THE REVIEW OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC Volume 3, Number 4, December 2010
THE FUNCTIONS OF RUSSELL’S NO CLASS THEORY KEVIN C. KLEMENT University of Massachusetts—Amherst
Abstract. Certain commentators on Russell’s “no class” theory, in which apparent reference to classes or sets is eliminated using higher-order quantification, including W. V. Quine and (recently) Scott Soames, have doubted its success, noting the obscurity of Russell’s understanding of so-called “propositional functions.” These critics allege that realist readings of propositional functions fail to avoid commitment to classes or sets (or something equally problematic), and that nominalist readings fail to meet the demands placed on classes by mathematics. I show that Russell did thoroughly explore these issues, and had good reasons for rejecting accounts of propositional functions as extralinguistic entities. I argue in favor of a reading taking propositional functions to be nothing over and above open formulas which addresses many such worries, and in particular, does not interpret Russell as reducing classes to language.
§1. Introduction. Although Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (here- after, PM ), published almost precisely a century ago, is widely heralded as a watershed moment in the history of mathematical logic, in many ways it is still not well understood. Complaints abound to the effect that the presentation is imprecise and obscure, especially with regard to the precise details of the ramified theory of types, and the philosophical explanation and motivation underlying it, all of which was primarily Russell’s respon- sibility. This has had a large negative impact in particular on the assessment of the so- called “no class” theory of classes endorsed in PM. According to that theory, apparent reference to classes is to be eliminated, contextually, by means of higher-order “proposi- tional function”—variables and quantifiers. This could only be seen as a move in the right direction if “propositional functions,” and/or higher-order quantification generally, were less metaphysically problematic or obscure than classes themselves. But this is not the case—or so goes the usual criticism. Years ago, Geach (1972, p. 272) called Russell’s notion of a propositional function “hopelessly confused and inconsistent.” Cartwright (2005, p. 915) has recently agreed, adding “attempts to say what exactly a Russellian propositional function is, or is supposed to be, are bound to end in frustration.” Soames (2008) claims that “propositional functions . . . are more taken for granted by Russell than seriously investigated” (p. 217), and uses the obscurity surrounding them as partial justification for ignoring the no class theory in a popular treatment of Russell’s work (Soames, 2003).1 A large part of the usual critique involves charging Russell with confusion, or at least ob- scurity, with regard to what a propositional function is supposed to be. Often the worry has to do with the use/mention distinction: is a propositional function, or even a proposition,
Received: October 9, 2009 1 For criticisms of this decision, see Kremer (2006); Pincock (2006); Proops (2006); Sainsbury (2006), and for follow-up discussion see Soames (2006); Kremer (2008); Soames (2008).