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Author Guidelines for 8 The Impact of US Sanctions on Iran By Hussein Abdullah Qader Volume 11, 2014 ISSN (Print & Online): 2307-4531 © IJSBAR THESIS PUBLICATION www.gssrr.org IJSBAR research papers are currently indexed by: © IJSBAR THESIS PUBLICATION www.gssrr.org The Impact of US Sanctions on Iran Copyright © 2014 by By Hussein Abdullah Qader All rights reserved. No part of this thesis may be produced or transmitted in any form or by any means without written permission of the author. ISSN(online & Print) 2307-4531 The IJSBAR is published and hosted by the Global Society of Scientific Research and Researchers (GSSRR). Address: Khllda - Wasfi Al Tall Street, P.O.Box : 2245 Amman 11953, [email protected], Amman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 0 The Impact of US Sanctions on Iran By Hussein Abdullah Qader Supervisor: Khaled Salih Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree Master of Art in International Studies Department of Politics and International Relations University of Kurdistan-Hewler Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq June 2014 1 Table of Contents List of Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................... 3 Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 4 Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... 5 List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... 6 Statement of Originality .................................................................................................................. 8 Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 9 Chapter One: Introduction and Methodology ................................................................................ 10 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 10 The Problem and its Significance ............................................................................................... 13 The Main Argument and Methodology (of Data collection) ..................................................... 14 Thesis Structure ......................................................................................................................... 16 Chapter Two: Literature Review ................................................................................................... 18 Sanctions ................................................................................................................................... 18 Economic Sanctions .................................................................................................................. 19 Sanctions against Iran ................................................................................................................ 20 Theoretical Frameworks ............................................................................................................ 22 Chapter Three: Historical Background of U.S. Iranian Relations ................................................. 26 Nuclear Program ........................................................................................................................ 31 History of Iran's Nuclear Program ......................................................................................... 31 From 2002 to Present (Negotiation, Sanctions, Deal) ........................................................... 32 Chapter Four: Foreign Sanctions against Iran ............................................................................... 36 Reasons behind Sanctions ......................................................................................................... 36 U.S. Sanctions ........................................................................................................................... 37 Chapter Five: Impact of Sanctions ................................................................................................ 48 Economy .................................................................................................................................... 48 Inflation ................................................................................................................................. 51 Unemployment Rate .............................................................................................................. 52 Rial Decline ........................................................................................................................... 53 Iranian GDP ........................................................................................................................... 55 2 Industrial Sector .................................................................................................................... 56 Iranian Population ..................................................................................................................... 58 Health Care ............................................................................................................................ 58 Education ............................................................................................................................... 60 Oil sector ................................................................................................................................... 62 Negotiations and Deals .............................................................................................................. 64 Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 65 General conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 68 References ..................................................................................................................................... 73 3 List of Tables and Figures Table 1/ US sanctions against Iran (2002-2006) ........................................................................... 38 Table 2/ US sanctions against Iran (2007-2011) ........................................................................... 40 Table 3/ US sanctions against Iran (2012-2013) ........................................................................... 42 Figure 2/ Islamic Republic of Iran: Average of annual inflation rate, Consumer prices ............... 51 Figure 3/ Islamic Republic of Iran: Unemployment Rate ............................................................. 53 Figure 1/ Islamic Republic of Iran: Gross domestic product, constant prices (Percent change) ... 55 4 Acknowledgements I would like to express my appreciation to my supervisor Kak Khaled Salih for his guidance and advice. It should be noted that it was great opportunity for m e to work under Kak Khaled’s supervision, without whose patience and guidance this thesis would not have been possible. Many thanks to Dr. Alex Danilovich the Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kurdistan who was my mentor in this research. I would like to express my special gratitude and appreciation to Mr. Michael Eleftheiou, who reviewed parts of my research and to Ms. Deborah Morgan-Jones for reviewing all parts of research. I also appreciate the role of my parents and members of my family, who have always supported me morally as well as economically and encouraged me to continue my studies. Finally, I must give special thanks to all of my friends who directly or indirectly helped me to complete this thesis. Thank You Hussein Abdullah Qader 5 Dedication To my family 6 List of Abbreviations CISADA Comprehensive Iran Sanction Accountability and divestment Act of 2010 ETS Education Testing Service EIA Energy Information Administration EU European Union EU3 Britain, France and Germany GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ILSA Iran-Libya Sanctions Act IMF International Monetary Fund IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC-QF Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps- Quds Forces ISA Iran Sanctions Act ITRA Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act of 2012 ITSR Iranian transaction and Sanctions Regulations 7 NDAA National Defense Authorization Act for 2013 NIOC National Iranian Oil Company NPT Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council U.S. United States of America WMD Weapons of Mass-Destruction 8 Statement of Originality I confirm that this research is the product of my own work and it has not been submitted for other purposes at other institutions. I am familiar with the Plagiarism Policy of the University of Kurdistan/Hawler and I have the original work in case of damage to the copy once submitted to the University. Student signature Student full name: Hussein Abdullah Qader 9 Abstract This study looks at different ways states act in order to achieve their objectives in the international arena; foreign policy employs various ranging from diplomacy, propaganda, economic statecraft to the outright of military
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