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The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C.L Boston College Law Review Volume 59 | Issue 1 Article 6 1-25-2018 The edeF ral Equity Power Michael T. Morley Barry University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C.L. Rev. 217 (2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE FEDERAL EQUITY POWER MICHAEL T. MORLEY INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 219 I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY............................................................................. 224 II. AMERICAN EQUITY PRIOR TO ERIE .......................................................................................... 230 A. Equity Jurisdiction .............................................................................................................. 232 B. Equity Procedure ................................................................................................................ 236 C. Equitable Remedies............................................................................................................. 238 D. Equity and Substantive Rights ............................................................................................. 241 III. EQUITY IN THE POST-ERIE WORLD ......................................................................................... 244 A. Erie and General Law ......................................................................................................... 244 B. Guaranty Trust and Equity .................................................................................................. 247 IV. A NEW THEORY OF EQUITY .................................................................................................... 249 A. Equity and the Federal Rules .............................................................................................. 250 1. Injunctions Under Rule 65 .............................................................................................. 252 2. Receivers Under Rule 66 ................................................................................................ 255 B. Equity and the Rules of Decision Act ................................................................................... 258 1. Equity, Hanna, and the Twin Aims of Erie ..................................................................... 259 2. Remedies as Substantive Law ......................................................................................... 264 C. Equity and the Constitution ................................................................................................. 267 1. Federalism ...................................................................................................................... 267 2. Separation of Powers ...................................................................................................... 270 3. Equity and Federal Common Law ................................................................................. 273 D. A New Conception of Equity: Equity Follows the Law ......................................................... 275 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 279 217 THE FEDERAL EQUITY POWER MICHAEL T. MORLEY* Abstract: Throughout the first century and a half of our nation’s history, federal courts treated equity as a type of general law. They applied a uniform, freestand- ing body of principles derived from the English Court of Chancery to all equita- ble issues that came before them, regardless of whether a case arose under fed- eral or state law. In 1945, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, the United States Su- preme Court held that, notwithstanding the changes wrought by the Erie Doc- trine, federal courts may continue to rely on these traditional principles of equity to determine the availability of equitable relief, such as injunctions, even in cas- es arising under state law. This so-called “equitable remedial rights doctrine” is based on an anachronistic misunderstanding of the nature of the federal equity power. Equity should not be understood as a single, independent body of princi- ples that a federal court must apply in all cases that come before it. Rather, a federal court’s power to impose an equitable remedy stems, if at all, from the le- gal authority that establishes the underlying right. For state-law claims, a federal court must apply state statutes and precedents—not uniform, centrally devised federal standards—to determine the availability of equitable relief. The manner in which state-created rights are protected is as much a matter of substantive state policy as a state’s initial creation and allocation of those rights. When ad- judicating a federal statutory claim, the underlying federal statute itself governs the availability of equitable relief; a federal court may presume Congress in- tended that traditional equitable principles apply as a matter of statutory inter- pretation, unless the statute’s text or legislative history contains a clear statement to the contrary. Finally, for constitutional claims, federal courts may apply tra- © 2018, Michael T. Morley. All rights reserved. * Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. Climenko Fellow and Lectur- er on Law, Harvard Law School, 2012–14; Yale Law School, J.D., 2003; Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, A.B., magna cum laude, 2000. I am grateful for comments and feedback I received at the Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop at the University of Georgia, the Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop at Emory University School of Law, the New Scholars panel at the 2015 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Conference, the Junior Faculty Works-in-Progress colloquium at Marquette University School of Law, the Developing Ideas Conference at the University of Kentucky Law School, and a faculty workshop at Barry University School of Law. I am especially grateful to Samuel Bray, Heather Elliott, Steve Friedland, Jack Goldsmith, Douglas Laycock, Nancy Leong, John Leubsdorf, Jake Linford, Thomas B. Metzloff, Chad Oldfather, James E. Pfander, Doug Rendle- man, Caprice Roberts, Ryan Scoville, and Fred Smith, Jr. for their comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to acknowledge Matthew Rapkowski and the entire staff of the Boston College Law Review for their extraordinary work in editing this piece. 218 2018] The Federal Equity Power 219 ditional equitable principles as a matter of constitutional common law, unless Congress displaces them with a valid alternative remedial scheme. INTRODUCTION Under what circumstances should a federal court grant equitable relief, such as an injunction, in a diversity case?1 The answer to this deceptively simple question implicates profound issues going to the root of both federal- ism and separation of powers, and has wide-ranging ramifications for our modern conception of the federal judiciary’s equity power. In 2006, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the United States Supreme Court articulated its well-known four-factor test for granting injunctive relief, which it claimed was derived from principles historically applied by the English Court of Chancery.2 Many states, in contrast, have their own, differing standards for injunctive relief; rather than applying a balancing test, several states either require or prohibit the award of injunctive relief in certain types of cases.3 A court’s decision as to whether to apply federal or state standards for granting an injunction may, in many cases, determine a litigant’s ability to obtain inter- im or final relief. Part of the difficulty underlying this choice-of-law issue stems from Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins.4 Erie, as construed in cases such as the 1965 Su- preme Court decision Hanna v. Plumer, directs federal courts to apply state law for “substantive” issues and federal law for “procedural” issues in cases arising under state law.5 Some scholars contend, however, that remedies are neither purely procedural nor substantive but rather share attributes of both (a position I reject).6 Consequently, many remedial issues fit awkwardly at best within the Erie framework.7 1 This article’s analysis applies to any claim in federal court arising under state law. Although diversity cases are the primary focus, its conclusions apply equally to claims within a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988). 2 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006); see infra notes 265–266 and accompanying text. 3 See infra notes 415–431 and accompanying text. 4 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 5 Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 6 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 2 (2d ed. 1993); David Crump, The Twilight Zone of the Erie Doctrine: Is There Really a Different Choice of Equitable Remedies in the
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