He asked him to mastermind a distorting campaign against the fifth conference of the Islamic states, due to be held in Kuwait, and seek to deflect attention to the plight of the Iraqi people and arrogance of the regime in Baghdad. A week later, he received a written message from the doctor, placed at the newspaper box outside his house, instructing him to do whatever possible to obstruct the holding of the conference. After reading it, he tore it up. Days later, Abu Youssef showed up, told him that he was aware of the contents of the message and that he would leave Kuwait for good, and that another person named Rabah would be in touch with him. He told him that the weapons were dumped into the bottom of the sea close to Kubbar island to evade Kuwaiti naval patrols. He told him that the arms were hidden in tanks attached to a rope that was connected to a floating buoy. He told him to retrieve the weapons and that he would transport part of them to Iraq and leave the rest in his possession to be used in explosions in Kuwait. Four members of the group retrieved the explosives from the sea bed. They pulled out metal tank and four small containers. They failed to salvage one container but the rest of the items were placed at a house of a member of the group. The chief of the band, one day, met a mate at a mosque after dusk prayers and invited him to his home, where they discussed schemes of America and Britain for exploiting wealth of the region. They thought that the best means to target American interests was to cut off the crude supplies to it. He asked him to join the group and supply him with information about the oil installations in Al-Shuaiba where he worked. He also gave him a small camera to shoot the site. He did so and processed the film, but did not print the pictures. He also asked him to carry out sabotage acts at the sites but he refused. After giving him a period of time for thinking, he handed him a hand-grenade. He hid it at the garden of his house. A week later, a member of the band visited him and handed him seven kilograms of explosives. He told him to place the bomb under any pipeline and turn on the switch, but he refrained from doing so. The chief visited him, on 20-1-1987, reprimanded him and took the explosives.

The second chief of the cell:

The other leader handed to a member a clock and a fuse and asked him to fetch the explosives from their mate to place them at any site at his work. But the latter took the items to his work place the next day, disconnected the battery from the clock and hurled them into a water canal leading to a beach. The chief also gave 15 kilograms of explosives to two other activists with four fuses and two clocks and asked them to blow up sites. They placed one at a gas site and another at an oil well in the region of Al-Muqawaa. He also persuaded another to blow up Mina Abdullah refinery and told him that Islam ordered him to so because Kuwait helped the Iraqi government in its war against Iran and handed him some explosives. The worker showed up at work at 10:30 a.m., half an hour earlier than usual, where he secretly planted the bomb at an oil tank at the refinery. He proceeded to the work place of a mate at the site. His boss saw him there and asked him why he turned up early. He did not answer and returned to his work place. At 1:10 p.m., the bomb blew up causing confusion and chaos, but he remained at his work place. The other leader of the group secretly brought 10-15 kg of explosives to his work place, along with a fuse, wires and a hand-grenade. He concealed the explosives under his clothes which he carried in a bag. Security men at the gate did not notice this. During his presence at work on the industrial island, located 15 km off the pier of the port, he concealed the bomb into a pipe that was connected to at tank that was under maintenance. He defused the hand-grenade and tossed it into the fire engine pump.

Explosion of the bombs:

The bomb blew up at night on 19-20-1978. The explosion at Mina Abdullah dented the side of the tank that contained black fuel. That at Al- Muqawaa well resulted in leakage of oil and scorching fires. The explosion at the tank No. 20 was so powerful and left extensive damage. When Kuwait hosted the fifth conference of the Islamic states, on 26-1- 3-1978, a member of the group, on 2244-1-87, planted a small bomb under a car parked near a hotel in the center of the capital. The explosion smashed the car and left extensive damage nearby.

Arresting the culprits:

The state security inspectors detained 16 citizens charged with having a hand in the attacks. They found in their possession explosives, four machine guns, 17 pistols, 38 hand-grenades, fuses and 30 kilograms of explosives that were retrieved from the sea bed.

Violent demonstrators:

The security authorities assigned a number of inspectors to monitor a fourth fugitive in Mishref. Four days after enforcing the measures, on 30- 1-1987, at noon time after the Friday prayers, some worshippers called for a demonstration to break the siege around the house of the suspect. Some 150 persons responded. The security forces tried to disperse them but they fought back and tried to break into the house to release the surrounded persons. Some hurled stones at the personnel, prompting one officer to fire into the air, but when this did not deter the protestors, the officers had to open fire into the ground and then to the feet of the attackers. An officer reached a nearby house and called for back-up by telephone. The back-up force arrived at the scene and arrested some of the protestors. But the fugitive managed to flee along with members of his family during the clashes. An officer and four of the protestors were wounded in the violence. Police later arrested a number of activists who gathered at hospital to inquire about fellows who were injured in the clashes.

Prosecution of the suspected bombers:

The prosecution began, on 1-2-87 interrogating suspects of the oil installations explosions. They all denied the charges. The defense argued against the detention of the suspects and search of their houses and questioned authenticity of the evidences.

The court opinion:

The state security court approved legal grounds of the detentions and the search of the houses of the detainees, and noted that the confessions of the suspects were authentic and matched the investigations, examinations and the technical reports.

The verdict:

The court, at a session held on 6-6-1987, convicted six of the accused and sentenced them to death. Another one was sentenced to life in prison for involvement in the blasts. One of them was sentenced to seven years behind bars, for he refrained from carrying out sabotage attacks, however he had kept in his possession a hand-grenade, an unlicensed pistol and photographs of oil sites. The ninth, who was penalized with only three years in prison, had dumped the fuse and the battery into the water canal for he was not convinced of carrying out the attacks. He however had an unlicensed pistol in his possession. As to the fourth accused, the tribunal opined that the fact that he had possessed a pistol, assembled a bomb and was taught how to use them were insufficient factors to convict him as an expert in explosives and guns. It ruled the imprisonment of the 10 th for seven years for possession of a hand-grenade, and ordered suspension of the imprisonment sentence against the 11 th for he was a student, and for keeping a pistol for only two days. The 12 th accused, a student at the teaching faculty, was given a verdict of 10 years behind the iron bars for keeping a hand-grenade. It also ordered the holding of the imprisonment for three years against the third accused considering his age and the holding of a pistol for only one week. The 14 th convict was to be punished with three years in the prison for hiding a pistol and an automatic rifle. The 15th and 16 th were acquitted.

Prosecution of the protestors:

The court of the state security held its first session to cross examine the case of the demonstration that involved 26 persons, who were questioned one after another before the tribunal. One told the court that after he was told that the fourth accused person in the case of the oil sites was sealed off in his house by the security forces, he hurried to the site along others to lift the blockade, that he had hurled stones in the direction of the policemen, that he had been hurt in the head and had to be hospitalized. Another claimed that he tried to persuade the security personnel to lift the siege and allow the family of the wanted to leave, and that when the shooting began he tried to leave but was hit with a bullet in the abdomen that warranted hospitalization. A fellow confessed that the security forces warned him along with the mates from approaching after the Friday prayers, and when one of them tried to approach them he was shot in the belly. Then, the protestors tossed stones at the policemen, and that he was hit with a bullet in his leg. His mate who also testified in front of the court claimed that the blockade had been broken when he showed up at the house. He said he could remember how he was wounded and claimed that he was with the crowd but had no hostile intentions. Another claimed that he accidentally happened to be at the location during the clashes. Others made various allegations, all claiming that they were there by accident and had no violent intentions. The imam of the mosque categorically denied inciting the worshippers. He said that he was on his way to his house in Bayan when he spotted a relative talking with the police guarding the residence of the accused in the explosions case. The conversation developed into a quarrel. He added that the next day he headed along with a relative to the interior ministry building to protest the bad behavior by the policemen. Upon arrival, he was designated by a crowd to convey their protests to the officials over the violence the day before. The next day after finishing the Friday prayers, he proceeded to another mosque in Hawally and told the attendees about promises he had been given by the ministry officers to resolve the problem, and that he was detained on 8-2-1987 while returning home.

Views of the judges:

The court ruled that all the protestors disregarded orders by the security authorities to disperse, that three of the accused confessed to taking part in the demonstration and refused to heed the police orders. The others joined the protest and fled before the orders to disperse and were not involved in the violence. Others followed the protestors out of curiosity and some intervened to aid the injured. It acquitted the imam of the charges of involvement in the protest although he had lectured the worshippers at the mosque, wearing a coffin.

The verdict:

The state security court at a session held on 25-7-1987 sentenced one of the accused to five years in prison, others to six months because they were younger than 18. The rest were acquitted.

Photos:

Blast and fire at a site of oil pipelines

Blast at a site for oil gathering.

Scenes of the explosions

Tight security during the prosecution

Hijack of Al-Jabriah plane:

Three hours had passed since take-off, with passengers of the Kuwaiti Airway planes reflecting on the recreational sites they had seen in Bangkok and the good times they spent there. That was on Tuesday, April 5, 1988, and the plane was heading home from Thailand with 96 passengers on board in addition to the five man crew. Atmosphere on board of the plane was serene. Things appeared in order and the passengers calm and relaxed, except for one who had boarded it, looking drunk. All of a sudden, three persons stood up, one in the front part of the aircraft, another in the middle and third at the rear. Others rushed to the cabin ordering the pilots to fly in the direction of the sun!! The chief pilot turned back and said carelessly to the shouting person, "are you still drunk?" But the gunman shouted again, brandishing a pistol and a hand-grenade. The engineer asked, "Why in the direction of the sun?" The other hijackers ordered the passengers to drop to the ground and announced that the plane was being commandeered. A steward attempted to confront them but he was hit on the head with the butt of a pistol. The hijacker forced him to the floor, kicking him.

Hands on heads:

The hijackers ordered the passengers to stay put and raise their hands above their heads. One of them cried, "If someone moves or cries I will kill him instantly." Stunned, the passengers glued to their seats, shocked and deeply bewildered. The gunmen forced the Iraqi chief pilot, Subhi Naeem, the co-pilot, Eid Rashed Al-Azmi, and the engineer, Ayed Al- Shemlan, to fly the plane in the direction of Meshad airport northeast of Iran. Meanwhile, the observation post at Kuwait Airport tried in vain to contact the plane. The pilot tried to signal via the radar that the aircraft was taken over, but the leaders of the hijackers prevented him from doing so, saying, "Do not touch anything." The gunman asked about the recorder of the flight, the black box. The pilot acknowledged that the box was available and showed him a map illustrating the course of the flight to the Iranian airport. During the flight over Oman , the pilot received a warning from the ground that he changed the course of the scheduled flight, but the gunman prevented him from replying. He also told him not to contact a plane that was flying close to them.

In Meshad:

When the plane reached the skies over Meshad, it was contacted for verification, "Kuwait 422?" but the gunman prevented the pilot from answering and he himself replied and notified the Iranian authorities that the plane was under his control and asked for permit to land. It did so while the Iranian authorities stationed sharpshooters at vantage points at the facility. Iraq delegated the deputy prime minister to negotiate with the hijackers who demanded that Tehran release seven prisoners who had been convicted for blowing up the American, French embassies and other installations. The gunmen asked for refueling and permit to fly away.

Classification of the passengers:

The Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al- Sabah chaired an emergency meeting of the cabinet and decided to send an official delegation to Iran to help in the negotiations with the hijackers. He called on the Iranian authorities to prevent the aircraft from taking off and seek to end the operation in a bloodless way. Kuwait Airways Corporation, for its part, set up an operations room to follow up on the situation round the clock. Kuwait Airport went on alert in anticipation that the aircraft might head this way, halted all flights to Bangkok, Manila, Delhi, Colombo, Dhaka and Bombay. Cargo flights were also suspended. A Jordanian passenger, who was freed by the hijackers because of cardiac illness, told the journalists that the gunmen tied the passengers after questioning them and divided them into three categories: a group in the front, another for women while placing the men in the rear. They also separated the nationalities. They intentionally seated each physically weak passenger beside a stout one. They also ordered the civilians to refrain from talking or turning back. The gunmen demanded that the Iranian authorities supply them with drinking water, back-up power units and fuel. The gunmen, 20 hours after taking over the plane, released 24 women of various nationalities but they did not include any Kuwaiti. They were transported to a nearby hotel. The gesture was apparently intended to ensure a tighter grip on the situation on board. In the Thai capital, the local authorities established after investigations that the hijackers carried false Kuwaiti and Bahraini passports.

The second day, Wednesday 6-4-1988:

A Kuwaiti delegation including three senior officials of the foreign ministry arrived in Meshad to try facilitate the negotiations, provided that there would be no blackmailing. A stewardess, who was freed, said she could not determine nationality of the hijackers, that they spoke several languages and accents, that they were in their 20s, worn out because of lack sleeping, but appeared well trained and communicated with certain signals or codes. The plane was supplied with a doctor and oxygen to treat some of the passengers, in addition to some meals. The hijackers expressed anger that a long time passed without results in the negotiations and threatened to fly in case their demands were not met. The Iranian authorities declared consent to supply it with fuel to avert a catastrophe, amid reports that if the plane headed to Beirut the situation would become much more complex. There were conflicting reports about conditions of the plane that day and unfounded reports about a planned security operation to storm the aircraft.

The third day, Thursday, 7-4-1988:

The hijackers freed 32 passengers, at dawn, bringing the number of those who were released to 56, while 55 remained on board of the aircraft. The gunmen demanded that they be supplied with a power generator to turn on the air-condition set. The Iranian authorities, meanwhile, secured a telephone line with Kuwait to enable the gunmen express their demands directly to the leaders, rather than to the Kuwaiti delegation that was present at the airport. The hijackers threatened to "make the passengers pay the price if their demands were not heeded," and that they would consider them as political prisoners. They also demanded removal of the barriers to facilitate take-off of the aircraft, arguing that the procrastination would imply Iranian complicity with Kuwait. They also argued that their release of a number of passengers should not be viewed as a sign of weakness, instead a sign of good intentions. The chief pilot of the plane contacted the observation tower, protesting that the kidnappers threatened to coerce him fly the plane despite low fuel and threatened to kill him if he refrained from flying. A Kuwaiti passenger, after expiry of the grace period declared by the hijackers, was coerced into addressing a wire-less message saying that the passengers suffered from fear and fatigue, and that the gunmen were serious, and that they forced a Kuwaiti female passenger to address an identical message urging the authorities to accept their demands. Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, in a message addressed to the prime minister of Iran, called for securing the lives of the passengers and objected to the Iranian intention to allow the aircraft take off. However, the Iranian authorities supplied it with fuel.

The fourth day, Friday, 8-4-1988:

Forty-nine passengers, who had been freed, returned to Kuwait on board of the plane, "Warba." They were subjected to a medical examination upon arrival. A journalist jokingly asked one of the returnees whether he would travel again to Bangkok in the future. He replied, "I will scratch it off my map of tourism and I will never go there again." Meanwhile, the Iranian authorities removed the blockades at the airport allowing the aircraft to fly at 2:15 p.m. Tehran declared that it was flying in the direction of the West. Larnaca Airport declared shortly later that the plane entered the Turkish air space, but Ankara said it would not allow it to land, then the Beirut airport said the commandeered plane was flying in its direction and that it would not allow to touch down no matter what the consequences may be. Staff and workers at the airport were placed on high alert and scores of Lebanese and Syrian troops were put on high alert at the air facility. Traffic at the Beirut airport was halted, barricades were placed on the runways and medics were alerted. The chief pilot tried in vain to contact Beirut. Then, he switched to Larnaca, declaring that the fuel would be sufficient for only three hours and that he would be compelled to land in Beirut. When the aircraft entered the Lebanese air space, the chief pilot contacted the observation tower asking for permit for emergency landing.

The observation tower: We have no orders to allow you land. The pilot: There is a gun pointed at my head. The tower: We have been living under threats of guns for 15 years. The airman: We have passengers suffering from cardiac illnesses. The tower: All Lebanese have been suffering from heart troubles since 15 years ago. Then, a crying passenger talked to the tower, saying that the fuel would run out and the passengers were near nervous breakdown. The tower: You are wasting your time. A hijacker: Notify the ministers of interior, justice and labor that the fuel of the plane had run out. The tower: The orders are firm and clear … No landing. The pilot: I will make emergency landing. The tower: We have instructions to open fire if you try to land. The hijacker: We will get down and I will cut off your tongue. The tower: We have informed you about the orders. The pilot: I will carry out emergency landing and I will let the plane fall into the sea. The tower: Let it fall into the sea. The hijacker: We will land despite what may happen. We hold the ministries of justice, labor and interior responsible for the casualties. The tower: You are the hijackers and you are responsible for safety of the passengers.

The commandeered plane roared over Beirut for three hours and 23 minutes circling 22 times at a low altitude, with two botched bids to land. Hundreds of residents of the city watched the plane circling time and again overhead from the roof-tops.

The hijackers told the pilot to land the plane onto the sea, but he warned them it would crash upon impact on the surface of the waters and no-one on board would survive. The hijackers decided to shift to Damascus Airport but the authorities there declined giving them a permit to land. In desperation, the pilot contacted Larnaca airport and was given okay to land there. En route to Cyprus, the stewardesses gave some instructions to the passengers on precautions for emergency landing. Later, the plane landed safely at Larnaca airport, seven hours after take-off. Security forces sealed it off, and the hijackers asked for a power generator.

The hijacker radios the tower: Please supply us with a power generator. The observation tower: We are looking for an engineer to install it. The hijacker: Let me say it frankly to you, that there is no need for an engineer to equip the plane with a generator. The tower: You should free some of the passengers as a good gesture. The hijacker: I cannot release more people and we are supposed to be on guard against you. Not the other way round. The tower: Driver of the vehicle boarding the generator is afraid of approaching the plane. The hijacker: We will be kind to you and I promise you that no one will be hurt. Shortly later, a vehicle approached the plane boarding the generator. It was installed. Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti delegation headed to Cyprus aboard a special plan to follow up on the drama.

The fifth day, Saturday, 9-4-1988:

The hijackers soon asked for refueling, newspapers, food, water and ice. The Kuwaiti delegation asked the Cypriot authorities to keep the plane at the airport, fearing more complications and for being concerned about safety of the passengers. As to the gunmen, they freed the Kuwaiti passenger, Fadel Abdel Rasoul, aged 32. They offered to free more in exchange for fuel. Later they offered freeing half of the passengers in exchange for three of their imprisoned fellows. All these offers were emphatically rejected by the Kuwaitis. The following heated conversation was recorded:

The hijacker: If you do not fill the tankers by 10 a.m. we will kill a passenger. The tower: Please confirm your message. The gunman: Yes we confirm it and the deadline will be at 10:30 a.m. The tower: This means 62 minutes from now but your threats to kill passengers will not serve your cause and will undermine our efforts to help you. Freeing passengers will be rewarded with fuel. Please reconsider your attitude. The hijacker: (15 minutes ahead of the deadline). You have procrastinated. By 11 a.m. prepare a coffin and an ambulance. The tower: Please reconsider your stance. The hijacker: We have killed a Kuwaiti passenger. The tower: Please confirm. The gunman: Yes we confirm, he was a security man and additional awards will be given if you fail to supply us with fuel!! Indeed, they had killed the Kuwaiti national, Abdullah Al-Khaldi, who was a member of the border guards and dumped his body onto the tarmac. Quickly, medics reached the corpse and carried it away on an ambulance.

The sixth day, Sunday, 10-4-1988:

The negotiations reached a dead-end. Kuwait remained adamant and the gunmen too. The plane engineer radioed the tower warning that the hijackers were serious and would hurt other passengers. In an hour, the gunmen agreed to prolong the grace period further and declared intention to fly to Kuwait International Airport, though this was actually a trick for they were aware that they would not be safe in Kuwait. Shortly later, they asked to be allowed to declare a statement on the Cypriot radio, and that was done. The Cypriot Government adopted the following tactic: keeping the plane grounded, pursuing the negotiations, trying to exhaust the hijackers, refrain from making deals, observing tone of the rhetoric of the gunmen and abstain from bursting into the plane unless the gunmen started wasting too much blood.

The seventh day, Monday, 11-4-1944:

The hijackers killed another Kuwaiti, Khaled Ismail, 20, and dumped his body onto the tarmac, four minutes after expiry of the second deadline. Contacts between the gunmen and the airport stopped for two hours. The gunmen called the airport demanding to be refueled. At 6 p.m., they issued a statement and threatened to blow up the plane if they were not allowed to fly to Algeria, and that they would free all the passengers in exchange for the three prisoners held in Kuwait.

The eighth day, Tuesday, 12-4-1988:

The saga of the plane seizure appeared to have reached a dangerous turning point when the hijackers called the plane, "the aircraft of the great martyrdom." One of them read a statement warning that they deiced to wear coffins. Then, a military aircraft landed near the plane, prompting the gunmen to inquire about it. They were assured that it boarded supplies for the British troops deployed on the island. The Cypriot Government, having examined the situation and realized that the hijackers appeared suicidal, decided to refuel the plane. The gunmen, for their part, released 12 passengers including four Kuwaitis.

Storming the plane was impossible:

British aviation officials sharply criticized the Cypriot authorities for allowing the plane to fly. However, chiefs of anti-terrorism squads affirmed that bursting into a Jumbo-747 was a very hard task. The doors of the aircraft were very high from the ground and blasting off the doors would not inflict enough damage that would facilitate the actual storming. Moreover, the Cypriot squads were not trained on storming giant aircraft such as the Jumbo-747.

Uncommon hijackers!

Observers and the negotiators at the airport realized that the gunmen were well trained, shrewd and cold blooded. Some spoke English and others had knowledge of all the technologies used on the plane. They did not need technicians to install the generator, neither they needed medics to install the blood drip for a sick passenger.

The ninth day, Wednesday, 13-4-1988:

The hijacked plane reached Hawari Boumedian Airport in Algiers. The interior minister contacted the gunmen and then met them directly on board of the plane, where they promised that they would not use violence against the passengers. They were supplied with food and fuel for operating the air-condition set. Meanwhile, a Kuwaiti Boeing arrived in Kuwait from Larnaca, boarding 12 of the released passengers and the two corpses.

The 10 th day, Thursday, 14-4-1988:

Kuwait held a funeral process for Abdullah Al-Khaldi and Khaled Ayoub that grouped thousands of citizens, led by Sheikh Saad Al- Abdullah Al-Sabah. Meanwhile, at the Algiers airport, the tower asked the crew to park the aircraft at another spot to give space to an incoming plane boarding the Zambian president. Later on, an Algerian doctor boarded it, examined and treated passengers. The hijackers had to release a 70-year-old Kuwaiti passenger because he complained repeatedly and caused some commotion, asking to go to the toilet repeatedly. His family, later, said they were not aware he was on the plane. There were reports that wife of Imad Mughniyeh, was sister of the explosives expert Yousef Badr Edddine, who was one of seven activists held in Kuwait, under the nick-name Elias Saab, and one of three who had been sentenced to death.

The 11 th day, Friday, 15-04-1988:

At 8 a.m., the hijackers asked for 50 breakfast meals, Algerian and French newspapers, but they were told that the dailies did not publish on Friday. The Algerian authorities adopted a diplomatic policy with the hijackers. Each time they would make new threats, an Algerian negotiator would board the plane and calm them down.

The 12 th day, Saturday, 16-4-1988:

At 1 p.m., the Algerian authorities asked 200 journalists who were covering the event at the airport to nominate two of them for interviewing the hijackers in response to their demand. After a heated debate, they elected two of them; the correspondent of the New York Times in the Middle East, Yousef Ibrahim, and the correspondent of the French news agency, Marie France. The two journalists along with the Algerian negotiator boarded the plane.

The Algerian journalist: Have you heard about Abu Jihad's assassination? What is your opinion?

The hijacker: We condemned this act that was carried out by the Zionists.

The Algerian journalist: Is there any possibility to free the passengers on the advent of Ramadan?

The hijacker ignored the question and repeated the demands.

The New York Times correspondent: What are the chances of freeing the passengers in exchange for your departure?

The hijacker: No chance whatsoever … We will not abandon the plane and we will commit a massacre.

The correspondent: The passengers of Kathma had been freed but he was interrupted by he hijacker.

The gunman: We have nothing to do with the 1984 incidents and we are ready to accept a full-scale solution that may be offered by our Algerian brothers.

The French journalist, who did not understand Arabic, repeated the same questions.

The chief hijacker, after the interview that lasted or 15 minutes, asked the journalists to report it without alterations.

In the meantime, HH the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al- Sabah, telephoned the Algerian president, requesting proper measures to spare the lives of the passengers and the crew.

The 13 th day, Sunday, 17-4-1988:

This day witnessed contacts and talks between the hijackers and the Algerian officials.

The 14 th , Monday, 18-4-1988:

Ramadan began and the hijackers asked for copies of the Koran and Sohour meals. The Amir and the Crown Prince did not receive well-wishers on the advent of the fasting month as a result of the tragedy. His Highness the Amir ordered allocations of special financial aid for the families of the two Kuwaiti victims. He also ordered they be pardoned of their debts to the state.

The 15 th day, Tuesday, 19-4-1988:

The gunmen demanded that they be supplied with water, newspapers and cleaners. The Algerian negotiator boarded the plane for talks. The gunmen demanded fuel and electric power to operate the air-condition set. This day witnessed on-and-off negotiations and the gunmen commandeering the aircraft started to appear exhausted. Obviously, they had anticipated that the operation would not last more than three day.

The 16 th day, Wednesday, 20-4-1988:

The Algerians promised the gunmen that they could proceed to any country they might choose in exchange for releasing the passengers. At this point, the gunmen appeared less suicidal and keen on sparing their own lives. At 6:30 a.m., the gunmen descended the plane with escort of Algerian security personnel, without knowledge of the journalists. Half an hour later, the Algerians boarded the aircraft and told the passengers and the crew that the hijacking operation was over. It was a moment of disbelief for the passengers. Meanwhile, the gunmen disappeared and the saga came to an end after 16 days, including four days in Iran, five in Cyprus and eight days in Algeria. Oddly, the hijackers kept passports of the 94 passengers!!

The next day, 21-4-1988, the Kuwaiti plane Qaru brought the passengers back home to a warm welcome by thousands of cheering people led by the Amir and the Crown Prince. Students welcomed the freed people with flowers while the national anthem was played. The first passengers to emerge from the ill-fated plane were Ibtisam and Anwar Al-Sabah.

The flaws and the responsible authorities:

Undoubtedly, the authorities at the Thai airport were primarily responsible for the hijacking, and that was confirmed by an Iata report that included surveillance of the security conditions at the air facility following the incident, as well as the inspection by the Kuwaiti security team. As to Kuwait, both the Kuwaiti Airways and the Interior Ministry were responsible for the incident, but the ministry was particularly blamed for failing to ensure security on board of the national carriers.

Flaws attributed to the KAC:

The corporation failed to take proper security precautions to level off with the security flaws at the Thai airport, thus giving the hijackers the chance to sneak into the plane. The Kuwaiti security officer stationed at Bangkok Airport had filed several reports about the insufficient security measures at the airport.

The corporation depended entirely on the Thai security precautions, contrary to chapter 17 of Chicago security aviation that stipulates that there should be no complete dependence on the local authorities for such precautions and that the aviation company should take proper measures in this regard.

The security precautions aboard Al-Jabriah were flawed, and that appeared in the forms of:

Non-existence of armed security personnel aboard the plane, limited capacity of the metal detectors, opening the gate of the plane in absence of the Kuwaiti security officer, loading the luggage into the plane in absence of the person in charge of security of the contracted company, allowing a passenger to board and sit in the first class shortly ahead of take-off without checking his passport or his suitcase.

A passenger protested that the security alarm at the inspection gate did not go on although she was carrying some metallic items such as a lighter and a necklace.

Failure of the security officer at Bangkok Airport to implement the security instructions. He did not inspect the floor under seats, neither he checked the hand-carried luggage of the passengers or their passports.

Photos: Abdullah Al-Khaldi, Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmad and Khaled Ismail.

Excerpts of a poem by the national martyr, Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmad in homage of the three martyrs who had fallen in the hijacking of the plane, hailing their courage and sacrifice for the homeland, Kuwait.

Others photos: Al-Jabriah, journalists covering the event, cheering Kuwaitis after end of the ordeal, two British passengers.

Botched attempt to assassinate Bush:

Speeches made by the head of the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein, during the occupation of Kuwait, were distressing and frustrating, for the Kuwaitis. In contrast, speeches by US President George Bush noting necessity of liberating the country boosted morals of the Kuwaitis despite the hardships, detentions and killing of citizens at hands of the occupation regime every day. Bush is deeply respected among the Kuwaitis for adopting the cause of the liberation as a moralistic and humanitarian cause. He succeeded in leading a coalition of the major powers on the basis of a joint political stance and formed the largest military coalition since the Second World War. The US president decided to visit Kuwait in response to an invitation by the Amiri Diwan. In preparation for the visit, the streets of the country were adorned with flags and photos of the Amir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah and the American flags and the police took intensive measures. On April 12, 1993, Bush and his spouse boarded a plane at Huston Airport but after one hour of flying it sustained a technical failure, thus it flew back. But they flew to Kuwait on April 14 aboard another Kuwaiti plane. The US president was greeted upon arrival by thousands of citizens, led by the Amir and the officials. His three day stay was busy. He inspected positions of the Kuwaiti and American armies and was decorated by the Amir with the number-one medal, the Mubarak Al-Kabeer medal. Bush addressed the parliament, received a certificate of honor from Kuwait University, inspected the oil lakes formed by the leakage of the crude, a house in Al-Gurain that witnessed a clash between the resistance fighters and the occupation forces. The senior guest and his accompanying delegation concluded the visit on April 16, 1993. Several days after the visit, the Kuwaiti security authorities declared discovery of a sabotage cell dispatched by the Iraqi regime by land to assassinate the American president and carry out sabotage. Washington declared that it would closely follow up on the case. There were diverse reports and analyses about the reported futile operation. The Deutsche Press Agency reported that the accused were responsible for bombing attacks that targeted video-tape shops and that the action was intended to drive a wedge between the Islamic groups and the Kuwaiti Government. Some analysts questioned the reports about the technical failure of the plane that caused delay of the visit, whether the Kuwaiti authorities' discovery of the sabotage cells resulted in delaying the trip. However, the captain of the plane of the delayed flight, Husam Shemlan, confirmed that a part of the left wing of the aircraft had broken, and Bush stated that he learned about the plan against his life after returning home, but noted that he would not have changed his plan had he learned about the killing plan earlier. The administration of Clinton sent a team of intelligence and counter- terrorism personnel to Kuwait to closely follow up on the case. Observers anticipated American military action against the Baghdad regime if it was established that the regime plotted to kill Bush. Washington after return of the investigators declared that Baghdad plotted to kill Bush and the New York Times reported that the type of explosives smuggled into Kuwait were identical to the type of the explosives used by the Iraqi intelligence. Iraq officially declared that the reported plot was fabricated by Kuwait and Washington to justify extending the economic sanctions on Iraq, and claimed that Bush failed in the US elections as he failed in the "mother of battles." Kuwait announced that the accused would be tried in the country and would not be handed over to the Americans. The prosecution, having questioned the 14 persons charged with complicity in the botched bid against Bush, referred them to the state security court, along with a file of more than 1,000 pages.

Prosecution of the suspects:

The court held the first session at 9 a.m., June 5, 1993 amid tight security. The chief justice, Salah Al-Fahad called on the accused one after another, but the defense attorney asked for halting the proceedings pending a meeting with the detainees, and asked that the accused should be all presented during the hearings. The judges accepted the request and the session was called off for one hours, during which the defense lawyers met their defendants for the first time.

The suspect Raad Al-Assadi:

The court held the first session. The chief judge asked for bringing the detainee, Raad Al-Assadi, who served the intelligence during his work as a café waiter, from behind the bars. Al-Assadi, in his 30s, worked at a popular café in the region of Al-Ashar in Basra, and was believed to be the head of the band and the number-one mastermind of the assassination plan. Al-Assadi, speaking with a firm posture in front of the justices, confessed fully, though he tried to put the blame on the accomplice, Wali Al-Ghazali. He told the court that an official of the Iraqi intelligence, Mohammad Jawad, asked him to escort Wali Al-Ghazali in his entry to Kuwait to guide him to the location of Kuwait University. He added, "he told me to smuggle explosives into Kuwait and left the choice for me to choose a target, be it commercial stores, malls or exhibitions in exchange for money. I proposed the matter to my friends Salem Nasser and Bandar Ajeel, and they agreed to help me regarding residency, movement and guidance." At this point, he was interrupted by Ajeel, who said, "Are you trying to portray us as tourist agents?" But the chancellor ordered him to stay silent and wait for his turn to talk. Al-Assadi added, "The intelligence official Mohammad Jawad handed me a forged UAE passport, a pistol, a Kalashinkov and explosives and taught how to set them off. He also gave me whiskey boxes and gave Wali Al-Ghazali an identical passport, a belt laden with explosives and two anti-armor mines to use them against Kuwaiti security personnel in case they chased us. Then, I joined the other members of the group including the liquor smuggler Salem Nasser who drove the super van, based on his knowledge of the side border routes across the desert. I drove the explosives-laden jeep behind him, and when we arrived at the region of Al-Shuaib, we replaced the plates with Kuwaiti ones. When darkness, fell, we crossed into Kuwait with the lights off till we reached Al-Salmi desert at dawn on 13-4-1993. We unloaded the cargo, the liquor and the explosives, and I asked my mates to stay at the place till I return. I drove the jeep with company of Al-Ghazali, Salem Nasser, Bandar Ajeel and my uncle, Habib Jaber, heading toward the house of Bader's cattle stable in Al-Sulaibiah. Some of my company proceeded to other spots. As to me, Salem Nasser, Bandar and Al-Ghazali, we left the super van and the jeep at the stable and proceeded to Bader's house, where we had dinner and drank wine. At dawn, we proceeded to the stable, but we were surprised at seeing the security personnel surrounding it. Panicked, we returned with company of Al-Ghazali, the suitcase that included the bombs, the pistol, the belt and the bomb remote control, and decided to go o the house of my uncle, Jabbar Habib. On the road, I took the belt from Al-Ghazali and hurled it on the side of the road (later the security forces could not find it) and when we arrived, we told Jabbar about the siege of the stable. Justice Al-Fahad asked to fetch a chair for Al-Assadi, and said to him, "If you are tired you can sit." He replied, "Thank you sir … we have erred and we request pardon." Al-Assadi carried on, saying, "After the authorities uncovered our plot, we decided to flee without carrying out the mission. At dawn on 15-4- 1993, we spotted a person switching on the engine of his car and returning home. In his brief absence, I drove it heading toward Iraq along with my companions across the border. I and Al-Ghazali tore off the forged UAE passports and at 11:30 a.m., a police patrol detained us. We claimed that we had just entered the Kuwaiti territories looking for work and gave them forged names of ourselves but during the interrogations we confessed to our real names and the mission we were tasked with by the Iraqi intelligence." The audience observed that Al-Assadi had the character of a pathological criminal or assassin, some one who could murder a victim and cut it into pieces.

The accused Wali Al-Ghazali:

Al-Ghazali, in his 30s, served as a nurse at Al-Najaf Hospital. He joined the Baath Party in 1982. In his testimony, he spoke with a lowered head, low voice laced with fear and confusion. He said, "on 8-4-1993, a person named Abed Al-Hussein, who served the Iraqi intelligence, arrived at my work place and told me that the intelligence authority in Basra wanted to talk to me. I went with him to the city and resided at room 218 at Hamdan Hotel on their expense. In the morning the next day, the intelligence member Mahmoud Jawad (Abu Rafed) showed up and talked to me about the international economic blockade on Iraq an the damage inflicted upon the country by president Bush, arguing that he should be assassinated during his visit to Kuwait, and that could be done during his reception at Kuwait University. He asked me to follow up on the Kuwaiti media to determine his schedule. I tried to relieve myself of this mission and told him that I was father of five children and that I had never visited Kuwait. He told me that all Iraqis had children and that he would task a guide for me and that no honest Iraqi would reject this task! "I had no choice but to consent. The next day, at a garage Abu Rafed signaled at a jeep and explained to me how to set it off, and that with the usage of a remote control and a battery to be laden into the four-wheel vehicle. He handed me 5,000 Iraqi dinars that I gave to my family and 1,200 US dollars for my expenses in Kuwait. He asked me to go to Najaf and give the money to the family and return to Basra the same day with company of the intelligence man, Walid. I visited my family and handed them the money and told them that I would remain in Basra for a week. I returned to Hamdan Hotel the same day and the next morning, that fell on 12-4-1993, Abu Rafed and another person named Adel Al-A'immah handed me the remote control device, two mines, a silencer-equipped pistol and the belt at the garage. They told me to wear the belt and blow myself up after carrying out the mission to disguise my identity, that in case I could not blow up the jeep, I should put on the belt, sneak into the crowd and blow myself up close to Bush's motorcade. "Abu Rafed handed me a forged UAE passport in the name of Saqer Khalifa, attached with a close-up photo of myself. The passport bore various Arab and English stamps by custom authorities of some other countries. I noticed 10 boxes of whisky on board of the jeep. Later on, a super van turned up boarding Al-Assadi. I drove the jeep behind him till we reached the town of Al-Zubair, where we were joined by nine compatriots. At dawn on 13-4-1993, we entered Kuwait to inquire about Bush's timetable but Al-Assadi told me the next day that our mission snagged and that we must flee Kuwait or risk being apprehended. We were detained on 15-4-1993 in the desert while were trying to escape. The justice: Is this the whole truth? Al-Ghazali: I would not keep facts, and this my full confession. The judge: Do you wish to add anything? Al-Ghazali: We have erred and appeal for mercy. I have hoped when crossing to Kuwait that we face obstruction to foil the mission.

The accused Salem Nasser:

This detainee was a liquor smuggler with a record of several imprisonment sentences. He was more shrewd than his compatriots and rhetorically more brazen. He denied knowledge of this mission. He said that Al-Assadi sought his help for entering Kuwait only. The justice told him that he remembered his face, and he acknowledged that he had appeared in front of the court for non-criminal cases.

The detainee Bandar Ajeel:

He had a record of stealing cars. Ajeel said that he had entered Kuwait and stole a car in Abu Hlaifa and sold it in Iraq. He said Al-Assadi was an officer in the Iraqi intelligence, that he had witnessed a man screaming at a popular café in the past, searching for Al-Assadi and that the upset man had been put in prison for 10 years as a result of a fabricated report by Al- Assadi against him.

The accused Adel Ismail:

He was a stout Iraqi who resided in Kuwait in 1963 but was expelled several times on liquor cases but sneaked back repeatedly. He justified his latest illicit comeback as intended to obtain money from his daughter and aunt, and claimed that he paid Al-Assadi 5,000 Iraqi dinars to arrange his illegal entry.

Ali Khudair:

He claimed that he sneaked into Kuwait in search for better living and that he bought in complicity with Hadi, Adel and Jabbar six kilograms of drugs for trade in Kuwait.

Jabbar Nasser:

He said that he came to Kuwait to sell narcotics.

Daidan Attiah:

He claimed that he came in search for a person indebted to him.

Jabbar Habbib:

(Khaled Al-Assadi) a resident of Kuwait between 1963 and the time of liberation. He claimed that he infiltrated into the country to check on his wife and children and take money from her. He told the court that he compromised with his spouse over the children by taking money from her.

Bader:

He denied any links with the Iraqi intelligence, said he was involved in liquor trade and had no knowledge about the plot.

Ahmad Jabbar:

He said that he hosted his father Jabbar along with a number of mates, that Al-Assadi handed him a suitcase, and that when he became aware that it was stuffed with bombs and arms, he dumped it into a trash place (however security authorities could not find it).

Nasser:

He said he secured residency for his friend, Adel, along with his mates, for 16 years, and that he did not betray his country.

Salem:

He said that his brother Bader asked him to transport the accused to and from the stable and had no connections with them.

The inspection officer:

Colonel Abdel Samad, a veteran chief inspector, said in his testimony to the court, "We had received secret information about a plan prepared by the Iraqi intelligence to carry out a terrorist scheme in Kuwait. On 13-4- 1993, my clandestine source told me that a super van that came from Iraq entered the Kuwaiti territories boarding a number of persons, and that it pulled up in Al-Salmi desert. I sped to the set location with company of a number of officers including bomb disposal experts. We found a handbag stuffed with explosives and nine volt batteries. After obtaining a search warrant, I searched the cattle barn in the region of Al-Sulaibiah. I also found two super vans and a jeep. Records at the traffic department proved that the vehicles had been stolen during the blatant Iraqi occupation. I also located 12 cartons of liquor. At night, I apprehended Bader when he came to the barn. Upon questioning, he confessed to hosting the infiltrators and I believed that he was aware of the nature of their mission." The accused Bader tried to interrupt the officer but the chancellor hushed him up. Col. Abdel Samad proceeded, saying, "The accused Bader showed me the location of the house of Adel's aunt, so I arrested him there. The latter told me that the three others were at the apartment flat of the accused Nasser. The others were caught while trying to flee across the desert. At first, the bomb disposal experts found no explosives in the jeep, but later after Al-Assadi's confession, it was re-examined and the explosives were located.

The bomb disposal officer:

The officer testified, saying, "I had received a notification by telephone from the state security inspection about location of explosives in Al- Salmi desert. There, I found a military bag stuffed with six explosives of highly destructive capacity. On 18-4-1993, I examined the jeep anew and found 80 kilograms laden into it. The way it was set warranted terrorist expertise of top caliber. The explosives could have been set off either by pulling the fuse, ramming the jeep into the target or by remote control.

Testimony of the Kuwaiti national:

A national testified that during the occupation he was caught by the Iraqi intelligence on charges of being involved in the resistance. He was transported to a prison in Al-Nassiriah in Iraq where he remained till 2-3- 1991, when he left the cell during an attack by forces of the popular uprising. He added that Adel Ismail who appeared in a picture was the intelligence member involved in his detention.

The prosecutor:

The prosecutor called for maximum penalty against all the accused.

Striking the Iraqi intelligence headquarters:

On 27-6-1993, two American warships fired 23 Tomahawk missiles in the direction of Iraq directly hitting and destroying headquarters of the intelligence in Baghdad. The next day, the US revealed to the world satellite photos of the target (1). The Herald Tribune, on July 1, published in its European edition an editorial that was published by the New Times the day before, under the title, "Make the Baghdad case," arguing that there was no necessity to launch the strike and questioned the timing of the attack that was launched before end of the prosecution in Kuwait. It also argued that Washington should have obtained blessing of the Security Council. The correspondent of the Washington Post wrote that the detainees were not professional intelligence personnel, that Al-Assadi and Al- Ghazali lacked experience and that the plot lacked good preparation and planning.

(1) The Iraqi intelligence was established by the Saddam regime in 1968. It grouped 450,000 informants, who worked in government and private institutions, cafes and night clubs. This network enabled the regime to maintain a grip on the country. Billions of dinars were spent on this apparatus per year.

The Washington Post correspondent also wrote that non-presence of an Iraqi embassy in Kuwait was one of the factors that rendered the operation futile.

The defense:

The lawyer of Al-Assadi during the hearing said his defendant had no choice but to get along the intelligence, out of fear for himself and his family, that he had dumped the explosives in the desert and tried to return home without causing any harm. He appealed for mercy and treating him as prisoner of war. The attorney of Salem Nasser and Bander Ajeel said the real agents of the intelligence were Al-Assadi and Ghazali, and that his defendants were liquor smugglers. The lawyer of Adel Ismail, Ali Khudair and Jabbar Habib argued that they had no connections whatsoever with the Iraqi intelligence.

The state security court verdict:

At the hearing on 4-6-1994, the tribunal issued death verdicts against Raad Al-Assadi, Wali Al-Ghazali, Salem Nasser, Bandar Ajeel, Adel Ismail and Bader. It sentenced Hadi Oudah, Jabbar Nasser, Daidan Attiah and Jabbar Habib to six months in prison for illegal entry into the country. It ordered imprisonment of Ali Khudair for four years for possession of an automatic rifle. The court sentenced Ahmad Jabbar to 10 years behind iron bars for possession of explosives and two years for complicity in the smuggling of the liquor. It also acquitted Nasser and sentenced Salem to five years in prison. The detainees panicked when hearing the verdicts. Al-Assadi screamed, "We did not carry out the operation and we did not kill any one." His uncle, Jabbar, told him, "it is your fault it is your fault." Al- Ghazali remained calm, but Salem Nasser trembled and murmured incomprehensible terms. Bander was enraged. His face turned pale and his hands trembled. Adel Ismail collapsed and uttered some words. Bader was overwhelmed with fear. Nasser smiled when he heard the amnesty.

The court of cassation:

Only nine of the accused stood before this court after expiry of the prison sentences. It upheld the death verdicts against Al-Assadi and Ghazali. Altered the other sentences. It sentenced Salem Nasser and Bandar Ajeel to life in prison with hard labor, softening the death verdict. It ordered the imprisonment of Adel Ismail for 15 years, instead of execution, and gave Bader an identical verdict. It decided to imprison Ahmad Jabbar for five years instead of 10 and acquitted Salem Jiad.

(George Bush senior: born in 1924. he was the youngest pilot in the US air force in 1942. In 1945, he married Barbara Pierce who gave him four boys and a girl. He served as the US ambassador at the United Nations between 1971 and 1972. He chaired the Republican Party between 1973 and 1974. He headed the CIA on 1976-1977. He was elected vice president 1981-1989 and president between 1989 and 1993.)

Photos:

The Amir, the Crown Prince receive Bush

Bush is granted an honorary certificate at a ceremony.

Bush holds the honorary shield granted by the university.

Bush and his spouse Barbara.

Bush inspects American troops.

Close up photos of Al-Assadi and Ghazali.

The attorney Najeeb Al-Wagayan talks to the detainees across the bars.

The editor of legal affairs at Al-Qabas newspaper stands in front of the accused outside the cell.

Excerpts of press editorials welcoming Bush.

Hijacking of planes, why?

Some radicals resort to the hijacking of planes because they believe this is the best means to propagate their cause worldwide. Moreover, it is quite easy to commandeer a plane with a small pistol, a hand-grenade and the kidnapper can hold hostages of multi nationalities.

Motives of the aircraft seizures

The motives for taking control of an aircraft by force are diverse. They may be political, social, personal, psychological or material. Some had hijacked a plane to try to circumvent a legal sentence, others for evading military service, to avenge social or political injustice. A number of hijackers seized planes under influence of alcohol, for being mentally deranged, for struggling for independence, to draw attention of the international public to a certain cause, to press for releasing prisoners or for political asylum. Regardless of the nature of the cause or the motive, whoever holds passengers at gunpoint in the air is neither viewed a struggler nor brave. Such an act is counter productive to the aspired cause. The passengers no matter to which religion they may be affiliated are innocent victims and their safety and lives must not be abused on the basis of verses of the Holy Book, the Koran that prohibits wasting life of an innocent and promises hell for whoever kills a believer.

The first plane hijacking:

Hijacking of airplanes started in 1939, when Peruvian rebels commandeered an American aircraft to drop leaflets against their regime. More such events took place after 1945 when the world was partitioned between two camps of powers. Some planes were seized by elements fleeing dictatorships. In 1958, Cuban refugees in the US drew the limelight for seizing aircraft. American planes topped the list of commandeered aircraft globally. The American press made some sarcasm, proposing that passengers wear swimming suits to ensure they do not conceal arms under their clothes. Some hijackers used the idea forcing policemen delivering ransom money to wear such suits. The press also proposed that stewardesses wear sensational clothes to confuse the hijackers. The Palestinians soon jumped into the arena, seizing in 1968 an Israeli plane. Statistics showed that such incidents amounted to 298 between 1974 and 1993. Most of such incidents that occurred in the 80s were related to the Gulf war.

States that commandeered hijacking of planes:

States were also involved in hijacking. On 20-10-1956, two French warplanes forced plane of the Algerian leader, Ahmad Bin Bella, to land in Algiers airport where he was detained and taken to prison. Israel had forced two Lebanese planes to fly to Israel on suspicion they boarded Palestinian leaders. American warplanes forced an Egyptian plane to fly to an Italian island in violation of international treaties.

Agreements for organizing aviation security:

The 1963 Tokyo Treaty stipulates basics for aviation security. The 1970 Hague accord deals with penalties for hijacking aircraft. The 1971 Montreal accord deals with sabotage against civil aviation. The 1974 attached provision stipulates recommendations as to weapons on board of aircraft. The 1975 Bonn treaty calls for penalizing any state that harbors hijackers or acts leniently with them.

Anti-hijack squads:

They include the British squad (SAS). The German GSG-9 group. The American intervention force, Delta. The French gendarmes.

Some of the successful operations against hijacking:

One of the most successful operations against hijacking was carried out by German commandos in 1977 to rescue 86 passengers of Boeing (737) of Lufthantha, that was seized in Mogadishu. The squad stormed the plane in two minutes, killed the gunmen and saved the passengers. None of the members of the squad suffered injuries.

Some of the most futile operations:

One of the ill fated operations was when Egyptian soldiers burst into an Egyptian plane at Malta airport to try end hijacking. Sixty people were killed in the operation. One of the gunmen, Mohammad Ali Rizek, 25, was sentenced to 25 years in prison but was set free on February 25, 1993.

The hijacker:

The hijacker in action is under tremendous stress. Most of them show keenness on preserving lives of the passengers because they constitute the bargaining chip. However, he may turn violent and hurt them in case his demands are not met.

The hostages:

Many hijackers pick up a number of VIPs for sake of blackmailing. In most cases, passengers belonging to a country hated by the gunman are prone to be hurt first and mostly. In some cases passengers sympathize with the hijackers particularly when they sense absence of cooperation from the authorities thus negotiators seek to shorten the talks to avert such a relationship.

The targeted state:

The targeted state is not necessarily the state that holds the negotiations with the gunmen seizing the plane, for such talks may be held in a third country. Authorities generally seek to tire the gunmen psychologically and try to procrastinate as long as possible. Some try to gather as much details as possible about status of the gunmen and plane from inside ahead of planning an assault. This option turns very much likely when the gunmen start hurting the passengers. Such an operation should be carried out rapidly with minimum losses. The attacking squad uses special weapons, such as tear or nerve gas or rubber bullets.

Hijacking of Kuwaiti aircraft:

Kuwait airport since 1973 recorded witnessing the landing of five hijacked planes and the seizure of seven planes where two Kuwaitis and two Americans were killed. Kuwait during these operations took a firm stand, not to give in to the gunmen. Other countries adopt other policies. For instance, the US bombed Libya for backing terrorism and at the same time offered arms to Iran in exchange for hostages. Israel in 1985 swapped 700 prisoners for the passengers of the TWA plane. Western governments made a deal to release Leila Khaled after she was convicted of hijacking a plane in exchange for passengers of an American plane and a Swiss aircraft.

The top sabotage attacks against Kuwait:

14-16/11/1968: Bomb blast in front of the Iranian embassy and another in front of Al-Salam Palace.

25/1/1969: Explosion of three bombs outside the National Assembly, the residence of the interior minister and the ministry headquarters.

31/13/1972: Assassination of Herdan Al-Tikriti, the vice president of Iraq. Iraqi intelligence was accused of being behind the operations.

6/4/1972: bomb blast in car of the Jordanian diplomat Mohammad Affannah in front of the Jordanian embassy.

5/7/1973: Arrival of five hijackers with their hostages from the Saudi embassy in Paris aboard a Kuwaiti plane.

20/12/1973: Gunmen hijack a Lufthantha in Rome and surrender at Kuwait airport.

6/2/1974: Occupation of the Japanese embassy in Kuwait.

11/4/1975: Blowing up offices of an American insurance company.

17/6/1976: Blast of two grenades at the building of the Kuwaiti daily Al-Anbaa.

2/7/1976: A Molotov cocktail is hurled at the office of the Syrian airways.

5/6/1977: A paralyzed Lebanese hijacks a Lebanese plane to Kuwait.

8/7/1977: Seven gunmen hijack a Kuwaiti plane on a flight from Beirut to Kuwait. They surrender in Syria.

2/10/1977: A commandeered Lufthantha lands at Kuwait airport, flies to Dubai, then to Aden and Mogadishu. German commandos storm it, kill the gunmen including a girl.

15/6/1978: the head of the bureau of the Palestine Organization Ali Yassin is assassinated.

29/4/1980: A Kuwaiti diplomat in Iran is shot at and wounded in Tehran.

21/5/1980: Two bombs blow up in front of the offices of the Iranian airways in Kuwait.

1/6/1980: Explosion of a bomb at the office of Kuwait Oil Company in London.

4/6/1980: Unidentified gunmen fire RPGs at the building of the Iranian embassy.

21/6/1980: Botched bid to assassinate the head of the PLO in Kuwait, Awni Battash.

24/7/1980: A person who has been deported from Kuwait hijacks a plane on flight from Beirut to Kuwait.

12/7/1980: Bomb blast at the office of Al-Rai Al-Aam daily..

17/11/1980: Futile bid to blow up headquarters of the Islamic Social Reforms Society.

7/2/1981: An Iraqi doctor, Jassem Al-Mash-Hadani, who entered Kuwait with a Syrian passport bearing the fake name Abdel Salam Semaan, is assassinated.

28/3/1981: Office of the Kuwaiti-Iranian Navigation Company is blown up.

25/6/1981: The country witnesses five explosions at several places.

24/2/1982: A group calling itself "the sons of Al-Sader" commandeers a Kuwaiti plane at Beirut airport.

4/6/1982: The Kuwaiti first secretary in India, Mustafa Al-Marzouk, is assassinated.

23/8/1982: The UAE diplomat in Kuwait, Mohammad Al-Juwaied, is injured in a bid on his life.

16/9/1982: Botched assassination attempt against the Kuwaiti diplomat, Hamad Al-Jutaili, in Karachi.

16/9/1982: The Kuwaiti diplomat, Najib Al-Rifaee, is assassinated in Madrid.

16/9/1982: A Molotov cocktail is hurled on the office of Kuwait Airways in Athens.

25/8/1983: A Yemeni national hijacks a Yemeni passenger plane and forces it to land in Kuwait. He surrenders to the local authorities.

12/12/1983: Bomb blasts target the American, French embassies and six Kuwaiti installations.

13/5/1984: Iran begins striking Kuwaiti and foreign oil tankers during the war with Iraq.

12/9/1984: An assassination attempt against the chief editor of Al- Anbaa Khaled Al-Marzoug and his mate at a resort in Spain results in death off their driver.

4/12/1984: The Kuwaiti plane Kathma is hijacked.

1/3/1985: The Iraqi diplomat Hadi Saeed and his son are assassinated in Kuwait.

23/4/1985: The chief editor of Al-Seyassah is wounded with five bullets in a bid on his life.

25/5/1985: A bomb attack on the motorcade of His Highness the Amir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah.

7/6/1985: Bomb blasts at the northern and southern oil tanks in Al- Ahmadi start raging fires that are to be put out in three days.

11/7/1985: Bomb blasts at popular cafes.

17/6/1985: Bomb blasts at oil installations in Al-Ahmadi.

24/1/1987: Bomb goes off near a hotel where an Islamic summit is held in Kuwait.

11/5/1987: Blast at the office of the American airlines in Kuwait ahead of arrival of the US official Richard Murphy.

22/5/1987: Bomb explosion at Al-Ahmadi refinery kills a man. The bomb goes off while being set.

15/7/1987: Bomb blast near the office of the French airways kills two persons as they try to set it.

24/10/1987: Explosion at the offices of the American airways in Kuwait City.

3/11/1987: A booby-trapped car goes off in front of the building of the foreign ministry.

5/4/1988: Al-Jabriah plane is hijacked.

9/4/1988: Bomb blast at parking lot of the ministry of interior.

26/4/1988: Bomb blast near the office of the Saudi airways in Kuwait City.

7/5/1988: Explosion at offices of an American company for car leasing in Kuwait.

18/5/1988: Blast in a car in the center of the capital kills its two occupants.

28/2/1991: An unidentified gunman carrying a silencer-equipped pistol shoots and wounds member of the National Assembly Hamad Al-Jouan at the door of his house. He suffered paralysis as a result of the injuries.

15/7/1991: Unidentified attackers fire an RPG at a video shop for the actor Abdel Hussein Abdel Redha.

30/11/1991: Shooting at windows of the faculty of medicine.

5/5/1992: Futile assassination attempt against the Kuwaiti charge d'affaires in India, Met'eb Al-Rumaih.

5/5/1992: Bomb blast close to the house of the dean of the medicine faculty.

7/5/1992: Futile bid to kill the actor Abdel Hussein Abdel Redha.

19/5/1992: Gunmen open fire at a troupe of the Romanian circus.

19/5/1992: Shooting at the camp of the Italian circus.

25/6/1992: Bomb blast in the garden of the dean of the faculty of medicine, killing a gardener.

11/7//1992: Gunmen open fire at Indians as they emerge from Al- Zainabiah Husseiniah, wounding them in the legs.

4/9/1992: Blast at a videotape store in Khaitan.

1/12/1992: A large cache of arms found at barn in Al-Sulaibiah. Three citizens plotted to dispatch weapons to Bosnia. One of them, Adel Al- Ghanem, died there in 1995.

10/12/1992: blast at a videotape store in Khaitan.

3/3/1992: Blast at a videotape store in Khaitan.

15/4/11993: The network of saboteurs who plotted to assassinate US President George Bush senior during a visit to Kuwait is uncovered.

3/11/1993: Three attacks on Sikh residents of Kuwait.

21/12/1993: Attacks kill two Sikhs and set afire a large store for a Sikh merchant.

30/2/1994: Bomb goes off at entrance of Ghernata Cinema Theatre in Khaitan.

24/11/1994: Gunmen open fire at the video store of the singer, Abdullah Ruweished.

1995: Tear gas targets students at Kuwait University during a celebration for the Democratic movement list in the elections of the faculty of commerce.

Do not inquire about nationality of the criminal, but who stands behind him (page 331)

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