Report No. 29423-MZ Report No. 29423-MZ Mozambique Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Primary School Enrollment and Retention– Public Disclosure Authorized Authorized Disclosure Disclosure Public Public The Impact of School Fees January 31, 2005
Human Development 1 Country Department AFCO2 Africa Region
oabqePoverty and Social Impact Mozambique Public Disclosure Authorized Authorized Disclosure Disclosure Public Public
Analysis Public Disclosure Authorized Authorized Disclosure Disclosure Public Public
Document of the World Bank Public Disclosure Authorized Authorized Disclosure Disclosure Public Public
SER Sector Expenditure Review SSA Sub-Saharan Africa UPC Universal Primary Completion UPE Universal Primary Education
Vice President: Gobind T. Nankani Country Director: Michael Baxter Sector Director: Yaw Ansu Sector Manager: Dzingai Mutumbuka Task Team Leader: Alexandria Valerio
PSlA Mozambique: Primary Education
Table of Contents Acknowledgements...... v Executive Summary ...... vi Chapter 1: BACKGROUND ...... 1 A . Primary Education in Mozambique ...... 1 B. Possible Factors behind the Low Completion Rates ...... 2 C. Policy Alternatives ...... 3 D. The Study ...... 3 Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 8 A . Education and Development ...... 8 B. Attaining Education for All ...... 8 C. Constraints to Increasing Enrollment and Completion Rates ...... 9 Chapter 3: EDUCATION INDICATORS IN MOZAMBIQUE ...... 17 A . Trends in Education Indicators ...... 17 B. The Geographic and Gender Dimensions of Equity ...... 20 C. Education Expenditure ...... 23 Chapter 4: SCHOOL FEES: POLICY AND PRACTICE ...... 25 A . Government Policy on School Fees ...... 25 B. The Poverty Reduction Strategy and Education Sector Plan ...... 28 C. Perceptions of Policymakers and Education Officials ...... 29 Chapter 5: SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY ANALYSIS ...... 36 A . Objectives, Methodology, and Sample ...... 36 B. Demand-Side Factors ...... 37 C . Supply-side Factors ...... 46 D. Contextual Factors...... 50 E. Summary ...... 53 Chapter 6: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ANALYSIS ...... 59 A . Description and Data ...... 59 B. Measures of Enrollment, Pupil Retention, and Dropouts ...... 60 C. Direct Costs ...... 77 D. Opportunity Costs ...... 91 E. Multivariate Analysis ...... 92 Chapter 7: CONCLUSIONS...... 103 A . The Education System at a Crossroads ...... 103 B. Official Policy on School Fees ...... 103 C . Measuring Direct Costs and Opportunity Costs ...... 105 D. Assessing Supply-side Constraints ...... 108 E. Assessing Contextual Factors ...... 109 F. Impact of Reducing or Abolishing School Fees and Other Direct Costs ...... 109 G. Summary of Conclusions ...... 112 H. Recommendations...... 114 I. Developments since the Completion of the PSIA Study ...... 118 Bibliography ...... 153
i List of Annexes
Annex A: Education Pyramid in Mozambique in 2002 ...... 120 Annex B: Key Education Indicators...... 121 Annex C: Dakar World Education Forum Goals and Millennium Development Goals ...... 122 Annex D: Primary Completion Rates in Africa, by Gender, 1990s ...... 123 Annex E: GER in Primary Schools, by District, Province, and Gender, 1997 and 2003 ...... 124 Annex F: Primary Repetition Rate, by District, Province, and Gender, 1997 and 2003 ...... 127 Annex G: Primary Dropout Rates, by District, Province, and Gender, 1997 and 2003 ...... 130 Annex H: Primary Completion Rates, by District, Province, and Gender, 1997 and 2003 ...... 133 Annex I:Interviewees: Assessment of Cost Sharing Policies in Primary Education...... 136 Annex J: Methodology of the Qualitative Analysis ...... 137 Annex K: Schools Visited and People Interviewed for the Qualitative Analysis ...... 142 Annex L: General Methodological Issues Related to the Quantitative Analysis ...... 144 Annex M: Methodological Issues Related to the Analysis of School Dropouts ...... 146 Annex N: Methodological Issues Related to the Analysis of Direct Costs Using the IAF...... 148 Annex 0:Econometric Model ...... 149
List of Tables
Table 3.1. GER. NER. and Number of Primary and Secondary Pupils. 1997 and 2003 ...... 17 Table 3.2. Primary and Secondary Repetition. Dropout. and Completion. 1997 and 2003 ...... 18 Table 3.3. Number of Teachers and Share of Unqualified Teachers in Primary and Secondary Education. 1992. 1997. and 2003 ...... 19 Table 3.4. GER and NER in Primary Education, by Province. 2003 ...... 20 Table 3.5. Primary Repetition. Dropout, and Completion Rates. by Province, 2003 ...... 21 Table 3.6. GER. by Gender, 1997. 2000. and 2003 ...... 21 Table 3.7. Lower Primary GER, Repetition. and Completion, by Province and Gender, 2003 .....22 Table 3.8. GER, Repetition, and Completion Rates in Upper Primary School, by Province and Gender. 2003 ...... 22 Table 4.1. Annual Fees by Type and Educational Level (MZM) ...... 26 Table 4.2. Factors Having a Substantial Impact on Enrollment and Completion Rates (%) ...... 30 Table 5.1. Fees and Other Direct School Costs (MZM) ...... 38 Table 5.2. Financial Resources Available to Primary Schools (MZM. millions) ...... 49 Table 5.3. Impact of Demand-Side, Supply-side, and Other Factors on Primary Enrollment and Completion Rates. Four Provinces ...... 53 Table 5.4. Stakeholder Views on Factors Affecting Attendance and Dropout Rates (ranking) ....54 Table 5.5. Stakeholder Views on Factors Affecting Completion Rates (rankings) ...... 55 Table 6.1. GER by Consumption Quintile and Level of Education ...... 60 Table 6.2. NER by Consumption Quintile and Level of Education...... 61 Table 6.3. Distribution of Age Groups by Level of Education (%) ...... 62 Table 6.4. Age Composition in the Education System (YO)...... 63 Table 6.5. Children’s Educational Attainment by Age (Yo) ...... 64
11 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education
Table 6.6. School Attendance by Age Group. Urban Areas (YO) ...... 64 Table 6.7. School Attendance by Age Group, Rural Areas (YO)...... 65 Table 6.8. School Attendance by Age, Urban Areas (%) ...... 65 Table 6.9. School Attendance by Age, Rural Areas (YO) ...... 66 Table 6.10. School Attendance by Age Group, Men (%) ...... 67 Table 6.11. School Attendance by Age Group, Women (YO)...... 68 Table 6.12. School Attendance by Age, Boys (YO)...... 69 Table 6.13. School Attendance by Age, Girls (Yo) ...... 69 Table 6.14. School Attendance by Consumption Quintile, 6-10 Age Group (Yo) ...... 71 Table 6.15. School Attendance by Consumption Quintile, 11-14 Age Group (YO)...... 72 Table 6.16. School Attendance by Consumption Quintile, 15-24 Age Group (Yo) ...... 72 Table 6.17. Dropouts in Lower Primary School, by Age and Gender (Yo) ...... 73 Table 6.18. Lower Primary Dropouts, by Age Group, Quintile, and Rural or Urban Area (YO).... 74 Table 6.19. Dropouts in Upper Primary School, by Age and Gender (YO)...... 74 Table 6.20. Upper Primary Dropouts, by Age Group, Quintile, and Rural or Urban Area (YO).... 75 Table 6.21. Average Household Expenditure on School Fees, by Quintile (MZM) ...... 79 Table 6.22. Average Annual Expenditure on School Fees per Child, by Quintile (MZM) ...... 79 Table 6.23. Average Annual Household Expenditure on Selected Discretionary Items, by Quintile (MZM)...... 80 Table 6.24. Average Annual Household Expenditure on Uniforms, Books, and Other School Supplies, by Quintile (MZM) ...... 81 Table 6.25. Average Annual Household Expenditure per Child on Uniforms, Books, and Other School Supplies, by Quintile (MZM) ...... 81 Table 6.26. Distances in Minutes to Closest Primary and Secondary Schools, by Urban and Rural Location (% of households) ...... 82 Table 6.27. Average Annual Lower Primary Fee Expenditure per Child, by Province and Quintile, Urban Areas (MZM) ...... 85 Table 6.28. Average Annual Lower Primary Fee Expenditure per Child, by Province and Quintile, Rural Areas (MZM)...... 85 Table 6.29. Average Annual Lower Primary Fee Expenditure per Child as a Share of Average Household Cash Income, by Province and Quintile, Urban Areas (YO)...... 86 Table 6.30. Average Annual Lower Primary Fee Expenditure per Child as a Share of Average Household Cash Income, by Province and Quintile, Rural Areas (YO)...... 86 Table 6.31. Ordinary Least Square Regressions on the Average School Fee Expenditure per Child ...... 88 Table 6.32. Children Declaring They Had Worked in the Previous Week, by Age Group, Gender, and Urban or Rural Location (%) ...... 91 Table 6.33. Probit Estimates of the Probability of a Child Being Enrolled in Primary School...... 94 Table 6.34. Fractional Logit Model (the Ratio of Children in Primary School among All Children in the Household Who May Be Enrolled) ...... 96 Table 6.35. Probit Estimates of the Probability of a Child Dropping Out of Primary School...... 98
... 111 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education
List of Figures
Figure 1.1. Contextual Factors and Demand-Side and Supply-side Constraints...... 5 Figure 1.2. Typology of Fees ...... 6 Figure 6.1. Children Attending Lower or Upper Primary School, by Age and Urban or Rural Location (Y) ...... 67 Figure 6.2. Children Not Attending School or Never in School, by Age and Urban or Rural Location (YO)...... 67 Figure 6.3. Children Attending Lower and Upper Primary School, by Age and Gender (YO)...... 70 Figure 6.4. Children Not Attending School or Never in School, by Age and Gender (YO)...... 70 Figure 6.5. Children Completing Primary School, by Age and Gender (%) ...... 76 Figure 6.6. Children Completing Primary School, by Age and Urban or Rural Area (YO)...... 76 Figure 6.7. Average Annual Lower Primary Fee Expenditure per Child, by Province and Urban and Rural Location (MZM '000s) ...... 83 Figure 6.8. Average Annual Upper Primary Fee Expenditure per Child, by Province and Urban and Rural Location (MZM '000s) ...... 84
iv PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Acknowledqements
Acknowledgements
This poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) study was undertaken by a team led by Alexandria Valerio and composed of Mafalda Duarte, Elena Bardasi, Manolo Shchez, Brigitte Bagnol, and Noel Kulemeka. Susana Monteiro, Flivia Martins, Flavio Magaia, and Elsa Alfaica, technical staff at the National Institute for Educational Development of Mozambique, contributed through the collection of qualitative data in the provinces, districts, and schools visited. Financial assistance from the World Bank’s PSIA facility and the Department for International Development (U. K.) is gratefully acknowledged. The team received technical contributions from Peter Moll, Antonio Franco, Louise Fox, Alain Mingat, Erwin H. R. Tiongson, Paud Murphy, Xiaoyan Liang, Carla Bertoncino, and Don Bundy of the World Bank. The study benefited from the valuable assistance of Zefanias Muhate (Permanent Secretary), Virgilio Juvane (Director of Planning), Manuel Francisco Lobo (Director of Basic Education), Antonio Chambal (Director of Administration and Finance), and Manuel Rego (Senior Officer, Directorate of Planning) of the Ministry of Education, Mozambique. The team would like to acknowledge the technical support received from peer reviewers in the World Bank, including Luis Crouch (HDNED), Stefan0 Paternostro (PRMPR), and Valerie Kozel (HDNSP), and from representatives of cooperating partners in Maputo, including Allison Beattie and Paul Wafer (Department for Intemational Development, U. K.), Joe Vere (UNICEF), Bridget Walker Muiambo (Development Cooperation Ireland), Karen Johnson (Save the Children), Nina Steensen and Anne Teigen (World Food Program), and Kirsi Viisainen (Finland). A number of other people participated in the primary research, including senior officials at the Ministry of Education, in Maputo, provincial officers from Gaza, Maputo City, Niassa, and Zambkzia, district officials from Bilene-Macia, Chokwe, Xai-Xai District and City, Urban Districts 3 and 5 of Maputo City, Lichinga District and City, Lago, Sanga, Quelimane City, Namacurra, and Nicoadala, and school level staff. The report was presented to the National Seminar on Basic Education on May 21, 2004. The comments of the seminar participants are reflected in the study. The financial assistance of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in facilitating a discussion of the PSIA results during the seminar is gratefully acknowledged. Finally, we would like to express our appreciation for the extensive collaboration of representatives of the cooperating partners supporting the education sector in Mozambique throughout the process of preparation. Isabel Mutambe (AFTH1) provided assistance in typing and editing and in designing the layout of the report.
V 1Executive Summar
Executive Summary
Though the national education system, including primary education, is neither compulsory, nor free in Mozambique, the school network has witnessed an impressive expansion since the signing of the Peace Agreement in 1992. Enrollments in lower primary education (Ensino Primlirio do Primeiro Grau or EP1, grades 1 through 5) have reached near universal proportions. In the period from 1992 to 2003, the gross admission rate to grade 1grew from 59 percent to 123 percent, the gross enrollment rate (GER) in EP1 increased from 60 percent to 112.7 percent, and the number of lower primary schools rose from 2,800 to over 8,000, Indicators of the internal efficiency and quality of education, however, do not display the same pattern of development. Since 1992, efficiency and quality indicators, such as repetition and dropout rates, the proportion of qualified teachers, and the number of school shifts and of daily hours of instruction have improved only marginally. Given that repetition and dropout rates are about 22 percent and 8 percent, respectively, in EP1, the high access rate evident in grade 1is obviously declining dramatically as pupils move through the system. Analyses by age indicate that, of 100 pupils who gain access to grade 1, only 37 survive to grade 5. By grade 7, only 15 pupils remain in the system, and by grade 12 only a single pupil remains, For those pupils who stay in the system, it is difficult to ascertain learning achievement, as there is nonational assessment mechanism in place to track learning outcomes. Poor survival rates mean that, though initial access is fairly high, the completion rate is low in EP1, and much worse in upper primary education (Ensino Primlirio do Segundo Grau or EP2, grades 6 and 7). The completion rate in EP1 in 2003 was 40 percent, but only 17 percent in EP2. The rates tend to be lower for girls, pupils attending schools in the northern and central regions of the country, and in rural areas. While a child’s chances of entering grade 1have risen significantly in recent years, 80 percent of pupils are unlikely to progress beyond grade 7. Completion rates for EP1 have shown a positive upward trend since 1997, rising from 22 percent in 1997 to 40 percent in 2003, mostly as a result of the expansion in access since 1992. However, the rates remain well below the regional average and pose a risk to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), Education for All (EFA), and, more broadly, a sustained reduction in poverty. There are many factors and plausible hypotheses to explain the low completion rates. The most frequently cited may be grouped into three categories: demand-side constraints (direct costs and opportunity costs in the form of formal and informal school fees and forgone paid or unpaid work), supply-side construints (quality of education, access, and the physical condition of school infrastructure and related facilities), and contextual factors (socioeconomic, cultural, and traditional community practices, chronic illness in the household, and so on). Recent studies on Mozambique have started to identify the characteristics of the impact of the interplay among demand and supply constraints and contextual factors on enrollments and pupil retention in primary schools. One of the limitations of these studies, however, is the lack of information on the specific role that direct costs and opportunity costs exercise in financing primary education, in household decisionmaking regarding the length of children’s schooling, or in forcing children out of school before they can complete lower (grade 5) or upper primary (grade 7) education.
vi PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary
There is considerable debate in Mozambique on formal and informal school fees and on the potential impact of a fee reduction or the elimination of fees on the demand for schooling. The debate tends to be restricted to anecdotal evidence, however; information is limited about household education expenditure, especially on school fees and on books, other school supplies, and uniforms, and the impact this has on household schooling decisions. While its is plausible that a fee reduction or elimination might stimulate enrollment and retention, particularly among the poorest who are more likely to be out of school, there are concerns that a sudden, sharp expansion could also have an unintended, negative effect on the quality of education; ultimately, lowering the perceived benefits of education and discouraging parents from sending their children to school. These concems emanate from experience in Malawi and Uganda where setbacks in educational quality were observed after the elimination of primary school fees in the 1990s. In the case of Mozambique, it is difficult to speculate on the potential impact of fee reduction policy because, unlike Malawi and Uganda where initial pupil admission rates and gross enrollment rates were low, these indicators are already at nearly universal levels. In Mozambique, the key question is the extent to which school fees have and impact on pupil retention and completion rather than on first time enrollment. The main objective of this poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) is to measure the impact of direct costs (formal and informal school fees and related schooling expenses) and opportunity costs on enrollment and pupil retention in primary education. The analysis also provides insights into the contextual factors associated with low pupil retention and an examination of the likely impact and magnitude of policy alternatives aimed at lowering all costs and mitigating contextual factors. Because the GER in lower primary schools has already reached over 100 percent despite the prevailing direct costs and opportunity costs, it seems fitting to estimate the potential impact of an elimination of official school fees and other types of contributions on pupil retention and completion rates, particularly across household income quintiles, and on the quality of education rather than on first time enrollment. The study has relied on primary and secondary data sources for the analysis. In terms of primary data, two field surveys were undertaken. One survey was carried out among senior officials at the Ministry of Education and education staff in the provinces and districts in order to assess the government policy on fees (of all types). The other survey was performed in selected districts, schools, and communities in order to determine the consistency between the government policy and the way this policy is interpreted and applied in schools. Secondary sources have included a national household budget survey (Inqutrito aos Agregados Familiares sobre Orcamento Familiar, or the IAF) in 2002-03 that provides detailed information on household income and expenditures in a representative sample of 8,700 households. These sources also include a variety of published and unpublished studies, statistics, and manuscripts.
vii PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary
Official Policy on School Fees
The official policy on school fees was established by ministerial decree no. 6 of 1986 (Diploma Ministerial no. 6/86), which outlines the fees payable to the system and the associated rules and regulations governing the use of the fees and the fee exemption procedures (Xegulamento de Propinas e Taxus de Internamento no Sistema Nacional de Educa@o). The policy makes a distinction among registration fees (registration and attendance), examination fees, boarding fees, contribution quotas, monthly payments, and "other" fees. Given the importance of primary education, the policy restricts the number of official fees at the lower levels of the education system. For primary schools, the policy stipulates that pupils must contribute a fixed amount, to be paid in cash, through the Social Action Fund (Ac@o Social Escolar, or ASE) and are to meet boarding costs (the latter, if applicable, only in EP2 grades). Contributions through the ASE are intended solely for the purpose of supporting needy pupils through the provision of school materials, clothing, and other personal items. There are no fees for teacher education. For secondary education, literacy programs, and technical and vocational education and training, the policy includes the collection of registration and examination fees and, where applicable, boarding fees. In effect, the ASE contribution acts as a school registration fee. The decree of 1986 makes no mention of whether schools have any freedom to collect additional fees and, if so, for what purpose, nor does it offer guidance on management, decisionmaking and accountability procedures or on the role of school uniforms. The ministerial decree of 1986 was revised in 1987 through another decree (no. 152/87) with the objective of adjusting the fees, which had been eroded by inflation. In practice, the majority of primary schools generate revenues locally to cover routine expenses, mainly through school fees (formal and informal) and an array of levies. Direct government budget allocations to cover daily operations in EP1 are extremely rare; only the largest schools located in urban areas receive assistance from the government to pay for water and other utilities. A recent analysis of public education expenditure analysis estimated that school fees may account for up to 18 percent of recurrent expenses in EP1 and 23 percent in EP2. The education expenditure analysis indicated the bulk of public expenditures are accounted by teacher and administrative salaries, system administration, textbook procurement, and classroom construction and upgrading. According to the household survey, annual average expenditure on school fees per child was 21,410 meticais (MZM) in EP1 and MZM60.013 in EP2, plus an additional MZMl14,249 for uniforms, books, and other school supplies. Though expenditures on education accounts for less than 1percent of total household expenditure on average, school fees are not only an important source of revenue in schools (or in most cases the only source of cash revenue), equivalent to US$2.5 million in EP1 and US$1 million in EP2, but also much higher than the official fees stipulated in the ministerial decree of 1987.
viii PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary
Official Policy on School Fees
The official policy on school fees was established by ministerial decree no. 6 of 1986 (Diploma Ministerial no. 6/86), which outlines the fees payable to the system and the associated rules and regulations goveming the use of the fees and the fee exemption procedures (Regulamento de Propinas e Taxus de Internamento no Sistema Nacional de Educaqcio). The policy makes a distinction among registration fees (registration and attendance), examination fees, boarding fees, contribution quotas, monthly payments, and "other" fees. Given the importance of primary education, the policy restricts the number of official fees at the lower levels of the education system. For primary schools, the policy stipulates that pupils must contribute a fixed amount, to be paid in cash, through the Social Action Fund (Acqcio Social Escolar, or ASE) and are to meet boarding costs (the latter, if applicable, only in EP2 grades). Contributions through the ASE are intended solely for the purpose of supporting needy pupils through the provision of school materials, clothing, and other personal items. There are no fees for teacher education. For secondary education, literacy programs, and technical and vocational education and training, the policy includes the collection of registration and examination fees and, where applicable, boarding fees. In effect, the ASE contribution acts as a school registration fee. The decree of 1986 makes no mention of whether schools have any freedom to collect additional fees and, if so, for what purpose, nor does it offer guidance on management, decisionmaking and accountability procedures or on the role of school uniforms. The ministerial decree of 1986 was revised in 1987 through another decree (no. 152/87) with the objective of adjusting the fees, which had been eroded by inflation. In practice, the majority of primary schools generate revenues locally to cover routine expenses, mainly through school fees (formal and informal) and an array of levies. Direct govemment budget allocations to cover daily operations in EP1 are extremely rare; only the largest schools located in urban areas receive assistance from the govemment to pay for water and other utilities. A recent analysis of public education expenditure analysis estimated that school fees may account for up to 18 percent of recurrent expenses in EP1 and 23 percent in EP2. The education expenditure analysis indicated the bulk of public expenditures are accounted by teacher and administrative salaries, system administration, textbook procurement, and classroom construction and upgrading. According to the household survey, annual average expenditure on school fees per child was 21,410 meticais (MZM) in EP1 and MZM60.013 in EP2, plus an additional MZM114,249 for uniforms, books, and other school supplies. Though expenditures on education accounts for less than 1percent of total household expenditure on average, school fees are not only an important source of revenue in schools (or in most cases the only source of cash revenue), equivalent to US$2.5 million in EP1 and US$1 million in EP2, but also much higher than the official fees stipulated in the ministerial decree of 1987.
viii PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary
Perceptions of Policymakers and Education Officials
The findings resulting from the interviews with central, provincial, and district government officials indicate that, though there was general consensus on the main constraints on enrollment and pupil retention in primary education, the relative importance assigned to each constraint varied according to the level of government. The most important factor mentioned by all was the opportunity costs related to the work children perform outside the household. District officials placed much more emphasis on the significance of these costs. The second most important factor mentioned by all was the direct costs related to learning materials. Once again, the district officials emphasized the importance of these costs. Interestingly, central government officials considered school fees more important than did district officials. Other factors were also considered important as constraints on enrollments and pupil retention. Poverty and vulnerability, which are exacerbated by famine, natural disasters, and chronic illness, were mentioned by half the interviewees. Also mentioned were factors such as traditional cultural practices, lack of relevance of the curriculum, school organization, proximity to school, especially post-EP1, parental attitudes, lack of information among parents about the rights of children to attend school even though they are poor, lack of motivation among children, the low social value placed on education, and orphan or vulnerability status.1 The general opinion was that the regulations on fees are old, irrelevant, and no longer implemented. The officials also emphasized that the policy is not practicable any longer in terms of the frequency of payment and the exemption mechanisms available. The fees being charged in primary schools at present far exceed the limits fixed in the ministerial decree of 1987 (though the officials interviewed were generally not knowledgeable about the government policy or the amount of the fees). Moreover, the fees differ significantly within and across districts. They are much higher in urban areas than they are in rural areas, and how the fee revenue is used is difficult to determine, given that schools are not required to account for it. Agreement was general that some schools deny access to children for lack of payment and that parents are not well aware of the policy according to which children whose parents cannot afford to pay cannot be denied access to school. In fact, most provincial and district officials said that parents who cannot afford the fees do not attempt to enroll their children. Indeed, the majority of parents interviewed were convinced that there were no mechanisms available to allow their children to go to school if the fees had not been paid. And, even if there were mechanisms available, many parents expressed apprehension in using them for fear of retaliation or to avoid enduring social ridicule. Other issues explored during the field study among policymakers and education officials included the role that fees play in financing primary education, the extent to which revenue generated by schools is linked to the quantity or quality of the services provided in the schools, and whether parental or community accountability would suffer if fees were removed. The majority of interviewees agreed that fees are an essential source of funds to run primary schools, especially given the perennial liquidity problems of the government budget. They believed that, without the fees, primary schools would face more difficulties. In fact, 68 percent
1 Includingstreet children, land mine victims, children with disabilities, abused or neglected children and children affected by HIV/AIDS.
ix PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary of all interviewees thought that fees are key in helping expand access to education through new classroom construction (55 percent of the central government officials, 63 percent of the provincial officials, and 100 percent of the district officials). Finally, while most senior central and provincial government officials considered the elimination of the direct costs associated with fees as a means of enabling poor children to attend primary school, thereby raising enrollment and pupil retention rates, district officials said that the elimination of fees would be harmful and should be avoided.
Analysis among Schools and Communities
The findings of the survey among stakeholders in the schools and communities are consistent with the findings of the survey among govemment policymakers. According to the local stakeholders, the factors with the greatest impact on primary school completion rates are the direct costs for leaming materials and books, the high opportunity costs, the low value attributed to education by parents and pupils (demand-side constraints), and poverty. Poverty seems to be closely linked to other problems created because of the lack of food among families and in schools. The degree of the effect of these factors appears to vary across provinces. For example, the low value attached to education by parents and pupils in Zambezia seems to be the factor with the most impact on primary school completion rates, whereas, in Niassa, demand-side constraints, supply-side constraints, and contextual factors are all important. In Niassa, the lack of full primary and full secondary schools (the Escola Primliria Completa or EPC, covers grades 1 to 7, and the Escola Secunduria Completa, grades 8 to 12) and the participation of children in initiation rites are important, though not crucial. In the other provinces sampled, these factors were not highlighted. Opportunity costs, on the other hand, are a much more important factor in rural areas than in urban areas, though they can be significant among low income households in cities, such as Maputo or Quelimane, where children are compelled to work in order to contribute to the family income. For parents in rural areas, their children are an important source of labor, especially during the harvest. This affects the children’s performance in school and is a contributory factor in high repetition and dropout rates. Instead of completing primary school, over-age pupils, a common phenomenon in rural schools, choose to drop out to seek work in Maputo City or some in the mines of South Africa. The survey among stakeholders failed to support the hypothesis that school fees are the main factor in influencing attendance and completion in EP1 or EP2. The amount of registration fees by themselves are not considered decisive in determining whether children attend school or drop out. They do contribute moderately, however, particularly when there are more than two children of school age in a household. Parents then experience difficulty in sending all their children to school, given the combination of fees and other direct costs. Since school fees are not the decisive factor, fee reduction or elimination for primary schools may mitigate, but would not solve the problem of low pupil retention and high dropout rates. Parents and guardians would still be required to pay for expensive school supplies and uniforms or other clothing and cover other direct costs such as school meals and transportation.
X PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary
Although they were not mentioned as critical constraints on enrollments and pupil retention in primary schools, other supply-side factors were also considered as having a negative effect on enrollments and pupil retention, namely, the limited access to EP2 by children in rural areas, the inadequacy of physical infrastructure, which adds to the unattractiveness of the learning environment for students and teachers, the acute shortage of school furniture (mainly desks), the shortage of qualified teachers and the poor teacher training, the lack of appropriate teaching and learning aids, and the lack of relevance of the curriculum. (Thus, the primary curriculum appears to be more relevant to children in urban schools than to children in rural schools.) Among the contextual factors, the results of the survey suggest that socioeconomic and cultural conditions appear to play the most significant role in explaining the low completion rates in primary schools. Poverty is prevalent in urban and rural areas, but parents in rural communities struggle more to cope with the costs of sending their children to school. Scarce income must be divided among subsistence items and the cost of school. If parents cannot afford primary education or see only a low return to education, they are likely to take their children out of school and put them to work on the farm. Cultural factors are also important in rural communities, especially in the north where initiation rites are traditionally followed. Initiation rites usually prevent girls from completing primary education, since, once the initiation ceremony is complete, a girl is considered a woman who is ready for marriage. School becomes irrelevant.
Household Survey Analysis
The PSIA included an analysis based on the IAF household budget survey. The purpose of the analysis was to measure the impact of school fees and other costs on the demand for education. Although it would have been interesting to undertake a quantitative analysis of supply-side constraints, the household survey employed for this analysis contains only limited information on supply-side variables. Consistent with the findings of the other surveys (see above), the analysis of the IAF data show that school fees alone have essentially no impact on enrollments and dropouts. The analysis highlights the existence of other important constraints on school attendance and pupil retention, such as school proximity, the characteristics of the children, the geographical location of a household, parental educational attainment, and household welfare status. The more distance between a household and the nearest primary school, the greater the probability that children in the household will not attend school. This is a crucial factor in rural areas, where 35 percent of the households are more than 30 minutes distant from a primary school. Improving the access to and availability of schools can increase enrollments in primary schools considerably and, to some extent, help decrease the number of dropouts, especially in areas where there are few schools. Girls are more likely than boys never to attend school, though the difference is more pronounced among older children than it is among younger ones, which is probably the result of recent efforts to expand access in EP1. In addition, there is a variation between boys and girls in the average age when the child starts school. Girls are less likely than boys to start in EP1 at
xi PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary age 6 (only 35 percent among girls compared to 43 percent among boys). The implication is significant, however. The older the starting age the higher the probability of not completing primary school. The age of 15 appears to represent a turning point for girls. Attendance in EP2 begins to decline among girls at that age, while some advance to secondary school many girls stop attending school altogether. Especially in the 15-24 age group, girls are more likely than boys to drop out because of marriage (and pregnancy). The girls who remain in school move as well as, if not better, than boys. In general, enrollments in rural areas are substantially lower than those in urban areas. Moreover, children in rural areas tend to start in EP1 later, at an older age, and therefore also either finish later or drop out prematurely. Children in rural areas are less likely to attend EP2 than are urban children. The difference between rural and urban areas in the share of pupils completing EP1 or EP2 is greater than the difference in the enrollment rates in the two areas. In rural areas, the share of children completing EP1 is always lower, at all ages. The share of those who complete EP2 is negligible in rural areas, only 5 or 6 percent of the 18-19 age group. Poor children are less likely than rich children to be enrolled in EP1. As measured by household consumption, welfare is clearly associated with school enrollments and pupil retention, explaining, at least in part, the differences in enrollment rates between rural and urban areas. The children of parents with less educational attainment are less likely to be enrolled. Forming another disadvantaged group are the children who are not the children of the head of the household. Many of these children are likely to be orphans.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Government policy stipulates that, for primary school, households must contribute to the ASE a fixed amount (MZM150 per pupil), to be paid in cash, and meet boarding costs (MZM500), the latter, if applicable, only in EP2 grades. Contributions to the ASE are intended solely for the purpose of supporting needy pupils through the provision of school supplies, clothing, and other personal items. There are no fees for teacher education. The official policy makes no mention of whether schools have any freedom to collect additional fees and, if so, for what purpose, nor does the policy offer guidance on the uses of funds generated by schools, on school accountability with regard to the funds, or on the role of uniforms. The study finds that neither the policy, nor the fees have changed since 1987. The policy is considered out of step with key developments in the educational system since 1992. The majority of EP1 schools rely on the funds they generate through fees to meet routine expenses. Direct budgetary allocations from the Ministry of Education to cover daily operations are extremely rare. Only the largest urban schools receive assistance to pay for water and other utilities. The fees charged by schools are well above those fixed in the relevant government policy documents. Paying school fees seems to be the norm, not the exception in Mozambique. The fees include ASE contributions and a variety of other, mostly ad-hoc charges. Additional fees are levied for enrollment or registration certificates, end-of-year passing certificates, certificates issued upon completion of grade 5 and grade 7, examination fees (the revenue is sometimes used to provide lunch for external examination evaluators), and fees for
xii PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary test booklets. Some schools also charge special fees for the construction of new classrooms or the rehabilitation of old ones, for cleaning materials, school guards, or sports equipment. Although the general policy is that no child is to be kept out of school because a fee has not been paid, in practice, most schools enforce the payment of fees without exception. The study finds general agreement that the ASE funds should be used for the benefit of needy pupils. However, school directors say that, in most cases, the funds, along with other school fees, benefit all children by ensuring the normal operation of schools. Few schools visited had safety net strategies in place to cater for vulnerable and disadvantaged pupils. In addition to fees, households with children in school must meet the costs of uniforms or school clothing, school supplies, and school snacks. In many instances, these costs pose the greatest obstacle to enrollment and may cause households to take children out of school. The cost of uniforms, which are mostly an urban phenomenon, can range from MZM160,OOO to MZM180,OOO per child. In rural areas, the equivalent problem is the cost of regular clothing; children feel ashamed if they must attend school in the same old clothes each day. According to the household budget survey, total household and per child expenditures on school fees (the ASE contributions and other school fees) rise from one level of education to the next. The average total expenditure for EP2 is almost three times that of EP1. The expenditure on lower secondary schools (Escolas Secundurias do Primeiro Grau or ESG1, grades 8 to 10) is seven to nine times that for EP1, and the expenditure on upper secondary schools (Escolas Secunddrias do Segundo Grau or ESG2, grades 11 and 12) is more than one and a half times that for ESG1. These amounts may appear small, especially for primary schools; they barely reach 1 percent of average total household consumption and an even smaller share of total average household cash income. Nonetheless, they are an important source of cash revenue in schools and are clearly higher than the limits set in the ministerial decree of 1987. The most substantial EP1 fee is paid in Maputo City (about MZM70,OOO a year), followed by fees in urban areas in Nampula (MZM55,OOO). EP1 fees tend to lower in rural areas, though, in some cases, they are relatively high and not necessarily much lower than the fees in urban areas (in Sofala, for example). The household survey confirms that the average amount spent on books, uniforms, and other school supplies is high, if not higher, than the corresponding amount spent on primary school fees. For example, the average annual amount spent on books is about MZM43,OOO per child, which is twice as much as the average fees for EP1 (MZM21,410); even more expensive are the uniforms, on average about MZM73,OOO per child, more than the EP2 fee (MZM60,013) and more than three times the average EP1 fee. The study found that several supply-side factors, including school infrastructure and the quality of education, particularly in terms of qualified teachers, the availability of women teachers, good textbooks, adequate learning materials, and the relevance of the curriculum, play a large role in determining enrollment rates. The majority of schools visited, especially in rural areas, offered little to encourage pupils to attend classes regularly. The two main cultural constraints on pupil retention and school completion are early marriage among girls and initiation rites among boys and girls. Initiation (puberty) rites are symbolic events during which substantial elements of traditional education are transmitted to young people. These rites are practiced mainly in rural areas, but also occasionally in cities in
... Xlll PSEA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary the central and northern regions. Initiation rites affect girls more than boys. The initiation rites among girls usually take place during the first menstruation of the girls, when they are between 12 and 15 years of age, and they provide a clear reason for dropping out of school since, when the rites are completed, girls are perceived as women who are ready for marriage. Against this background, the central question of the study was: What would happen to enrollments if school fees were reduced? The results of the multivariate analysis point to several important responses. In general, school fees alone have limited statistically significant impact on either enrollments, or dropping out of primary schools. There are, however, some geographical exceptions. In urban areas in the center of the country, higher fees are associated with lower enrollment probabilities. While the impact of school fees is not statistically significant in general, households in the central region and in urban areas send fewer children to school when fees are higher, and they send more children to school when fees are lower. For example, if the average per child fee for EP1 were reduced by 200 percent, from MZM21,400 to slightly more than MZM7,000, a household that currently sends two of three children to school would be more likely to send the third child to school as well. The cost of uniforms is associated with a positive effect on enrollments in EP1. An explanation for this apparently counterintuitive result was offered by the Minister of Education. The uniform performs a special egalitarian function. By masking the social status of children, it obscures any visual social differences among them. For this reason, parents prefer to send their children to school in uniforms. This explanation does not contradict the findings of the analysis. The proximity to school appears to be a key variable in explaining enrollments in EP1 and EP2 and plays a substantial role in explaining dropouts from EP1 in rural areas. The greater the distance between household and school, the more likely that the child will not attend. The level ofhousehold consumption has a significant influence on whether a child will attend EP1. It also affects whether a child will drop out of EP1 in a rural area, though the impact is not as large as might have been expected. The number of children enrolled in EP1 would rise by 52 percent in urban areas and 34 percent in rural areas if household consumption were to increase by one unit. For example, if the level of consumption of an urban household grew from MZM14,500 to MZM39,500 a day, an expansion of more than 170 percent, the number of children in the household who would be attending EP1 would climb from two in four to three in four. The variation in household consumption must be great in order to produce a substantial shift in the probability of enrollment. The personal characteristics of the child, particularly age, gender, and vulnerability status, greatly affect the probability of enrollment and dropping out. The probability that a child will attend EP1 increases with the age of the child, but at a declining rate. The impact is larger in rural areas, which is an expected result, given that children in rural areas tend to start school later than do children in urban areas. Gender is also associated with different probabilities of enrollment and dropping out. Girls are less likely than boys to be enrolled in EP1 (-20.6 percent in rural areas), and older girls exhibit an additional lower probability of being enrolled relative to boys. Though it is not possible to define unambiguously the status of orphans in the dataset, the variable "not a child of the household head" may delimit that status somewhat, while also
xiv Executive Summar capturing the status of children who may be related to the heads of household, but are not their children and, therefore, potentially also disadvantaged. The estimated coefficient of this variable is statistically significant and large in size in the regressions on enrollments and dropouts for both EP1 and EP2, particularly in urban areas. Not being the child of the household head is associated with a 12 percent reduced probability of attending EP1 in urban areas and a 14 percent reduced probability of attending EP2. Similarly, the number of dropouts from EP1 increase by almost 3 percent and from EP2 by 5 percent if the child is not the child of the household head. Overall, the quantitative analysis assigns school fees little impact on enrollments and dropouts. However, some caveats apply. First, the household survey is likely to capture only a part of all school fees, namely, those that are paid in cash and that parents are more likely to have formally agreed upon. It is possible that a substantial portion of school fees, including the most controversial ones, such as in-kind fees, extraordinary fees, personal favors to teachers, and so on, have gone completely unrecorded in the survey, though it is precisely this sort of fee that results in non-enrollment or dropping out. Second, the amount of the fees reported by households is very small, especially for primary schools. These small amounts can have only a limited impact, if any, on the demand for education. Therefore, the reduction or elimination of primary school fees could mitigate the problems of enrollment and dropping out, but cannot be expected to solve them. For many parents, it is the associated costs of schooling such as school supplies, textbooks and uniforms what poses the real burden. Several factors in the study findings stand out as more critical than others in relation to increasing enrollment, retention and completion rates in primary education. Some of these factors may merit more immediate attention. It is suggested that the following (in order of importance) should be viewed as priorities in discussions regarding the development of government policy on primary education.
+ Revise and disseminate information on official policy toward school fees in order to clarify the type and frequency of the fees allowed, the role of parents and communities in establishing fees, and the exemption mechanisms available for those who cannot afford the fees, including orphans and vulnerable children. + Ensure that children begin grade 1at the appropriate age of 6 or 7.
~3 Improve access (proximity) to EP1 and EP2 schools, especially in rural areas.
e Improve the quality of school infrastructure. + Ensure that EP1 schools receive sufficient financial resources to purchase educational materials, including notebooks, and create additional incentives to raise the retention in school of disadvantaged groups, especially girls and orphans in rural areas. + Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure on education, particularly in EP1 and EP2.
xv PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Executive Summary
Developments since the Completion of the PSIA Study
In light of the negative impact of school fees on student enrollment and completion rates in primary education and in an effort to promote equitable access to education, as stipulated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Govemment of Mozambique issued a ministerial decree in 2004 wherein it declared the abolition of the ASE and any other fees and levies in primary education as of the 2005 academic year, which began in mid-January 2005. The decree of 2004 allows parents, communities, and other interested parties to make contributions in cash or in kind, although only on a strictly voluntary basis. While the government’s decision to abolish all fees is a bold step to encourage and accelerate enrollment in primary education, the decree of 2004 does not mention if additional budgetary allocations will be made to cover the shortfall in school-generated revenue (an average of MZM21,410 per child in EP1 and MZM60,013 per child in EP2) or if school supplies, textbooks, school uniforms, and other miscellaneous items, which were financed by households (at an average of MZM114,249 per enrolled child), will be covered through other means. In the event that items such as school fees previously financed by households are covered by the government and provided directly to schools and students, an additional US$2.5 million for EP1 and US$1 million for EP2 would need to be allocated in 2005 (at current enrollment levels). However, should students who dropped out before completing lower or upper primary school be encouraged to re-enroll, the government‘s allocation would have to be raised substantially in order to provide for the rise in the number of new or returning students, particularly in upper primary schools. It should be noted that under the current fee abolition scheme and in the absence of additional budget resources, households would still be required to purchase school supplies, uniforms and, in some grades, textbooks. While it is too early to determine the initial impact of the government’s decision, the removal of fees is likely to increase the absolute number of students, especially in EP2, in which only slightly more than 10 percent of the eligible school-age population is currently enrolled and where the social pressure to expand is highest. It is also possible that students who dropped out before completing EP1 or EP2 be encouraged to re-enroll. The question of whether retuming students would remain in the system until completion would also depend on the household’s ability to meet additional expenses to cover school supplies, uniforms and textbooks or on an extraordinary effort form the government to increase public expenditure to cover school supplies and other miscellaneous schooling expenses for the majority of EP1 and EP2 pupils.
xvi PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 1: Background
Chapter I:BACKGROUND
A. Primary Education in Mozambique
1.1 The national education system, which defines the principles, objectives, pedagogical approaches, and structure of each of the subsystems in the education sector, was legally established in Mozambique through ministerial decree no. 6, 1992 (Diploma Ministerial no. 6/92). According to the decree, the national education system is govemed by the following principles: (a) education is a right and a duty of all citizens; (b) the govemment allows for the participation of communities, cooperatives, enterprises, and the private sector in the education process; (c) the government organizes and promotes learning as an integral part of educational activities in accordance with the Constitution; and (d) public education is secular.
1.2 The decree of 1992 does not establish that education, including primary education, should be compulsory or free. Rather, the decree assigns to the Council of Ministers the responsibility for determining the pace at which compulsory education should be introduced, taking into account socioeconomic developments in the country.
1.3 The analysis presented in this study concentrates on the two levels of primary education, lower primary education (Ensino Primurio do Primeiro Grau or EPl), which offers grades 1 through 5, and upper primary education (Ensino Primurio do Segundo Grau or EP2), which offers grades 6 and 7. Most Mozambican schools provide only one level of primary education (EP1 or EP2), but a small share, about 10 percent of all schools enrolling grade 1 pupils, cover all seven grades. Each of these is referred to as a full primary school (Escola Primhria Completa or EPC).
1.4 Although primary education is neither compulsory, nor free, the school network has witnessed an impressive expansion since the Peace Agreement of 1992, and enrollment in EP1 has reached near universal proportions. During the period from 1992 to 2003, the gross admission rate to grade 1 increased from 59 percent to 123 percent, while the gross enrollment rate (GER) for EP1 grew from 60 percent to 112.7 percent, and the number of EP1 schools rose from 2,800 to over 8,000.
1.5 Indicators of the intemal efficiency and quality of education, do not display the same pattem of development, however. Since 1992, efficiency and quality indicators, such as pupil repetition and pupil dropout rates, the proportion of qualified teachers, the number of school shifts, and the number of daily hours of instruction, have improved only marginally. Although initial enrollment in grade 1 is nearly universal, analyses based on recent survey data indicate that, of 100 pupils who gain access to grade 1, only 37 survive to grade 5. By grade 7, only 15 pupils remain in the system, and, by grade 12, only a single pupil remains. (See Annex A for a graphic representation of the education pyramid in Mozambique.) The completion rates tend to be lower among girls and among pupils attending school in the northern and central regions of the country. For those students who stay in the system, it is difficult to ascertain changes in
1 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 1: Background leaming achievement because there is no national assessment mechanism in place to track learning outcomes.
1.6 Completion rates in EP1 have shown a positive trend since 1997, rising from 22 percent in 1997 to 40 percent in 2003. (See Annex B for definitions of selected education indicators.) Still, they remain well below the regional average and pose a risk to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, Education for All, and, more broadly, a sustained reduction in poverty. (See Annex C on the MDG.) Given the central objective of poverty reduction in Mozambique and the importance of education in achieving this objective, this study is intended to provide insights on the factors that are associated with the low completion rates in primary education.
B. Possible Factors behind the Low Completion Rates
1.7 Many plausible hypotheses might explain the low completion rates. The most frequently cited ones can be grouped into three categories. First, it has been suggested that demand-side constraints or, more specifically, the high direct costs and high opportunity costs of schooling because of formal and informal school fees and forgone paid or unpaid work increase the likelihood that children will drop out of school. Few studies exist that might help determine the extent to which various costs have an impact on school enrollments and pupil retention rates in Mozambique. Anecdotal evidence implies, however, that the costs are significant and may have great influence on schooling decisions, particularly among the poorest households. In a situation in which slightly more than half the population is living below the poverty line, the direct costs and the opportunity costs of education provide a plausible explanation for the poor completion rates (Ministry of Planning and Finance, IFPRI, and Purdue University 2004).
1.8 Second, it has been proposed that supply-side constraints, such as the poor quality of education, which has been exacerbated by the rapid expansion in access and the poor physical infrastructure of most primary schools, may have an impact on completion rates. The relative increase in the proportion of unqualified teachers, open-air classrooms, and teacher absenteeism, the deterioration in pupil-teacher ratios, and the scarcity of textbooks and learning materials, particularly in the EP2 grades, lend support to this hypothesis.
1.9 Third, contextual factors, such as socioeconomic conditions and local traditional practices, can exert harmful effects, especially on the education of girls. Food insecurity and chronic illness in families may also inflate the opportunity costs of children’s presence in school.
1.10 Recent studies on Mozambique describe the interplay among demand and supply constraints and contextual factors in terms of impacts on enrollments and pupil retention rates in primary schools. The findings point to a mix of influences. They highlight the cost of schooling, inadequate household incomes, insufficient human capital development, the distances children must travel to reach school, education quality, and the rise in the prevalence of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) as key
2 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 1: Background constraints (Breslin 2003; Lavinas 2003; Handa 2002; Handa and Simler 2000). One limitation of the studies, however, is the lack of specific information on the impact of direct costs and opportunity costs on the financing of primary education or in forcing children out of school.
C. Policy Alternatives
1.11 While the achievements of the Ministry of Education in increasing enrollment over the last 10 years are laudable, it is widely recognized that the educational system is at a crossroads. There is a need to reevaluate the underlying, multifaceted causes behind the poor primary school completion rates. This is especially important if Mozambique is to achieve the Education for All goal of universal completion of primary schooling (grade 7) by 2015.
1.12 In response to the problem of low completion rates, the Ministry of Education is considering intensifying various policy altematives as a way forward. The policy alternative that attracts the public and resonates strongly with the cooperating partners who are providing financial and technical assistance in the education sector is the elimination of school fees in primary education. Other policy altematives under consideration include the expansion of the school network, particularly the construction of schools closer to communities, and the improvement in the quality of education by strengthening and expanding teacher education programs, improving teacher management and deployment practices, supplying basic leaming materials, and improving the relevance of the curriculum.
1.13 While it may be worthwhile to implement many, if not all, of these policy altematives at once, it is important to prioritize them according to the likely costs and potential impacts of each, especially given current financial burdens and the pressing social demand for more expenditure in other areas of the education system. Although the Ministry of Education is already implementing some of these policy alternatives, particularly those related to reducing the supply-side constraints, the issue at hand is whether to continue emphasizing supply-side policies or whether there is a more appropriate combination of policies and interventions that would respond with greater effectiveness to the challenge of enhancing completion rates and, more broadly, raising the educational attainment, competencies, and skills of the labor force.
D. TheStudy
Objective
1.14 The main objective of this poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) is to gauge the impact of direct costs (formal and informal school fees and related schooling expenses) and opportunity costs (forgone paid or unpaid work) on enrollments and pupil retention in primary education. In a context in which the GER in EP1 has already reached over 100 percent despite the prevailing direct and opportunity costs, estimates are needed on the potential impact of the elimination of school fees and other types of household contributions on pupil retention and completion rates. Most useful would be an analysis emphasizing not first-time enrollment rates
3 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 1: Background
(which are positive), but the effects school costs - measured in terms of household income levels-have on retention and completion rates and the quality of education.
1.15 The study estimates demand-side constraints by reckoning the direct costs and the opportunity costs faced by pupils and households and the distances children must travel to attend school, while supply-side constraints are measured, albeit in a limited way, using subjective, self-reported indicators of schooling quality. The study also considers the impact of contextual factors such as economic status, social and cultural practices, and chronic illness in the household, all of which play a role in household decisionmaking on schooling. Having identified the magnitude of the constraints, the study compares the distributional impact of cost reductions in primary education with that of easing supply-side constraints across regions, income groups, and vulnerable groups. Ultimately, the study seeks to inform the choice, design, and sequence of policy options and institutional reforms aimed at improving completion rates, especially among children in poor and vulnerable households.
Relevance
1.16 The study is relevant for several reasons. First, the Ministry of Education is moving rapidly and aggressively forward to reach the Education for All and Millennium Development Goals and is therefore examining the option of abolishing school fees so as to stimulate the demand for schooling and to reduce dropout rates.
1.17 Second, the study coincides with the final preparatory phase of the government’s Education Sector Strategic Program 2005-10. The program envisages the continuation of pilot initiatives such as Direct Support for Schools (Apoio Directo 2s Escolas), which channels small grants directly to all primary schools for the purchase of materials and classroom consumables, thereby helping reduce the direct costs of primary schooling (see PF Consulting Lda. 2003).
1.18 Third, international experience gathered through fee reduction schemes in India, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, and Uganda indicates that, while such schemes can boost the demand for education, they should not be undertaken without assessing the consequences in post-primary education or without adequate preparation so as to cope with any sudden, sharp rise in the demand for schooling that may result. One should ensure that there is a pool of potential teachers who may be deployed rapidly, that the infrastructure is in place to serve more pupils without having to cut hours of instruction, and that a supply of basic teaching and leaming materials can be guaranteed. Failure to prepare a comprehensive response with a clear strategy for confronting financially and physically any sudden jump in the demand for schooling may be a formula for failure.
1.19 A significant debate is being conducted in Mozambique on formal and informal school fees and on the possible impact of a fee reduction or elimination policy on the demand for schooling. The debate is focused particularly on pupil retention among the poorest households and on the quality of education should a sudden, sharp rise in pupil retention occur. (The gross
4 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 1: Background admission and gross enrollment rates are already nearly universal in EP1.) The debate tends to be restricted to anecdotal evidence, however, as there is little information on household education expenditure, especially on school fees and school-related items such as books, other educational materials, and uniforms, and the impact this has on household schooling decisions. The study will assist the government in predicting the potential consequences of a policy to reduce the formal and informal school fees currently being required in primary schools.
Conceptual Framework
1.20 Figure 1.1 shows the demand-side and supply-side constraints on education considered within the study. On the demand side are factors related to the benefits (retums to education) and the costs, which are divided into direct costs (fees, books, uniforms, other education-related materials, and other costs such as transport) and opportunity costs (forgone work inside and outside the household). On the supply side, the main factors identified are the existence (or absence) and location (distance) of schools, the adequacy and quality of education infrastructure, and the quality of education, including such aspects as the number and the qualification of teachers, the availability and quality of teaching-leaming materials, and curriculum relevance. The contextual factors considered include sociocultural factors, traditional community practices, household food security, and chronic illness in the household.
igure 1.1. Contextual Factors and Demand-Side and Supply-side Constraints
Benefits (Returns to education
Demand-side constraint{costs Direct costs - Uniforms;eoeoSks 1 [- Other school supplies - Other direct costs Opportunity costs -Work in the household - Work outside the household
Existence of schools and location (distance) Supply-side constraints Adequacy and quality of infrastructure Quality of education (number and qualification of teachers, availability and quality of teaching-learning materials, relevance, and so on)
Sociocultural and community practices Contextual factors Household food security Chronic illness, hunger, and so on
.21 Since one of the specific objectives of this study is to estimate how government policy on formal or informal school fees affects the demand for primary schooling, the study classifies fees as follows (see Figure 1.2): first, the form in which the fees are paid, that is, whether they are paid in cash or in kind (including labor); second, the source of the fees, that is, whether the
5 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 1: Background fees are official (determined by law or regulation) or school based (determined by the school, a practice that contradicts official policy); third, a category labeled "atypical," which incorporates fees that are neither official, nor required of all students, including direct payments requested by teachers, special contributions for key events, and so on; fourth, the purpose of the fee, that is, fees for registration, attendance, examinations, school materials, non-teacher salaries, the maintenance of infrastructure, and so on; finally, the frequency of the payments demanded.
Figure 1.2. Typology of Fees In cash In kind (including labor) Form Official (established by law) School level (established by schools with or without parental involvement; it can also include fees established by other Source institutional levels rather than the central authorities) Atypical (that have not been established by any institutional level) Direct Costs (formal and informal, < rRegistration and matriculation Attendance including contributions, fees, levies) School materials and interventions in school iNon-teacher salaries Annual By semester Frequency Quarterly Monthly, and so on
Data Sources
1.22 The study has relied on primary and secondary data sources for the analysis. In terms of primary data, two field surveys were undertaken. One was conducted among senior officials at the Ministry of Education and education staff in the provinces and districts. The aim was to assess the governmental policy on fees of whatever sort. The other survey was conducted in selected districts, schools, and communities to determine the consistency between the government policy and the interpretation and application of the policy in schools.
1.23 The secondary sources have included a national household budget survey (Inqukrito aos Agregados Familiares sobre Orpmento Familiar, or the IAF), which was carried out from 2002 to 2003. The IAF supplies detailed information on household incomes and expenditures based on a representative sample of 8,700 Mozambican households. The secondary sources have also included a variety of published and unpublished studies, statistics collections, and manuscripts. These sources are listed in the Bibliography.
6 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 1: Background
Structure of the Study
1.24 The study is organized into seven chapters. Following this introductory background chapter, Chapter 2 reviews the literature on international progress and trends in efforts to raise enrollment and completion rates and the available research on the role of and interplay among demand-side and supply-side constraints and contextual factors in this area. Chapter 3 outlines key trends in educational indicators for Mozambique using the statistical database of the Ministry of Education. Chapter 4 describes the government policy on school fees and provides a glimpse into the way this policy is interpreted and applied from the perspective of policymakers, senior officials, and technical officers at the central, provincial, and district levels. Chapter 5 presents the findings from the school and community survey on the role, magnitude, importance, and perceived impact exerted on initial enrollment and pupil retention by the costs associated with schooling. Contextual factors are examined in this chapter. Chapter 6 explains the findings of an econometric analysis, based on a household survey, that examined the impact of direct costs and of opportunity costs on the demand for education and the extent to which the demand for education might be sensitive to a reduction in these costs. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes key findings and offers conclusions and policy recommendations. A number of annexes follow at the end of the study.
7 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 2: Literature Review
Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Education and Development
2.1 The importance of education in advancing economic and social development and, especially, the role of primary education in reducing poverty are well documented. There is an extensive empirical literature demonstrating the contribution of education to economic growth, social development, the promotion of human rights, and the development of human capabilities (Azardis & Drazen 1990; Cohn and Geske 1990; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Barro 1992; Barro and Lee 1993; O”eilll995; Lau and others 1993; Schultz 1992; Behrman 1996).
2.2 In terms of economic growth at the macroeconomic level, education promotes rapid technological adoption and innovation, while, at the microeconomic level, education has a direct impact in raising labor productivity and boosting the retums to education. Education has an essential part in social development, especially in the promotion of sound health practices. The education of girls, for example, is highly correlated with improvements in health and nutrition, reductions in fertility, infant mortality, and morbidity rates, the fight against HIV/AIDS, the lessening of income disparities, and the promotion of social and political participation, especially among those most likely to be poor or marginalized, such as girls, ethnic minorities, orphans, children affected by HIV/AIDS,2 people with disabilities, and people living in rural areas.3 Beyond the instrumental perspective of education, there is a human rights dimension, Basic education is a right to which people, irrespective of their circumstances, should be entitled. Education promotes human capabilities to reflect, make choices, seek a voice in society, and enjoy a better life.
B. Attaining Education for All
2.3 Given the pivotal role of education in fostering economic growth, social development, and poverty reduction, govemments have pledged to achieve the goals of Education for All- universal access to and completion of primary education and gender parity in primary and secondary education - as signatories to international agreements, including those of the World Conference on Education for All (1990), the World Summit on Social Development (1995), and the World Education Forum (2000). The Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000 incorporate the Education for All goals and have galvanized international support, particularly in countries in which the attainment of Education for All remains a distant, difficult possibility.
2 Children who are affected by HIV/AIDS include children who are looking after sick caregivers, who have been rejected by their families or others due to the stigma of AIDS, who are living with HIV/AIDS, who are living in households headed by grandparents or other older people due to the devastations of AIDS, who are living in communities with high HIV prevalence, or who have lost one or both parents. 3 Research indicates that greater participation leads to higher quality institutions, stronger democratic processes, and, in the end, more equitable development policies. For example, see Bruns, Mingat, and Rakotomalala 2003.
8 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.4 Regional progress toward attaining the Education for All goals has been uneven. Since the 1990s, GERs have increased steadily in South Asia, the Arab States, North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, while the rate of progress in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia has been slow. From 1989 to 1999, the GER in sub-Saharan Africa rose from 78 to 81 percent, while in Central Asia the rate grew from 87 to 89 percent. In fact, since the early 1990s, enrollment rates have expanded in sub-Saharan Africa by less than 1 percent per year, or less than the rate of increase of the primary school-age population.
2.5 Progress in curbing school dropouts, particularly before pupils have completed the full primary education cycle, has been somewhat limited across all regions, including those countries where significant progress has been achieved in boosting GERs and expanding access to primary education.4 Since 1990, the global average completion rate for the developing world has only improved from 72 to 77 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa exhibited by far the lowest completion rate, with barely half of all school-age children completing primary school.5 South Asia followed, with a regional average completion rate of about 70 percent. The Middle East and North Africa showed a pattem of stagnation through the 1990s, with the average completion rate at around 74 percent. The Eastem Europe and Central Asia region (92 percent) came closest to the goal, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (85 percent), and East Asia and the Pacific (84 percent). Globally, though completion rates for girls improved more than did those for boys over the decade, the average completion rate for girls, at 76 percent, continued to lag behind that of boys, at 85 percent (Bruns, Mingat, and Rakotomalala 2003). Higher completion rates are of paramount importance so as to ensure that children acquire essential literacy and numeracy and the broader life skills needed to escape the poverty trap.
C. Constraints to Increasing Enrollment and Completion Rates
2.6 While it is clear that enrollment and completion rates are affected by demand-side and supply-side constraints and other contextual factors, the relative magnitude of the impact of each varies across and within countries depending on the specific country situation, the government’s long-term policy on education, and the relative development of the education sector. In some countries, demand-side factors, such as the price or direct cost of schooling, show a greater influence in inhibiting initial or sustained enrollment, while, in other countries, supply-side and contextual constraints have a more substantial effect.
2.7 It is important to determine the relative impact and the magnitude of each influence in order to ensure that educational policy and investments respond effectively to the situation. For example, in a country where there are sufficient school places for all school-age children, but the high direct costs of education (the school fees and school-related expenses) result in significant dropout rates, it would be unwise to initiate a large-scale classroom construction program (that
4 In 1998, UNICEF estimated that more than 150 million children in developing countries, almost one third of all children of primary school age, were starting school, but were not completing grade 5. 5 On a population-weighted basis, the global progress is more encouraging. The global completion rate rose from 73 to 81 percent over the decade, although it was only 51 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.
9 is, a supply-side intervention). As long as the costs of education remain high, an expansion in new school spaces would be unlikely to resolve the problem.
2.8 The following subsections provide a brief review of the international literature, including the available research on Mozambique and the research on the relative impact and importance of demand-side and supply-side constraints and contextual factors.
Demand-Side Constraints: Direct Costs and Opportunity Costs
2.9 Using data from Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia, a case study found that the direct costs of education have a negative impact on the demand for education and are one of the key factors, among a wide range of other sociocultural factors, preventing full access to education (Boyle and others 2002). The study also indicates that the demand for education among the poorest households is a "vulnerable demand," that is, it can change as a result of economic and natural shocks such as sudden shifts in the prices of staple foods, the death of a breadwinner because of AIDS, or other illness in the household.
2.10 In terms of the type of directs costs having the most impact, Boyle and others (2002) found that, in Uganda and Zambia, a substantial part of the reported costs were accounted for by school uniforms-though these are not compulsory, many schools still require them-and unexpected or atypical costs such as contributions to teachers who were leaving a school or joining a school or the repair of buildings affected by natural calamities. In Zambia, the problem was exacerbated by the timing of school expenditures. These were required in January to March, the period when incomes are at their lowest in rural areas, when malaria is most prevalent, and when extra money is needed for medicines.
2.11 Interestingly, Boyle and others (2002) also observe that expenditures on social events such as weddings, funerals, and circumcision ceremonies account for a large portion of household budgets, despite the significant poverty in most of the countries examined in the study and the obviously limited economic return on these expenditures. They find that expenditures on social events compete with expenditures on education and, at times, win out over education expenditures, especially if the perception of the quality of education is negative. The relative importance of education within household expenditures improved only when the quality, relevance, and benefits of education were perceived as superior to the advantages accruing from other sorts of investments. In Malawi, for example, after an initial surge in enrollments following the introduction of a fee reduction scheme, there was a drop off that the authors believe reflected a realization among parents that some costs were being shifted rather than abolished and the negative judgments of parents regarding the overcrowded classrooms. The authors conclude that education policies seeking to address access, attendance, and completion must also address the quality of education if they are to ensure sustained demand.6
6 The study highlights the fact that parents predominantly see quality of education in terms of availability and the competencies of teachers.
10 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.12 A recent study by Bentaouet Kattan and Burnett (2004) has reviewed available evidence on the impact in primary education of user fees, namely, tuition, textbook charges, the cost of compulsory uniforms, community contributions, and school-based activities fees such as exam fees. Obtained from a survey of 79 countries, their findings indicate that fees are commonplace. Among the countries surveyed, 97 percent reported charging some type of fees, which are usually collected by the schools. The authors estimate that household expenditures for education account for about 20 percent of primary education expenditures throughout the world, with higher proportions in Africa (30 percent) and in the transition countries of the former Soviet Union (approximately 40 percent). The primary education expenditures represent, of course, a relatively higher proportion of total household expenditures among households in the lowest income quintile distribution. In Ghana, per pupil household expenditure on primary education was equivalent to 7 percent of the annual household expenditures among the poorest quintile in 1998/99. In Zambia, an average 16 percent of non- food household expenditure was allocated to education expenses, while, in Tanzania, household expenditures on primary education accounted for 37 percent of all recurrent expenditures on education in 1995. The review by the authors of available studies analyzing the impact of school fees on primary school enrollments indicates that reducing the costs of schooling among low-income and underrepresented or vulnerable groups promotes enrollments, attendance, and pupil retention.
2.13 Deininger (2003) has carried out one of the few quantitative studies available on the impact of the elimination of fees on shifts in enrollments. The study analyzes the effect of Universal Primary Education in Uganda. Launched in 1997, the policy aim was to do away with the costs to households of primary education (formal and informal fees) for up to four children per household, of which at least two had to be girls. Using household survey data from 1992 and 1999/2000, the author found an increase in primary school attendance among children of the poor and among girls as a result of the policy. For example, in 1992, school attendance in the 6-12 age group was 46 percent for the bottom income quintile and 82 percent for the top income quintile. By 1999, the percentages for the same age groups in the bottom and top income quintiles were 78 percent and 89 percent, respectively. The improvement was especially significant among girls in the 6-8 age group in the bottom quintile. School attendance among this group rose from 26 percent to 66 percent over the period. Although the expansion in attendance resulted in an increase in the number of pupils per school, quality indicators such as the ratio of pupils to trained teachers deteriorated rapidly, particularly in rural areas. The author concludes that, while fee abolition policies can make primary education more accessible, especially if enrollment rates are low, a fee reduction policy must be implemented hand-in- hand with efforts to improve or at least maintain the quality of education.
2.14 Similarly, Kadzamira and Rose (2003) evaluated the impact of the Malawian govemment’s 1994 policy of free primary education. Their findings indicate that, although GRE increased substantially-from 88 percent in 1992/93 to 139 percent in 1997/98-following the abolition of fees, many households were not able to sustain their initial demand for education for a variety of reasons, but often related to poverty. The pupil retention rate by grade level
11 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 2: Literature Review remained unchanged over the same period: only half the children who had started Standard 1 were surviving to Standard 3, and less than 20 percent of pupils were completing the full primary cycle (eight years). The authors conclude that the policy did not sufficiently reflect the ways in which the direct and indirect costs of education could continue to be prohibitive for some households (that is, lack of income to buy school materials and clothing for school, forgone labor, early pregnancy, food insecurity), the effect that the expansion in enrollments would have on the quality and relevance of education, and the perceived loss of accountability by schools because parents felt they could no longer influence school affairs since they were no longer required to pay for services.
2.15 In the case of Mozambique, a study by Oxfam (Watkins 2000) reports that, in some districts, communities are paying four times the official school fees and that examination fees, which are not part of the official government policy on fees, are commonplace and required if a student wishes to sit for the end-of-cycle examinations.
Supply-side Constraints
2.16 Filmer (2004) has studied the impact of policies aimed at raising enrollments through the expansion of school infrastructure. Using data from demographic and health surveys in 21 low- income countries, the study simulates the impact of lowering the average distance children must travel between their homes and school. The results indicate that, although boosting school availability can be a tool for increasing enrollment, the effect is typically small. The author concludes that policy interventions to raise enrollments should not rely on school construction. Instead, other interventions, such as those that affect the demand for schooling directly through enrollment incentives or indirectly through the benefits expected from schooling, should be included in strategies to reach Education for All objectives
2.17 Handa (2002) has studied the relative importance of the supply of schools versus household demand factors, as well as issues of cost effectiveness, in pushing up primary school enrollment in Mozambique. Handa’s analysis of supply-side interventions, which considers the impact of an increase in the number of rural schools, shows that elevating the proportion of rural villages with primary schools from the current 68 percent to 79 percent or to 89 percent would boost the enrollment by 13 percent and 35 percent, respectively. In contrast, the analysis of demand-side interventions finds that a rise in enrollment of 2 to 4 percent would result from interventions aimed at raising per capita consumption, while a rise of 8 to 15 percent would be generated by interventions aimed at raising literacy levels among adults (heads of household).7
2.18 The study also reviews the impact of the characteristics of schools on primary school enrollments in rural Mozambique. It finds that aspects of the quality of schools and the ease of
7 If literacy itself is not the cause of an expansion in child schooling, but factors associated with literacy such as personal preferences or the values of education, then the simulation results are likely to overestimate the benefits of adult literacy campaigns in Mozambique.
12 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 2: Literature Review access to schools stimulate enrollments; however, the effects are small and differ by gender. School quality, measured by the number of trained teachers in a school, has a positive and significant impact on enrollments, but the gender composition of the trained teaching staff (women teachers) is even more important in determining the outcomes of household decisions to send children to school. School access, measured by the travel time to the nearest school, also has an impact on enrollments. Reducing the travel time to the nearest school would increase enrollments by 17 to 20 percentage points. The impact is even greater among girls if the nearest school is built with cement. The study concludes that, when relative costs are considered, adult literacy campaigns are nearly 10 times more cost effective than the interventions focused on household incomes and 1.5 to 2.5 times more cost effective than interventions involving the building of more schools.
2.19 These findings reinforce the conclusions reached by an earlier study on Mozambique conducted by Handa and Simler (2000). That study found that, while school quantity is more important in raising enrollments, indicators of school quality such as the pupil-teacher ratio are important determinants of efficiency and of higher grade attainment by pupils. According to the authors, improving school quality by reducing the pupil-teacher ratio tends to boost the grade-level attainment of pupils and therefore school efficiency by approximately 9 percent, but has no impact on overall enrollment rates. They argue, however, that it is possible to raise the probability of first-time enrollment, while enhancing efficiency and grade-level attainment by building small schools in rural villages that lack schools.8 After considering cost information, the authors conclude that the main implication is that a sound policy would involve the expansion of educational facilities through the well-targeted placement of new schools.
Contextual Factors
2.20 There is general agreement in the literature that Universal Primary Education cannot be attained if other important household needs are not addressed-such as the lack of-food, poor health, the lack of clothes. or the lack of money to purchase basic school materials-that may be beyond the scope of educational policy and imply more well-coordinated intersectoral efforts. As Kadzamira and Rose (2003) observe for Malawi, poverty-related factors interact and reinforce one another, creating cycles of deprivation that require multifaceted interventions. A telling example offered in the research is that, in countries where the school calendar coincides with the period of hunger before harvests, children either do not go to school, or they attend school without eating, which diminishes their attention, participation, and leaming.
2.21 A study undertaken on behalf of Save the Children U. K. (Breslin 2003) in Mozambique reinforces the evidence for the negative impact of direct costs and, especially, the opportunity costs on the demand for education. The study finds that, when a parent or household member is
8 One should recall that these results are based on a single measure of school quality, the pupil-teacher ratio, and that there are other dimensions of school quality-such as curriculum reform-unrelated to this ratio that may have major positive implications for school enrollment and school achievement.
13 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 2: Literature Review ill, children suffer from emotional problems, uncertainty, and stress. The high level of domestic and caring responsibilities placed on children whose parents or caregivers are chronically sick often translates into children stopping school. The study also finds that illness in the household affects household savings and forces substantial prioritization on expenditures for food, clothing, health, and school materials. The longer the illness, the greater the likelihood that the household will prioritize resources to cover food and health expenditures, thereby affecting children’s education, sometimes permanently. On those occasions when parents or caregivers manage to keep children in school despite the illness, the study finds high levels of discrimination among peers and neighbors, resulting in children leaving school prematurely.
2.22 A study by Ainsworth, Beegle, and Koda (2002) analyzes the impact of adult mortality on primary school enrollment in northwestem Tanzania in the late 1990s. The study indicates that households often cope with adult deaths by delaying the enrollment of young children (the 7-10 age group), while maintaining the enrollment of older children (the 11-14 age group). It also shows that matemal orphans and orphaned or non-orphaned children in poor households are particularly affected, as they are likely to be older than their classmates when they enroll. While children in low-income households are more likely to delay enrollment following the death of an adult, the enrollment of the children in better-off households is not affected. In the case of Tanzania, however, where delayed enrollment is a common feature of the education system, the study finds that the main factors associated with the delays are more closely related to the quality of education. The authors conclude by suggesting that interventions aimed at improving the quality of education may have a larger impact on the welfare of orphans than do targeted transfers or subsidies enabling children to attend low-quality, crowded schools with limited opportunities for secondary schooling.
Government Responses and Government Experiences
2.23 Though many countries have laws stipulating that primary education should be compulsory and free, educational systems in low-income countries seldom have sufficient resources to cover the full budgetary implications of running a system that guarantees access and quality to all school-age children. Often, most of the budget for education is spent on teacher and administrative salaries, leaving few resources for equally important expenditures on quality inputs such as textbooks and classroom materials. Where public resources are limited, primary schools typically cope by raising revenues locally from a variety of sources, including school fees, contributions, and levies, which may go beyond what the official policy stipulates. Parents are left to meet a number of direct costs that should otherwise be met by govemments. For poor parents, the amount and frequency of fees may be deciding factors on whether to enroll or keep their children in school (Bentaouet Kattan and Burnett 2004).
2.24 As a way to minimize the costs of schooling and boost enrollment and completion rates, some govemments have adopted special measures, including the abolition of school fees and
14 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 2: Literature Review the provision of compulsory and free primary education.9 Thus, free primary education was adopted in Malawi in 1994, Uganda in 1997, Lesotho in 2000, Tanzania in 2001, Madagascar in 2002, and Kenya in 2003. The impact of this policy varied depending on the original problems it was meant to address and the general condition of the education sector, including the initial level of enrollment and completion rates, the fees, and the extent to which educational systems were prepared to cope with the sudden surge in demand that resulted from the policy in terms of qualified teaching staff, adequate textbook and classroom materials, and the existence of strategies to offset the forgone school revenue because of the elimination of the fees.
2.25 A common response to the elimination of school fees is a rise in the demand for schooling, as the policy cuts direct education costs so that it becomes easier for parents to send their children to school. However, as revealed through the literature review, the initial increase in demand is short-lived in some cases, as the policy tends to cover only official registration, examination, and maintenance fees. Parents are left with the burden of other direct expenses such as the costs of exercise books, pens, clothing or uniforms, and requests for contributions for sports, drinking water, and labor and materials for school upgrading and maintenance.
2.26 Fees are frequently eliminated under social and political pressure and without adequate assessment of the potential consequences. Unless the sector is made ready through additional financing and extra human resources to cater for the surge in the demand for schooling that can result from such a policy, the quality of education begins to deteriorate rapidly, leaving parents to question the value of education and making it difficult for the government to maintain any gains achieved through the policy.*O This highlights the perennial tradeoff dilemma between quantity and quality for governments, which must also respond to other development objectives in, for example, maternal and child health, water and sanitation, and food security. The trick is to maximize both quantity and quality.
2.27 Contrary to the conventional view, which sees the abolition of fees as a panacea for raising the demand for schooling, evidence from several countries indicates that this might not be the case given the array of additional direct costs and unofficial fees and levies. As the evidence from Malawi shows, despite some relaxation of the financial constraints facing households in terms of primary schooling, there are factors that continue to prevent the poorest households from sending all their children to school or sustaining their initial demand for
9 The example of Malawi is illustrative. In Malawi, free primary education involves the financing of primary schools, the supply of sufficient learning materials and teachers, the provision of classrooms, classroom furniture, teacher housing, sanitation facilities, and boreholes for water, and abolishing all fees. These steps were reinforced by other measures such as the non-enforcement of a requirement that school uniforms be worn. As a result, there was a massive expansion in access (quantity), and Universal Primary Education was attained for the first time. See Kadzamira and Rose 2003. 10 Even if there is a rise in the government expenditure allocated to education, this is only sufficient in many cases to cover the payment of the extra salaries because of the teachers added in response to the expansion in primary enrollments. At any given level of efficiency, higher enrollments require proportionally more resources for all inputs (classroom space, desks, books, and so on).
15 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 2: Literature Review education until their children have obtained at least basic literacy and numeracy skills. While fee abolition policies can have a long-range impact on the demand for schooling, the possible consequences must be carefully weighed, and they must be accompanied by sufficient financial resources to offset forgone school revenue and maintain instructional quality.
2.28 Public policy on education is often geared to the expansion of access, as in the case of fee abolition policies, without concomitant improvements in the quality of education or in completion rates for primary schooling. Empirical evidence suggests that enhancing the quality of education is as important as increasing demand, especially for very poor children who may face higher opportunity costs.
16 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 3: Education Indicators in Mozambique
Chapter 3: EDUCATION INDICATORS IN MOZAMBIQUE
A. Trends in Education Indicators
3.1 This chapter presents key trends in gross and net enrollment rates and repetition, dropout, and completion rates, as well as in several indicators of educational quality and equity. The purpose is to contextualize the analysis and findings included in the subsequent chapters. The data presented here are taken from the 1997 and 2003 EducStat, the Ministry of Education’s annual school survey. (See Annex B for definitions of selected education indicators.)
Gross and Net Enrollment Rates
3.2 Since the Peace Agreement in 1992, Mozambique has made significant progress in enhancing access to primary education. From 1997 to 2003, the GER in lower primary schools (EN, grades 1-5) grew from 74.8 to 110.4 percent, and the GER in upper primary schools (EP2, grades 6 and 7) rose from 19.3 to 35.5 percent. The net enrollment rate (NER) climbed from 43 to 67.9 percent in EP1 and from 2.2 to 4.3 percent in EP2 over the same period. In absolute terms, the number of pupils in EP1 increased from 1.7 million in 1997 to 2.8 million in 2003, which represents the greatest-ever expansion in access to the system (Table 3.1). Despite these large gains in primary school access, the enrollments in EP2 and in secondary education (grades 8-12) are still unsatisfactory.
Table 3.1. GER, NER, and Number of Primary and Secondary Pupils, 1997 and 2003 EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 Indica tors grades 1-5 grades 6-7 grades 8-1 0 grades 11-12 Gross enrollment rate 1997 74.8 19.3 6.2 0.3 2003 110.4 35.5 15.3 1.5 Net enrollment rate 1997 43.0 2.2 0.6 0.0 2003 67.9 4.3 1.5 0.5 Number of children 1997 1,744,863 153,102 45,211 2,614 2003 2,826,362 351,575 142,784 18,291 Number of schools 2003 8,077 950 125 29 Source: EducStat annual school survey, 1997 and 2003. Since EducStat is regularly updated, EducStat data may vary slightly from the data in other Ministry of Education publications.
Repetition, Dropout, and Completion Rates
3.3 The average repetition rate in primary education in 2003 was 21.7 percent in grades 1-7 (21.9 percent in EP1 and 19.5 percent in EP2). This was high relative to the rates in neighboring
17 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 3: Education Indicators in Mozambique
Tanzania (3 percent), Zambia (5 percent), and Malawi (15 percent)." Though the rates in EP1 declined slightly, from 24.9 percent in 1997 to 21.9 percent in 2003 for the repetition rate and from 8.8 percent to 7.6 percent for the dropout rate, they remain high and pose a challenge for achieving the Universal Primary Education and Universal Primary Completion goals. In EP2, the trend has been similar in terms of repetition, albeit more pronounced, with the rate decreasing from 28.8 percent in 1997 to 19.5 percent in 2003, while dropout rates grew from 6.9 percent to 8.9 percent over the same period (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2. Primary and Secondary Repetition, Dropout, and Completion, 1997 and 2003 EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 Rates grades 1-5 grades 6-7 grades 8-10 grades 11-12 Repetition rate 1997 24.9 28.8 20.2 37.2 2003 21.9 19.5 15.4 14.6 Dropout rate 1997 8.8 6.9 3.7 5.3 2003 7.6 8.9 6.0 3.8 Completion rate 1997 22.0 7.3 2.0 0.6 2003 40.0 17.0 4.6 1.1 Modified completion rate 2003 60.2 32.1 8.3 1.9 Source: EducStat annual school survey, 1997 and 2003. Available population data aggregate 16-to-17 and 18-to-24 age groups. To estimate the completion rate for lower secondary (grades 8-10) and upper secondary (grades 11-12), the age groups were therefore divided randomly by the number of age years (the 16-17 age group by two, and the 18-24 age group by seven).
3.4 The level of access in EP1 is impressive, but completion and repetition rates do not display the same success. The share of pupils completing the full primary cycle (grades 1-7) remains small relative to the achievement in neighboring countries or countries at income levels similar to those in Mozambique. Thus, the primary completion rate was 50 percent in Malawi (1995), 81 percent in Swaziland (1997), and 83 percent in Zambia (1995).12
3.5 Given the dramatic repetition and dropout rates as pupils move through the system, the high access rate in grade 1 appears much less significant. The poor rates of survival of pupils through the successive grades mean that, though initial access is fairly high, the EP1 completion rate is low. The situation is worse in EP2. The completion rate was 40 percent in 2003 for EP1, but only 17 percent in EP2. The rates tend to be lower for girls, pupils attending school in the northern region of the country, and in rural areas.'3 For example, while the EP1 completion rate
~~
11 The rates for neighboring countries refer to 1999/2000 (UNESCO 2002). 12 See Annex D for data by country. 13 The completion rate used in this report is defined as the total number of students graduating from the final year of a cycle of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the segment of the population that is at the age corresponding to the official age for graduation. Since the number of
18 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 3: Education Indicators in Mozambique in 2003 was 48.2 percent for boys, it was only 31.9 percent for girls. The same trend is observed in EP2, where the completion rate for girls in 2003 was 12.6 percent, compared to 21.5 percent for boys. This suggests substantial inefficiency. A child’s chances of entering grade 1 have increased in recent years, but 80 percent of pupils are unlikely to advance beyond grade 7.
Proportion of Unqualified Teachers and Pupil-Teacher Ratios
3.6 The rapid expansion in enrollment has had unanticipated negative consequences. The proportion of unqualified teachers and the pupil-teacher ratio have been rising over the last 10 years. The proportion of unqualified teachers in EP1 grew from 26.6 percent in 1992 to 42.2 percent in 2003. In EP2, the increase in the proportion of unqualified teachers was greater: from 6.4 percent in 1992 to 34.6 percent in 2003 (Table 3.3). The pupil-teacher ratios in EP1 have also climbed, from 59 pupils per teacher in 1997 to 64 pupils per teacher in 2003, and there are large variations within and across provinces. It is clear that, despite the substantial growth in the absolute number of teachers in 1992-2003, pre-service and in-service teacher education programs have not been able to cover the needs in teacher training. As a result, the proportion of teachers with proper training has fallen.
Table 3.3. Number of Teachers and Share of Unqualified Teachers in Primary and Secondary Education, 2992,1997, and 2003 EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 Year Indicator grades 11-12 grades 1-5 grades 6-7 grades 8-20 1992 Teachers, number 21,776 2,000 1,558 127 % unqualified 26.6 6.4 4.5 4.7 1997 Teachers, number 28,715 3,982 1,308 219 % unqualified 29.6 21.1 18.0 12.3 2003 Teachers, number 42,847 9,139 3,523 657 % unqualified 42.2 34.6 37.2 16.8 Source: EducStat annual school survey, 1992,1997, and 2003.
3.7 The Ministry of Education does not carry out national student assessments. This renders difficult the accurate measurement of trends in leaming outcomes. However, the high proportion of unqualified teachers and the surging pupil-teacher ratio-well above the generally agreed maximum of 40-45 pupils per teacher in lower primary schools-suggest that there has been a decline in the quality of education in recent years.
students graduating from the final year of a cycle is likely to be lower than the number of students enrolled in the last year of the cycle, a modified completion rate has also been calculated using the enrollment in the final year of the cycle, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the segment of the population that is at the age corresponding to the official age for graduation. As anticipated, the latter rate points to higher rates of completion across provinces, ranging from an additional 15 to 30 percentage points for grade 5 completion and to an additional 9 to 35 percentage points for grade 7 completion.
19 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 3: Education Indicators in Mozambique
B. The Geographic and Gender Dimensions of Equity
3.8 As illustrated in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, there are large variations in gross and net enrollment and completion rates across regions. Maputo Province and City show the highest rates, while provinces in the central and northern regions of the country lag behind. Nearly universal access and completion in lower primary education characterize Maputo City. (In 2003, the GER was 139.9 percent, and the NER was 92.1 percent. The completion rate was estimated at 88.9 percent.) However, universal access and completion remain elusive in Cab0 Delgado, Manica, Nampula, Niassa, Sofala, Tete, and Zambezia province^.^^ A clear example is offered by the differences in this respect between Nampula and Maputo Province. The GER and NER in lower primary schools in 2003 were, respectively, 152.4 and 92.4 percent in Maputo Province, while they were only 89.1 and 51.7 percent in Nampula.
Table 3.4. GER and NER in Primaru Education, bu Province, 2003 EP1, grades 1-5 EP2, grades 6-7 Province GER NER GER NER Cab0 Delgado 111.0 67.5 22.9 1.1 Gaza 134.3 77.2 53.2 5.0 Inhambane 132.2 77.5 56.2 5.7 Manica 116.7 67.4 37.7 4.6 Maputo City 139.9 92.1 92.0 17.0 Maputo Province 152.4 92.4 74.1 8.5 Nampula 89.1 51.7 22.7 2.0 Niassa 102.0 66.4 31.1 2.9 Sofala 103.0 64.8 36.3 5.8 Tete 101.8 67.6 24.5 3.9 Zambdzia 106.2 68.1 22.5 2.8 Nationwide 110.4 67.9 35.5 4.3 Source: EducStat annual school survey, 2003.
3.9 The same holds for completion rates. For example, in 2003, the completion rates in EP1 were 82.2 percent in Maputo Province and 62.2 percent in Inhambane, but only 28.5 percent in Nampula and 23.4 percent in Zambezia. This pattern is also evident for repetition and dropout rates. Thus, while the dropout rate in EP1 in 2003 was 2.3 percent in Maputo City, it was 10.5 percent in Zambezia.
3.10 Similar variations can be observed across districts. Approximately 40 districts out of the total of 141 districts show completion rates of 25 percent or less in EP1, while about 85 districts exhibit completion rates of 40 percent or less. The differences are likewise manifest in EP2 in the provinces and districts, and they become more apparent as students progress through the education system. This is so because participation in post-lower-primary education is, by
14 The northern provinces are Cab0 Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa. The central provinces are Manica, Sofala, Tete, and Zambdzia. The southern provinces are Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo City, and Maputo Province.
20 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 3: Education Indicators in Mozambique definition, conditional on the completion of lower primary school, but also because of the much more limited number of schools that are available above the primary level. (See Table 3.2 and Annex A.)
Table 3.5. Primary Repetition, Dropout, and Completion Rates, by Province, 2003 EP1, grades 1-5 EP2, grades 6-7 Province Repetition Dropout Completion Repetition Dropout Completion Cab0 Delgado 17.0 10.4 30.9 14.6 19.5 11.1 Gaza 23.9 5.6 61.8 19.9 7.9 25.6 Inhambane 27.1 4.9 62.2 24.0 6.4 25.8 Manica 23.0 7.2 43.4 21.7 9.2 17.3 Maputo City 24.6 2.3 88.9 22.0 4.3 46.0 Maputo Province 22.0 6.0 82.2 14.9 9.7 34.6 Nampula 19.9 6.8 28.5 17.9 6.3 11.0 Niassa 18.5 10.2 33.0 17.4 15.7 13.4 Sofala 18.0 5.9 41.4 18.5 6.2 17.6 Tete 16.0 8.7 33.9 15.8 11.2 11.9 Zambezia 26.1 10.5 23.4 22.4 11.3 11.0 Nationwide 21.9 7.6 40.0 19.5 8.9 17.0 Source: EducStat annual school survey, 2003.
3.1 1 At about 20 percent, the gender gap in enrollments was high in EP1, where it was steady from 2000 (21 percent) to 2003 (20.6 percent). However, the gender gap in EP2 worsened considerably, growing from 7.4 percent in 1997 to 14.6 percent in 2003 (Table 3.6).
Table 3.6. GER, bu Gender, 1997,2000, and 2003 EP1, grades 1-5 EP2, grades 6-7 Indicator 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 Total 74.8 91 110.4 19.3 24.2 35.5 Boys 87.6 103 120.6 23.0 29.3 42.9 Girls 61.9 81 100.3 15.6 19.1 28.3 Gender gap 25.7 21 20.3 7.4 10.2 14.6 Source: EducStat annual school survey, 1997,2000, and 2003.
3.12 There were also significant variations in gross and net enrollment and completion rates by gender across provinces and districts (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo City, and Maputo Province show the smallest gaps in completion rates by gender, while Cab0 Delgado, Manica, Nampula, Niassa, and Sofala provinces exhibit the greatest. For example, the gap in the completion rate between girls and boys in EP1 in 2003 was 3.4 and 1.5 percent in Gaza and Maputo Province, respectively, while it was 22.1 percent in Cab0 Delgado and 23.4 percent in Sofala.
21 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 3: Education Indicators in Mozambique
Table 3.7. Lower Primaru GER. Revetition. and Comvletion. bu Province and Gender. 2003 Boys Girls Completion gap Province GER Repetition Completion GER Repetition Completion Cab0 Delgado 125.6 17.0 42.1 96.7 17.0 20.0 -22.1 Gaza 136.6 24.9 63.5 131.9 22.9 60.1 -3.4 Inhambane 135.1 27.7 67.0 129.3 26.4 57.6 -9.4 Manica 131.3 23.1 56.4 102.4 22.9 31.0 -25.4 Maputo City 138.2 25.8 94.2 141.7 23.5 96.7 2.5 Maputo Province 152.7 23.0 82.9 152.1 21.1 81.4 -1.5 Nampula 99.9 19.5 38.7 78.1 20.4 18.1 -20.6 Niassa 113.7 18.5 42.9 90.4 18.6 23.3 -19.6 Sofala 117.4 17.9 53.1 88.5 18.2 29.7 -23.4 Tete 111.5 15.9 41.9 92.0 16.1 25.9 -16.0 Zambezia 120.3 25.6 32.1 92.0 26.8 14.6 -17.5 Nationwide 120.6 21.9 48.2 100.3 21.9 31.9 -16.3 Source: EducStat annual school survey, 2003.
Table 3.8. Uvver Primary GER, Repetition, and Comvletion, bu Province and Gender, 2003 Boys Girls Completion gap Province GER Rwetition Comvletion GER Rwetition Comdetion Cab0 Delgado 31.1 14.2 15.5 14.8 15.6 6.7 -8.8 Gaza 54.2 19.0 27.3 52.3 20.8 23.9 -3.4 Inhambane 61.5 23.3 29.7 51.1 24.9 21.9 -7.8 Manica 50.8 20.8 25.0 25.3 23.4 9.9 -15.1 Maputo City 89.8 20.3 45.8 94.1 23.6 46.2 0.4 Maputo Province 74.7 13.8 37.8 73.5 15.9 31.5 -6.3 Nampula 31.7 18.1 15.9 13.7 17.4 6.0 -9.9 Niassa 42.0 17.5 19.0 20.1 17.1 7.7 -1 1.3 Sofala 46.0 17.9 24.0 26.8 19.5 11.3 -12.7 Tete 31.5 15.4 15.8 17.5 16.6 8.0 -7.8 Zambezia 31.3 22.6 15.6 13.7 21.9 6.4 -9.2 Nationwide 42.9 18.9 21.5 28.3 20.3 12.6 -8.9 Source: EducStat annual school survey, 2003.
3.13 The discrepancies are obvious in the districts as well. An analysis demonstrates that the completion rate among girls is less than 20 percent in 67 districts (48 percent) out of the total of 141 districts. Among boys, only 11 districts (8 percent) out of the total of 141 districts exhibit completion rates of less than 20 percent. While it is evident that school-age children should all be provided with the opportunity to attend and complete lower primary education, more serious and more targeted efforts are required to improve the indicators among girls in disadvantaged provinces and districts. (See Annexes D through H for indicators disaggregated by gender and district.)
22 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 3: Education Indicators in Mozambique
C. Education Expenditure
3.14 The government’s commitment to expanding educational opportunity is clear in the boost in the resources allocated to the education sector. Between 1999 and 2002, the share of education in public expenditure grew from 18 to 20 percent. The rise was from 19 to 21 percent if measured as a proportion of discretionary public spending.15 As a share of gross domestic product, education expenditure increased from 2.9 to 4.4 percent over the same period, including donor education resources. If only primary education is taken into account, the percentage is 3.0. On average, donors finance about 27 percent of the total annual education budget, corresponding to approximately US$41 million of the total budget of US$153 million.16
3.15 While government’s emphasis on education increased in the last three years, from a cross-country perspective, budget allocations to education in Mozambique are still low. On average, countries in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) spend 5.1 percent of GDP on education. According to the Education for All Fast Track Initiative, the established benchmark for public expenditure on primary education is 3.5 percent of GDP and 20 percent of the total government expenditure. At present, Mozambique spends 3.0 of GDP on primary education, a figure situated below the benchmark and inadequate to meet the Education for All targets by 2015. In fact, in the context of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative, the Ministry of Education estimated the cost of primary expansion at an additional US$60 million (on average) per year for the next 15 years so as to ensure that the universal completion of quality primary education is reached by 2015.”
3.16 An analysis of expenditure by functional category reveals that most of the education budget is accounted for by teacher and administrative salaries, system administration, textbook procurement, and classroom construction and upgrading. Direct budget allocations to cover daily operational expenses in EP1 are extremely rare; only the largest urban schools receive assistance to pay for water and other utilities. The majority of primary schools generate revenues locally for routine expenses, mainly through school fees and an array of charges.
3.17 There is little information on the efficiency and effectiveness of the public expenditure on education. Nonetheless, despite the increase in resources allocated to the sector, the proportion of unqualified teachers continues to rise, especially in rural areas. Given the limited
15 Discretionary expenditure normally refers to total government expenditure, minus spending on debt and pension liabilities. In Mozambique, the government defines the indicator as total government expenditure, minus spending on debt. The definition used here is consistent with the latter definition. l6 A portion of the total government budget is financed by external resources through direct budget support allocations. 17 See Ministry of Education (2003a). The proposal was approved in March 2003. The estimates include capital and recurrent expenditure and factor in the costs associated with HIV/AIDS in terms of teacher absenteeism and replacement and orphan care and support. The estimates take into account efficiency improvements in terms of the reduction of pupil repetitions and school dropouts and the need to raise the efficiency of the management and use of resources.
23 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 3: Education Indicators in Mozambique resources available to the country and the competing demand from other priority sectors, it is unlikely that public education expenditure can continue to rise indefinitely. It is therefore imperative that an in-depth analysis of teacher deployment, management, compensation, and teaching load requirements at all levels of the educational system be undertaken so as to improve the use of the resources and ultimately, the impact of resources on educational outcomes. (See Ministry of Education 2003a.)
24 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and ,Practice
Chapter 4: SCHOOL FEES: POLICY AND PRACTICE
4.1 This chapter has two objectives. The first objective is to provide a thorough description of government policy on school fees, including the type, magnitude, frequency of payment, and exemption mechanisms, as well as the interpretation of these aspects in govemment strategy documents on education and poverty reduction more generally (Sections A and B). The second objective is to provide insights into the way the govemment policy on fees is interpreted by policymakers, senior officials, and technical officers in selected provinces and districts, including whether the fees are perceived to have an impact on school enrollment and pupil retention (Section C). To achieve the first objective, the chapter relies on a review of legal documents that establish the government's policy for dealing with direct costs in primary education. To achieve the second objective, the chapter relies on the results of in-depth interviews with Ministry of Education officials conducted to elicit their views and opinions about the impact of school fees on household schooling decisions and, if this perceived impact is negative, how the effects might be mitigated so as to reach the goal of universal completion of primary education.
A. Government Policy on School Fees
Oficial Policy
4.2 The official policy on school fees was established through ministerial decree no. 6 of 1986 (Diploma Ministerial no. 6/86), which outlines required education fees and the associated rules and regulations governing the use of fees and the exemption procedures (Regulamento de Propinas e Taxus de Internamento no Sistema Nacional de Educa@o). The policy makes a distinction among registration fees (registration and enrollment), examination fees, boarding fees, contribution quotas, monthly payments, and "other" fees. It allows for the collection of several fees throughout the system to be used to promote a rapid expansion in access and, to a lesser extent, improvements in quality.
4.3 Given the importance of primary education, the policy restricts the number of official fees at the lower levels of the system. For primary schools, the policy stipulates that, for each pupil, a fixed amount must be contributed, in cash, to the Social Action Fund (Actio Social Escolar, or ASE) and to meet boarding costs (the latter, if applicable, only in EP2). Contributions to the ASE are intended solely for the purpose of supporting needy pupils through the supply of school materials, clothing, and other personal items.'* The ASE contribution is collected, administered, and spent by the schools, usually at the discretion of the school director, according to the norms established by the minister of education and the Ministry of Education. There are no fees for teacher education. For secondary schools, literacy programs, and technical
18 According to Article 7 of the 1986 decree, "the ASE contributions will go into a school-based fund whose objective will be to support needy children to purchase [school] materials, clothing, and personal essentials . . . ."
25 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice and vocational education and training, the policy includes the collection of registration and examination fees and, where applicable, boarding fees. The decree of 1986 makes no mention of whether schools have any freedom to collect additional fees and, if so, for what purpose, nor does it offer guidance on the uses to which such funds should be put, on the accountability of schools with regard to funds they have collected, or on the status of school uniforms.
4.4 The decree of 1986 was revised by ministerial decree no. 152 of 1987. The main objective of the decree of 1987 was to adjust fee levels that had been eroded by inflation. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the types of fees as described in the decree of 1987.
Table 4.1. Annual Fees by Type and Educational Level (MZM) Level Registration Examination (each subject) Boarding ASE Primary education EP1, grades 1-5 - - 150 EP2, grades 6-7 - 500 250 Secondary education ESG1, grades 8-10 2,000 1,000 400 ESG2, grades 11-12 3,000 1,500 500 Teacher education - - 400 Adult education Level 1 4,000 200 3,000 400 Level 2 6,000 500 5,000 500 Note: The Mozambican currency is the metical (plural, meticais), or MZM. The approximate exchange rate (February 2004) was US$1= MZM23,250 (January 2005, MZM18,355).
4.5 According to the decree of 1987, the payment of fees gives students the right to register and attend school, use school facilities, and participate in relevant tests and examinations. Similarly, payment of boarding fees entitles students to food and lodging in boarding schools, with the exception of EP1. Boarding schools cater for a share of students in EP2 and beyond.
4.6 At all levels, students who repeat a class are required to pay an additional 50 percent of the fee except under extraordinary circumstances for which they must present a written document. The policy also stipulates that students who cannot afford the ASE contribution should be provided an exemption and be allowed to register. Unless exempted, students who are not able to pay the required fees within the fixed time limit are not entitled to enroll. In the case of boarders, such students forfeit their right to use boarding facilities. School directors have the responsibility for granting exemptions.
Payment Mechanisms, Frequency of Payment, and Time Limits
4.7 With the exception of the ASE contributions, which are paid in cash to the school authorities, all other fees are to be paid according to a process referred to as "the nullification of stamps." That is , rather than paying cash, parents must purchase official stamps equivalent to the relevant fee. The stamps are then attached to a form supplied to the school to demonstrate
26 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice payment. The sale of the stamps is a source of public revenue, and, while the objective in principle is to create revenue for the individual schools, the funds are rarely transferred to the schools. The issue of the use of the revenue is mainly of interest to secondary schools and technical and vocational training schools because of the amount of the fees in question. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight the issue here because of its bearing on collection practices for revenue across all levels of education. In practice, while some schools rely on the nullified stamps, many still require cash contributions, since fees are their primary source of income for operational expenses
4.8 ASE payments and other registration fees can be paid either in one installment (during the two weeks preceding the beginning of the school year at the end of January or during the first week of the school year) or in two equal installments (during the same two weeks before the beginning of the first and second semesters of the school year). Fees can also be paid at the time of enrollment, which typically takes place at the end of the academic year. Boarding fees can be paid in one installment during a six-week period (two weeks preceding the school year and the first four weeks of that year), in two equal installments (during the same periods before the beginning of the first and second semesters), or in 10 equal installments (between day 1and day 15 of each month from February to November). Finally, the ASE contribution must be paid in cash directly to the school secretariat. The policy also establishes that the district education director can authorize the payment of ASE contributions in kind to the students who should benefit from the funds in accordance with rules to be established. While the district director is not permitted to alter the schedule of payments, she can delegate this responsibility to the school director.
Fee Reductions and Exemptions
4.9 Although school directors have the mandate to grant exemptions, they must adhere to regulations establishing the eligibility criteria for households that may qualify for a partial reduction of fees or full exemption from payment. The eligibility criteria are as follows. First, if a member of the household is employed and the household’s annual income is between MZM11,OOO and MZM16,OOO (the updated values in the decree of 1987), the household may be eligible for a reduction in fees, while households with annual incomes below MZM11,OOO may be exempt.19 Second, if no household members are employed, households may seek a reduction or exemption if they cannot afford the fees. (However, fee exemptions and fee reduction waivers are usually only granted to students whose parents have been affected by the war, mainly through disability, or to students who are in military service.) ASE contributions need not be paid by students to whom fee exemptions have been granted. Finally, students who repeat are not entitled to apply for a fee reduction or exemption, except under extraordinary circumstances. To obtain an exemption, they must demonstrate, in writing, that their parents, guardians, and themselves have not been at fault for the repetition, and they must explain the cause of the requirement to repeat.
19 For comparison, the poverty line in 2002 was MZM8,603 per day per adult equivalent.
27 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice
4.10 All requests for a fee reduction or exemption are to be submitted to the school directors using a standard form that must be supported by specific documents required by the govemment and, if deemed necessary, additional documents required by the school director to verify the socioeconomic conditions within the household.20 The rules stipulate that the reductions granted by any school director can never be granted to more than 25 percent of the total number of pupils enrolled in the case of registration fees and 10 percent of the total number of boarders in the case of boarding fees. The provincial director of education can raise the percentages, but only upon the request of the district administrator. Finally, the rules establish that amendments to the regulations can be made only by the Minister of Education, with the agreement of the Minister of Planning and Finance.
B. The Poverty Reduction Strategy and Education Sector Plan
4.11 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 1999-2001 and the Education Sector Strategic Plan 1999-2003 are the key official documents guiding public policy and investment in the education sector in Mozambique. These documents interpret the policy on school fees as defined in the ministerial decrees of 1986 and 1987 and guide officials of the Ministry of Education, including teachers, in the application of the policy within schools.
4.12 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 1999-2001 emphasizes the following important measures to reduce poverty that are closely linked to the direct and indirect costs of schooling. (a) In order to enhance the access of girls to primary education, each provincial education office (direcqlio provincial de educaqlio) and each district education office (direcpio distrital de educaclio) are to apply exemptions on the payments of ASE contributions by the poorest households. (b) Strategies should be developed and implemented to make civil society aware, through information and communication programs and community education campaigns (radio announcements and printed bulletins), of the rights and the importance of enrolling in primary education. (c) Ensure that children from the poorest households possess basic learning materials in order to promote access and pupil retention in primary education and ensure that the School Fund (Caixa Escolar) program covers 75 percent of the children from the poorest households who are attending primary schools.21
4.13 The Education Sector Strategic Plan is less clear, especially about the amounts of the fees and the role of the exemption mechanisms in the primary school system.
4.14 "The success in the implementation of the education strategy will require close collaboration between the Ministry of Education and others, such as parents, local communities,
20 A statement from a public authority in the place of residence indicating the number of people in the household, their professions or occupations, whether they are working for someone inside or outside the household, and their incomes. The statement should specify,that the household is unable to pay the fees in part or in whole. 21 The School Fund is a pool fund financed by several cooperating partners. The objective is to provide primary school pupils (grades 1-7) with free textbooks.
28 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice employers, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and religious bodies, that will be called on to assume increasing roles in the financing and management of education,” states the plan document. The document thus reflects a recognition of the limited financial and administrative capacity of the sector and the need for the sharing of responsibility among various partners so as to sustain the higher costs associated with the expansion of access to education and improvements in the quality of education.
4.15 “The government will seek to transfer most of the costs of school construction and learning materials to the parents, communities, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and the private sector in order to retain resources to assist the poorest communities and households,” the document also declares. The strategic framework for investment thus shows a recognition of the need to share costs so as to support an expansion in the school system, but is less explicit about how the resources for school construction and maintenance will be raised or about the mechanisms that will be established to assist poor households or children whose parents or guardians are ill and unable to contribute.
C. Perceptions of Policymakers and Education Officials
4.16 The objective of this section is to examine the official policy on fees according (which from the description presented above appears to be bureaucratic and cumbersome) to the way it is interpreted by Ministry of Education officials, For this purpose, 25 in-depth interviews were conducted at the Ministry of Education and at provincial and district education offices in order to determine how the policy on school fees is being understood and applied and also to gauge its impact at various levels of the system and in different regions of the country. Policymakers and officials were asked to share their perceptions of the policy, the way it is being applied, and the extent to which they thought fees and other costs, both formal and informal, were having an impact on enrollments and pupil retention in primary schools. Their feedback about possible methods to improve the policy, if any, was also recorded.
4.17 The interviews provided much useful information. A summary of the main themes emerging from the interviews is presented hereafter. (See Annex Ifor a list of the Ministry of Education officials interviewed.)
Perceptions of the Main Factors Constraining Enrollments and Pupil Retention
4.18 Although there was general consensus about the main constraints on enrollment and pupil retention in primary education among interviewees at the central, provincial, and district levels, the relative importance of each constraint varied by level (Table 4.2). Few of the officials interviewed made a distinction between the factors affecting enrollments and the factors affecting pupil retention; they considered that the same factors influence both.
4.19 The factor mentioned most often by the interviewees was the opportunity costs related to the work children perform outside the household. Officials at the district level placed
29 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice significantly more emphasis on this factor. Whereas about three fourths of the interviewees at the central and provincial levels considered this to be an important factor affecting enrollment and pupil retention in primary education, all the interviewees at the district level emphasized it.
Table 4.2. Factors Having a Substantial Impact on Enrollment and Completion Rates (YO) Factors Total Central Provincial District Work by the child outside the home 76 73 75 100 School materials 40 27 50 50 School fees 36 45 50 0 Lack of relevance of the curriculum 32 27 37 33 Cultural factors 24 27 12 33 Distance to school 20 27 12 17 Lack of information, including rights to education 16 27 12 0 School uniforms 12 27 0 0 Organization of learning 12 18 12 0 Distance to upper primary or secondary school 12 18 0 17 Parental attitudes 8 0 25 0 Children’s lack of motivation 4 0 0 17 Social value placed on education 16 9 25 33 Orphanhood 4 0 0 17 Sample size N 25 11 8 6 Note: The table shows the percent share of the interviewees mentioning each factor.
4.20 The provincial officers in Gaza Province all indicated that young boys living in districts bordering South Africa and Zimbabwe were migrating for work and that this was affecting enrollment and retention rates. District officials in ManhiGa District (Maputo Province) said that seasonal work on the sugar cane plantations of the two largest sugar companies (Maragra and Chinavane) was affecting retention in the district negatively. They stressed the value of understanding local socioeconomic conditions and employment prospects, which vary greatly across the country, so as to tailor education programs to regional needs and characteristics.
4.21 Interestingly, only two of the interviewees suggested that work inside the home might be an important factor. The factor mentioned the second most frequently by the interviewees was the direct costs of learning materials and school supplies. District and provincial officials, who are in closer contact with the schools, emphasized this factor more regularly than did their colleagues at the central level (50 percent compared to 27 percent).
4.22 School fees were considered to be relatively more important by the officials at the central level than they were by the district officials. Surprisingly, while 45 percent of the central-level interviewees and 50 percent of the provincial-level interviewees brought up the fees, none of the district officials did so. Similarly, 27 percent of the central officials said school uniforms posed an obstacle to enrollments and pupil retention, but none of the officials in the provinces or the districts did so. The uniforms seemed to represent a difficulty in urban rather than rural areas.
30 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice
4.23 The interviewees mentioned other factors besides direct costs and opportunity costs. Poverty and vulnerability, exacerbated by famine, natural disasters, and chronic illness, were cited by 50 percent of the interviewees (not shown in Table 4.2). Cultural factors such as early marriage, initiation rituals among children and young people, and discrimination against girls in education were discussed by 24 percent of the interviewees.22 Lack of relevance of the curriculum was brought up by about one third of each group of interviewees. The organization of learning, which was defined as the way teachers use various activities to stimulate development among children, particularly children in the early grades, was mentioned by 12 percent of the interviewees, though no one at the district level. The interviewees pointed out that it is difficult to motivate children properly when the pupil-teacher ratio is so high.
4.24 Distance to the nearest school was cited by 20 percent of the interviewees, and 12 percent talked more specifically about the distance to schools offering EP2 or higher levels of education. Parental attitudes toward education were mentioned by 8 percent of the interviewees.23 A lack of motivation among children, orphanhood, and the lack of information among parents about school, including the right of children to attend school even if they are poor, were also suggested as reasons for the low enrollment and pupil retention rates.24
Knowledge about the Policy toward Fees
4.25 Interviewees were asked about the government policy toward school fees. In general, it was found that they were fairly familiar with certain aspects of the policy. Officials at all levels were aware, for example, that fees were not supposed to be collected in primary schools, with the exception of the ASE contribution. They also knew that children could not be denied access to school if their families were unable to pay this contribution and that the money collected for the ASE was to be used to help poor children attend school. However, the interviewees were less familiar with the amounts of the fees. Few knew, for instance, the amounts of the various fees stipulated in the ministerial decree of 1987.
Application of the Fee Policy
4.26 Lnterviewees were asked how the fee policy was applied in the schools. The usual answer was that the law was old and irrelevant and was therefore not implemented. Among the
22 Many community members believe primary school is a place for children and therefore inappropriate for girls who have begun the menstruation cycle, since these girls are no longer considered children. 23 This was discussed only as regards Maputo City, where it was felt some children are not enrolled because their parents “are careless and could not be bothered.” Parents may feel that it is the responsibility of fathers to register children for school so that, if the fathers are absent or indifferent about school, the children will not be enrolled. 24 Interviewees said some people consider schooling useless in a society in which “thieves” and corrupt individuals obtain good positions. These people therefore felt that what mattered most was to learn “how to make one’s way in this social context.”
31 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice evidence the officials put forward was the fact that inflation has eroded the value of the metical to the point that bills and coins of the denominations required to pay the fees laid out in the decree of 1987 no longer exist. The lowest coin denomination is MZM500, while the ASE contributions are supposed to be MZM150 per year for EP1 and MZM250 for EP2. Moreover, although the ASE contribution is supposed to be paid once a year at the beginning of the first semester or twice a year at the beginning of each semester, this creates confusion because, since 2003, the school year is no longer divided into semesters, but into trimesters. The officials explained that communities have devised other ways to respond to the needs of schools.
4.27 The officials also generally agreed that the fees charged in primary schools were higher than allowed by law, although the officials were not knowledgeable about the amounts of many of the fees. The officials said the fees differed significantly within and across districts and were much higher in urban areas than they were in rural areas. They added that it was difficult to determine how the ASE contributions and the other fees are used, given that schools are not required to make an accounting. Many of the officials thought that the ASE contributions and the fees were being applied mainly to make up for the shortages in the govemment allocations and to cover the salaries of non-teaching staff, purchase basic materials, maintain school buildings and grounds, and, in some cases, build new classrooms. Interviewees admitted that school revenues were also employed for non-educational purposes.
Establishing Fee Amounts
4.28 According to the interviewees, at least three mechanisms are used to establish the amounts of the school fees. First, school staff, together with parents, decide on the fees to be charged, sometimes as part of school council activities. Second, school staff may decide on the fees without consultation with parents. Finally, fee amounts may be established by provincial or district staff.
4.29 Almost 90 percent of the interviewees from the Ministry of Education believed the schools set their own fees without consultation. The provincial and district officials, meanwhile, were of the opinion that schools fix the fees in consultation with parents, although the level of participation by parents varies substantially among schools. The lack of guidelines prompted several provinces and districts to issue regulations on the ASE contributions and fees collected in primary schools in the last couple of years. In Maputo Province, the provincial director prepared a position paper on the proper collection and use of fees. Likewise, Manhila District developed norms for the application of school fees: 20 percent for routine operations, 50 percent to implement a school plan agreed on by parents and school staff, and 30 percent to help poor children.
Exemption Mechanisms
4.30 The officials generally agreed that some schools deny access to children whose parents cannot pay. The interviewees said that the parents are not necessarily aware that government
32 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice policy stipulates that children whose parents cannot afford to pay school fees cannot be denied access to school. Indeed, 82 percent of the interviews from the central level, and 100 percent of the provincial and district officials had themselves been unaware before the interviews of the exemption mechanisms as they are established in the decree. The majority were convinced there were no regular procedures available to permit children to go to school without paying fees.
4.31 Most of the provincial and district officials said that parents whose children have been turned away from school because the household cannot afford the fees or because parents disagree with the amount of the fees usually do not attempt to enroll their children despite any mechanisms that may exist. The officials said it would be pointless to rely on the mechanisms because they would not work properly. Half the interviewees from the ministry claimed that, in any case, parents would be reluctant to press the issue out of fear of retaliation against their children in school, though this was not mentioned by the provincial or district 0fficials.2~
4.32 Government policy documents on fees do not discuss it, but the role of poverty certificates is important, in theory, in the school enrollment process and as evidence of the right not to pay fees. Poverty certificates were reportedly introduced toward the end of the 1980s and revived in 1996 as a key initiative of the then newly created Ministry of Women and the Coordination of Social Action. A poverty certificate entitles a poor household to subsidies for school registration fees and school exercise books. If nearby schooling is not available, poverty certificates can be used to pay for boarding school. Households with poverty certificates are eligible to receive free medical care. If medical care services do not exist close by, the certificates can be presented to cover the cost of transport to Maputo for treatment.
4.33 However, in reality, poverty certificates do not appear to be effective in helping poor families overcome cost-related barriers to education. Many potentially eligible families are not aware that poverty certificates exist, and information on the benefits and the application process is not readily accessible. In addition, the procedures involved in procuring the document, though they vary among provinces, are usually expensive, complex, and discouraging. In Zambkzia, for example, a certificate may be obtained only after the following steps have been taken in sequence. A family must ask the local community authority or zone officer (secretdrio da zona) for a written declaration certifying the poverty status of the family. A family member must then submit the declaration to the district representative of the Ministry of Women and the Coordination of Social Action. To confirm the family’s poverty status, the district representative visits the family at home. The family then presents the declaration of poverty to the local district administration, which issues an official request for a poverty certificate. A family member takes the request to the local civil registry office so that it can be authenticated. Although the service is supposed to be free in the case of a poverty certificate, it is common practice for the registry office to charge MZM11,OOO. A member of the family submits the
25 School staff typically deny access to children they do not want in school by delaying the children’s enrollment until the school runs out of places or by directly threatening the children in school. The threats often have a detrimental psychological effect on the children and the parents.
33 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice authenticated request to the district administration, where the certificate is issued. Finally, to be fully recorded and verified, the certificate makes the rounds of the civil registry office, the district director of the Ministry of Women and the Coordination of Social Action, the local administrative post, and the community leader before it eventually reaches the beneficiary.
Role of Fees in Primary School Financing
4.34 Other issues explored among policymakers and education officials included the role that fees play in financing primary education, the extent to which school revenues are linked to the quantity or quality of the services provided through the school, and whether parental or community accountability in education would suffer if fees were removed.
4.35 The majority of interviewees agreed that fees are an essential source of the funds necessary to run primary schools, especially because of the perennial liquidity problems experienced with the government budget.26 They believed that, without the ASE contributions, primary schools would be in a much worse position. Among the interviewees, 55 percent at the central level, 63 percent at the provincial level, and 100 percent at the district level acknowledged that the revenue collected through the ASE plays a key part in expanding access to education through classroom construction. Only 16 percent of those interviewed believed that ASE contributions affect the quality of service, while 12 percent believed fee removal would have a negative impact on parental and community accountability.
Feedback on Potential Policy Responses
4.36 The feedback supplied by all the interviewees on possible policy responses to lessen the negative impact of school fees may be summarized in three scenarios. First, the current fee policy should be maintained, but the ASE contribution should be abolished in primary schools. Second, the current policy should be maintained, but the fee rates should be revised in line with present day needs. Third, the fee policy should be replaced, and a more flexible system should be established whereby schools, in agreement with the communities, would decide the value of the fees.
4.37 Overall, 48 percent of all the interviewees believed the first scenario would be the most desirable, while the preferences of the remaining 52 percent were split equally between the other two scenarios. When the preferences are broken down according to the institutional level of the interviewees, striking differences become apparent. Most policymakers and senior officials in the ministry and the authorities in the provincial education offices considered the elimination of the direct fees as the best means of enabling poor children to attend primary school. The district officials thought the elimination of the fees would be bad. They said, "what
26 For example, until February 27, 2004, no budgetary resources (the so-called first advance payment) had been allocated to the various educational establishments to pay for goods and services (operating expenditures and routine expenditures) even though the school year begins in late January.
34 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 4: School Fees: Policy and Practice is free is not valued.” They proposed instead that the fees should be restructured, and the use of the fees should be better regulated. Most district officials argued that school councils should be allowed to decide on the required contributions, the frequency of payments, and the type of payment (in cash or in kind) in accordance with local circumstances. Most provincial and district officials thought school revenue should also be employed to provide free meals for poor children as a means to promote enrollment and pupil retention among the most vulnerable.
4.38 In the event fees are abolished for primary school, several ways were suggested to offset the loss of school revenue. Almost two thirds believed the Direct Support for Schools program should be extended and institutionalized, while 58 percent believed the government education budget should be augmented. There was general agreement that the arbitrary limit on the maximum percentage of children allowed to be exempted from fees at any given school (25 percent) and the lengthy bureaucratic process to obtain the exemptions needed to be revised.
35 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
Chapter 5: SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY ANALYSIS
A. Objectives, Methodology, and Sample
5.1 The purpose of the following analysis of schools and communities is to shed light on the demand side, the supply side, and other factors influencing attendance, dropout, and retention rates in primary schools, especially in rural areas, including the role of school fees. The overall goal is to gauge the consistency between the government policy on school fees and the way the policy is interpreted and applied in schools and viewed by parents and community leaders.
5.2 The chapter is structured as follows. This section presents the objectives of the qualitative analysis, the analysis methodology, and the analysis sample. Section B describes the demand-side factors influencing enrollment, dropout, and completion rates in primary school. Section C outlines the corresponding supply-side factors. Section D lists other contextual factors (socioeconomic, cultural, political, family related, and so on) that influence the indicators on primary schools. Section E summarizes and concludes. (The survey methodology, the schools visited, and the individuals interviewed are discussed in Annexes J and K.)
5.3 The analysts of schools and communities relied on a group of 30 schools to gather information directly from stakeholders on school fees, other direct costs, and opportunity costs. The small school sample allowed them to embark on more in-depth qualitative explorations of the issues involved in the impact of costs on primary schools, enrollment, and pupil retention.
5.4 The main focus of the qualitative analysis is a case study of a select group of schools in districts in four provinces in the northern, central, and southern regions of Mozambique. The 30 schools selected were in the provinces of Niassa (ll),Zambezia (lo), Gaza (5), and Maputo City (4). Originally, three provinces (Gaza, Niassa, and Zambezia) had been chosen for the survey, but, after consultation with key officials at the Ministry of Education in Maputo, it was decided that Maputo City should be included as an additional province with special characteristics. Maputo City was therefore added to the sample of provinces, and some of the initial schools selected in Gaza were eliminated from the study and replaced by schools in Maputo City.
5.5 The qualitative analysis has been designed as an important complement to the comprehensive quantitative survey discussed in Chapter 6. It therefore does not seek to be representative of the situation in all schools, districts, and provinces. The analysis was conducted on the basis of structured and semi-structured interviews of school directors, teachers, students, parents, and community leaders. In addition, provincial, city, and district directors of education were interviewed. The objective of the interviews was to determine and assess the way the interviewees understood and interpreted the government’s official policy on fees, the types and amount of the fees, the mechanisms used in schools to set the fees, the recourse mechanisms typically employed to exempt needy students, the advantages and disadvantages of the fees, the impact of the fees on regular school attendance, and the extent to which the fees and other direct costs deter enrollments. The methods used to finance education,
36 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis including the extent to which schools rely on fee revenue to cover day-to-day operations, were also examined. Similarly, the analysis sought the opinions of teachers and parents about whether children would be likely to stay in school longer if the fees were reduced or abolished.
B. Demand-Side Factors
Registration Fees
5.6 The survey revealed that primary school fees are above the rates fixed in the 1986 and 1987 decrees. Moreover, in effect, the ASE contributions act as registration fees, especially in primary schools (see Table 4.1). Actual registration fees are collected through the ASE, which means they are collected by the schools. The application of the government policy on fees varies across districts and provinces, but a common denominator seems to be that, because they are poorly funded, lower primary and rural primary schools, in particular, are forced to charge registration fees for all children in order to cover routine operations. Though the general policy is that no child is to be kept out of school because the respective fee cannot be paid, schools appear to enforce the fees universally (Table 5.1).
5.7 The survey found large variations in the fees being collected. In Zambkzia Province, an attempt had been made to standardize primary fees. No fees were being charged for grade 1; the fee for grade 2 was MZM1,000, and MZM5,OOO was being charged for grades 3 through 5. Upper primary schools could charge MZM10,OOO for each enrollment. The study discovered one lower primary school with a MZM7,OOO fee. In Niassa Province, the fees varied from MZM5,OOO for EP1 to MZM10,000-MZM20,000 for EP2 in the rural districts visited. In Lichinga City, the fees ran from MZM7,OOO for EP1 to MZM40,OOO for EP2. The difference in the fees in EP1 and EP2 was between two to four times in rural areas and up to four times in urban areas. Though these figures may not be representative of the entire province, they may be taken as evidence that, in Niassa, as children advance to upper primary school, parents must pay much more.
5.8 In Gaza Province, the fees ranged from MZM10,OOO (Chokwe) and MZM30,OOO (Xai-Xai District) for EP1 and from MZM15,OOO to MZM45,OOO for EP2 in the more rural districts to between MZM30,OOO for EP1 and MZM50,OOO for EP2 in Xai-Xai City. The Xai-Xai City education office had adopted a uniform policy toward registration fees: MZM30,OOO and MZM50,OOO for EP1 and EP2, respectively.
5.9 Parents in Xai-Xai City did not express great concern over these fees, but parents in the peripheral areas of the province said the fees were difficult to pay if a household had more than one child in school. The district education director in Ch6kwe suggested that, should registration fees continue to be the norm for primary schools, the fees might be set through each of the school clusters (Zonas de Influ2ncia Pedaghgica, essentially small networks of schools in which the teachers meet regularly to share information, methods, and experiences), rather than through directives emanating from district or provincial education offices. This would ensure that fees would reflect local conditions, thereby making them more realistic and affordable.
37 W W n PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
5.10 Maputo City is a unique case. No other city or province has fees higher than the schools in Maputo. Schools visited in two of the city's low-income urban districts, Urban Districts 3 and 5, reported registration fees ranging from MZM50,000-MZM100,000 for EP1 to MZM65,OOO- MZM85,OOO for EP2. Schools in nearby wealthier districts had much higher fees, making it impossible for parents in the low-income districts to send their children to what they consider "quality schools."
5.11 While the parents in the low-income districts expressed a willingness to pay and said they could afford the local fees for one child, they faced difficulties in paying for more children. Indeed, they said they had to make hard decisions about which children would go to school and which would not. Usually, it was the young girls who were more likely not to be chosen to go to school. For parents living in wealthier areas, the main problem was not the fees, but the lack of places in school to accommodate all children who wanted to attend school, especially upper primary and secondary school.
5.12 The study found that schools with an evening shift, all of which are EP2 schools, have much higher fees than do the day-shift schools. (The evening courses are attended by over-age students and by young girls or women who are pregnant.) In one school in Maputo City, for example, the registration fee for an EP2 pupil attending the day session is MZM65,000, whereas the fee for a pupil in the evening session is MZM85,OOO. Moreover, students attending the evening shift often must purchase the textbooks, which are otherwise free. The textbooks used in the new curriculum, introduced in January 2004, are far more expensive than the old ones. One interviewee explained that, while a full set of books for grade 7 had cost MZM80,OOO in the past; now, the price was MZM1,000,000, more than a tenfold increase.
5.13 For all schools, the ASE resources are the first funds that become available at the beginning of the school year. There is a general understanding that this money should be used for the benefit of the children and, specifically, needy pupils. However, according to school directors, the ASE fund is applied in many other ways to ensure normal activity, particularly before the money arrives from the Direct Support for Schools program and the general government budget (0rq"zto gerul de
5.14 School directors asserted that the funds are spent for a variety of purposes, such as buying chalk and blackboards, clocks, sports equipment, supplies for extracurricular activities, exercise books the teachers use to plan and prepare their courses, pens, writing paper, photocopying, educational materials, benches, tables and chairs, and materials for the construction, refurbishment, or maintenance of schools. They are also applied for the salaries of guards, other staff, and occasional workers, to pay water and telephone bills, for food for school
27 The Direct Support for Schools program was started in March 2003. A small cash grant, calculated according to a school-based financing formula, is provided to all EP1 schools (over 8,000 schools) twice a year. In 2003, through the program, all EP1 schools received a flat sum of MZM4.7 million, and, in 2004, they received amounts proportional to their pupil populations.
39 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis visitors and for teachers during exams, for the organization of sports activities, and for teacher training. ASE funds are also used to purchase exercise books and uniforms for poor children and orphans and to pay for hospital care for children.
5.15 In most schools, parents, community leaders, and even teachers were unable to explain clearly how the ASE funds were spent, suggesting that there is a lack of guidance and transparency. Moreover, several senior Ministry of Education staff spoke of a misuse of the funds; the provincial director of Zambkzia said that school directors and finance officers had built homes for themselves through the ASE. The provincial director of Niassa said that some school directors had bought motorcycles with ASE contributions.
5.16 Because of the misuse of ASE resources collected by primary schools from parents, the Minister of Education issued a declaration in 2004 (Despacho no. 8/GM/2004) stating that the funds were to be spent only by the educational institutions to which they belonged and for purposes fixed according to plans drafted and approved by school councils.
Other Contributions to Schools
5.17 The qualitative survey found that, apart from the ASE funds, other contributions, also viewed as fees, were collected by schools at the beginning, during, or at the end of the school year. These fees are either agreed upon together with the school councils and the communities, or are imposed by the school alone. These additional fees cover, among other items, the enrollment certificate (boletim de matricula), the passing report (boletim de passagem), the certificate of completion for grade 5 or grade 7, examinations (sometimes to provide lunch for external evaluators), and examination booklets (Table 5.1). Some schools also have fees for the construction of new classrooms, the refurbishment of old ones, cleaning materials, security guards, and sports equipment.
5.18 Though some of these fees are small, cumulatively they can become significant. For example, in one school in Maputo City, the established registration fee is MZM50,OOO for EP1 and MZM65,OOO for EP2, but parents said that, when the additional fees are included, they pay MZM90,OOO for EP1 and MZM100,OOO for EP2, which makes a significant difference if parents have more than one or two children attending the same school.
5.19 Besides money fees, parents in both urban and rural areas are sometimes obliged to make in-kind contributions for the construction and maintenance of school buildings. These contributions may be compulsory. Parents said that, if at least one adult in a household does not participate in the local school maintenance or building program, a child from the household would be expelled. Orphans and children living in lone-parent households have difficulty contributing in such a manner, and this may raise the pressure on already vulnerable families. As in the case of the ASE, no uniform system appears to exist to record the resources so obtained by schools; nor was it clear whether the schools were held accountable for the benefits they received through these in-kind contributions. The benefits vary widely in importance from
40 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis district to district and from school to school and may reach the equivalent value in terms of time of the registration fees.
Uniforms
5.20 Paying for school uniforms, whether new, or used, can represent a significant direct expense for households. In urban schools, a uniform may cost from MZM160,OOO to MZM180,OOO or more per child. This can be a factor in the non-attendance of children in schools in cities such as Maputo or Xai-Xai, since parents who have many school-age children may be unable to pay for several uniforms at once, though they might otherwise be willing to buy them.
5.21 Most rural schools do not require uniforms, but the survey discovered exceptions (for example, some schools in the district of Lago in Niassa Province). In rural areas, uniforms therefore do not appear to have an impact on enrollment or pupil retention.
School Supplies
5.22 Everyday school supplies are likewise a large direct burden for households, which must buy notebooks, pencils, pens, erasers, rulers, bags, satchels and backpacks, and so on. Parents stressed that school supplies were a significant expense considering that they usually must purchase the items more than once during the year and that the prices are high. This is especially true of notebooks, which cost an average of MZM5,OOO each. In the higher grades, teachers require up to 10 blank notebooks per year. It may be difficult for parents to estimate accurately the costs of these supplies beforehand. Sometimes, the cost, added to all the others, can be enough to convince parents not to send all their school-age children to primary school.
5.23 School directors, teachers, parents, and guardians said that the introduction of the Direct Support for Schools program has made an important difference because schools receiving program funds are able to provide children with school supplies such as notebooks, pencils, and pens. The staff of EP1 schools in rural areas therefore view the program as a major one that is helping to raise enrollments and attendance in lower primary education.
Other Direct Costs
5.24 As another direct cost, parents mentioned the food they must provide for their children to take to school or the money they must give them to buy a snack (lanche). Most schools do not have a snack program (lanche escolar); it is therefore the responsibility of parents and guardians to supply the food or the money to buy it. In rural communities, parents give between MZM1,OOO and MZM2,OOO to each child to pay for their snacks. Though this is may seem little each day, it is a considerable sum if calculated for a school year.
5.25 Many households are so poor, they cannot send their children to school with a snack or provide them with the money to buy the food. The result is that many children do not attend,
41 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis return home early, or drop out because otherwise they will go hungry. In provinces such as Gaza, which, in some districts, has suffered from droughts and poor harvests, teachers said that the snacks are a factor influencing attendance in primary school.
5.26 Parents said that the purchase of clothing is also a relevant expense. Teachers and parents commented that poor children feel ashamed if they must go to school wearing the same clothes or old clothes every day. Many parents cannot afford to buy new clothes; consequently, they may opt to take their children out of schoo1.28 The impact of clothing on enrollment and pupil retention is thus probably at least as great in rural areas, even though uniforms are less common there than they are in urban areas.
5.27 All told, no single direct cost appears to be decisive in influencing enrollment, retention, or completion rates negatively in primary education. It is, rather, the cumulative effect of all direct costs that may have a negative impact. Fees paid to schools, including the ASE contributions, are not a determining factor alone, but they become a major factor when the other fees and contributions are added. In urban areas, the fees are high, and not all households can afford them; rural parents pay less, but they must still struggle to pay the fees given the poverty, unemployment, disease, large numbers of children in families, and so on in the countryside. In rural areas, the inability to pay for school supplies is probably the most important single factor affecting enrollments and attendance, whereas, in urban areas, the inability to pay for uniforms and school supplies together seems to be the key factor. The result is that it is often necessary for poor parents to pick out among their children the ones who will attend school.
Fee Exemption Mechanisms (All Fees)
5.28 In most of the schools visited, the staff felt that a failure to pay fees is not, nor should be a barrier for children to attend school. For example, teachers in the Forquia Sede EP1 school in Namacurra District explained that poor children can acquire a poverty certificate from the secretary of their neighborhood that will allow them to benefit from free access to school. A survey of the 645 pupils in the school revealed that only one child did not pay and had a poverty certificate.
5.29 The poverty certificate must be reissued every year, and the bureaucratic process is complex (see elsewhere above). The cost in money and time can be prohibitive. Officially, in Quelimane, the certificate costs MZM5,000, while, in other districts, parents said it could cost up to MZM50,000, excluding transportation to the various administrative offices. In some cases, especially for EP1, the certificate appears to cost more than the fees it absolves.
28 Because they do not want their children to sit on the ground or on dirty floors, parents in one school in Maputo City said, for the children to sit on, they must buy extra cupulanus, the pieces of fabric that native Mozambicans wrap around their bodies as clothing. A capulana may cost MZM70,OOO.
42 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
The Specific Case of Orphans and Vulnerable Children
5.30 The main field study finding relating to orphans and vulnerable children is that the professionals in nearly all schools in urban and rural areas lacked precise knowledge about the number of orphans in their communities and were even unaware of the number of children enrolled in their schools of whom one parent or both parents were deceased. Some school directors and teachers said “yes, we have them,” but did not know how many there were.
5.31 Community members in Gaza, Maputo At 17 de Setembro, a full primary school in City, Niassa, and Zambezia said there were Quelimane City, Zambkzia Province, a girl in Orphans in their who were living with EP2 explained that she had lost both parents relatives or guardians. In many cases, they said and that her aunt paid the schoolfees the children’s parents had died of AIDS. This (MZM10,OoO) and the contribution to build could not be confirmed, however, since schools the school (MZM10,OOO). She asked: do not keep records on this important issue, nor “Why were we not told of the possibility are records kept on the ways in which AIDS is of not paying [the feel 01 of not contributing affecting individual districts. to the construction of the school? I know orphans who have to sell mangos to pay the fees, and they pay with difficulty.” 5.32 During interviews, parents said that,
5.33 The study revealed that efforts were sometimes being undertaken to ensure that orphans have access to school. For example, in February 2004, the Children’s Rights League in Quelimane asked provincial authorities to simplify the process for obtaining poverty certificates and lower the cost, and then the league organized directors of school clusters to examine methods to identify orphans and vulnerable children in the area.
5.34 In Niassa Province, at A Luta Continua, a full primary school in Lichinga City, the director said the poverty certificate is free. In Gaza Province, at Chongoanine, a full primary school in Xai-Xai District, the director is extremely sensitive to this issue and allows children to register without paying or without producing a poverty certificate. The director said that, of 1,495 pupils, 44 have a poverty certificate, and 180 are not paying fees, but are still studying. At 25 de Setembro, an EPl school in Xai-Xai City, the director said that, of 1,325 children in the school, 35 would pay the fee later during the year, and their parents had signed a written agreement to this effect. ”In this school, nobody drops out because they haven’t paid,” said the director. At Africa Amiga, a full primary school in Chokwe District, Gaza Province, there are
43 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
1,559 pupils, and 158 are orphans. Approximately 20 percent of the pupils do not pay fees; they have submitted certificates from the village secretary. ”The children who do not pay are not expelled from school,” the teachers explained. “During the registration process, the director told the parents that all children would be regi ered whether or not they had paid the fees.”
“The orphan cannot study because 5.35 Despite some efforts from individual nobody can come. . . to build the school.” schools to grant free access, the study found that, in “We have a lot of orphans here, but they most of the schools visited, either the poverty stay outside the school. Their uncles and certificate, or some other form of document is aunts do not care. They cannot afford to required before orphans are granted a fee have all their children in the school.” exemption. Being an orphan is not in itself a -Parents of pupils in Forquia Sede, an sufficient condition to obtain free access to school. EP1 school in Namacurra District, ZambPzia Province. Opportunity Costs ”The school does not accept . . . children who do not pay.” 5.36 Parents and teachers at schools in rural -Parents at Nensenhenge, a full districts frequently mentioned that children helped primary school in Sanga District, Niassa out on small farms (machamba). Teachers said that Province. children often disappear for several weeks during the harvest and then either reappear, or drop out of ”When the parents cannot pay the fees, school altogether. There are two harvest times. The the children can continue to study. But a first most important takes place between lot of parents do not know about this.” and April -Parents at Eduardo C. Mondlane, and June (corn, beans); the second takes place from an EP2 school in Lichinga City, Niassa November to March. Children who come back after Province. helping their parents with the harvest have usually fallen behind in their school work and tend to fail the examinations at the end of the year. There are high repetition and dropout rates in rural districts, especially in isolated communities and remote schools. The school year does not follow the agricultural cycle, and parents must therefore face a difficult decision if they want to send their children to school, but, at the same time, believe that they need them as helpers during the harvest to ensure the family’s subsistence. Often, the latter path wins out.
5.37 Socioeconomic conditions also often oblige children who are older relative to the age set for a grade, especially boys over 15 years old, to leave their rural communities to seek work in Maputo or in the mines in South Africa. Many parents and teachers said this is a contributing factor in poor dropout and completion rates in EP1. The problem appears particularly acute in the provinces of Gaza and Niassa.
5.38 In urban areas such as Maputo and Xai-Xai, poor parents often send their children to sell goods at local markets or have them take care of smaller children, while the parents work at the market or elsewhere. There are many children in Maputo who attend school, but also work on the streets so as to contribute to the family income. The time they spend working obviously affects their performance in school. They have less opportunity to do homework, review
44 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis lessons, sleep properly, and so on. In addition, they may also acquire a taste for the working life and enjoy earning money rather than going to school. For many, it is a matter of survival.
Perceived Benefits of Education
5.39 The benefits or returns to investment in education are generally more well appreciated by parents in urban areas. They see the potential connection between formal education and a better future for their children and themselves. Parents in Maputo felt that it was important that boys go to school in order to prevent them from joining gangs and becoming delinquents. Others thought that children who are educated “can get good employment to earn a living and help their family” and that through education ”they can have a better life than their parents’’ and ”learn to live with different kinds of people.’’ Most parents in urban areas see more benefits than disadvantages in sending their children to school and are willing to pay high registration fees, as long as they are assured their children will obtain a quality education.
5.40 Their rural counterparts likewise recognize the benefits of education. Many of them commented that going to school prepares the child for the future by training the child ”to get have a good job and thus be able to help the family and take care of parents in old age.’’ They also said that ”the child can be useful to the family because he/she will know how to read and write” and, ”even if he cannot get employment, he can create his own business with the knowledge he will acquire.”
5.41 However, parents in rural areas also saw serious potential disadvantages in sending their children to primary school. Some parents and teachers in rural areas spoke of sons or daughters who had finished grade 7, the full primary cycle, but who cannot begin secondary school because there is no secondary school in the community or nearby, while the cost of sending their children to secondary school in the provincial capital is prohibitive. Nor can these young people find jobs. “They study, and then they don’t work,” some people said. “We don’t see any benefits.” The only perceived value is that, after completing school, the children are literate and numerate. The link between poverty and a lack of education or between education and a better life is not so clearly recognized in rural areas as it is in urban communities.
5.42 Some parents are reluctant to send their daughters to school because girls sometimes become pregnant because of their classmates or even their teachers. “When a daughter becomes pregnant, money for registration fees and school materials is thrown away.” This feeling is particularly strong in northern provinces such as Niassa, where culture, traditions, and religion play an important role. Young girls who become pregnant must leave school, become mothers, and, perhaps, if they are lucky, attend night classes. Girls are traditionally viewed as potential mothers, and, after going through the initiation rites, they often fail to return to school because they feel they have become women and are ready for marriage.
5.43 In Maputo, parents favor sending boys rather than girls to school. They argue that, by sending boys to school, they avoid the danger that the boys will join gangs or become
45 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis delinquent. Not all parents are of the same opinion, however, and it is becoming common now to see girls attending schools, particularly in urban areas. ”Even as a woman, she will be able to help with the expenses of the household and take care of her children.”
C. Supply-side Factors
Access and Distance to Schools
5.44 The survey revealed that distance appears not to be an important factor in lower primary school attainment, since all households were close to an EP1 school. However, most EP2 schools are concentrated in or near urban centers. Lack of access to EP2 therefore seems to be a clear factor influencing the transition from EP1 to EP2. Though the distance to the nearest EP2 school may not be a significant factor in urban areas, it is a factor in rural areas, where the closest EP2 school may be several kilometers away. Parents may therefore not wish to send their children, especially their daughters, to these schools. Children who live in communities where there is a full primary school are lucky because they can complete their primary education without interruption in the same community. However, full primary schools are the exception rather than the rule.
5.45 Secondary schools are so few that, for a child in rural areas who has completed grade 7, it is nearly impossible to continue into lower secondary school (escola secunduria do primeiro grau, or ESG1, grades 8 to 10) unless the family can afford to send the child to the nearest provincial capital or large city where there is an appropriate school. Meanwhile, children who complete primary school in urban areas have a better chance of continuing their formal education. Nonetheless, the costs may still represent a barrier. In many cases, secondary schools require registration fees that are up to 10 times the primary school fees. The field study found that, in the district of Lago, in Niassa Province, for example, the registration fee for one EP2 school was MZM20,000, while the registration fee was MZM200,OOO for an ESGl school in the same community. This is a substantial amount in a poor rural area.
Adequacy and Quality of School Infrastructure
5.46 The majority of the facilities in the primary schools visited during the field study, especially in rural areas, were inadequate. Often, they had insufficient classroom space for the number of pupils registered, and some were holding classes outside under the shade of large trees. Many of the classrooms lacked windows, walls, cement floors, or even ceilings. The majority of the schools were not maintained and were in disrepair. Few schools visited were of solid construction. One exception was a school in a poor neighborhood in Maputo, built through the support of foreign donor funds. The building construction was good quality. There were two floors, sufficient classroom space, separate bathrooms, and a teachers office and meeting room. In rural areas, most of the schools consist of a small main building with classrooms, offices, and bathrooms and perhaps a few new separate classrooms built using local materials. Even on the periphery of cities such as Xai-Xai, schools included classrooms built
46 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis with local materials. Many of them, as in Niassa, do not have electricity or running water. Bathrooms are supplied in the form of latrines.
5.47 One of the obvious problems facing most schools was the lack of furniture, especially desks. Many children have to sit on the cement or dirt floor during classes, which is not healthy over long periods of time. The lack of adequate school furniture may be a contributing cause of non-attendance and dropouts. The field study learned that, in schools with both regular and makeshift classrooms, children in the makeshift classrooms sometimes moved surreptitiously to other classes because they wanted to have desks or, at least, a cement floor.
5.48 Since rural schools have few operating funds, they often solicit the cooperation of the community to help with the building of makeshift classrooms using local materials. These classrooms are only temporary and are not able to withstand heavy rains, wind, constant sunlight, and so on. Parents in rural areas contribute money to buy local materials, but also their labor to build additional classrooms. School directors and teachers in rural schools often spoke of the lack of housing for teachers. Many teachers are not from the community and require housing. Lack of housing is therefore one of the reasons teachers give when declining postings to rural schools.
Quality of Education
5.49 Information on the education sector can be gleaned from the available statistics (see Chapter 3). However, additional information was also collected during the survey. From the interviews with teachers and pupils and from observations during the school visits, it is evident that most schools have limited teaching and learning materials, such as textbooks and other reference books. None of the 30 schools visited possessed a school library. Most of the schools were relying on old textbooks that were being shared among pupils and teachers, and (as of March 2004) not all the schools had received the new books for the revised curriculum. In many cases, schools which had obtained new books had received only the books for one or two subjects. Most schools lacked the resources to buy even basic materials to enable them to carry out administrative and technical functions, such as paper, notebooks, pens, pencils, blackboards, chalk, rulers, erasers, and so on. They must therefore rely on the contributions of parents in order to secure the most basic school supplies.
5.50 The Direct Support for Schools program was launched in 2003. It channels funds directly to lower primary and full primary schools for the purchase of a centrally determined list of teaching and learning materials. The program has helped schools to alleviate the chronic problem of the lack of materials. As a result, the rural schools visited had been able to buy these materials and distribute notebooks, pens, pencils, and other school supplies and educational aids to children who could not otherwise afford them. This had led to a rise in enrollments in some schools. Although the financial support provided is limited, the program appears to have made an important difference in education in rural schools.
47 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
5.51 A key factor affecting the quality of education is the availability of good teachers. There are substantial differences in this respect across provinces. The differences tend to favor urban areas. For example, the proportion of qualified teachers in EP1 in Manica and Niassa Provinces is only 58 percent, while it is 94 percent and 75 percent, respectively, in Maputo City and Sofala Province. The lack of qualified women teachers may be influencing attendance and dropout rates among girls in primary schools in some provinces. The problem is particularly acute in the northem provinces of Cab0 Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa and in the central province of Zambezia. Stakeholders in several communities said that new teachers who were recent secondary school graduates were often men, young, and single and, in some instances, lacked maturity and ethical principles. This was sometimes leading to harassing behavior toward young girls and women students.
Re1 evance of Education
5.52 It was clear to the research team that parents, teachers, and community leaders in urban areas consider primary education highly relevant to the future of children. They see the connection between poverty and the lack of formal education, and they want to ensure that their children progress as far as possible in the formal school system. They see education as a route for their children to escape poverty and as an insurance policy for parents. They also see a connection between education and the future development of the country. Parents in urban areas view education as important for both boys and girls, although they may show a slight preference for sending boys to school. The children in urban schools are also enthusiastic about school and about the prospects of continuing into secondary and higher education.
5.53 Meanwhile, although parents, teachers, and community leaders in rural areas value primary education, they also question its relevance. The parents often said that the cost of sending their children to school was too high, given the meager incomes from their small plots of land. Notebooks and other school supplies were too expensive. They were unable to send all their children to school. One rural parent said that he had five children of school age, but could only afford to send three to school. Deciding which children to send to school was painful.
5.54 Teachers said that schools fail to adapt to the needs of the communities. Rather, it seems that schools want the communities to adapt to them. The school year in rural areas does not follow the agricultural cycle. During the harvest months, parents must take their children out of school so the children can help gather in the crops for family consumption and to sell. Since this is a matter of socioeconomic need and, indeed, family survival, it makes sense that children drop out of school temporarily to help their parents. Similarly, during the period of the initiation rites for young girls and boys, children fail to attend school. The school year does not allow for these traditional celebrations, which are culturally significant, especially in the northem provinces. In addition, after the ceremonies, girls and boys, who now consider themselves as women and men and are so perceived by the rest of the community, often do not retum to school.
48 PSXA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
5.55 Over-age children in rural areas do not see the relevance of staying in EP1 or EP2 and often drop out of school to migrate to Maputo or South Africa in search of work. Others set up small businesses in order to earn a living. Two children in Niassa who had dropped out of school to set up a business (a small store) admitted during an interview that they now had sufficient money to go to school, but were too old.
5.56 A perception arose during the study that the current curriculum and the teaching and leaming practices are more relevant to urban children than to rural children and that the new curriculum may also be more relevant to the needs of urban areas than it is to those of rural areas. Since the study did not set out to assess the appropriateness of the old or the new curriculum for basic education, this must remain a perception based on information gathered during the interviews in urban and rural communities.
Financial Resources Available for Primary Education
5.57 Three major sources of financing are currently available for primary schools in Mozambique: the general govemment budget, the ASE, and the Direct Support for Schools program. Table 5.2 summarizes the information collected during the field study about the financial resources available to 30 primary schools in the four provinces visited.
Table 5.2. Financial Resources Available to Primary Schools (MZM, millions) ~ Direct Support for Province General government budget ASE Schools z7rowam Niassa Lower primary: usually no support All, 2003: 4.7 (US$196); Lower primary: 0.415-2 Upper and full primary: 3-190 2004: 3.6-53 (US$150- (US$17-US$83) (US$125-US$7,917) US$2,208) Upper and full primary: 1.9- 58 (US$79-US$2,416) Zambkzia Lower primary: 1.5-12 (US$62- All, 2003: 4.7 (US$196); Lower primary: 0.8-9 US$500) (two schools, Quelimane 2004: 3.8-33 (US$158- (US$33-US$412) City) US$1,375) Upper and full primary: 5.6- Upper and full primary: 18-72 37.6 (US$22&US$1,566) (2003) (US$750-US$3,000) Gaza Lower primary: 0.350 (US$14.60) All, 2003: 4.7 (US$196); All primary schools: 4-39 (Xai-Xai City) 2004: 3.'&31 (US$150- (US$166-US$1,625) Upper and full primary schools: 4- US$1,291) 70 (US$166-US$2,9 16) Maputo All schools received funds. The Lower and full primary, All primary schools: 25-274 City amounts received by schools in 2003: 4.7 (US$196); (US$1,041-US$11,416) poor Urban Districts 3 and 5 Urban Districts 3 and 5, Note: Schools in Catembe, the ranged from 120 to 280 (US$5,000- 2004: 25-61 (US$1,041- poorest locality, may have US$11,666) US$2,541) collected much less than MZM25 million.
49 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
5.58 Some schools are able to access all these sources, while others have access to only one or two. The majority of primary schools receiving funds from the government budget are upper primary or full primary schools. EP1 schools rarely receive any of the funds. The exceptions are selected urban EP1 schools, especially in Maputo.
5.59 The study found that one of the main problems of the funds from government allocations is that they tend to arrive after the beginning of the school year, making it necessary for schools to find other means to cover costs. The collection of school fees (the ASE) is unregulated. There are no control mechanisms or transparency, which makes the process prone to misuse by school officials. Most primary schools are poorly financed, especially in rural areas. They lack a consistent source of funding that would enable them to operate normally and fill needs as they arise. Rural EP1 schools collect fees from parents, but these are insufficient to enable the schools to function properly. This affects the quality of the education being offered.
5.60 There was agreement among the stakeholders interviewed during the field study on the recent government efforts to improve the financial situation of schools through the Direct Support for Schools program. The interviewees stressed the importance of the program in easing the routine operation of EP1 schools, especially rural schools, by allowing them to buy basic school materials for pupils and for the schools. Although the funds received through the program are relatively small, they represent a greater amount, at least in rural areas, than the contributions that, in theory, are collected through the ASE. School directors and district directors of education expressed their satisfaction with the transparency, simplicity, and accountability of the program.
D. Contextual Factors
5.61 Socioeconomic constraints are the main reason for children’s exclusion from the education system. During the stakeholder interviews, it became clear that lack of money to meet all the costs associated with primary schooling is a crucial factor when parents are deciding whether to send children to school.
5.62 Investing the scarce human, material, and time resources into ensuring that a child may attend school requires a high level of trust in the education system and in the benefits that education might provide. Evidence of a return to such an investment is, however, generally lacking in rural areas, where there is no access to formal employment, and obtaining a wage is difficult. If money is insufficient to buy clothes for the entire family and to feed the family properly, it is hard for household members to believe that sending children to school might have a benefit for the household. Children themselves often fail to find motivation or encouragement to attend school under these circumstances.
5.63 Parents know they will face constant difficulties in keeping their children in school. They know they will not be able to enroll their children in EP2 when the children complete grade 5 as the upper primary school is too distant from home. In any case, the cost of education
50 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis rises in EP2. Parents may therefore feel reluctant to exert pressure on children to complete EP1 because they understand the limitations. Thus, the decision to send one instead of the other child can be part of a coping strategy established according to the financial capacities of the household, the human resources needed to carry out activities vital for the household, and the anticipated short and long-term retums.
5.64 In addition to the socioeconomic factors, some households face difficulties because there is only one adult in the household (a lone mother or father or anelderly guardian). Interviewees said that orphans, but also children living with a divorced mother or other single parent were sometimes excluded from school. In Mozambique, approximately 25 percent of all households are woman-headed, suggesting that many women must assume the responsibility for meeting all the family needs. In rural areas, due to the migration of men to towns, cities, or neighboring countries to find work, many women remain behind on their own to look after the farms and educate the children, while awaiting irregular financial contributions from their partners.
A woman at Forquia Sede, an EP1 school in 5.65 Single, divorced, or widowed mothers Namacurra District, ZambCzia Province, are also financially disadvantaged. In most explained: cases, these households face constraints when “The child wants to dress, has to have sending children to school due to a lack of breakfast, and has to get the fees paid. Where financial resources or the need to rely on can we get this money? Here, the cost of living to is high. Sometimes, we get 1,000 meticais, but children ensure family subsistence. Parental it is not enough, and we have to prioritize divorce and the migration of fathers for work among the children. This year, there is hunger can also result in a child dropping out of here; my son complains of hunger, and Isay, school. Alcoholism and violence in the home ‘My son, Ihave nothing. You have to go to are frequently cited as causes of dropping out school like that without eating.’ I leave the or non-attendance at school. child at home crying, and Ihave to go to the fields. Iput a piece of cloth in both ears not to 5.66 Preparing young children to go to hear, and Igo. What can Ido? Last year, we school means feeding, bathing, and dressing had a harvest of rice, but it was not enough them early in the moming to attend the first because we had to sell two sacks [of rice] to buy clothes. This year, it is worse because we class at 6:30 in the moming. Usually, it is the do not know how we are going to cope; the mother or another woman who is responsible rice is drying out because of the sun and the for preparing the food, fetching the water, and lack of rain. We are going to lose the harvest.” making sure that the child is ready. These daily activities represent an extra burden on women household members. A lack of motivation on their part or sickness can cause the child to drop out of school or not register in anticipation of the work that must be done.
Cultural Factors
5.67 The two main cultural constraints to school completion are early marriage among girls and initiation (puberty) rites among boys and girls. Initiation rites are ceremonies marking the symbolic passage from childhood to adulthood. During the rites, a large part of traditional
51 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis education is transmitted. They have been retained mainly in rural areas, but they are also practiced in cities, especially in the central and northern regions. Usually, these rites take place after the harvest, when there is an abundance of food and leisure time available for the ceremonies. The initiation rites affect girls more than they do boys. The rites for girls normally occur during the first menstruation when the girls are between 12 and 15. They provide the girls with a clear motive for dropping out of school because, once the rites are completed, the girls are considered women. This frequently opens the way for the possibility that the girls will marry soon after. Early marriage and the initiation rites are therefore interrelated.
5.68 Gender roles ascribe to boys and girls a set of responsibilities. These responsibilities evolve over time depending on factors such as class, age, religion, and race. In Mozambique, as in many parts of the world, girls and women tend to have a lower status in society and less self- esteem than men. The formal education of girls is generally less appreciated because girls are not perceived as breadwinners. However, their reproductive capacity sets them apart.
5.69 Girls usually marry at a young age, especially in rural areas and in the northern and central regions. Marriage may be arranged while the girls are still young. After they menstruate for the first time, they may already begin living with their (older) husbands. Emphasis on early marriage and pregnancy represents a key constraint on the education of girls. Though they are legally allowed to continue their education, pregnant girls often do not remain in school either because they do not feel at ease, or because the community and the school environment fail to encourage them. An alternative for these young mothers is to take the evening classes with older people. Even when these are available, evening classes can be inconvenient, and they are more expensive than the day classes. Girls must return home without transport, facing the risk of harassment. Frequently, their partners forbid them to attend school in the evening.
5.70 Role models who can demonstrate how education might allow girls to gain access to a career are lacking in rural areas. Since girls and women have difficulty earning a living or contributing financially to the subsistence of their households, girls and their parents are not encouraged to insist on education as a path to a meaningful future.
5.71 "This year, we have five women teachers instead of only one out of a total of eight teachers," observed the director of Forquia Sede, an EP1 school in Namacurra District, Zambezia Province. "Interestingly, the number of children who came this year to register increased; mainly the number of girls." The study team was unable to learn the amount of the increase in the number of girls resulting from the more girl-friendly environment in this school, but it is certainly an important step forward given that men teachers have been known to harass girls sexually, forcing parents to cancel arranged marriages or deal with unwanted pregnancies.
52 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
E. Summary
5.72 This report has identified a wide range of factors that have had an impact on enrollment and pupil retention in primary education. It is important also to examine carefully those factors that stakeholders have discussed during the interviews. The qualitative analysis summarized in this chapter will facilitate a comparison with the other findings of the study to confirm them and add more detail, and it will advance the effort to establish policy recommendations. Table 5.3 presents a rating of the impact of each demand-side and supply-side factor and other contextual factors on primary schools across the four provinces surveyed in the analysis.
Table 5.3. Impact of Demand-Side, Supply-side, and Other Factors on Primary Enrollment and Comdetion Rates, Four Provinces Niassa Zambtzia Gaza Maputo City Factors EP1 EP2 EP1 EP2 EP1 EP2 EP1 EP2 Demand side (direct costs) School fees (all) 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 Uniforms 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 School supplies 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 School snack 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 Transport 4 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 New clothing 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 Opportunity costs 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 Benefits of education 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 Supply side School access and distance 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 2 Infrastructure adequacy and quality 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 Constraints on quality of education 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 Availability of financial resources 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 Contextual factors Socioeconomic 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1
Cultural I 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 3 Family related 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Other* 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 Note: Code: 1= high impact. 2 = moderate impact. 3 = low impact. 4 = no impact. * Sexual harassment and financial corruption were not a special focus of the analysis, but examples of both problems emerged during conversations with parents and pupils.
5.73 The qualitative research confirms that different policy measures would have different impacts in various areas of the country. It could be argued from the qualitative analysis that social advocacy campaigns to inform parents about, for example, the rights of children, the benefits of education, the official policy on school fees, and the importance of ensuring that children enter grade 1 at the age of 6 would have an impact in all four provinces in the study. The impact would be greater if the campaigns and the policies were adapted to the realities of each of the provinces. For instance, the message of the importance of attendance at school after participation in initiation rites or after an early marriage could be targeted on Niassa, a northern
53 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis province in which culture and tradition are ever present, while this would not be so necessary in Gaza or Maputo City. Meanwhile, an effort to reduce the direct costs of schooling would, of course, have an impact in all provinces, but would perhaps have a still greater impact in provinces such as Gaza and Maputo City if it dealt with the costs related to uniforms and fees.
5.74 The opinions expressed by the stakeholders in the interviews were diverse within and across the four provinces (Tables 5.4 and 5.5). In Niassa, school directors and teachers said that participation in initiation rites is a key factor behind primary school dropouts, but it is not so considered by parents and students. Similarly, parents and students feel that opportunity costs and low retums to education, which seem to show a positive correlation, are key factors in poor attendance and pupil retention (a view held by provincial education directors and some district directors), but school directors and teachers did not attach so much weight to these factors.
Stakeholders Niassa Zambizia Gaza Maputo City 1. opportunity costs 1. opportunity costs - 1. opportunity costs Provincial 1. returns to education 1. returns to education - 1. returns to education directors 1. initiation rites 1. distance to school - 1. Dovertv 1. opportunity costs 1. opportunity costs 1. opportunity costs 1. poverty District 1. initiation rites 2. marriage 2. pregnancy directors 2. returns to education 3. poverty, returns to 2. cost of uniforms education 1. initiation rites 1. opportunity costs 1. poverty, returns to 1. poverty, opportunity education, pregnancy costs School 2. marriage 2. returns to education 2. opportunity costs, 2. returns to education, directors 3. returns to education 3. poverty cost of uniforms, orphanhood marriage 1. initiation rites 1. poverty 1. returns to education, 1. opportunity costs, marriage change of location 2. marriage 2. opportunity costs, cost of 2. poverty Teachers uniforms 3. returns to education 3. returns to education, marriage and pregnancy 1. returns to education 1. opportunity costs - 1. poverty 2. opportunity costs 2. returns to education - 2. orphanhood, cost of Parents uniforms, marriage 3. poverty, marriage 3. direct costs, orphanhood - 3. change of location 1. returns to education 1. pregnancy - - Community 2. initiation rites, 2. opportunity costs - - leaders marriage 3. poverty - - 1. opportunity costs, 1. direct costs - - returns to education 2. marriage 2. opportunity costs/ early - - Students pregnancies 3. pregnancy 3. poverty, distance to - - school, opportunity costs, orphanhood
54 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
Table 5.5. Stakeholder Views on Factors Affecting Completion Rates (rankings) Stakeholders Niassa Zambizia Gaza Maputo City 1. direct costs (fees) 1. returns to education - 1. returns to Provincial education director 2. poverty (hunger) - 2. direct costs 3. few women teachers - 1. poverty (hunger) 1. poverty (hunger), - - District distance to school directors 2. direct costs, returns 2. direct costs, returns to - - to education education, teacher training - - 1. returns to education 1. returns to education 1. direct costs 1. returns to School education directors 2. poverty (hunger) 2. school infrastructure 1. returns to education 2. direct costs (fees) 3. direct costs 3. direct costs 1. school infrastructure 1. poverty (hunger), 1. returns to education 1. returns to education 1. direct costs direct costs 2. returns to education 2. direct costs 2. poverty (hunger), 2. returns to Teachers direct costs education 3. poverty (hunger) 3. direct costs, school infrastructure 1. poverty (hunger), 1. returns to education 1. direct costs (fees) - direct costs, returns to Parents education 2. cost of uniforms, no 2. poverty (hunger) 2. other direct costs, few - secondary school 3. direct costs schools - - - 1. direct costs (fees) 1. direct costs (fees) Students - - 2. other direct costs 2. other direct costs
- Not available.
5.75 All stakeholders in Zambkzia attached weight to opportunity costs. Distance to school was considered central by pupils, and orphanhood was given a role by pupils and parents. In Maputo City, it was agreed that poverty is a key factor in low primary school retention rates, but opinions were mixed on the importance of other factors. Parents noted early marriage, orphanhood, and the cost of uniforms. Teachers and school directors talked of opportunity costs, and school directors spoke of orphans. In Gaza, opportunity costs, direct costs, and low education retums seemed the vital factors according to all stakeholders, who were, however, divided on individual factors. Most school directors and teachers felt that infrastructure is vital, but parents and pupils did not bring this up. The cost of uniforms was routinely discussed by district education directors and school directors, but it was not mentioned by parents or pupils.
Impact of School Fees
5.76 The findings on the impact of school fees (registration fees or ASE contributions) fail to support the hypothesis that school fees are the main factor in determining attendance and completion in primary school. Registration fees alone are not the decisive factor in non- attendance, dropping out, and non-completion. They are only a moderate contributing factor, particularly in cases in which there are more than two children of school age in a household.
55 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
Parents then often decide to hold back one or more of the children from school because of the combination of registration fees and other direct costs.
5.77 Because school fees (for registration) are not the decisive factor, the reduction or elimination of school fees in primary schools might mitigate, but probably would not solve the problems reflected in the indicators. Parents and guardians would still have to pay for school supplies and clothing or uniforms and cover other direct costs such as snacks and transportation. Since, in theory, children who are unable to pay school fees may remain in school, it would follow that school fees alone ought not to be an obstacle to a primary education. In practice, however, schools enforce the payment of fees. The fees, along with the other costs, render school unaffordable for many households, especially those with several school-age children. Fee exemption mechanisms are not generally well known. Seldom are parents aware that they can apply for a poverty certificate, which would entitle them to register all their children free of charge. For those parents who are aware, however, the application process for the certificates is cumbersome and time consuming. School fees are not properly regulated, and the registration fees, ASE contributions, and other charges can therefore be substantial for parents and guardians. The funds can be easily diverted from the purposes for which they were designed.
Impact of Other Direct Costs
5.78 Other direct costs, such as the cost of uniforms and school supplies, are significant factors in determining enrollment, dropout, and completion rates. The cost of uniforms has a more important impact in urban schools. The cost of school supplies is a factor especially in rural areas. Notebooks are expensive for parents in rural areas. The need regularly to purchase school supplies presents parents and guardians with a considerable problem, which appears to be more decisive than school fees in decisions about schooling. (Children are usually sent home ifthey do not have adequate school supplies.)
5.79 In rural areas, teachers and parents said that the cost of the school snack was a contributory factor in schooling decisions. Some children come to school without having eaten breakfast and without money to buy a snack. Hunger forces them to return home to eat. This is a serious problem in very poor districts in Gaza, Niassa, and Zambezia. Some teachers and parents suggested that, if rural schools had school lunch programs, children would attend school more regularly and stay in school longer.
Impact of Opportunity Costs
5.80 Opportunity costs are generally a much more important factor in rural areas than they are in urban areas, but they play a significant role in cities, such as Maputo or Quelimane, where children are compelled to work in order to contribute to the family income. Children are a key source of household labor in rural areas, especially during the harvest. The work affects the children’s performance in school and contributes to repetition and dropout rates. Over-age
56 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis children, common in rural schools, often choose to drop out to seek work in Maputo or in the mines of South Africa rather than completing primary school.
Impact of the Perception of the Benefits of Education
5.81 The benefits of sending children to school are much more apparent to urban parents and guardians than they are to their counterparts in rural communities. Parents in rural areas see little point in sending their children to school if grade 5 represents the final year. Children in urban areas have a much better chance of continuing into upper primary school and secondary education and may therefore be more motivated to remain in school.
Impact of Supply-side Constraints
5.82 Rural children have relatively good access to EP1, even if the school is somewhat distant, but only limited access to EP2. Urban children have good access at both levels. Urban and rural schools show serious problems in the quality of infrastructure. Inadequate school buildings and the absence of maintenance programs lead to an unattractive educational environment for pupils and teachers. There appears also to be an acute shortage of basic school fumiture (desks), so that children often must sit on cement or dirt floors, possibly contributing to a loss of motivation and, ultimately, to children dropping out of school.
5.83 Problems in teacher availability and training, the provision of teaching and leaming materials, and the relevance of the curriculum act as constraints on improvement in enrollment, dropout, and completion rates. Teaching and leaming materials are not readily available, and the content of the primary curriculum appears to be more relevant for children in urban areas than it is for children in rural schools.
5.84 EP1 schools, especially in rural areas, are poorly funded and are dependent on the fees collected from parents (ASE contributions) and on the assistance provided through the Direct Support for Schools program. The shortage of funding for schools adds to the poor teaching and leaming conditions and the lack of materials and equipment necessary for an education of acceptable quality.
Impact of Other Factors
5.85 Factors extemal to the schools can also play a role. Of these, socioeconomic conditions and traditional practices appear to be the most significant. Poverty is prevalent in urban and rural areas, but, in rural communities, parents must struggle more to cope with the costs of schooling. Scarce income must be divided between subsistence spending and the costs of schooling. If parents face difficulty in paying for primary education and are aware of only a low retum to education, they are likely to take their children out of school and put them to work in the household or on the farm.
57 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 5: School and Community Analysis
5.86 Culture and traditional practices are important in rural communities, especially in the north, where initiation rites are common. Initiation rites usually prevent girls from completing primary education, since, once the initiation is complete, girls are considered women and available for marriage. School becomes irrelevant. Girls usually do not return to school after participating in initiation rites.
58 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Chapter 6: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ANALYSIS
A. Description and Data
6.1 The main goal of the household analysis presented in this chapter was to measure the effect of school fees and other costs on the demand for education. The analysis had only limited information on supply-side variables. It is thus restricted to the study of demand-side factors.
6.2 The chapter consists of two parts. The first part (Sections B-D) outlines descriptive statistics on outcomes (attendance, enrollments, dropouts) and on direct and indirect costs of education. The study demonstrates that the outcomes and the costs vary according to the characteristics of individuals, households, and locations. The second part (Section E) is devoted to an econometric analysis. This multivariate analysis assesses the extent to which the demand for education is sensitive to reductions in school fees, while also taking into account a wide range of factors that may also affect demand. The study likewise seeks to measure the impact of fees on education demand. If the demand elasticity to fees is high, a large boost in demand following a reduction or elimination of fees might be expected. While this would certainly be a desirable outcome in terms of access to education, a sudden rise in demand can also influence education quality negatively or may simply not be accommodated, given the current supply situation (the quality of teaching staff, the infrastructure, and so on). It may be, however, that factors other than fees-low levels of well-being, for example-represent the main obstacle to attendance. In this case, the elimination of fees would not raise attendance. Rather, other interventions might be needed, such as government transfers or scholarships for poor children.
6.3 The data employed for the analysis are drawn from the national household budget survey (IAF) for 2002-03. This cross-sectional survey, covering approximately 8,700 households and 44,000 individuals, was conducted from July 2002 to June 2003. It contains detailed information on the expenditures, transfers, and incomes of Mozambican households, as well as information on the profile of household members and demographic and geographic characteristics. The survey questionnaire included modules on health, employment, education, housing, poverty indicators, and excesses against individuals within the household.
6.4 Data on daily, monthly, and annual expenditures allow the construction of a consumption aggregate that can be used as a measure of ~elfare.~9Information on annual education expenditures by households is disaggregated by level and type of school (public or private) and by the typology of expenditure (school fees, uniforms, books, and other school supplies). In the section of the questionnaire on education among individuals, responses are sought about the year of education completed, current school attendance and grade, attendance at school during the previous year, problems experienced, if any, with the education offered at the school currently attended, and the reasons for non-attendance, if any. In the housing section of the questionnaire, information is sought about the distance from home to school, which was
29 For details, see Ministry of Planning and Finance, IFPRI, and Purdue University 2004.
59 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis the only information on education supply collected among all households, that is, not only among households with children in school. (See Annex L for a summary of the number of observations in the IAF and their distribution across the main subgroups used in the analysis.)
B. Measures of Enrollment, Pupil Retention, and Dropouts
6.5 The study relied on the IAF microdata to compute several measures of school attainment. The advantage of using microdata for this type of analysis lies in the availability of a broad range of characteristics of individuals and households that can be linked to school outcomes. Noother source of data allows for the analysis of variations in school outcomes when consumption and other household and individual characteristics vary.
Gross and Net Enrollment Rates
6.6 Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present two common measures of school attendance, the gross and net enrollment rates. Gross enrollment rates (Table 6.1) were calculated as the ratio of all children enrolled at a given education level, without age restrictions, and all the children in the age range formally corresponding to that education level in the population. The age ranges corresponding to each education level are: 6-11 for lower primary school, 12-13 for upper primary, 14-16 for lower secondary, and 17-18 for upper secondary school (Escola Secundliria do Segundo Grau, or ESG2, grades 11 and 12).
6.7 Net enrollment rates (Table 6.2) were calculated as the ratio of all children at a given education level who are in the appropriate age range corresponding to that level and all the children in the age range formally corresponding to that education level in the population (that is, the denominator is the same as in the calculation of the GER in Table 6.1).
6.8 Gross and net enrollment rates were computed separately by consumption quintiles.3O Unfortunately, it was not possible to compute them for each grade, but only for lower and upper primary school and lower and upper secondary school more globally.
30 Consumption quintiles of the distribution of per adult equivalent consumption were computed after normalizing each individual's (equivalent) consumption according to a regional poverty line (after subtracting education expenditures so as to obtain a measure of consumption that does not depend on the educational choice). The poverty line calculation was introduced so as to adjust for different living standards across the country. A total of 13 poverty lines were computed and made available by the Ministry of Planning and Finance and the International Food Policy Research Institute. They are specific to single provinces or to aggregations of provinces and have been computed separately for urban and rural areas. Specifically, they refer to the provinces of Cab0 Delgado and Niassa, rural and urban; Nampula, rural and urban; Sofala and Zambezia, rural and urban; Manica and Tete, rural and urban; Gaza and Inhambane, rural and urban; Maputo, rural and urban; and Maputo City, urban only. For the derivation of the consumption aggregate, see Ministry of Planning and Finance, IFPRI, and Purdue University 2004.
60 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.1. GER by Consumption Quintile and Level of Education Ouintile EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 98.8 50.3 13.2 2.3 95.6 54.6 15.4 3.7 98.1 46.5 22.1 6.2 104.3 54.2 20.5 5.4 106.1 86.6 46.9 22.6 All 100.2 57.0 22.8 7.9 Notes: Gross enrollment rates are calculated as the ratio of all children enrolled in a given education level (without age restrictions) over all children in the age range corresponding to that education level. The age ranges corresponding to each education level are: 6-11 for EP1, 12-13 for EP2, 14-16 for ESG1, and 17-18 for ESG2.
Table 6.2. NER by Consumption Quintile and Level of Education Quintile group EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 1 59.4 8.0 2.2 0.6 2 59.8 8.3 4.6 0.4 3 60.2 6.0 4.6 0.9 4 66.6 9.8 7.1 0.6 5 72.2 15.2 9.9 3.6 All 63.1 9.1 5.5 1.2 Notes: Net enrollment rates are calculated as the ratio of all children in a given education level who are in the age range corresponding to that education level over all children in the age range corresponding to that education level. The age ranges corresponding to each education level are: 6-11 for EP1, 12-13 for EP2,14-16 for ESG1, and 17-18 for ESG2
6.9 The net enrollment rate is a measure of the efficiency of the education system in recruiting and retaining children at the appropriate age. The difference between the gross and net rates is a measure of the enrollment of over-age children, that is, children above the age stipulated by the education system for the level of school.
6.10 The high gross rates and the difference between the gross and net rates in Mozambique reflect the large share of over-age pupils at each level of education. The presence of over-age pupils is an outcome of delayed entries into school and high repetition rates. In EP1,37 percent of the pupils are over age. The problem becomes acute in EP2, where 84 percent of the pupils are the "wrong" age.31 This suggests that the system is inefficient in recruiting children at the appropriate age and advancing them at a steady pace through school. Without more detailed data on school entry ages and repetition rates, however, the identification of the specific cause and the stage in the system at which it occurs is difficult.
6.11 Net enrollment rates increase with consumption, particularly in EP1, indicating that students in the highest (most well off) quintiles, particularly the fourth and the fifth, are more
31 This is computed as (57-9.1)/57.
61 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis likely to be in the "right" education level. This probably results from a combination of higher attendance rates in the appropriate age group, lower repetition rates, and lower dropout rates among children from wealthier families.
6.12 Nonetheless, the share of over-age students among the total enrolled population is not substantially lower in the top quintile groups. For example, in the fifth quintile, 83 percent of all students enrolled in EP2 are over age, compared with 85 percent in the bottom quintile. On the one hand, pupils in the top quintile are more likely to repeat less. On the other hand, those who repeat and become older than the regular age are from households that have the financial means to keep them in education rather than pulling them out.
6.13 Though the difference is much smaller than it is in primary education, the gross and net enrollment rates for secondary education are substantially higher for students in the top quintile group (the fifth) than they are for the other quintile groups.
School Attendance
6.14 Because so many pupils enter school late and repeat often, the gross and net enrollment rates are not informative about variations in school attendance by age. This section therefore analyses school attendance by age. Table 6.3 shows the distribution of individuals 6 years of age or older across education levels by age group. The top row shows the percentage of those children and young people not in school disaggregated by age group. In the next two rows, the total share of children not in school (the top row) is disaggregated into those who never went to school and those who went to school at some point in the past. The remaining rows show, by education level, the share of each age group attending school.
Table 6.3. Distribution ofAge Groups by Level ofEducation (%) Level of education 6-10 11-14 15-24 25-34 35+ All Not attending now 38.2 23.0 68.2 93.2 97.9 69.1 Never in school 34.4 12.2 20.9 26.5 43.6 29.7 Attended in the past 3.8 10.8 47.3 66.7 54.3 39.4 Literacy classes 0.4 0.4 1.7 3.5 1.3 1.5 EP1 (lower primary) 61.1 65.3 11.3 0.4 0.1 22.9 EP2 (upper primary) 0.3 10.4 9.8 0.8 0.1 3.8 ESGl (lower secondary) 0.0 0.9 6.6 1.1 0.2 1.9 ESG2 (upper secondary) 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 Technical and vocational (elementary) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Technical and vocational (basic) 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 Technical and vocational (intermediate) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 Teacher training 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Higher education 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 Other 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
62 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
6.15 A large proportion (38 percent) of children aged 6-10 are out of school, and the majority of these (89 percent of the share, or 34 percent of the age group) never went to school. Many of the latter may yet start school when they are older. If the pattem of attendance by the 11-14 age group is repeated (12 percent declare they have never been to school), one may expect that at least 22 percent of the 6-10 age group will begin school before the age of 14.
6.16 In fact, the percentage of children who never attended school is substantially lower among the younger age groups than among the older ones. While 44 percent of the individuals 35 or over never went to school, this is true of only 12 percent of the 11-14 age group. Nonetheless, the share of children out of school among the 6-10 age group is disturbingly high. If nothing else, this confirms that entry into primary school is frequently delayed.
6.17 Among the 11-14 age group, 65 percent were still attending EP1. This is probably also the result of late entries into school and high repetition rates. Thus, Table 6.4, which shows the age composition at each level of the education system, reveals that only 53 percent of the pupils in EP1 are the "right" age. Similarly, entry into EP2 occurs much later than the expected age, which would be 10-11. The majority (65 percent) of the pupils in EP2 are over 14.
6.18 Few children continue to EP2. Only 10 percent of the children aged 11-14 were attending EP2. This cannot be entirely explained by the phenomenon of over-age students because the share remains about 10 percent for the 15-24 age group. Finally, few children attend secondary school: 1 percent of the 11-14 age group, 8 percent of the 15-24 age group, and slightly more than 1 percent of the 25-34 age group. The shares in technical and vocational training, teacher training, and higher education are lower still.
Table 6.4. Age Comaosition in the Education Sustem (YO) Level of education 6-10 11-14 15-24 25-34 35+ A11 Not attending now 11.0 4.0 23.0 23.0 39.0 100.0 Literacy classes 5.4 2.8 26.4 40.5 24.9 100.0 EP1 (lower primary) 53.4 34.6 11.6 0.3 0.2 100.0 EP2 (upper primary) 1.8 33.3 60.4 3.5 1.0 100.0 ESGl (lower secondary) 0.2 5.8 81.8 9.8 2.4 100.0 ESG2 (upper secondary) 0.0 1.1 79.3 11.6 8.0 100.0 Technical and vocational (elementary) 0.0 0.0 82.3 17.7 0.0 100.0 Technical and vocational (basic) 0.0 1.6 89.1 5.0 4.4 100.0 Technical and vocational (intermediate) 0.0 0.0 50.6 39.4 10.0 100.0 Teacher training 0.0 0.0 72.6 14.1 13.4 100.0 Higher education 0.0 0.0 24.0 58.3 17.7 100.0 Other 0.8 0.0 42.3 34.8 22.2 100.0 Total 20.0 12.1 23.3 17.1 27.5 100.0
6.19 Table 6.5 shows educational attainment by year of age among individuals 6 to 19 years old. Only 39 percent of children age 6 are attending EP1. The share has risen to 53 percent by age 7, and 65 percent by age 8, but 31 percent at age 8 have still never gone to school at any
63 PSXA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis time. Attendance continues to improve among children at ages 9 through 11, and 83 percent of the children at age 11 are in school, the highest share for any age. Age 14 represents the downward tuming point. The share of children at age 14 in EP2 is 20 percent. However, the share of those not attending has also begun to increase once more.
Table 6.5. Children’s Educational Attainment by Age (%) Never in Attended in Age Not attending EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 Other school the past 6 60.6 59.3 1.2 38.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 7 47.0 44.7 2.3 52.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 8 33.9 30.8 3.1 65.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.5 9 23.9 19.8 4.2 75.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 10 25.1 17.3 7.8 73.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 11 17.7 12.4 5.3 77.8 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 12 22.9 12.6 10.3 70.1 6.6 0.1 0.0 0.3 13 22.5 12.6 9.9 63.6 12.5 0.7 0.0 0.8 14 29.3 11.0 18.3 46.8 20.2 3.2 0.2 0.4 15 35.9 16.2 19.7 36.7 21.5 5.0 0.0 0.9 16 48.5 17.3 31.2 22.3 19.0 8.3 0.3 1.6 17 52.5 16.8 35.7 19.2 15.5 9.3 1.2 2.4 18 67.7 20.8 46.9 8.4 10.3 10.2 1.2 2.2 19 74.0 21.2 52.8 4.8 7.3 8.8 2.3 2.9 Note: ”Other” includes elementary, basic, and intermediate technical and vocational education and training, teacher training, higher education, and literacy education.
School Attendance in Urban and Rural Areas
6.20 Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show the large differences in attendance in urban and rural areas. In the 6-10 age group, 44 percent in rural areas do not attend school. This is nearly twice the share in urban areas (23 percent). The corresponding figures for the 11-14 age group are 27 and 14 percent. Moreover, the share of those who have never gone to school is much higher in rural areas, and it appears that this share is decreasing relatively more slowly in rural areas. Over 50 percent of individuals aged 35 and above in rural areas have never gone to school. This is almost twice as many as the share in urban areas (27 percent). Meanwhile, among children aged 11-14, more than 15 percent in rural areas have never gone to school. This is almost three times the corresponding share in urban areas (less than 6 percent).
6.21 The differences are more evident in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. In urban areas, 11 percent of children aged 11 are in EP2, rising to 38 percent at age 14. In rural areas, only 1 percent of 11- year-olds are in EP2, and the share peaks at 14 percent at age 15.
6.22 The trends documented in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 are represented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. Attendance is much lower in rural areas. Moreover, rural children tend to start EP1 later and therefore exit later than do urban children: the rural EP1 attendance curve is shifted downward
64 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis and to the right with respect to the corresponding urban curve. Rural children are also less likely to attend EP2 than are urban children. Likewise, many more rural children do not attend school at all. At any age, the proportion of rural children out of school is substantially higher.
Table 6.6. School Attendance by Age Group, Urban Areas (YO) Level of education 6-10 11-14 15-24 25-34 35+ All Not attending now 23.4 14.4 55.8 89.1 97.4 61.1 Never in school 20.9 5.6 10.0 12.7 26.9 16.1 Attended in the past 2.5 8.8 45.8 76.4 70.5 45.0 Literacy classes 0.5 0.5 1.1 2.1 0.6 1.o EP1 (lower primary) 75.5 60.2 7.5 0.6 0.1 22.8 EP2 (upper primary) 0.5 22.0 15.3 1.9 0.3 7.5 ESGl (lower secondary) 0.1 2.7 14.6 3.0 0.6 5.1 ESG2 (upper secondary) 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.8 0.4 1.2 Technical and vocational (elementary) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Technical and vocational (basic) 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 Technical and vocational (intermediate) 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 Teacher training 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 Higher education 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.3 0.4 Other 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 6.7. School Attendance bu Aae Group, Rural Areas (%) Level of education 6-10 11-14 15-24 25-34 35+ All Not attending now 44.3 27.2 76.6 95.2 98.1 73.1 Never in school 40.0 15.4 28.2 33.3 50.8 36.5 Attended in the past 4.3 11.8 49.4 61.9 47.3 36.6 Literacy classes 0.4 0.3 2.1 4.2 1.7 1.7 EP1 (lower primary) 55.1 67.8 13.9 0.3 0.2 22.9 EP2 (upper primary) 0.3 4.8 6.1 0.2 0.1 2.0 ESGl (lower secondary) 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 ESG2 (upper secondary) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Technical and vocational (elementary) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Teacher training 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
6.23 Tables 6.8 and 6.9 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2 highlight three key distinctions between urban and rural areas. First, in rural areas, attendance is much lower at any age, and the share of children who have never been in school is muchhigher. Second, in urban areas, the school entry age is much lower. At age 6, about 58 percent of urban children start EP1, compared to 32 percent in rural areas. The highest EP1 attendance rate in urban areas occurs among 9-year-olds (89 percent) and, in rural areas, among ll-year-olds (77 percent). Similarly, the move into EP2 occurs earlier among urban pupils. Third, the share of rural pupils in EP2 is much lower. Likewise, rural secondary school attendance is very limited, though this is not surprising since most secondary schools are located in urban areas. By contrast, 10 percent of 14-year-olds attend secondary school in urban areas, rising to about 20 percent for the 16-17 age group.
65 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.8. School Attendance by Age, Urban Areas (%) Not Never in Attended in EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 Other Age attending school the past 6 41.3 39.2 2.0 57.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 7 31.2 29.4 1.8 67.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 8 20.6 18.7 1.9 78.3 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.3 9 10.6 8.5 2.1 88.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 10 14.4 10.1 4.3 83.8 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 11 9.4 7.2 2.1 78.8 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 12 12.7 3.0 9.7 71.2 15.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 13 18.1 10.2 7.9 54.5 25.3 2.0 0.0 0.2 14 17.5 2.0 15.5 33.6 38.3 9.4 0.2 1.1 15 25.5 10.5 15.0 24.7 34.3 13.4 0.0 2.1 16 34.3 6.1 28.2 14.2 30.8 18.2 0.6 1.8 17 38.5 7.1 31.4 10.0 25.5 19.8 2.8 3.4 18 48.6 8.1 40.5 8.8 13.8 22.4 3.0 3.4 19 61.7 15.1 46.6 4.0 9.4 17.3 5.2 2.4 Note: “Other” includes elementary, basic, and intermediate technical and vocational education and training, teacher training, higher education, and literacy education.
Table 6.9. School Attendance by Age, Rural Areas (YO) Total not Never in Attended in EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 Other Age attending school the past 6 68.0 67.1 0.9 31.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 7 53.4 50.9 2.5 46.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8 39.4 35.8 3.6 59.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 9 29.4 24.4 5.0 70.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 10 30.0 20.5 9.4 68.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 11 21.7 14.9 6.9 77.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12 27.2 16.6 10.5 69.7 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 13 25.0 13.9 11.1 68.7 5.3 0.0 0.0 1.1 14 35.3 15.7 19.7 53.6 11.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 15 41.8 19.4 22.3 43.6 14.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 16 57.9 24.7 33.3 27.6 11.1 1.8 0.0 1.5 17 62.2 23.4 38.7 25.5 8.5 2.0 0.1 1.7 18 80.5 29.2 51.2 8.1 7.9 2.0 0.0 1.5 19 83.6 25.9 57.7 5.5 5.6 2.1 0.0 3.2 Note: “Other” includes elementary, basic, and intermediate technical and vocational education and training, teacher training, higher education, and literacy education.
6.24 It was not possible to confirm explanations for non-attendance in school, since the responses to the community questionnaire, which included an inquiry about the existence of schools in the district, contain a large number of missing values. It is, however, possible to consider data on distance from schools, since this was included in the housing section of the questionnaire. (The relevant results are presented later in this section.)
66 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Figure 6.1. Children Attending EP1 and EP2, by Figure 6.2. Children Not Attending or Never in Age and Urban or Rural Location (YO) School, by Age and Urban or Rural Location (YO)
90 80 80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20
10 10
0 0 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Age Urban lower primary - - - - - Rural lower primary -Urban upper primary - - - Rural upper primary -Urban not attending -Urban never in school -.-. Rural not attending - - Rural never in school
6.25 The low percentage of students in upper primary schools and secondary schools in rural areas probably results from the shortage of such schools in the countryside. The extent to which there is migration from rural to urban areas to attend secondary education is not known, but given the strong social demand for secondary education within urban areas, there may be few opportunities for students from rural areas to attend. An additional explanation is that there may be few job opportunities in rural areas which demand more than some basic education, so that students are not encouraged to remain in school.
Attendance by Gender
6.26 Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show school attendance by age group and gender. Girls are less likely than boys to attend school. The difference, though, is below 4 percent among the younger age groups. Among the 6-10 age group, 40 percent of the girls do not attend school, compared to 36 percent of the boys. Among the 11-15 age group, the corresponding figures are 25 and 21 percent. The difference, however, becomes considerable in the 15-24 age group. Only 24 percent of the girls in this age group are in school, compared with 41 percent of the boys.
6.27 Girls are also more likely than boys never to have attended school, and, in this case as well, the difference between the sexes becomes more pronounced among older children and young people. Among women aged at least 35, more than 60 percent have never gone to school, compared to 26 percent of men. Meanwhile, among the 11-14 age group, the respective shares are only 15 and 10 percent. This seems to indicate that access to school among women has improved substantially over time.
67 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
6.28 Tables 6.12 and 6.13 add detail to the picture. First, girls are less likely than boys to begin EP1 at age 6 (35 percent of girls compared to 43 percent of boys). Second, the age of 15 is a turning point for girls. Attendance in EP2 commences a decline, in part because girls are advancing to secondary school, but also because many stop attending school altogether.
Table 6.10. School Attendance by Age Group, Men (%) Level of education 6-10 11-14 15-24 25-34 35+ All Not attending now 36.3 21.2 58.5 93.4 97.5 65.3 Never in school 31.8 9.5 12.4 14.6 25.9 20.2 Attended in the past 4.5 11.7 46.1 78.8 71.6 45.1 Literacy classes 0.2 0.5 0.9 2.5 1.3 1.1 EP1 (lower primary) 63.0 66.5 15.0 0.5 0.3 25.6 EP2 (upper primary) 0.5 10.7 13.5 0.9 0.2 4.7 ESGl (lower secondary) 0.0 1.o 8.7 1.1 0.2 2.3 ESG2 (upper secondary) 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 Technical and vocational (elementary) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Technical and vocational (basic) 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 Technical and vocational (intermediate) 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 Teacher training 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 Higher education 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.2 Other 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 6.11. School Attendance by Age Group, Women (%) Level of education 6-10 11-14 15-24 25-34 35+ All Not attending now 40.0 24.9 76.0 92.9 98.3 72.7 Never in school 37.0 15.3 27.6 35.8 60.4 38.4 Attended in the past 3.0 9.6 48.4 57.1 37.9 34.3 Literacy classes 0.6 0.2 2.3 4.3 1.4 1.9 EP1 (lower primary) 59.2 63.9 8.4 0.4 0.0 20.4 EP2 (upper primary) 0.2 10.1 6.9 0.7 0.1 3.0 ESGl (lower secondary) 0.0 0.8 4.8 1.0 0.1 1.5 ESG2 (upper secondary) 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.3 Technical and vocational (elementary) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Technical and vocational (basic) 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 Technical and vocational (intermediate) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 Teacher training 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Higher education 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
68 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.12. School Attendance by Age, Boys (%) Not Never in Attended in EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 Other Age attendinq school the vast 6 56.6 55.9 0.7 43.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7 46.6 44.1 2.5 53.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 8 30.3 26.2 4.0 68.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 9 22.2 17.1 5.1 77.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 10 26.7 17.3 9.4 71.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 11 15.3 9.9 5.4 80.5 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 12 21.7 9.3 12.4 70.5 7.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 13 19.6 10.5 9.0 65.5 12.8 0.8 0.0 1.4 14 28.0 8.2 19.8 48.7 19.7 3.3 0.1 0.2 15 32.1 12.2 19.9 39.3 22.7 4.9 0.0 1.0 16 40.0 9.6 30.4 27.2 24.4 7.4 0.1 1.0 17 39.4 9.3 30.1 23.7 20.5 12.8 1.7 1.9 18 53.1 13.7 39.4 11.9 15.5 14.7 1.8 3.0 19 59.7 9.2 50.5 7.6 11.4 12.7 3.7 4.9 Note: “Other” includes elementary, basic, and intermediate technical and vocational education and training, teacher training, higher education, literacy education.
Table 6.13. School Attendance by Age, Girls (%) Not Never in Attended in EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 Other Age attending school the past 6 64.2 62.5 1.7 34.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 7 47.4 45.4 2.0 52.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 8 37.0 34.6 2.3 62.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 9 25.9 22.9 3.1 73.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 10 23.4 17.2 6.2 75.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 11 20.0 14.7 5.3 75.2 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 12 24.3 16.5 7.8 69.6 5.8 0.2 0.0 0.2 13 25.7 14.8 10.9 61.4 12.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 14 31.0 14.7 16.3 44.5 20.8 3.0 0.3 0.5 15 40.4 21.0 19.4 33.5 20.0 5.2 0.0 0.9 16 56.7 24.7 32.0 17.6 13.8 9.3 0.4 2.3 17 64.3 23.5 40.8 15.1 10.9 6.1 0.8 2.8 18 81.2 27.3 53.9 5.1 5.5 6.0 0.7 1.5 19 84.4 30.0 54.5 2.8 4.2 5.9 1.2 1.4 Note: “Other” includes elementary, basic, and intermediate technical and vocational education and training, teacher training, higher education, literacy education.
6.29 By age and gender, Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show primary school attendance and the share of children and young people who are not now attending school or who have never attended school. There is a close similarity in attendance pattems among both boys and girls until the age of 15. Attendance is very similar in EP1 and EP2. Though girls are slightly older when they start school, the share of girls not in school rapidly declines, and, from the age of 7 to the age of 14, the share of girls who are not in school is comparable to the corresponding share of boys.
69 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
However, after the age of 14, a difference in attendance emerges. The share of girls not in school rises rapidly, much more so than the share of girls never in school. This suggests that girls are more likely to drop out beginning at about that age. This is less the case among boys.
Figure 6.3. Children Attending EP1 and EP2, by Figure 6.4. Children Not Attending School or Age and Gender (%) Never in School, by Age and Gender (YO)
80
70
60
50
40 30
20
10
0 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Age Age Boys lower primary - - - - - . Girls lower primary -Boys not attending -Boys never in school -Boys upper primary - - Girls upper primary - - - - - . Girls not attending - - Girls never in school
6.30 In summary, rather than a lack of access to school, the problem for girls seems to be that they are dropping out after a certain age for various motives. Especially in the 15-24 age group, girls are more likely than boys to drop out because of marriage and the birth of offspring. Data not shown here indicate that, among women aged 15-24 who are not attending school, 4 percent fail to do so because of pregnancy, and 20 percent because of marriage. Marriage was the second most important reason these women gave in the survey for stopping school. (The most important reason given was “because of no interest.”) As a consequence of these and other reasons, girls are less likely than boys to continue into upper primary and secondary school.
6.31 As long as girls go to school, they seem to do at least as well as boys. Among the 11-14 age group, the percentage of girls in EP2 is as high as the percentage of boys, and this despite the later school start among girls. Overall, though the indicators are less positive among girls than they are among boys, the gender differences are not as pronounced as are the differences between urban and rural areas, and they are shrinking rapidly among younger children. It seems that, at least among children now in the lower levels of education, the location of the home relative to the school plays a muchlarger role than gender in determining attendance.
6.32 Gender differences within rural and urban areas were also explored during the survey. (The results are not shown here.) As anticipated, girls in rural areas suffer from two disadvantages, one related to gender, and the other related to the rural location of their homes.
70 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
The difference in attendance between girls and boys is greater in rural areas than it is in urban areas, especially among the 11-14 and 15-24 age groups. However, boys living in rural areas also exhibit lower enrollment rates relative to boys living in urban areas. Similarly, living in urban areas benefits both boys and girls.
Attendance by Level of Household Consumption
6.33 The differences in attendance in urban and rural areas certainly depend in part on the unique characteristics of each of the two types of location. There are dissimilarities in the accessibility and quality of schools, and there are disparities in general welfare and the prevalence of poverty that affect opportunity costs. The multivariate analysis provides the means to distinguish clearly among the various possible explanations for the differences.
6.34 This section focuses on one possible explanation: the extent to which differences in welfare provision are associated with differences in school attendance.32 Tables 6.14 to 6.16 show the relevant percentages of potential leamers attending or not attending each level of education. The percentages are presented separately for the 6-10, 11-14, and 15-24 age groups by consumption quintile. (See elsewhere above for a definition of the consumption quintiles.)
6.35 Non-attendance declines as consumption increases among all age groups. Within the 6- 10 and 11-14 age groups, the proportion of the bottom quintile ("l",the poorest) not attending school is more than one and a half times the corresponding proportion of the top quintile ("5", the richest). The largest difference across quintile groups is in the proportion of those who have never attended school. This proportion is smallest within the top quintile.
Table 6.14. School Attendance by Consumption Quintile, 6-20 Age Group (YO) Status 1 2 3 4 5 All Not attending 43.4 41.5 41.2 34.7 26.9 38.2 Never in school 38.0 37.4 38.0 31.4 24.7 34.4 Attended in the past 5.4 4.1 3.2 3.3 2.2 3.8 Literacy classes 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 EP1 (lower primary) 56.3 57.5 58.2 64.7 71.7 61.1 EP2 (upper primary) 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.3 ESGl (lower secondary) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
32 The average per adult equivalent consumption found in the IAF 2002-03 survey was MZM16,866 per day in urban areas and MZM12,919 (23 percent less) in rural areas.
71 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.15. School Attendance by Consumption Quintile, 12-24 Age Group (YO) Status 1 2 3 4 5 All Not attending 26.4 26.6 20.9 22.9 16.0 23.0 Never in school 13.2 13.9 12.0 12.9 7.9 12.2 Attended in the past 13.2 12.7 8.9 10.0 8.1 10.8 Literacy classes 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.4 EP1 (lower primary) 65.3 62.1 69.6 65.6 63.9 65.3 EP2 (upper primary) 8.0 9.9 8.7 10.5 16.8 10.4 ESGl (lower secondary) 0.2 1.o 0.3 0.8 2.6 0.9 ESG2 (upper secondary) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 Technical and vocational (basic) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 6.16. School Attendance by Consumption Quintile, 15-24 Age Group (YO) Status 1 2 3 4 5 All Not attending 66.7 69.4 69.6 70.3 65.6 68.2 Never in school 23.1 21.3 21.1 25.0 14.7 20.9 Attended in the past 43.6 48.1 48.5 45.3 50.9 47.3 Literacy classes 2.2 0.8 2.3 2.0 1.2 1.7 EP1 (lower primary) 15.7 12.6 10.9 11.3 6.7 11.3 EP2 (upper primary) 10.1 11.7 9.5 8.3 9.6 9.8 ESGl (lower secondary) 4.6 4.7 6.1 6.4 10.5 6.6 ESG2 (upper secondary) 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.o 3.6 1.4 Technical and vocational (elementary) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 Technical and vocational (basic) 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 1.3 0.5 Technical and vocational (intermediate) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 Teacher training 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 Higher education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 Other 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
6.36 In the 6-10 age group, attendance in EP1 rises sharply with household consumption, especially from the third to the fourth and from the fourth to the fifth quintiles. While only 57 percent of children in the bottom quintile attend EP1, the share is 71 percent in the top quintile. Likewise, among the 11-14 age group, the quintile share in EP2 becomes larger as consumption increases, and the largest rise occurs from the fourth to the fifth quintiles. The trend is similar in the 15-24 age group in secondary school. While only 5 percent of the age group in the bottom quintile is in secondary school (lower or upper), 14 percent attend in the top quintile.
6.37 Measured through household consumption, welfare is thus clearly associated with school enrollment and pupil retention and thus explains, at least in part, the differences in school attendance between rural and urban areas.
72 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Dropouts
6.38 For the purposes of the survey, a dropout from EP1 is a child aged 6 to 17 who was attending EP1 during the year previous to the survey, but, the year of the survey, stopped attending before finishing school. Similarly, a dropout from EP2 is a child or young person aged 12 to 19 who, the year previous to the survey, was attending either EP2, or the final year of EP1, but decided not to continue in school during the year of the survey. (The procedure used to identify primary school dropouts, as well as information on the sample sizes, is presented in Annex M.)
6.39 The share of dropouts by age in EP1 is relatively stable at around 3 to 6 percent among children up to the age of 13, after which it rises among both boys and girls (Table 6.17). There is no evidence that dropouts are more common among girls than boys. Indeed, dropout rates tend to be lower among girls than they are among boys up to age 15. However, at age 17, girls show higher dropout rates (25 percent compared to 16 percent).
Table 6.17. Dropouts in EPZ, by Age and Gender (%) Age Boys Girls All 6 1.2 7.6 3.7 7 5.8 4.1 5.0 8 3.9 3.7 3.8 9 4.9 3.4 4.2 10 9.5 6.4 8.0 11 3.7 4.4 4.1 12 7.8 3.8 6.0 13 5.5 8.1 6.6 14 12.4 7.6 10.4 15 14.7 13.1 14.0 16 19.1 19.3 19.2 17 16.0 24.9 19.7 All 7.7 6.4 7.1
6.40 Because children are dropouts for the purposes of the survey only if they attended school the year previous to the survey, one may expect that girls are a more select sample than boys since fewer girls enter the system, and fewer girls are therefore potentially available to drop out, Nonetheless, the comparable dropout rates among girls may be interpreted as a positive finding.
6.41 The share of dropouts is smaller in the top consumption quintile than it is in the lower quintiles among all age groups, except for the 15-17 age group (Table 6.18). Nonetheless, at this stage of the analysis, because the study has not controlled for other covariates, it appears one can only say there is little evidence of a monotonous decrease of dropout rates with consumption along the distribution. However, there is rather clear evidence of higher dropout rates in rural areas relative to urban areas, except for the 15-17 age group, where the dropout rates in rural and urban areas are similar.
73 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.18. Dropouts in EP1, by Age Group, Quintile, and Rural or Urban Area (YO) Quintile 6-1 0 11-14 15-17 All, 6-17 1 8.6 6.6 18.3 9.4 2 5.9 9.9 12.8 8.3 3 4.3 5.0 17.7 6.0 4 4.7 5.9 16.0 6.5 5 3.1 3.6 19.2 4.9 Urban 2.5 4.8 17.2 4.6 Rural 7.0 7.0 16.7 8.3 Total 5.4 6.4 16.8 7.1
6.42 The dropout rates for EP2 are no higher than those for EP1 (Tables 6.19 and 6.20). However, a direct comparison between EP1 and EP2 dropout rates is difficult because the children are at various ages and selected differently. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the group at risk of dropping out of EP2 is a much smaller one and, it may be argued, a much more select group than the corresponding group in EP1.
Table 6.19. Dropouts in EP2, by Age and Gender (YO) Age Boys Girls All 12 0.9 3.7 2.0 13 6.8 0.9 4.2 14 6.1 4.5 5.4 15 8.8 5.1 7.2 16 10.6 17.6 13.4 17 12.5 21.5 15.9 18 19.9 29.3 22.7 19 25.5 38.5 30.4 All 10.7 12.1 11.2
6.43 Among both boys and girls, EP2 dropout rates increase substantially with age, but especially from the age of 16 (Table 6.19). Moreover, they are lower among girls than among boys in the age range 13 to 15, but higher in the older age ranges. These results, when viewed in conjunction with those illustrated in Tables 6.10, 6.11, and 6.17, seem to suggest that the problem of girls is not that they transfer from EP1 to EP2 at a reduced rate relative to boys, because the same share of girls and boys aged 11-14 attend EP2. Rather, girls seem to drop out because of factors related to age, particularly after they reach 15 years of age.
6.44 EP2 dropout rates in urban areas are substantially lower than they are in rural areas (Table 6.20). However, dropout rates in rural areas are not as high as might have been expected. In rural areas, students who complete EPl and those who start EP2 have a reasonable chance of not dropping out; the decision about whether to continue schooling is likely to have already been made. Once more, there seems no clear-cut relationship between dropout rates and income, at least at this stage of the analysis.
74 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.20. EP2 Dropouts, by Age Group, Quintile, and Rural or Urban Area (%) Quintile 12-14 15-19 All, 12-19 1 5.4 14.7 11.8 2 6.5 14.2 11.7 3 4.7 10.7 8.6 4 2.0 21.9 13.7 5 3.0 14.9 10.4 Urban 2.9 12.7 9.0 Rural 6.9 18.4 14.9 Total 4.3 15.0 11.2
Explanation of Completion Rates
6.45 This section focuses on primary school completion rates. However, the limited data do not include information on the age at which each individual completed lower or upper primary school, nor the age at which the individual started schoo1.33 Therefore, the completion rates calculated here are not gross completion rates.34 Instead, reflecting the available information, the rates measure the percentage of children, by age group, who have completed EP1 and EP2. The results are presented in Figure 6.5 (disaggregated by gender) and Figure 6.6 (disaggregated by rural and urban location).
6.46 A single cohort of children is considered first. If all children bom in a certain single year started lower primary school at the appropriate age, 6, and graduated in the regular period of five years, all would have completed EP1 at age 11. So, a "curve" (actually a point in this case) showing primary school completion among the cohort would begin at 100 percent at age 11 and would remain constant at 100 percent at age 11 for that cohort even as the cohort advanced in age since all children in the cohort would have already completed lower primary school no matter that they subsequently reach the age of 12,13,14, and so on.
6.47 However, a certain proportion of children do not attend school at all, start when they are older than 6, or finish in more than five years. For this reason, as the cohort advances in age and more of the children complete school, the completion curve for the cohort would rise. It would rise until those children who have still not completed EP1 (or have never enrolled) will never graduate. Only then would it flatten out (at a level below 100 percent).
33 Unfortunately, because of the structure of the data, a multivariate analysis of the completion rates has not been possible. There is no information on the personal characteristics of the children or the characteristics of the household or area of residence at the time of school completion. 34 The gross completion rate is the total number of students completing the final year of lower (upper) primary school, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the segment of the population that is at the age corresponding to the official age for lower (upper) primary school graduation. The official graduation age is 11 for EP1 and 13 for EP2.
75 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
6.48 Since cross-sectional data are used to construct this curve, age and cohort effects are confounded; if younger cohorts of children enter school earlier at higher enrollment rates, their completion profile is shifted upward relative to that of older cohorts, and, if it takes less time for them to complete lower primary school since they repeat less, their completion profile will also be steeper. Thus, it may well be that, relative to those who are now at age 12, a higher percentage of those who are now at age 11 will complete EP1 at age 12. The points on the profile presented in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 each therefore refer to a different birth cohort.
Figure 6.5. Children Completing Primay School Figure 6.6. Children Completing Primay School, by Age and Gender (%) by Age and Urban or Rural Area (%)
6070 1I 50
40
30 30 20
10
0 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 -at least lower primary boys at least lower primary rural at least lower primary girls -at least lower primary urban at least upper primary boys _____.at least upper primary rural at least upper primary girls at least upper primary urban
Completion Rates by Gender
6.49 These caveats should be borne in mind when examining Figure 6.5, in which completion profiles are presented separately by gender for both EP1 and EP2. Three interesting details emerge. First, completion rates are low, especially for EP2. Only slightly more than 50 percent of boys who are currently 18 years old have finished EP1, and fewer than 25 percent have completed For no other age group, even taking account of those older than 18, are these shares higher.
6.50 Second, the completion pattem among girls is surprisingly similar to that among boys up to the age of 16 except for EP1, where a small gap opens up from 14 to 16 years of age. This result is welcome. It implies that girls are advancing through the system as well as or better than are boys given that the attendance rates for the (current) 6-10 age group are lower for girls than they are for boys (by about 4 percent; see Tables 6.10 and 6.11) and are possibly even lower for girls who are now over 10 years old. However, the completion rates are the same.
35 Those who have finished upper primary school are obviously also counted within the group of those who have finished lower primary school.
76 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
6.51 Third, there is a dramatic change in the completion rate among girls starting at about age 17 in both EP1 and EP2. At this age, the rate for girls ceases to rise any farther, while it continues to rise for boys. Two explanations for this pattern are possible. A first potential explanation is represented by a sudden and dramatic cohort (generational) change among girls who are now 16 or younger relative to those who are now 17 or older. It is clear that there is a cohort effect; a higher percentage of today’s 16-year-olds will have completed EP1 when they are 17 relative to today’s 17-year-olds. However, it seems implausible that such a strong cohort effect would exist only for girls at that age, implying that the key explanation for the reversal of the trend at 16 is an age effect peculiar to women. Their completion curve flattens at age 16, indicating that girls who have not completed school by that age will never complete it. This result is compatible with the observed increase in dropout rates among girls relative to those among boys at the age of 16 or 17 (Tables 6.17 and 6.19).
Completion Rates by Urban and Rural Area
6.52 Figure 6.6 shows the completion rates separately for urban and rural areas. The difference between the two areas in the percentage of pupils completing EP1 and EP2 is even greater than the difference in the enrollment rates in the two areas. In rural areas, the share of children completing EP1 is lower at all ages. At age 16, only slightly more than 20 percent of the children living in rural areas have completed EP1, compared to almost 65 percent of the children living in urban areas. The completion profile curve is flatter for EP1 in rural areas, probably indicating a larger share of delayed entries and more years of attendance because of higher repetition rates. In the case of EP2, the share of those who finish in rural areas is negligible, only 5-6 percent of the 18-19 age group. This is possibly a consequence of the shortage of upper primary schools in rural areas.
C. Direct Costs
Types of Direct Costs
6.53 The IAF contains information on annual household education expenditures by level and type, as well as expenditures for uniforms, books, and other school supplies.36 These expenditures were not collected during the survey for each child separately, but were recorded as a total household amount by level and type of education. In the case of school fees, one may speculate that the likely types of expenditure included for each education level are any school fees paid, in cash, for registration, attendance, examinations, or other Moreover, one
36 The education levels are lower primary, upper primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, elementary technical and vocational, basic technical and vocational, intermediate technical and vocational, higher education, and “other” education. For lower and upper primary school, lower and upper secondary school, and higher education, expenditures were collected during the survey separately for private and public institutions. 37 No clear, precise guidelines were given to the interviewers on the items to be counted among “school expenditures’’ except that they had to include propinas e matriculas (charges and enrollment fees).
77 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis may anticipate that households would include in their responses in the questionnaire any fees from any relevant normal source, such as official education sector fees and all fees charged by the individual school administrations, as well as selected atypical fees, provided they were paid in cash. By contrast, one would not expect households to report monetary values for any fees paid in kind, especially fees that are illegal or semi-illegal. Indeed, some of these sorts of atypical fees (bribes to education directors or teachers, for example) are likely to go unreported or underreported even if they are paid in cash.
6.54 In this section, household expenditures for education and the ranges of these expenditures by consumption quintile and by type are documented on the basis of the IAF data. Since the expenditure information is collected among households, the interviewers were faced with the problem of making adjustments for the variation among households in the number of children attending school and in the education expenditures for each child. Given that information on expenditures on school fees were collected separately among schools, the amounts spent by households on each level of education, public and private combined, was divided by the number of children attending the corresponding level of education.38
6.55 More problematic was the analysis required to attribute reasonably the expenditures on books, uniforms, and other school supplies and learning materials. These expenditures are given in the survey as a cumulative amount for all children attending school, irrespective of the level or type of education establishment. The most practical solution seemed to be to divide the total amount by the total number of children attending school. However, it is possible (and even likely) that the need for books and uniforms, as well as the cost of these items, varies greatly across the levels of education.39 Therefore, the assumption in the analysis is probably inaccurate.
6.56 Finally, it must be bome in mind that education expenditures are collected as an annual amount (“in the 12 months preceding the interview”). Since school attendance is recorded at one point in time, it is possible that this annual expenditure does not refer precisely to the children who were observed to attend school at that given moment, although one may expect that the discrepancies will be small and that the results will, on average, be valid.
School Fees
6.57 Table 6.21 shows the average annual household expenditure on school fees, by quintile group, for all levels of primary and secondary school.40 These averages have been obtained by
38 Public and private expenditures have been combined. The number of children attending private institutions is negligible (except in the top quintile) and the expenditures for “church,” “community,” “nongovernmental,” and “other” schools that children may attend do not appear to have been consistently classified as public or private by the households. 39 In order to obtain more realistic results on the costs by level of education in the multivariate analysis, the average cost of uniforms was computed by rural or urban location by considering only those households with children going to lower (or upper) primary school. 40 Education expenditures and household consumption have been spatially adjusted in the same way.
78 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis including only the positive values in each respective category, that is, households reporting that they had spent money were counted, while households declaring zero expenditures were di~regarded.~~Table 6.21 presents household averages as yet unadjusted by the number of children attending school. Table 6.22 refers to average expenditures per child, that is, the amount spent, on average, per child attending each education level and living in a household reporting money expenditures on the corresponding education level.
Table 6.21. Average Household Expenditure on School Fees, by Quintile (MZM) Quintile EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 1 32,645 64,341 138,285 197,118 2 33,217 60,906 234,210 357,840 3 30,510 65,968 247,692 207,393 4 36,073 102,081 186,175 258,393 5 72,271 203,934 417,263 702,637 All 40,479 105,319 285,871 498,820
Table 6.22. Average Annual Expenditure on School Fees per Child, by Quintile (MZM) Quintile EP1 EP2 ESGl ESG2 1 15,979 43,124 98,405 146,578 2 16,670 40,303 180,637 328,297 3 16,779 42,623 170,133 98,988 4 19,337 64,720 113,129 220,574 5 41,548 99,173 29 6/357 490,115 All 21,410 60,013 198,881 357,159
6.58 Both household and per child expenditures on fees increase the higher the education level. The average expenditure for EP2 is almost three times that for EP1; the expenditure on ESGl is seven (per household average) to nine (per child average) times that for EP1, and the expenditure for ESG2 is more than one and a half times that for ESG1. Nonetheless, on average, these expenditures barely reach 1 percent of total household consumption (the results for ESG2 are not shown) and an even smaller share of total household cash income (see Tables 6.29 and 6.30).Q Though these amounts may appear small, especially for EP1 and EP2, they are clearly higher than the official fees fixed in the ministerial decrees of 1986 and 1987 (see Table 4.1).
6.59 Expenditure on education also seems small relative to household expenditure on non- essentials (compare Tables 6.23 and 6.25). Though the share of households reporting expenditure on alcohol and tobacco is much smaller than the share reporting expenditure on education (about 95 percent of households with children in EP1 reported expenditure on fees, while only 20 percent reported expenditure on alcohol and tobacco), the amount spent on alcohol and tobacco by those households with some positive spending was 60 times higher than
41 The proportion of surveyed households reporting that they had spent money on lower or upper primary school or lower or upper secondary school was 90 percent or more. 42 Average per adult equivalent consumption in 2002 was MZM14,185 per day (MZM5,177,525 per year).
79 the average EP1 fee. For households in the first (lowest) quintile, it was a still substantial 30 times higher. A similar picture emerges from a view of spending on restaurants and bars. Among households with positive expenditure, spending on leisure and recreation is smaller on average than that on other non-essentials, but still higher than the average EP1 fee (about 11 times more) and higher than the average EP2 fee (about four times more).
Table 6.23. Average Annual Household Expenditure on Selected Discretionary Items, by Quintile (MZM) Item 1 2 3 4 5 All Alcohol and tobacco Mean, all households 50,306 105,902 129,542 243,165 709,975 277,105 Mean, households wlexpenditure >O 477,960 533,210 557,713 883,268 2,841,569 1,260,198 % of households wfexpenditure >O 11.2 17.6 19.6 23.9 24.1 19.8 Leisure Mean, all households 53,983 55,036 71,098 64,346 767,818 230,915 Mean, households wfexpenditure >O 87,652 95,280 130,615 131,056 1,598,168 432,073 Yo of households wlexpenditure >O 66.7 62.5 59.5 52.9 55.3 58.9 Restaurants and bars Mean, all households 37,122 58,940 107,446 137,499 619,709 217,044 Mean, households wlexpenditure >O 386,330 577,618 689,676 895,552 2,780,470 1,425,106 Yo of households wlexpenditure >O 6.7 8.4 12.2 14.8 23.0 13.9
6.60 The share of households reporting they spent money on primary or secondary school was 90 percent or higher. Moreover, this share does not depend on the level of income welfare; households in the bottom quintile are as likely as those in the top quintile to spend money on education. The average expenditure is substantially higher, however, in the top quintile, while it does not appear to vary with income in any large or consistent way among the other quintiles. One reason for the higher amounts in the top quintile is the not insignificant number of children in this group who attend private schools, in particular, expensive private schools.
Expenditure on Uniforms, Books, and Other School Supplies
6.61 Tables 6.24 and 6.25 report average household and per child expenditure on uniforms, books, and other school supplies and learning materials. The last column of both tables presents the average household expenditure, which is based on all household education expenditures as reported in the survey (that is, fees, books, school supplies, and uniforms). The average spending on uniforms, books, and other school supplies is as high, if not higher, than the value of the primary school fees. For example, the average annual amount spent on books is approximately MZM43,OOO per child, about twice as much as the average EP1 fee. The uniforms are even more expensive, MZM73,OOO per child, which is more than the EP2 fees and more than three times the average EP1 fee. Unlike the expenditure on fees, only a relatively small share of households spend money on uniforms or, especially, books. The share is larger among households in the top quintile than it is among households in the bottom quintile (not shown). The average amount spent is also larger in the top quintile. For books, it is possible that the
80 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis larger amount in the top quintile is due to an overrepresentation of pupils from the top of the consumption distribution in the higher levels of education, since books become more expensive as pupils advance through the system. (It has not been feasible to take this into account.)
Table 6.24. Average Annual Household Expenditure on Uniforms, Books, and Other School Supplies, by Quintile (MZM) Other school Average household education
1 66,286 162,258 64,798 142,130 2 88,143 192,396 68,906 169,471 3 93,710 198,753 65,389 165,111 4 73,330 213,051 77,105 188,796 5 165,728 231,269 146,512 768,060 All 113.309 207,507 84,830 291,276
Table 6.25. Average Annual Household Expenditure per Child on Uniforms, Books, and Other School Supplies, by Quintile (MZM) Other school Household per child education Quintile Books Uniforms sum1 ies exvenditure 1 24,465 55,153 28,199 62,251 2 33,272 65,392 31,598 78,415 3 31,381 65,842 30,847 78,726 4 30,110 77,129 38,308 94,002 5 66,394 88,041 67,319 355,763 All 43,143 73,820 39,293 135,659
6.62 In summary, the expenditure on education increases with the level of education and with the level of economic welfare of the household. While ESGl and ESG2 fees are sizeable, average annual EP1 and EP2 fees are small, especially relative to household consumption and cash incomes. In primary education, expenditure on books and uniforms is higher than that on fees, though the expenditure on books and uniforms is likely to be more discretionary.
Time Spent Traveling to School
6.63 While the in-cash school fees are certainly an important component of the overall direct costs for education, other direct costs can play an important role in the schooling decision. Unfortunately, there is no information in the IAF about fees and other costs paid in kind. However, all households, including those without children in school, were asked about the distance in minutes to the closest primary and secondary schools using the means of transport normally employed by the household members to cover similar distances. No distinction was made between lower and upper primary schools, which is regrettable since the two levels of education would seldom be in the same location, especially in rural areas. In any case, the information about distance is important, serving to capture one factor determining access and therefore influencing enrollment and dropout rates.
81 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
6.64 Table 6.26 illustrates the findings on distance for primary and secondary schools in urban and rural areas. The top panel in the table shows the percentage distribution of the travel time to a school across all households in the IAF, including those without children in school. It therefore represents the potential time costs determined by the distribution of households and schools across the country. The bottom panel weights the households listed in the top panel by the number of children in the households who are actually in primary or secondary school. It thus represents the effective time costs.43
Table 6.26. Distances in Minutes to Closest Primary and Secondary Schools, by Urban and Rural Location (% of households) Primary Secondary Minutes Urban Rural All Urban Rural All All households 0-29 minutes 91.0 65.3 73.0 41.2 4.1 15.2 3044 minutes 6.8 14.5 12.2 30.1 7.1 14.0 45-60 minutes 0.9 10.2 7.4 15.6 11.6 12.8 60-119 minutes 0.5 5.5 4.0 7.2 12.6 11.0 120+ minutes 0.7 4.5 3.4 6.0 64.6 47.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 No. households 4,002 4,686 8,688 4,001 4,688 8,689 Weighted by number of children in school 0-29 minutes 91.7 74.4 80.9 60.5 23.8 57.4 3044 minutes 6.9 13.0 10.7 31.3 13.4 29.8 45-60 minutes 0.8 7.6 5.0 7.3 24.6 8.8 60-119 minutes 0.3 3.5 2.3 0.5 2.5 0.7 120+ minutes 0.3 1.5 1.1 0.4 35.7 3.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 No. households 1,809 2,996 4,802 864 79 943
6.65 The proximity to primary and secondary schools differs dramatically in urban and rural areas. In general, the number and distribution of primary schools are such that most households are relatively close to one; 91 percent of urban households and 65 percent of rural households are within a half hour of a primary school. The situation is not the same, however, for secondary schools. In urban areas, access to these schools is relatively easy; 41 percent of all households are within a half hour, and almost 90 percent within an hour of the nearest secondary school. In rural areas, children in 65 percent of the households would be obliged to travel for two hours or more to reach the closest secondary school.
6.66 This geographical distribution of primary and, particularly, secondary schools has a substantial impact on the number of children attending school, as the percentages in the bottom
43 For primary school, most households indicated the minutes it would take to reach the school walking; 99 percent in urban areas and 97 percent in rural areas reported traveling by walking. For secondary school, 83 percent in urban areas said they would walk. Only 38 percent in rural areas said this; 12 percent said they would use a bicycle, and 48 percent said they would use a car or other motor vehicle.
82 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis panel of Table 6.26 demonstrate. Based on the weighting pattern, the distribution of distances to primary schools measured in minutes remains almost identical with respect to the top panel for urban households and fairly similar for rural households. This indicates that, though more distant households may tend to put fewer children in school, the influence of distance on school attendance may not be so significant, since all households are fairly close to a primary
6.67 By contrast, few secondary schools exist in rural areas, and children are less likely to attend (the low number of weighted observations), but are responsive to the distance (that is, the children attending a secondary school are those who are closer to the school).
Geographical Patterns in Education Expenditure
6.68 Variations across provinces in education expenditure are highlighted in this section. For each province and separately by urban and rural location, Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the average annual per child expenditure on EP1 and EP2 school fees. All the amounts have been spatially adjusted to take into account differences in prices across provinces. Without this adjustment, the differences between Maputo City and the other provinces in particular, but also more generally between urban and rural areas would have been more substantial. This would have partly been a consequence, however, of price variations and would not have faithfully reflected genuine distinctions in education costs. Even so, there is great diversity across provinces in the average per child school fee paid.
6.69 The largest EP1 fee expenditure occurs in Maputo City (about MZM70,OOO a year), followed by the fee expenditure in urban areas in Nampula (MZM55,OOO). These fees tend to be much lower in rural areas, though they are relatively large in some cases and not necessarily substantially less than the fees in urban areas (in Sofala, for example).
44 Because the survey did not distinguish between EP1 and EP2, an attempt was made to restrict the sample used in Table 6.26 to those households in which there were only children attending EP1 or only children going to EP2. However, the number of households with children attending only EP2 was too small (161 in urban areas and 67 in rural areas) to produce significant results. Moreover, one should expect substantial self-selection in rural areas, that is, households that are too distant from an upper primary school will not send their children to school and thus will not appear in the sample. The distribution of the observed distances between upper primary schools and households that have children attending only that type of school is therefore not informative of the overall distribution of upper primary schools across rural areas. (One should anticipate that the former represents a considerable underestimation of the latter.)
83 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Figure 6.7. Average Annual EP1 Fee Expenditure per Child, by Province and Urban and Rural Location (MZM 'I 80 1 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Urban 0 Rural
6.70 By contrast, the EP2 fee expenditure is much more similar in urban and rural areas. The only exceptions are the provinces of Nampula and Maputo. Moreover, aside from urban areas in Niassa, the fees are much larger than the EPI fees, up to three times as high (such as in Nampula). For EP2 fees, Maputo City is not the most expensive location. The average fee expenditure is greater in urban Nampula and Sofala.
Figure 6.8. Average Annual EP2 Fee Expenditure per Child, by Province and Urban and Rural Location (MZM '1 Os)
160 I 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
H Urban 0 Rural
6.71 Tables 6.27 to 6.30 break down by consumption quintile the amounts in Figure 6.7. On account of the sample size, this can be done only for EP1 fees. As documented in Table 6.27, the average urban per child EP1 fee expenditure tends to rise as the level of household
84 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis consumption increases. This is true in nearly all provinces. In the three less well off quintiles, the expenditure is nonetheless fairly stable. Only in the fourth and (usually) the fifth quintiles is a significant boost in fees observed.
Table 6.27. Average Annual EP1 Fee Expenditure per Child, by Province and Quintile, Urban Areas (MZM) Province 1 2 3 4 5 All Niassa 7,913 8,701 10,310 11,572 123,900 39,245 Cab0 Delgado 12,584 15,466 14,864 8,949 19,211 14,577 Nampula 3 6,643 30,565 37,387 81,489 69,284 55,384 Zambkzia 4,405 12,070 6,515 23,772 57,318 26,863 Tete 21,806 24,265 26,714 23,457 3 7,705 25,394 Manica 12,461 14,616 20,033 14,710 15,922 15,852 Sofala 34,577 33,744 38,881 49,905 49,861 42,454 Inhambane 18,509 17,028 17,393 20,326 33,994 19,248 Gaza 19,838 22,068 22,318 20,363 22,875 21,432 Maputo 28,419 30,423 31,496 33,991 70,474 35,566 Maputo City 41,075 41,882 40,528 42,080 180,931 69,907 Total 25,585 26,794 28,989 42,938 74,640 40,274 Note: The averages based on fewer than 50 observations are indicated in italics. Education expenditures have been spatially adjusted.
6.72 In rural areas, school fees are much less responsive to changes in household consumption, and only in three provinces (Gaza, Tete, and Zambkzia) are larger EP1 fees paid by households in the top quintile (Table 6.28).
6.73 Tables 6.29 and 6.30 show the average per child EP1 fee as a percentage of household cash income. Since it appears that the school fees recorded in the IAF survey are mainly fees paid in cash, they should also be measured against the cash incomes of the households.45 Overall, the EP1 fees represent only 0.2 percent of cash incomes in urban areas, and 0.1 percent in rural areas. For the bottom quintiles, the share is higher: 0.3 percent in urban and rural areas for the first quintile. There is also some variation across provinces, but, in general, fees represent a very small part of the total cash incomes of household in all parts of the co~ntry.~6
45 The EP1 fee as a percentage of average household cash income represents a measure of the (potential) difficulty of households to pay the fee. However, the timing of the fee payments (and of the receipt of the incomes) is crucial. Information on timing cannot be derived from the IAF survey. 46 The tables report per child EP1 fee expenditure, not total household expenditure for EP1 fees. More than 45 percent of households have only one child in lower primary school. Over 75 percent of households have one or two children in lower primary school.
85 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.28. Average Annual EPZ Fee Expenditure per Child, by Province and Quintile, Rural Areas (MZM’I Province 1 2 3 4 5 All Niassa 8,611 6,545 7,852 8,041 7,093 7,580 Cab0 Delgado 8,951 5,867 7,545 8,102 7,371 7,596 Nampula 17,533 17,409 19,117 15,587 17,837 17,497 Zambezia 7,666 4,702 6,852 6,142 27,042 9,541 Tete 17,128 18,768 16,878 15,163 24,229 17,795 Manica 6,187 7,291 7,916 8,128 7,652 7,551 Sofala 21,056 33,211 30,639 34,327 29,412 30,764 Inhambane 14,862 13,526 17,701 15,072 15,694 14,982 Gaza 10,666 14,383 13,378 13,294 17,885 13,961 Maputo 10,868 13,988 14,615 13,558 13,515 12,079 Total 12,591 11,756 12,378 11,386 21,023 13,360 Note: The averages based on fewer than 50 observations are indicated in italics. Education expenditures have been spatially adjusted.
Table 6.29. Average Annual EPZ Fee Expenditure per Child as a Share of Average Household Cash Income, by Province and Quintile, Urban Areas (YO) Province 1 2 3 4 5 All Niassa 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 Cab0 Delgado 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 Nampula 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.4 Zambezia 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 Tete 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 Manica 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 Sofala 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 Inhambane 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Gaza 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 Maputo 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Maputo City 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 Total 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 Note: The average household cash income has been computed among households with children attending lower primary school. Education expenditures and cash incomes have been spatially adjusted.
Overall Patterns of Education Expenditure
6.74 The analysis so far highlights interesting patterns, but does not control for all factors that may be correlated with education expenditure. In this section, ordinary least square regressions of school fees are presented that permit a control for other factors that may be associated with the level of education expenditure. Though still descriptive, the regressions allow a distinction between factors that are associated with higher or lower expenditures and those that are not.
86 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.30. Average Annual EP1 Fee Expenditure per Child as a Share of Average Household Cash Income, by Province and Quintile, Rural Areas (YO) Province 2 2 3 4 5 Total Niassa 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Cab0 Delgado 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 Nampula 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 Zambezia 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 Tete 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 Manica 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Sofala 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 Inhambane 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 Gaza 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 Maputo 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 Total 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 Note: The average household cash income has been computed among households with children attending lower primary school. Education expenditures and cash incomes have been spatially adjusted.
6.75 Table 6.31 shows the results of ordinary least square regressions on the fees for primary schools. The dependent variable is the (logarithm of the) average per child school fees paid by households. The specification displayed in columns (1) and (4) includes (the logarithm of) consumption among the dependent variables; the specification in columns (2) and (5) includes (the logarithm of) income in cash rather than consumption, and the specification in columns (3) and (6) includes (the logarithm of) the average consumption in the district, along with (the logarithm of) household consumption.
6.76 Large, positive coefficients in the regressions for lower and upper primary school are associated with the greater educational attainment of parents, particularly mothers. In a household in which the mother has a higher education degree, 120 to 140 percent more is spent per child on EP1 fees with respect to a household in which the mother has never gone to school. This differential is even greater for EP2 fees (about 200 percent). A similar, albeit slightly smaller effect is associated with a father who has a higher education degree: 110 to 130 percent more is spent on EP1 fees, and 120 to 140 percent more on EP2 fees with respect to a household in which the father has never gone to school. There are, of course, few households with these characteristics: only about 0.5 percent of the lower primary sample and 1.2 percent of the upper primary sample.
6.77 Parents who have completed upper secondary school also spend more for a child who is in lower primary school with respect to parents who have never gone to school: 40 to 55 percent more in the case of a mother, and 24 to 30 percent more in the case of a father. Likewise, a mother with a technical and vocational training certificate spends 85 to 100 percent more for upper primary fees relative to a mother with no schooling, and a mother with a lower secondary education spends 25 to 33 percent more.
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6.78 These households represent a minority among all households with children attending EP1 or EP2, however. With the exception of parents with lower secondary education or higher, parents with some education do not spend greater amounts on school fees than do parents with no education. (More substantial per child EP1 fees are spent by households in which the father has completed lower primary school, but the differential is small, 7-10 percent, and, in specification 3, significant only at the 10 percent level.)
6.79 Although the fee expenditures (the dependent variable) have been adjusted according to the number of children attending EP1 and EP2, the analysis has nonetheless involved a control for the number of children going to school and for the profile of these children (the proportion of girls, the proportion attending various levels of education, and so on).
6.80 It might be expected that household decisions about the allocations for each child attending EP1 or EP2 would be determined alongside all other decisions about education. In fact, the greater the number of children going to primary school from a household, the smaller the average fee paid for each child. The elasticity is about 10 percent for EP1 fees, and slightly more for EP2 fees. As expected, the coefficient of the (logarithm of the) ratio of children going to private schools is positive and significant. The elasticity is small, though: only about 3 percent for both EP1 and EP2.
6.81 In households in which the proportion of girls going to EP1 is larger, the per capita amount spent on EP1 fees is less. The same applies to EP2, suggesting that there may be discrimination against girls in terms of money spent; either less money is spent on girls going to primary school, or, more plausibly perhaps, more girls can go to primary school only if the fees are low. If the fees per child are outside the control of the household, the household decides how much to spend for education by adjusting the number and the profile of the children going to school. The elasticity is small, however: 0.5 percent for EP1 fees, and 1percent for EP2 fees.
6.82 There is also a significant association between the amount of the school fees and the level of welfare. In specifications (1) and (4), a positive association with consumption has been estimated; the elasticity is 13 and 12 percent for EP1 and EP2, respectively. When income in cash is used instead of consumption (specifications 2 and 5), the coefficient is not statistically significant. In specifications (3) and (6), the analysis has therefore included household consumption, as well as the average consumption in the district where the household is situated. In this last specification, the household consumption elasticity is slightly smaller relative to specification (1) and (4), while the district average consumption elasticity is greater: 25 percent for EP1 fees, and 13 percent for EP2 fees.
6.83 Finally, there are large and significant geographical differences in fees, especially for EP1. In rural areas, per child EP1 fees are more than 40 percent less than those in urban areas, and EP2 fees are approximately 30 percent less than the corresponding urban fees. The average level of fees also changes substantially across provinces. For example, in Zambezia, the average per child EP1 fee is about 150 percent less than the corresponding fee in Maputo City; in Niassa,
90 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
140 percent less, and, in Sofala, 13 to 27 percent less. Smaller differences exist among EP2 fees, but coefficients are large and significant even in this case.
D. Opportunity Costs
6.84 The measurement of opportunity costs poses problems. The opportunity cost of going to school is provided by the value of the forgone opportunities open to the child. The exact nature or value of these opportunities is not evident, however. In developing countries, one of the most important alternatives to school is work in the labor market or as an unpaid family member on the farm or in the home. Unfortunately, while questions were included in the IAF on all individuals aged 6 or above in the household who were involved in formal or semiformal work activities in the labor market or as unpaid family members, the survey did not collect information about domestic chores among children or about the children who are employed whether they attend school or not. This section therefore focuses, all too briefly, on employment among children in the labor market or in family enterprises.
6.85 Table 6.32 shows the share of children who were employed during the seven days previous to the interview. Only 5 percent of children aged 6-10 and 16 percent of children aged 11-14 declared that they had worked during this reference week. Almost all were employed as unpaid family members in agriculture. The percentage of children working is much higher in rural areas than it is in urban areas. There is no substantial difference between girls and boys; boys aged 6-10 are slightly more likely to have been working than girls of the same age, but the corresponding share of children is essentially the same for the 11-14 age group.
Table 6.32. Children Declaring Rey Had Worked in the Previous Week, by Age Group, Gender, and Urban or Rural Location (YO) Children 6-1 0 11-14 Boys 5.6 16.3 Girls 4.3 16.1 Urban 1.3 7.9 Rural 6.5 20.3 All 5.0 16.2
6.86 Few children who work also go to school, that is, there is little overlap between school and work. Meanwhile, the share of children in employment is much smaller than the share of children not attending school, especially among the 6-10 age group. From the survey, it is not clear what the children were doing who were not attending school; one may speculate that they were employed in domestic work. A question in the IAF seeking reasons for children’s non- attendance at school might have offered insights into the altematives to school open to children not in education. However, the responses are not especially useful. Only a small share of children (0.3 percent of the 6-10 age group who are out of school, and 1.8 percent of the 11-14 age group) declared they were out of school because they were working. Even among those who were working, only a small portion (2 percent in both age groups) said work was the main reason they were not in school. For the 6-10 age group, the most common response the children
91 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
gave for being out of school was "other reasons'' among the responses that were listed (44 percent), while, for the 11-14 age group, it was "because of no interest in school" (31 percent).47
E. Multivariate Analysis
6.87 The goal of the multivariate analysis has been to estimate how household schooling decisions change as school fees change. To accomplish this, the analysis has also involved consideration of the ways a range of other factors is likely to affect educational choice. At this stage, the study must shift from a purely descriptive analysis of the amounts households pay in order to seek answers to the question: What would happen to enrollments if the money value of school fees declined? The key explanatory variable-school fees-needs to reflect not the realized choice of the households (the amount they pay for schooling), but the normative factors the educational system imposes on households (the amount the educational system requires for schooling). In econometric terms, this is an endogeneity problem. The data in the previous sections portray not the exogenous school fees set by the system, but the endogenous school fees that the households chose to pay (see Annex N). Some households chose to pay nothing and not to enroll their children in school. In that case, the result is zero fees paid and zero children enrolled. Even if the fee that the households were actually facing was greater than zero, the result of this choice in the data was zero. Were the fees to decrease, the households might choose to send children to school. By contrast, some households might choose to send their children to school even if higher fees were required because they perceive sufficient benefits in education (more so than the average household). The amount these households would pay does not reflect the actual fee they are required to pay.
6.88 The solution employed within the analysis was to replace the school fees that households are observed to pay (including the zeros) by the average fees paid in the districts where the households are 10cated.~8Two strategies were adopted. The first is commonly applied to investigate the impact of a set of factors on schooling decisions. It considers the child as the unit of analysis and models the probability that the child goes to school (or drops out of school) as a function of individual, household, and community variables.
6.89 The alternative strategy adopted was to consider the household as the unit of analysis and model the share of the children who may be enrolled that are actually enrolled as a function of household and community variables. (For details on the econometric models, see Annex 0.) The results of both types of model are reported here since they are both coherent, but also in order to employ each as a test of the robustness of the other.
47 The possible answers were: there is no higher level of education; school is too far away; school is too expensive; there are no places in the school; because of work; because of lack of interest in school; failure in school; got married; became pregnant; and other reasons. 48 Moreover, each household was assigned the average fees paid by the other households in the district, that is, the average computed after excluding the household in question.
92 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
6.90 On the probability that a child will attend EP1 and EP2, Table 6.33 shows the results of the estimation of the probit regressions in the form of marginal effects (the change in the probability of enrollments or dropouts following an infinitesimal change in a continuous explanatory variable or a 0 to 1 change in a dummy variable).@ Fees enter the equation as the log of the average EP1 or EP2 fees per child in the district in which the household is located. Interactions between this variable and the dummy for a child who is a girl, as well as the geographical variables, are also included to account for various effects by gender and location.
6.91 Table 6.34 shows the results of the estimation of the fractional logit model in the form of log ratios. In this case, the dependent variable is the ratio of children enrolled in EP1 and EP2 to all children in the household who are eligible for enrollment. The explanatory variable for school fees is constructed as the log of the total amount of fees that the household would have to pay to enroll all eligible children. The cost of uniforms is incorporated in the same way. The interaction between fees and the geographical dummies is also included. While child-specific variables cannot be embraced in the model, the ratio of all children who may be enrolled and who are girls and the ratio of all children who may be enrolled and who live in the household, but are not "natural" children (that is, who are cousins, orphans, and so on) were included.50
6.92 Finally, Table 6.35 shows estimates of the probability of dropping out of EP1 and EP2. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child has dropped out and 0 if not. The explanatory variables, including fees, enter the model in the same format as in the school attendance model in Table 6.33. The sample has been delimited by the age of the children. For EP1, an age range of 8 to 16 was adopted for attendance and dropouts. For EP2, 12 to 19 was used. These ranges are also employed in the fractional logit model to define the sample of children who may be enrolled.
6.93 Since there are large differences between rural and urban locations, all the models have been estimated separately for these two areas. The first type of model (the probit regressions) was initially estimated separately for boys and girls, but there was little difference in the results, so it was decided to include dummy variables for gender (as well as some interactions between girl and age, girl and fees, and so on) and estimate separate regressions only by area of residence.51 Note that all the regressions that refer to EP2 are estimated only for urban residents. In rural areas, the number of observations for EP2 is too small to provide meaningful results.
49 The marginal effects are computed at the mean of the regressors. 50 Not all children who are not living with one or both of their natural parents can be considered orphans. According to an assessment conducted by UNICEF (2003) in the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Sofala, and Tete, approximately 7.1 percent of children under 18 years of age are not living with either of their natural parents, while 9.5 percent are not living with their natural mother, and 28.7 percent are not living with their natural father. The study found that approximately 3.2 percent of children under 18 years of age are maternal orphans, and 10.1 percent are paternal orphans. Maputo Province shows the highest share of children who are orphans of both parents. 51 Moreover, the fractional logit model as set up cannot be estimated separately by gender.
93 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
Table 6.33. Probit Estimates of the Probabilitu of a Child Being Enrolled in Primaru School EP1 EP2 Categories Urban Rural Urban *** *** Age 0.188 0.283 0.02 Age squared -0.009 *** -0.012 *** -0.003 Girl 0.106 0.206 ** 0.014 Girl * age -0.007 * -0.023 *** -0.015 Not a child of the head or spouse -0.121 *** -0.077 *** -0.141 *** Birth order 0.015 *** 0.016 ** 0.022 *** Some disabled in the household -0.050 ** -0.056 ** -0.035 Woman-headed household -0.09 0.011 0.048 Nofather in the household 0.096 ** 0.044 0.018 Father: some primary education 0.029 0.029 0.043 Father: EP1 (lower primary) 0.053 ** 0.132 *** 0.009 Father: EP2 (upper primary) 0.047 * 0.076 0.063 * Father: ESGl (lower secondary) 0.078 *** 0.243 *** 0.058 Father: more than ESGl (lower secondary) 0.071 *** 0.141 0.105 *** No mother in the household 0.047 * 0.139 ** 0.049 Mother: some primary education 0.044 *** 0.071 *** 0.019 Mother: EP1 (lower primary) 0.087 *** 0.075 * 0.023 Mother: EP2 (upper primary) 0.076 *** 0.118 * 0.053 * Mother: ESGl (lower secondary) 0.05 0.025 0.061 Mother: more than ESGl (lower secondary) 0.123 *** 0.213 North 0.042 -0.155 -0.008 Center 0.190 ** -0.066 0.330 *** South, excluding Maputo City 0.019 0.09 Log (average consumption in the district) 0.016 -0.067 ** -0.058 Log (average household consumption) 0.043 *** 0.056 *** 0.030 * Primary school 30 to 45 minutes distant 0 -0.114 *** -0.012 Primary school 45 to 60 minutes distant -0.004 -0.191 *** -0.520 * Primary school 60 to 120 minutes distant -0.064 -0.270 *** Primary school more than two hours distant -0.278 ** -0.382 *** Log (average district school fee per child) 0.039 -0.015 -0.003 Log (average cost of uniform) 0.025 * 0.008 *** -0.001 Fees * girls -0.017 -0.016 0.041 Fees * center -0.090 *** -0.004 -0.115 ** Fees * south 0.007 0.021 -0.031 Fees * north -0.042 0.021 Observations 3,994 4,817 1,446 Pseudo-R2 0.2346 0.1350 0.2995 Log pseudo-likelihood -1,444.63 -2,661.93 -519.99 Notes: The marginal effect is computed at the mean of the regressors. For dummy variables, it is given for a discrete change from 0 to 1. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent. The reference categories are boy, child of the household head, father never in education, mother never in education, no disabled in the household, man-headed household, in Maputo City, and distance to school less than 30 minutes.
94 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis
6.94 In what follows, comments are included on the main results of the probit models. The results of the fractional logit model are reported in order to stress similarities in the results and to highlight a few discrepancies between the models.
Impact of School Fees and the Cost of Uniforms
6.95 The first noteworthy finding is that school fees generally have little or no statistically significant impact on enrollments in lower and upper primary education. The descriptive analysis demonstrates that the school fees are small, at least the portion paid in cash is small that the IAF survey is likely to capture. This may be responsible for the lack of a statistically significant impact. There are geographical exceptions, however. Table 6.33 shows that, in urban areas in the central region of the country, higher fees are associated with fewer enrollment probabilities. The elasticity is 9 percent for lower primary education and 11.5 percent for upper primary education.
6.96 The fractional logit model confirms these results (Table 6.34). The impact of school fees is not statistically significant in general, but households in urban areas in the central region send fewer children to school when the school fees are higher and more children to school when the school fees are lower. For example, if the average per child EP1 fee were to be reduced by 200 percent, from MZM21,400 (Table 6.22) to slightly more than MZM7,000, a household currently sending two out of three children to school would more likely also send the third child to schoo1.52 The impact in the case of EP2 fees in urban areas in the central region would be somewhat greater.
6.97 The impact of school fees on dropping out is negligible. An exception is urban areas in the southern region, where a rise in EP2 fees would result in an increase in dropout rates. However, at slightly more than 4 percent, the elasticity is small.
6.98 The cost of school uniforms is associated with a positive effect on enrollments in lower primary education. The probit and fractional logit models both estimate a significant coefficient for rural areas. (The coefficient for urban areas is imprecisely estimated.) At first, this appears counterintuitive. The minister of education has offered an explanation. School uniforms have a special egalitarian function in Mozambique (and elsewhere). By masking social status, the uniforms cancel out any visual social differences among children. For this reason, parents prefer to send their children to school in uniforms. This explanation is not incoherent with the findings of the analysis.
52 For a household with three children who are eligible to enroll in lower primary education, a decline in the average lower primary fee expenditure per child from MZM21,400 to MZM7,500 corresponds to a decrease of about one unit in the logarithm (log(64200)-1og(21400)=1.099), that is, an increase in the odds of 27.8 percent (see the coefficient of school fees in Table 6.34). In this case, the dependent variable is not the probability of an event, but an actual fraction, two of three children; the dependent variable would therefore change from 0.66 (2/3) to 0.84.
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Table 6.34. Fractional Logit Model (the Ratio of Children in Primary School among All Children in the Household Who May Be Enrolled) EP1 EP2 Categories Urban Rural Urban No father 2.329 * 0.997 Father: some primary education 1.064 1.041 1.212 Father: EP1 (lower primary) 1.421 1.892 *** 1.231 Father: EP2 (upper primary) 1.635 * 1.379 1.756 Father: ESGl (lower secondary) 2.203 ** 4.787 *** 2.047 * Father: more than ESGl (lower secondary) 2.230 ** 2.537 3.653 *** No mother 1.466 2.442 ** 0.838 Mother: some primary education 1.309 ** 1.466 *** 1.004 Mother: EP1 (lower primary) 2.557 *** 1.447 * 0.799 Mother: EP2 (upper primary) 2.078 *** 2.279 ** 1.286 Mother: ESGl (lower secondary) 1.662 1.333 Some disabled in the household 0.723 ** 0.815 * 0.894 Woman-headed household 0.58 1.314 Ratio of children who may be enrolled, girls 0.646 *** 0.663 *** 0.78 Ratio of children who may be enrolled, orphans 0.465 *** 0.851 0.471 *** North 0.849 0.305 * 3.731 Center 2.834 0.492 19.023 ** South, excluding Maputo City 1.056 3.725 Total school fees 1.049 0.91 1.316 Average consumption in the district 1.036 0.721 * 0.735 Average household consumption 1.522 *** 1.339 *** 1.597 *** Primary school 30 to 45 minutes distant 1.014 0.626 *** 0.883 Primary school 45 to 60 minutes distant 1.171 0.418 *** 0.000 *** Primary school 60 to 120 minutes distant 0.871 0.296 *** 0.000 *** Primary school more than two hours distant 0.303 * 0.205 *** Total cost of uniforms 1.075 1.035 ** 1.008 Fees * center 0.722 ** 0.978 0.528 ** Fees * south 1.122 0.952 0.737 Fees * north 0.89 0.819 Observations 2,205 2,616 801 Log pseudo-likelihood -1,345.52 -2,251.61 495.56 Notes: Odds ratios shown. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent. The reference categories are father never in education, mother never in education, no disabled in the household, man-headed household, in Maputo City, and distance to school less than 30 minutes.
Impact of Proximity to School
6.99 The second noteworthy finding is that school proximity seems to be a key variable in explaining primary school enrollment. The greater the distance to a school, the less likely that a child will attend. In rural areas, the probability that a child will enroll in EP1 falls quickly as the distance to the school rises. Relative to a school distance of less than 30 minutes, the probability
96 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis declines by 11 percent if the school is 30 to 45 minutes away, 19 percent if it is 45 to 60 minutes distant, 27 percent if it is from one to two hours distant, and 37 percent beyond two hours away. If a household is more than two hours from a lower primary school, the probability more than halves, falling from 68 percent (the general average of the sample) to 31 percent.
6.100 The probability of dropping out of school is less sensitive to distance. This is understandable since dropping out is, by definition, conditional on the child attending school during the previous year. Nonetheless, in a rural area, if a lower primary school is more than two hours distant, the probability that the child will drop out rises by almost 14 percent.
Impact of Household Consumption
6.101 The third noteworthy finding is that the level of household consumption affects the probability that a child will attend EP1. According to the fractional logit model, it also affects the probability that a child will attend EP2 and that a child will drop out of EP1 in a rural area, though the impact is not as large as expected.
6.102 The children of wealthier parents are more likely to be in EP1. However, the estimated elasticity is 4 percent in urban areas and slightly below 6 percent in rural areas. Larger coefficients are estimated in the fractional logit model. The number of children in EP1 would expand by 52 percent in urban areas and 34 percent in rural areas if the level of household consumption were to climb by one unit.53 For example, if the level of consumption of an urban household grew from MZM14,500 to MZM39,500 a day, a rise of more than 170 percent, the number of children in the household in EP1 would increase from two in four to three in four.
6.103 Though the coefficient of household consumption is highly statistically significant, the variation in consumption levels must be great if substantial changes are to be produced in the probability of enrollment. The impact of variables such as school proximity, parental education, and the characteristics of the child seems to be greater than that of consumption (see elsewhere in this section). Moreover, according to the probit model, differences in household consumption do not appear to be linked to changes in the probability of dropping out of EP2 or even of attending, though the fractional logit model gives a different result in the case of attendance, on which the estimated impact is nearly the same as the impact on EP1 attendance in urban areas.
6.104 Mean per adult equivalent consumption in a particular district is not statistically significant in any of the probit regressions. There is an exception in the probability of rural EP1 enrollment, but the elasticity is small. The wealth of a district seems not to affect enrollment and dropout rates. While one may expect parents in wealthier areas to be more likely to send their children to school, the opportunity costs may be higher in these areas. The level of household consumption is likely to be important, not the level of consumption in the surrounding area.
53 Since household consumption enters the regression as a logarithm, the amount represented by one unit varies at different levels of consumption.
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Table 6.35. Probit Estimates of the Probability of a Child Dropping Out of Primary School EP1 EP2 Categories Urban Rural Urban * *** Age -0.015 -0.043 0.019 Age squared 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0 Girl -0.03 -0.093 * -0.056 Girl * age 0.003 0.008 ** 0.005 Not a child of the head or spouse 0.027 *** 0.012 0.048 *** Birth order -0.004 ** -0.008 ** -0.009 *** Some disabled in the household 0.020 * 0.013 0.002 Woman-headed household 0.016 0.042 -0.433 *** No father in the household -0.026 * -0.027 0.983 *** Father: some primary education -0.013 ** 0.007 -0.012 Father: EP1 (lower primary) -0.020 *** -0.016 -0.011 Father: EP2 (upper primary) -0.019 *** 0.016 -0.019 Father: ESGl (lower secondary) -0.020 *** -0.024 ** Father: more than ESGl (lower secondary) -0.018 *** -0.027 -0.031 *** No mother in the household 0.005 -0.035 -0.014 Mother: some primary education 0.001 0.004 -0.002 Mother: EP1 (lower primary) -0.016 *** -0.012 -0.009 Mother: EP2 (upper primary) -0.007 -0.037 -0.021 ** Mother: ESGl (lower secondary) -0.004 -0.019 Mother: more than ESGl (lower secondary) Rural North -0.006 0.027 -0.018 Center -0.005 -0.001 -0.164 * South, excluding Maputo City 0.037 -0.034 Log (average consumption in the district) -0.002 0.02 0.01 Log (average household consumption) -0.003 -0.022 ** -0.01 Primary school 30 to 45 minutes distant -0.004 0.016 0.035 Primary school 45 to 60 minutes distant -0.004 0.02 0.285 Primary school 60 to 120 minutes distant 0.069 * Primary school more than two hours distant 0.137 ** Log (average district school fee per child) 0 -0.001 -0.003 Log (average cost of uniform) -0.001 0.002 0 Fees * girls 0.001 0 -0.003 Fees * center 0.004 0.006 -0.007 Fees * south -0.012 -0.008 0.042 ** Fees * north 0.004 0.008 Observations 3,242 3,095 1,243 Pseudo-R2 0.1946 0.0665 0.2403 Log pseudo-likelihood -454.55 -788.00 -253.02 Notes: The marginal effect is computed at the mean of the regressors. For dummy variables, it is given for a discrete change from 0 to 1. * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent. The reference categories are boy, child of the household head, father never in education; mother never in education, no disabled in the household, man-headed household, in Maputo City, and distance to school less than 30 minutes.
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Impact of Paren tal Education
6.105 The lack of a stronger association between household consumption and enrollment rates or dropout rates is partly explained by the impact of the educational attainment of parents on these rates. Parental educational attainment is also associated with household welfare. Thus, the consumption effects appear to be mediated to some extent by parental educational attainment.
6.106 In urban areas, relative to a child whose father or male guardian has never attended school, the probability that a child will attend EP1 is 5.3 percent higher if the child’s father or male guardian has completed EP1,4.7 percent higher if he has completed EP2, 8 percent higher if he has completed ESG1, and 7 percent higher if he has completed more than ESG1.
6.107 Even more substantial is the impact of a mother’s education; the corresponding probabilities range from 7.6 percent, if the mother has completed EP2, to 12.3 percent, if she has completed more than ESG1.
6.108 In rural areas, the impact of parental educational attainment is greater still, and, in this case, the coefficients of the educational dummies of the father are more significant than those of the mother (+13 percent for a father with EP1 and +24 percent for a father with ESG1).
6.109 The parental education coefficients estimated in the fractional logit model for EP1 enrollments are also large. The odds ratios are larger than 2 for a father with a lower secondary education or more, as well as for a mother (in an urban household) with a lower or upper primary education. This means that the share of children who are enrolled in school doubles in households in which the parents have earned these educational qualifications.
6.110 In rural areas, an odds ratio of almost 2 is estimated if the father has completed EP1. A larger coefficient is associated with a mother who has completed EP2, while a father with a lower secondary education increases the dependent variable by a factor of nearly 5. The probability of attending EP2, by contrast, is less responsive to parental education. The exception occurs among households in which a parent has obtained more than a lower secondary education (an elasticity of more than 10 percent in the probit model and an odds ratio of 3.5 in the fractional logit model). Few fathers, however, have reached this level of schooling.
Impact of the Individual Characteristics of the Child
6.111 The fourth noteworthy finding is that the personal characteristics of the child, particularly age, gender, and unusual vulnerability, have a large impact on the probability of enrollment or dropping out. Thus, the probability of attending EP1 rises with age, but at a declining rate. (Note that age limits of 8-16 for EP1 and 12-19 for EP2 have been adopted.) The age impact is greater in rural areas, which is an expected result given that children in rural areas tend to start school later than do children in urban areas.
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6.112 Older girls show less probability of being enrolled relative to boys of the same age, and this effect is also significant in rural areas. It is likely that a specific age effect explains why older girls are less likely to be going to school and more likely to drop out than are boys who are otherwise comparable (see elsewhere above).
6.113 Nonetheless, in the case of EP2, age does not seem to have any impact on the probability either of enrollment, or of dropping out of school. It needs to be bome in mind, however, that children, particularly girls, who are attending EP2 are a select sample and that dropouts are estimated conditional upon attendance at school the previous year, which means that the sample of dropouts is also highly select.
6.114 Gender is associated with various probabilities of enrollment and dropping out. While the probit model indicates that the gender effect is substantial only in rural areas, the fractional logit model estimates significant coefficients in both urban and rural areas. Girls are less likely than boys to be enrolled in EP1 (-20.6 percent in rural areas). Furthermore, older girls exhibit an additional element of lower probability of enrollment relative to boys (see elsewhere above). Nonetheless, there is no difference between boys and girls in the probability of being enrolled in EP2, nor of dropping out of EP1 or EP2 (though this probability is conditional on having attended school the previous year). In the fractional logit model, odds ratios substantially smaller than 1are estimated for the proportion of girls among all children who may be enrolled, indicating that households in which there are more girls enroll a smaller share of children. In this case, a significant coefficient is also estimated for urban households.
6.115 Though it is not possible to define unambiguously the status of orphans in the dataset, the variable "not a child of the household head" may include this characteristic and also capture the status of children who are related to, but not offspring of the head of the household and who are therefore potentially also disadvantaged. In fact, the estimated coefficient of this dummy is statistically significant and non-negligible in size in the regressions of enrollments and dropouts for EP1 and EP2. In this case, however, the coefficients are smaller and not significant in the case of rural areas. Not being the child of the household head is associated with a 12 percent reduction in the probability of attending EP1 in urban areas and a 14 percent reduction in the probability of attending EP2. Similarly, dropouts from EP1 increase by almost 3 percent and from EP2 by 5 percent if the child is not the child of the head-of-household.
6.116 Finally, the coefficient of the dummy that captures the presence of disabled children in the household who are potentially in need of care is also negative and significant for enrollments in EP1 (a -5 percent elasticity in both urban and rural areas), but not significant for the probability of enrollment in EP2, nor for dropping out of EP1 or EP2.
Summary of the Analysis
6.117 The household analysis herein has a single objective: to measure the effect of school fees and other school costs on primary school enrollments and dropouts. The examination of the IAF
100 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Chapter 6: Household Survey Analysis data has revealed that school fees and the cost of uniforms have essentially no general impact on enrollments and dropouts. Limited evidence suggests there are exceptions, however. The cost of uniforms seems to have a small impact on EP1 enrollments and dropouts (that is, a negative effect on the probability of enrollments and a positive effect on the probability of dropping out).
6.118 Some caveats apply to the above. First, the IAF is likely to capture only a part of school fees, namely, the fees that are paid in cash and on which parents have been more likely to agree formally. It is possible that a substantial portion of school fees-perhaps the most controversial, such as in-kind fees, extraordinary fees, personal favors to teachers, and so on-has gone completely unrecorded in the survey. It is precisely these types of fees that may result in non- enrollment or dropping out.
6.119 Second, the fee amounts reported by households are very small, especially for primary school. Such small fees can have only a limited impact, if any, on the demand for education.
6.120 Third, though the methodology adopted in the analysis involves strategies to circumvent potential endogeneity problems due to the fact that households more willing to send their children to school may also tend to be those more willing to pay higher fees, the reduced-form model employed may be incapable of completely isolating the pure effect of fees from the unobservable propensity of certain households to send children to school. However, there is insufficient information in the IAF to establish the extent to which parents may influence the amount of the fees they pay or whether child may be accepted in school if the households, for whatever reason, withhold the fee payments. A model that could disentangle the unobserved characteristics of the households from the effect of fees can be designed only on the basis of panel data and additional information on the actual level of endogeneity of school fees. Though fees vary across areas, there is insufficient variation in the data to estimate the effect of fees in the multivariate models. For example, there are no areas in which no fees are paid that one could compare with the areas in which substantial fees are imposed.
6.121 The analysis has highlighted the existence of other important constraints on school attendance. One key factor is school proximity. The greater the distance between primary schools and households, the greater the probability that school attendance will fall. This is a crucial factor in rural areas because 35 percent of all rural households are more than 30 minutes distant from a primary school. Improving school access and availability can raise enrollments considerably in primary school and, to some extent, help decrease the number of dropouts, especially in areas where schools are distant.
6.122 Some groups of children are especially disadvantaged in terms of school enrollment. Though it appears that, relative to boys, younger girls are less disadvantaged than older girls, there is still a non-negligible gender gap in EP1 and EP2 enrollments and in EP2 dropouts. This gap becomes substantial among girls over 14.
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6.123 Delayed entry and longer stays in lower primary school are significant problems, especially because older children are much less likely to attend upper primary school and much more likely to drop out of lower or upper primary school. If children were starting school at the proper age and progressing through lower primary school at the appropriate pace, more children would be enrolled in upper primary school, and the probability of dropping out would be substantially reduced.
6.124 Poor children are less likely than rich children to be enrolled in EP1. The children of parents with little educational attainment are also less likely to be enrolled. Forming another disadvantaged group are those children who are not the children of the heads of the households in which they live. Many (not all) of these children are likely to be orphans.
6.125 Finally, it must be stressed that a broad set of variables have a statistically significant impact on EP1 enrollments. Moreover, the estimated coefficients tend to be larger than those in the other regressions, indicating that there is substantial selection taking place from the start. Lower primary school attendance is not equally likely for all.
6.126 This initial selection continues throughout the educational system. For example, the fact that household consumption is not statistically significant in explaining EP2 enrollments does not mean that poor and rich children are equally likely to attend EP2. It means only that, among those children who completed lower primary school, household consumption is not a substantial factor in explaining EP2 enrollments. This conclusion does not highlight that poor children were already less likely to attend lower primary school and, therefore, because they have not completed that level of schooling, are also less likely to attend upper primary school. Focusing on the factors that constrain enrollments in lower primary school thus appears to be a crucial strategy in improving outcomes throughout the entire education system.54
54 This is a general statement. It does not take into account that, when the size of the sample of those who have completed EP1 increases, the estimated coefficients for EP2 enrollments and dropouts may change because the sample is differently selected.
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Chapter 7: CONCLUSIONS
A. The Education System at a Crossroads
7.1 The Government of Mozambique recognizes the importance of education, including primary education, in advancing economic and social development. Since 1992, significant efforts have been undertaken and substantial progress has been made in increasing access to primary education, particularly lower primary schools. The number of pupils in lower primary education grew from 1.7 million in 1997 to 2.8 million in 2003, representing the greatest-ever expansion of access to the system.
7.2 Completion, repetition, and dropout rates have not followed the trend of these impressive advances. The proportion of pupils who complete the full lower or upper primary education cycle (through grade 5 or grade 7, respectively) remains well below expectations in Mozambique relative to neighboring countries and countries at similar levels of income. Completion rates vary substantially by gender and across provinces and districts. Girls and children from low-income families in remote rural communities, particularly in the north and central regions of the country, are at a greater disadvantage. It is difficult to ascertain the changes in learning achievement as there is no national assessment mechanism in place to track leaming outcomes.
7.3 As a result, the educational system is at a crossroads. There is a need to reevaluate the underlying, multifaceted factors linked to the low primary school completion rates. An important debate is taking place in Mozambique that is aimed at determining the extent to which demand-side and supply-side constraints and other contextual factors are having an impact on enrollment and completion rates. Although the relative magnitude of the individual constraints is not known, there appears to be a strong sentiment that demand-side constraints (direct costs and opportunity costs) pose the greatest challenge to better completion rates. Easing the demand-side constraints by way of the reduction or elimination of school fees is commonly advocated as a solution, one that, ostensibly, should have greater impact on disadvantaged groups.
7.4 The PSIA study has sought to inform the debate by measuring the direct costs (formal and informal) associated with primary schooling, modeling the impact of a reduction or abolishment of fees on school enrollments and pupil retention, and providing an in-depth analysis of the perspectives of stakeholders on the role of direct costs, particularly school fees, as well as other constraints and factors that, in their view, influence school enrollment and completion rates.
B. Official Policy on School Fees
7.5 The official regulations stipulate that, for each primary school pupil, a fixed sum of MZM150 must be contributed, in cash, to the ASE, and another MZM500 must be paid for
103 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations boarding costs. The latter fee, if applicable, is supposed to be collected only in upper primary grades.55 The ASE contributions are intended solely for the purpose of supporting needy pupils in acquiring school supplies, clothing, and other personal items for school. There are no fees for teacher education.
7.6 For secondary education, literacy programs, and technical and vocational education and training, the regulations require the collection of registration and examination fees and, where applicable, boarding fees. The regulations do not mention whether primary or secondary schools have any freedom to collect additional fees and, if so, for what purpose; nor do they offer guidance on the uses of the funds generated by schools, the role of uniforms, or the financial accountability of schools. Neither the regulations, nor the fee amounts have been updated since 1987. The fee policy is considered to be out of step with key developments in the educational system since 1992. (See the final section of this chapter for a brief review of more recent changes.) Policy documents offer little, if any, guidance.
7.7 To cover operational expenses, the majority of lower primary institutions rely on funds they generate. Direct budgetary allocations through the Ministry of Education to meet routine expenses are extremely rare. Only the largest urban EP1 schools receive assistance in paying water and other utility charges. Since primary schools are poorly funded, it is not surprising that the majority are forced to impose fees, including and in addition to the ASE contributions, in order to continue operating.
7.8 The fees being required by schools are well above the amounts officially fixed in the government policy documents. Paying fees set by the schools seems to be the norm rather than the exception. Typical fees include not only the ASE contributions, but also a variety of other, mostly ad-hoc fees. Though the general policy is that no child is to be kept out of school because the fees have not been paid, most schools enforce the payment of fees in all cases.
7.9 The application of the government policy on fees varies across provinces and districts. The majority of policymakers, senior officials, and technical officers interviewed during the field study believed that, in the absence of school fees, including ASE contributions, primary schools would operate in a much more negative environment. Over two thirds of all interviewees acknowledged that the funds collected by schools are a key to the expansion of access to education, mainly through the financing they provide for classroom construction and building upgrades using unconventional materials.
7.10 Though there is general agreement that the ASE funds should be employed for the benefit of needy pupils, school directors say that the funds, along with other fees generated by the schools, benefit all children by ensuring the normal operation of schools. Few schools visited had safety net strategies in place to cater for vulnerable, disadvantaged pupils.
55 The amounts have never been adjusted for inflation.
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C. Measuring Direct Costs and Opportunity Costs
School Fees and School Expenses
7.11 ASE contributions are spent for a variety of purposes. Most commonly, the contributions are applied toward the purchase of school consumables, including chalk and blackboards, sports equipment, material for extracurricular activities, notebooks for teachers to use to prepare and plan their activities, pens, writing paper, photocopying, learning materials, benches, and chairs and tables, as well as to pay for upgrades in infrastructure, including materials for school construction, refurbishment, or maintenance. The funds also sometimes cover the wages of guards, auxiliary staff, and occasional workers, water and telephone bills, food and drink for visitors and teachers during exams, and the organization of sports activities and teacher training.
7.12 In addition to the ASE contributions, schools request additional monetary contributions from parents at the beginning, during, or at the end of the school year. These are also considered fees. For example, additional fees are charged for enrollment or registration certificates, passing certificates at the end of a school year, special certificates for the completion of grade 5 and grade 7, examinations (the money is sometimes used to provide lunch for external examination monitors), and test booklets. Some schools charge special fees for the construction or rehabilitation of classrooms, for cleaning materials, school guards, or sports equipment. Although some of these contributions are small, cumulatively they can become significant, especially for parents with several children of school age. For example, in one school in Maputo City, the established registration fee is MZM50,OOO for EP1 and MZM65,OOO for EP2, but, if the extra fees are included, parents pay MZM90,OOO for EP1 and MZM100,OOO for EP2 per child. If the cost of uniforms, school supplies, and books is added, the amount per child rises by an average of MZM135,659.
7.13 In many instances, the cost of uniforms or other clothing for school, routine school supplies, and school snacks was found to pose the greatest barrier to school attendance and to cause dropouts. The cost of uniforms, which are mostly an urban phenomenon, might range from MZM160,OOO to MZM180,OOO per child. Despite this high cost, most parents said that they preferred to buy uniforms rather than to purchase other clothing for their children to wear to school, In rural areas, the cost of regular, everyday clothing for school is a burden, but the special outlays are often necessary, for children may feel ashamed if they must attend school in the same old clothes.
7.14 Most parents consider school supplies a significant expense, given that they must make the purchase more than once a year. In the higher grades, teachers require pupils to buy up to 10 blank notebooks and other supplies. The expense is great, especially for the notebooks, which cost an average MZM5,OOO each. Sometimes, because of this expenditure alone, parents may decide not to send all their school-age children to the higher grades in primary school.
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7.15 Parents also spoke of the food they must provide for their children to take to school or the money they must give them to buy snacks. In rural communities, parents give between MZM1,OOO and MZM2,OOO a day to each child for food. Although this might not seem much, it becomes a considerable sum over the course of a school year.
7.16 According to the national household budget survey, total household and per child expenditures on school fees (the ASE contributions and other school charges) rise as pupils advance from one grade to the next. The total average expenditure for EP2 is almost three times that for EP1; the expenditure on ESGl is seven to nine times that for EP1, and the expenditure for ESG2 is more than one and a half times that for ESG1. These amounts may appear small, especially for lower and upper primary school, for which they barely reach 1 percent of total household consumption and an even smaller share of total household cash income. They are nonetheless much higher than the official fees fixed in the ministerial decree of 1987.
7.17 The most substantial lower primary school fee occurs in Maputo City (about MZM70,OOO a year), followed by fees in urban areas in Nampula Province (MZM55,OOO). The lower primary fees tend to be much less significant in rural areas, although, in some cases, they are not necessarily less than the fees in urban areas (in Sofala, for example). By contrast, the fees for upper primary school are fairly similar in urban and rural areas, the only exceptions being the provinces of Maputo and Nampula. Moreover, everywhere, except in the urban areas of Niassa Province, they are much more significant than the lower primary fees, sometimes even three times as high (in Nampula, for example). In the case of upper primary fees, Maputo City is not the most expensive area. In urban Nampula and Sofala, households with children in upper primary school pay a higher average per child fee.
7.18 In urban areas in almost all provinces, the average per child school fees tend to increase as the level of household consumption rises. Among the three lower quintile groups, the increases are fairly moderate. The most substantial climb is observed between the third and fifth quintiles. In rural areas, fees are much less responsive to changes in household consumption. Only in three provinces (Gaza, Tete, and Zambkzia) are larger EP1 fees paid by households in the top quintile. There is also some variation among provinces. However, in general, school fees represent a small part of the total cash expenditures of households in all parts of the country
7.19 The household survey confirms that, for primary school, the average amount spent on books, uniforms, and other school materials is as high, if not higher, than the sum spent on school fees. For example, the average annual amount spent on books is about MZM43,OOO per child, about twice the average fee expenditure for EP1 (MZM21,410); even more expensive are the uniforms, on average about MZM73,OOO per child, more than the average EP2 fee (MZM60,013) and more than three times the average EP1 fee.
7.20 In summary, cumulative direct costs have a negative impact on enrollments and pupil retention, particularly among low-income parents with large families to support. While the fees paid to schools, including the ASE contributions, are not a determining factor, they are an
106 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations important factor when added to the cost of uniforms and clothing, school supplies, and food. According to the analysis among schools and communities, the inability to purchase school supplies for children is probably the most important factor in rural areas, whereas the ability of their parents to pay for uniforms and school supplies can be the difference between a child being in or out of school in urban areas.
Management, Accountability, and Fee Exemption Mechanisms
7.21 Fee types and amounts may be determined in consensus with the school council and community or imposed by the school alone. Official policy documents do not offer any guidance. One of the main problems is that school fees are not properly regulated, and the amounts required for official fees and other charges may therefore be substantial for households. Since there is no control or accountability over the use of school fees, including ASE contributions, funds can be easily diverted for non-learning purposes. The benefits for the schools and pupils are thus limited. In most of the schools visited, parents, community leaders, and even teachers were unable to explain clearly how the ASE funds were used.
7.22 Several senior Ministry of Education staff spoke of the problem of the misuse of ASE contributions. The funds had sometimes been spent to build private homes or buy motorcycles. In fact, the significant misuse of the ASE funds prompted the minister of education to issue a declaration in 2004 (Despacho no. 8/GM/2004) stating that the funds were to be spent only by the educational institutions to which they belonged and for the purposes fixed according to plans drafted and approved by school councils.
7.23 While the declaration has addressed the issue of school-generated revenue, it does not address other basic issues such as the amount, type, and frequency of the fees permitted, nor does it offer any guidance on decisionmaking processes in the establishment of the fees, the management of the funds, or exemption criteria for pupils whose parents cannot afford the fees.
7.24 Some school directors and community leaders are aware of school fee exemption mechanisms such as the poverty certificate. However, it is generally agreed that obtaining such a document requires a great deal of stamina, perseverance, and, paradoxically, financial resources. The bureaucratic process involved in obtaining the certificate can be cumbersome and expensive. In some instances, the certificate may cost up to MZM50,000, excluding the outlays for several trips to the district capital, which, when added to the cost of the certificate, is more than twice the amount of the fees themselves, particularly for lower primary school. Moreover, even when households manage to obtain poverty certificates, they are still required to pay for uniforms or clothing, school supplies, and food. Meeting these costs is problematic in the case of poor and vulnerable children, including orphans.
7.25 One area of consensus among school directors, teachers, and parents is that the Direct Support for Schools program is helping to meet the financial needs of primary schools. Stakeholders feel that the program provides clear accountability mechanisms and guidelines on
107 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations
eligible expenditures so as to ensure that funds are used properly. Schools are employing the funds they receive through the program to purchase educational materials, thereby offsetting some of the direct costs that would otherwise fall to parents. The staff of rural schools believe the program is leading to an increase in enrollments and attendance in lower primary schools.
Opportunity Costs
7.26 Opportunity costs are a much more important factor in rural areas than in urban areas. Nonetheless, in cities such as Maputo or Quelimane, children are often compelled to work in order to contribute to the family income. For households in rural areas, children are an important source of labor, especially during the harvest. This affects children’s performance in school and contributes to poor repetition and dropout rates. Children who have started school late or repeated frequently, a common situation in rural schools, often decide not to complete primary education, and they drop out to seek work in Maputo or in the mines of South Africa.
7.27 According to the household budget survey, almost all children who work do not go to school. However, the percentage of children in employment is much lower than the percentage of children not attending school, especially among the 6-10 age group. From the survey, it is not clear what the children who are not attending school are doing. One may speculate that they are employed in some kind of domestic work. A question included in the survey that seeks reasons for children’s non-attendance at school might have offered some insight into the alternatives available to children not currently in education. The responses were not particularly enlightening, however. Only a small share of children (0.3 percent of the children in the 6-10 age group and 1.8 percent of the children in the 11-14 age group who are out of school) declared that they were out of school because of work. Even among those who were working, only a small minority (2 percent for both age groups) said that work was the main reason they were not attending school. For the 6-10 age group, the most common response selected in the survey for non-attendance was “other reasons” (44 percent), while, for the 11-14 age group, it was ”because of no interest in school” (31 percent).
D. Assessing Supply-side Constraints
7.28 Among the supply-side constraints that play a significant role in low enrollment rates and high dropout rates are insufficient school infrastructure and the poor quality of education, in particular the relevance of the curriculum and the availability of textbooks, leaming materials, and qualified teachers. The majority of the primary school facilities visited during the field study, especially in rural areas, were inadequate. Schools often lacked enough class space to accommodate the number of pupils registered. Some teachers were obliged to improvise classrooms under the shade of large trees. A problem in most schools was the lack of school furniture, especially desks for pupils and teachers. Many children had to sit on cement or dirt floors, a situation that is unsustainable over long periods. The lack of school fumiture may be a contributing cause in non-attendance and dropping out. In some schools that relied on both regular and makeshift classrooms, children who were in the makeshift classrooms sometimes
108 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations moved surreptitiously to the better classrooms because they wanted to have desks or, at least, cement floors.
7.29 A key factor affecting the quality of the education offered in schools is the availability of good teachers. There were substantial differences in this respect across provinces. Urban areas tended to be more well endowed with qualified teachers. For example, the proportion of qualified teachers in EP1 in the provinces of Manica and Niassa was only 58 percent, while, in Maputo City and Sofala Province, it was 94 and 75 percent, respectively.
7.30 A related problem is the lack of qualified women teachers. This may have an impact on attendance and dropout rates among girls in primary schools. The lack of qualified women teachers was especially acute in the northern provinces of Cab0 Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa and in the central province of Zambkzia. In several communities, stakeholders said that the unqualified teachers were recent secondary school graduates, were often young, single men, and, in some instances, lacked maturity and ethical principles. This sometimes led to the harassment of young girls and women students.
E. Assessing Contextual Factors
7.31 The two main cultural constraints on pupil retention and completion rates are early marriages among girls and initiation rites among boys and girls. The initiation rites involve ceremonies marking the passage from childhood to adulthood. They constitute a symbolic moment during which substantial elements of traditional education are transmitted. They are maintained chiefly in rural areas, but also in cities in the central and northern regions. The rites normally take place after the harvest, when there is an abundance of time and food available for the ceremonies. The initiation rites affect girls more than boys. Girls are normally initiated during their first menstruation, when they are between 12 and 15 years old. When the rites are completed, girls are considered women and may marry. They are thus provided with a clear reason for dropping out of school. The two constraints of early marriage and the initiation rites are therefore interrelated.
F. Impact of Reducing or Abolishing School Fees and Other Direct costs
7.32 The study seeks answers to the question: What would happen to enrollments if school fees were reduced?” The multivariate analysis has generated several relevant findings.
7.33 The first noteworthy result is that, in general, school fees have little OY no statistically significant impact on enrollments in lower and upper primary school. This is consistent with the outcome of the school and community analysis and the descriptive analysis of the household survey data. One possible reason for the lack of impact is that only a portion of all school fees, those fees paid in cash, are accounted for in the household survey.
109 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations
7.34 There are, moreover, some geographical exceptions to the conclusion about fees. In urban areas in the central region of the country, higher fees are associated with lower enrollment probabilities. While, in general, the impact of fees is not statistically significant, households in urban areas in the central region send fewer children to school when fees are higher, and they send more children to school when fees are lower. For example, if the average fees in EP1 were to decline by 200 percent, from MZM21,400, the average per child fee, to slightly more than MZM7,000, a household that currently sends two in three children to school would be more likely to send the third child to school as well. The impact would be somewhat greater in the case of EP2 fees, but would still be limited to urban areas in the central region.
7.35 The impact of fees on dropouts is negligible. An exception is urban areas in the southem region, where an increase in EP2 fees would result in a rise in dropout rates. The cost of uniforms is associated with a positive effect on enrollments in EP1. An explanation for this apparently counterintuitive result has been offered by the minister of education. The uniform has a special egalitarian function in Mozambique. By masking social status, it obscures visual differences among children. For this reason, parents prefer to send their children to school in uniforms. This explanation does not contradict the findings of the analysis.
7.36 The second noteworthy result of the study is that proximity to school seems to be a key variable in explaining enrollments in primary school. The greater the distance between home and school, the more likely it is that the child will not attend. In rural areas, the probability that a child will enroll in EP1 falls quickly as the distance to the school rises. Relative to a school distance of less than 30 minutes, the probability declines by 11 percent if the school is 30 to 45 minutes away, 19 percent if it is 45 to 60 minutes distant, 27 percent if it is one to two hours distant, and 37 percent beyond two hours away. If a household is more than two hours from an EP1 school, the probability more than halves, falling from 68 percent (the general average of the sample) to 31 percent.
7.37 The probability of dropping out of school is less sensitive to distance. This is understandable since dropping out is, by definition, conditional on the child attending school during the previous year. Nonetheless, in a rural area, if the EP1 school is more than two hours distant, the probability that the~childwill drop out rises by almost 14 percent.
7.38 The third noteworthy result is that the level of household consumption has an impact on the probability that a child will attend lower primary school. It also has an impact on the probability that a child will drop out of a lower primary school in a rural area, though the impact is not as great as might have been expected. The number of children enrolled in an EP1 would increase by 52 percent in urban areas and 34 percent in rural areas if the level of household consumption were to climb by one unit. For example, if the level of consumption of an urban household grew from MZM14,500 to MZM39,500 a day, an expansion of more than 170 percent, the number of children in the household who would be attending EP1 would rise from two in four to three in four. Though the coefficient of consumption is highly statistically significant, the variation in levels of consumption must be great in order for substantial changes to be produced in the
110 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations probability of enrollment. The impact of variables such as school proximity, parental education, and the characteristics of the child seem to be greater than the impact of consumption.
7.39 Differences in household consumption do not appear to be associated with substantial changes in the probability of dropping out of or even attending EP2, though the results of the probit and fractional logit models contrast somewhat in this regard. In any case, the lack of a stronger association between household consumption and school enrollment and dropout rates is partly explained by the impact of the educational attainment of the parents on these rates. Parental educational attainment is also associated with household welfare. In other words, the consumption effects appear to be mediated to some extent by parental educational attainment.
7.40 For example, in urban areas, relative to a child whose father or male guardian has never attended school, the probability that a child will attend EP1 is 5.3 percent higher if the child’s father or male guardian has completed EP1, 4.7 percent higher if he has completed EP2, 8 percent higher if he has completed ESG1, and 7 percent higher if he has completed more than ESGl. Even more substantial is the impact of a mother’s education; the corresponding probabilities range from 7.6 percent, if the mother has completed EP2, to 12.3 percent, if she has completed more than ESGl.
7.41 In rural areas, the impact of parental educational attainment is greater still, and, in this case, the coefficients of the educational dummies of the father are more significant than those of the mother (+13 percent for a father with EP1 and +24 percent for a father with ESG1).
7.42 The fourth noteworthy result is that the personal characteristics of the child, particularly age, gender, and unusual vulnerability, have a large impact on the probability of enrollment or dropping out. Thus, the probability of attending EP1 rises with age, but at a declining rate. The age impact is greater in rural areas, which is an expected result given that children in rural areas tend to start school later than do children in urban areas.
7.43 Older girls show less probability of being enrolled relative to boys of the same age, and this effect is also significant in rural areas. Nonetheless, in the case of EP2, age does not seem to have any impact on the probability either of enrollment, or of dropping out of school. It needs to be bome in mind, however, that children, particularly girls, attending EP2 are a select sample and that dropouts are estimated conditional upon attendance at school the previous year, which means that the sample of dropouts is also highly select.
7.44 Gender is associated with various probabilities of enrollment and dropping out. While the probit model indicates that the gender effect is substantial only in rural areas, the fractional logit model estimates significant coefficients in both urban and rural areas. Girls are less likely than boys to be enrolled in EP1 (-20.6 percent in rural areas). Furthermore, older girls exhibit an additional element of lower probability of enrollment relative to boys. Nonetheless, there is no difference between boys and girls in the probability of enrollment in EP2, nor of dropping out of EP1 or EP2 (though this probability is conditional on having attended school the previous
111 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations year). In the fractional logit model, odds ratios substantially smaller than 1are estimated for the proportion of girls among all children who may be enrolled, indicating that households in which there are more girls enroll a lower share of children. In this case, a significant coefficient is also estimated for households in urban areas.
7.45 It is not possible to define unambiguously the status of orphans in the dataset, but the variable "not a child of the household head" may include this characteristic and also capture the status of children who are related to, but not offspring of the head of the household and who are therefore potentially also disadvantaged. In fact, the estimated coefficient of this variable is statistically significant and non-negligible in size in the regressions of EP1 and EP2 enrollments and dropouts, especially in urban areas. Not being the child of the household head is associated with a 12 percent reduction in the probability of attending EP1 in urban areas and a 14 percent reduction in the probability of attending EP2. Similarly, dropouts from EP1 increase by almost 3 percent and from EP2 by 5 percent if the child is not the child of the head-of-household.
7.46 The coefficient of the variable that captures the presence of disabled individuals in the household who are potentially in need of care is also negative and significant for EP1 enrollments (-5 percent elasticity in both urban and rural areas), but is not significant for the probability of EP2 enrollment, nor for dropping out of EP1 or EP2.
G. Summary of Conclusions
7.47 The fees being required by schools are well above the amounts officially fixed in the government policy documents. Paying fees set by the schools seems to be the norm rather than the exception. Typical fees include not only the ASE contributions, but also a variety of other, mostly ad-hoc fees. Though the general policy is that no child is to be kept out of school because the fees have not been paid, most schools enforce the payment of fees in all cases.
7.48 The schools and community survey indicate that while the fees paid to schools, including the ASE contributions, are not a determining factor of enrollment or retention, they are an important factor when added to the cost of uniforms and clothing, school supplies, and food. The cumulative direct costs have a negative impact on enrollments and pupil retention, particularly among low-income parents with large families to support. The inability to purchase school supplies for children is probably the most important factor in rural areas, whereas the ability of their parents to pay for uniforms and school supplies can be the difference between a child being in or out of school in urban areas.
7.49 Similarly, the quantitative analysis assigns to school fees little, if any, impact on enrollments and dropouts. Some caveats apply, however. First, the household budget survey is likely to capture only a part of school fees, namely, the fees that are paid in cash and on which parents have been more likely to agree formally. It is possible that a substantial portion of school fees -perhaps the most controversial, such as in-kind fees, extraordinary fees, personal favors to teachers, and so on-has gone completely unrecorded in the survey. It is precisely these types of fee that may result in non-enrollment or dropping out.
112 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations
7.50 Second, the amount of school fees reported by households is very small, especially for EP1 and EP2. Such small amounts can have only a limited impact, if any, on the demand for education. Therefore, fee reduction or elimination in primary schools could mitigate, but should not be expected to solve the problem.
7.51 The analysis highlights, however, the existence of other important constraints on school attendance. One key factor is school proximity (a supply side constraint). The greater the distance between primary schools and households, the greater the probability that school attendance will fall. This is a crucial factor in rural areas because 35 percent of the all rural households are more than 30 minutes distant from a primary school. Improving school access and availability can raise enrollments considerably in EP1 and EP2 and, to some extent, help decrease the number of dropouts, especially in areas where schools are distant.
7.52 Some groups of children are especially disadvantaged in terms of school enrollment. Although it appears that, relative to boys, younger girls are less disadvantaged than older girls, there is still a gender gap in enrollments in EP1 and EP2 and in EP2 dropouts. This gap becomes substantial among girls over 14.
7.53 Delayed entry and longer stays in EP1 (repetition) are significant problems, especially because older children are much less likely to attend upper primary school and much more likely to drop out of lower or upper primary school. If children were starting school at the proper age and progressing through lower primary school at the appropriate pace, more children would be attending upper primary school, and the probability of dropping out would be substantially reduced.
7.54 Poor children are less likely than rich children to be enrolled in EP1. The children of parents with little educational attainment are also less likely to be enrolled. Forming another disadvantaged group are those children who are not the children of the head of the households in which they live. Many (not all) of these are likely to be orphans.
7.55 Finally, it must be stressed that a broad set of variables has a statistically significant impact on EP1 enrollments. Moreover, the estimated coefficients tend to be larger than those in the other regressions, indicating that there is substantial selection taking place from the start. Lower primary school attendance is not equally likely for all.
7.56 This initial selection continues throughout the educational system. For example, the fact that household consumption is not statistically significant in explaining EP2 enrollments does not mean that poor and rich children are equally likely to attend upper primary school. It means only that, among those children who have completed lower primary school, household consumption is not a substantial factor in explaining EP2 enrollments. This conclusion fails to highlight that poor children were already less likely to attend lower primary school and, therefore, because they have not completed that level of schooling, are also less likely to attend EP2. Focusing on the factors that constrain enrollments in lower primary school thus appears to be a crucial strategy in improving outcomes throughout the education system.
113 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations
H. Recommendations
7.57 The recommendations listed below concern the main question addressed by the study: What is the impact of formal and informal school fees on school enrollments and completion rates? Is it a demand side constraint or a supply side constraint? What is the role of contextual factors? It is hoped that the recommendations will be considered points of departure for discussions on the development of policies toward school fees and related expenditures on primary education. Indeed, the recommendations themselves emanate not only from the findings of the study, but also from suggestions made during discussions at a national seminar on basic education held in Maputo and attended by national technical officials and over 100 educators from the provinces. Given that recommendations have a financial impact, efforts were made to include actions that are financially affordable, relatively straight forward and effective at meeting the objective.
Regarding Demand-Side Factors
Recommendation 1: Revise official policy (the ministerial decree) on school fees so as to:
(a) Clarify the type (if any), purpose, and frequency of the fees and contributions that may be charged by schools, the payment mechanisms, and the recordkeeping procedures. Ensure that schools and parents are fully aware of the types of fees and contributions that are not allowed and should not be charged. (b) Create strict regulations on the collection of add-on and ad-hoc fees in primary schools in order to ensure that mechanisms are in place to encourage financial accountability and discourage unnecessary fees. (c) Define the roles, responsibilities, and decisionmaking authority of school directors, teachers, parents, and community members (outlined in the school council manual) in order to ensure transparency and accountability in the collection and govemance of school-generated revenue. (d) Define the exemption criteria for school fees and contributions (that is, the criteria for the exemption of grade 1and 2 pupils, the exemption of all lower primary school pupils, and the exemption of disabled, orphaned, or vulnerable children, and so on) and simplify the steps required to prove exemption eligibility to school administrations. (e) Eliminate or streamline the bureaucratic process involved in obtaining the poverty certificate required for fee exemption. In rural communities, for example, poverty certification should be a simple process based on the oral testimony of local authorities and community members, and the process should be free of charge. For this purpose, develop flexible criteria to be implemented by communities, churches and religious groups, nongovernmental organizations, schools, and community leaders in order to identify children who are out of school, especially orphans, and guarantee that they enroll in school and have access to appropriate school materials and clothing. (f) Increase awareness of the revised official policy through print and radio campaigns and through special brochures to be distributed together with the materials on the Direct Support for Schools program.
114 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendation 2: Design and launch print and community radio campaigns to inform, educate, and disseminate information on:
The rights of children and the benefits of education, especially in rural areas. The importance of ensuring prompt entry into grade 1 at the age of 6 or 7. As the study points out, delay in starting school is one of the most important constraining factors associated with pupil repetition and dropping out. The official policy on school fees and contributions, exemption criteria and mechanisms, the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, and policies on financial corruption and the misuse of fees. The official policy should recognize that fees in primary education represent a roadblock to improving equity in the access to services. (d) The intergenerational benefits of the education of girls, with an emphasis on ensuring at least completion of the full EP1 cycle, particularly in rural areas. If necessary, provide financial incentives to schools in order to boost the likelihood of the enrollment of girls. (e) The ministry policy against sexual harassment in schools, in particular the harassment of girls by teachers. The concept that schools should be responsive and adaptive to the socioeconomic, cultural, and political needs and conditions of the community rather than expecting the community to adapt to the needs of the school. Schools are active participants in the fight against HIV/AIDS through school-based prevention programs and the dissemination of information regarding the rights and proper care of those who are infected or affected by HIV/AIDS.
Recommendation 3: Expand and institutionalize the Direct Support for Schools program.
Expand the size of the program’s cash grant per school. (Currently the average grant size ranges from US$200 to US$3,000, depending on a school financing formula.) Earmark a portion of the expanded grant to cover operational and educational expenditures. Operational expenditures should be clearly defined and listed in the same way as school consumables are currently presented in the Direct Support for Schools program manual on eligible expenditures. While schools should have the authority to decide the mix of consumables to be purchased using the program cash grants, it should be clear that poor and vulnerable children should receive preferential treatment in the distribution of school materials, since the lack of money to purchase these has been found to represent one of the greatest constraints on sustained school attendance. Gradually introduce eligibility criteria for the cash grant in order to ensure that schools continue to receive resources if certain outcomes, mutually agreed, are met. This will mean that the grant will no longer be merely a cash transfer. It will become an incentive mechanism to foster change from the ground up. Eventually, school directors should be required to prepare simple school plans in which they state their objectives for the year. (d) Tailor additional interventions for districts in which enrollment and completion rates are extremely low. A one-size-fits-all approach to the problem of inadequate completion
115 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations
rates will not work. For example, programs should be implemented to delay or mitigate the impact of initiation rites among girls in order to ensure that young girls are not permanently excluded from school. (e) If the size of the cash grant were to be expanded by, say, 100 percent to cover all essential classroom consumables and school supplies for students, the cost of the program would rise from the current US$5.5 million to about US$12 million per year. This would increase the average benefit per pupil from US$1.90 to US$4.14 per year. (f) Consider the possibility of introducing a classroom and infrastructure upgrade allocation to help communities upgrade and equip classrooms with furniture and provide water and sanitation facilities for schools. The resources transferred through the upgrade allocation could be provided on demand through a partnership agreement among the school administration, the school council, and the local community. Most communities in Mozambique are already active in building or upgrading school infrastructure. The shortages are the lack of financial support-mainly for the purchase of conventional construction materials - and technical support to ensure that new school construction is able to withstand the rainy season. (g) Consider the possibility of introducing an allocation for orphans and vulnerable children in order to ensure that such children gain access to school and are able to purchase school supplies (exercise books, notebooks, and other consumables). Clear, simple criteria would have to be developed for the identification of these children and for monitoring their sustained enrollment.
Recommendation 4: Simplify school examination procedures and eliminate examination fees.
(a) Provide guidelines to schools to simplify the procedures for end-of-year and end-of- cycle examinations and, most importantly, eliminate all fees charged for the right to take examinations and receive certification for grades 5 and 7.
Regarding Supply-side Constraints
Recommendation 5: Build schools closer to communities in order to reduce the average distance to the nearest primary school.
(a) School proximity is one of the key factors in poor performance in enrollment and dropout indicators. Yet, there is little information on appropriate school site selection. It is therefore imperative to accelerate the completion of the school mapping exercise (Carta Escolar). The importance of this action should be emphasized. (b) Establish and disseminate clear criteria for school site selection in order to ensure that schools are located within easy walking distance in the communities served. (c) Gradually consolidate lower primary schools into full primary schools in order to expand access to the upper primary grades in the same school buildings. Information generated through the school mapping exercise is essential for identifying appropriate sites and matching sites with catchment areas.
116 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendation 6: Improve school infrastructure.
(a) Improve infrastructure so that it complies with the minimum requirements for a pedagogically sustainable teaching-learning process (cement floors, adequate ventilation, durable construction materials, potable water, toilet facilities, and so on). (b) Supply the essential furniture (pupil and teacher desks).
Recommendation 7: Improve the quality of education.
(a) Improve teacher deployment to ensure that qualified teachers are posted in rural areas. A special effort should be made to train more women teachers for rural communities. (b) Furnish the essential textbooks and complementary learning materials on time and in sufficient quantities (before or at the beginning of the school year). (c) Improve the relevance of education by teaching children with knowledge that counts. This is particularly important in rural areas.
Regarding Public Expenditure on Education
Recommendation 8: Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure on education, particularly in EP1 and EP2.
(a) Improve current practices in teacher compensation, deployment, and management in EP1 and EP2. Despite the increase in resources allocated to the sector, the proportion of unqualified teachers continues to rise, particularly in rural areas. (b) While additional resources for primary education are needed to expand the Direct Support for Schools program, upgrade infrastructure, improve quality, and so on, new allocations should be strategically applied so that the impact is likely to be as substantial as possible. Additional resources for the hiring of teaching staff could be spent so as to send additional qualified teachers to rural schools or to other schools in which there is a shortage of qualified teachers, in particular women teachers. Expenditure on education cannot continue to increase without organized monitoring and evaluation.
Summary of the Recommendations
The study highlighted certain issues that are more critical than others with respect to the efficiency and effectiveness of primary education. These issues may merit immediate attention. It is suggested that the following be taken as priorities in discussions regarding the development of policy in primary education.
e Revise and disseminate information on official policy toward school fees in order to clarify the type and frequency of the fees allowed, the role of parents and communities in establishing fees, and the exemption mechanisms available for those who cannot afford the fees, including orphans and vulnerable children.
117 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations
Ensure that children begin grade 1at the appropriate age of 6 or 7. Improve access (proximity) to EP1 and EP2 schools, especially in rural areas. Improve the quality of school infrastructure. Ensure that EP1 schools receive sufficient financial resources to purchase educational materials, including notebooks, and create additional incentives to raise the retention in school of disadvantaged groups, especially girls and orphans in rural areas. Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure on education, particularly in EP1 and EP2.
Developments since the Completion of the PSIA Study
In light of the negative impact of school fees on student enrollments and completion rates in primary education and in an effort to promote equitable access to education, as stipulated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Government of Mozambique issued a ministerial decree in 2004 wherein it declared the abolition of the ASE and any other fees and levies in primary education starting in the 2005 academic year, which began in mid-January 2005. The decree of 2004 allows parents, communities, and other interested parties to make contributions in cash or in kind, although only on a strictly voluntary basis.
7.59 While the govemment’s decision to abolish all fees is a bold step to encourage and accelerate enrollment in primary education, the decree of 2004 does not mention if additional budgetary allocations will be made to cover the shortfall in school-generated revenue (an average of MZM21,410 per child in EP1 and MZM60,013 per child in EP2) or if school supplies, textbooks, school uniforms, and other miscellaneous items, which were financed by households (at an average of MZM114,249 per enrolled child), will be covered through other means. In the event that items previously financed by households are covered by the government and provided directly to schools and students, an additional US$2.5 million for EP1 and US$1 million for EP2 would need to be allocated in 2005 (at current enrollment levels). However, should students who dropped out before completing lower or upper primary school be encouraged to re-enroll, the govemment’s allocation would have to be raised substantially in order to provide for the rise in the number of new or returning students, particularly in upper primary schools. It should be noted that under the current fee abolition scheme and in the absence of additional budget resources, households would still be required to purchase school supplies, uniforms and, in some grades, textbooks.
7.60 It is too early to gauge the initial impact of the govemment’s decision, but the removal of fees is likely to increase the absolute number of students, especially in upper primary schools, in which only slightly more than 10 percent of the eligible school-age population is currently enrolled and where the social pressure to expand is greatest. 5. It is also possible that students who dropped out before completing EP1 or EP2 be encouraged to re-enroll. The question of whether retuming students would remain in the system until completion would also depend on
118 PSIA Mozambique: Primary Education Conclusions and Recommendations the household’s ability to meet additional expenses to cover school supplies, uniforms and textbooks or on an extraordinary effort form the Government to increase public expenditure to cover school supplies and other miscellaneous schooling expenses for the majority of EP1 and EP2 pupils.
119 Annex A
Annex A: Education Pyramid in Mozambique in 2002
Higher Education Institutions Enrollment: 12,000 (30% women) No. Institutions: 10 (5 private)
:\ Secondary Education 2nd level Technical and Vocational Education (Grades 11-12) Intermediate Primary Teacher Enrollment: 18,300 (37% girls) day shift Industrial, Commercial, Agricultural Training Colleges 12,500 (39% girls) evening shift Enrollment: 3,481 (23% girls) day shift No. Schools: 29 2,219 (289% girls) evening shift *. v**.*0.
Teacher Education Centers No. Schools: 10 7*.* 8.
Enrollment: 937 (15% girls) No. Schools: 950 No. Schools: 15
Primary Education, 1st Cycle (Grades 1-5) Enrollment: 2.8 million (45% girls) No. Schools: 8,077
120 Annex B
Annex B: Key Education Indicators
Enrollment Ratios
0 Gross enrollment rate: total enrollment, regardless of age, at a given education level, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population in a given school year. 0 Net enrollment rate: total enrollment only of pupils of the official school age, at a given education level, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population in a given school year.
Flow and Transition Ratios
0 Dropout rate: total number of pupils, in a given grade, who have left school during a given school year before the end of that school year, divided by the total number of pupils enrolled in the given grade at the start of the given school year. (See Annex M.) 0 Repetition rate: proportion of pupils enrolled in a given grade in a given school year who are in the same grade the following school year.
System Efficiency Ratios
0 Completion rate: the total number of pupils graduating from the final year of a cycle of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the segment of the population that is at the age corresponding to the official age for graduation. 0 Modified completion rate: the enrollment in the final year of the cycle, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the segment of the population that is at the age corresponding to the official age for graduation. 0 Pupil-teacher ratio: the number of pupils enrolled in a given grade in a specific year divided by the number of teachers in the same grade and year. 0 Survival rate: the number of pupils in a given age-cohort who survive the successive grades of a certain level of education divided by the total number of students in that age-cohort who enrolled in grade 1.
121 Annex C: Dakar World Education Forum Goals and Millennium Development Goals
Dakar World Education Forum Goals Millennium Develovment Goals Expand and improve comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children Ensure that, by 2015, all children, particularly girls, children Ensure that, by 2015, children in difficult circumstances, and children belonging to ethnic everywhere, boys and girls alike, minorities, have access to and complete free and will be able to complete a full compulsory primary education of good quality course of primary schooling Ensure that the learning needs of young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programs Achieve a 50 percent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially among women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults Eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary Eliminate gender disparity in education by 2005 and achieve gender equality in education primary and secondary by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal education, preferably by 2005, access to and achievement in basic education of good and at all levels of education no quality later than 2015 Improve all aspects of the quality of education and ensure excellence so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracv, and essential life skills Source: Bruns, Mingat, and Rakotomalala 2003.
122 Annex D: Primary Completion Rates in Africa, by Gender, 1990s
I990 Most Recent Year Country Primaiygrades Girls Boys Both Year Girls Boys Both Year Cape Verde 6 - - - - 115 117 1997 Zimbabwe 7 94 100 97 1990 111 116 113 1997 Mauritius 6 135 136 135 1990 108 115 111 1997 Botswana 7 126 102 114 1990 107 96 102 1996 South Africa 7 81 72 76 1990 100 95 98 1995 Namibia 7 80 59 70 1990 94 86 90 1997 Zambia 7 84 110 97 1988 75 90 83 1995 Swaziland 7 - - 71 1990 85 78 81 1997 S5o Tome e Principe 4 ------84 2001 Gabon 6 77 66 71 1991 80 79 80 1995 Gambia, The 6 35 45 40 1991 - - 70 2000 Lesotho 7 82 45 64 1990 83 55 69 1996 Nigeria 6 62 82 72 1990 61 63 67 2000 Uganda 7 30 49 39 1990 - - 65 2001 Ghana 6 54 71 63 1990 - - 64 1999 Togo 6 26 55 41 1990 52 73 63 1999 Tanzania 7 45 46 46 1989 60 58 59 1997 Kenya 8 57 69 63 1990 57 58 58 1995 Malawi 8 22 38 30 1990 40 61 50 1995 Mauritania 6 26 41 34 1990 43 48 46 1998 Equatorial Guinea 5 - - - - 43 48 46 1993 Congo, Republic of 6 55 68 61 1990 60 28 44 2000 Cameroon 6 52 61 57 1990 39 46 43 1999 Burundi 6 43 49 46 1990 - - 43 1998 Senegal 6 35 56 45 1989 34 48 41 2000 Cbte d’Ivoire 6 32 55 44 1990 33 48 40 1999 Congo, Democratic Republic of 6 35 60 48 1990 34 45 40 2000 Benin 6 15 31 23 1990 30 47 39 1998 Mozambique 5 23 36 30 1990 22 50 36 1998 Eritrea 5 20 23 22 1991 31 40 35 1999 Sudan 8 - - - - 33 38 35 1996 Guinea 6 9 24 16 1990 24 44 34 2000 Comoros 6 32 38 35 1991 34 32 33 1993 Sierra Leone 7 - - - - 30 36 32 2000 Guinea-Bissau 6 12 21 16 1988 24 40 31 2000 Madagascar 5 35 33 34 1990 26 26 26 1998 Burkina Faso 6 14 24 19 1990 20 30 25 1998 Rwanda* 6 35 33 34 1990 27 30 28 2000 Ethiopia 6 18 25 22 1990 12 36 24 1999 Mali 6 9 14 11 1990 18 29 23 1998 Niger 6 13 23 18 1990 15 23 20 1998 Central African Republic 6 19 37 28 1990 - - 19 2000 Chad 6 7 31 19 1990 9 29 19 2000 Angola 4 35 42 39 1990 - - - - Liberia 6 ------Seychelles 6 ------Somalia 8 ------Not available. *Rwanda 1990 data are for a seven-grade primary cycle; 2000 data are for the new six-grade cycle, Source: Bruns, Mingat, and Rakotomalala 2003.
123 Annex E
Annex E: GER in Primary Schools, by District, Province, and Gender, 1997and2003
Lower primary school (grades 1-5) Upper primary school (grades 6-7) 1997 2003 1997 2003 District Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Ancuabe 66.2 40.2 53.0 116.8 88.2 102.0 21.8 5.8 13.8 32.7 9.1 20.1 Chihe 74.3 41.8 58.4 101.1 114.1 106.0 15.7 3.9 10.0 21.0 10.5 16.8 IbO 101.7 71.8 86.3 166.3 88.0 115.1 13.5 11.5 12.5 46.7 11.0 24.3 Macomia 59.4 32.8 46.3 124.0 80.7 101.3 6.8 1.5 4.1 21.6 7.4 13.9 Mecdfi 42.7 21.4 32.3 125.5 74.3 96.5 5.8 2.1 4.0 31.9 8.3 18.5 Meluco 58.9 31.8 45.5 126.2 54.0 82.1 18.7 1.9 10.3 45.9 7.3 22.5 Mocimboa da Praia 64.2 34.3 49.1 131.9 75.5 101.5 10.5 4.2 7.3 31.9 12.3 21.7 Montepuez 84.8 56.6 70.4 155.1 145.9 150.8 17.8 7.9 12.9 48.6 35.1 42.7 Mueda 77.3 60.9 69.2 124.1 112.4 118.2 11.5 4.4 8.0 21.4 19.8 20.7 Namuno 80.3 50.2 65.6 133.6 122.0 128.5 8.4 1.4 5.1 27.4 8.9 19.1 Palma 51.4 21.6 36.5 96.5 44.1 67.4 5.3 1.2 3.3 17.7 3.6 9.8 Pemba-Metuge 61.5 36.8 48.7 139.4 86.0 109.4 8.2 1.2 4.6 37.1 7.7 20.5 Quissanga 96.3 64.3 80.1 145.3 65.5 95.6 7.7 0.8 4.3 21.5 3.8 10.1 Pemba City 85.9 62.2 73.1 132.1 114.9 122.7 41.0 23.7 31.2 48.9 41.3 44.7 Balama 69.1 37.1 53.5 117.2 87.0 102.6 10.5 1.8 6.3 30.9 5.6 17.3 Muidumbe 87.2 61.5 74.4 126.1 85.2 103.1 23.5 5.2 14.5 25.2 13.8 19.5 Nangade 74.4 46.1 60.6 138.4 89.6 111.6 12.2 3.6 8.0 28.1 10.1 18.7 Cab0 Delgado Total 73.5 46.1 59.8 125.6 96.7 111.0 15.4 5.8 10.6 31.1 14.8 22.9 Bilene-Macia 102.4 86.1 94.3 139.9 136.0 138.0 21.4 13.7 17.6 52.2 45.0 48.6 Guija 110.9 99.2 105.0 161.3 158.7 160.0 9.4 13.2 11.3 36.5 40.1 38.3 Chibuto 109.8 104.2 107.1 171.9 171.8 171.8 23.3 20.9 22.1 51.3 57.2 54.2 Chicualacuala 69.8 61.0 65.3 117.6 116.4 117.0 15.9 13.0 14.4 45.3 43.5 44.3 Xai-Xai Ex Gaza 16.6 105.9 11.3 133.2 127.8 130.6 23.1 19.0 21.0 55.0 54.0 54.5 Chokwe 18.3 107.8 13.0 107.5 109.3 108.4 18.2 20.6 19.4 37.1 36.4 36.7 Manjacaze-Dengane 18.6 108.1 13.4 149.3 146.6 148.0 27.8 23.1 25.6 70.1 64.7 67.5 Massingir 03.3 85.6 94.0 164.0 148.9 156.2 8.7 6.5 7.6 35.4 33.9 34.6 Xai-Xai City 43.6 123.4 32.7 121.3 102.6 111.3 73.7 64.0 68.4 88.9 78.6 83.2 Chigubo 80.0 53.1 66.4 138.3 124.7 131.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.9 21.9 19.9 Mabalane 86.9 82.8 84.9 134.8 147.8 141.2 10.4 9.9 10.1 26.0 19.8 22.9 Massangena 36.6 102.1 19.8 126.7 139.3 132.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.5 37.2 36.3 Gaza Total 114.0 102.3 108.1 136.6 131.9 134.3 25.7 23.4 24.5 54.2 52.3 53.2 Govuro 84.0 53.2 68.2 172.3 150.6 161.2 31.7 12.4 21.7 54.6 32.4 42.9 Mabote 54.5 61.8 57.9 116.4 140.6 127.6 8.8 8.1 8.4 39.7 39.6 39.7 Homoine 128.3 113.5 120.9 155.4 158.7 157.0 32.9 26.9 30.0 81.5 74.9 78.2 Inhambane City 132.2 102.2 116.0 147.6 122.5 134.1 76.4 57.4 66.3 124.0 98.7 110.2 Jangamo 93.9 76.3 85.1 102.1 99.9 101.0 24.0 15.8 20.0 49.3 39.1 44.2 Inharrime 135.3 105.5 120.2 157.1 145.8 151.4 28.0 16.2 22.2 70.3 52.4 61.3 Massinga 85.1 75.4 80.3 118.4 117.2 117.8 16.9 14.1 15.6 40.8 37.1 39.0 Funhalouro 67.8 61.0 64.5 126.0 139.1 132.3 9.0 6.3 7.7 28.0 19.0 23.6 Mormmbene 101.3 86.0 93.7 144.4 138.6 141.6 30.3 22.6 26.6 64.6 54.0 59.3 Panda 121.9 86.9 04.4 151.7 141.5 146.7 34.0 20.3 27.4 56.4 42.3 49.5 Vilankulo 96.5 74.7 85.4 139.4 127.2 133.2 18.3 13.9 16.1 46.9 34.5 40.6 Zavala 125.6 106.0 15.6 147.8 139.7 143.7 36.1 22.5 29.2 60.5 43.8 51.9 Maxixe City 135.9 121.9 28.6 116.4 111.0 113.6 69.3 63.2 66.1 90.2 81.3 85.4 Inhassoro 74.2 55.0 64.4 142.4 129.4 135.8 17.0 10.5 13.7 49.0 29.1 38.9 Inhambane Total 106.5 89.4 97.9 135.1 129.3 132.2 31.0 24.0 27.5 61.5 51.1 56.2 BA,k BA,k 89.4 57.8 74.2 154.4 134.8 145.1 24.5 7.9 16.8 57.4 18.3 38.9 Gondola 81.7 45.1 63.1 151.2 121.5 136.3 9.9 5.1 7.5 52.1 19.2 35.5 Chimoio City 87.3 54.0 68.3 109.3 77.9 91.5 56.5 28.8 40.8 76.3 40.2 55.4
124 Annex E
Guro 94.0 56.0 77.0 176.5 177.4 176.9 22.0 7.4 15.8 88.6 27.9 62.5 Manica 99.5 70.8 84.5 111.6 93.6 102.3 37.1 17.5 27.1 48.9 28.1 38.1 Mossurize 31.7 23.1 27.8 92.6 70.3 82.7 4.9 3.2 4.1 11.2 7.4 9.5 Sussundenga 74.5 49.0 62.2 127.7 102.5 115.6 17.5 8.0 13.1 41.8 24.5 33.6 Tambara - 28.2 107.5 - 103.0 257.5 - 0.3 11.4 - 9.0 61.8 Machaze 60.1 34.7 49.5 146.4 148.5 147.3 4.2 1.0 2.9 19.3 9.1 15.0 Macossa 79.6 36.7 58.9 151.5 120.0 136.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.4 8.5 24.8 Manica Total 80.5 49.7 64.8 131.3 102.4 116.7 24.9 13.0 19.0 50.8 25.3 37.7 Boane 123.5 111.7 117.7 184.7 192.9 188.7 28.3 26.6 27.5 71.7 64.2 68.0 Magude 111.2 128.0 118.8 229.3 295.9 258.7 32.6 34.4 33.4 100.2 125.8 111.6 Manhiga 116.0 107.4 112.0 171.5 193.9 181.8 25.8 24.0 25.0 70.8 69.4 70.2 Marracuene 144.7 129.4 137.3 214.3 222.1 218.0 31.4 30.0 30.8 104.7 100.2 102.6 Matutuine 85.7 69.5 77.2 182.7 159.3 170.5 7.2 5.5 6.3 76.7 52.8 64.1 Moamba 104.4 95.6 99.9 195.1 194.1 194.6 18.9 16.1 17.5 85.9 90.2 88.0 Namaacha 136.0 116.4 125.5 167.4 148.1 157.2 44.9 34.4 39.3 100.7 75.0 86.6 Matola City 115.6 107.4 111.4 130.0 125.7 127.8 39.4 41.8 40.6 69.5 71.1 70.3 MaputoProvinceTotal 116.4 107.6 112.0 152.7 152.1 152.4 33.5 34.3 33.9 74.7 73.5 74.1 Angoche 58.3 24.5 41.6 75.4 50.1 63.5 11.4 3.6 7.6 24.9 6.9 16.5 Erati 31.7 20.7 26.5 46.5 41.4 44.1 3.9 0.8 2.5 15.6 4.6 10.3 Ilha de Moqambique 70.6 45.7 57.8 77.6 68.7 73.3 22.5 11.5 17.1 22.6 16.3 19.7 Nacala-Porto 63.5 40.7 51.5 58.6 40.6 48.7 25.3 11.7 18.0 28.0 11.8 19.0 Malema 92.3 63.0 77.8 136.2 115.4 125.8 15.7 6.3 11.1 31.6 13.6 22.5 Meconta 81.2 49.8 65.4 109.2 89.8 99.4 18.2 7.1 12.9 45.4 17.1 31.4 Mecubhi 91.7 57.3 75.2 120.5 102.9 112.2 15.2 4.8 10.5 37.9 13.8 26.6 Memba 56.8 32.1 44.9 83.0 64.5 74.4 7.6 1.2 4.6 18.7 5.8 12.8 Mogincual 70.9 30.2 51.3 117.6 68.7 94.1 4.1 0.3 2.4 24.6 6.6 16.1 Mogovolas 69.1 40.0 55.5 106.7 92.3 100.3 10.3 2.4 6.7 31.0 12.0 22.5 Moma 39.2 15.9 28.0 63.4 43.6 54.1 10.1 1.7 6.2 26.0 5.6 16.7 Monapo 65.7 34.0 49.9 80.1 56.9 68.4 11.5 3.3 7.5 22.1 8.4 15.3 Mossuril 64.0 35.3 50.2 88.3 81.2 85.3 6.2 1.5 4.0 15.0 6.0 11.2 Muecate 62.5 39.3 51.3 136.0 123.6 130.0 9.3 1.4 5.6 46.4 16.5 32.0 Murmpula 89.1 54.3 72.3 133.2 123.1 128.4 9.4 3.9 6.9 33.5 13.2 24.2 Nacala-A-Velha 54.7 26.4 40.9 37.9 29.8 34.2 6.2 2.1 4.3 7.1 3.0 5.3 Nampula District 106.9 72.1 89.6 165.4 148.0 156.9 11.2 5.1 8.2 22.3 6.9 14.7 Nampula City 96.4 72.8 83.5 113.0 81.5 94.3 31.9 19.5 25.0 59.1 30.2 41.7 RibauC 93.0 57.2 75.6 130.5 121.1 125.9 17.3 4.5 11.4 37.7 18.8 28.8 Lalaua 103.9 55.4 80.3 134.8 95.3 115.5 6.3 1.0 3.7 33.2 6.1 19.8 Namapa 186.4 97.3 143.7 328.7 216.7 275.6 22.2 5.8 14.8 67.7 20.6 46.1 Nampula Total 72.9 43.9 58.5 99.9 78.1 89.1 14.5 6.5 10.6 31.7 13.7 22.7 Cuamba 80.9 56.4 68.4 120.4 125.3 122.6 20.2 9.4 14.7 47.8 28.1 39.4 Majune 95.6 53.3 75.6 110.2 47.4 73.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 0.8 4.2 Mandimba 55.9 35.4 45.8 87.6 76.2 82.4 13.1 2.5 8.0 23.9 11.9 18.3 Marmpa 82.6 42.9 63.4 93.1 56.3 73.1 31.6 4.8 18.2 48.7 13.6 29.6 Maua 70.8 39.5 56.0 143.4 95.2 117.2 24.6 4.7 15.4 57.9 12.6 34.5 Mavago 47.9 22.4 35.6 118.5 43.2 72.9 41.7 7.0 24.2 45.6 8.9 22.7 Mecanhelas 94.9 66.1 80.7 206.6 205.9 206.3 21.8 7.8 14.9 60.3 35.3 49.0 Mecula 85.6 52.2 68.9 113.4 52.7 75.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.8 5.9 17.4 Lago 107.2 80.4 94.2 140.4 103.7 121.4 28.1 9.0 18.5 50.0 20.4 34.5 Lichinga District 42.4 26.5 34.8 77.6 52.4 65.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.4 2.5 6.1 Lichinga City 91.4 71.5 81.0 117.2 107.0 112.1 59.1 22.8 39.4 63.8 51.5 57.8 Sanga 72.0 49.5 60.9 84.8 76.4 80.9 17.2 5.1 11.6 32.5 13.1 23.4 Muembe 49.6 26.3 38.3 79.9 42.2 58.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.3 6.2 17.1 N’ Gauma 29.0 19.1 24.1 46.5 37.0 41.7 15.6 5.8 11.0 16.1 5.9 11.1 Metarica 77.4 49.6 63.9 138.6 73.2 99.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.0 10.3 25.2 Nipepe 86.5 51.0 69.4 103.0 67.9 84.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.7 8.6 21.0 Niassa Total 75.0 50.6 63.0 113.7 90.4 102.0 21.6 7.8 14.8 42.0 20.1 31.1
125 Annex E
Beira City 83.7 63.9 73.1 84.1 71.7 77.5 33.4 21.7 27.0 52.1 40.0 45.6 Bki 61.2 29.9 46.1 120.3 93.1 107.3 11.7 5.4 8.7 28.8 15.2 22.5 Caia 62.0 18.2 40.8 133.1 97.1 115.9 18.2 3.0 11.1 36.0 8.3 23.2 Chemba 58.6 19.5 40.3 141.7 90.7 118.3 9.7 1.4 5.8 31.5 7.1 20.4 Cheringoma 77.9 35.4 57.2 283.4 228.3 256.9 16.6 3.2 9.9 60.4 10.5 35.8 Muanza 21.9 5.3 13.5 232.4 144.1 188.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.4 13.6 34.8 Chibabava 45.6 22.1 35.3 150.2 94.3 126.0 3.4 2.3 2.9 31.2 12.6 23.2 Machanga 64.6 33.4 50.4 107.8 96.5 102.8 18.9 3.8 12.1 25.4 14.9 20.7 Dondo 102.4 65.6 83.0 126.1 104.6 115.0 42.1 20.6 30.7 58.9 31.9 44.8 Nhamatanda 69.7 37.1 53.6 127.9 99.2 113.9 17.6 5.8 11.7 52.0 16.6 34.8 Gorongosa 107.7 47.0 78.6 142.2 101.2 122.8 17.8 5.7 12.3 40.7 12.5 28.0 Maringue 34.4 6.4 21.3 114.8 60.9 89.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1 3.0 13.5 Marromeu 61.8 27.3 44.7 148.5 98.6 124.2 25.8 6.7 16.5 54.5 12.6 34.4 Sofala Total 73.3 44.1 58.6 117.4 88.5 103.0 23.5 13.1 18.2 46.0 26.8 36.3 Ang6nia 60.0 47.8 54.0 73.2 66.7 70.0 18.5 8.0 13.3 17.9 10.4 14.1 Cahora Bassa 97.5 71.2 84.1 119.1 104.0 111.4 37.8 24.7 31.1 45.5 29.3 37.0 Chiuta 48.7 31.1 40.4 107.0 86.9 97.5 8.2 3.2 6.0 19.1 8.8 14.4 Macanga 83.7 61.2 72.4 143.9 127.4 135.6 12.5 2.9 7.8 29.3 11.2 20.3 Maravia 46.1 33.5 39.9 96.4 88.6 92.6 6.5 1.0 3.8 17.6 8.2 12.8 Moatize 93.8 62.8 78.2 167.5 133.6 150.3 26.2 13.0 19.6 59.3 32.1 45.4 Magot 66.5 53.5 59.9 95.1 87.6 91.3 17.7 8.8 13.4 17.8 11.2 14.5 Mutarara 87.0 32.2 59.9 168.7 93.7 131.5 11.1 2.3 7.0 29.4 7.7 19.0 Tete City 104.8 84.6 94.3 108.1 96.6 102.2 60.0 44.9 52.1 54.1 41.0 47.1 Zumbo 56.2 34.1 44.9 87.0 67.0 76.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0 8.1 16.3 Changara 96.1 65.8 81.4 113.3 98.8 106.3 29.2 9.2 19.7 40.0 18.2 29.4 Tsangano 62.0 43.2 52.6 93.4 82.8 88.1 7.8 2.3 5.2 24.1 11.4 17.8 Chifunde 39.2 27.6 33.4 114.9 98.2 106.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.3 3.8 8.1 Tete Total 75.1 51.6 63.4 111.5 92.0 101.8 21.3 11.4 16.5 31.5 17.5 24.5 Alto-Mol6cut 152.2 117.0 134.7 162.7 157.7 160.2 15.4 6.2 11.0 37.3 19.3 28.5 Chinde 71.3 28.1 50.0 110.7 72.2 91.7 14.1 3.2 8.7 24.1 3.8 14.0 Gilt 105.5 78.6 91.9 117.9 109.0 113.4 25.1 7.4 16.5 25.2 10.8 18.2 GUrLlt 107.5 77.8 92.4 141.7 119.1 130.2 15.0 5.8 10.3 25.3 12.8 18.9 Ile 110.0 79.8 95.7 128.5 128.0 128.3 9.4 3.6 6.7 16.9 8.9 13.2 Lugela 105.9 64.7 86.0 135.9 116.4 126.5 5.2 2.2 3.8 15.4 4.5 10.2 Maganja da Costa 84.4 29.8 58.5 103.1 61.0 83.3 9.1 1.2 5.4 22.0 4.6 13.7 Milange 68.3 35.7 52.0 104.6 73.8 89.2 3.7 1.5 2.6 14.2 6.5 10.3 Mocuba 130.7 83.4 106.3 139.9 110.1 124.5 18.2 9.8 13.9 46.0 21.4 33.4 Mopeia 93.5 38.9 65.8 163.0 107.3 134.8 11.6 1.3 6.5 33.6 8.2 20.9 Morrumbala 43.7 16.5 30.1 93.3 46.1 69.8 5.8 1.0 3.4 14.9 3.1 9.0 Namacurra 109.7 56.5 83.8 112.1 83.8 98.3 22.1 6.6 14.7 42.7 15.6 29.7 Namarroi 75.0 39.9 58.6 126.6 115.2 121.3 4.7 1.1 3.1 16.0 6.8 11.8 Pebane 90.3 50.6 70.7 121.9 91.5 107.0 9.3 3.1 6.3 27.8 10.1 19.1 Quelimane City 107.8 80.5 92.8 88.4 68.7 77.5 32.1 17.9 24.0 71.5 37.8 52.0 Nicoadala 113.3 58.9 85.9 134.3 96.7 115.4 29.0 9.0 19.1 39.3 15.6 27.5 Inhassungue 105.2 39.1 73.3 115.5 75.8 96.5 24.5 5.6 15.4 46.7 9.4 28.7 Zambbia Total 96.6 57.0 76.9 120.3 92.0 106.2 14.9 5.7 10.3 31.3 13.7 22.5 Maputo City 111.3 106.3 108.8 138.2 141.7 139.9 57.9 61.0 59.5 89.8 94.1 92.0 Nationwide 87.6 61.9 74.8 120.6 100.3 110.4 23.0 15.6 19.3 42.9 28.3 35.5 - Not available.
126 Annex F
Annex F: Primary Repetition Rate, by District, Province, and Gender, 1997and2003
Lower primary school (grades 1-5) Upper primary school (grades 6-7) I997 2003 1997 2003 District Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Ancuabe 19.8 23.3 21.1 15.7 15.7 15.7 30.7 34.6 31.6 18.5 19.0 18.6 Chihe 22.0 23.9 22.7 17.7 17.4 17.6 25.6 38.2 28.0 17.8 13.8 16.8 IbO 16.8 20.3 18.3 11.2 11.1 11.2 11.1 21.7 16.0 5.0 4.3 4.8 Macomia 21.2 24.5 22.4 16.9 17.8 17.3 39.6 47.8 41.1 16.0 15.7 15.9 Mecufi 13.5 17.1 14.6 11.6 12.1 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 6.3 10.3 Meluco 26.0 26.7 26.2 17.1 18.3 17.6 30.9 27.3 30.6 14.2 15.3 14.4 Mocimboa da Praia 17.9 23.3 19.8 13.0 12.7 12.9 32.8 30.0 32.0 15.2 13.0 14.5 Montepuez 22.2 24.6 23.2 16.2 16.3 16.3 35.6 33.0 34.8 11.2 14.9 12.5 Mueda 20.4 24.0 22.0 17.8 17.2 17.5 25.8 46.2 31.3 13.5 14.7 14.0 Namuno 19.3 24.8 21.4 21.2 21.8 21.5 39.1 23.7 37.1 13.3 9.9 12.6 Palma 19.7 22.3 20.5 17.0 15.8 16.5 5.6 8.3 6.1 15.1 41.8 20.8 Pemba-Metuge 19.0 22.0 20.2 17.3 15.8 16.6 9.5 15.4 10.3 8.1 13.7 9.3 Quissanga 25.0 27.6 26.0 19.2 19.7 19.4 13.1 0.0 11.9 9.9 17.4 11.7 Pemba City 22.1 23.1 22.6 16.1 13.8 15.0 36.4 34.8 35.7 19.4 17.8 18.6 Balama 21.3 23.7 22.1 16.9 17.4 17.1 17.5 2.8 15.5 8.9 11.1 9.3 Muidumbe 18.4 21.9 19.9 16.5 20.2 18.2 30.4 35.2 31.3 16.2 20.8 17.9 Nangade 20.7 22.2 21.2 16.9 19.1 17.8 27.8 35.6 29.5 9.9 10.8 10.1 Cab0 Delgado Total 20.7 23.7 21.9 17.0 17.0 17.0 30.1 33.7 31.1 14.2 15.6 14.6 Bilene-Macia 31.6 32.5 32.0 23.7 22.2 23.0 26.4 26.7 26.5 15.4 19.3 17.2 Guija 26.3 27.7 27.0 23.0 21.9 22.4 18.6 15.6 16.9 16.6 17.4 17.0 Chibuto 29.7 28.2 29.0 23.6 21.9 22.8 23.2 27.3 25.1 17.4 20.0 18.7 Chicualacuala 21.5 23.0 22.2 26.4 22.1 24.2 22.9 24.6 23.7 22.5 24.8 23.6 Xai-Xai Ex Gaza 31.2 29.3 30.3 25.3 23.7 24.5 26.8 27.8 27.2 18.5 18.3 18.4 Ch6kwe 28.5 29.4 28.9 24.2 21.8 23.0 25.3 29.4 27.5 17.3 21.0 19.2 Manjacaze-Dengane 31.1 29.3 30.2 24.0 21.5 22.8 21.1 19.3 20.3 16.3 17.2 16.7 Massingir 27.7 28.2 27.9 25.4 26.2 25.8 28.8 19.0 24.5 14.5 18.5 16.6 Xai-Xai City 29.5 29.2 29.4 30.0 26.0 28.0 30.2 32.3 31.3 27.8 27.5 27.7 Chigubo 20.7 24.1 22.0 22.4 23.9 23.1 - - - 3.7 13.4 9.1 Mabalane 24.5 25.4 24.9 30.1 30.3 30.2 18.8 29.7 24.1 17.6 17.8 17.7 Massangena 22.0 24.8 23.2 23.3 24.0 23.6 - - - 17.4 17.0 17.2 Gaza Total 29.5 29.1 29.3 24.9 22.9 23.9 25.7 27.6 26.6 19.0 20.8 19.9 Govuro 20.3 25.1 22.2 23.5 22.9 23.2 16.4 18.6 17.1 21.0 30.0 24.5 Mabote 18.5 23.3 20.9 25.2 26.5 25.9 20.0 40.9 29.5 24.1 16.5 20.5 Homoine 22.5 22.2 22.3 26.3 22.8 24.6 22.2 26.6 24.1 22.4 23.7 23.0 Inhambane City 27.9 25.6 26.8 26.6 24.9 25.8 33.8 31.7 32.8 24.8 24.3 24.5 Jangamo 30.7 30.3 30.5 22.9 20.8 21.9 15.1 19.2 16.7 13.2 17.2 15.0 Inharrime 29.2 29.1 29.2 29.2 27.2 28.2 24.5 31.5 27.0 23 .O 22.3 22.7 Massinga 26.1 26.4 26.2 25.1 24.0 24.5 30.2 31.5 30.8 21.2 24.2 22.6 Funhalouro 20.9 22.1 21.5 27.7 31.1 29.4 12.7 15.2 13.7 10.7 16.4 12.9 Mormmbene 34.1 34.7 34.4 31.3 30.3 30.8 26.1 28.6 27.1 28.2 28.5 28.4 Panda 27.7 30.5 28.9 24.9 24.3 24.6 35.4 43.0 38.2 19.7 21.4 20.4 Vilankulo 21.2 23.0 22.0 27.6 28.0 27.8 24.5 30.3 27.0 21.1 24.5 22.6 Zavala 31.7 30.9 31.4 33.9 32.0 32.9 36.7 37.4 37.0 32.1 33.0 32.5 Maxixe City 28.4 28.2 28.3 27.3 24.5 25.9 26.6 29.9 28.3 22.9 25.3 24.2 Inhassoro 16.4 19.1 17.6 23.9 24.3 24.1 17.6 27.7 21.4 18.3 19.4 18.8 Inhambane Total 27.3 27.6 27.5 27.7 26.4 27.1 27.7 30.6 28.9 23.3 24.9 24.0 BA,6 BA,6 21.4 25.6 23.0 25.5 26.0 25.7 29.6 31.7 30.0 22.0 19.9 21.5 Gondola 21.2 21.3 21.3 22.7 22.0 22.4 23.2 29.0 25.1 20.1 22.1 20.6 Chimoio City 24.8 24.9 24.9 23.4 22.6 23.1 30.3 34.8 32.1 21.8 23.1 22.4
127 Annex F
Guro 15.6 17.0 16.1 19.2 17.8 18.6 29.2 40.6 31.4 20.8 21.9 21.0 Manica 25.3 25.7 25.5 28.1 26.5 27.4 29.2 30.1 29.5 23.1 29.0 25.4 Mossurize 12.6 15.7 13.8 17.5 18.9 18.1 26.3 23.5 25.3 16.1 17.4 16.5 Sussundenga 22.3 21.9 22.2 24.4 25.0 24.7 35.3 41.1 36.9 21.4 19.5 20.7 Tambara 12.6 17.3 13.8 16.8 15.4 16.2 1.5 0.0 1.4 10.3 3.1 9.3 Machaze 15.3 22.5 17.4 20.8 21.3 21.0 10.0 23.1 11.8 6.6 11.4 7.8 Macossa 13.7 16.4 14.5 19.8 17.7 18.9 - - - 15.3 34.5 18.4 Manica Total 21.3 23.1 22.0 23.1 22.9 23.0 29.0 33.1 30.4 20.8 23.4 21.7 Boane 27.5 26.7 27.2 21.6 19.9 20.7 34.9 30.3 32.7 14.3 15.4 14.9 Magude 33.5 30.8 32.1 20.9 17.5 19.2 20.2 27.4 23.4 12.2 9.6 10.9 Manhiqa 26.4 25.9 26.2 20.4 19.3 19.9 26.5 29.4 27.8 15.1 17.3 16.1 Marracuene 32.2 31.6 32.0 20.7 19.9 20.3 25.3 32.8 28.7 12.5 14.1 13.2 Matutuine 26.2 27.5 26.8 26.7 27.3 27.0 10.9 19.2 14.7 7.6 9.7 8.5 Moamba 27.9 25.5 26.7 24.1 22.3 23.2 24.2 28.2 26.0 13.5 13.5 13.5 Namaacha 24.2 24.0 24.1 23.1 20.9 22.0 31.4 39.4 35.2 17.4 17.4 17.4 Matola City 34.8 34.2 34.5 24.1 21.8 23.0 34.4 34.6 34.5 13.8 16.8 15.3 MaputoProvince Total 31.7 31.1 31.4 23.0 21.1 22.0 31.6 33.4 32.5 13.8 15.9 14.9 Angoche 19.4 25.0 21.1 18.1 20.5 19.0 22.8 18.2 21.8 17.9 15.4 17.4 Erati 18.4 23.1 20.1 23.5 24.6 24.0 26.3 36.4 27.9 19.7 18.7 19.5 Ilha de Moqambique 18.7 20.5 19.4 17.9 19.6 18.7 28.3 37.3 31.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 Nacala-Porto 21.4 21.9 21.6 19.3 19.4 19.3 34.7 38.0 35.9 23.4 22.0 22.9 Malema 20.3 22.5 21.2 21.9 21.4 21.6 28.6 28.0 28.5 21.7 20.6 21.3 Meconta 20.5 23.3 21.6 19.8 19.4 19.6 30.2 34.5 31.4 16.8 14.9 16.3 Mecuburi 18.9 22.5 20.2 20.6 20.4 20.5 22.8 25.0 23.2 21.5 23.4 22.0 Memba 17.6 23.4 19.6 19.3 23.5 21.0 36.0 20.0 34.0 15.4 11.4 14.6 Mogincual 20.6 26.6 22.3 20.0 23.0 21.0 24.4 33.3 25.0 11.7 10.6 11.5 Mogovolas 18.6 23.8 20.4 18.6 20.7 19.5 21.3 28.8 22.5 16.4 16.3 16.4 Mom 19.9 28.4 22.2 19.6 23.2 21.0 14.0 17.9 14.5 15.9 14.1 15.6 Monapo 16.7 22.1 18.6 17.0 20.4 18.4 25.1 17.5 23.5 11.3 10.3 11.0 Mossuril 16.4 20.4 17.7 18.0 18.4 18.1 39.3 20.0 35.8 21.5 18.1 20.7 Muecate 19.3 23.6 20.9 17.4 16.5 17.0 24.2 39.1 26.1 17.7 11.1 16.0 Murmpula 20.8 24.6 22.1 24.6 23.1 23.9 25.3 30.8 26.7 15.9 16.0 16.0 Nacala-A-Velha 20.9 25.2 22.3 18.5 21.3 19.6 36.9 39.5 37.5 16.0 12.8 15.2 Nampula District 18.1 19.9 18.9 18.7 19.4 19.0 28.8 29.6 29.1 16.3 14.8 16.0 Nampula City 21.3 21.9 21.6 19.5 18.2 18.8 29.2 33.1 30.9 20.2 18.7 19.5 Ribau6 20.8 24.4 22.1 17.6 17.3 17.5 24.0 31.2 25.3 13.5 12.3 13.2 Lalaua 23.1 27.7 24.7 20.3 22.7 21.3 5.0 8.3 5.4 8.6 2.8 7.7 Namapa 20.5 23.9 21.6 20.2 22.9 21.2 37.6 30.1 36.3 23.5 25.2 23.9 Nampula Total 19.7 23.1 20.9 19.5 20.4 19.9 27.9 31.5 29.0 18.1 17.4 17.9 Cuamba 20.3 20.9 20.6 19.0 19.1 19.0 26.0 30.5 27.4 20.1 19.7 19.9 Majune 18.6 20.1 19.1 18.1 20.9 19.2 - - - 4.6 0.0 4.1 Mandimba 18.4 21.7 19.7 16.8 17.1 17.0 17.6 24.5 18.7 12.4 9.4 11.5 Marmpa 17.7 17.4 17.6 21.8 22.0 21.9 31.1 32.0 31.2 21.1 21.6 21.2 Maha 14.8 16.5 15.4 15.3 15.0 15.2 21.8 6.8 19.7 8.6 7.2 8.4 Mavago 14.4 24.6 17.6 16.0 21.1 17.8 32.0 22.7 30.7 21.5 25.5 22.5 Mecanhelas 20.4 23.2 21.5 19.5 19.7 19.6 14.2 22.2 16.3 17.6 22.5 19.2 Mecula 20.1 23.0 21.2 20.2 20.0 20.1 - - - 15.8 7.9 14.3 Lago 22.2 23.6 22.7 20.5 20.3 20.4 42.3 40.7 41.9 29.1 25.3 27.9 Lichinga District 16.4 16.8 16.6 16.5 17.6 17.0 - - - 12.9 24.6 15.4 Lichinga City 21.6 21.9 21.8 18.9 17.8 18.4 23.4 33.5 26.6 14.9 14.0 14.5 Sanga 18.9 18.6 18.8 16.5 15.3 16.0 11.7 16.0 12.6 12.9 10.1 12.2 Muembe 18.5 25.6 20.9 16.5 14.1 15.5 - - - 14.8 9.6 13.7 N’ Gahma 24.6 29.0 26.3 16.6 16.5 16.5 35.8 46.7 38.5 18.9 20.5 19.3 Metarica 18.2 21.7 19.5 16.9 17.8 17.3 - - - 17.2 11.9 16.0 Nipepe 18.6 23.0 20.2 20.2 20.4 20.3 - - - 13.6 16.5 14.2 Niassa Total 19.6 21.5 20.4 18.5 18.6 18.5 25.1 31.0 26.6 17.5 17.1 17.4
128 Annex F
Beira City 22.8 23.8 23.3 19.1 18.6 18.9 22.7 24.8 23.6 22.6 21.7 22.2 Bki 18.5 22.5 19.8 19.8 19.0 19.5 24.3 19.1 22.8 12.2 15.0 13.1 Caia 10.3 15.3 11.4 16.8 18.8 17.6 6.4 9.4 6.8 11.7 11.0 11.6 Chemba 14.7 25.5 17.1 21.5 22.9 22.0 3.7 7.7 4.2 16.0 9.5 14.9 Cheringoma 21.9 28.3 23.8 18.5 20.5 19.3 11.0 14.3 11.5 13.5 10.3 13.0 Muanza 12.8 11.9 12.6 12.6 18.1 14.7 - - - 12.2 9.1 11.6 Chibabava 13.1 20.3 15.1 15.2 17.8 16.0 9.4 7.1 8.6 11.2 25.3 14.5 Machanga 24.3 27.5 25.2 26.4 25.7 26.1 17.9 34.3 20.2 22.1 31.5 25.1 Dondo 24.3 26.0 25.0 14.5 14.2 14.4 29.0 25.1 27.7 14.8 14.4 14.7 Nhamatanda 14.9 17.6 15.9 16.0 16.4 16.2 12.2 10.6 11.8 14.0 13.5 13.9 Gorongosa 12.3 15.6 13.3 17.7 18.5 18.0 19.0 17.2 18.6 14.0 20.8 15.4 Maringue 8.4 18.8 9.8 16.3 19.4 17.3 - - - 9.7 11.8 9.9 Marromeu 20.2 25.7 21.9 18.9 20.0 19.3 19.7 24.8 20.7 22.0 20.9 21.8 Sofala Total 19.1 22.9 20.5 17.9 18.2 18.0 21.4 23.5 22.1 17.9 19.5 18.5 Ang6nia 19.5 19.8 19.6 17.3 17.1 17.2 24.8 31.4 26.8 22.0 23.0 22.4 Cahora Bassa 23.7 22.3 23.1 15.1 15.0 15.1 29.3 31.2 30.1 20.3 23.8 21.7 Chiuta 16.4 21.8 18.4 15.6 16.6 16.0 1.0 2.9 1.4 7.5 12.7 9.0 Macanga 16.8 20.6 18.4 15.4 16.4 15.9 14.0 6.5 12.6 10.5 12.2 11.0 Marbvia 15.2 20.1 17.2 13.6 15.1 14.3 1.1 0.0 1.o 16.0 12.5 14.9 Moatize 23.6 25.7 24.4 14.9 14.4 14.7 33.4 39.2 35.3 15.3 17.3 16.0 Magoe 22.2 26.3 24.1 17.5 18.1 17.8 7.1 8.3 7.5 22.7 18.2 20.9 Mutarara 16.5 22.6 18.1 12.3 12.5 12.4 13.2 15.4 13.6 10.7 12.0 10.9 Tete City 19.1 19.2 19.2 20.5 18.1 19.3 12.3 13.3 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.2 Zumbo 17.8 24.0 20.2 18.4 21.7 19.9 - - - 13.3 16.8 14.1 Changara 20.4 21.1 20.7 19.9 20.6 20.2 27.2 33.7 28.6 17.3 17.9 17.5 Tsangano 17.6 20.3 18.7 13.8 13.4 13.6 21.4 23.3 21.8 14.1 11.1 13.1 Chif'unde 10.8 12.0 11.3 10.7 11.2 10.9 - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 Tete Total 19.3 21.3 20.1 15.9 16.1 16.0 21.0 22.9 21.6 15.4 16.6 15.8 Alto-Mol6cuC 24.1 28.2 25.8 27.7 28.0 27.8 25.6 29.1 26.6 18.7 15.9 17.7 Chinde 24.7 26.4 25.2 26.9 26.7 26.8 27.5 24.5 27.0 17.6 15.0 17.3 Gilt 27.1 30.3 28.5 31.1 33.4 32.2 22.2 22.7 22.3 26.0 18.0 23.7 GUrUt 25.1 27.6 26.2 27.3 27.8 27.5 21.3 32.5 24.5 25.8 22.4 24.6 Ile 24.2 28.5 25.9 26.9 27.5 27.1 18.7 29.3 21.3 14.7 19.2 16.1 Lugela 19.1 23.6 20.8 26.4 26.3 26.4 25.2 35.0 27.8 21.7 16.4 20.6 Maganja da Costa 25.0 29.7 26.2 27.6 28.5 27.9 20.3 23.4 20.7 23.4 24.6 23.6 Milange 19.2 22.8 20.5 19.6 20.7 20.1 21.3 14.9 19.4 12.4 13.8 12.8 Mocuba 23.8 28.6 25.8 26.4 27.9 27.1 26.2 35.1 29.4 24.3 24.0 24.2 Mopeia 20.0 20.4 20.1 24.0 26.5 25.0 10.7 17.4 11.4 14.6 13.5 14.4 Mommbala 15.6 17.7 16.2 19.8 23.5 21.0 24.6 20.8 24.1 19.4 15.3 18.7 Namacurra 27.8 30.1 28.6 26.9 26.9 26.9 33.4 35.9 33.9 29.8 30.0 29.9 Namarroi 23.8 29.2 25.5 27.4 26.5 27.0 42.9 43.5 43.0 18.9 19.8 19.1 Pebane 24.2 30.3 26.4 26.5 28.7 27.4 20.4 15.7 19.3 19.3 17.8 18.9 Quelimane City 31.2 30.6 30.9 26.2 25.6 25.9 30.6 25.7 28.5 22.9 24.8 23.7 Nicoadala 29.4 32.2 30.4 24.1 24.7 24.4 31.4 32.5 31.7 26.7 21.5 25.2 Inhassungue 31.5 30.4 31.2 27.5 29.0 28.1 36.8 43.8 38.0 23.1 19.7 22.5 Zambdzia Total 24.8 28.2 26.0 25.6 26.8 26.1 27.1 29.5 27.8 22.6 21.9 22.4 Urban District 1 28.9 24.1 26.5 24.8 22.1 23.5 33.5 34.6 34.0 28.2 28.3 28.2 Urban District 2 31.4 29.7 30.6 27.4 24.4 25.9 26.0 28.7 27.5 20.7 23.7 22.3 Urban District 3 31.2 29.9 30.6 22.0 20.4 21.2 32.4 43.6 37.6 13.7 15.7 14.7 Urban District 4 35.6 32.7 34.2 25.6 23.1 24.4 29.5 29.1 29.3 18.7 21.1 19.9 Urban District 5 33.2 30.9 32.1 28.1 26.0 27.1 25.3 31.5 28.6 19.2 26.4 23.1 Maputo City 32.2 29.6 30.9 25.8 23.5 24.6 30.3 34.5 32.4 20.3 23.6 22.0 Nationwide 24.0 26.3 24.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 27.3 30.9 28.8 18.9 20.3 19.5 - Not available.
129 Annex G
Annex G: Primary Dropout Rates, by District, Province, and Gender, 1997and2003
Lower primary school (grades 1-5) Upper primary school (grades 6-7) 1997 2003 1997 2003 District Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Ancuabe 15.9 20.6 17.7 10.6 10.9 10.7 6.7 22.0 10.0 10.1 12.1 10.6 Chitire 16.8 19.5 17.7 8.5 9.4 8.9 9.3 24.8 12.3 8.4 13.6 9.7 IbO 17.8 18.5 18.1 13.4 10.6 12.0 -18.5 13.0 -4.0 5.0 12.8 7.2 Macomia 22.3 31.8 25.6 10.6 8.4 9.7 -2.8 4.3 -1.6 7.9 14.6 9.8 Mecufi 6.3 7.3 6.7 5.5 4.1 4.9 14.5 22.2 16.4 12.0 10.3 11.5 Meluco 4.9 3.2 4.3 6.4 1.4 4.4 33.6 36.4 33.9 10.7 5.9 9.8 Mocimboa da Praia 20.8 20.2 20.6 16.3 16.4 16.3 5.7 5.0 5.5 72.9 78.5 74.5 Montepuez 14.3 14.6 14.5 10.1 9.1 9.6 8.5 12.7 9.8 11.0 12.9 11.7 Mueda 13.6 14.0 13.8 14.0 11.5 12.8 9.4 19.7 12.2 11.2 19.2 14.7 Namuno 7.4 10.6 8.6 6.1 4.3 5.3 4.7 10.5 5.4 7.9 9.0 8.2 Palma 14.6 18.9 15.9 12.8 12.6 12.7 11.1 25.0 13.6 21.5 26.9 22.6 Pemba-Metuge 9.0 21.1 13.7 7.0 6.9 6.9 2.4 15.4 4.1 10.6 0.7 8.5 Quissanga 30.0 39.3 33.8 15.7 16.9 16.2 14.8 0.0 13.4 6.3 20.3 9.6 Pemba City 7.9 4.6 6.4 11.2 10.3 10.7 2.9 7.4 4.8 42.1 38.0 40.0 Balama 20.2 24.6 21.7 9.4 8.3 9.0 8.8 11.1 9.1 6.6 8.1 6.8 Muidumbe 19.1 18.1 18.7 20.2 17.1 8.7 6.2 27.3 0.0 5.2 18.9 10.1 Nangade 17.3 15.3, 16.5 14.6 14.5 4.5 13.0 13.3 3.0 10.7 18.6 12.9 Cab0 Delgado Total 15.1 16.8 15.7 10.7 9.9 0.4 7.3 13.2 8.9 17.5 23.7 19.5 Bilene-Macia 5 .o 3.5 4.3 5.9 5.7 5.8 9.4 8.4 9.0 8.3 8.2 8.3 Guija 7.0 5.3 6.2 8.4 7.0 7.7 16.6 7.3 1.3 9.7 13.7 11.7 Chibuto 2.1 2.4 2.3 5.8 5.2 5.5 7.0 10.1 8.4 5.9 8.5 7.2 Chicualacuala 6.7 2.7 4.8 6.2 3.2 4.7 5.9 11.5 8.5 6.5 4.8 5.7 Xai-Xai Ex Gaza 5.0 4.4 4.7 5.2 4.6 4.9 11.4 8.3 10.1 11.3 11.6 11.4 Chokwe 10.3 7.4 8.9 6.0 5.8 5.9 7.1 9.1 8.2 6.7 9.1 7.9 Manjacaze-Dengane 3.7 3.4 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 5.9 7.3 6.5 6.1 5.6 5.8 Massingir 11.5 13.4 12.4 11.3 11.6 11.4 7.7 2.4 5.3 7.3 5.9 6.5 Xai-Xai City 4.1 4.9 4.5 6.0 3.3 4.7 13.7 16.6 15.2 5.7 6.8 6.3 Chigubo 8.2 6.0 7.3 15.2 1.8 8.9 - - - 13.0 17.9 15.7 Mabalane 0.6 1.o 0.8 8.2 6.1 7.1 13.0 29.7 21.1 7.6 12.4 9.7 Massangena 17.7 11.3 15.0 10.1 8.4 9.2 - - - 12.4 9.8 11.2 Gaza Total 5.5 4.6 5.1 6.0 5.1 5.6 9.7 11.3 10.5 7.5 8.4 7.9 Govuro 5.8 8.7 7.0 9.7 8.9 9.3 8.7 1.2 6.5 9.0 14.5 11.2 Mabote 10.5 10.1 10.3 10.1 8.6 9.3 8.8 15.2 11.6 6.1 9.5 7.7 Homoine 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.1 3.4 7.3 7.0 7.2 5.9 7.4 6.6 Inhambane City 5.0 1.7 3.4 2.7 1.0 1.8 4.0 6.1 5.0 -0.3 6.9 3.3 Jangamo 1.7 2.9 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.4 5.0 2.1 3.9 5.8 8.5 7.0 Inharrime 3.1 2.6 2.9 4.3 2.9 3.6 5.2 8.9 6.6 6.5 3.1 5.0 Massinga 4.4 5.2 4.7 5.3 5.6 5.4 10.1 14.2 11.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 Funhalouro 14.9 6.9 11.3 12.2 11.5 11.9 18.3 10.9 15.4 13.8 15.8 14.6 Morrumbene 1.9 0.2 1.1 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.6 4.9 4.7 6.4 6.8 6.6 Panda 6.4 3.3 5.1 6.9 6.4 6.6 4.1 8.1 5.5 6.2 6.5 6.3 Vilankulo 4.6 7.5 5.9 9.2 7.7 8.5 5.7 10.3 7.7 11.9 6.7 9.7 Zavala 3.8 2.9 3.4 3.9 2.4 3.2 4.2 7.0 5.3 6.5 7.5 6.9 Maxixe City 5.6 1.7 3.6 3.5 3.0 3.3 0.7 9.7 5.2 3.2 6.9 5.1 Inhassoro 3.6 6.3 4.8 11.7 9.2 10.5 7.9 5.0 6.8 13.5 4.9 10.3 Inhambane Total 4.2 3.5 3.9 5.3 4.5 4.9 4.9 8.2 6.3 6.0 7.0 6.4 Bh6 10.6 12.2 11.2 9.5 8.1 8.9 5.5 5.6 5.5 11.5 12.6 11.8 Gondola 8.4 9.2 8.7 7.6 7.3 7.4 1.0 3.7 1.9 11.1 11.4 11.1 Chimoio City 4.2 3.2 3.7 5.3 4.6 5.0 9.3 14.2 11.3 6.0 11.8 8.4
130 Annex G
Guro 5.9 8.3 6.7 5.6 5.2 5.4 13.9 13.0 13.7 8.3 4.8 7.6 Manica 5.2 5.4 5.3 6.8 5.6 6.2 12.2 8.3 10.9 6.4 8.9 7.3 Mossurize 18.5 16.1 17.6 6.3 6.6 6.4 4.4 2.4 3.7 2.2 12.1 5.8 Sussundenga 12.6 11.7 12.3 9.0 8.2 8.6 14.9 10.7 13.7 6.6 21.9 11.9 Tambara 14.6 19.7 15.9 5.7 3.2 4.7 2.9 0.0 2.9 12.7 14.1 12.9 Machaze 12.8 10.8 12.2 13.0 10.4 11.9 21.3 30.8 22.6 12.5 9.4 11.7 Macossa 15.8 12.7 14.9 10.3 8.2 9.4 - - - 7.3 0.0 6.1 Manica Total 8.5 8.0 8.3 7.6 6.6 7.2 9.6 11.1 10.1 7.9 11.6 9.2 Boane 7.0 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.4 6.4 5.5 6.0 9.1 6.3 7.8 Magude 5.9 6.7 6.3 11.1 10.4 10.7 10.8 0.3 6.1 25.9 28.2 27.0 Manhiqa 7.3 8.5 7.9 7.8 8.7 8.2 10.6 12.0 11.2 6.9 13.8 10.0 Marracuene 5.1 3.8 4.5 5.8 4.5 5.2 11.7 7.5 9.8 4.6 2.4 3.6 Matutuine 6.6 7.7 7.2 29.9 31.0 30.4 1.6 1.9 1.7 12.8 19.1 15.6 Moamba 9.4 9.5 9.5 8.5 10.4 9.5 0.9 12.6 6.1 8.3 7.1 7.7 Namaacha 10.7 11.5 11.1 10.1 9.7 9.9 14.6 6.1 10.6 10.0 9.3 9.6 Matola City 3.6 3.2 3.4 2.3 2.1 2.2 1.1 3.5 2.3 8.8 9.3 9.0 Maputo Province Total 5.3 5.3 5.3 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.3 4.7 4.5 9.3 10.2 9.7 Angoche 11.3 15.2 12.5 8.2 8.3 8.2 7.8 14.2 9.3 7.3 7.6 7.4 ErSti 10.1 11.1 10.5 8.0 6.4 7.3 11.4 15.2 12.0 4.8 5.8 5.0 Ilha de Moqambique 6.9 5.9 6.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 16.0 17.8 16.6 0.3 2.5 1.1 Nacala-Porto 6.3 6.8 6.5 8.9 7.2 8.1 12.7 17.0 14.2 5.5 10.5 7.2 Malema 7.9 9.1 8.3 8.4 6.5 7.6 4.6 9.0 5.9 9.2 9.7 9.4 Meconta 16.0 15.5 15.8 8.1 7.2 7.7 3.7 10.5 5.5 6.2 7.8 6.6 Mecubhi 9.9 9.0 9.6 6.4 4.5 5.6 39.1 53.4 42.1 9.2 9.1 9.2 Memba -0.3 2.5 0.7 4.9 5.6 5.2 8.1 -4.0 6.7 7.1 8.1 7.3 Mogincual 13.3 16.9 14.3 8.8 8.2 8.6 11.6 0.0 10.9 8.0 8.6 8.1 Mogovolas 7.8 6.8 7.4 4.2 3.6 4.0 11.3 8.2 10.8 9.2 14.0 10.3 Mom 11.6 8.6 10.8 11.5 11.7 11.6 12.6 28.2 14.5 6.7 12.7 7.6 Monapo 5.7 3.2 4.9 4.2 2.8 3.6 9.7 9.4 9.6 6.5 13.5 8.4 Mossuril 2.1 1.2 1.8 0.4 0.6 0.5 8.9 0.0 7.3 10.4 6.0 9.4 Muecate -26.6 -23.7 ,255 6.9 4.4 5.7 00.0 100.0 100.0 10.5 8.1 9.9 Murmpula 12.7 12.8 12.8 9.4 8.2 8.8 13.8 3.8 11.2 15.2 7.7 13.3 Nacala-A-Velha 13.7 14.1 13.8 7.2 10.3 8.5 13.1 52.6 22.5 8.6 3.5 7.3 Nampula District 9.8 9.4 9.6 12.5 12.6 12.6 6.3 9.2 7.2 -27.0 -49.5 -32.2 Nampula City 7.4 5.5 6.5 4.4 3.7 4.0 -2.5 8.4 2.3 5.4 5.3 5.3 Ribauk 10.1 8.2 9.4 4.7 2.8 3.8 9.7 10.6 9.9 7.3 8.9 7.8 Lalaua 14.9 16.1 15.3 7.5 6.7 7.2 13.8 41.7 17.4 10.8 10.4 0.7 Namapa 10.7 13.3 11.5 8.9 8.5 8.7 7.1 14.0 8.3 6.5 11.7 7.6 Nampula Total 8.3 7.9 8.2 7.2 6.3 6.8 9.0 12.5 10.1 6.1 6.6 6.3 Cuamba 15.4 18.2 16.6 11.6 0.4 11.1 3.4 -3.1 1.3 13.8 15.5 4.3 Majune 2.2 4.4 2.9 10.6 8.5 9.8 - - - 20.0 -12.5 6.4 Mandimba 14.0 15.2 14.4 11.3 4.1 12.5 9.2 4.1 8.4 10.5 5.5 9.0 Marmpa 2.9 7.2 4.3 8.9 8.6 8.8 9.7 16.0 10.5 12.5 11.9 2.3 Maua 12.8 11.7 12.4 4.5 7.2 5.7 4.1 22.7 6.8 4.2 12.4 5.8 Mavago 18.7 15.3 17.7 9.8 18.0 12.7 18.0 27.3 19.3 7.6 19.1 10.5 Mecanhelas 15.2 14.8 15.1 11.7 10.5 11.1 12.7 10.4 12.1 13.0 19.5 15.1 Mecula 9.2 10.9 9.9 3.1 0.2 1.8 - - - 20.9 5.3 17.9 Lago 12.6 8.8 11.0 9.8 10.3 10.0 10.8 15.0 11.8 18.2 32.0 22.5 Lichinga District 10.6 12.6 11.3 14.9 17.4 15.9 - - - 19.3 8.8 17.0 Lichinga City 5.6 7.6 6.5 5.0 4.0 4.5 15.7 11.6 14.4 13.6 24.3 18.3 Sanga 9.9 12.5 10.9 14.3 15.1 14.6 26.5 8.0 22.8 27.5 30.8 28.4 Muembe 25.2 21.9 24.1 9.4 8.2 8.9 - - - 23.6 -30.8 12.5 N'Gabma 12.7 16.6 14.3 11.5 12.0 11.7 18.7 26.7 20.7 13.4 10.3 12.5 Metarica 2.6 1.6 2.2 11.5 11.5 11.5 - - - 11.1 5.9 9.9 Nipepe 9.9 11.3 10.4 12.1 15.7 13.6 - - - 6.3 12.7 7.6 Niassa Total 11.2 12.1 11.6 10.2 10.1 10.2 12.0 9.5 11.4 14.0 19.4 15.7
131 Beira City -0.2 0.5 0.1 2.3 1.5 1.9 1.1 5.5 3.0 1.2 5.5 3.3 Bki 3.1 5.4 3.8 8.3 7.9 8.1 -39.4 -25.3 -35.3 9.0 14.8 10.8 Caia 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.1 8.3 7.0 19.0 17.0 18.8 9.5 13.0 10.1 Chemba 20.5 20.2 20.4 8.9 10.2 9.4 31.8 7.7 29.2 7.5 14.3 8.6 Cheringoma 9.8 18.9 12.6 10.7 12.6 11.5 21.9 0.0 18.4 15.7 25.6 17.1
Muanza -69 I 8 -123.8 -80.4 9.4 3.6 7.2 - - - 16.5 24.2 18.0 Chibabava 5 .O 7.5 5.7 8.6 7.0 8.1 9.4 25.0 14.8 -3.7 6.3 -1.3 Machanga 3.1 3.9 3.3 10.1 8.2 9.3 9.4 11.4 9.7 4.6 2.8 4.0 Dondo -0.5 0.8 0.1 5.4 4.2 4.8 6.3 9.0 7.2 7.5 9.2 8.1 Nhamatanda 5.9 8.2 6.7 6.1 6.0 6.1 19.9 17.4 19.3 9.4 7.5 9.0 Gorongosa 14.9 15.8 15.2 7.5 6.5 7.1 9.2 14.9 10.4 14.5 16.3 14.8 Maringue 18.9 22.4 19.4 9.8 11.7 10.4 - - - 19.3 -2.9 17.1 Marromeu -1.7 6.4 0.7 6.7 10.1 8.0 4.1 9.9 5.3 8.6 5.3 8.1 Sofala Total 8.9 6.0 7.8 6.2 5.5 5.9 3.5 6.0 4.4 5.7 7.1 6.2 Angonia 25.5 25.0 25.3 15.9 17.4 16.6 13.9 24.7 17.1 14.5 11.9 13.5 Cahora Bassa 5.4 7.2 6.2 7.7 6.4 7.1 7.5 16.9 11.3 -2.5 -6.1 11.0 Chi6ta -0.7 6.7 2.0 9.2 7.0 8.3 15.2 8.8 13.7 15.7 12.7 14.8 Macanga 6.9 7.6 7.2 4.5 3.4 4.0 4.2 25.8 8.0 20.7 20.2 20.5 Maravia 6.4 11.5 8.5 9.9 10.9 10.4 5.5 7.1 5.7 21.5 16.9 20.0 Moatize 15.3 13.6 14.6 7.1 5.6 6.4 4.2 5.8 4.7 16.7 16.8 16.8 Magot 8.9 6.4 7.7 -3.0 -2.3 -2.7 12.9 14.8 13.6 0.0 4.8 1.9 Mutarara 22.6 27.2 23.8 12.3 13.2 12.6 13.5 35.4 16.9 3.7 0.4 3.1 Tete City 5.0 2.2 3.7 0.1 1.4 0.7 1.0 2.1 1.5 4.5 5.2 4.8 Zumbo 2.4 2.7 2.5 30.2 29.9 30.1 - - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 Changara 11.3 10.5 11.0 8,9 7.2 8.1 13.7 8.6 12.5 8.5 3.8 7.1 Tsangano 15.9 12.8 14.6 3.4 1.8 2.6 15.8 -1.7 12.0 27.0 18.7 24.4 Chifunde 20.5 23.3 21.7 1.9 14.2 3.0 - - - -21.2 -42.1 -26.0 Tete Total 14.1 13.3 13.8 9.0 8.4 8.7 8.3 9.6 8.8 12.4 9.0 11.2 Alto-Mol6cuC 15.4 12.9 14.3 8.5 7.8 8.2 8.7 17.6 11.2 12.1 15.7 13.3 Chinde 11.9 19.7 14.1 6.7 14.0 9.6 25.8 28.3 26.3 10.1 10.7 10.2 Gilt 11.0 10.1 10.6 9.0 8.5 8.8 12.5 21.0 14.4 35.2 38.5 36.1 GWC 13.0 10.7 12.0 3.0 13.1 3.1 6.0 25.0 11.5 22.9 25.2 23.7 Ile 19.6 18.8 19.3 0.6 10.0 0.3 50.6 66.7 54.6 7.7 1.3 5.7 Lugela 12.5 12.6 12.5 11.2 11.6 11.4 12.3 18.3 13.9 11.3 19.9 13.1 Maganja da Costa 15.5 18.4 16.2 13.8 16.7 14.8 11.6 9.4 11.3 11.0 14.0 11.5 Milange 22.8 25.3 23.7 15.4 17.8 16.4 5.4 7.0 5.9 6.7 19.1 10.7 Mocuba 15.6 14.7 15.2 10.7 9.9 10.4 2.7 5.0 3.5 12.8 13.1 12.9 Mopeia 12.8 16.8 14.0 14.9 15.9 15.3 28.3 4.3 25.9 13.5 17.5 14.3 Mommbala 18.1 20.8 18.9 17.4 20.8 18.5 19.2 13.2 18.4 8.4 5.4 7.9 Namacurra 11.1 12.6 11.6 5.9 6.5 6.2 44.5 65.8 49.1 5.5 4.4 5.2 Namarroi 17.3 13.5 16.1 13.5 10.9 12.4 10.1 8.7 9.9 -11.2 1.2 -7.9 Pebane 7.4 8.5 7.8 6.8 6.3 6.6 -15.0 -5.9 -12.8 13.5 16.8 14.3 Quelimane City -0.6 3.2 1.2 1.6 0.8 1.2 -95.2 -78.1 -87.8 9.0 6.7 8.1 Nicoadala 8.0 9.8 8.7 4.9 5.1 5.0 17.4 12.7 16.3 9.6 11.6 10.1 Inhassungue 9.1 12.9 10.1 10.1 12.0 10.8 21.1 9.4 19.0 6.3 5.2 6.1 Zambdzia Total 13.4 13.5 13.5 10.5 10.6 10.5 3.0 -4.7 0.9 11.0 12.1 11.3 Urban District 1 3.4 3 .O 3.2 3.4 3.8 3.6 1.3 1.6 1.5 6.1 6.4 6.3 Urban District 2 3.8 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.0 3.2 8.3 5.1 6.6 7.9 5.2 6.5 Urban District 3 3.9 1.1 2.5 3.3 1.2 2.2 20.5 9.2 15.3 5.5 3.0 4.2 Urban District 4 2.7 1.2 2.0 1.3 2.1 1.7 0.8 3.5 2.2 1.4 1.7 1.6 Urban District 5 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.6 5.6 4.7 2.9 3.6 3.3 Maputo City 2.8 1.7 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.3 7.6 4.8 6.2 4.6 4.0 4.3 Na;io n w ide. ..9.3 8.2 8.8 7.9 7.2 7.6 6.9 6.9 6.9 8.7 9.2 8.9 - Not available.
132 Annex H
Annex H: Primary Completion Rates, by District, Province, and Gender, 1997 and 2003
Lower primary school (grades 1-5) Upper primary school (grades 6-7) 1997 2003 1997 2003 District Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Ancuabe 15.1 3.6 9.3 40.3 16.8 28.6 9.4 1.8 5.6 16.7 3.5 9.1 Chiive 14.4 3.6 9.2 30.3 18.0 25.7 6.4 1.2 3.9 12.1 4.1 8.6 IbO 20.6 9.0 14.7 56.3 31.8 41.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.4 3.4 11.2 Macomia 5.1 1.2 3.2 38.1 14.0 25.7 3.5 0.7 2.1 10.7 3.2 6.5 Mecufi 11.9 2.7 7.5 38.1 13.6 24.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.3 3.4 8.4 Meluco 11.0 2.1 6.6 59.2 11.8 30.7 7.9 0.0 3.9 32.8 4.8 15.6 Mocimboa da Praia 11.8 3.7 7.7 33.7 14.3 23.5 4.8 2.0 3.4 3.1 0.8 1.9 Montepuez 17.6 7.2 12.4 51.9 30.9 42.2 6.6 1.8 4.2 25.6 21.8 24.0 Mueda 14.8 4.7 9.8 37.3 25.9 31.7 6.5 1.9 4.3 12.5 9.2 11.1 Namuno 12.3 2.4 7.5 44.2 13.1 29.3 4.2 0.2 2.3 16.3 7.1 12.6 Palma 9.2 0.8 5.1 17.2 3.4 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 2.1 4.8 Pemba-Metuge 14.6 3.5 8.8 48.2 13.4 27.5 4.1 0.4 2.2 19.0 5.3 11.9 Quissanga 8.3 1.5 4.9 40.9 5.7 17.8 4.5 0.0 2.3 12.0 3.0 6.5 Pemba City 40.4 22.5 30.5 72.1 62.4 67.1 14.7 7.2 10.5 18.7 14.0 16.0 Balama 11.5 2.2 7.0 41.2 10.7 26.6 2.9 0.5 1.8 20.4 3.0 10.3 Muidumbe 28.8 10.7 19.8 40.3 18.1 27.8 3.8 0.1 2.0 13.8 4.9 9.7 Nangade 13.1 5.9 9.6 39.1 15.3 25.5 2.8 1.0 1.9 9.2 3.5 6.5 Cab0 Delgado Total 15.8 5.7 10.8 42.1 20.0 30.9 5.8 1.7 3.7 15.5 6.7 11.1 Bilene-Macia 37.7 26.2 31.9 65.1 56.0 60.5 9.9 4.7 7.3 26.0 22.3 24.1 Guij a 21.7 16.3 19.0 50.3 55.4 52.9 2.9 6.0 4.4 18.7 18.9 18.8 Chibuto 34.0 32.8 33.4 76.5 74.7 75.6 12.3 9.1 10.8 21.5 22.1 21.8 Chicualacuala 18.7 12.8 15.7 59.5 48.6 54.0 7.4 3.7 5.5 27.6 24.1 25.8 Xai-Xai Ex Gaza 37.1 30.4 33.8 62.7 57.8 60.2 10.6 8.6 9.6 25.9 23.7 24.8 Chokwe 28.2 27.1 27.6 46.3 47.5 46.9 6.7 5.5 6.1 17.0 14.9 15.9 Manjacaze-Dengane 42.7 34.4 38.7 81.0 79.9 80.5 13.5 10.4 12.0 42.7 35.5 39.2 Massingir 9.3 5.1 7.1 56.4 55.6 56.0 3.1 4.1 3.6 19.6 14.4 16.8 Xai-Xai City 65.3 55.2 59.8 70.4 62.9 66.3 31.7 22.3 26.5 43.6 34.3 38.4 Chigubo 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.9 25.5 27.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 11.9 11.7 Mabalane 20.9 12.2 16.6 39.1 38.1 38.6 3.4 3.5 3.4 15.7 11.1 13.4 Massangena 11.0 9.5 10.3 45.1 48.3 46.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.2 15.9 17.6 Gaza Total 35.9 30.3 33.1 63.5 60.1 61.8 11.6 8.9 10.2 27.3 23.9 25.6 Govuro 26.9 14.5 20.5 75.8 43.4 59.0 12.9 2.4 7.5 21.8 13.0 17.2 Mabote 7.9 10.0 8.8 48.9 48.8 48.8 4.1 3.5 3.8 23.0 14.2 18.8 Homoine 52.1 40.4 46.4 83.0 85.0 84.0 17.0 12.5 14.8 46.3 41.8 44.1 Inhambane City 64.2 46.8 54.9 91.6 70.1 79.9 27.7 20.1 23.6 86.1 63.4 73.7 Jangamo 38.0 26.2 32.1 61.9 51.8 56.9 13.2 9.8 11.5 25.5 18.9 22.2 Inharrime 45.4 26.9 36.1 78.5 61.4 69.9 6.4 3.1 4.8 32.9 17.7 25.3 Massinga 30.8 21.8 26.4 55.9 51.3 53.7 4.9 2.8 3.9 19.2 16.9 18.1 Funhalouro 12.3 10.1 11.2 34.5 28.6 31.6 2.6 0.8 1.7 9.1 7.2 8.2 Morrumbene 40.4 31.7 36.1 62.5 55.8 59.2 11.6 6.6 9.1 23.4 17.3 20.3 Panda 39.0 22.9 31.1 62.4 56.8 59.6 8.7 3.0 5.9 28.4 16.6 22.5 Vilankulo 33.9 20.0 26.9 60.9 40.2 50.4 10.0 6.8 8.4 25.8 16.0 20.8 Zavala 49.8 34.7 42.1 69.7 59.3 64.3 11.8 4.1 7.9 20.4 11.3 15.7 Maxixe City 63.8 60.7 62.2 80.7 72.9 76.5 33.8 23.9 28.6 41.7 32.4 36.7 Inhassoro 19.8 12.1 15.9 55.3 43.4 49.2 10.1 4.9 7.5 27.9 11.9 19.8 Inhambane Total 40.6 30.2 35.4 67.0 57.6 62.2 12.5 8.0 10.2 29.7 21.9 25.8 Bill6 26.5 7.1 17.4 68.2 30.9 50.6 11.6 2.0 7.2 33.3 11.0 22.8 Gondola 27.0 8.0 17.5 72.0 33.5 52.6 5.7 1.5 3.6 16.2 4.5 10.3 Chimoio City 51.9 24.3 36.2 61.4 37.3 47.6 14.6 5.1 9.2 39.0 15.5 25.4
133 Annex H
Guro 24.0 6.3 16.3 97.3 58.3 80.3 11.7 4.5 8.7 52.0 16.0 36.6 Manica 39.9 21.8 30.6 50.8 32.2 41.1 13.8 5.4 9.5 24.4 11.5 17.7 Mossurize 5.7 4.0 5.0 15.3 10.4 13.1 2.9 1.5 2.3 7.6 4.6 6.3 Sussundenga 18.5 9.2 14.1 49.1 27.9 39.0 6.9 3.9 5.5 20.2 7.3 14.1 Tambara - 1.8 17.5 - 18.1 91.4 - 0.0 0.0 - 2.9 32.5 Machaze 6.1 1.8 4.3 43.2 25.5 35.9 1.8 0.6 1.3 10.2 4.2 7.7 Macossa 6.2 1.1 3.8 43.1 12.5 28.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.3 7.3 18.4 Manica Total 28.3 13.1 20.7 56.4 31.0 43.4 9.0 3.3 6.2 25.0 9.9 17.3 Boane 34.3 23.8 29.2 89.6 88.2 88.9 9.7 6.1 8.0 38.2 33.3 35.8 Magude 33.9 43.5 38.2 12.9 152.3 130.3 12.1 10.5 11.4 40.5 43.3 41.7 Manhiqa 34.7 28.8 32.0 82.0 89.1 85.3 8.2 6.5 7.4 35.6 29.6 32.9 Marracuene 48.9 35.6 42.6 16.9 119.4 118.1 9.1 9.5 9.3 61.0 49.1 55.3 Matutuine 17.6 11.8 14.5 70.4 58.5 64.1 3.2 2.4 2.8 44.5 19.9 31.5 Moamba 33.8 21.2 27.6 86.6 86.2 86.4 10.1 6.6 8.4 38.2 33.9 36.1 Namaacha 34.9 34.6 34.7 93.5 73.3 82.6 16.1 10.2 13.0 45.7 26.9 35.4 Matola City 47.0 44.3 45.6 77.5 75.0 76.2 15.3 14.4 14.9 35.3 30.7 32.9 Maputo Province Total 41.2 37.3 39.3 82.9 81.4 82.2 12.5 11.3 11.9 37.8 31.5 34.6 Angoche 12.4 3.2 7.9 29.6 10.7 20.8 6.3 1.4 4.0 13.2 3.4 8.6 ErLti 6.6 1.4 4.2 16.7 6.3 11.8 1.1 0.4 0.8 9.2 2.8 6.1 Ilha de Moqambique 17.1 10.0 13.5 28.6 16.3 22.8 7.9 4.2 6.1 12.0 6.4 9.4 Nacala-Porto 21.2 8.3 14.3 26.8 12.6 18.8 6.5 2.6 4.4 10.6 3.7 6.8 Malema 21.4 6.2 14.0 50.6 24.4 37.3 5.1 1.6 3.4 13.9 3.3 8.6 Meconta 18.0 6.7 12.4 45.5 22.5 33.9 8.4 3.1 5.8 25.0 8.3 16.8 Mecubhi 23.9 7.9 16.4 46.1 21.3 34.6 3.9 0.4 2.3 20.4 6.5 13.9 Memba 8.4 1.5 5.1 27.0 9.4 18.9 3.7 0.4 2.2 10.0 3.1 6.9 Mogincual 7.4 1.4 4.6 36.3 8.3 23.2 2.6 0.5 1.6 15.8 4.7 10.5 Mogovolas 13.8 3.2 8.9 33.0 15.1 25.2 2.4 0.3 1.5 17.2 4.9 11.5 Moma 12.0 2.1 7.3 24.8 7.9 17.1 4.0 0.5 2.4 14.4 2.3 8.7 Monapo 14.9 3.1 9.1 39.3 15.3 27.4 6.2 1.5 3.9 9.5 3.2 6.4 Mossuril 5.4 1.3 3.5 21.6 7.6 15.7 2.2 0.1 1.2 8.0 2.7 5.8 Muecate 9.1 2.4 5.9 55.6 29.5 43.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.5 8.8 18.9 Murmpula 14.1 3.7 9.2 40.6 18.4 30.3 2.2 0.8 1.6 15.1 6.1 10.9 Nacala-A-Velha 4.3 1.6 3.0 12.3 3.6 8.3 2.8 0.9 1.9 3.5 1.7 2.7 Nampula District 15.8 4.2 10.1 55.6 23.5 39.8 4.5 1.6 3.1 12.3 4.7 8.6 Nampula City 37.2 21.1 28.4 57.5 31.7 41.7 10.3 5.2 7.4 27.8 13.7 19.4 Ribaue 25.7 8.8 17.7 56.8 33.9 45.8 6.4 1.5 4.2 18.0 5.8 12.3 Lalaua 14.4 3.1 8.9 54.4 14.0 34.6 3.5 0.4 2.0 21.5 3.8 12.7 Namapa 26.6 6.8 17.4 93.7 26.3 62.3 7.4 1.2 4.6 29.6 8.6 19.9 Nampula Total 16.8 6.4 11.7 38.7 18.1 28.5 5.2 1.9 3.6 15.9 6.0 11.0 Cuamba 22.5 10.4 16.4 51.9 39.0 46.5 9.2 4.6 6.9 20.9 11.5 16.8 Majune 17.2 2.3 10.0 41.5 8.1 21.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 0.9 3 .O Mandimba 14.6 6.0 10.4 23.9 12.2 18.4 7.1 0.8 4.0 13.8 8.0 11.0 Marmpa 22.8 4.6 13.9 43.6 13.7 27.0 14.4 1.6 8.0 21.9 5.9 13.1 Ma6a 11.4 2.3 7.2 72.8 25.7 47.2 16.5 1.6 9.6 43.3 6.9 24.5 Mavago 11.1 0.0 5.6 41.0 5.8 18.8 38.9 3.4 20.8 24.8 3.1 11.2 Mecanhelas 20.9 6.6 13.8 68.9 41.4 55.7 12.0 3.3 7.7 23.3 12.0 18.2 Mecula 13.1 3.1 8.3 29.7 11.3 18.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.9 2.7 8.1 Lago 27.3 10.6 19.0 47.8 22.1 34.7 12.0 3.4 7.6 16.6 4.3 10.1 Lichinga District 6.0 1.9 4.1 15.7 3.9 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.9 2.4 Lichinga City 39.2 22.4 30.3 54.0 57.8 55.8 30.4 9.7 19.2 26.5 18.8 22.7 Sanga 16.2 6.2 11.4 29.4 14.3 22.2 7.6 1.5 4.8 13.2 3.1 8.5 Muembe 13.7 1.7 8.0 25.9 8.5 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.1 3.6 11.8 N’Ga6ma 3.5 1.9 2.7 10.4 3.7 7.0 11.5 3.3 7.7 7.6 1.9 5.0 Metarica 19.7 5.6 12.9 57.0 17.0 33.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.9 3.4 12.6 Nipepe 12.9 2.3 7.8 43.8 9.3 25.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.1 2.6 9.5 Niassa Total 19.5 8.1 13.9 42.9 23.3 33.0 11.4 3.4 7.4 19.0 7.7 13.4
134 Annex H
Beira City 60.6 36.4 47.5 53.8 39.5 46.1 11.2 6.4 8.6 29.1 17.1 22.6 Bhi 22.5 7.4 15.3 48.1 23.8 36.7 8.3 3.2 5.9 12.0 3.8 8.2 Caia 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.4 15.6 35.1 9.3 1.4 5.6 20.2 3.7 12.6 Chemba 7.6 0.9 4.5 41.6 5.1 24.8 5.4 0.4 3.1 16.3 1.0 9.3 Cheringoma 22.9 1.4 12.4 67.6 14.8 42.0 9.1 1.8 5.4 30.4 1.6 16.1 Muanza 7.1 1.4 4.3 58.7 8.4 33.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.6 10.5 19.1 Chibabava 9.4 4.3 7.1 46.2 16.5 33.4 0.8 0.3 0.6 22.5 8.2 16.3 Machanga 24.9 7.5 17.0 46.3 23.0 35.9 10.8 1.4 6.5 14.9 6.8 11.3 Dondo 46.9 21.9 33.7 66.5 42.2 53.8 13.7 4.9 9.1 32.2 13.5 22.5 Nhamatanda 26.2 8.5 17.4 61.5 25.2 43.8 5.8 1.9 3.8 23.0 6.8 15.1 Gorongosa 19.2 6.6 13.3 49.5 20.1 35.9 11.6 3.5 7.9 19.4 6.3 13.5 Maringue 2.7 0.0 1.5 24.6 3.5 14.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.2 2.3 7.2 Marromeu 26.8 7.8 17.5 49.3 11.1 30.9 10.9 3.3 7.2 18.1 2.5 10.6 Sofala Total 34.1 18.8 26.4 53.1 29.7 41.4 9.2 4.1 6.6 24.0 11.3 17.6 Angdnia 12.1 5.3 8.8 18.6 12.4 15.5 9.1 2.7 5.9 6.7 3.3 5.0 Cahora Bassa 43.8 27.0 35.2 66.5 46.8 56.3 19.8 10.2 14.9 28.7 16.9 22.5 Chiuta 21.4 6.6 14.6 40.9 15.0 28.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 2.4 4.7 Macanga 15.6 3.8 9.8 42.7 29.0 35.9 9.4 1.2 5.4 12.9 3.9 8.4 Maravia 7.8 3.8 5.8 21.0 16.8 18.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 3.3 6.1 Moatize 26.4 15.2 20.8 69.6 43.0 56.1 7.0 2.0 4.5 24.8 13.1 18.8 Migot 19.0 9.2 14.1 38.0 23.6 30.7 13.4 4.6 9.1 11.7 5.4 8.6 Mutarara 19.5 2.8 11.4 58.1 17.1 38.0 5.1 0.8 3.1 18.8 4.9 12.2 Tete City 58.1 49.2 53.5 60.6 52.3 56.2 32.2 22.1 27.0 34.2 23.2 28.3 Zumbo 7.0 4.2 5.6 17.1 6.2 11.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Changara 29.2 14.1 21.9 53.9 33.4 43.9 11.5 3.7 7.8 17.7 6.2 12.1 Tsangano 13.1 5.6 9.4 34.4 17.8 26.1 4.5 1.1 2.8 10.6 4.8 7.7 Chifunde 7.1 1.0 4.1 22.2 11.9 17.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 3.4 8.0 Tete Total 22.4 12.5 17.5 41.9 25.9 33.9 10.0 4.7 7.4 15.8 8.0 11.9 Alto-Moldcut 32.5 11.7 22.3 44.3 31.1 37.8 3.4 0.9 2.2 19.6 10.3 15.0 Chinde 14.2 3.2 8.7 26.2 5.7 16.1 4.2 0.9 2.6 12.2 1.8 7.0 Gilt 29.9 10.4 20.2 30.9 17.0 24.0 7.1 1.3 4.3 7.4 1.8 4.7 Gurut 19.5 7.5 13.4 30.7 14.9 22.6 6.2 2.0 4.0 8.3 3.4 5.7 Ile 17.4 5.7 12.0 26.3 13.7 20.5 1.1 0.5 0.8 8.7 5.2 7.1 Lugela 10.5 2.9 6.9 18.3 7.3 13.0 1.5 0.4 1.0 6.8 1.9 4.5 Maganja da Costa 11.8 1.7 7.0 22.9 6.0 14.9 3.3 0.6 2.0 12.0 2.2 7.3 Milange 5.3 1.4 3.4 16.0 6.2 11.1 1.8 0.4 1.1 7.4 2.7 5.0 Mocuba 27.0 11.1 18.9 39.8 20.6 29.9 7.0 2.6 4.8 26.1 11.4 18.6 Mopeia 11.4 2.2 6.8 36.9 8.5 22.6 5.9 0.7 3.3 16.0 3.6 9.8 Mormmbala 6.5 0.9 3.7 17.6 3.7 10.6 2.4 0.3 1.3 8.6 1.9 5.3 Namacurra 28.7 6.7 18.1 40.9 16.4 29.1 5.0 1.2 3.2 20.2 7.4 14.1 Namarroi 7.2 2.1 4.9 27.0 10.4 19.4 1.8 0.4 1.2 8.0 3.6 6.0 Pebane 14.1 3.1 8.7 31.1 10.2 20.8 6.3 1.4 3.9 15.1 4.3 9.8 Quelimane City 51.3 27.7 38.0 50.2 29.3 38.4 28.4 14.4 20.3 36.2 18.4 25.9 Nicoadala 32.0 10.3 21.1 49.5 20.2 34.8 9.7 2.6 6.2 20.4 7.1 13.8 Inhassungue 25.8 3.8 15.2 39.0 9.3 24.6 8.0 2.3 5.2 17.2 3.0 10.3 Zambbia Total 20.2 7.2 13.7 32.1 14.6 23.4 6.0 2.3 4.2 15.6 6.4 11.0 Maputo City 56.4 57.7 57.1 87.2 90.5 88.9 21.8 20.3 21.1 45.8 46.2 46.0 Nationwide 27.0 17.0 22.0 48.2 31.9 40.0 9.3 5.3 7.3 21.5 12.6 17.0 - Not available.
135 Annex I:Interviewees: Assessment of Cost Sharing Policies in Primary Education
Name Institution Position Zefanias Muhate Ministry of Education Permanent Secretary Ismael Nheze Ministry of Education Adviser to The Minister Manuel Rego Ministry of Education Adviser to The Minister Eurico Banze Ministry of Education Inspector General Sim5o Mucavele Ministry of Education Director, National Institute for Educational Development Manuel Lobo Ministry of Education National Director of Basic Education Antonio Chambal Ministry of Education National Director of Administration and Finance Pedro Biche Ministry of Education National Director of HumanResources Paula Mendonca Ministry of Education National Coordinator of Education For All Ernest0 Muianga Ministry of Education National Director of Adult Literacy Zacarias Mazembe Ministry of Education Head of Finance Department Carlos Diante Provincial Education Office, Maputo City Head of Finance Department Luisa Dimande Provincial Education Office, Maputo City Technical Expert in Planning In@sMarines Provincial Education Office, Maputo City Inspector Argentino Nunes Provincial Education Office, Maputo City Technical Expert in Pedagogical Action Felix Mazivila Provincial Education Office, Gaza Head of Human Resources Department Custodio Balate Provincial Education Office, Gaza Head of Pedagogical Action Department Isaias Macie Provincial Education Office, Gaza Planning officer Ercilio Siquigo Provincial Education Office, Gaza Finance officer Orlando Matavel District Education Office, Bilene-Macia District Director Fernando Sitoe District Education Office, Bilene-Macia Head of Department of Pedagogical Action Francisco Chavo District Education Office, Bilene-Macia Head of Planning Department Celeste Chitoquice District Education Office, Bilene-Macia Head of Human Resources Department Lourenco Cossa District Education Office, Bilene-Macia Technical Expert in Pedagogical Action Oc4lio Zivane District Education Office, Manhila District Director Note: At the Ministry of Education, the methodology relied on individual semi-structured in-depth interviews. Semi-structured focus group discussions and interviews were held at the provincial and district education offices. At the provincial education offices, most heads of departments were not available at the time of the discussions. Their representatives participated instead. At the district education offices, the directors were asked to obtain the participation of the people who were most relevant in terms of the themes under discussion. The themes were communicated to these participants two days before the interviews took place.
136 Annex J
Annex J: Methodology of the Qualitative Analysis
In order to supplement and confirm the review of the literature, the policy analysis, and the analysis of the information obtained through the IAF from 2002 to 2003, a qualitative analysis among schools and communities was included in the research design. Relying on a small sample of schools in representative provinces, the analysis would provide responses from the field on questions relating to school fees and other demand-side and supply-side factors. The responses were to come directly from stakeholders and supply explanations and interpretations of issues that could not be fully understood through policy analysis or a quantitative survey.
Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of the school and community analysis was to explain any underlying factors that might influence enrollment, dropout, and completion rates in primary schools, especially in rural areas, and the role of school fees in determining these rates. The objective was to gauge the consistency between the official policy on school fees and the interpretation and application of the policy in schools, including through the views of parents and community leaders.
Sample and Criteria for Selection
According to the plan in the study design, the sample was to consist of 30 schools, lower, upper, or full primary schools. Three provinces were selected as representative of the regions: Gaza, Niassa, and Zambbzia. The idea was to choose 10 schools in each of the three provinces. When the issue of the selection of the provinces was taken up with officials at the Ministry of Education, they suggested that Maputo City should be part of the analysis and that the 10 schools assigned to Gaza could be divided with Maputo. This proposal and reasoning were accepted, and Maputo City was included as a fourth province in the analysis. Thus, four provinces, one each from the northern, central, and southern regions, plus the capital of the country, were selected. The criteria for selecting the provinces revolved around enrollment and retention rates in urban and rural areas, the enrollment and retention of girls, poverty indicators, cultural diversity, and logistical considerations. Up to four districts in each province (up to 12 in all) were selected according to the following characteristics: a mix of urban, peri-urban, and rural districts (with an emphasis on the last), a range of incomes, some poor districts with high enrollment rates, some poor districts with low enrollment rates, districts with low retention rates among girls, a range of cultural and language groups, and logistical considerations (distance, accessibility, and so on). Schools were selected within the districts according to the following characteristics: up to three schools in each district, some poor schools with high enrollment rates, some poor schools with low enrollment rates, schools with parents associations, and a range of locations (with an emphasis on rural schools). The table below indicates the names and locations of the schools in the sample that were visited. There were 30 schools in the sample.
137 Annex 3
Province District EP1 EP2 Full primary school ~~ Gaza Xai-Xai Chongoanine Xai-Xai City 25 de Setembro Bilene Ingombane Bairro da Macia 3 Ch6kwe Africa Amiga Maputo City Urban District 3 Maxaquene City Polana Canico “A” Urban District 5 Magoanine Unidade 2 Niassa Lichinga Mussa Machumane 24 de Junho Sanga Caliche10 Nensenhenge Licole Lichinga City Eduardo C. Mondlane A Luta Continua Lago Metangula Chiwanga Milagre Mabote Zambezia Quelimane City Acordo de Lusaka Sinacura Manhawa 17 de Setembro Namacurra Macunhanha Neuala Forquia Sede Nicoadala Temane 25 de Junho Miremene
Approach and Methods
The main approach involved a case study of 30 representative schools in the northern, central, and southern regions of the country. The schools were located in both urban and rural areas, with an emphasis on the latter. More or fewer schools might have been selected, but, given the resources and the time available, the study team decided that 30 schools was an appropriate number. Because the schools selected were located in 13 districts with different characteristics, the team was able to collect information that lent itself to comparisons across regions and across urban and rural areas and income groups. The two principal methods employed were individual interviews and focus group discussions. The individual interviews were conducted with the aid of semi-structured interview manuals containing interview questions and space to record responses. The method was applied chiefly with city, district, and provincial directors of education and school or pedagogical directors. The focus group discussions were conducted with the aid of semi-structured discussion manuals, which also contained discussion questions and space to take notes on responses. The focus group method was employed with parents, students, and community leaders. It was decided that the collective interviews or focus groups would involve four to six participants. It was felt that the small number would allow the people in the group more opportunity to speak, unlike the situation in larger groups.
138 Annex 1
Research Team
The team for the analysis was comprised of the principal consultants, Manolo Shchez (education specialist and team coordinator), Brigitte Bagnol (sociologist and gender specialist), and Susana Monteiro, Flavia Martin, Flavio Magaia, and Elsa Alfaica (research assistants from the National Institute for Educational Development of the Ministry of Education). During implementation, this six-member team was divided into subgroups of three or four researchers. The subgroups went to Gaza, Niassa, and Zambezia. The team also worked together during the post-implementation phase involving the data analysis and organization. The report itself (the present document) was put together by Manolo Shchez and Brigitte Bagnol. The initial editing of the document was carried out by the team coordinator (Manolo Shchez).
Preparation
The preparation phase of the analysis occurred from February 23 to March 1, 2004. During this time, meetings were held with donors and officials of the Ministry of Education, the research team was assembled, and the preliminary research instruments were designed.
Implementation
The first phase of implementation after the design of the tools for data collection was the testing of the tools in three schools (Maxaquene City, Polana Canico "A, and Unidade 2) in Urban Districts 3 and 5, Maputo. The testing of the questionnaires allowed the team to revise the manuals and improve the clarity of the questions. First week. The first week of implementation, March 1-5, was used to conduct interviews in four schools in Maputo City (the first two days) and collect information in the province of Gaza, where five schools were visited (the remaining two days). There were heavy rains in Chokwe District in Gaza. Total schools visited: 9. Second week. The second week of implementation, March 6-13, was spent in the northern province of Niassa, where 4 districts and 11 schools were visited. The only constraint was the distance to some of the districts in Lichinga, such as Lago and Sanga. Two vehicles were used; excellent arrangements were made, and an orientation was conducted by the provincial and district education offices. A final, slight refinement to the tools was carried out during the week. Total schools visited: 11 Third week. During the third week, March 15-20, the province of Zambezia was visited by a team of four researchers led by Brigitte Bagnol. Three districts and ten schools were visited. Time was a factor because the team had only four days to reach the ten schools. During this week, Manolo Shchez and Flavio Magaia completed interviews pending in Unidade 2 school in Urban District 5 (Maputo) and visited and conducted interviews in Magoanine school in the same district. Note: The logistical arrangements made with the provincial and district education offices were coordinated and facilitated by the finance director of the Ministry of Education, Maputo. The provincial, district, and city directors of education provided assistance to the research team
139 Annex 1 in the provinces. These officials or their representatives kindly accompanied and introduced the team throughout the visits. The provincial education offices arranged one or two vehicles for transportation to districts and schools. In Zambkzia, the team hired a second vehicle.
Data Processing and Analysis
The data processing and organization were carried out in Maputo from March 22 to March 31 by the whole team. The team coordinator created 10 matrixes and tables to facilitate the processing and organization of the information collected in the completed interview manuals. Because of the large amount of information collected in the 30 schools from at least six types of informants, this was a time-consuming task. In the end, the information was summarized in the tables according to the main themes of the study.
Limits of Analysis
The team aimed at reaching a group of representative schools, especially in poor rural communities. Districts were selected in each of the four provinces based on the statistical indicators available through the quantitative survey, that is, gross and net enrollment rates, average amounts contributed in school fees, school pedagogical performance, and so on. It was felt that it would be desirable to visit a few representative schools in urban areas, several schools in the periphery of urban centers, and a good number of rural schools away from urban centers. Due to time, human resource, and logistical constraints, it was not possible to include schools in remote districts of large provinces such as Niassa and Zambezia. Despite this limitation, the team members are confident that the team visited a sufficient number of rural schools outside Maputo City and other provincial capitals and urban centers so as to draw meaningful conclusions about the situation of rural schools from the perspective of school costs. One problem that the team faced during the implementation phase was a lack of communication. When the provincial education offices leamed of the team’s visits, they had difficulty contacting the district education offices, which subsequently did not notify the rural schools because of the distance, the lack of telephones and vehicles, and so on. This restricted the ability of the team to arrange interviews with parents and community leaders. Nonetheless, the team was able to interview small groups of parents in most schools. The views of community leaders, on the other hand, may be underrepresented in the report because it was difficult to reach them or to arrange meetings. Another constraint during the implementation phase was the limited time and resources to cover the 30 schools adequately. At first, the team went as a unit from school to school and split up to conduct the interviews. As the work progressed and came to include larger provinces such as Niassa and Zambezia, the team members understood it would be better to use two vehicles and divide up the work so that the researchers could each cover one school per day and spend more time at the school and in the community. In the provinces of Niassa and Zambezia, an average of four to five hours were spent in each school. In addition to interviewing teachers, school principals, pupils, parents, and community leaders who are stakeholders in the schools, the team realized after the first week of interviews
140 Annex 3 that they should include the perspectives, if possible, of children of school age who were not attending school and the parents of these children. Although the team attempted to include as many of these people as they could find, relatively few were located. Therefore, the views of such people on the reasons for non-attendance or for dropping out of school are underrepresented in the report. The team filled in some of this gap by substituting the views of parents who could not afford to send all their children of school age to school. Although the sexual harassment of girls and corruption in primary schools may be factors in school non-attendance and dropping out among girls, these issues were not specifically addressed in the manuals for the interviews among teachers, students, and parents. The team touched upon these issues with several provincial and district directors of education. Nonetheless, information on these issues as factors in the problems faced by girls in education, especially in rural areas, is underrepresented in this analysis. Despite the limitations of the analysis, the team is confident that sufficient quality information was gathered in the 30 schools visited to be able to analyze meaningfully school costs and other factors that may influence attendance, dropout, and completion rates among boys and girls in primary schools and to draw reasonable conclusions and recommendations on the appropriate policy toward school fees.
Tools Used
Seven tools (including questionnaires and manuals) were designed to be used during the interviews with the various participants who were the main sources of information for this analysis. The manuals were formatted so that researchers could use them to take consistent notes during each interview. Once filled in, the interview manuals formed the basis for the processing and organization of the data obtained through the responses. All six researchers used exactly the same manuals (in Portuguese) during the work in the schools and communities. Although there was leeway in following up on questions or in asking questions not contained in the manuals, an effort was made to rely on the standard questions as much as possible. The few interviews with out-of-school children and with parents of such children were conducted using adaptations of the pupil and parent interview manuals. No specific manuals were designed for these two sources of information.
141 Annex U
Annex K: Schools Visited and People Interviewed for the Qualitative Analysis
Provinces and schools lndividuals interviewed Maputo City Samuel Modumela, city director of education, Maputo Francisco M. Saveca, pedagogical director, Urban District 3 Sergio Machava, director of education, Urban District 5 Polana Canieo “A, Urban District 3, Felipe Jeremias, school director EPC 4 teachers, 5 parents, 2 community leaders, 4 pupils Maxaquene “C”, Urban District 3, A. Jog0 Sitoe, school director EP2 4 teachers, 2 parents, 1community leader, 6 pupils Unidade 2, Urban District 5, EPC Manuel Maquina Pacheco, school director 4 teachers, 5 parents, 1community leader, 6 pupils Magoanine, Urban District 5, EPC Inhcio S. Langa, school director 8 teachers, 5 parents, 8 pupils Gaza Province Elisa Pondje, city director of education, Xai-Xai City Antonio A. Miambo, pedagogical director, Xai-Xai District Orlando Matuvela, district director of education, Bilene District Azarias Xavier, district director of education, Ch6kwe District 25 de Setembro, Xai-Xai City, EP1 Arnaldo Macamo, school director 4 teachers, 4 parents, 1community leader, 6 pupils Chongoanine, Xai-Xai District, EPC Felix Manhique, school director 4 teachers, 10 parents, 7 pupils Ingombane, Bilene, EP1 Angelica Aurelio Boca, pedagogical director 4 teachers, 3 parents, 1community leader, 4 pupils Bairro da Macia, Bilene, EPC Benedicto Julio Mondlane, school director 9 teachers, 5 parents (22 present), 9 pupils Africa Amiga, Chokwe, EPC Carlos Eugenio Chambisco, school director 3 teachers, 6 pupils Niassa Province Jo50 A. G. Assale, provincial director of education Sebastizo Dos Santos, chief of planning department Sergio Levene, chief of pedagogical action department Lena Tiam, adviser to provincial director Domingos Quenklave, city director of education, Lichinga City Maria Betinia J. Detepo, director of education, Lichinga District Lucia E. G. J. Salimo, director of education, Sanga District Benedicto Buanacaia, director of education, Lago District A Luta Continua, Lichinga City, EPC Carlos JoBo, school director 5 teachers, 3 parents, 4 pupils Eduardo C. Mondlane, Lichinga City, Filipe Pedro, school director EP2 5 teachers, 1parent, 5 pupils Mussa, Lichinga District, EP1 Maria Luisa Benete, school director 2 teachers, 1parent, 4 community leaders, 6 pupils Machumane, Lichinga District, EP1 Armindo Gaponge, school director 3 teachers, 5 parents, 1community leader, 6 pupils 25 de Junho, Lichinga District, EP1 Lourenco Nlola, school director 4 teachers, 3 parents, 1community leader, 6 pupils
142 Provinces and schools Individuals interviewed Metangula, Lago District, EP2 Antonio Ali, school director 8 teachers, 6 parents, 6 pupils Chiwanga, Lago District, EPC Leongue Romano, school director 7 teachers, 9 parents, 3 community leaders, 6 pupils Milagre Mabote, Lago District, EPC Jorge Ali Chssimo, school director 5 teachers, 5 parents, 6 community leaders, 6 pupils Nansenhenje, Sanga District, EPC Jorge Quenesse, school director 6 teachers, 3 parents, 6 community leaders, 4 pupils Vicente Calichelo, Sanga District, Iassine Rachide, school director EPC 6 teachers, 7 parents, 2 community leaders, 6 pupils Licole, Sanga District, EPC Eduardo Mateus, school director 6 teachers, 3 parents, 2 community leaders, 4 pupils Zambtzia Province Isabel Azevedo, provincial director of education Leceros Filipe Aranica, city director of education, Quelimane Virginio Luis Monoleia, director of education, Nicoadala District Bernard0 Mahara, director of education, Namacurra District Sinacura, Quelimane City, EPC Pedro Matola, school director 5 teachers, 1parent (also community leader), 6 pupils 17 de Setembro, Quelimane City, Martius Vicente, school director EPC 9 teachers, 4 parents, 2 community leaders, 5 pupils Manhawa, Quelimane City, EP1* In@sde Castro, school director 4 teachers, 3 parent, 3 community leaders, 6 pupils Acordo de Lusaka, Quelimane City, Alexander Luis, school director EP1 4 teachers, 3 parents, 6 pupils Neuala, Namacurra District, EPC Assome Jose Manonja, school director 6 teachers, 5 parents, 1community leader, 6 pupils Forquia Sede, Namacurra District, Feranando Angelo, school director EP1 4 teachers, 6 parents, 7 pupils Macunhanha, Namacurra District, Filipe Teles de Lemos, school director EP1 2 teachers, 6 parents, 1community leader, 6 pupils 25 de Junho, Nicoadala District, EPC Arnaldo Francisco Soares, school director 6 teachers, 5 parents, 1community leader, 6 pupils Temane, Nicoadala District, EP1 School director, 2 teachers, 5 parents, 1 community leader, 6 pupils, 1child out of school Miremene, Nicoadala District, EP1 Paulo B. Tricono, pedagogical director 2 teachers, 8 parents, 1communitv leader, 5 pupils Note: EPC = full primary school. EP2 = upper primary school. EP1= lower primary school. * This school introduced grade 6 in 2004.
143 Annex L: General Methodological Issues Related to the Quantitative Analysis
The data used for the analysis were collected through the IAF (Inqukrito aos Agregados Familiars sobre Orqamento Familiar) for 2002-03. This is a cross-sectional survey covering about 8,700 households and 44,000 individuals. It was conducted from July 2002 to June 2003. It contains detailed information on the expenditures, transfers, and incomes of Mozambican households, as well as information on demographic, individual, and geographic characteristics. More specifically, the survey questionnaire includes modules on health, employment, education, housing, poverty indicators, and victimization (particularly within the household). Several sections on daily, monthly, and annual expenditures facilitate the construction of a consumption aggregate to be used as a measure of well-being. (For details, see Ministry of Planning and Finance, IFPRI, and Purdue University 2004.) Information on annual expenditures for education at the household level exists separately by level and type of school (public or private) and by typology of expenditure (school fees, books, uniforms, and other school supplies). The section on the education of individuals contains questions about educational attainment, current school attendance and level attended, attendance in school the previous year, the nature of any difficulties in the school currently attended, and the reasons for non-attendance in school. Finally, in the housing section is a question on distance to schools. This is the only information on education supply collected among all households, rather than only those that have children in school. The table below shows the number of observations in the IAF and their distribution across the main subgroups used in this analysis.
Observations Number Unweighted (YO) Weighted (YO) All 44,083 Households, number 8,700 Composition by gender Men 21,010 47.7 48.0 Women 23,072 52.3 52.0 Composition by age Under 6 8,870 20.1 21.4 6-10 6,623 15.0 15.7 11-14 4,328 9.8 9.5 15-24 8,939 20.3 18.4 25-34 5,749 13.1 13.4 35+ 9,573 21.7 21.6 Composition by area Urban 21,912 49.7 32.1 Rural 22,171 50.3 67.9 Composition by province Niassa 4,126 9.4 5.1
144 Observations Number Unw eigh t ed (Yo) Weighted (% ) Cab0 Delgado 2,848 6.5 8.4 Nampula 3,341 7.6 18.8 Zambezia 3,449 7.8 19.2 Tete 3,546 8.0 7.7 Manica 4,767 10.8 6.7 Sofala 4,449 10.1 8.4 Inhambane 3,507 8.0 7.4 Gaza 4,257 9.6 7.0 Maputo Province 4,182 9.5 5.6 Maputo City 5,611 12.7 5.7 School attendance (all 6 or older) Not attending 23,094 65.6 69.1 Literacy classes 398 1.1 1.5 EP1 (lower primary) 8,177 23.2 22.9 EP2 (upper primary) 1,897 5.4 3.8 ESGl (lower secondary) 1,116 3.2 1.9 ESG2 (upper secondary) 238 0.7 0.4 Elementary technical and vocational 7 0.0 0.0 Basic technical and vocational 90 0.3 0.1 Intermediate technical and vocational 42 0.1 0.1 Teacher training 14 0.0 0.0 Higher education 87 0.2 0.1 Other 30 0.1 0.0
145 Annex M
Annex M: Methodological Issues Related to the Analysis of School Dropouts
The IAF did not generate panel data, and identifying information on dropouts is not straightforward. Moreover, among the retrospective questions, there is no information on the education level the individual was attending the previous year. The only information on this issue is supplied by responses to a question on whether the individual^ was in school the previous year and the maximum education level achieved in the current year. Using these responses, one may reconstruct the annual number of primary school dropouts, as shown in the tables below. The group at risk of dropping out of lower primary school includes all children who were going to school the previous year and have "none" as the maximum education level this year, that is, they have not yet completed lower primary school. Among these, some are going to lower primary school this year, and some are not (the dropouts). The analysis also sets a maximum age limit of 17 for inclusion in the group at risk (and the dropouts). The aim is to exclude older individuals who may be special cases, but retain individuals older than the appropriate age with respect to the education level, given that over- age pupils are common in Mozambique. Groups 3 and 4 in the tables are the groups at risk of abandoning lower primary school before completion. Group 3 is the dropouts. Notice that the group at risk of dropping out as defined here does not include all those in lower primary school the previous year (that is, it does not include groups 1 and 2). On the one hand, there is insufficient information to construct a view of those who were in lower primary school the previous year. (One cannot observe a distinction between groups 1 and 7 and groups 2 and 8.) On the other hand, those who completed lower primary school the previous year face a choice this year that is different (to go or not to go to upper primary school) from the choices facing the rest of the sample. The group at risk of dropping out of upper primary school (or, more precisely, of dropping out before completing upper primary school) includes all those who were going to school the previous year and show lower primary school as the maximum education level this year, that is, all those who have not completed upper primary school (groups 1and 2). Among these, some will go to school this year (upper primary school) and some will not (dropouts). As age limits, the analysis imposes 12 to 19. Notice that the group at risk includes not only those who were attending upper primary school the previous year and have not completed it yet (groups 7 and €9, but also those who were attending lower primary school last year and either decided to continue into upper primary school, or to stop (groups 1and 2). The dropouts are those who decide not to continue to upper primary school after completing lower primary school, as well as those who were attending upper primary school and stopped before completion (groups 1and 7).
146 Education level attended the Maximum education level observed Outcome observed this year Group vrevious wear (not observed) this wear Not in school (exit) 1 EP1 (completed) Go to EP2 2 EP1 (lower primary) Not in school (exit) 3 None Continues in EP1 4 Not in school (exit) 5 EP2 (completed) Go to secondary, technical 6 EP2 (upper primary) and vocational, or other Not in school (exit) 7 EP1 Continues to EP2 8
Sample Sizes
Sample Observations Restrictions Group at risk of dropping out of EP1 (groups 3 7,240 and 4) In school the previous year (in - Not in school this year (dropouts) (group 3) 408 EP1, not final year), age 6-17 - In EP1 this year (group 4) 6,832 Group at risk of dropping out of EP2 (groups 1,671 In school the previous year 1+2+7+8) (EP1, final year, or EP2, not - Not in school this year (dropouts) (groups 1+7) 161 final year), age 12-19 - In EP2 this year (groups 2+8) 1,510
147 Annex N: Methodological Issues Related to the Analysis of Direct Costs Using the IAF
The IAF contains information on annual household education expenditures by level and type, as well as expenditures for uniforms, books, and other school supplies.56 These expenditures are not collected for each child separately, but are recorded by level and type of education as a total household amount. Nonetheless, one may readily speculate about the type of expenditures likely to be included for each education level: any type of school fees paid, in cash, for registration, attendance, examinations, and so on. However, it is not expected that the households report the monetary value of any fee paid in kind (the guidelines given to the interviewers are not very clear on this point), especially fees that are ”illegal” or ”semi-illegal.” Because the information on expenditures is collected on the basis of households, it was necessary to make a per child calculation for the analysis. The household amount spent on each level of education, public and private combined, was therefore divided by the number of children attending the corresponding level of education. The decision was taken to mix public and private expenditures because, on the one hand, the number of children attending private institutions is negligible (except in the top quintile) and, on the other hand, the expenditures for ”church,” “community,” ”nongovemmental,” and ”other” types of schools that children may attend have been classified rather randomly as public or private by the households. More problematic was the assumption that had to be made in order to calculate the per child expenditure for books, uniforms, and other school materials. This expenditure is given as a cumulative amount for all children going to school, irrespective of the level and type of education. The best that could be done was to divide the total amount by the total number of children going to school, as in the case of the calculation on fees and charges. However, the need for books and uniforms (and their cost) may vary greatly by education Finally, the education expenditures are collected as an annual amount (”in the 12 months before the interview”). Because school attendance is recorded at one point in time, it is possible that the annual expenditure does not exactly refer to the children that are observed to be going to school at a given moment. Nonetheless, it is expected that the discrepancies are small and that the results are valid on average. Tables 6.24 and 6.25 in the main text show the average annual household expenditures on books, uniforms, and other school materials, by quintile group, for EP1, EP2, ESG1, and ESG2. The last column presents the total average expenditure, which is obtained from the sum of all household expenditures on education.58 These averages include only the positive values in each category, that is, the households declaring zero expenditures have been disregarded.
56 The education levels are lower and upper primary school, lower and upper secondary school, elementary technical and vocational, basic technical and vocational, intermediate technical and vocational, higher education, and “other” education. For lower and upper primary school, lower and upper secondary school, and higher education, the survey collected information on fees and charges separately according to institution type (private and public). 57 In the multivariate analysis, the average cost of uniforms was computed by considering only those households with children in lower (or upper) primary school. 58 Education expenditures were spatially adjusted as in case of household consumption.
148 Annex 0
Annex 0: Econometric Model
The Model
The econometric model has been estimated based upon the human capital model. According to the human capital theory, schooling decisions are determined by equating the marginal retum and the marginal cost of education. The desired number of years of schooling increases with the retums to human capital and decreases with the costs of education. After solving the optimization problem, the reduced-form demand for schooling is of the form:
where Si is the desired amount of years of schooling, ri is the rate of return to education, XLi are the characteristics of the individual (sex, age), Xhi are the characteristics of the household to which individual i belongs (education of the parents, household income, geographical location), and XSiare the characteristics of the school (school quality, school costs). The rate of return to education is difficult to quantify, because it depends on future eamings opportunities. Empirically, it is assumed that the rate of return is affected by specific individual characteristics and local geographical factors (for example, labor market characteristics). Under this assumption, the demand for schooling becomes:
1.2. si = f(Z,, ,Zhi, ZSi) where the vectors Zkitk = 1, h, and s, include the same variables as vectors Xkitplus those that affect the rate of return.
Empirical Implementation
Ideally, the schooling decision (dependent variable Si) is captured by the desired length of education (years of schooling). However, in practice, this variable is seldom included in the available datasets. The IAF includes information about school attendance (whether the child goes to school or not) and about the level of education currently attended. The approach adopted here was therefore to estimate separate regressions by level of education; the probability of enrollment in lower and upper primary school was estimated. This approach has been adopted in other studies as well (for example, Deininger 2003; Ranasinghe and Hartog 2002). Altematively, one might have estimated an ordered probit model for the realized level of education (Ranasinghe and Hartog 2002; Holmes 2003). However, because no information was available on the grade, but only on the level of education, the former solution was preferred. Explanatory variables included in vector 2, are the age and gender of the child and the child’s relationship with the household head. The relationship with the household head is
149 Annex 0 meant to capture, albeit imperfectly, the condition of orphans.59 In Zhj, parental education has been incorporated (in particular, mother’s education, which is expected to have the largest impact on a child’s education), family size (number of children in the various age groups), the residence (dummies for the regional area-north, center, south, and Maputo City-and rural or urban location), and household consumption (consumption quintile). The level of household consumption determines the amount the parents can spend for a child’s education in direct costs (for example, fees, books, uniforms, and so on) and indirect costs (forgone earnings). The vector Zsj includes variables capturing school characteristics, such as measures of quality, costs, and so on. In fact, the coefficient of fees is the principal item of interest. Two main issues should be considered in deciding how to incorporate school costs into the probit regression. First, the amount of fees is not available for everyone, but only relative to those children currently in school. Second, fees are likely to be endogenous, that is, the amount of the fees may depend on how rich parents are and therefore on how rich the area is. Rich parents are more likely to send children to school and pay higher fees. Tables 5.1 and 5.4 confirm that this is the case. Finding instruments to gauge and account for school fees, however, is very difficult. Partially to avoid this problem, the following regression has been estimated.
where P(Sj = 1) indicates the probability of the child attending school, modeled using a probit - model, Zkjare the vectors defined above, Fj is the average level of fees per child paid in area j (calculated over all children in area j, excluding child i), is the average of other relevant area variables such as consumption and school quality (calculated in the same way as the average fee, that is, as leave-out-mean variables), and E~ is an error term. The inclusion of average area fees, together with a set of area controls (including average consumption), can alleviate the problem of the endogeneity of the school fees.60 The comparison between the household consumption coefficient and A, the coefficient of F,can facilitate an assessment of the impact on school attendance of increased household consumption versus reduced fees.
59 Although a question exists in the IAF about whether the mother is alive, this variable has produced unreliable results; the number of orphans appears to be largely underestimated using this variable. 60 A third problem is the fact that education costs may be discretionary to some extent. (For example, a child might be accepted in school even if the household does not pay school fees, and uniforms may not be required in some places, such as rural areas.) It was decided to exclude from the regressions all the costs that are likely to be largely discretionary (for example, books and other school supplies) and therefore highly endogenous. As regards school fees, one may take comfort because, in the sample here, fees are paid relative to 97 percent of the children in school. With respect to uniforms, using area averages may help in distinguishing geographical situations in which the costs related to uniforms are high (and presumably compulsory) and other situations in which uniforms are not required.
150 Annex 0
The estimation here is based on a calculation, separately for urban and rural areas, of the average school fee paid in the district and the average cost of a uniform in the province. While one would like to assess whether the cost of uniforms has an impact on enrollments, the decision was taken that the correct procedure was to compute the average cost of uniforms using only those households with children going to lower (or upper) primary school, given that the cost of uniforms is collected as a cumulative amount for all children going to school, irrespective of the level. So, it was necessary to compute averages over larger areas in order to keep the sample sizes meaningful. To control for school quality, the analysis involved the construction of leave-out-mean area averages of a set of variables relative to problems that exist for all who attend lower (or upper) primary school. Due to sample size problems, the mean was computed at the provincial, urban, or rural level. Finally, the analysis controlled for (leave-out-)mean district consumption. The sample is defined, in the case of enrollments in lower primary school, as the group of individuals who should be in lower primary school and can be either in lower primary school, or out of school. In the case of enrollments in upper primary school, the sample is defined as the group of individuals who have completed lower primary school and may be either in upper primary school, or out of school. In order to focus on a group of relatively homogeneous individuals, the analysis has also imposed age limits of 6 to 17 for lower primary school and 12 to 19 for upper primary school. A probit model was estimated for dropouts from lower and upper primary school. (For the definition of dropouts, see Annex B.)'jl Although, ideally, it would be interesting to estimate both enrollments and dropouts, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find convincing identifying variables for the two sets of coefficients. This is the reason two separate probit regressions have been estimated. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the probability of dropping out is estimated as a conditional probability, conditional on having been enrolled during the previous year and of having completed lower primary school, in the case of dropouts from upper primary school. (See the last column in the second table in Annex M, which indicates the sample restrictions.) Enrollment in upper primary school is also estimated conditional on the child having completed lower primary school. The estimation of the impact of the cost of schooling using the household as the unit of analysis and the construction of the dependent variable as the share of children who are eligible for enrollment and who are actually enrolled was carried out by Alain Mingat. Rather than employing ordinary least squares, the fractional logit model (Wooldridge 2001) is appropriate when the dependent variable is a proportion that is only defined in the interval [0,1] and can also take the extreme value of 0. In the case here, the dependent variable is the ratio of children who go to lower (or upper) primary school among all children living in the household that could potentially go. The sample of the "enrollable" children is defined as all those children who are in the 8-16 age range for lower primary school and in the 12-19 age range for upper primary school and have not completed lower or upper primary school (and therefore are still eligible to go to primary school). An alternative definition has also been tried, that is, the ratio of children in the same age ranges that are receiving or have received lower or
61 For dropouts and enrollments, the age limits imposed are the same.
151 Annex 0 upper primary education among all children aged 8-16 and 12-19. Thus, included in this case also are the children for whom education was already bought by the household. However, the first definition has been preferred, given that all explanatory variables refer to the present time, and it is not clear when the education was acquired by all those children who have already completed education, nor is it clear which were the explanatory variables at that time.62
62 The fractional logit model has been estimated in Stata using the glm (generalized linear models) command, with logit as the link function.
152 Bibliography
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