Reporting America’s “Colour Problem”: How the U.S. and British Press Reported and

Framed Racial Conflicts during World War II

A dissertation presented to

the faculty of

the Scripps College of Communication of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Pamela E. Walck

August 2015

© 2015 Pamela E. Walck. All Rights Reserved.

This dissertation titled

Reporting America's "Colour Problem": How the U.S. and British Press Reported and

Framed Racial Conflicts during World War II

by

PAMELA E. WALCK

has been approved for

the E. W. Scripps School of Journalism

and the Scripps College of Communication by

Michael S. Sweeney

Professor of Journalism

Scott Titsworth

Dean, Scripps College of Communication

ii Abstract

WALCK, PAMELA E., Ph.D., August 2015, Journalism

Reporting America's "Colour Problem": How the U.S. and British Press Reported and

Framed Racial Conflicts during World War II

Director of Dissertation: Michael S. Sweeney

Race and ideologies of racial supremacy were at the very heart of World War II.

U.S. troops did not have to look far to see how race influenced the American war machine as the country’s military policies required African American and white troops to be processed, trained, and stationed at separate but supposedly equal installations across the country. Race determined whether one carried a rifle or drove a supply truck; operated the naval big guns or loaded munitions into Liberty-class ships; and even whether you would deploy or not.

This study took an historical look at how the media reported race and race relations in a war fought over race. Specifically, it examined three events in the United

States: the Detroit race riots, Harlem riots, and the Port Chicago explosion; and three incidents in the United Kingdom: the first racial incident in Antrim, Northern Ireland, the mutiny at Bamber Bridge, and the Bristol race riots, to reveal how mainstream newspapers and the American black press reported these events. Through an extensive examination of news coverage in twenty-four newspapers, U.S. and British government and military documents, and oral histories, this study examines how race was reported and framed in the media—and attempts to demonstrate how those frames and newspaper routines expand our understanding of race and race relations during this critical period of history.

iii This study found that often the mainstream media in both nations downplayed race—or at the very least attempted to minimize it—during major news events, unless it was impossible to ignore. Sometimes this effort to curtail the role of race came from overt pressure from the government, as it was with the British press. Other times, news workers self-censored for fear that images of violence between Americans would fuel the

Axis propaganda machine. Still other times, wartime censors severely delayed news reports. This study also found differences in how the U.S. and British press reported domestic incidents, particularly in terms of volume and tone of coverage.

iv Preface

Wilbur Dickens was ninety-two years old when he joined eighty-five other World

War II veterans and their family members—all part of the Anzio Beachhead Veterans

Association—as they toured Fort Stewart on a warm, sunny South Georgia day in April

2009. The Tifton, Georgia, man was hard to miss in his tan, light wool WWII army

uniform. It was still in mint condition and fit Dickens well, despite the many years on his

aged frame that now required a wheelchair for him to move about. A young African

American soldier, Private First Class Jason Davis, had been “volun-told” to escort

Dickens that day as the group of WWII veterans moved from gun-range to Warriors

Walk—a series of sidewalks on post lined with hundreds of Eastern redbuds, each tree

honoring Third Infantry Division men and women who had made the ultimate sacrifice in

America’s War on Terror in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The visit ended with all the pomp and circumstance of a formal military ceremony

on Cottrell Field, where Colonel Chuck Sexton addressed his troops of the Second

Brigade Combat Team who were preparing for yet another deployment to Iraq that

November. “Hitler bragged he would sweep the Americans back into the sea. He

promised another victory for fascism. But he was wrong. Dead wrong,” said Sexton, of

the costly, three-month effort on the beaches of Italy in the early months of 1944.1 The

commander went on to note that in a victory “purchased in blood” these frail, old men

were once strong, fierce warriors who had “spent time in hell.”2 Sexton then thanked the

Greatest Generation, reminding them that the young men and women in uniform before them were a lasting part of their legacy. There was hardly a dry eye in the parade stands.

As a military reporter for the daily newspaper in nearby Savannah, I remember

my own struggle to hold back tears—to remain the professional, impartial observer—all

the while knowing that statistically speaking, many of the elderly men standing on the

field that day would likely not be alive when the brigade deployed seven months later.

Even fewer would be living when the unit returned stateside twelve months after that.3

Events such as these always lured my mind to thoughts of my own paternal grandfather who had served in the China-Burma-India Campaign and had not—at the time of my reporting in 2009—become one of those statistics, one of hundreds of WWII veterans lost to the grave each day.

Sexton was correct. The young men and women of every race, color, and creed standing before them that day on Cottrell Field were indeed a part of a rich military heritage and legacy. But it is hard to ignore the harsh reality of that period in history: that the sacrifices made by hundreds of thousands of African American veterans during WWII have gone largely unheralded. That even in popular memory the African American experiences of WWII lack any sense of conformity to the ideals of white heroism and

sacrifice4 that are fused into popular American culture through books, movies, and even

video games.

A Patriotic Sense of Place

For the last two years of my doctoral program, two round, silver-colored charms

have hung around my neck on a military dog-tag chain. One, a round, aluminum disc

with the unit numbers faintly hammered out with a nail head, bears the name of my

paternal grandmother’s father who fought across France during World War I. The second,

a good luck charm from Santa Ana, California, is stamped with the name of my father’s

vi dad, who was a radio operator with the Twenty-Third Fighter Squadron—more commonly known as the Flying Tigers—in the CBI. Both family heirlooms have traveled with me from presidential libraries and national archives in the U.S. to public records offices and tiny villages across the U.K.

Growing up I can remember my grandfather occasionally telling my brothers and me stories about his WWII service. He told tell us about the time he had the privilege of holding Joe DiMaggio’s ankles during physical training at Fort Ord, California. (A lifelong Philadelphia Phillies fan, even he felt honored by assisting the New York

Yankees legend.) Other times, he would pull out this old, beaten-up scrapbook filled with black and white photos of exotic places such as Hong Kong and Shanghai. Or he’d talk about how he and his buddy pooled their money to purchase a used typewriter so they could practice after hours while based in Kansas City for their MOS (military occupational skill) training. Or how one of his daily practices—along with others on the airfield—was to pause from his job to count the number of planes returning to the muddy airstrip following a firefight with the enemy—each missing plane filled with names and faces of men he knew. My siblings and I returned home with these tales of Pappy during the war. Our dad would be incredulous because he had never heard them before. Indeed, it was a world Pappy had been reticent to speak of, but the stories started to flow with greater frequency in his final years. He could remember 1943 clearer than the previous day’s activities. As an adult, I exchanged emails with him. His messages to me were often written in all caps. A modern-day equivalent to shouting, but something I knew was a holdover from his war days.

vii Only when I started covering the military as a newspaper reporter did I begin to fully appreciate the sacrifices of my grandfather and other family members over the centuries. The budding historian in me appreciated the roles, albeit small ones, that each family member had played on the larger world stage. The American Revolution. The

Civil War. World War I. World War II. Vietnam Era. The First Gulf War. It remains hard not to have a strong sense of place, purpose, and pride in this knowledge that ties me to the larger historic narrative of this country. Each individual, regardless of how insignificant a role, represents a thread in a much larger American tapestry.

But I also know there are many holes in our nation’s fabric. Narratives either forgotten or ignored because of gender or race. For these veterans, the battle was not limited to the enemy at the front lines. For too many Americans, the added adversaries of prejudice, indifference, and arrogance—often from their own countrymen—are also embedded in their wartime experiences. As a result, their stories are missing from the collective narrative. This truth was never clearer to me than during a visit to the National

World War II Museum in New Orleans, Louisiana, in September 2013. In an elaborate visual journey through images, videos, audio clips, and static displays depicting the events leading to Operation Overlord, the Normandy invasion, and eventually victory in

Europe followed by triumph in the Pacific, it was hard not to notice how many narratives were missing from the museum’s exhibit. It was, indeed, very white and very male.

In terms of sheer numbers, it can almost be justified. According to the museum, some 901,896 African Americans served out of 17,867,000 Americans between 1939 and

1945.5 (It should be noted that 358,074 women donned the uniform as well, from WACs and WAVES to the U.S. Coast Guard and Nursing Corps6—some of whom I had the

viii pleasure of meeting and interviewing in my military reporting days.) In truth, African

Americans represented a mere fraction of the total number of service members who

fought in WWII. But this alone does not justify their absence from the grand narrative.

Yes, their service was quite different from that of their white counterparts—thanks in

large part to military policies that prevented them from picking up arms and fighting. It

would, in fact, take the sheer loss of white U.S. soldiers on the beaches of Normandy to

help break through the color bar and put African Americans on the front line. Shoulder to

shoulder with their white peers.

Gaps in the WWII Narrative

These policies, in effect, created gaping holes in the American collective story of

personal sacrifice during the war years. A docent at the WWII museum assured me

during my visit that the museum was working on a special African American exhibit

designed to help correct this wrong—and rightfully so. But doing this does not change

the realities of that period. It does not change the America that was. As historian Michael

C.C. Adams admonishes, the collective we of the United States should not forget the

“ugly things we did and magnify the good things.”7 We should resist the urge to “retell

our past not as it was but as we would like it to have been.”8 We must remember the injustice, along with the valor.

With few exceptions most African Americans served in support roles of the great

American war machine.9 They loaded and unloaded shipments at the docks. They cooked hot meals, worked the mess halls, and waited on officers’ tables. They drove war materiel

and supplies for thousands of miles. Missing from this patriotic narrative of the great

American effort to stand up for what President Roosevelt called the Four Freedoms—

ix freedom of religion, freedom of speech and expression, freedom from fear, and freedom from want—are the untold stories of hundreds upon thousands of African Americans who served to preserve those rights for strangers but were denied those same liberties on the home front because politicians lacked the ability, or political will, to forge social changes.

Some U.S. military leaders of the day went so far as to declare that wartime was no time to conduct “social experiments.”10 These policies bred frustration and inequality, so much so, that by 1943, the discontentment boiled up and spilled out into American streets in the form of race riots. (The frustration was not all that dissimilar to that which fueled riots in

U.S. cities of Ferguson, New York City, and Baltimore as this book was being researched and written.) The WWII battle space was not immune to these vexations as our allies in

Great Britain are all too keenly aware.

Giving a Voice to the Voiceless

As a journalist for more than a decade, I felt that one of the most important parts of my job was to help make government affairs more transparent and relevant to the public. I took my role as a member of the Fourth Estate quite seriously, whether it was covering elections and elected bodies, testing the application of Open Records laws, or giving a voice to Iraq War veterans whose lives had been forever changed by multiple deployments and post-traumatic stress disorder. I firmly believed that part of the role of newspapers in society was to monitor power and give a voice to the voiceless.11 I still do.

And I am thankful for my many friends and colleagues who have remained in the newsroom and continue to uphold these basic tenets of journalism with passion and vigor.

It is also what motivates me to prepare new generations of journalists to do the same in an increasingly more complex world.

x As an historian, I find myself naturally drawn toward stories that have been overlooked or marginalized by both society and history books. In my research, I have found occasions when people elected or appointed to public service opted to hide behind the veil of secrecy or the unusual circumstances of wartime confidentiality as a justification for their actions—actions that prompt questions I believe are still worth answering. My hope is that in doing so, I might help restore dignity and voice to a generation of war veterans who were first silenced by government policies, and now, seven decades later, are being silenced by the grave. And while some may question why a white female is addressing an issue that is firmly rooted in the well-documented and long-marginalized African American narrative in the United States, to them, I say why not me? For similar restrictive forces in society challenge and marginalize female voices as well. What’s more, I truly believe the fight for racial equality knows no color bar.

This is all to say that I have great empathy for the families of African American veterans of WWII, whose stories have gone untold. For them, there is yet another gaping void. A missing thread. This time, it is in the familial pride that comes with national recognition for service to country in wartime that many of their white counterparts sense—my family included. Pride that comes with the knowledge of ancestral associations with epochal moments in WWII or affiliation with renowned battles or military institutions: Anzio Beach, Normandy, Iwo Jima, Battle of the Bulge, the Eighth

Army Air Force, the Flying Tigers, the Pacific Fleet. It is for these families and these individual legacies that I humbly attempt to write. And in so doing, hope to help in some—albeit small—way to right a great wrong.

–Pamela E. Walck

xi Dedication

In memory of Woodrow P. Walck, whose story remains untold.

Acknowledgments

So many people have helped nurture this seed of an idea into reality and for that I shall remain indebted. A special thanks goes to the Contemporary History Institute at

Ohio University. Not only did they graciously fund my archival trips to two presidential libraries, but the faculty and graduate students also welcomed this former journalist into their ranks. For that, I am forever grateful.

A special thanks also goes to Michael S. Sweeney, whose calm presence was truly welcomed on this journey. Advisor. Mentor. Friend. When I was wandering off into historical wastelands he kept me on track; when I stumbled across documents only an historian could appreciate he rejoiced; and even on my roughest of drafts he was quick to return copy with feedback that instantly put things back into perspective. Much gratitude also goes to the rest of my committee, Patrick S. Washburn, Katherine Jellison, and

Benjamin R. Bates, for their words of encouragement, exceptional charade skills, and unfaltering belief that I was onto something. Thank you.

Finally, to my parents, Philip S. and Ellen Walck, who never doubted when I left a perfectly good job that I loved to go to grad school; my brothers, Philip and Nathan, and sister-in-law, Rebecca, who know all my foibles and thereby never let me take myself too seriously; and Paula, Jim and the Metzger boys, who let me and my dog crash their couches, holidays, and camping trips, giving me a much needed respite when family wasn’t nearby to do so—there just aren’t enough words to express my gratitude.

xiii Table of Contents

Page

Abstract ...... iii Preface ...... v Dedication ...... xii Acknowledgments ...... xiii List of Figures ...... xv Introduction: Gaps in the Narrative of World War II ...... 1 Chapter 1: First Impressions: How an Antrim Bar Fight Introduced John Bull to an American Institution ...... 18 Chapter 2: Casting Blame: The Black Press Becomes a Target Following Riots in Detroit and Harlem ...... 61 Chapter 3: A Riot ‘Never Out of Control’: How the Press Reported A Night of Terror and How Bamber Bridge Remains in British Collective Memory ...... 129 Chapter 4: Epochal Change: How a Riot in the U.K. and an Explosion on a U.S. Naval Dockyard Became Pivotal Moments in World War II ...... 158 Conclusion ...... 205 References ...... 258

xiv List of Figures

Page

Figure 1. Davis Tours the British Isles ...... 52

Figure 2. The Face of Race Relations ...... 54

Figure 3. Inside Ye Olde Hob Inn ...... 133

Figure 4: Outside Ye Olde Hob ...... 135

xv Introduction: Gaps in the Narrative of World War II

The frustration and confusion felt by the author of a letter to the editor appearing in the Pittsburgh Courier on January 31, 1942, was palpable. He loved America. It was his home that he would defend. And yet, too many nagging questions lingered: “‘Should I sacrifice my life to live half American?’ ‘Will things be better for the next generation in the peace to follow?’ ‘Would it be demanding too much to demand full citizenship rights in exchange for the sacrificing of my life?’ ‘Is the kind of America I know worth defending?’”1 James G. Thompson, a twenty-six-year-old cafeteria worker at a Cessna factory in Wichita, Kansas, argued that the same evil inflicting injustice and tyranny on millions of people a world away were permitted to go unfettered in America through a second-class citizenship status foisted on 12.8 million people in the form of Jim Crow laws, blatant discrimination, and angry lynch mobs. His letter urged the newspaper’s editors—and American leaders—to consider two “V”s for victory: “The first V for victory over our enemies from without, the second V for victory over our enemies from within.”2

A week later, inspired by Thompson’s poignant letter, the Courier launched its own Double Victory campaign with a bold image that featured an American bald eagle— wings outstretched and standing atop two large, inset “V’s” with the words “Double

Victory at Home – Abroad” declared in all capital letters.3 One black press historian

noted the Double V campaign became high profile for the Courier, ranking it in historical

importance “with Ida B. Wells’s vigorous antilynching campaign and Robert Abbott’s

extraordinary call for blacks to leave the South. Other black newspapers quickly joined

in, continually pushing for a ‘double victory’ for the remainder of the war.”4 Double

Victory clubs sprouted up from Pittsburgh to Berkeley, California. Competing black

newspapers began reporting their own stories of prominent black churches in their

coverage areas sponsoring “Victory” meetings and social club activities in cities such as

Milwaukee and Chicago. The New York Public Library hosted a well-attended public

debate in New York City where editors of the black press expressed their views on the

merits of the campaign.5 And one year to the day after the Double V campaign’s launch,

The New York Times reported that the staff of the Pittsburgh Courier had been named

one of eighteen individuals or organizations honored by the New York Public Library’s

Schomburg Collection of Negro Literature for their contributions to race relations during

the previous year.6

But Thompson’s doubts about the America that was in 1942 were far from an anomaly. Indeed, there was a great divide among Americans in the earliest days of joining the Allied efforts in World War II—a divide that often fell on racial fault lines.

For white Americans, who would become the face of U.S. democracy in action through its troop deployments from England to Burma, the status quo was good, equal, and just.

Few saw need for change.7 Not so for African Americans.8

For the largest group of minorities in the United States, the country was not a

bastion of democracy and liberty for all. For them, it was a place that idealized and

promoted one thing but practiced something else. America’s allies would see this

duplicity, in words and deeds, as well. For Great Britain, the country’s closest partner, the

United States was a strange dichotomy where politicians boldly touted the Four Freedoms

of democracy, but kept a segment of its populace in societal bondage through Jim Crow

2 laws that limited who could vote, where one could live and shop, where one went to

school, and what jobs one could take. As this research will demonstrate, these same

limitations were deeply embedded in U.S. military society—policies that became

kindling that fueled friction and strife between white and African Americans to the point

that incidents became news events covered by the press in both nations.

For the last seven decades, WWII historians have turned to primary military and

government documents to demonstrate the disparity between how white and African

American armed forces were utilized during the war years.9 This study does not intend to repeat that research, but rather to expand on this knowledge by examining how the images and stories of U.S. troops in the print media—and the larger account of race relations in a war against a foe who constructed ideals of racial superiority—have contributed to the overall narrative of the American experience during WWII.

Military Policies Overshadowed by the Past

Military records dating as far back as America’s colonial days find slaves and freemen alike who served in colonial militias or used service in the Continental Army to gain their personal freedom from slavery.10 This tradition of military service continued during the American Civil War, where as many as 30,000 African Americans served in the Union’s naval force and an additional 186,000 donned the Union’s Army uniform despite concerns among some government officials about the merits of permitting them to carry firearms.11 After the Civil War, the U.S. military maintained four of the “Negro

regiments” that had been created during the conflict, and service members continued to

fill their ranks as the country entered the twentieth century.12 This tradition of military

service remained a strong source of “Negro pride” in the African American community

3 as the United States moved into a new century, with many leaders in the minority

community holding firm the belief that following the next major conflict, white public

officials would make good on promises to end discriminatory practices and policies

across the country.13 None were so outspoken as W.E.B. Du Bois, editor of The Crisis, a

publication of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

(NAACP), who urged his African American readers during the First World War to “close

ranks” and support the war effort, remaining confident that in the peacetime to follow,

they could anticipate societal gains such as those earned by past generations of African

Americans who had donned the uniform of the U.S. armed forces.14 Du Bois’s call to put

the nation before equality came at a critical time when many African Americans felt

sharp disappointment from the lack of progress they had made as a community—

particularly as hate speech, mob-driven lynchings, Jim Crow laws, and blatant

discrimination intensified, especially in the American South.15

Despite some 404,348 African Americans serving during World War I, a majority

found themselves caught up in military policies that kept them in heavy labor units and

service positions such as quartermasters, stevedores, and infantry units.16 Two African

American infantry divisions, the Ninety-Second and Ninety-Third, were deployed to

France, while the four regimental units that had dated to the Civil War were kept stateside in “defensive positions in the continental United States and its island territories.”17

The conduct of deployed troops in the heat of battle had had mixed reviews.

Army historian Ulysses Lee, in his seminal study The Employment of Negro Troops, noted:

4 In assessments of Negro participation in World War I, the two infantry divisions got the bulk of public and official attention both during and after the war. Their employment and conduct produced a fog of reports, rumors, and legends which grew and changed, with the passage of time. The Negroes’ view of their participation was considerably at variance with that of the Army’s senior commanders and of white officers of Negro units. Both views influenced heavily the developing attitudes of the public and the Army toward participation of Negro troops in future emergencies.18

Common complaints of the all-African American units during WWI were many, including: that they exhibited a gross lack of discipline and were disrespectful of fellow

African American officers;19 that doubts surfaced about the mental capacities of African

Americans to lead troops, with some military leaders expressing the opinion that only

“mulattoes” had the potential to become officers;20 that there circulated widely a belief

that African American troops were unreliable in combat;21 and that African American troops were quick to claim “special victimization” in terms of their treatment.22

According to Lee, during the interwar years, these stereotypes and complaints about all-African American units clouded how military leaders and government officials perceived the future roles of African American troops in combat. Further complicating the matter was the very real disparity in educational levels among African Americans and the general population. This concern about “efficient military administration and leadership”23 among African American draftees prompted discussions among U.S. military officials of maintaining a segregated armed forces and using white officers and noncommissioned officers to fill the educational and intellectual roles of military units, since reducing the number of black draftees would not be likely and social mores argued integration would not be an option.

5 The pre-WWI optimism expressed by African American leaders, such as Du Bois,

was quickly dashed. One historian noted of the First World War: “The press accounts of

bravery and accomplishment . . . were accompanied by unsettling rumors and allegations.

There was a report of Negro cowardice and ineptness, and another concerning the

mistreatment of Negro soldiers by white officers. . . . Negroes were understandably

disappointed, and The Crisis suggested that the army wanted these divisions to fail.”24

Historians have posited that these initial reports greatly influenced American military leadership going into WWII, because “many of the Army’s senior commanders of World

War II were the younger generals and field grade officers of World War I and many of the leading Negro protagonists and spokesmen of World War II were the Negro officers and enlisted men of World War I.”25

In 1922, the U.S. Army developed a plan that would influence how African

American troops were utilized in future conflicts. This proposal called for the continued

limitation of maintaining only four all-African American Army regiments and left the

development of “Negro National Guard units . . . entirely to the states.”26 It was this plan

that also called for the assigning of white officers to all-black units, maintaining separate

training facilities, and capping “negro manpower” to 10.73 percent of the entire

military.27 By 1937, military leaders were revisiting the issue of military manpower and concluded that “failure to provide larger percentages of Negroes in initial mobilization would result in the repetition of mistakes made in World War I.”28 Among other topics

discussed and addressed by the revised plan were the expectations of low African

American intelligence testing scores that would require larger percentages of the African

American population to be drafted in hopes of filling necessary positions. Additional

6 revisions to the mobilization plan, later in 1940, once more adjusted the proposed

percentage of African Americans to be drafted, but “the problem of the lack of balance

between Negro combat and service troops remained.”29

Between September 1939 and the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on

December 7, 1941, the U.S. Army grew exponentially, and with that growth came an

increase in the number of African American soldiers among its ranks, from barely 4,000

to 97,725.30 One historian noted that by the end of America’s first year of participating in

WWII, the number of African Americans in the U.S. Army totaled 467,883.31 Adding to

the challenge of this massive growth was the army policy to maintain a separate but equal

approach to training, meaning that it would accept African Americans into the military

branch as long as it was in segregated facilities and in direct proportion to that of the

general black civilian population in the United States.32 In other words, U.S. military installations needed two of everything to accommodate both white and African American troops—including dance halls and recreational facilities both at home and overseas—and despite the randomness of conscription the Army would only allow African Americans to make up 10 percent of its total population because that reflected the racial makeup of the civilian population.

Things were not much better for African Americans in the other branches of the

U.S. armed forces. The U.S. Navy maintained a very limited number of African

Americans among its ranks, and those who did serve were largely limited to steward positions on ships.33 The U.S. Marine Corps, the smallest of the American armed forces, blatantly opposed the admission of African Americans, while the Army Air Force initially blocked, then later followed the Army’s lead on its segregation policy.34

7 These race policies “created difficulties that were peculiar to the Negro units.”35

For example, policies dictated that in addition to African Americans training at separate facilities from those of their white peers, based on the experience of WWI, African

American units could not be commanded by black officers for fear that enlisted soldiers would not listen to their racial peers as officers. Military policies also forbade black officers to outrank white field officers in any particular unit. As a result, white officers— often from the South—were placed in command of black troops, which caused friction with the rank-and-file.36

This separate-but-equal approach became a sticking point between Secretary of

War Henry L. Stimson, who argued that wartime was no time to begin using the Army

“as a sociological laboratory for effecting social change within the military establishment,” and his civilian aide, William H. Hastie, an African American who advocated integrating smaller African American units into larger, all-white ones.37 Hastie

further argued that “(t)he policy of assigning most black soldiers to menial duties should

be stopped” and contended that segregation remained the “root of all difficulties . . . (that

offered) the most dramatic evidence of hypocrisy in our profession that we are girding

ourselves for the preservation of democracy.”38 Many of Hastie’s suggestions were adopted by the end of the war, despite being initially panned by white officials at the time he proposed them.39

As training transitioned into station assignments, it was not uncommon for

governors in Southern states to object to the stationing of African Americans at military

bases located within their borders. For example, Arkansas Governor Homer M. Adkins

protested the use of African American troops to guard a military airfield in his state, and

8 the governor of Mississippi objected to black instructors teaching whites at a military

institution in his state.40 At one point, the entire Mississippi state delegation objected to

the assignment of “Negro officers” in their state.41

Adding to the challenge of the debate over African American troops: leaders

within the African American community were not in unison either. Army historian Lee

noted: “Not all Negroes were agreed on the details of this participation. Some refused to

compromise on anything short of complete integration into the armed forces without

segregation of any sort. Others were willing to accept varying measures of segregation in

the hope of achieving compensatory advances in the form of additional opportunities for

service, promotion, and status within a segregated system.”42

Reporting on the “World Outside”

While historians have well-documented these developments in the evolving policy surrounding the use of African American troops during WWII, little attention has been paid to how these policies sparked racial strife among American troops—whether stationed stateside or abroad. Even less research has examined the role of the news media and how they reported incidents prompted by such discriminatory military policies.

It is with this in mind that this study seeks to examine how the mainstream print media in Great Britain and the United States, as well as the American black press, used words and images to present their audiences with pictures of “the world outside.”43 This

study will focus specifically on several events, both in the U.S. and in the U.K., where

racial tensions flared into public disturbances—or in the case of the final incident, led to a

disaster with a disparate number of casualties, based on racial demographics. The

incidents examined include:

9 Ÿ a stabbing outside a pub in Antrim, Northern Ireland, on September 30, 1942, chosen for study because it represented the first major recorded racial incident abroad between African American and white U.S. troops and occurred during the same time the

U.S. Army’s only African American general officer, Brigadier General Benjamin O.

Davis Sr., was conducting a high-profile tour of military posts with white and African

American troops;

Ÿ the Detroit race riots of June 20-24, 1943, selected because in a summer filled with race-based riots, historians consider this to be the most significant and certainly most violent of the WWII-era race riots;44

Ÿ the street firefight among Americans in Bamber Bridge, England, on June 24,

1943 (which is believed to have been fueled, in part, by news of the Detroit riots);

Ÿ the Harlem riots of August 1-2, 1943, a two-day melee sparked by a white policeman shooting an African American soldier trying to intervene in an arrest in a hotel lobby, which spurred a commodity riot that found many white-owned shops looted and stripped bare in Harlem;45

Ÿ the Bristol, England, race riot of July 13, 1944, the largest and last major race- based riot reported in the U.K. during WWII, occurred in the main city market a month after the Normandy invasion and left hundreds injured; and

Ÿ the Port Chicago, California, explosion on July 17, 1944, which left hundreds of

African American troops dead or injured and forced the military to revisit some of its policies regarding the uses of troops.

Questions driving this study included: What frames did the American press (both mainstream and black) use to portray racial tension among troops in the United States

10 between 1942 and 1945? What news frames did the American press use to portray the same racial tensions among U.S. troops stationed in Great Britain from 1942 to 1945?

How did the British press report these same racial disturbances that occurred in both the

U.K. and in the U.S.? How did story frames differ between the mainstream and black press? How do the written accounts and memories of World War II-era race riot survivors remember these racial tensions? What role did the U.S. military and U.S. civilian Office of Censorship play in controlling what was written about race relations among American troops?

The primary sources of information for this study included: newspaper coverage of each incident and subsequent editorial commentary; governmental documents, including correspondence among government leaders and military reports; and oral histories of individuals who were eyewitnesses. In terms of newspaper coverage, this study specifically examined news stories published in the days directly before and after each incident from January 1, 1942, through May 8, 1945. Although the United States entered the war on December 8, 1941, when Congress voted to declare war against Japan a day after Pearl Harbor was attacked, this study examined events in the press beginning with January 1, 1942, because U.S. troops were not mobilized until that month. Similarly, because the focus of this study was exclusive to events between U.S. troops in the

European Theater of Operations, the coverage period ended with V-E Day on May 8,

1945, rather than the official end of the war on September 2, 1945, when Japan signed its official surrender. Twenty-four newspapers were examined for this study, including twelve from Great Britain and twelve from the United States.

11 Local and regional newspapers were selected because not only do they represent

the newspapers of record for their respective coverage areas, but such publications also

have the potential to offer closer examinations of how local life might have been

disrupted or influenced by racial events. Among the British newspapers that reached local

and regional audiences, were: Belfast News-Letter, Belfast Telegraph, Bristol Evening

Post, Bristol Evening World, The Chorley Guardian, The Lancashire Daily Post, and the

Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror. American newspapers representing local and regional newspapers included in this study were: Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Boston Daily

Globe, The (Baltimore) Sun, Detroit Free Press, San Francisco Examiner, and the Los

Angeles Times.

National papers were also examined because, beyond functioning as papers of record, these types of publications also functioned as opinion leaders or influencers for the country. These publications also represented larger circulations in their respective nations. National British newspapers studied included: The Daily (London) Express, The

(London) Daily Mail, Irish News, News of the World, and The (London) Times. National

U.S. newspapers included: the Chicago Daily Tribune, The Washington Post, and The

New York Times. Because these mainstream U.S. newspapers largely excluded African

American life from their publications, three black newspapers were also examined:

Pittsburgh Courier, Chicago Defender, and The (Baltimore) Afro-American. These newspapers, in addition to being respectively the three largest-circulation black press publications in the U.S. during World War II, also had the largest number of war correspondents assigned to Europe from among the country’s black presses.46

12 The majority of domestic newspapers were collected through electronic ProQuest searches. In these cases, news coverage was first examined a day prior to each event— through both page-by-page and word-search methods—followed by each subsequent day.

Coverage of each event was examined, up until a week following the incident, to account for the influence of wartime censorship on the press and delays in news wire services. In the instances of the black newspapers, which were all weekly publications, coverage was examined up to three weeks following an incident.

For news coverage of the British press, the same approach was made, including news the day before the event, the day of the incident, and up to a week following the incident. Since a majority of the papers were on microfilm, digital and keyword searches were not possible. In those instances, whole pages were carefully scanned for headlines of the news events. Microfilm collections were examined and collected at the following libraries: Belfast Central Library; London Central Library; Preston Central Library;

Chorley Central Library; Bristol Central Library; the William T. Young Library,

University of Kentucky; and the Charles V. Park Library, Central Michigan University.

Archival work was conducted in both the United States and in the United

Kingdom. Primary documents from domestic archives included: the Dwight D.

Eisenhower Papers-Pre-Presidential, 1916 -1952 at the Dwight D. Eisenhower

Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas; the Philleo Nash Papers at the Harry S. Truman

Library, Independence, Missouri; the Benjamin O. Davis Sr. Papers at the U.S. Army

Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Records of Military Agencies Relating to African Americans from the Post-World War I Period to the Korean War, National

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland; and the National

13 Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) collection, Manuscript

Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. British archival work included Colonial

Office, Home Office, and Foreign Office records collections at the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast; Public Records Office-Kew Gardens; Preston Public

Records Office; and Bristol Public Records Office.

A Thematic Approach

Although there is a natural chronological flow to research of this nature, in the organizing of this work some more obvious themes emerged. As such, the chapters will focus on overarching themes in the narrative of the development of race relations during

World War II, rather than sticking strictly to a chronological order.

Chapter One examines the first major racial incident between African American and white U.S. troops stationed in Northern Ireland, also known as Ulster, in mid-1942. It will demonstrate how U.S. officials were aware of Allies’ concerns about the deployment of African American troops, but largely ignored those concerns. And while some military leaders went out of their way to make the deployment smooth, cultural adjustments still prompted reason for alarm and launched special investigations by the U.S. Army’s only

African American general, General Benjamin O. Davis Sr. This chapter will also examine how British officials feared racial incidents among Americans and fretted about the impact they would have on Britons, as well as how a lack of a color bar in Britain would create problems not only for African Americans, but also citizens of color from British colonies. Similarly, this chapter further examines how local politics—particularly among

Irish Catholics—influenced how the citizens of Ulster responded to the arrival of African

Americans in the summer of 1942.

14 Chapter Two focuses on the turbulent times in America during 1943, with particular attention on the Detroit and Harlem riots in June and August, respectively. It will examine how the mainstream press’ coverage compared with black press reports and similar news coverage in the British press. Particular attention will be paid to the matter of timing, and how a mishap at a radio station in New York expedited the arrival of information about the Detroit race riots in London, versus the length of time it took for the same papers to report the riots in Harlem. This is of particular interest given that publications during this time—especially newspapers in Britain—were concerned about aiding or inadvertently abetting the enemy’s propaganda efforts. This chapter will also examine how news organizations, as well as U.S. officials, were quick to assign blame for the riots and social unrest, often pointing to everything but the role that government policies might have played in fomenting these disturbances.

Chapter Three examines how a particular incident in a small village in northwestern England not only reflected the growing social unrest in the United States, but also deeply influenced how British citizens remember the war years. Through the lens of collective memory, this chapter examines how the “Munity at Bamber Bridge” remains a vibrant part of Lancashire’s narrative of the war years and how this continues through generational passing along of oral histories. This chapter also reveals the role the local press plays in enhancing—and extending—this collective memory from generation to generation.

Chapter Four focuses on 1944 and how two events in important port cities—one on the British West Coast and another on the American West Coast—marked an epochal moment in race relations during the war. In the United Kingdom, a ruckus in Bristol a

15 month after the Normandy invasion would become the last major incident between

African American and white U.S. troops on British soil as the Allies began to hone in on

victory in Europe. In America, a devastating explosion at Port Chicago, a naval dockyard,

would not only force U.S. military officials to re-examine who worked where, but

analysis of press coverage of the tragedy demonstrates the disparities between how the

mainstream and black press reported an event that left hundreds of African Americans

dead or injured.

Finally, the conclusion examines what bigger lessons can be learned through this

close examination of press coverage during WWII. It will demonstrate the differences

between the U.S. and British press, the role of stereotypes in the press, and how

censorship influenced this period in world history.

Democracy: A Reality in Time

By the time WWII ended in the summer of 1945, African American troops were

serving side by side with their white peers in Allied foxholes from Europe to the Pacific.

The demands of total war ultimately proved too powerful for the separate-but-equal

mentality U.S. government and military officials had stubbornly clung to when the

country entered the conflict a few years earlier. It also marked a turning point for the U.S.

military—putting a permanent fissure in misguided arguments against social

experimentation during wartime—by ultimately pushing an institution steeped in

tradition into decidedly new territory as a forerunner of social integration in America by

1948.47 To be sure, it would take two more decades for African Americans, such as the

Courier’s letter writer, James G. Thompson, to see American society take more permanent steps toward racial equality. But even in those earliest days of war, Thompson

16 saw glimmers of hope that the United States could become a shining light of democracy for all. He concluded his letter to the Courier with great optimism: “I might say that there is no doubt that this country is worth defending; things will be different for the next generation; colored Americans will come into their own; and America will eventually become the true democracy it was designed to be. These things will become a reality in time; but not through any relaxation of the efforts to secure them.”48

Despite living in the America that was 1942, Thompson held out hope for a society that could be. For many African Americans of his generation, it would take deployment to Northern Ireland for them to catch a glimpse of what that future might look like. Seven decades later, many are still waiting to see these dreams of equality become reality.

17 Chapter 1: First Impressions: How an Antrim Bar Fight Introduced John Bull to an

American Institution

American troops marching in formation through the streets of Belfast were a

welcomed sight to the war-weary citizens of Northern Ireland—also known as Ulster—in

late January 1942.1 Newspapers that rarely ran photographs during the paper rationing of the war years suddenly dedicated dozens of column inches to images showing the arrival of the Yanks.2 In one photo, a cheeky American soldier stood on a ladder to woo an

Ulster woman leaning out of a second-floor window. Newspaper editors labeled him an

“American ‘Romeo’” attempting his first conquest of war, while another image featured the profile of a U.S. soldier chomping down on a fat cigar as he surveyed his new surroundings.3 Editorials breathlessly praised the speed of the Americans, whose president just three weeks earlier had promised manpower to his nation’s new ally after the country was drawn into World War II with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on

December 7, 1941. An editorial in the Belfast News-Letter noted: “No more striking demonstration of our great ally’s earnestness could be desired than the presence of these fighting men in our midst.”4 It was as if the British Isles had suddenly taken a collective

sigh of relief.

The first African American troops would not land in Northern Ireland for another

six months.5 Unlike their white counterparts, the arrival of African American troops

would not be heralded in the British press nor would Ulster newspapers dedicate column

inches to stories and photographs documenting their arrival or record their romantic,

wartime conquests. The American press, on the other hand, briefly noted that African

American troops had deployed to Europe for the first time since World War I. The New

York Times ran a photo on page eight of its July 29, 1942, edition across the three top center columns. Similarly, the Chicago Defender ran a photo documenting the deployment of African American troops on page six of the newspaper’s July 25, 1942, edition. Both images featured a platoon-sized unit of African Americans interacting with

British troops. Neither photo named the soldiers or their unit, as unit identification would have run counter to censorship regulations. But the similarities between the photographs ended there. The Times image depicted a platoon standing around a refreshments table in

Northern Ireland shortly after landing. Two white Ulster volunteers are pushed into the far corner of the frame. They appeared to be observers rather than participants. The soldiers, meanwhile, looked frightened and uncertain. It is a stark contrast to the photos of their white compatriots who had arrived triumphantly months earlier and paraded down the main streets of Belfast, proud looks on their faces, as they wooed Ulster women.

The Times image was starkly different than what ran in the weekly, black press publication, the Chicago Defender. In a newspaper that routinely featured stories and images of African Americans participating in the war effort, this image ran across four columns on the top of the page. And while it also featured a platoon-sized unit of soldiers, the composition was quite different. In this picture, the troops are engaged in conversation with a corporal in the British Royal Air Force. Everyone is smiling as the white airman showed off a piece of equipment captured from the Germans. The spoils of war. The men appeared to be comfortable and at ease with each other. The image reaffirmed to the Defender’s African American readers that there was no color bar in

19 Britain and that the men deployed there were enjoying a life not possible back home in

the States. 6

These images were hidden from view for a majority of Ulster citizens. Instead, thousands of African American troops quietly dispersed across Northern Ireland and into villages scattered across England, practically doubling the small island nation’s minority population overnight.7 For many African Americans, especially from Southern states, the

deployment would be the first time they were in a society where Jim Crow laws did not

dictate the boundaries of everyday life. For their white American counterparts,

deployment became a frustration as they saw African Americans stepping out with

British women and, in many instances, being treated better by their British hosts,8

breeding hostilities among the camps. And for Ulster citizens, particularly Irish Catholics,

the arrival of African American troops to Northern Ireland in the autumn of 1942

represented an opportunity to passively defy the crown by socially engaging with them—

much to the dismay of British and American officials.9

This chapter will examine how British officials expressed concerns about the arrival of African American troops into their homogenously white society, how the government attempted to control disturbances, how the British braced for the predictable unrest among the Americans, and how British officials put pressure on editors by urging them to exercise discretion in how newspapers reported racial tensions. It also will look at measures American military officials took to help smooth over potential racial issues among deployed units—including a highly publicized tour of the U.K. by the U.S.

Army’s only African American general officer—with little success, and eventually resorted to an extension of Jim Crowism in Northern Ireland and across the U.K. Finally,

20 this chapter examines how predictions of racial problems were quickly realized outside an Antrim bar, in a village just north of Belfast, by examining British and American press reports of the incident.

While British historians have included Antrim in their list of examples of high- profile racial tensions that occurred among American troops stationed in Britain,10 previous research has largely ignored media coverage of the incident. Similarly, previous research has failed to examine the story frames used by the press to report this first major incident that resulted in the death of one American soldier and the serious injury of another. By further study of this incident, it will be argued that a better understanding of the routines used by the press to report racial tensions will be helpful in appreciating the larger picture of race relations during the war. It will also be argued that because this event occurred early in the war, both the British and American press demonstrated greater freedom in terms of how it was reported—a freedom that diminished as the war dragged along and news organizations exercised more self-censorship and experienced more government-imposed censorship as fears mounted about how stories of racial disunity could and would be used in Axis propaganda.

Questions driving this study included: What frames did the American press, both mainstream and African American publications, use to portray racial tensions among troops in Northern Ireland and Antrim? How did the British press report the same racial disturbance? Were there differences in these story frames? How do Belfastians recall the arrival of American troops in 1942? What do these citizens remember about race and racial tensions during this period? And what evidence is there that censorship—whether

21 self-imposed by news workers or imposed by their governments—influenced the publication of the Antrim incident in the summer of 1942?

The primary sources of information for this study included: newspaper coverage of the Antrim incident and published editorials; U.S. and British governmental documents, including correspondence among government leaders and military reports concerning racial tensions among U.S. troops; and oral histories of individuals who remember the American troops arriving in Ulster in 1942. This chapter specifically examined news coverage from September 30, 1942, through October 10, 1942, in twenty- four newspapers, including local, regional, and national newspapers in both Great Britain and the United States. The period of examination was expanded into mid-October for the

American black press publications because of weekly production deadlines and lengthier story turnaround.

Creating a “Considerable Flutter” in Ulster

“MORE AMERICAN TROOPS IN ULSTER,” the headline in the Belfast News-

Letter blared across the top three, center columns on the front page of the May 19, 1942, edition.11 Below the single-deck headline, sandwiched between stories about the war efforts in the China-Burma-India campaign in the East and Vichy talks in Rome, ran a photo of American troops walking down the gangway of their ship. Even five months after the first arrival of Americans, the press in Northern Ireland was still reporting relief at the sight of more Allied forces. The paper’s military correspondent noted: “It was heartening to see the tanks coming ashore”12 in the largest contingent of American troops since the United States had joined the war effort. In the months that followed, the newspaper would print images of the Americans—U.S. sailors saluting the American flag

22 at a naval base in Londonderry; U.S. commanders participating in ceremonies with the

Lord Mayor of Belfast; and servicemen playing exhibition games of American baseball

on the local soccer pitch.13

Indeed, in a summary of American forces and military activities in 1942, an

Ulster cabinet official noted the general camaraderie between American and British troops from the first arrival of Yanks in early 1942. The report noted: “The first arrival on the 26th of January was a mere token force of some 4,000 men. . . . [T]heir coming

caused a considerable flutter all over Ulster and they received an official welcome from

the Governor and Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and Sir Archibald Sinclair the

British Air Minister.”14

As British and American troops prepared for the Northern Africa Campaign, the same cabinet member noted that cooperation and conviviality among the troops left positive feelings all around. The official report added:

It may be said too that the British did not find the Americans so assertive as they might have feared, nor did the Americans find the British so unsociable and supercilious as they might have expected. In fact, generally, the American was treated by the garrison and populace of Northern Ireland as a welcome guest and there was much effort, both public and private, to make his stay as pleasant as it could be in the circumstances.15

The official credited much of this to the fact that many of the first Americans to arrive in

Ulster were from the U.S. Midwest and young men raised on farms rather than major urban centers. These Yanks fit well into the rural surroundings of Northern Ireland and were generous to the citizens, even to the point of raising funds for war orphans, sharing their rations with the general populace, and showering the regional children with sweets.

23 But the shiny veneer of the American invasion16 did not last long in some quarters of British government. By June 1942, British officials in the Colonial Office, Foreign

Office, and Home Office were all voicing serious concerns about the implications of the

Americans stationed in the British Isles. Of particular concern: The numbers of African

American troops en route and how racial tensions among the Americans might influence

British society. Fears quickly became reality, from Northern Ireland across the British

Isles.

A “Very Nasty Situation Brewing Up”

One Colonial Office official noted to a colleague on June 24, 1942: “I hear through a liaison officer with the Americans that they [white U.S. soldiers] are taking a threatening attitude about the blacks and coloured people they find over here. They were proud of having ‘beaten up’ one, apparently an American negro, who ‘gave himself airs’ at some entertainment.”17 The official added that there had also been growing talk among the Americans that they would lynch anyone of African descent seen dancing with white girls. He noted: “Allowance must be made for loose talk of course, but I fear there may be a very nasty situation brewing up.”18 The official concluded that as a matter of

imperial policy, “we cannot encourage a colour bar or tolerate outrages on blacks.”19 It

did not take long for accounts of “nasty situations” to start popping up across the small

nation.

John L. Keith, a welfare officer in the Colonial Office, noted just a few days later

that a white American soldier had publicly insulted a former serviceman from West

India—an incident that had resulted in a police report. Keith further noted: “There is to

my knowledge apprehension among coloured Colonial people in this country about the

24 generally rude attitude the American soldiers take towards them, and it is clear to me that

the presence of American troops in any Service hostel makes impossible the entry of

Colonial Servicemen.”20 A month later, Keith wrote to Sir Charles Jeffries, in the

Colonial Office at Whitehall, noting that the large numbers of African American troops in

the U.K. was “having repercussions on our work for coloured Colonial people, and the

treatment the Americans mete out to their negroes is the subject of comment by coloured

Colonials.”21 Keith noted that during a conversation with African American troops

stationed in the Liverpool area, he had been told that white Americans were preventing

them from using the same places for entertainment when they were given passes off post.

American commanders had suggested presentations to British military staff explaining

the complex race issue back in the U.S., prompting Keith to note to his colleague:

Any discriminatory treatment of coloured persons in this country is bound to react on the work we are trying to do to break down the colour bar and to help coloured people in this country to fit into the work and life of this country. I do not understand the references to lectures to be given by Americans on the colour question. It would be very undesirable for the Americans to lecture British people on colour bar! I think in our interests we should press the Americans to provide very fully for leave, recreation, sports etc., for their negroes, and we should suggest to them that they might seek our assistance and that of other persons and agencies to provide suitable hospitality etc.22

He concluded by observing—rather prophetically as it would turn out—that any attempt

by the Americans to segregate troops would result in British citizens developing a strong

resentment toward their allies.23 Keith’s observations were an about-face from comments he had made just a month earlier, when he had said it was “rather a pity that the

Americans cannot bring over some of their negro fighting men,” which at the time he

25 thought would perhaps help ease the lot for Colonial minorities still trying to adjust to

British society.24

These mounting concerns were not limited to the Colonial Office. By July 1942, similar concerns about race and race relations began to arrive in the form of letters to the

British Home Office from chief constables across the country as the number of American troops arriving in the British Isles kept increasing. Oxfordshire’s Chief Constable T.E. St.

Johnston, in a letter to Sir Frank Newsam, the British undersecretary of state in the Home

Office, noted:

Eighteen hundred American troops are now quartered in this County, and many more are expected in the near future. Although all the troops that have arrived so far are white, it is expected that there will be a fair proportion of coloured troops among the incoming contingents, and the problems that will arise when this occurs, have been under active discussion in this County during the past few days.25

St. Johnston went on to state that neither the Home Office nor the War Office had

established a policy26 regarding African American troops in the U.K., and in discussions

with colleagues in the southern part of the country there were growing concerns “that

serious clashes are likely to occur between American white troops and American

coloured troops, unless definite regulations are laid down in order to segregate these

persons when off duty.”27 The Oxfordshire constable added that it was his opinion that if left to themselves, the African American troops would be fine, but that “the American white troops will create trouble if it is found that the coloured troops are associating with white civilians, and in particular with white girls.”28 Although he initially proposed that

certain parts of British towns be dedicated white areas, and others, strictly for African

26 American troops, St. Johnston admitted that implementing such a proposal would prove

difficult for local authorities. He added:

The colour bar, as such, is not understood in this Country, and the British public who have been encouraged from the start of the War, to give hospitality and a friendly reception to members of the armed forced of all Allied Nations, will wish to give hospitality to coloured troops. This has actually occurred in Gloucestershire, where it is understood that coloured troops have been received into people’s homes and are being entertained in exactly the same way as white troops billeted in the neighbourhood. The British public do not object to white women being seen with the members of the coloured races, especially in Oxfordshire where for years past, no differentiation has been made with respect to the Indians and Africans who have been members of the University. In fact the President of the Oxford Union during the ensuing year is a West Indian. The only persons who will take objection to the association of white people with the coloured troops will be the American white soldiers, and it therefore appears that the matter is primarily one for treatment by the American Military Authorities as an internal disciplinary problem.29

St. Johnston further suggested that it be clearly emphasized to the American military

leaders that they were guests in the U.K., and as such, expected to behave accordingly.

He concluded by suggesting a propaganda campaign for the Americans be conducted to

better explain the British position on African American troops and the lack of a color bar

in the country. Similarly, he urged the Home Office to consider finding a way to prevent

British women from “misconducting” themselves with African American troops, “if for

no other reason than that we do not desire to have a certain proportion of the population

semi-coloured, in rural districts in this Country in the future.”30

It did not take long for St. Johnston’s latter request to gain traction among officials in the Home Office. By August 10, 1942, a confidential memo entitled “U.S.A.

COLOURED TROOPS” was circulating among members of the Home Office and the country’s Regional Commissioners. Drafted by Harry Haig, regional commissioner for

27 the Southern Regional Headquarters, the two-page report outlined how the presence of

African American troops in the U.K.—and their interactions with British civilians—could

stir up problems among American troops and urged a nationwide educational

undertaking. Haig noted that while waiting for American military officials to make a final

decision on its policies regarding troops, public complaints about incidents could

develop, adding:

If, therefore, we do not want to see criticism of the American authorities develop, it would be wise to do a little educating of our population in the history and facts of the coloured problem in the U.S.A. . . . [I]t is suggested that discreet propaganda should be put about in the areas where coloured troops are intended to be stationed, primarily intended to reach the girls.31

Haig’s report went on to outline the contents of the propaganda piece, which regional

commissioners envisioned would include a “sympathetic historical statement” about how

African Americans arrived in the United States, the experience U.S. leaders had when

attempting to “mix the races,” and the general societal difficulties that resulted. Haig’s

proposal noted: “This implies no inequality. But the races are different in character, in

education, in outlook; and intimacy in the end means trouble. Do not treat them in any

way as outcasts. Be helpful, be kind; but not intimate.”32

Further, Haig wrote that the regional officials concurred that this propaganda

campaign should be limited to word of mouth: “On no account should there be any Press

discussion or publicity.”33 Similarly, he felt that local authorities must be warned, in a discreet manner, of the “dangers of arranging for mixed entertainments, particularly dances.”34 Haig and his colleagues concluded that while their region had little practical

experience in dealing with race relations, “there are fairly wide-spread apprehensions of

28 the trouble that may arise when the coloured troops come to this Region, as it is

understood they certainly will.”35

Two days after Haig’s memorandum on the “U.S.A. Coloured Troops” began to circulate among Regional Commissioners, one unnamed official from the Bristol area offered his opinion on how the Home Office should proceed. He noted: “In this Region we have had some experience of the coloured problem. It is true that our experience has been very limited, and that up to date no serious incident has occurred. There are, however, definite pointers to the fact that unless something is done about the whole matter, we shall have incidents, and that if they multiply, they may represent in bulk a very serious problem.”36 The regional official noted that “broad and large” a majority of the citizens in the area had no idea the presence of African American troops could present any problems.

Further, the unnamed author felt that extending hospitality to African American troops was not a concern, but rather, of greater concern was shielding more vulnerable civilians from them. He wrote: “[I]t is a matter of protecting from deplorable consequences certain of our womankind, and of averting, should those consequences develop into fact, possible trouble between ourselves and the Americans.”37 Specifically, the official feared that lower-class women, who perhaps did not know better, could be easily taken advantage of by African American troops who, with deep pockets to woo women, also purchased bicycles to allow them greater mobility in the countryside. He noted: “And there is no doubt that a very large number of girls, some of them outwardly of respectable class, are now walking out with coloured troops.”38 Adding to his personal frustration was that many of the women were really just girls, between the ages of sixteen

29 and eighteen, who were no longer under the organizational control of schools or social

groups that Haig’s proposal intended to target with a word-of-mouth propaganda

campaign. As such, he concluded by urging the Home Office to use haste in putting

together a plan:

I should like to emphasise the need for speed. Broad and large the darky is a simple minded child. But like other children, if you give him an inch he will take an ell and once he has taken an ell, the trouble will have started. . . . The problem is an urgent one, in my view. Only yesterday I was given an authentic account by a responsible person of two young girls coming out of a public house, escorted by one buck nigger, all of them in drink. Speculations on this sort of incident are rather frightening. We have in the Regions been presented by the Government with a tar baby, and no sort of guidance as to how the creature is to be nourished, educated, or controlled. Somebody at the top has got to have the guts to give us guidance, so that we may proceed upon a level and considered national policy. The matter is of some urgency, in order that we may prevent calamities which will become apparent in nine months’ time, with all their consequences.39

After reaching consensus among the Regional Commissioners and Home Office staff, an informational circular, along the lines of Haig’s original proposal, was offered to the War

Office, Ministry of Information, Foreign Office, and Colonial Office for recommendations. Newsam noted that the response had been positive, adding: “If all the

Departments concerned agree, the draft circular will be shown to the American Military

Headquarters in London before issue to the police.”40 Eleven days later, Newsam presented the approved circular to Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commanding general of the U.S. Army in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO).

American officials: Discrimination should “be sedulously avoided”

Frank Newsam’s August 31, 1942, letter to Eisenhower, the highest-ranking U.S.

official in the ETO, was framed as being written as a courtesy that was certainly owed to

the commanding general of American troops in Britain before the country’s constables

30 and police departments were presented with an informational circular. But rather than

raising the much-discussed concerns about biracial births, the dangers of street fracases,

and fears of building resentments among British civilians, Newsam instead used an

incident in Liverpool to explain why British officials felt strongly about enforcing their

country’s policy of nondiscrimination in public places. He noted:

Certain incidents have been reported to us which, in our view, make it desirable to issue instructions to the police in this matter. For example, there was one incident . . . towards the end of July, when white American seamen and soldiers resented the association of British women with coloured American troops. The situation became so menacing and ugly that the police on the spot decided to part the soldiers and the girls in their own interests. One police officer spoke to the girls while another police officer pointed out to the coloured American soldiers that their association with white women seemed objectionable to white American troops, and that in their own interest it would be much better if they and the girls parted company. The coloured soldiers resented being spoken to on this matter by the British police, and one of them replied: “It is not democracy if we cannot do what we like.”41

Newsam concluded that he felt the general should know about the difficult position

British police officers were being placed in, and suggested that knowing the U.S. government’s approach to matters between its service members and U.K. civilians would give him “an opportunity” to take any further actions among his service men, “as seems to you desirable.”42 Eisenhower’s Acting Chief of Staff Brigadier General John E.

Dahlquist responded three days later: “The Commanding general is in complete accord with the instructions the Home Office proposes to issue. This policy of non- discrimination is exactly the policy which has always been followed by the United States

Army.”43 He also noted that U.S. Army officials had a policy in place that if a particular

place was “out of bounds” for some U.S. soldiers, it was considered “out of bounds to all

United States Army personnel.”44

31 Indeed, shortly after the arrival of African American troops to the British Isles,

the U.S. Army’s Adjutant General’s office issued what it called a “Policy on Negroes”45 to the Commanding General and Service of Supplies staff in the European Theater of

Operations, U.S. Army (or ETOUSA) that essentially placed the responsibility of maintaining peaceful race relations among U.S. troops on their commanding officers.

Lieutenant Colonel Fred A. Meyer, the assistant adjutant general, wrote at the command of Eisenhower: “It is the desire of this Headquarters that discrimination against the Negro troops be sedulously avoided.”46 He noted that the Red Cross had already been informed that African American troops could be expected to enter their clubs in the ETO and that

“wherever it is not possible to provide separate accommodations, the Negro soldiers will be given accommodations in the clubs on the same basis as White soldiers.”47 Although

Eisenhower and the Adjutant General’s Office were well aware that commanders of white and African American soldiers stationed in camps near smaller towns might find it difficult to give equal accommodations, especially when dances or socials were concerned, the commanders were expected to “use their best judgment in avoiding discrimination due to race, but at the same time, minimizing causes of friction between

White and Colored Troops. Rotation of pass privileges and similar methods suggest themselves for use; always with the guiding principle that any restriction imposed by

Commanding Officers applies with equal force to both races.”48 These policies and

pronouncements made it clear that Headquarters Command expected each commander to

do his part in ensuring that troops deployed to Great Britain would behave themselves.

Similarly, the U.S. War Department issued a seven-page pamphlet that aimed at

preparing American soldiers—many of whom had never been exposed to other cultures

32 or traveled overseas—for life in wartime Britain.49 Thousands of the pamphlets were published and handed out to U.K.-bound troops, offering pointers on everything from not insulting their hosts with boastful talk about past wars and refraining from pointing out

“Tommy’s” need for American assistance to taking advantage of British hospitality.50

The pamphlet went on to remind the U.S. troops that the British had many similarities to

Americans. It noted: “In ‘getting along’ the first important thing to remember is that the

British are like the Americans in many ways—but not in all ways. You will quickly discover differences that seem confusing and even wrong.”51 Although the short booklet did not directly address the issue of race relations, it hinted that there were elements of

British culture that represented a departure from the societal norms back in the States. It concluded with one final line: “It is always impolite to criticize your hosts; it is militarily stupid to criticize your allies.”52

U.S. military officials’ concerns about race relations did not end with introductory pamphlets for their troops to life in wartime Britain. ETOUSA also issued a memorandum to commanders and leaders of African American troops explaining the sensitivity of the issue, noting that one in ten American soldiers were minorities. It added:

Colored Americans, along with all others, have been taught the national ideals of the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution of the United States. Limitations of their civilian activities and opportunities contrary to those ideals growing out of custom and personal beliefs, concerning group differences, have no place in our army life. So far as they involve discrimination on basis of race or color, they are contrary to specific provisions of selective service legislatives, and they are fatal to military efficiency.53

The memo to commanders of African American troops argued that in the name of military efficiency, team work would be required of everyone and noted that the

33 ETOUSA Commanding General—presumably Eisenhower—sincerely hoped that “every

soldier returning to the homeland, will take back this comradeship, mutual respect, and

the spirit of helpfulness developed during his service with us.”54 The memorandum

concluded by announcing that Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, who at the time was

the U.S. Army’s only African American general officer, had been tasked with

commanding a special section that would be responsible for investigating and “adjusting

problems which may arise in connection with the command and leadership of our colored

troops.”55

U.S. military officials were not the only individuals in the U.S. government deeply concerned about the race issue. The civilian U.S. Office of Facts and Figures established a Bureau of Intelligence that, as early as March 1942, was contemplating how

Axis radio might use the race issue against the Allies in its propaganda war. To counter the “unconfirmed ‘news’ reports on Axis shortwave radio,” the Bureau established a list of recommendations and guidelines for how U.S. censors might exercise control over the media.56 These suggestions ranged from advising the U.S. press, particularly radio

broadcasting companies, to “be more cautious in selecting and identifying such reports

before publication” and educational programs to help inform U.S. citizens of Axis

propaganda efforts, to establishing a news desk in Washington, D.C., where an

experienced newspaper editor would be “on call” for telephone consultations.57

The Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) also closely monitored African American morale. In the summer of 1942, it launched a confidential, in-depth examination of societal issues influencing morale among African Americans—both domestically and those in the military. It should be noted that the OFF was a short-lived U.S. government

34 office that was closed and its work blended into that of the Office of War Information

(OWI), which was established by a Presidential Executive Order on June 13, 1942.58 An

Office of War Information consultant, Milton Starr,59 conducted the study, noting rather

idealistically his intention was to “analyze briefly the whole field of Negro morale on an

entirely realistic basis. The writer realizes that the pure principles of democracy are far

from fulfillment in the life of the American Negro.”60 Starr evoked verbiage echoing that of W.E. Du Bois’s famous The Crisis editorial three decades earlier, when he noted in his opening paragraphs that during this time of national and world crisis, it was essential for

Americans to “de-emphasize our many long-standing internal discensions [sic] and to close ranks as much as practicable for the duration.”61 He further warned that the nation’s

enemies would do everything in their power to create dissention among Americans, and

that race relations was essentially the chink in the U.S. government’s armor—and that the

American black press was falling prey to this disinformation campaign. At the same time,

Starr warned, “it would be the sheerest folly to violently antagonize thirty million

southern whites in a hopeless attempt to placate thirteen million Negroes.”62

Starr was not the first—nor the only—U.S. official to reach such a conclusion

about the black press in America. In mid-June 1942, U.S. Attorney General Francis

Biddle met with John Sengstacke, publisher of the Chicago Defender and founder of the

Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, to discuss how negative commentary in the

black press was “hurting the war effort.”63 In that meeting, Biddle insisted that the black press tone down its war rhetoric immediately, but Sengstacke countered that that would not happen “unless the government worked more closely” with the black press.64

35 Although there is nothing to link Starr’s report to any outcomes from that meeting between Biddle and Sengstacke, it is evident that by the time the OWI consultant wrote his report in the late summer of 1942, he was clearly advocating the idea that OWI officials pursue information that demonstrated social gains for African Americans—but only when it appeared practical to do so. Starr concluded:

There are not enough “bands playing” for the Negro soldier or civilian in this war. The radio, movies and press are all teeming with a spontaneous morale-building propaganda singing the glories of the Marines at Wake Island, of MacArthur’s men in the Phillipines, [sic] of our heroes in the Navy, air service, etc. The Negro is not getting his fair share of this “band music”, and it would not be too difficult nor too costly to arrange a program of propaganda which would give the lie to the current notion prevalent among the Negroes that “this is a white man’s war.”65

Starr argued that by sending more information about the role African American troops were playing in the war, it would raise the general public’s awareness and increase

African American morale as a whole.

Jim Crow, Women, and Whiskey in Northern Ireland

It did not take long for many of the citizens of Northern Ireland to develop a preference among the American troops. One Northern Ireland Member of Parliament,

Dame Dehra Parker, noted in a letter to Robert Gransden, the assistant secretary to the cabinet secretariat, that in her district of Moneymore “the coloured men are well looked after.”66 In fact, she stated, the African American troops were perhaps better looked after than their white compatriots in towns to the west of Belfast, just across Lough Neagh.

She added: “Apart from the feelings of the troops concerned, the whole situation is bad.

Our people do not understand and seem to prefer the black to the white. I am told that this applies particularly to the R.C. [Roman Catholic] population and of course—the lowest

36 class of white girl.”67 Parker’s comments reinforced some of the primary fears that

British officials in the Home Office, Colonial Office, and Regional Commissioners had

expressed among themselves throughout the summer of 1942.

However, unlike officials in Whitehall who feared illegitimate biracial births and

the social consequences of intimacy with African American troops, Parker’s comments

about the Northern Irish Roman Catholic’s preference for African American troops

hinted at a more serious concern that was exclusive to Northern Ireland: the festering

tension between the Catholics and the Protestants. Historian Simon Topping noted:

Northern Ireland was also, in effect, a single-party state dominated by unionists (Protestants), which excluded the Irish nationalists (Catholic) minority from government and discriminated against them in everyday life. Elements within this minority, who viewed the partition of the island as illegal, periodically destabilized the state, notably during a spate of terrorist attacks in 1942.68

To be sure, reports of sectarian violence in the form of car bombs and shootings by

members of the Irish Republican Army reached the American press during the fall of

1942.69 Topping argued that it was this disparity in the treatment of Irish Catholics by their unionist government that prompted many citizens in Northern Ireland to passively defy Stormont by engaging in friendships with African American troops—knowing full well that officials in Westminster disapproved of such behavior. The historian also argued that perhaps most noteworthy was that although the types of problems that generally came with Americans deployed to the U.K. in WWII were “mirrored in

Northern Ireland,” what was rather unusual was “the infrequency of serious flashpoints . .

. where racial problems appear much less often in government reports than from other

37 regions.”70 This could be, in part, due to the tremendous effort put into organizing

recreational activities for visiting troops across Northern Ireland in 1942.71

For members of the Northern Ireland Welfare Committees—volunteer groups quickly formed across Ulster in an effort to entertain U.S. and Canadian troops during their down time—these flashpoints had a commonality: alcohol. Several committee members raised concerns about the role alcohol played in many communities where few other entertainment options were available. The committees had already begun petitioning local governments, particularly in Belfast, to permit movie theaters to open on

Sundays as an entertainment option for the troops. One committee report noted: “If the

Northern Ireland Government are not prepared to look with favour on such proposal, then it is considered that support should be given to a request for an extension of the authority already given by the Secretary of State for the opening of a number of places in and around Belfast.”72 An entire agenda item of the same welfare committee meeting was

dedicated to the issue of drink. The meeting notes observed: “Many of the comparatively

minor troubles that have arisen are undoubtedly due to the sale of spirits to troops,

American troops in particular.”73 With more money to spend than their Canadian and

British counterparts, American troops—the welfare committees were discovering—often purchased entire bottles of whiskey from publicans to drink after the pubs closed. Or, sometimes, “illicitly distilled spirits” were offered to troops through the black market.

By September 10, 1942, the Welfare Committee confirmed that U.S. military officials had agreed to make pubs that sold entire bottles of liquor “off limits” to troops regardless of race. U.S. military officials also noted they would work with Ulster officials to report publicans that were selling illegally to troops.74 At the same meeting, it was

38 noted that several cinemas in Belfast and Londonderry had agreed to open on Sundays to

troops and were working with the mayors of both cities to secure civilian guests of troops

permission as well. But these measures to spread soldiers out across Northern Ireland

were increasingly difficult as the number of troops continued to increase throughout

1942. The strain of so many Yanks in Northern Ireland was evident by December. A

Postal Censorship Report noted the increasing unpopularity of American troops. One

Belfast letter writer noted to a friend in the U.S.:

Six countys [sic] are over run with Yankee soldiers. I went to a dance in Newcastle once and was I glad to get out of it safe, I don’t think there was a sober man in the place and they fought with each other like mad men they wernt [sic] long till they had the place to themselves, but I think the whiskey here is too strong for them.75

Another writer from Belfast, a month earlier in a letter to a friend in the United States,

noted the growing unpopularity of U.S. troops, and voiced concerns about the behavior of

African American troops toward Ulster women: “The Yankee troops are not at all

popular. They have to be kept out in the country. If a negro in U.S.A. would even try to

do some of the things they do here, they would be strung up on a lamp post. Is it the

custom over there for men to embrace strange women in the street?”76 Yet another correspondent, this time from Portadown, was slightly more blunt in a January 8, 1943, letter to someone in the U.S.: “It will be a red letter day in Ireland the day the Yankee

Army clears out. I expect there are some decent fellows amongst them, but they are the worst set of drunkards ever imported into any place.”77

Seven decades later, Belfast citizens still recalled the overall popularity of

American troops and the disparity in treatment of African American troops, more so than

39 their drunken antics. Kathleen Rajan was eighteen when the American troops arrived in

Belfast. She remembered:

Oh, it was exciting because it was something really new. A lot of the young men from Northern Ireland had already gone to war. My boyfriend at the time, he became my husband, had been gone for a while. The Americans . . . had a lot of money and the girls, of course, liked that. They were well-to-do and better paid. They also had things for us to do. It wasn’t like today. We had concerts and pictures or films, as you say, and parties at churches.78

Although the war-weary city enjoyed the distraction that the Americans brought, Rajan said the arrival of U.S. troops also had a downside in the form of broken hearts all across

Ulster. She recalled:

The Americans came and took over and suddenly you’d hear that that engagement or this romance broke off. There were lots of broken hearts at that time. One friend of mine, his fiancée met an American solider and she just wrote and told him she was marrying an American. Just like that. It broke his heart. He came home and was absolutely broken hearted. He never saw her again.79

Rajan also remembered hearing stories about how local parish priests were regularly asked by white American commanders to hold segregated masses for the U.S. troops stationed in town and felt tremendous pressure when they refused, insisting on integrated services.

Exercising “Great Discretion”

On August 21, 1942, the Belfast newspaper editors were called into a meeting with Stormont officials and British Troops Northern Ireland (BTNI) Lieutenant Colonel

Turnham to discuss the steps being taken by U.S. commanders to encourage a better understanding of the British troops, to address the difference in prevailing attitudes toward African American service members, and to talk about concerns that the disparity

40 in salaries between Americans and British troops might prompt. Based on the topics of

discussion in the meeting minutes, it is clear that British officials were convinced that it

was more of a matter of when—and less of a question of if—something would happen

among the U.S. troops. According to Stormont’s account of the meeting:

Col. Turnham, addressing his remarks to the editors, asked for their aid in “playing down” incidents that may occur which were not serious in themselves, but which by undue publicity could be played up by their enemies in order to strain relationships between the two countries. He states that the incidents so far reported had been handled with great discretion by the newspapers and he hopes that the authorities could depend on the newspapers to use their influence to foster good relations between the two Forces.80

The British officer argued that because little of significance was happening on the battlefront, readers would be more focused on the small incidents that sprang up between

Allied forces, but that “when the war activity became more marked” that attention would lessen.

It should be noted that British wartime censorship was much more severe than that found in the United States during WWII. Where American editors and publishers agreed to a “voluntary domestic censorship,”81 the British press saw the war bring “a great self-abnegation of power by the Press.”82 British Press historian Mick Temple noted

more recently, that the British government’s wartime censorship practices went much

deeper. By 1940, the “draconian” Regulation 2D, introduced by British home secretary

Sir John Anderson, “gave government the right to ban publication of material or

publications ‘prejudicial to national interest’: those accused had no right of appeal in the

law, and inevitably, comparisons with Nazi Germany were made by opponents.”83 In

addition to government officials holding the right to shut down publications, Temple also

41 noted it was common for British censors to cut articles out of publications arriving in

Great Britain from the United States because of questionable content.84

This heavy-handed approach to the press during the war years meant that it was not uncommon for British government and military officials to hold meetings with the country’s newspaper editors and publishers to request tempered approaches to news stories. Such was the case during the August 21, 1942, meeting in Northern Ireland.

Stormont officials later reported: “The newspaper representatives present assured Col.

Turnham that they would do everything possible to encourage a better understanding between the two Forces and would deal with great discretion with stories that might occur regarding friction between men of the two Armies.”85 This resolve was tested nine days

later, in the village of Antrim, located just eighteen miles northwest of Belfast.

The First Casualty

The first casualty of racial unrest among American troops in the ETO was Private

William C. Jenkins, who died of knife wounds he sustained on the evening of September

30, 1942, in the village of Antrim. The incident involved what would become the

hallmarks of future incidents between African American and white U.S. troops deployed

to the U.K. during WWII—the deadly mixing of alcohol, prejudice, and white Military

Police. The Belfast Telegraph, which was the first newspaper in the study to name

Jenkins as the victim, published on the afternoon of October 1, 1942. The nine-paragraph

story ran down a single column on page three, sandwiched between a story about the

Russians advancing to Stalingrad and another involving a shooting incident with the Irish

Republican Army in Belfast.86

42 The Telegraph noted that Jenkins, an African American, was “stabbed to death

during a disturbance in the streets of Antrim about nine o’clock on Wednesday night.”87

The article noted that an unnamed, white soldier was also injured. The report described

the incident, noting that Jenkins was among a group of U.S. soldiers who “came under

the notice of a U.S. military patrol.”88 When the MPs ordered the men to return to camp, the newspaper reported, the soldiers refused, a “disturbance ensured” and prompted gunfire.89 Once calm had been restored, Jenkins was discovered “lying in a pool of blood, knifed to death.”90 The Telegraph’s report also quoted from a press release, issued by the

ETOUSA Northern Ireland Headquarters, that described a scene where several shots were

fired, but made a point to clarify that Ulster civilians were not involved in the incident.

The only time race is identified in the news report is in terms of the individuals fatally

injured or with serious injuries. The rest of the report left it to the reader to determine if

the group of soldiers ordered back to their barracks were all African American. Likewise,

it is up to the audience to conclude that the MPs making the orders were white.

A day after the Telegraph’s report, the Irish News published a five-paragraph

news story—anchored on the bottom right-hand corner of the front page—with a headline

declaring in all capital letters: “AMERICAN SOLDIER KILLED IN ANTRIM STREET

FRACAS.”91 The Irish News relied heavily on the official press release leading the short

story with a verbatim republishing of the U.S. military’s official description of the

incident that left one soldier killed and another seriously injured. The paper then goes on

to explain that the Press Association learned that “the U.S. soldier killed was a negro,

while the wounded soldier is a white man.”92 The Irish News expanded the story by reporting that the incident occurred outside of a public house in Antrim, which is where

43 Jenkins and the group of men were approached by the MPs. Again, racial descriptors

were missing from the rest of the account, leaving audience members to reach their own

conclusions about the races of the other individuals involved in the street fight.

It would seem that the Antrim incident was quickly moved to the press wires in

Northern Ireland because the Belfast News-Letter’s report reads identical to the one found

in the Irish News. The most significant difference is that where the News turned a

sentence into a secondary headline, the News-Letter used it as the lead sentence. The

News-Letter editors also created a sub-headline “CLOSING TIME” that indicated the

incident occurred around the time the Antrim pub closed.93 The report also noted that it

remained unclear how the white soldier was seriously wounded—whether from knife

wounds like the African American soldier who had died, or from gunshot wounds.

Neither soldier was named. The News-Letter concluded by reporting: “It is understood

that no inquest will be held.”94 None of the Northern Ireland newspapers felt it necessary to editorialize about the incident. Instead, their editorial columns focused on debates in the House of Commons over relaxing regulations limiting travel from Britain to Northern

Ireland,95 and the latest from the Eighth Army’s fight in Egypt against Rommel’s

forces.96

Among the mainland British newspapers examined, The (London) Times was the

only other British news organization to report the Antrim incident. The two-paragraph

brief, under the headline “U.S. SOLDIER KILLED IN ANTRIM,” appeared on October

2, 1942, in the middle column at the bottom of page two.97 From the wording, it is

apparent that the Times pulled the story off of the press wires or from a wired copy of the

ETOUSA Northern Ireland Headquarters press release. It cited the official statement and

44 noted it had been issued a day earlier. The statement, much like what was reported in the

Northern Ireland press, noted that there had been a “disturbance in the streets of Antrim”

between American MPs and soldiers.98 The brief reported that shots were fired, leaving one soldier dead from knife wounds, and another seriously injured. It concluded by reassuring British citizens that the incident was exclusive to U.S. troops and no civilians were involved. There is no acknowledgement of race, nor any mention of the pub and the possible role that alcohol might have played in the fracas.

On the Times’s editorial page, editors pontificated on growing anxiety over coal supplies as London and the rest of the country began preparing for winter, while a staff columnist expanded on the growing disunity in India. However, at the very bottom of the editorial page, a letter to the editor carried the headline: “COLOURED SOLDIERS.”99

Written by a D. Davie-Distin, a snack bar manager for a shop located in Oxford, the

author wrote that the shop’s employees felt compelled to comment on the current state of

affairs in England—particularly surrounding the issue of race. Davie-Distin described

how an African American soldier had come into the store the night before, carrying a

note from his commander. In the note, the commander begged the shop owner to look

after the soldier, who was responsible for running supplies across the country and often

missed regular meals and was having difficulty securing food off-post. The letter-writer

noted:

Naturally, we “looked after” him to the best of our ability, but I could not help feeling ashamed that in a country where even stray dogs are “looked after” by special societies a citizen of the world, who is fighting the world’s battle for freedom and equality, should have found it necessary to place himself in this humiliating position. Had there been the slightest objection from other customers I should not have had any hesitation in asking them all to leave.100

45

The letter to the editor concluded by noting that when the soldier departed, he left a

payment that was twice the amount of his check. For the readers of The Times, that letter

to the editor would be the only mention of race in the newspaper that day. None of the

remaining eight British newspapers—neither in Bristol nor in Lancashire—reported the

incident from Antrim.

News Crosses the Atlantic

News of the Antrim incident traveled quickly. The New York Times, The

Washington Post, and the Detroit Free Press all published wire reports of the incident on

Friday, October 2, 1942—the same day news hit The (London) Times. The Chicago Daily

Tribune reported the Antrim street fight more than a week after the fact. Among the mainstream newspapers in this study, these four publications were the only ones to report the first major racial incident among U.S. troops deployed during WWII. Three of the four newspapers noted the racial identity of the men involved.

In a newspaper that claimed to publish all the news fit to print, The New York

Times turned to United Press wire services for its source on the Northern Ireland incident.

Under a headline declaring: “U.S. SOLDIER KILLED IN BRAWL IN IRELAND,” the

Times noted in the subhead that an African American soldier was stabbed to death during an altercation where Military Police were involved.101 The six-paragraph story ran down- page in the second column on page three. The story began with original reporting from the wire services, it noted that an African American soldier had been stabbed to death and a white U.S. soldier seriously injured when MPs “had to use force to break up a brawl outside a pub in the village of Antrim.”102 The wire story noted that witnesses reported

46 multiple shots had been fired, prompting residents to flee the town. The story also

expanded what was written in the British press when it reported that several soldiers were

arrested. The story noted: “The argument was reported to have started as Negro troops

left the pub. The military police rushed up, but the Negroes refused to disperse and the

police were forced to draw their revolvers.”103 The story concluded with the same

statement reported by the British press, issued directly from the ETOUSA Northern

Ireland Headquarters, including the fact that civilians were not injured in the incident and

the lack of acknowledgement by military officials of the races of soldiers involved in the

fracas—or the role race might have played in the event. It should be noted that The New

York Times story does not identify either soldier by name.

Even careful readers of The Washington Post might have overlooked the two-

paragraph brief published on October 2, 1942, on page four about the soldier killed in

Antrim. The last brief in half a column of “War Sidelights,” the International News

Service wire story was whittled down to two paragraphs under the headline: “Yank

Killed in Ireland.”104 The races of the soldiers involved in the brawl were eliminated from the report. Instead, readers would only learn that one U.S. soldier was “stabbed to death and another shot seriously in an altercation with military police in the streets of

Antrim.”105 And while the brief noted that it was an order from MPs for the U.S. troops to return to their barracks that prompted the fight, there was no indication the military police officers were white. Nor was it acknowledged that the soldiers refusing their orders were

African American. Again, neither the killed soldier, nor the seriously injured one, was named.

47 The Detroit Free Press, like The New York Times, also turned to the UP wire

service for its two-paragraph story about the Antrim bar fight in its October 1, 1942,

edition. The brief, which ran at the bottom of page two, declared: “Yankee Soldier Dies

in Irish Brawl.”106 The lead sentence noted that an African American soldier had died and

a white American soldier was seriously injured after U.S. military police “had to use

force to break up a brawl” outside the Antrim pub.107 The short story also noted that

several American soldiers were arrested in connection with the incident, but the report

did not identify the names of neither the killed nor the injured man. Nor does the Free

Press version mention the ETOUSA headquarters press release.

A day later, the Chicago Daily Tribune published a story about how British girls

between the ages of thirteen and sixteen were throwing themselves at U.S., Canadian, and

“other overseas troops” stationed in Great Britain.108 It would, in fact, be a full week after the incident in Antrim that the Tribune reported a U.S. soldier was killed in a street fight in Ulster. Even then, the story was limited to a single-paragraph at the bottom of page nineteen. The Associated Press brief gained its newsy edge by announcing that just a day earlier, U.S. military officials in Northern Ireland had named the soldier who died from knife wounds in Antrim. The brief noted: “United States army headquarters disclosed today that the Negro soldier killed Sept. 30 in a street fight . . . was Pvt. William

Jenkins.”109 The other new information: Jenkins was from Evansville, Indiana.

Same Story, Different Frame

The Pittsburgh Courier, Chicago Defender and The (Baltimore) Afro American all reported the stabbing death of an African American soldier in Northern Ireland in

October 1942. All three newspapers, with weekly publications on Saturdays, had just

48 missed getting the news into their papers the first weekend in October. The Courier and

the Defender both reported the news on October 10, 1942. The Afro American published

the following week. And while all three black presses utilized wire services—the

publications were limited to either the Associated Negro Press (ANP) or the National

Negro Publishers Association (NNPA) because they were banned from membership in

mainstream wire services such as the AP or Reuters110—the manner in which the news

was reported both in terms of headlines and placement on pages varied.

For readers of the Courier, the bold headline: “SOLDIER KILLED IN

IRELAND,” in extra bold font, dominated page twenty-two, despite being below the fold

and only three paragraphs long.111 Flanked at top and bottom with the Courier’s Double

Victory campaign “VV,” the unidentified wire report is nearly identical to the UP wire story that appeared in The New York Times a week earlier. But where the Times used the term “Negro”112 to refer to African American soldiers, the Courier edited the copy to say

“colored.”113 Courier editors also deleted the direct quote from the ETOUSA Northern

Ireland Headquarters that had been tacked on to the end of the Times wire story. The paper did include the last sentence, which stated that no civilians were injured in the violent altercation. Courier editors, despite taking the time to use a Belfast, Northern

Ireland dateline, did not identify from which black press wire services the story was pulled.

The Defender, on the other hand, clearly identified that it used an ANP wire story in a brief with the bold headline: “SOLDIER SLAIN DURING KNIFE FIGHT IN EIRE” on page two of its October 10, 1942, edition.114 In terms of who was involved in the fight,

however, the two-paragraph brief was rather vague. It stated: “One Negro solider was

49 stabbed to death Wednesday night and another sustained serious gunshot wounds after

military police used force to quell a fight outside of a pub (tavern) in the village of

Antrim.”115 The wire brief explained that an argument that involved several soldiers started outside of the pub, but when MPs arrived, the soldiers “refused to disperse,” prompting the police to draw their service weapons. In the description of the altercation, racial identifiers were not used, leaving readers to guess that the soldiers were most likely

African American, while the MPs were most likely white. Again, there is no mention of the name of the soldier who was killed, nor the soldier seriously injured.

A week later, the Defender ran another ANP wire story, this time confirming the soldier’s death and naming him as Private William Jenkins of Evansville, Indiana.116 The

two-paragraph brief noted that Jenkins was the victim of a stabbing. It also explained

how the incident began: “Trouble is said to have started in a pub (tavern) between

soldiers who had been drinking there. They moved out to the street and continued the

argument.”117 When military police attempted to breakup the argument, violence broke

out and “Jenkins was killed in the melee.”118

The Afro American was the last of the newspapers to report the Antrim incident.

In an ANP wire story, published at the bottom of page three on October 17, 1942, the

story was nearly identical to the brief published the same day in the Defender—with one

exception: The Afro American did not call the fight a melee. Instead the brief concluded,

“Pvt. Jenkins was the victim of knife wounds.”119 Again, the role that race might have

played in the incident was stripped out of the wire story, although the influence of alcohol

as a potential accelerant in the street fight was retained. The only other mention of the

Antrim incident in the Baltimore-based newspaper came in the form of a front page story,

50 also published on October 17, 1942, by wartime correspondent Ollie Stewart, who had

attended a press conference held by Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis Sr. As the U.S.

Army’s only African American general officer, Davis had been tasked just a month

earlier with overseeing race issues in the ETOUSA, after conducting similar inspection

tours of African American troop conditions in basic training camps and Army

installations across the United States during the first half of 1942.

Davis Gets a “Tough Assignment”

The arrival of General Davis to the ETOUSA Headquarters in late September

1942 as an advisor to the U.S. Army’s Service of Supplies Commander Major General

John C.H. Lee, created a stir in both the American mainstream and black press alike (See

Figure 1). Newspapers that would fail to report on the Antrim incident did not miss the

opportunity to publish wire stories about how the nation’s only African American officer

general was now in the U.K. and tasked with overseeing African American soldiers

stationed there.120 The fact that Davis’s appointment was news demonstrated the importance of his assignment. The magnitude of the work was not lost on Davis himself.

Just days after his arrival in London, Davis wrote his wife, Sadie, on September 30, 1942, attempting to verbalize the significance of his task:

I have received a rather tough assignment. I have had to be firm in several instances. I think my action is effective. Some of the folks in addition to being inexperienced appear to be afraid. There are reminders that we are in the Theater of operations. Yesterday morning during a heavy rain an enemy plane came out of a heavy cloud and dropped several bombs on a town through which we passed a couple of hours later. We could hear the detonations. These troops, white and black of the Service of Supply have to work very hard. I am afraid that they are not sufficiently hardened and disciplined.121

51 Davis’s ETO post inspections and tours of the working conditions of African American soldiers began immediately. In fact, he was in England only a matter of days when the

Figure 1. Davis Tours the British Isles Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis Sr., far left, leaving a building during an inspection tour of African American troops in the U.K. (Source: Benjamin O. Davis Papers, box 36, folder 26, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.)

Antrim incident prompted a visit to Northern Ireland, where he conducted an investigation on behalf of the Army. Historian Marvin E. Fletcher noted:

He talked with American soldiers and policemen and Irish civilians. The news of Davis’s work quickly reached the American black press, whose members were able to reassure their readers that Davis was on the scene, investigating problems. After finishing his work, he left for England on the evening of 8 October. . . . he submitted a report to General Lee on the murder of the black soldier. The SOS commander was impressed with the work and asked Davis to accompany him on another inspection tour. This pleased Davis, who thought that Lee was an officer who understood what he, Davis, could contribute.122

52 The significance of Davis’s inspection tour of the Northern Ireland operations,

and subsequent investigation into the murder of Private Jenkins, is substantial because it,

in part, demonstrates that U.S. military leaders were aware of how volatile race relations

among American troops had become in a short amount of time. It also reveals that

Eisenhower and his command staff had been proactive in attempting to resolve these

matters, rather than reactionary to increasing racial tensions.

This timeline of Davis’s arrival in the U.K. also counters British historians Simon

Topping and Graham Smith, who have argued that the U.S. military’s only African

American general officer was dispatched to the British Isles because of the incident at

Antrim. Topping, describing Davis’s work in the ETO, wrote: “General Benjamin O.

Davis, the first African American general, examined inter-racial violence on or near

military bases in the United States and was sent to the U.K. in the wake of the events in

Antrim.”123 Smith, more than two decades earlier, claimed: “The growing problem of clashes between black and white GIs in Britain, and in particular the death of a black soldier in Antrim, Northern Ireland, persuaded the Army to offer Davis a unique role. He was charged by Eisenhower with conducting an investigation into racial friction in

Britain.”124

While it is true that Davis had spent the first half of 1942 troubleshooting racial

issues in the U.S., investigating incidents at military installations from Camp Livingston,

Louisiana, to Fort Dix, New Jersey,125 he was already in the U.K., essentially continuing

this same work when the Antrim murder occurred. If anything, it could be argued that

Davis’s presence in England—combined with the unfortunate timing of the incident

between white and African American troops in Antrim shortly after his arrival in

53 theater—only served as a reinforcement that the U.S. military had much more work to do

in terms of handling race relations among its own troops.

Davis’s high-profile position as the U.S. Army’s only African American general

officer also made him the de facto contact person for all things race-related in the U.S.

Army during the war—both in the United States and on the British Isles (see Figure 2).

During his time in England, Davis met with Lady and Lord Astor, who passed him on the

street and stopped to invite him into their home. Davis would later declare the hostess as

“charming.” Davis also met with America’s first lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, during her

heavily publicized tour of Bristol in November 1942.126

Figure 2. The Face of Race Relations Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis became a recognizable figure among U.S. Army officers stationed in England in fall, 1942. Left to right: Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, Davis, and Brigadier General W.G. Weaver. (Source: BODP, box 36, folder 26, USAMHI.)

54 During his time in Britain, Davis received numerous letters from American and

British citizens expressing their views on race and race relations. For example, one

British woman expressed her perplexity over the race issue in a handwritten letter dated

October 25, 1942. She asked how white American soldiers could be so “unchristian” and

so “impertinent” as to demand to their British hosts who could and could not be

entertained in private homes.127 Miss M. Lyall also asked Davis to explain his country’s position on race relations and prejudice. She wrote: “I have never been able to understand the American attitude to ‘color.’ Racial prejudice is an evil, wicked thing.”128 To be sure,

Lyall admitted, her own countrymen were often quick to dislike foreigners, but she

blamed that on Britain’s regrettable tendency toward “insularity and unfamiliarity with

others [rather] than racial prejudice.”129

Of one thing Lyall said she was quite certain: “America is a great country, but it is time she attend her views on the color question—if she really means to be on the side of justice and equality for all peoples. I trust that this will come in due time. Perhaps this terrible war will bear fruit in ensuring a juster and happier world afterwards.”130 Lyall’s letter is telling, in that it demonstrates and helps explain the growing frustration among

British citizens, as early as October 1942, over the U.S. Army’s handling of African

American soldiers during WWII. Lyall’s frank correspondence also demonstrates how clearly the citizens of Great Britain understood and acknowledged the duplicity in what

U.S. leaders said versus the policies they implemented—even if the leaders themselves were blind to the problems such policies were causing in countries hosting African

American troops.

55 Conclusion

Race, nearly from the onset of the U.S. troops’ deployment to Great Britain, was

of great concern among both British and American officials. But the reasons for concern

were quite different. For the British officials, race relations were an added layer of

nuance that began with general consternation over the differences between the two

nations and their troops. American soldiers came to the British Isles better dressed, better

paid, and better supplied in terms of food as well as war materiel. These facts—combined

with the romantic notions fed to British society through Hollywood films about how

glamorous Americans were—meant that jealousy on the part of British soldiers would

almost inevitably spark conflict between the men.131 Adding to the concern were men

acting out of line merely because it was wartime and they were far from home. One

British woman, in a letter to a friend, wrote:

Things are getting pretty bad in Bedford. The Yankees are molesting and beating up no end of girls, and getting a really bad name for themselves. Luckily, I have escaped, but I had rather a tussle with one in the High Street the other night. He was drunk and clung to me like grim death. I was by myself and I had been to the pictures. It was about 10.20 so the High Street was full of drunks staggering out of the pubs. I don’t think anything of a fellow having a drink but when he doesn’t know when he has had enough and makes a nuisance of himself, well, it’s the limit. A lot of the girls here have been ruined by some of the officers. I think they are worse than the ordinary privates.132

Racial differences only added to British officials’ concern, particularly where their womenfolk were concerned. Fears of a sudden influx of illegitimate, mixed-race war babies prompted the Home Office to launch a word-of-mouth campaign among women’s groups urging British women to avoid intimate relationships with American troops— particularly African American soldiers. British officials also struggled to explain the

56 American attitude toward African Americans to a nation that had little exposure to people of African or Caribbean descent. This difficulty was only complicated by Britain’s vast holdings across the globe in the form of colonies where people of color were the majority and an imbalance of policies created similar situations to the institution of Jim Crow laws in the American South.

American officials, particularly military leaders, were also keenly aware of the potential problems matters of race could present to their troops deployed overseas. As early as 1940, President Roosevelt, in an attempt to appease the African American population and garner their votes, appointed Judge William Hastie, the dean of Howard

University’s Law School, as a civilian aide to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.133

Two years later, while setting up his command in the ETO, Eisenhower appointed Davis as commander of a special section in the Inspector General’s Office that would be tasked with investigating and “adjusting problems which may arise in connection with the command and leadership of our colored troops.”134

Eisenhower seemed convinced, perhaps rather naively, that the strong guidance and discipline enforced by a capable Army officer corps, from second lieutenant to general, could ensure that white and African American soldiers would put their domestic differences aside for the greater good of the war effort. Further, he was convinced that in so doing, “every soldier returning to the homeland, will take back this comradeship, mutual respect, and the spirit of helpfulness developed during his service with us.”135 His dream of bringing racial harmony to the United States, through the institution of the U.S.

Army, was a lofty and unattainable goal ahead of its time.136 It was certainly an

57 unachievable goal for Northern Ireland in the fall of 1942, as well as over the next two subsequent years as additional chapters in this study will demonstrate.

In terms of how the media reported race and race relations, several trends emerged. Perhaps most noteworthy was that the Belfast Telegraph, a unionist newspaper, was the first publication to name Private Williams Jenkins as the victim of a stabbing, sparked by racial violence in the streets of Antrim on September 30, 1942. It would be a full week later before other newspapers, including those in the U.S., would report the soldier’s name—after the ETOUSA Northern Ireland Headquarters issued a statement releasing Jenkins’s name. In reporting the soldier’s name first, the Telegraph demonstrated the most independent reporting among the newspapers in this study.

Rather than relying solely on the ETOUSA press release about the Antrim incident, Telegraph staff conducted independent research and learned the soldier’s name in time for the next day’s newspaper deadline. This was a bold move, especially considering just nine days earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Turnham, the BTNI commander, had gathered the local newspaper editors and urged them to exercise restraint in terms of how they reported racial incidents. It would seem that in this instance at least, the

Telegraph defied those orders and demonstrated the hallmarks of a free press, despite wartime, in terms of reporting the Antrim incident. Ironically, the Irish News, which did not send editors to that meeting, essentially published the ETOUSA press release verbatim.

It should also be noted that among the British papers reporting this first racial incident, the news story was predominantly framed as an American soldier had been killed in a street fracas between other Yanks. Because it was outside a bar, alcohol was

58 likely involved, although this was not reported explicitly, but rather implied. The fact that

the soldier who died was African American was secondary information or not mentioned

at all.

In terms of the American black press, the same weekend that The (London) Times

and The New York Times were reporting the initial incident, Defender correspondent

George Padmore had a front-page column addressing the growing concern about race

relations among the Americans deployed to the U.K. Padmore’s censored dispatch

reported: “More and more each day the entire question of race prejudice and U.S.

pressure to extend discrimination to the British Isles is coming realistically to the fore

here.”137 While his column was not unlike others in competing newspapers, Padmore did write rather tongue-in-check, when he noted that certain topics are more easily passed through wartime censors, than others. He continued:

While yet no official ruling has been made to lay off color bar difficulties, the trouble I have experienced in transmitting such information clearly indicates that the subject is disliked. This policy is in some respects tragic for it epitomizes for the colored races throughout the world the fundamental issue of the war and is the touchstone of the sincerity of the United Nations in implementing the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.138

Padmore’s commentary makes one wonder how much of the wire services’ downplaying of the racial tensions, the issue clearly at the heart of the Antrim incident, were a direct result of censorship, rather than the ETOUSA Northern Ireland Headquarters controlling the message in terms of what information was available to news organizations picking up the story for publication.

One thing is clear: as early as October 1942, British and American newspapers were at the mercy of wartime censors and military officials when it came to sensitive

59 information involving U.S. troops and race relations. For newspapers local to the incident, as was demonstrated in the Antrim incident, a greater level of autonomy was achieved with independent news reporting routines evident—including investigative efforts to secure the names of the victims and details about the role race played in the incident. Considering how heavy-handed the British government was in terms of enforcing wartime censorship, the blatant defiance of Telegraph in the form of detailed reports on the Antrim incident could be viewed as yet another political act of defiance against the crown and officials in Whitehall—actions that had much more to do with local politics than concerns about the war or Americans fighting outside of a bar. Another clear lesson from Antrim was that unlike the American press, which was heavily divided along racial fault-lines based solely on skin color, the British press clearly saw the frame of “American” as a racial identifier. To the British press—and its readers—the term

American clearly meant both ethnicity and race.

60 Chapter 2: Casting Blame: The Black Press Becomes a Target Following Riots in

Detroit and Harlem

In the early summer of 1943, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services issued a routine

but cautionary press release from J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.1 Under a heading that declared: “WARNING: From the F.B.I.,” Hoover advised his fellow Americans to be vigilant against enemy sabotage. He noted that while sabotage is often physically visible it can be subversive as well. Hoover wrote:

“There is another kind of sabotage – the sabotage of those who are trying to undermine

American unity with whispers. Watch out for those who try to spread the propaganda of hate. Be on guard against anyone who tries to tell you that this country’s troubles are caused by any one group or religion.”2 He then offered a twelve-point list of potential whispered propaganda topics, from broad subjects such as the work of the British and

Russian Allies to more domestically narrow subjects, such as draft and rationing boards and the Red Cross. The last item on Hoover’s list: “Negroes.”3 Then, in a rather prophetic turn, Hoover noted that propaganda against these listed items were part of the “enemy’s trick – because the enemy is trying to get us fighting among ourselves.”4 Hoover and the

FBI would not have to wait long to see whisper campaigns gain footholds as cities across

the United States began to explode into full-fledged riots and disturbances along racial

fault-lines. Beaumont, Texas. Mobile, Alabama. Los Angeles, California. Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania. Camp Stewart, Georgia. Washington, D.C.5 But these minor skirmishes paled in comparison to events that occurred in the U.S. in the summer of 1943: Detroit and Harlem.

Detroit, home of the American automotive industry, became a major industrial

center during World War II, earning the city the nickname of the Arsenal of Democracy.

Between June 1940 and June 1943, more than half a million Americans—of which some

50,000 were African Americans—relocated to Detroit to work in its factories.6 Racially based strikes, poor housing conditions, and an ambivalent local government all combined to turn Detroit into a “keg of dynamite with a short fuse,” according to historian Dominic

J. Capeci Jr.7 The city exploded on the sweltering evening of June 20, 1943. Fighting,

which began on Belle Isle, a 985-acre recreational public park along the Detroit River

popular among African American residents, quickly spread into the city. After four days

of violence, some thirty-four people had been killed and 676 injured, and $2 million in

damage had been done to personal property.8

Two months later, on August 1, 1943, an incident involving a disgruntled

customer in the lobby of a Harlem hotel led to an altercation between the thirty-five year

old African American woman and a white police officer. The verbal clash prompted an

African American soldier to intervene on the woman’s behalf and a scuffle ensued. As

the soldier fled the lobby he was shot in the back. Rumors quickly spread around Harlem

that a white policeman had killed an African American soldier, prompting a riot that

began around 10:30 p.m. and lasted until the next day.9 By the time peace was restored to

Harlem, six people had died, 185 were injured, more than 550 African Americans were arrested, and some 1,450 stores reported damages totaling more than $5 million.10

The scale and scope of the violence in both Detroit and Harlem left historian

Capeci, decades later, to observe that, “Without doubt, World War II had sharpened racial tensions.”11 Because the violence was happening on American streets—rather than

62 on the streets of foreign, unnamed cities—American newspapers from Detroit and New

York to Washington D.C., and San Francisco reported the riots as major news events. So

much so that, in some instances, the news reports minimized the latest war reports from

abroad or pushed them inside the newspaper. Within days, mainstream U.S. newspaper

editorials and news reports cast about American society in search of someone or

something to blame for the violent outburst. Among U.S. government and military

officials, however, a target had already been well established: the American black press

itself.12

This chapter examines how mainstream and black press newspaper articles from the U.S. portrayed these two incidents, with particular attention to how race was reported and framed in the news coverage. Similarly, it will examine how the British press reported the news of the rioting in Detroit and Harlem, with particular attention to how race was reported. This chapter also examines the extent to which British newspapers censored themselves, in some cases refraining from reporting the incidents in Detroit and

Harlem at all.

While historians as well as social scientists have closely examined the Detroit and

Harlem race riots in 1943—and what prompted these explosive moments in American society—little scholarly research has focused on news routines and how the media reported these events for mass audiences. Similarly, little research has focused on how leaked radio news reports of Detroit’s being placed under martial law and under the control of federal troops influenced the flow of news to publications in Great Britain. It will be argued that examining these media practices expands our understanding of how

63 the press and wire services worked during the war years, and how wartime censorship both in Great Britain and in the United States influenced public knowledge of events.

Questions driving this study included: What frames did the American press, both mainstream and African American publications, use to portray racial tensions among

Americans in Detroit and Harlem in 1943? How did the British press report the same racial disturbances? Were there differences in these story frames? What evidence is there that censorship—whether self-imposed by news workers or imposed upon them by their governments—influenced the publication of the events in Detroit and Harlem in the summer of 1943?

The primary sources of information included: newspaper coverage of the riots in

Detroit and Harlem and U.S. and British governmental documents, including correspondence among government leaders and intelligence reports of events leading up to the riots. This study specifically examined news coverage of the Detroit race riot from

June 21, 1943, through July 1, 1943, in twenty-four newspapers, including local, regional, and national newspapers in both Great Britain and the United States. In the instances of the black press, the weekly publications were examined through July 17,

1943, to accommodate the news cycle. Similarly, news reports of the Harlem riot were examined from August 1, 1943, through August 7, 1943, in the same twenty-four newspapers. Among the black newspapers, publications were examined through August

14, 1943, to accommodate the weekly news cycle.

Detroit: Not on the Radar Screen

In a June 21, 1943, Office of War Information summary of racial tensions across the United States, Detroit was not listed among the sixteen cities in the eight-page report

64 presented to Jonathan Daniels, the administrative assistant to President Franklin D.

Roosevelt, and Philleo Nash, the assistant deputy director of the Office of War

Information. Instead, Beaumont, Texas topped the list of racial hotspots. The report noted

that two days of rioting had begun in the Texas city on June 16. The two-day melee left

two men dead—one white, one African American—and some sixty African Americans

hospitalized. An estimated one hundred homes and shops, mostly those of African

Americans, were also severely damaged. The report observed:

Everything seems quiet but tense at Beaumont and Orange today. No trouble since first outbreak. Beaumont says quite a large segment of white population there not satisfied and still harboring ill feelings toward Negroes. Negroes keeping off streets and 11 P.M. curfew continuing tonight renewal of trouble will break if any. Texas guard still enforcing martial law.13

The report narrative noted that under Colonel Sidney C. Mason, a group of Texas

Rangers, local police, and state troopers had effectively enforced martial law in

Beaumont. The report quoted Mason as stating: “The Negro Section of Beaumont has been literally stomped into the ground.”14 The narrative on Beaumont concluded:

Beaumont is a congested area whose population has grown from 65,000 to 100,000 since the war. Previous inter-racial incidents have marked it for some time as a point at which violence was likely. A few weeks ago, local authorities placed separate buses in service for Negroes and whites.15

Another Southern city topping the OWI list of potential racial hot spots was Mobile,

Alabama. The field officer there noted that all was quiet in the city after the release of an

agreement with the shipyard regarding African American workers who had been fighting

against discriminatory practices there. The report noted:

The Negro press and the NAACP are now vigorously attacking the President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice Committee because it has approved a segregated settlement and one which, they say, restricts

65 Negroes to the skills involved in bare hull construction. The NAACP and the Negro press state that they feel the Alabama Drydock and Shipbuilding Company case will become a precedent.16

This summary of the incident in Mobile, as well as the field officer’s noting that the editor of the Mobile Press-Register had been held in the county jail for ten hours for contempt of court after harshly criticizing how the court case was handled, noted that some fault in the unrest was at least in part a result of “labor and race policies of the

Federal Government.”17 At the same time, the OWI report also cast blame on the black press and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

These propaganda whispers against others18 were not limited to members of the

African American community. On the U.S. West Coast, a similar whisper campaign had

taken hold among U.S. servicemen against “young civilians of Mexican descent.”19 For

Mexican Americans arriving in the U.S. in the decades preceding WWII, many

“encountered much of the social ostracism accorded Negroes—in schools, movie houses, playgrounds, community swimming pools. Their American-born children grew up in a jangled environment: at home they were Americans, speaking a language different from their parents; outside they were Mexicans.”20 In an attempt to establish new identities,

many Mexican American teens banded together in gangs, donned zoot suits,21 and had

“slick chicks” on their arms in equally outlandish garb for the day.22 Together, the gangs

engaged in street battles among themselves, and eventually with law enforcement as

crime escalated. These street battles were reported widely in the mainstream Los Angeles

press, prompting the attention of servicemen stationed nearby. The racial tensions

reached a breaking point on the night of June 4, 1943, in a fight described as starting

when:

66 [B]ands of sailor vigilantes invaded the squalid Mexican quarter on the east side, harrying all zoot suiters they met, thrashing those who refused to discard their fancy clothes, ripping to shreds baggy pants and long coats. By the next night the “sharpies” had forgotten their own back-alley strife to join forces. They waded in with tire irons, chains, knives, broken bottles, clubs, steel bars, wrenches, and rope lengths weighted with wire and lead. And by last Monday night the soldiers and sailors were pouring into Los Angeles by the hundred seeking a showdown.23

After six nights of fighting, which the mainstream press quickly dubbed the Zoot Suit

Riots, an estimated ninety-four civilians and eighteen servicemen were injured in the fighting and another ninety-four civilians and twenty servicemen arrested.24

In the years after WWII, sociologists would reexamine the race riots across the

U.S. in 1943, in search of answers as to why people acted out in violence during this period of American history. Sociologist Benjamin D. Singer and colleagues concluded that riots—and race riots in particular—were a direct result of a collective group of people feeling that there were few options left for them in terms of seeking justice. The researchers wrote: “[T]he likelihood of violence being utilized as a collective defense is greater when institutionalized means of redressing grievances are, or are believed to be, absent or ineffective.”25 And although most communities dispatched police to restore

peace, Singer and his colleagues found that bringing police action into the fray only made

the “critical mass of subjectively aggrieved individuals” more likely to react with

increased violence.26

Detroit Race Riot: A Black Press Perspective

News of the race riots and subsequent martial law declared in Detroit had been in the mainstream press for several days when weekly readers of the Chicago Defender,

Pittsburgh Courier, and The (Baltimore) Afro American first saw headlines about

67 disturbances in America’s Arsenal of Democracy. But unlike the mainstream press,

which will be examined later in this chapter, the black newspapers included front page

commentaries that warned readers against falling prey to propaganda campaigns

unleashed by the Axis’s “fifth column”27 alongside news stories about the latest casualty numbers and arrests in Detroit.

The Defender recalled in a seven-paragraph editorial on its front page that earlier in the week a rumor had circulated in Chicago that more than a thousand African

Americans had reportedly organized a caravan “to Detroit to battle white rioters.”28 So much stock had been placed in the rumors, Defender editors alleged, that the Associated

Press called their offices seeking confirmation. The editors argued: “There is a lesson in this false report. Remember it. Rumors start riots. . . . So button your lip and remember the fellow who spreads racial hatred—no matter of his color—is working overtime for

Hitler.”29 Alongside the rumor editorial, the Defender published a story about the Detroit

riots in the center column of the front page, just above the fold.

Under a headline that declared: “DETROIT DEATH TOLL REACHES 15 IN

CLASHES,” the news story reported the latest information regarding the number of

killed, injured, and arrested broken down by the number of African Americans and

whites in each category.30 In the third paragraph, the Defender listed the names of

African Americans killed in the rioting, followed by the name of whites who also died in

the street fighting. After relaying this information, the story—lacking a byline but

identified as “Special to The Defender”—offered readers a chronological narrative of

how the fighting started on Belle Isle and quickly spread into the city. The report noted:

68 Colored persons on their way to work were waylaid by white gangs and beaten. Retaliatory measures were taken by colored groups as they came upon white citizens hastening to their jobs. In short order, general rioting had started. Negro motormen were pulled off street cars operating in the white districts, and white motormen were dragged from those in colored sections.31

The article noted that tear gas was used at one point, when the fighting crowd got “within

a stone’s throw of the city hall.”32 It reported white crowds throwing large stones at automobiles passing by with African American drivers or passengers. It described wholesale looting of white businesses by gangs of African Americans. And above all, the

Defender story criticized Detroit’s mayor for maintaining “a deaf ear” to repeated calls for declaring martial law in the city.33 The article also noted that at one point, two

hundred African Americans were deputized “with instructions to go throughout the

colored section and try to discourage further trouble.”34 The article ended with a round-up

of news briefs from across the nation where defense contractors had shut down plants out

of fear of potential racial rioting35 and curfews were implemented as part of precautionary measures.36

In secondary stories, Defender coverage included an unbylined, Washington,

D.C.-based story about African American leaders, including Phillip Murray, head of the

Congress of Industrial Organizations, who were urging President Roosevelt to take steps

to reduce violence in American cities37 and another unbylined story that demanded FDR use the platform of his radio addresses to ask Americans to stop the racial violence.38 But it was on its editorial page that Defender editors sought to cast blame for the country’s spate of race riots—including the fighting in Detroit—on racial agitators. The editorial noted:

69 A conspiracy of violence and murder is steadily gaining ground in our country. That murderous campaign of fifth-columnists and defeatists is seeking the military defeat of our country through the development of nationwide racial clashes of white against black. The leaders of the Ku Klux Klan, the Coughlinites and other gangs of terrorists have begun a storm trooper-like campaign throughout the country.39

The editorial added that Fascists had found America’s weakness: race relations. It stated:

“They have found a weapon of insurrection in racial hatreds. They are utilizing this now when the administration is making every effort to unify the American people in order that the major enemy of civilization may be defeated.”40 The editorial encouraged African

Americans to remain steadfast to the country’s efforts to win the war and urged FDR to

speak out against the persecution of individuals based on color, race, or religion.

The overarching frame of the Defender’s initial Detroit race riot coverage was one

of steadfast patriotism for the war effort. The editorials in particular served as rallying

cries for continued African American support of the country’s total war, despite the many

violent incidents that had sprung up across the country targeting minority groups

including African Americans and Mexican Americans. In the following weeks, Defender

coverage continued to follow the Detroit race riot news arch, using story frames about

rebuilding the city and finding someone to blame for the violence—often intertwining

both frames into the same article. In a July 3, 1943, front page article, Walter Atkins, a

staff correspondent reporting from Detroit, described the efforts to rebuild the “race war- riddled city.”41 He noted: “Monday’s race riots were the climax of several years of Klan,

Black Legion, Coughlinite and Axis agitation. The cost was high. Thirty-one deaths, some 750 known injured, perhaps a million dollars in property loss.”42

70 At the same time, Atkins noted that while there had been discussion of cracking

down on Detroit police officers who contributed to the violence by shooting and killing

African Americans participating in the riot, “as yet nothing of the kind has resulted.”43

Further, Atkins reported that some of the very causes of the riot remained. He noted:

“The same pattern of discrimination that has relegated Negroes to second class

citizenship still remains.”44 In a secondary, unbylined story on page six, the Defender noted that some fault was owed to Detroit’s mayor Edward J. Jeffries Jr., who had launched an investigation into the riot that some Democratic Party leaders were describing as “a re-enactment of ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin in Cadillac Square.’”45

Meanwhile, African American unity was another story frame that emerged in the

Defender coverage. In an unbylined article with a dateline from Detroit, placed at the top

of page seven, reported that several of the city’s African American organizations were

working together to “bring normalcy back to Detroit.”46 The article also noted how a race

committee, consisting of twenty-five community members, had already been created in

hopes of developing concrete steps toward “racial harmony” that would prevent future

disruptions in Detroit.47

Defender editors kept Detroit race riot follow-up stories above the fold on its front page for a third week, in its July 10, 1943, edition. Under a headline that read: “BLAST

DETROIT MAYOR IN COP WHITEWASH,” an unbylined story by the Associated

Negro Press (ANP) offered a round-up of the latest developments, from biracial committee reports to efforts to add as many as two hundred African Americans to the city police department. 48 Additional stories as well as letters to the editor in that same edition

71 aligned blame on individuals and organizations alike, from President Roosevelt and poor

housing conditions in Detroit to the Detroit police department and Axis “agents.”49

By July 17, 1943, the Defender’s coverage of the Detroit riot had dwindled significantly, and was bumped off the front page and onto page three, with a report about an anticipated August departure for Army troops deployed to the city to help quell the fighting nearly four weeks earlier. Meanwhile, the Defender’s editorial page continued to hammer on the race riots, this time using an editorial cartoon by Tony Jackson to criticize

U.S. Representative Martin Dies, a Texas Democrat, who chaired the House Committee on Un-American Activities and had launched an investigation into the causes of race rioting across the United States. The cartoon featured a man—representing Congressman

Dies—dressed like Sherlock Holmes and on his hands and knees with a magnifying glass as he inspected a footprint with the word “segregation” written inside it, but declared

“JAPS!”50 Meanwhile, in the foreground, a white man in a Ku Klux Klan hood and gown

snickered at the clueless congressman while another white man in a Black Legion hood

and gown looked on in the background. Jackson’s political commentary addressed the

feelings of frustration among members of the African American community, who felt

strongly that it was forces inside the United States that had much more to do with the

racial unrest in 1943 than propaganda from a Japanese enemy an ocean away.

The Defender’s biggest competitor, the Pittsburgh Courier, ran a front page riot

story on June 26, 1943, as well. Under a headline, written in all caps that declared:

“RACE RIOTS SWEEP NATION,”51 Courier staff correspondent John R. Williams

wrote in first person, describing his experience in Detroit:

72 As I type these lines, I am sitting atop a racial volcano which has been ignited by the flames of racial hatred! This city, “Arsenal of Democracy,” is involved in a race riot which has already resulted in ten known deaths – eight Negroes and two white—possibly a dozen others—injury to more than 200 and the arrest of 245 people, most of them Negroes.52

Williams’s report listed the names of the African Americans confirmed dead in the

violence. He also attempted to identify the initial cause of the riots, but in doing so,

demonstrated how chaotic Detroit had become in a short amount of time:

Some declare that a Negro lad brushed against a white woman. Others declare that a colored woman was molested by two white men. Racial friction, which had been obviously slumbering for months, mushroomed into physical violence. Conditions are growing worse as the hours pass. Thoughtlessness is manifest on both sides. Foolhardy Negroes are turning over automobiles and stoning white occupants who happen to drive in or near Negro neighborhoods. Stores owned by whites in the Negro district are being stoned with the wholesale breaking of windows.53

The Courier writer noted how African American leaders in Detroit complained to Mayor

Jeffries that his police department was partial to the whites who were permitted to roam

the streets freely while officers shot or clubbed African Americans and forced them off

the roads.

Williams also noted how, during a public meeting with the mayor, leaders of both

white and African American organizations accused The Detroit Times, a Hearst-owned

mainstream newspaper, of “helping to incite the rioters by the type of stories it is

running.”54 And much like its Chicago competitor, the Courier also blamed the Ku Klux

Klan for inciting the violence. Williams concluded his report by quoting R.J. Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers (CIO), who had stated during an NAACP meeting that he had solid evidence that a strike prior to the rioting “had been promoted by

‘agents of the Ku Klux Klan, acting for the enemy.’”55

73 A week later, the top of the Courier’s front page—above even the weekly

newspaper’s masthead—was a photograph of the Detroit morgue, where a dozen gurneys

bore the bagged-bodies of victims of the riot’s violence. A quote above the haunting

image, attributed to John J. Ingalls, declared: “IN THE DEMOCRACY OF THE DEAD .

. . ALL MEN AT LAST ARE EQUAL.”56 Again, the Courier opted against using ANP wire stories, such as those appearing in the Defender, and instead turned to another staff member for the main story. This time, the reporter was the paper’s own managing editor,

William G. Nunn. He reported: “POSITIVE . . . not negative . . . ACTION is needed here

AT ONCE! Out of the welter of this city’s riotous 24 hours of savagery, which listed 34 dead, 675 injured, 1,362 jailees, five things stand out in bold relief against the “symphony of hate” background which enveloped the town.”57 Nunn then listed the five items, in all caps, from demanding a grand jury investigation and cleansing the Detroit police department to calls for the federal government to take a stand on “minority groups” and maintaining U.S. troops in Detroit until “race tension has completely subsided.”58

Number three on Nunn’s list: “THE PART PLAYED BY SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS

MUST BE THOROUGHLY CHECKED AND EXPOSED.”59 Nunn added that city officials must resist the urge to whitewash the riot, and instead get to the bottom of issues prompting the violence in the first place. He added:

These are the luminous impressions which the writer has garnered in the past 48 hours . . . hours of intense probing . . . hours spent in talking to hundreds of people, both black and white . . . hours spent in driving through the streets . . . querying army officials . . . representatives of national organizations . . . labor leaders . . . civic leaders . . . soldiers and officers of the law.60

74 Nunn reported that Michigan Governor Harry S. Kelly had demurred calls for a grand

jury investigation. The article continued on page eight and argued further on why Kelly

was wrong and a grand jury was indeed needed to help right the wrongs committed in

Detroit.

In another front page story, this time located below the fold, Courier war

correspondent Randy Dixon turned to a story frame of blame when he reported via cable

from London that in interviews with deployed African American servicemen, many of

the men had strong opinions as to the causes for the race riots back home in the States.

Dixon reported:

Opinions among the various American doughboy racial groups in the European Theater of Operations is that underlying forces – principally Coughlin’s Silver Shirts [sic], the Ku Klux Klan and similar fascist organizations – were responsible for the Detroit riots. Condemnation of conditions causing the riots stemmed from virtually every source, high and low. Main comment about riots—and coal strikes too—assumed the form of severe criticism of homefronters’ agitating needlessly—while soldiers, black and white, are losing their lives on the battlefront for them.61

Dixon noted that despite the disheartening news about unrest, morale among African

American troops remained high. He also noted that the British newspapers wrote extensively about the riots, but focused “on the economic and labor aspects” of the street fighting.62 He wrapped up his report by noting there was a race riot in an unnamed

“Northwest Anglican city” where an African American soldier, Private William

Grossland, was named as a “serious casualty.”63 This incident, as the next chapter will expand upon, was indeed a race riot between two groups of U.S. troops in the British village of Bamber Bridge—an event that would become deeply rooted in the region’s collective memories of WWII.

75 Courier editors were not finished covering the Detroit news on the front page. In

a news brief, with no dateline or identified writer, the Courier reported how Nazi-

controlled Vichy radio in France was having a field day with the Detroit riot. The two-

paragraph report noted that Axis radio “asserted Wednesday that Detroit’s race riots were

symptomatic of the ‘internal disorganization of a country torn by social injustice, race

hatreds, regional disputes, the violence of an irritated poletarist [sic] and gangsterism of a

capitalistic police.”64 The brief also noted that the Japanese propaganda machine had

picked up the news, adding that the “radio stations were so busy luridly describing the

Detroit riots” that the story had disrupted the Japanese War Office of Information’s

regular propaganda broadcasting schedule to relay the news.65

Courier coverage continued inside the paper. On the page eight jump, editors dedicated almost an entire page to not only the rest of Nunn’s lengthy report from

Detroit, but the page also featured reactions from prominent African American leaders from across the country. Those responding included Walter White, executive secretary of the NAACP; C.C. Spaulding, a prominent businessman who founded North Carolina

Mutual Life Insurance; and Dr. Charlotte Hawkins Brown, a prominent educator who founded the Palmer Memorial Institute in North Carolina. On page five, the Courier reported at length about how mainstream radio news commentators had taken to the airwaves to decry the violence and urged calm.66 Another story, down page, took

Congressman Dies to task for his sudden interest in what prompted the Detroit riots. The unbylined story noted:

For years, Negro leaders all over the country have been trying to get Representative Martin Dies (Democrat of Texas), chairman of the well- known Dies committee, to do some investigating about conditions all over

76 the country which affect Negroes. They have wanted him to probe the numerous lynchings which have swept the country, particularly those in Mississippi and Florida. They have wanted his committee to ferret out the causes underlying the waves of economic and industrial unrest, which have made defense plants growing cancers. . . .[a]ccording to Mr. Dies and his purported evidence, the Japanese were busy. With whom? Negroes, of course! Mr. Dies is going to try and prove that Negroes, working for Japanese agents, were the actual cause of the riot. He’s going to fly in the face of the facts. He’ll ignore the number of Negro dead.67

The fifteen-paragraph story concluded with the hypothesis that the congressman’s committee would likely ignore all the possible riot causes, and instead cast blame on

African Americans working in collusion with the Japanese. Meanwhile, the story noted, the primary suspects who stirred up the race riot—in the eyes of the Courier’s editors— from German and Polish influences to Southern whites and the Detroit police department, were ignored.

A few pages over, on page fourteen, the Courier used an entire back page to illustrate the violence of the Detroit riots, with seven images, including those taken by staff photographer Langford James. Many of the captions included arrows, pointing to white rioters caught on film yanking African American citizens out of trolley cars or running away from the scene of the violence. In all, Courier editors ran fourteen news stories over five different pages in its July 3, 1943, edition.

But the newspaper’s editors left their harshest criticism of the race riots for its editorial page. Under a headline that read: “Disgraceful but Inevitable,” the editorial compared the “outrages” in U.S. cities from Los Angeles and Beaumont to Detroit on equal footing with “the rape of Nanking, the massacre at Lidice, the bombing of

Guernica, the atrocities against Jews in Warsaw, and the shelling of working-class quarters in Vienna by the Austrian fascist [Englebert] Dolfuss.”68 The editorial added:

77 It is difficult to find adequate language to condemn the wanton slaying of 30 American citizens (mostly by police and state troops), the firing on defenseless people in their home by troops armed with machine guns, the brutal beating of innocent pedestrians and motorists by packs of bloodthirsty gorillas, the vandalistic destruction of homes and businesses, the 700 wounded and injured, and the jailing of 1,100 citizens, mostly of the group assailed.69

Calling the riot the latest “pogrom against colored people,” it argued that Detroit must not be considered merely an isolated incident, but that until American leaders decided to put a stop to the disgraceful loss of lives and property, “the blood of future victims” would remain on their hands.70

In the July 10, 1943, edition of the Courier, editors kept the latest developments from the Detroit race riots on the front page for the third week, but by this time newspaper staffers were no longer reporting from the Arsenal of Democracy. Instead, the headline on what appeared to be a wire story declared: “‘WHITEWASH’ OF POLICE

DURING RIOT IS SCORED.”71 The unbylined article noted that the NAACP had issued

a report calling out the Detroit mayor’s absolution of the city’s police department of any

wrongdoing as a total whitewashing of law officials’ complicity in the deaths of citizens.

The article also listed multiple points that the writer felt were needed to be addressed,

from calling out FDR to conduct a fireside chat about race relations to retaining the

federal troops until racial tensions had fully subsided. Although the story lead differed

significantly from what ran that same week in the Chicago Defender, the Courier’s story

on the jump page appeared almost identical to that of the Defender’s ANP wire story.

Again, the Courier dedicated an entire inside page to the aftermath of the Detroit

riots, this time turning to page five for coverage of a wire story about the Detroit

community leaders meeting to establish a strategy toward improved race relations, and a

78 story about the one million man hours lost during the violence in the city.72 The editors

also expanded on the previous week’s reaction from prominent African American leaders

by adding noteworthy liberal white leaders as well, asking them what caused racism and

how it could be cured. This time, the respondents extended to William H. Hastie, the

former civilian aide to Secretary of War Henry Stimson; A. Philip Randolph, founder of

the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the first all-African American union accepted

into the AFL in 1939; and Wendell L. Willkie, the 1940 Republican presidential

candidate.

Courier editors continued to scathingly challenge Congressman Dies and his

committee’s plan to investigate the cause of the Detroit race riots in their weekly

editorial. Under a headline that declared: “Of All People!,” the editors noted:

If the situation were not so serious the proposal of Congressman Martin Dies of Texas, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, to investigate “the growing racial antagonism in this country” would arouse Gargantuan laughter. Dies represents (?) the Orange- Beaumont district of Texas, where a Negro voter is as rare as a Japanese soldier on Guadalcanal, where Ku Kluxism is a “way of life,” and where the level of civil liberty is about that of Nazi Germany.73

The editors then called out the Dies committee for its targeting of the Japanese American

“menace,” while ignoring how pockets of Italian Americans, German Americans, and

Spanish Americans had given comfort to the enemy with their pro-Axis activities, and by wholesale ignoring the role that the Ku Klux Klan had played in inciting racial tensions.

The editors added:

We would be willing to give Congressman Dies and his associates the benefit of the doubt and praise their announcement to investigate “this dangerous situation” if we felt that they were motivated by a sincere desire to do something definite about it, but there is nothing in the record of this committee to prove that it is anything more than a witch hunting body.74

79

For the second week in a row, Courier editors implored American leaders to act quickly

and relieve the racial tensions within the country.

Baltimore-based The Afro American also turned to the ANP for its initial story

about the Detroit race riots in the June 26, 1943, edition. But unlike the Defender or the

Courier, The Afro American identified the ANP writer as T. John Wood. Much like its

competitors, the article led with the physical cost of the rioting:

Under military control by order of President Roosevelt, Detroit settled down to normal Tuesday after thirty-six hours of bloody rioting in which 23 persons were killed, 200 wounded to a hospital degree, 600 received minor injuries, over 1300 were placed under arrest and property damage estimated at approximately a quarter of a million dollars.75

Again, The Afro American broke down the number of African American riot victims, noting that of the twenty-two killed in the fighting most were “killed by police who concentrated in the colored area while white rioters took over the downtown section of the city.”76 Wood’s report noted that three white riot victims were believed to have died after “isolated fights with colored citizens.”77 Like the other black newspapers, The Afro

American sought to explain how the massive fighting started, and reported that two

witnesses said they saw a crowd of fifty white people chasing a young African American

boy down the street as Belle Isle was closing for the night. Wood noted: “Within a few

seconds, they said, colored people became involved in the affair which spread like

wildfire from the interior of the park to the exits and thence to the center of the city which

has been virtually sitting on a powder keg for over a year.”78

The Afro American account included details about white Detroit citizens lining up for four miles along a major downtown thoroughfare, Woodward Avenue, blocking and

80 beating up any African Americans attempting to pass through. The report retold stories of

white mobs stopping motorcars and public trolleys alike, pulling African American

drivers out and beating them up or chasing them back to the African American section of

town. A photograph that accompanied Wood’s story, also on the front page and above the

fold, displayed the violence in action as it showed a crowd of whites swarming a streetcar

while frightened African American passengers attempted to climb out windows to escape

the mob.79

Wood also described rampant looting in the African American district, when he

reported: “Vandalism and looting in the colored section continued until every white-

owned store, pawn-shop, tavern and market had been cleaned out of merchandise; at one

corner a man virtually went into business selling goods from a looted store.”80 Wood’s article also noted the number of women involved in the fighting. In a secondary story, also on page twenty-four, that broke down the riot, hour by hour, a staff correspondent noted that at one point, Detroit police were so frantic to regain control that “policemen whipped out tommy guns, and threw tear gas bombs almost always in one direction—at the colored people.”81

Much like the Defender and the Courier, The Afro American also reported how

the Axis propaganda machine was reacting to the riot news. In a brief, front page story,

the newspaper informed readers that Germany’s propaganda machine had already picked

up the story and was gloating over the news. The six-paragraph brief noted: “Nothing has

been heard over the Japanese radio stations yet but mention is expected shortly.”82

81 On its opinion page, The Afro American editors tackled the topic of division

among Americans. And much like its competitors, the newspaper spoke out against the

violence levied against African Americans. Its editors opined:

Instead of concentrating our fight on the enemy, a small number of Americans are conducting a full-scale offensive against colored people. This minority of race haters is not concentrating on defeating our foreign enemies for two reasons: 1. U.S. propaganda tells us that we are superior to the Japanese in men and equipment and we are not defeating them. 2. The U.S. Government has not gotten tough with those who sabotage the war effort by means of segregation and mob violence.83

The editors then went on to extrapolate how U.S. forces had to date been soundly whipped by the Japanese in the Philippines, Wake Island, and Kiska. They then tied their argument back around to segregationists in the U.S., noting that it was easy for them to act out against minorities because “they haven’t had to face the Japanese yet.” The editors predicted that even these instigators would start to feel the effects of violence and food and gas rations in a way that would refocus their energies. The editors concluded:

“As the casualty lists begin to come in; as more and more men are killed and wounded in action; as even so rich a land as ours feels the increasing pinch of food, coal, oil, and gas shortages, we will quit fighting each other in order to center all our efforts on our enemies across the Pacific.”84 Although the editorial did not state so outright, it suggested

that the blame for causing division among Americans should be cast with race supremacy

groups and segregationists attempting to keep African Americans out of capitalizing on

the nation’s booming wartime economy. In a third and final editorial that week, the

editors looked to Beaumont, Texas, and cited Frederick Douglass, when they told

audiences that they needed to fight back harder to prevent future attacks. Editors wrote:

“Colored communities must be prepared to protect themselves. Frederick Douglass said

82 that the slave that resisted vigorously was almost never whipped. If mobsters attacking

colored homes get a hot reception once, they will not repeat that visit.”85 This message—

fight back harder and prevent violence from coming to your home again—was a much different approach than that of the Courier, which attempted to shame white politicians into action on behalf of African Americans and fairness, or the Defender’s call to African

Americans to remain dedicated to the war effort despite what appeared to be the pervasive spreading of fascism and Nazism in the United States.

A week later, The Afro American had its own staff correspondents in Detroit to report on the riot aftermath. M.S. Lewis wrote in a front page story on July 3, 1943:

“Your chances of being shot if you were a colored man in the Detroit riots were 20-1, with odds in the favor of the police.”86 The article noted that out of the twenty-seven riot deaths, twenty were at the hands of police and all were African Americans. Lewis’s report revealed how grisly some of the deaths at the hands of police were:

One of the most gruesome of the killings was that of “John Doe No. 395,” dead on admission to Receiving Hospital, who bore four bullet wounds administered by three patrolmen who purportedly fired five shots between them. Had the number of men shot by police in the course of performing their duty not raised the count, the total number of riot casualties as of Wednesday morning would have been three among whites, and seven among colored people, insofar as can be ascertained.87

Also on the page nine jump, The Afro American published an article originally printed in

the Detroit Free Press, describing eye-witness reports to the rioting that led with a

description of a mob of white youth along with soldiers and sailors, making their way up

Woodward Avenue, attacking every African American they encountered. Included on the

page was a photo of two white men helping an African American to his feet. The caption

83 read: “No crackers here. These Good Samaritans are shown helping this man to his feet after the courageous (?) white mob has beaten him and left him in the street.”88

Despite having staff writers in Detroit, The Afro American also ran another ANP story by John Wood, this time focusing on the wholesale destruction of white-owned shops in the African American section of Detroit. Articles that assigned blame for the riots also started to appear, with another ANP article—this time without a byline—that claimed that the race conflicts in the U.S. were a result of government policies. The article stated that a group of leaders had called an emergency meeting and determined the cause of racial unrest. The article reported: “Widespread discrimination and segregation in the armed forces, government departments, federal housing programs, and industrial concerns holding war contracts, were cited as causes for the unrest among the races.”89

Much of the report’s criticism focused at the top echelon of U.S. government: President

Roosevelt, who the author argued as commander-in-chief had the authority to change military policies but refused to; and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who the story argued had up to that point blocked African American women from joining the WAVES program and prevented African American men from being promoted to the rank of officer.

Also on page nine, The Afro American noted that in “an exclusive statement to the

AFRO” the Detroit FBI bureau chief stated that while the Ku Klux Klan had been under surveillance for subversive activities, there was no evidence that the white supremacy group had organized the Detroit race riots.90 In all, The Afro American dedicated one full inside page to riot stories and ran some six news articles following the incident.

84 It also dedicated nearly its entire editorial column on July 3, 1943, to the topic of the Detroit riots as well as its editorial cartoon. In the primary editorial of the week, the newspaper called out the Detroit police department for targeting African Americans rioting in the streets. It also called on the U.S. government to take action in the form of policies and regulations to prevent further rioting and racial unrest. The editors opined:

The Federal Government, in order to win the war quickly, save Americans’ lives and America itself from destruction, must make racial intolerance a violation of Federal Law. Segregation must be illegal in any public place. Every citizen must have the right to vote without being taxed or intimidated. It must be unlawful to refuse employment to any citizen on account of race.91

The editorial noted that emancipation was the outcome of the American Civil War, and hoped that freedom and an end to racial discrimination would become the legacy of

WWII.

Meanwhile, under the headline “TIME TO DO SOMETHING BESIDES ROLL

UP YOUR SLEEVES,” the week’s editorial cartoon depicted Uncle Sam in an American

GI uniform, pushing up his sleeves while a short, chubby guy representing “Segregation” blew a raspberry at him. Uncle Sam was also surrounded by another short guy, prepared to throw a rock, named “Riots,” and a third figure, who carried a club behind his back, named “Strikes.”92 The cartoon expressed the frustration felt in the African American community, which viewed Uncle Sam—or the U.S. government—as much bigger than the concerns of riots, strikes, and segregation. At the same time, the cartoon indicated that while Uncle Sam was good at pushing up his sleeves, he had yet to do something concrete that actually defended the millions of American citizens forced into second-class citizenship through policies and societal mores. The editorial ended the newspaper’s

85 initial coverage of the Detroit race riots, as it moved on to other subjects in the following

weeks.

A Detroit Newspaper Covers the Riots

The two-paragraph brief slipped onto the lower right-hand corner of the Detroit

Free Press edition of Monday, June 21, 1943, could have easily been overlooked. The

page was, after all, dominated by a headline that ran in all capital letters at the top of the

front page and declared the latest strike as crippling to Willow Run.93 But the information

contained in that brief, under a headline that stated: “Call 50 Police to Bridge Riot,”94 went on to dominate the newspaper—not just in Detroit, but around the U.S. and make appearances in the U.K. press—in the days to come. To be sure, it seemed like a minor event: Detroit police officers had been called to the bridge leading onto popular Belle

Isle, just before midnight on Sunday, to “quell a racial disturbance.”95 According to

police, when they arrived on the scene they found several people had been stabbed “in a

fight between Negroes and whites.”96 A day later, June 22, 1943, the Detroit Free Press published a special edition packed with news and photographs of the riots that had rattled the city for thirty-six hours before federal troops were mobilized, martial law declared, and peace restored once more to America’s Arsenal of Democracy.

There was no mistaking the import of what had happened in the city. The three- inch-high headline screamed: “MARTIAL LAW AT 10 P.M., U.S. TROOPS MOVE

IN.”97 Just below the double-deck headline, the Free Press reprinted Michigan Governor

Kelly’s proclamation declaring a state of martial law on the streets of Detroit along with two staff photographers’ images. With the exception of two Associated Press stories about Capitol Hill activities out of Washington, D.C., the rest of the front page was

86 dedicated to local reports of the riot. There was a story about the number killed, injured

and arrested.98 There was another article about how mobs of whites had roved city streets

and attacked any African American they could find.99 There was one about the injured rioters, both African American and white, who awaited treatment in the hospital—with new riot victims arriving every two minutes—but kept racial prejudices checked at the door.100

The only front page story with an actual staff byline, by James S. Pooler,

attempted to answer one question: Why? Pooler contended few should have been

surprised. He wrote:

For three years the rumblings of the racial eruption have been close to the surface. It may be more than passingly significant that the talk, never discreet, always set the race riot for summer and the place as Belle Isle. That is where it started on the eve of summer before it spread unwholesomely across a bridge and throughout a city of 2,000,000 purported civilized beings. It did not take a prophet to know the riot was coming. Loose talk, blowing on hot prejudices, may have fanned it, but even the unemotional analyst could see the cumulative evidence—the housing troubles, the protest against racial discrimination in industry, the sporadic violence in high schools, and only a few days ago the Packard strike, rooted in racial antagonism.101

Pooler then took his readers on a look back to the more recent history of Detroit, and the slow build of unrest among the white and African American citizens. The reporter noted that the industrial boom of the war had brought thousands of newcomers to the city, straining housing stock and the economy. He observed that occasionally fights would break out, but nothing major. Then came the war. Pooler opined: “[T]he war did not help in making passions calmer. Prejudice is an old trait on which even dictators ride to power, the war brought in more rowdyism; juvenile mobs flourished and all that was

87 required was to link racial prejudice with the growing spirit of mobism.”102 For Pooler,

the riot was a matter of when, not if.

On page seven, readers started to see the degree of the severity of the riots, with a

two-column story that listed by name first the seriously injured and then those with minor

injuries. The names of African Americans and whites intermingled. Head wounds. Gun

shots to the chest. Skull fractures. Broken bones. Internal injuries.103 Meanwhile, on page

thirteen, six images covered the page, giving readers a close-up view of the violence. In

one picture, an African American woman and her child peered out of a car window. The

caption reported: “Negro woman begs mercy for husband, who has just been dragged

from their auto at Case and Stimson during morning rioting.”104 In another image, at the bottom of the page, the picture caught a group of about half a dozen white men pulling

African American passengers out of a stopped street car. Many of the images captured whites acting as the aggressors. For example, on page twenty, a white youth was shown chasing after an African American, waving a lead pipe as he ran. In the far right of the frame, a group of more white men, armed with bottles, chased three feet behind.105 In

another image, about a dozen white men proudly surrounded the slumped bodies of two

African Americans lying on the ground, injured and unmoving. The image was

reminiscent of an African safari rather than an occurrence in a metro U.S. city. All told,

the Free Press published seven stories and eighteen images across ten pages on the

second day of its riot coverage.

By Wednesday, June 23, 1943, new story frames appeared in the newspaper.

Although the riot story still led the newspaper, the headline was muted: “KELLY

RELAXES MARTIAL LAW.”106 A secondary headline noted that minor riots had been

88 successfully broken up by soldiers and state police. A relaxed martial law meant the

Detroit Tigers baseball team could suit up once more and horse racing was back in action.

The article, while still providing readers with the latest in deaths and injuries, also

indicated life was slowly returning to normal in Detroit. The unbylined story noted:

In modifying the restrictions to let the Tigers play and the horses to run at the State Fairgrounds, Gov. Kelly emphasized that the ban on evening gatherings was still in force. Only day-time sports events will be permitted, he said. Briggs Stadium and the Fairgrounds will be guarded, solely as a precautionary measure, he added, by companies of State Troops.107

An image, played at the center of the front page and taken by a staff photographer,

showed Detroit police and U.S. Army soldiers working together to clear an apartment

building of suspected snipers.108 The image assured readers that Detroit authorities had regained control of the city. At the same time, community leaders also spoke out and demanded that a grand jury investigate the cause of the riots and preventive steps be taken to ensure another city-wide disruption did not occur.109

But even in this local coverage, framed as the city returning to normal, new

conflict arose. In an Associated Press article, the editor of the Atlanta Constitution made

news when he took offense at Detroit officials who blamed a sudden influx of

Southerners as the cause of the race riots. The unbylined story noted that Ralph McGill,

editor of the Constitution, had telegraphed both the Detroit mayor and police

commissioner, and stated:

Detroit is learning what the South learned long ago that the race problem is a national problem and not a sectional problem. It grows out of injustices, maladjustments and out of economic inequalities of which Detroit and the South have each their share. The South does not criticize Detroit but shares with Detroit the hope for an early settlement. . . . What I do wish to protest is the cheap and easy habit of blaming any and all racial

89 troubles on the South even when they occur in Detroit. The fifteen-year- old youngsters who began your riot certainly were not Southern workers.110

McGill concluded that the South would continue to work at improving race relations,

much like Detroit, but asked that the northern city’s leaders “not contribute to further

disunity by the easy and unworthy slap at the South in the effort to explain” their own

troubles.111 The AP story did not seek responses from either Detroit Mayor Edward J.

Jeffries nor from the city’s police commissioner John H. Witherspoon in regard to

McGill’s comments. Nor did the Free Press assign a local reporter to garner reaction from the two men.

Additional stories in the Free Press that day included an appeal to white and

African American citizens from Mayor Jeffries for a return to normal routines112 and a

city recreational board meeting that questioned how it could expand city programs to

target the teenagers who had participated in the riot.113 Both stories appeared on a page

with a large, four-column photograph of army soldiers from nearby Fort Custer, relaxing

after working to restore peace to the city. Again, these stories demonstrated how the

normalcy frame spread to inside pages with assurances from city officials that everything

was calm once more, and that should trouble arise, police and federal troops were close

by to assist.

Three days after the race riots first shook the city, the Free Press tackled the topic

on its editorial page with a scathing indictment of the political ineptness of Detroit

leaders. In the minds of the top editors of the Free Press, fault for the riots lay at the feet

of the police department. Citing a newspaper interview with Police Commissioner

Witherspoon about precautions being made to prevent a riot such as ones occurring

90 across the country, the editorial charged: “He spoke with the optimism of a young and

inexperienced officer. . . . This is no time for kid-glove treatment of law violation. This

is no time for panty-waist politics. In the inexorability of all-out war the majesty and

dignity of the law can only be upheld by exercising the POWER OF THE LAW.”114 The editorial contended that because of the history of ineffectiveness by the Detroit police force, a hole had been “made in the dike of public morale.”115 As a result, law violators felt brazened to the point of committing crimes with police officers standing right next to them. The editorial charged that these same law violators had a different reaction when federal troops came to town:

You will notice that none of these gangsters who swarmed over our streets all Sunday night and all day Monday passed on any insults to the soldiers of the United States Army when the troops rumbled into town at midnight. Instead, they scurried to their holes in keeping with their rattish [sic] nature. It is the policy of the politician to avoid trouble, to soft pedal on principle so that votes will not be lost. But, as day follows night, kid- gloving criminals leads to anarchy.116

The editorialist noted that he could not condone the conduct of nearby Chicago’s mayor,

Ed Kelly, who had declared at the start of the war that neither strikes nor riots would be tolerated in his city. When unrest did occur, “he gave orders to shoot to kill” and the city remained peaceful.117 The editorial concluded that what America needed most during these uncertain times was politicians who could see beyond politics and re-election, and instead make upholding the law a fundamental priority. So while the black press blamed the Ku Klux Klan or American fascists for the race riots, one of Detroit’s own major daily publications pointed a finger, instead, at poor leadership at the local level for the waste of innocent lives.

91 Free Press readers awoke Thursday, June 24, 1943, to images of a dozen riot

victims on gurneys in the Wayne County Morgue running across five columns above the

fold. Placed just above the staff photograph was a quote from John J. Ingalls: “In the

democracy of the dead, all men at last are equal.”118 It is the exact image and quote the

Pittsburgh Courier published days later on the front page of its July 3, 1943, edition.

Although it is hard to imagine that identical treatment of photograph and quote—one by a mainstream daily newspaper, the other by a weekly black-owned publication—was purely coincidental, it is impossible to say for certain whether the Courier was inspired by the Free Press. Regardless, the image and quote set a somber tone for the Free Press that day as its front page was filled with riot aftermath stories about the death toll rising to thirty-one victims after two more people died in local hospitals; the strain on local courts to process nearly a hundred citizens for the role they played in the violence; and the dramatic Northeastern High School Class of 1943 graduation that was guarded by

U.S. soldiers, bayonets in hand.119 The latter story garnered much press attention.

Free Press staff writer Lyford Moore noted that there were twenty-nine African

Americans among the local graduating class, and even as the ceremony was getting under way, “the district hoodlums were on hand to observe.”120 It reminded readers of the terror

that had controlled the city for more than a day. But even in this, the frame of normalcy

and control is evident, when Moore added: “It was well that the soldiers were here.

Otherwise, it is hardly likely that all of the graduates would have reached their homes.”121

The reporter noted that many of the young men in the class had already been drafted. He observed: “Many of the boys, both black and white, were headed almost directly for

Army camps; others of both races had had to go even before receiving their diplomas.

92 They were all kids together in a democracy they were determined to save.”122 This patriotic theme, found more overtly among stories in the black press, also appeared in the mainstream press, as reporters used current events to remind readers of the bigger picture—of what was as stake.

By Friday, June 25, 1943, the Free Press still ran follow-up stories to the riots on its front page, but war news began to dominate the newspaper once more. For example, non-riot related stories such as a staff reporter’s piece about a strike ending at the Ford

Motor Company’s River Rouge plant and an Associated Press wire story about the Allied attack on Hitler’s “Atlantic Wall” led the front page.123 The riot stories were secondary as politicians continued to discuss the merits of calling a grand jury and civic organizations held meetings to promote racial unity in the city.124 Inside, staff photographers continued to document Detroit’s return to normalcy as police directed traffic to and from Belle Isle, which had reopened once more, and inside a bar, where patrons were allowed to once again enjoy a cold beer at their favorite watering hole.125 By Saturday, June 26, 1943, the riot story was completely off the front page of the Free Press.

Mainstream U.S. Newspapers Cover the Story

News of the Detroit race riots broke in newspapers across the U.S. on Tuesday,

June 22, 1943. Among the newspapers in this study, each daily turned to Associated

Press or United Press wire service stories to lead the front page with one exception—The

(Baltimore) Sun, which did not report the unrest in Detroit until Wednesday, June 23,

1943, and then did so by placing the story at the bottom of the page, well below the fold.126 It is impossible to know why The Sun’s editors opted to delay publication by a

93 day, although it should be noted that a nearby competitor, The Washington Post, led with

an AP story a day earlier at the top, center column of its front page.127

Only three newspapers reported in front page headlines that racial tensions were at the root of the rioting. The Chicago Daily Tribune used a series of headlines to convey the seriousness of the events in Detroit, from what appeared to be a 100-point all-cap font across all eight columns of the front page that stated: “ARMY RULES DETROIT; 23

DIE” to a secondary headline, across a single column, three lines deep, that declared:

“HOMES FIRED, SHOPS LOOTED IN RACE RIOTS.”128 Inside, the newspaper ran a photograph that depicted the violence. The caption read: “A Negro being dragged from a street car near the downtown section of Detroit yesterday evening as mobs continued to battle in the streets.”129 What the caption does not say: white men were the aggressors

and physically pulled the African American man from the street car by brute force.

That same day, The Boston Daily Globe headline screamed across the front page: “23

KILLED, U.S. ARMY RULES DETROIT,” while a three-column-wide photograph, just

under the headline, captured the image of a mob of white men chasing a lone African

American through a busy Detroit street.130 An AP story accompanying the headline

reported that President Roosevelt had called on the race rioters to “disperse and retire

peaceably” before going into a chronological narrative of how the event had unfolded,

including the arrival of federal troops to assist in restoring calm to the city.131 Although

its AP story took a similar, narrative approach, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette’s headline

demurely stated in a single column: “Army Called to Detroit Race Riots.”132 The wire story reported multiple incidents where white mobs were aggressors toward African

Americans. For example, the Post-Gazette wire story reported: “White mobsters set fire

94 to the homes of two Negro families and in a fight on a street car a Negro slashed a white

man. A gang of white men, seeking to take two Negroes from the custody of police in a

scout car, overturned the car and set it afire. The two Negroes and police leaped to safety.

The Negroes fled.”133 The story also noted that the wild spread of rumors among African

Americans had hindered efforts to restore calm to Detroit.

Not every newspaper in the study used headlines to report the role race played in the rioting. Under a headline about the latest coal strike, the San Francisco Examiner simply declared in all capital letters: “ARMY CALLED IN DETROIT RIOTS.”134 The

lead sentence in the article, however, did explain the role of race, when it stated:

Race rioting which had flared for nearly twenty-four hours over wide sections of this sprawling “arsenal city” was apparently being brought under control by soldiers and police early today—after twenty-three persons had been killed and more than 700 injured and President Roosevelt had issued a formal proclamation calling upon the rioters to “disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes.”135

At one point, the same wire story noted that Detroit police fired more than a thousand rounds of ammunition as well as tear gas into an apartment building where African

American snipers were camped out and allegedly took shots at white people in the streets below. On page nine, the Examiner ran four wire photos of the rioting, including the image of a white mobster attacking an African American who had been arrested and was being led away in handcuffs, while Detroit police officers appeared to do little to protect the suspect136

Just a couple of hundred miles south, the Los Angeles Times was still reporting the names of victims in the city’s Zoot Suit Riots on inside pages, when it ran a story on its front page on June 22, 1943, about the rioting in Detroit. Editors appeared to take

95 great pains to not call it a race riot. Instead, the headline stated: “TROOPS ROUT MOBS

IN DETROIT RIOT.”137 Although the story lead mentioned that armed federal troops had been called to Detroit to help clear the city’s streets of “white and Negro mobs,”138 the

report never used the phrase race riot. Instead, it described events in terms of rioting

between whites and African Americans. For example, the UP wire story noted:

Rioting between roving bands of whites and Negroes persisted despite efforts of nearly 4000 Detroit police and State troopers, all of whom carried automatic rifles and rode in squad cars. They patrolled a two-mile square zone near the downtown area. All through the day, gangs of men— predominately white—roamed the Negro district. Most of the hunted Negroes were caught and beaten severely.139

On the adjacent page, the LA Times ran two wire photographs depicting the carnage in

Detroit. Neither image mentioned race, although the larger of the two images featured a

large mob of white men dashing toward something off the right side of the frame, darting

through traffic as they went.140

A day later, only four of the newspapers kept the Detroit riot story on the front page. All four publications—The New York Times, The Boston Daily Globe, The Sun, and the San Francisco Examiner—used the same AP wire story. Again, the frame of normalcy was the overarching theme of the June 23, 1943, coverage. The death toll mounted to twenty-eight dead. The street fighting had been quelled. Federal troops were mobilized and in control. Curfews remained in effect. Peace was restored to Detroit.

At the same time, a story frame seeking blame emerged In the Post-Gazette, a military analyst for the newspaper, Major George Fielding Eliot, argued that the strikes and riots plaguing America in the summer of 1943 could be “Nazi inspired.”141 In his

analysis piece, Eliot contended that with America finally reaching a point where she was

96 sending out men and supplies to fight the Axis, Germany had every reason to want to

stymie that effort. He wrote:

The evil leaders of Germany are well aware that their hour of reckoning is upon them. They have long recognized the decisive nature of American power, once it could be fully developed against them. They have done everything they could to prevent its being so developed. They spared no effort to keep us weak and divided among ourselves, by supporting faction and discord among us before Pearl Harbor.142

Eliot went on to quote a comment made by Hitler, who said America was “permanently

on the brink of revolution” and it would be simple enough for him to produce “unrest and

revolts” from within the U.S.143 The analyst argued that Americans of every color and creed should seriously consider these comments, before he concluded:

Race riots break out in areas as far distant from each other as Detroit and East Texas. Troops which should have no other task than preparation to meet the enemy in battle are compelled to turn their weapons against their fellow citizens. Can it be that these events, which serve the cause of the enemy so well, have come, at this crucial moment, by mere coincidence? It is not likely, is it not indeed almost certain that enemy agents have been at work to bring these things to pass?144

Eliot’s commentary gained support in the coming days as newspapers published AP wire

service stories that ranged from Vichy France’s propaganda radio gloating over the

disorder spreading across the United States to blaming longtime residents of Detroit who

were unyielding to the changes brought by wartime industries. Newspapers also adopted

localized story frames that asked the question: could this happen in our community,

too?145

On editorial pages, the newspapers clearly fell into two primary categories: Those

who subscribed to the suspicion that an Axis element had agents fomenting disunity in

the country; and those who did not. The venerable New York Times’s editorial department

97 firmly fell into the former category. Even as federal troops were still fighting to regain control in Detroit’s streets, the Times editorial stated while poor housing conditions, overcrowded city streets, and congested public recreational facilities certainly played a part in the chaos, those situations alone were not responsible. Instead, the editors argued:

“Sinister individuals and organizations, doing the work of the Axis, if not actually allied with it, have taken full advantage of the situation.”146 And while the Times did not clearly cast blame on these actors, it offered a warning: “Keeping peace and good-will among all sorts and conditions of people at home is an indispensable part of the war effort. Those who hamper this work, whatever their race or creed, are not good

Americans.”147 The Washington Post editorial, on June 23, 1943, went a step further:

All of this represents a battle triumph for our enemies. It is perhaps no accident that the tragedy occurred in a city which has spawned some of our principal native Fascists. The immediate cause of the uprising, to be sure, lies in the inadequate living facilities of a community which has become desperately overcrowded as a result of the war. But beneath this is the poison of a contempt for democratic process, of a denial of democratic principles.148

The Post concluded that anyone willing to stir up “enmity” between the races could only be viewed as an enemy of the United States.149 It was a sentiment shared by the LA Times editorial, which pointed a finger at Communists “and Communist elements in the C.I.O.” for deliberately “fomenting race antagonism.”150 The LA Times, much like The

Washington Post, concluded that such agitators were working against the Allied effort, when it stated: “Whoever stirs up racial prejudice or racial hatred is, whether he knows it or not, working for Hitler and Goebbels.”151 But not all the editorial writers agreed with these conclusions.

98 The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial, on June 24, 1943, argued that it was too

convenient to point a finger overseas at the Axis enemy. The editorial suggested the real

cause for disunity and community-wide rioting lay much closer to home:

It’s a rather comforting thought to put the blame on outside influences— especially those which the people as a whole detest and are fighting to destroy. It provides an easy explanation which excuses us from blame. To a very limited extent there may be an element of truth in it, but let’s not delude ourselves to the point of failing to scrutinize causes and policies which lie within our own control.152

Instead the editorial charged that discriminatory practices in American society—from economics and education to political participation—were to blame for the varied degrees of friction among African Americans and whites all across the country. Editors at The

Sun were more explicit, when they argued that communities that had experienced major disruptions in population as a result of the war effort had a greater responsibility to be proactive in preventing racial imbalances and friction. Further, the editors argued: “This is a community responsibility in which both races have a share but in which the main burden falls on the white people, who not only have the greater advantages in such matters but who, as the overwhelming majority, also have the deciding voice in determining community policies.”153 It should be noted that both the Pittsburgh Post-

Gazette and The Sun were in cities with major wartime industries and large minority

populations as well as an active advocacy black press. And both newspapers had

editorials with a much more tempered approach in terms of casting blame. It could be

argued that because of these factors the Post-Gazette and The Sun were likely more aware

of how local and national policies on employment, education, and discrimination affected

African Americans than other newspapers in the study.

99 The British Press Reports Detroit

News of the Detroit race riots spread quickly across the Atlantic Ocean. But the first reports were not from newspapers, but rather, from a radio broadcast. According to a news article published in The Sun on June 25, 1943, the London correspondent for

Columbia Broadcasting System had just completed his live report from London, to

American audiences, when a short-wave radio switch was inadvertently left open around

12:45 a.m. London time. So when the New York City-based broadcaster went on the air to report that Michigan’s Governor Kelly had declared martial law in Detroit in the wake of the race riots, the information also aired to London audiences. The Sun wrote: “this announcement was overheard in London, with the result that people in England heard the news before they were supposed to have it.”154 According to Paul Patterson, publisher of

The Sun who was in London at the time of the slip-up and reported the information back

to his newspaper, American censors intended to release the information after President

Roosevelt’s proclamation of calling for all Americans to remain calm.

Five of the British mainstream newspapers in this study reported the Detroit race

riots on June 22, 1943—the same day their American counterparts were first going to

press with the same news. However, that British papers breaking this news were not

based in London. Instead, it was regional papers, including those in Belfast and Bristol,

which first broke news of the unrest in Detroit. The Irish News and the Belfast Newsletter

both published the same one-paragraph brief from Reuters News service that reported

martial law had been declared in Detroit by Michigan’s governor.155 The same report, sourced presumably by the leaked CBS broadcast, also reported eleven men had been killed and an additional five hundred injured “during the last 24 hour in racial riots.”156

100 The Lancashire Daily Post also reported the incident as “racial riots” in a lengthier

Reuters brief that ran on its June 22, 1943, front page. The story noted: “Mr. Henry

Stimson, U.S. War Secretary, acting on President Roosevelt’s orders, has called out troops to quell racial rioting in Detroit, America’s big engineering centre.”157 In the

Lancashire paper’s report, the number killed in the fighting was reported at twenty-three with more than seven hundred injured.

Both the Bristol Evening Post and the Bristol Evening World used the same, but lengthier, Reuters report on inside pages, that stated that calm had been slowly restored to

Detroit as federal troops assisted the local police. The Reuters wire report was an abbreviated chronological narrative of how the fighting started:

The rioting began around midnight on Sunday, when a negro and a white man got into a fight on the way home from an amusement park. Within a few hours, bands of negroes and whites were roaming the streets looking for trouble. Fighting flared up intermittently, but every effort was made by State Police and troops to preserve order and in some cases tear gas was used.158

The Bristol reports also acknowledged the problem that housing had become in Detroit as its population boomed because of the defense contract work that was attracting workers from other parts of the country.

In follow-up stories the next day, the Irish News and Lancashire Daily Post continued to update readers on the rise in casualties in Detroit’s race riots as well as the role federal troops played in maintaining peace overnight. The Lancashire Daily Post also picked up on a popular story frame in the States—finding someone or something to blame for the violence—when it reported:

The Ku Klux Klan and other semi-fascist organizations are accused by the Negroes of being behind the riots. The first serious signs of this race

101 hatred came recently when thousands of workers at the Packard company’s factory went on strike because three Negroes were put to work on the assembly line with white workers.159

The same wire service story noted that the death toll in Detroit had been increased to twenty-eight, “25 of whom are Negroes.”160 Meanwhile, the Irish News led its front page with a story about how disruptive the coal strikes and race riots had become in America.

The Reuters News piece, written by John Leonard, ran across the top three columns on

June 23, 1943, under a headline that declared: “RIOTS AND STRIKES CAUSE CRISIS

IN U.S.”161 The story carried a Washington, D.C., dateline and noted that America was

“gripped by a domestic crisis almost without precedent in President Roosevelt’s tenure in

office.”162 The article noted how two things were greatly influencing Britain’s closest

ally. First, it reported that American coal mines were “idle.”163 And second: “The great

armament city of Detroit, in Michigan, now under martial law, is slowly recovering from

a racial outbreak—possibly inspired by Axis agents—in which 23 people have been

killed and more than 700 injured.”164 In truth, the work stoppage at American coal mines

had been in the British press for days and continued to be a focal point—and a topic of

contention—in a nation that was dependent on U.S. coal supplies. But the role that Axis

agents might have played, and the need to cast blame, were new frames for the Irish

News.

Even while these regional British papers were publishing second-day stories about

the Detroit riots, London dailies were reporting it for the first time on June 23, 1943.

Both The Daily Express and The Daily Mail opted to run front page stories on the Detroit

race riot and subsequent chaos in the States. For readers of the Express, the headline

appeared just above the fold, and although it only ran over a single column, it still packed

102 a punch: “A CITY HEARD A RUMOUR: And 28 died.”165 In an almost gossipy approach, the reporter, C.V.R. Thompson, explained to his readers why this news from across the Atlantic was important:

This is a story which should not be read merely because it tells of violent and pitched battle between Whites and Negroes in Detroit, America’s Birmingham. The reader should not be enthralled just by the spectacle of trams and cars being turned over and houses put to the torch, of streets of blood, of a whole city’s population skulking into apprehensive hiding. . . . Instead, this is a story which should be studied as a warning of what can happen on the home front when people listen to rumours, and to subversive whispering.166

Thompson returned to a more chronological narrative, explaining to London readers how two men, one African American and one white, got into a fisticuffs bout on “an island playground” and the fighting “spread like fires in an incendiary raid across the whole city of Detroit.”167 After setting the scene, Thompson asked his readers how such a thing could happen. Then he proceeded to explain:

High-paying war industries have attracted thousands of “hill-billy” Negroes into the city. With more money in their pockets than ever before, and in greater numbers than ever before, the Negroes were attracting plenty of attention in Detroit. . . . But someone has been building up this situation. There have been rumours going around Detroit for weeks, rumours among white people of killings and murders that were being hushed up, rumours among coloured people, particularly the more backward ones, of White duplicity, the end of the coloured man now, to gain ascendancy.168

Thompson noted that American officials had begun blaming Axis agents, namely native

fascists groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, for the subversive whispers that had killed

twenty-eight people and injured hundreds more. The reporter concluded that there was

much to be learned by the American experience, when he added: “the moral of this story

for America, and anywhere else it is read, is Don’t Listen to ‘Someones.’”169

103 The newspaper’s competitor, The Daily Mail, also reported on the Detroit race

riots with help from staff correspondent, Don Iddon. But unlike Thompson’s article,

which read more like a finger-wagging at the gullible, Iddon wrote a straight news story

about federal troops deployed to Detroit and the martial law declared there. He described

the city for his readers: “Army jeeps and armored cars are patrolling the streets of Detroit

to-night. Soldiers with fixed bayonets are stationed up and down the town.”170 He then used a chronological narrative to tell about the fight that started on Belle Isle and spread into the city. A day later, Iddon wrote a column about what he termed “American unrest.”171 In this column he argued that while things might look bad in the States, between coal strikes and city-wide riots, “for every Detroit, there are ten thousand peaceful cities hard at work turning out weapons to beat the Axis.”172 Iddon continued

that anyone with ideas in their heads that the United States had fallen into utter chaos and

disorder, he or she should “scrap it. America is not seething with disorder.”173 Instead,

Iddon compared the problems plaguing Britain’s ally as typical growing pains of a nation churning out war materiel—and he predicted that these pangs would subside. At the same time, the columnist warned that the coal strikes and race riots might not be over, so readers should not fall prey to Axis propaganda that suggested America would crumble into an internal war. Iddon concluded: “So don’t get perturbed over the recent American news. A month from now it will probably be forgotten. The war effort here is still something to marvel at.”174 Iddon would be proven both correct and wrong in his

predictions. Correct in that the Detroit race riots would slow, but never fully stop the

great American war machine. Wrong, in that the rioting would not be forgotten in a

104 month’s time. In fact, less than two months later, in a different American city, headlines

once more would blast news about rioting and deaths.

Rumor Sparks Rioting in Harlem

The headlines were all too familiar for readers of the black press in the summer of

1943. The Chicago Defender’s main headline on August 7, 1943, blared across the top of

the front page in all capital letters: “6 DEAD IN HARLEM RIOT.”175 The Defender’s

staunch competitor, the Pittsburgh Courier, offered a nearly identical headline, along

with a secondary headline that declared: “DISGRACEFUL SCENES ENACTED AS

HOODLUM ELEMENTS LOOT STORES; 195 HURT—363 JAILED.”176 Meanwhile, the Baltimore-based Afro American’s August 7, 1943, edition cut to the chase: “False

Report That Soldier was Killed Leads to Outburst.”177 Across the top of the Baltimore newspaper, above its masthead, The Afro American featured four photographs of what by now had become familiar images to readers: cars overturned and set ablaze; empty streets with shattered storefronts; public officials with stern looks on their faces attempting to regain control.178

But there was one significant difference: New York officials were quick to

declare Harlem as simply a riot. Not a race riot. It was information the Courier’s New

York correspondent, Billy Rowe, quickly pointed out to readers:

For the benefit of our readers . . . the trouble which broke out here Sunday evening and lasted into the dawning hours . . . was not a race riot. By no stretch of the imagination can the thing be termed such. It was the violent outbreak of irresponsible persons, gone crazy with mob-fever, who took upon themselves to defy established law and order . . . breaking windows of established business establishments, roaming the streets looking for trouble, using insulting epithets at police officials, defying those race leaders who attempted to give them the facts.179

105 Rowe noted that some forty blocks of Harlem—from 110th Street to 155th Street—had

been declared off limits for whites and any other “trouble-making youngsters.”180 But

unlike Detroit, where local and state law enforcement shot randomly into the rioting

crowds, Rowe reported that the police officers and armed troops “have been instructed

NOT to ‘shoot to kill’ and to use all patience and forbearance which is theirs, to keep

down trouble.”181 Rowe also noted that New York’s Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, who had

spent the entire evening in Harlem personally directing the three thousand patrolmen and

one thousand detectives who had been called to the scene, was “booed when he attempted

to make a direct appeal to the people from the steps of a Harlem police station.”182 The

Courier was not alone in its approach to downplaying the racial angle.

The Afro American, while never specifically declaring that the incident was not a race riot, did note that an integrated police force “worked together to halt the looting.”183

And unlike Detroit, where law enforcement shot willy-nilly into the rioting fray killing mostly African Americans, the Afro American reported: “Police shot only when attacked or when looters failed to halt when ordered. Rioters were bent on robbing not on murder.”184

Like the Courier, the Defender used very specific language in its news story, when it reported: “Both Negro and white leaders were of the opinion that the outbreak was not of a racial nature. Instead, they held it was simply a series of disorders in which the Harlem hoodlum elements used an attack on a Negro soldier as an excuse to loot stores in the section owned by white persons.”185 Instead, the Defender noted that what was being called the worst disturbance in Harlem’s history began “when a white policeman shot a soldier, Robert Bandy, in the shoulder in Braddock Hotel.”186 The

106 shooting occurred after the policeman, James Collins, had attempted to arrest a woman in

the lobby of the hotel and the soldier had interfered, “using the policeman’s night stick to

strike him over the head. The policeman drew his gun and fired. Both were taken to

Sydenham hospital.”187 Rumors quickly spread across Harlem that Bandy was dead,

which prompted large crowds to follow the ambulance and gather outside the hospital.

According to Defender news reports, law enforcement acted quickly and rushed

seven thousand reserves to the Harlem hospital around 8:30 p.m., but by 10:30 p.m.,

rioters were out in force, smashing windows of businesses along 125th Street. Before

long, “wholesale looting” began in a wide swath of the northern Manhattan

neighborhood, from 110th Street to 145th Street and between Lenox Avenue and Eighth

Avenue.188 Despite the newspaper’s in-depth news articles about the events in Harlem, there were no images accompanying the reports. Instead, on the front page, was a three- column photo of two Tuskegee airmen on graduation day, standing next to three young

African American women smiling at the camera.189 Defender editors blatantly addressed the issue of riot photos in a brief editorial on its front page, in which it was noted:

The Chicago Defender is not publishing any photos of the Harlem riot in this—or any other edition—of the paper. At least a dozen photos of the outbreak were available to the Defender through its regular sources. They were gruesome, bloody, inflamatory. [sic] In line with the request of President Roosevelt, leading governors and mayors that all efforts be made to calm and ease racial tensions and further the war effort, we are relegating these photos to the files. Perhaps some day when sanity and intelligence again prevail, when passions are calmed and men of good will can view the photohistory of American atrocities without reaching for weapons, we will bring these pictures out again.190

Instead, Defender editors argued that now was the time for Americans to be patient, and

tolerant and use common sense. The editorial concluded: “Let’s beat our enemies lest we

107 beat ourselves.”191 Although the Courier did not run an editor’s note regarding images

from the Harlem riots, the nation’s largest-circulating African American-owned press—

which ran entire pages of images from violence in Detroit just two months earlier—did

not run a single photograph from Harlem.

In its August 14, 1943, edition, the Courier ran an editorial on the front page

decrying the “hotheads” in Harlem, publicly shaming the actors.192 It stated:

The prepondering [sic] majorities of law-abiding American colored people are deeply downcast and humiliated because of the acts of vandalism and disorder committed by their fellowmen a short while ago. They fully realize and understand that sticks and stones, iconoclasm and disorder are not going to solve any problems of race, nor promote peace among disturbed and discordant American groups. But there is not only shame and sorrow for what happened in this curious ghetto, there is also grim determination to get at the source of the disgrace and wipe out the ugly cause.193

The editorial concluded that while La Guardia and others in officialdom continued to investigate the matter, “intelligent colored publishers” were already well aware of what prompted the Harlem discord: “It appears to us that the Axis of Crime-Politics and

Corrupt Police must be smashed in all underprivileged communities.”194 The editorial

then urged enlightened African American readers, church pulpits, and the black press to

take a proactive step toward “converting the hoodlum element” into more law-abiding

ways.195 The primary story on the Harlem riot noted that out of 500 individuals arrested,

350 had been fingerprinted by police, of which 120 had criminal records—including two

men who were shot and killed by police.196

In addition to a follow-up story about Harlem returning to normalcy as civic

groups continued to study the cause of the violence, the Courier also published a short

ANP wire story about how news of the Harlem riot was censored. It noted that London

108 newspapers did not receive reports of the riots in Harlem until well after the situation had

become old news because “the U.S. censor released the news Wednesday.”197 The Afro

American also reported the censorship of the Harlem riots in its August 14, 1943, edition, when a columnist noted: “U.S. censors withheld the news of the Harlem riot from British newspapers for three days. It is embarrassing to admit abroad that the four freedoms do not exist at home.”198

On its editorial page, The Afro American took a critical look at the differences between the disturbances in Detroit and those in Harlem and included criticisms for how

Mayor La Guardia classified the activities in one of his borough’s neighborhoods as

“hoodlumism” rather than a “race riot.”199 The editorial opined:

Let’s call it a half riot. Detroit resented local prejudices. Harlem was outraged by mistreatment of colored soldiers in uniform nationally and what it thought was an instance of the needless shooting of a soldier in New York. Detroit’s cops did five times as much shooting and killing as Harlem’s, but New Yorkers also did twenty times as much looting and store wrecking as Detroiters. The disturbance in New York must therefore go down in the AFRO books as a race riot. We have no objection to what anyone else desires to name it.200

The editorial added that when people acted out in violence, such as in Detroit and

Harlem, it sent a clear message to community officials that “they are not moving fast

enough.”201 The editors further argued that these disturbances would continue until the rights established by the U.S. Constitution were upheld for all people, regardless of race or creed. It noted: “It’s as simple as that. We need no interracial commissions or conventions. If we are to have peace and unity at home, we must have it on constitutional grounds. Colored people must be treated as all other citizens. No special orders or reservations for them can be tolerated.”202 Again, the black press used current events and

109 the editorial page to advocate for the equality called for in the U.S. Constitution, but still

lacking within American society.

Much like The Afro American, the Chicago Defender also took great exception to

La Guardia’s insistence on denying that the events in Harlem were those of a race riot.

Instead, in the main editorial on August 14, 1943, the editors argued that the very same

symptoms that resulted in a race riot in Detroit were just as evident in Harlem, perhaps

even more so as the city represented the country’s largest African American community

and acted as the nation’s center for the African American intelligentsia. The editorial

noted:

It does not matter that there was a difference in the character of the violence as it reflected itself in Harlem, and the rioting against Negroes in Detroit and other cities. Harlem cannot be separated from Detroit. Fundamentally, the same factors that led to the Detroit outbreak are responsible for the scenes which disgraced New York City’s Negro District.203

Further, the Defender criticized La Guardia for claiming the Harlem rioting was driven by the actions of hoodlums and irresponsible people, and argued that such statements explained nothing about the greater complexities the nation was facing. It added:

This is far too simple an approach. It avoids those fundamental factors which, in this war are becoming dominant in the life of the Negro people—social ostracism and segregation, political disfranchisement, economic restrictions, and the long list of civil disabilities which have accumulated over the years and are creating a very unstable social psychology among the Negro people. These cannot be removed from any discussion of the Harlem clash.204

Instead, the editorial charged that ultimately responsibility laid with the president, who

had the ability and the elected power to enforce social changes in the country, if he would

choose to do so.

110 The Mainstream Press Has its Say

Amid headlines about U.S. planes bombing Romanian oil fields and Berlin evacuation orders, the one-column story that ran the length of the front of The New York

Times on August 2, 1943, almost got lost in the news.205 Under the headline, “HARLEM

DISORDERS BRING QUICK ACTION BY CITY AND ARMY,” the unbylined story

reported that traffic remained diverted from a large portion of Harlem. Meanwhile Mayor

La Guardia had taken to the airwaves shortly after midnight and urged neighborhood

residents to return to their homes and explained why such a large section of Harlem

remained off limits.206 The article noted that “a series of incidents had arisen from the shooting of a soldier by a policeman.”207

The news story did not mention race until the third paragraph, when it noted

“thirty persons, some of them Negroes, were admitted to Sydenham Hospital.”208 The story downplayed the role of race as it offered a chronological narrative of the events that transpired in Harlem, from the police officer attempting to arrest a woman in the lobby of the Braddock Hotel to the soldier who tried to stop the policeman and was shot in the back of his shoulder after attacking the cop with his own nightstick. The article did not mention the race of the people who followed the soldier’s ambulance and gathered outside the hospital awaiting word—while rumor spread that the soldier had died.

The article also reported that La Guardia was on the scene early, directing police and making public appeals over the radio, along with African American civic leaders who also appealed for calm in Manhattan’s northern neighborhood and voiced support for the mayor and the police. A day later, on August 3, 1943, the Times reported—again on the front page—that eight thousand members of the New York State Guard were still on

111 standby at armories across the city and an additional fifteen-hundred African American

volunteers had taken to the streets to assist the six thousand city police and military

police already patrolling the neighborhood. A story frame of normalcy was repeated

throughout the second day of coverage as Mayor La Guardia urged citizens to return to

work and promised to lift the curfew if everything remained “quiet.”209

The report noted the tally of dead, injured, and arrested. It also added the element

of race: “The dead were all Negroes, as were all the injured except about forty policemen,

including two captains. The disorder was not a race riot, as virtually the only white

persons involved were among the police who attempted to maintain law and order and the

storekeepers whose property was stolen.”210 The only images that appeared in the

newspaper were placed on the jump, on page ten, and featured images of a block along

125th Street that showed storefront windows busted and mannequins stripped and tossed about the sidewalks. In another image, a group of African Americans surrounded the remains of a pawn shop that had been looted, with most of its wares in a heap outside the store, while a photo a column over showed city police forming a line down the middle of a Harlem street, prepared for battle.211 A page over, on nine, an unbylined story gushed as

it reported the activities of Mayor La Guardia as he worked to regain control of his city. It

noted:

He conferred with Army, police and other city officials and with representative citizens of Harlem; he toured the trouble areas in his police car observing the damage done to shops in the outbreak of hoodlumism Sunday night, and he assumed active command of the forces mobilized to keep the peace in Harlem last night.212

112 It was a much different image than what the media presented of the Detroit mayor, just two months earlier, who hesitated to seek federal troops and was later criticized for his poor leadership during the city’s tribulations.

Leaders within the African American community also quickly circled the wagons around La Guardia and publicly affirmed the mayor’s classification of the disturbances in

Harlem as a result of hoodlumism, rather than race riots. An August 3, 1943, Times article quoted NAACP executive secretary Walter White:

It cannot be too clearly emphasized that this was not a race riot in any sense of the term. The false rumor that a policeman had killed a Negro soldier in the presence of his mother spread like wildfire. The mistreatment of Negro soldiers, particularly in the South, is a terribly sore point with Negroes. Thus the beginning of the trouble.213

White further argued that most of Harlem’s citizens were already home and asleep when the violence began, and in addition to placing the blame on hoodlums, added that high rents, job discrimination, and other “evils” had contributed to a general feeling of bitterness among the neighborhood’s residents.214

That same day, on the editorial page, the newspaper called the events in Harlem a

“tragedy” and reinforced the mayor’s description of the cause as a result of hoodlums.

The editorial also praised the mayor and his prompt actions, when it opined:

Walter White, secretary of the National Association for the Advancement Colored People, said truthfully that there is “a great difference here from the conditions in Detroit.” One difference lies in the prompt and more effective action of the Mayor and the police. . . . It must be clear, however, that Mayor La Guardia and Police Commissioner [Lewis] Valentine intended to deal with lawbreaking in Harlem as they would lawbreaking elsewhere, without discrimination except against the lawbreakers themselves.215

113 The editorial added that hoodlumism was not exclusive to race. The best thing citizens of

the city’s five boroughs could do: acknowledge each was dependent on the other. It

concluded: “The wise citizen knows this and the good citizen acts accordingly.”216

The New York Times was not the only mainstream newspaper to offer readers a more tempered approach to reporting the events in Harlem. In fact, of the remaining mainstream U.S. newspapers, it was the Detroit Free Press alone that ran an Associated

Press brief on its front page on August 2, 1943. Perhaps it was because editors there were still editorializing about Detroit’s own race riot two months earlier.217 Perhaps it was because the local stories continued to follow the courts’ process as individuals were charged and tried by juries of their peers. Either way, the Free Press reported down page, in a three-paragraph brief, that extra police and emergency back-up squads were on call after “a crowd gathered following the shooting of a Negro soldier by a policeman.”218

The brief neither called the incident a race riot, nor used the term hoodlumism, coined by

Mayor La Guardia and used lavishly in The New York Times reports.

A day later, buried on page eighteen, the Free Press officially called the incident

a riot, when it reported: “Lights on in Harlem after Riot.”219 A secondary headline noted

that six people had been killed and an additional 543 injured in the fighting and looting.

The lead sentence noted: “Wild smashing of shop windows and looting of stores owned

by both Negroes and whites marked the disorders.”220 The AP story added that the looting caused an estimated $5 million in damage. This second-day wire story was framed in terms that police had everything under control and if citizens continued to cooperate, the curfew would be lifted along with the reopening of bars, movie theaters, and other recreational facilities. Unlike Detroit’s riot, where wire stories moved with

114 multiple photographs of whites attacking African Americans, or flipping cars over and

torching them, the Harlem images were framed more as aftermath, depicting African

Americans staring at the damaged shops in Harlem or of police officers assisting injured

African American youths.221 A day later, the Free Press published another wire story, this time from the United Press service, on the front page that declared: “Life in Harlem

Nearly Normal.”222 The story arc had come full circle, with control regained and life

returning to normal as carpenters rebuilt the destroyed store fronts in Harlem.

Only three other U.S. dailies reported the Harlem riot on Monday, August 2,

1943, including the Boston Daily Globe, The (Baltimore) Sun,223 and the LA Times. The

Globe’s four-paragraph AP brief, which ran at the bottom of page nine, already framed

the story as Mayor La Guardia being in control as he ordered traffic off all Harlem streets

following unrest sparked by a police officer shooting an African American soldier.224 To be sure, the brief downplayed the violence that swept Harlem, which was what likely prompted Globe editors to run another AP story the following day at the bottom of the front page. In the story, although framed as everything being under control in Harlem once more, the facts spoke for themselves about how out of control the northern

Manhattan neighborhood had been: six dead, 543 injured, five hundred arrested, $5 million in damage, and six thousand police on patrol.225 Again, the frame of public officials taking action also emerged in this wire report, as Mayor La Guardia became the central New York figure, who “conferred constantly with police, Army and Negro leaders and issued four radio appeals to the public to keep calm.”226 Just above the jump story, an

image of a street patrol making its way down a tattered Harlem street showed the

aftermath but none of the initial violence or perpetrators in action.

115 The LA Times ran similar images of Harlem on an inside page—including the

same image as the Globe with a three-member patrol making its way down a Harlem

street—along with photographs of world events, such as U.S. bombers making a run on

Wake Island and Italians demonstrating in Milan.227 Again, the images were focused on

the aftermath, rather than the violence in action. Included in the LA Times’s sparse

coverage of Harlem was another AP brief, this time from Eleanor Roosevelt, which urged

Americans to remain calm. The wire story quoted the first lady as stating that she “hoped

that ‘people who can control it will keep their heads and act in a kindly way.’”228

For readers of The Washington Post, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Chicago Daily

Tribune, and San Francisco Examiner, news of the Harlem riots would not appear in

print until August 3, 1943.229 All four newspapers also opted to publish AP wire service

stories on inside pages that framed the news as local law enforcement being in control

and on the scene. The only newspaper out of the four to publish images of the violent

aftermath in Harlem was the Examiner, which dedicated an entire inside page to seven

wire photos. Again, the images were mild compared to those that came out of Detroit. In

one, a car was turned over and set ablaze, while a police officer walked by. In another,

police arrested several African Americans who had participated in the looting and were

carrying boxes of lifted good. Or in another, a group of guardsmen lined up along an

empty Harlem street in broad daylight as they enforced curfew.230

Unlike Detroit, where many of the newspapers opined about the tragedy and causes of violence in America’s Arsenal of Democracy, few newspapers editorialized about Harlem outside of the black press and The New York Times. Editors at The Boston

Daily Globe, The Washington Post, and the Chicago Daily Tribune all concurred that

116 Harlem was completely “different” than Detroit—falling into the trap of what the black

press contended was an oversimplification of the East Coast unrest. Globe editors argued:

No conflict between white and colored groups set off the spark in Harlem, the greatest Negro community in America. The provoking incident—a colored soldier resenting the arrest of a colored woman—is too trifling to explain the death and destruction that followed. The rioting, with its smashing of windows and looting of stores, was hoodlumism at its worst.231

The Boston editors criticized the army for rebuffing African American appeals to hire

more people of color for their force, and added:

The subsequent appeal of a Negro leader for Negro military police in Harlem and the Army’s rebuff of the request is itself an eloquent testimony to the need for more imagination in dealing with problems involving racial differences. . . . Submerged in much of America into a second-class citizenship, the Negro has had a hard enough time figuring out what he is fighting for in this war. He needs to be convinced that he has a share in our democracy.232

This insightful take on the Harlem riots, written by a mainstream newspaper, demonstrated that there were some editors who were well aware of the inequality and questions that African Americans still struggled with some two years into the war. And while the black press dismissed mainstream newspapers as oversimplifying the racial tensions, it is clear that at least some editorial boards understood the frustrations among

African Americans and that societal changes were needed.

Editors at The Washington Post concurred with their Boston colleagues, when they opined:

Our entire Nation has a responsibility to probe into and eliminate so far as possible the causes of friction which make such tragic outbursts possible. Negro leaders everywhere have an equal obligation to convince their followers that they cannot hope to improve their situation by the tactics apparently employed in Harlem. Resort to lawlessness, particularly when the provocation is minor or nonexistent, can only destroy the constructive

117 work of those who are trying to ameliorate the conditions under which many Negroes live.233

Although Washington Post editors sought to place blame on the African American

community for Harlem, at the same time they called for national leaders to improve

conditions that prompted racial friction. This framing of blame again differed widely

from that in Detroit, where many editors were quick to blame saboteurs and Axis agents

for the violence that fell on that city.

British Press’ Take on Harlem

Unlike the news that was leaked over the radio about martial law being declared

in Detroit in June 1943, news of the unrest in Harlem was delayed for days—to the point

that the delay itself became news. The New York Times reported, on August 5, 1943, that

U.S. censors had intentionally held the news of the Harlem riots.234 To be sure, while only six of the twelve British newspapers published stories about the Harlem riots, none of the papers reported before August 5, 1943.

Three of the London papers reported Harlem’s disturbance, but The Daily Express was the only one to report it on its front page. And even then, the focus of the story was that U.S. censors held the information for nearly four days. The paper noted: “America’s censorship released last night news of a riot in Harlem. . . . A rumour that a drunken policeman had shot a Negro soldier led to a riot in which five people were killed, 543 injured and £1,000,000 worth of goods looted.”235 Inside, on page three, the Express’s

Newell Rogers reported from New York: “It began with a shot in a dingy hotel lobby in

Harlem, New York’s great coloured quarter—a shot from a white man’s gun at a Negro.

The coloured man was only wounded. But it started the worst riot in Harlem’s history.

118 Only tonight did the U.S. censorship release the story, three days after the battle.”236

Despite headlines that declared the events in Harlem a riot, Rogers noted that Mayor La

Guardia had denied it was a riot, calling it “sheer hoodlumism” instead.237 The reporter

also noted that unlike in Detroit and Los Angeles earlier in the year, there had been no

direct fighting between African Americans and whites. Rogers added: “For seven hours

throughout the night that terrifying thing ‘the mob’ was loose in the shabby alleys of

Harlem—loosed by one of those mass mistakes the mob always makes.”238

The report proceeded in chronological fashion to retell how the fight started, how city officials and African American leaders responded, and when peace had returned to the northern Manhattan neighborhood. Throughout the narrative, Rogers added rich details that were absent from his American colleagues’ reports. For example, Rogers described a second day of looting in Harlem, which included “gangs of zoot-suited youths,” and noted that zoot suits were the “baggy garb of teenage Negro dandies.”239 It

should be noted that the presence of Harlem youth in zoot suits was not reported by the

AP, UP, nor The New York Times. Rogers also concluded that unlike in L.A. or Detroit,

in Harlem the rioters were “seeking only goods, not blood.”240

The (London) Times and The Daily Mail both opted to report news of Harlem on

inside pages in the August 5, 1943, editions. In the more reserved Times, the report

“From Our Own Correspondent” reported that “hoodlumism” broke out in Harlem after a

scuffle in a Harlem hotel lobby between an African American soldier on leave and a

white police officer.241 The report never mentioned U.S. censorship or delays in reporting the incident. Meanwhile, The Daily Mail’s New York correspondent, Don Iddon, made a less overt comment about the wartime censorship in his opening sentence:

119 Now it can be told. There has been grave trouble in Harlem, where a million coloured people live in cramped tenements. The trouble has not been racial, and it is all over now. But on Sunday night a tidal wave of disorder and hoodlumism swept the district. As a result, six people—all coloured—are dead, some 400 have been injured—mostly coloured—and about 500—all Negroes—have been charged with rioting, looting, and assault.242

Iddon’s report did not include the presence of zoot suits, but he described the streets of

Harlem as a place where “gangs of young hoodlums, including girls” roamed the streets in a “wild orgy of attacking policemen, street fighting, stabbings, and shootings.”243 He

concluded by noting that the neighborhood was in shambles by the time the street

fighting ended, jails had been overwhelmed with suspects and “a huge mountain of loot

has been assembled.”244 The Belfast News-Letter, Irish News, and The Western Daily

Press & Bristol Mirror published a much more subdued wire story, offered by the AP

and Reuters that presented the Harlem riots without such colorful details.245 The stories, identical in each publication, noted: “censorship permitted the news to be transmitted only yesterday” and made the distinction that the “disturbances were not actual race riots” but rather events caused by “hooligans.”246 None of the mainstream British papers

offered commentary or editorials about Harlem, nor did their columnists wax on about

the doom and gloom coming out of Britain’s closest ally.

Conclusion

Several trends, both in the mainstream and black press, emerged from this study

of how media reported the Detroit and Harlem riots in the summer of 1943. Some of the

findings lend themselves to a better understanding of the bigger picture of wartime

censorship and media routines, such as looking to place blame when major events tore at

the fabric of society such as the riots in Detroit appeared to do. Other findings

120 demonstrated how story frames—whether originated by the media or by its sources, as in

the case of Mayor La Guardia and his use of “hoodlumism” rather than “riot” in

Harlem—influenced how stories and events were ultimately portrayed to the masses.

Similarly, this study revealed a profound difference between the aims of the

mainstream media versus those of the black press during this period. While the

mainstream media focused on censorship and getting news to readers, the black press was

intent on not just keeping African American readers informed, but also advocating on

behalf of the community for civic justice and social change. One example of this distinct

difference is when the Pittsburgh Courier sent William G. Nunn to report on Detroit. His

dispatch was part-news, part-editorial as he argued his case against the ineptness of the

Detroit police department.247 At one point, Nunn demanded answers from Detroit Mayor

Jeffries:

Why was it that the police allowed the riot situation to get so completely out of control? Why couldn’t the police have broken up the marauding groups of whites who stormed street cars and buses during the height of the rioting Monday, pulling innocent men to the streets and beating them? Why was it that out of the 1,362 jailed, over 1,000 were colored?248

This fundamental difference between the objectives of the mainstream and black press became salient points not just for the U.S. government, but also for Great Britain.

After a tumultuous 1943—both in the United States and among U.S. troops within the British Isles—officials in Whitehall struggled to understand the dynamics of race relations in America. In February 1944, H.G. Nicholas of the Ministry of Information submitted a report, entitled “THE NEGRO PRESS,” to Angus Malcolm in the North

American Department of the British Foreign Office. Drafted by MI’s New York Survey

121 Department, the report was a primer of sorts for British officials unfamiliar with the

history of the American black press. In his report, Nicholas noted:

The Negro press is, above all else, a crusading press. Its primary reason for existence is its role as champion of the Negro cause. It does not pretend to give “all the news that is fit to print”. Instead, all news is presented in light of its racial significance, and all editorial comment is devoted to the advancement of the Negro. The Negro press cannot, therefore, be regarded as a substitute for the white press or as its colored counterpart; it is avowedly a Negro supplement to the white press.249

Nicholas’s report also observed that unlike the mainstream American press, the black

press was prone to ignore major international news unless it was something that could be

framed in terms of race. Because of the black press’ effort to make readers think globally

in terms of race, Nicholas noted: “it is inevitable that it should be anti-British.”250 At the same time, the report observed that the black press often stressed how much better the

British treated African Americans compared to their own countrymen. He added: “This new incentive to friendship does not outweigh the old, deeply-rooted antagonism based on British colonial policy and the ‘general color bar that England maintains throughout the world.’”251 The report then broke down the newspapers and circulations of the publications mentioned in the report in an effort to help FO officials become more familiar with their names and titles.

Nicholas also noted that monthly MI reports monitoring the black press in

America would be made available if the Foreign Office was interested in receiving them.

This report is significant in that, while the U.S. government’s surveillance and suppression of the black press has been well-documented by historian Patrick S.

Washburn,252 there has been little evidence that America’s closest ally was also

122 monitoring the content of the black press on a monthly basis as it pertained to British

policies—particularly regarding its colonial holdings across the globe.253

In terms of press coverage of the riots in Detroit and Harlem, it should be noted

how much more extensive the American press—both black and mainstream news

organizations—covered these tumultuous events, particularly in comparison to how the

British press reported similar disturbances among U.S. troops stationed in the British

Isles. It is impossible to say whether this difference in reportage was a direct result of

wartime censorship or limited access to military officials who could comment on the

record about the incidents that occurred in the U.K—both of which could influence how

much British newspaper reported on such events. Similarly, it is likely that paper

rationing in Great Britain during the war years also played a role in how and what editors prioritized in terms of news. Further, because the primary actors were American troops, not British citizens, this detail likely influenced the newsworthiness of such stories.

U.S. Press Trends in Crisis

By the time the race riots hit Detroit in June 1943, the black press was insistent

that a target for blame be found. The Chicago Defender, perhaps the most editorially

vocal, almost immediately sought targets to level blame on for the race riots gripping the

country. Often these targets varied from Axis agents to inept American leadership, from

the local mayoral office to the White House. Similarly, the Pittsburgh Courier was quite

vocal in calling out the Hearst-owned Detroit Times for what the black press editors saw

as inflammatory coverage of the riots in Detroit.

In fact, all three black newspapers in this study routinely called out the U.S.

government for turning a blind eye to not only the role national discriminatory policies

123 and practices played in fueling the racial unrest during the summer of 1943, but also to

the hate-speech groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, that were permitted to go unfettered in

their attacks of African Americans. The Defender and the Courier were particularly vocal

on this point.254 For example, in a July 10, 1943, editorial, Defender editors opined:

These clashes can be stopped. They can be stopped now and present menace lifted. This is true because we know the Bundists, Klansmen, National Association of Manufacturer leaders who are the conspirators. There must be a nation-wide demand that these elements be politically destroyed; that their roots among the backward stratum of Americans be torn up and that their voices in hall or press be stilled by order of the government.255

The editorial added that a thorough investigation, by African Americans and whites alike,

into subversive organizations such as these was not only needed, but the only way for the

country to move forward and improve race relations.

The Detroit Free Press was equally critical of leadership—particularly the local

leadership—in the aftermath of the June riots. Topics from police laxity to questioning

the abilities of local leadership became quick and easy targets for primary causes of the

days-long riots. In an editorial on June 26, 1943, the Free Press opined that when “the

race-riot grand jury convenes charges of police laxity” made by a local circuit court judge

“should be thoroughly investigated.”256 The editorial noted:

If a policeman in the line of duty, tells a bunch of hoodlums to disperse at a street corner and they tell him to go to hell with obscene compliments and he is powerless to enforce his order, right then and there law and order cease to exist. Such a situation is an open invitation to the anarchy through which we have just gone.257

The editorial concluded that as long as politics were permitted to dominate the police department, morale and police efficiency would lag and law and order would suffer.

124 Among the British newspapers reporting the events in Detroit, this study found that it was regional papers in Belfast, Bristol, and Lancashire—cities all far from

London—that first broke the news of the Detroit race riots to readers in the British Isles.

In fact, many of these papers were publishing follow-up reports on June 23, 1943, when the London papers were publishing their initial stories—despite the fact that a slip-up in

New York-based CBS radio meant that many Londoners had already heard about the martial law declaration in Detroit and the governor calling for a state of emergency.

Incidentally, it was information British audiences heard simultaneously with America listeners.

And while the regional papers did not editorialize on the Detroit disturbances, it was the London papers with U.S.-based correspondents who ended up writing commentaries about the upheaval among Americans, and urged Britons not to become disheartened by the news. Don Iddon, writing for The Daily Mail, urged readers to take heart—that despite coal strikes, work-stoppages, and racial unrest, the whole of America was not “seething with unrest.”258 That for every unraveling city, there were thousands of others continuing onward, building munitions and vehicles that would push the war machine forward.

Harlem vs. Detroit: Similar Story, Different Approach

Although less than two months separated the upheavals in Detroit and Harlem, there were distinct differences in the tone, coverage, and play of the stories and images of

Harlem. Perhaps most obvious was the muted tone of what few photographs ran of the

Harlem riots. Virtually none of the papers published photos of Harlem youth committing crimes. Instead, the images were framed in terms of aftermath, with the results of the

125 looting and window smashing along 125th Street that displayed the carnage of rage.

Images that did feature African Americans often did so in a frame that demonstrated unity: African American volunteers working side by side New York’s majority white, thin blue line to restore order to Harlem. Mayor La Guardia consulting with African

American community leaders. African Americans and whites working together to clean up the smashed store front windows and sidewalks covered in discarded loot.

Some newspapers, such as the Defender, blatantly told readers they would not see any of the images of the chaos. The black-owned newspaper disclosed that it had made an editorial decision to not run the photos, citing their graphic nature. Although no record could be found to say that U.S. censors or government officials pressured the Defender or any of the American newspapers in the study to make these editorial decisions, the reality is that after a summer of conflict, the press did not publish images of direct violence in

Harlem. The Pittsburgh Courier, although it never explicitly said so, followed the same practice as the Defender, and did not run images of the destruction or disturbances that occurred in Harlem.

The Afro American, on the other hand, did run four photos on its front page the first week it reported the Harlem incident, but did not run additional photos in subsequent weeks. Among the mainstream newspapers that ran images from Harlem, the photographs generally ran inside the newspaper and never depicted African Americans and whites in direct conflict with each other. It is impossible to know for certain if the newspapers were self-censoring in terms of the scope of coverage of Harlem. It should be noted that earlier in 1943, both the Defender and the Courier had self-censored news

126 about long-awaited station assignments for the Tuskegee Airmen after being pressured from the government.259

What is undeniable is that black and mainstream newspapers alike ran far fewer stories and photographs of the Harlem riot than two months earlier in Detroit. Similarly, the newspapers quickly adopted Mayor La Guardia’s verbiage of the events in Harlem being a result of hoodlumism, not racial tensions. It is argued here that because the highest official in New York City repeatedly framed the events in Harlem as a result of hoodlumism, it meant that the press quickly adopted this terminology and did not appear to question it. This media routine is not unexpected. Three decades later, mass communication researcher Sharon Dunwoody would conclude that most journalists are so highly dependent on press conferences and officials conducting them that sources—rather than the news gatherers themselves—generally control the story frames and what information is presented to audiences.260 This tendency was as much a factor in 1943 as it was in 1978, at the time of Dunwoody’s study—or even today.

Perhaps the biggest lesson from this study of the events in Detroit and Harlem during the summer of 1943 is that while journalism routines generally followed the same patterns during periods of crises—from reporting the basic details of what happened, where, when, to whom, and why—the terminology used by officialdom is quickly adopted by the press. After the devastation of race riots in Detroit, when similar fighting rippled across Harlem, New York’s Mayor La Guardia refused to use the phrase “race riots” to describe the events that occurred on August 1-2, 1943. Instead, he repeatedly blamed the events on “hoodlumism”—an expression that was quickly integrated into

127 news reports in both the mainstream and black press in America, and eventually made its way into wire stories in the U.K.

128 Chapter 3: A Riot ‘Never Out of Control’: How the Press Reported A Night of

Terror and How Bamber Bridge Remains in British Collective Memory

All the American GIs wanted were a round of pints before leaving Ye Olde Hob

Inn on the night of June 24, 1943.1 But it was shortly after 10 p.m. and the last call for

drinks had already gone out at the pub, one of three in the sleepy northwestern English

village of Bamber Bridge. The African American soldiers, numbering around a dozen and

based at nearby Adams Hall where the U.S. Army’s Eighth Air Force Station 569 was

located, were getting a little rowdy. Although this scenario likely played out thousands of

times while American troops were stationed in Great Britain between 1942 and 1945, this

night would be different.

Maybe what happened was due to the policies the American military espoused

limiting the roles of African American troops, particularly denying them the right to

participate in combat with their white peers.2 It was certainly a testimony to the growing

tensions between white and African American troops that had been festering as the war

drudged along with no clear victory in sight. Perhaps it was fueled in part by a radio

bulletin about race rioting in Detroit and the subsequent martial law declared by

Michigan’s governor, information accidentally transmitted from Columbia Broadcasting

System’s New York City news bureau to London without censorship approval just two

days earlier.3 Or, perhaps it was white U.S. soldiers’ growing confusion and anger over the preferential treatment British civilians repeatedly extended to African American troops.4

Whatever the reason, on this night, at this pub, with this particular military unit,

what began as good-natured ribbing with a British barmaid over additional libations

inside the Hob Inn escalated into a verbal altercation between African American troops

and white U.S. military police outside. The evening ended with a massive gun battle in

the center of town—akin to legendary tales from the American Wild West—an event that

terrorized the British village, left one African American soldier dead, and several other

U.S. troops injured.5 Some seven decades later, it remains an evening of infamy from the county of Lancashire’s World War II years. And it remains forged into the collective memory of the residents of Bamber Bridge, despite newspaper reports at the time t minimized the significance of the events that night.

This chapter seeks to demonstrate that newspaper articles published in Britain and

America—from Belfast and London to Washington, D.C., and Chicago—portrayed a night that was never truly “out of control,” yet the events in Bamber Bridge were vastly different than merely a minimal disturbance according to primary documents, including military records, government officials’ reports, post-war articles, and oral histories.

Further, this research not only sheds light on how quickly news of the Detroit race riots reached England, but it also supports one historian’s claim that widespread news of racial friction in the U.S. could have very well influenced American troops stationed four thousand miles away.6

While historians have examined the events leading up to what has been dubbed the mutiny at Bamber Bridge, previous research has ignored how the wartime press reported the news. As such, this is the first extensive examination of media practices during coverage of the incidents. Before this research, explanations of what happened in

130 Bamber Bridge were largely limited to British historians and government documents. It will be argued that examining the media practices expands our understanding of how the press and wire services worked during the war years, and how wartime censorship—both in Great Britain and in the United States—influenced press reports about Bamber Bridge.

Questions driving this study included: What frames did the American press, both mainstream and African American publications, use to portray racial tensions among troops in the Bamber Bridge incident? How did the British press report the same racial disturbance? Were there differences in these story frames? How do memories of Bamber

Bridge citizens concur with or differ from published accounts? What evidence is there that censorship—whether self-imposed by news workers or imposed upon them by their governments—influenced the publication of the events at Bamber Bridge in the summer of 1943?

The primary sources of information included: newspaper coverage of the racial disturbances; U.S. and British governmental documents, including correspondence among government leaders and military reports of the racial events; and oral histories of individuals who were witness to the events. This study specifically examined news coverage from June 24, 1943 through July 10, 1943 in twenty-four newspapers, including local, regional, and national newspapers in both Great Britain and the United States.

A Night of Infamy

The three-paragraph brief on the top, center of page four in The Lancashire Daily

Post on June 25, 1943, was short and to the point: There had been several noteworthy

“incidents” at a camp in northwest England between white and African American troops and the U.S. Army headquarters had launched an investigation. The paper noted: “It is

131 unofficially understood, however, that the situation is now completely under control, and

that, contrary to local rumours, no one was killed.”7 The altercation between the

Americans, the paper reported, occurred after a “white U.S. military policeman had occasion to remonstrate with five coloured soldiers.”8 The picture, painted in the minds

of readers, 9 was that of American soldiers once again behaving badly in a British street.10

But for the villagers of Bamber Bridge, it was much more than a bit of fisticuffs among

Americans in a public space. Postwar reports and military records paint a much darker picture of this night that is still vividly remembered by residents.

Trouble at the Hob Inn

According to military reports, two white American military policemen were passing through Bamber Bridge as part of their evening patrol on the night of June 24,

1943, when they were approached by several officers and advised that trouble was brewing at the Hob Inn.11 The MPs, based out of nearby Preston, went to investigate.

When they entered the thatch-roofed pub shortly after last rounds had been called, they

found a group of about ten African American soldiers mingling with British troops and

villagers. (See Figure 3). Several of the patrons, including the Americans, were pestering

the barmaid for more drinks, but she was adamant about refusing them. The men were

getting rowdy. One of the African American soldiers was out of uniform and off post

without a pass.

When the MPs attempted to arrest the soldier in violation of military policy and

return him to Adams Hall, where his 1511th Quartermaster Truck Company was

stationed, he resisted. What’s more, several of the British patrons12 quickly came to his

defense with verbal indications that they would not permit anyone to be arrested that

132 night. One resident recalled decades later how the locals’ verbally supporting the African

American soldiers prompted “the whole thing to escalate.”13 Realizing they were outnumbered, the MPs left with promises to return with reinforcements. The Hob Inn patrons, meanwhile, began to disperse, with the African Americans heading north along

Station Road toward their post half a mile away. En route, the GIs met several British

Auxiliary Territorial Service girls, who followed the soldiers as they made their way slowly up Station Road in a festive—albeit perhaps slightly drunken—fashion.

Figure 3: Inside Ye Olde Hob Inn, Bamber Bridge, U.K. According to locals, Ye Olde Hob Inn has functioned as a pub for the last 300 years, despite changes in management over the years. During World War II, it was a popular watering hole for African American soldiers stationed half a mile up the road at Adams Hall. It was events here between white and African American soldiers that prompted a sixteen-hour showdown on June 24, 1943. (Photo by Pamela E. Walck)

Before the soldiers on foot could get very far, however, the white MPs returned with additional help and approached the rowdy group of GIs in the center of the narrow 133 roadway. Historian Ken Werrell described the scene that unfolded as filled with “shouts,

curses, insults, dares and then, in short order, a brief, confused and bloody fight.”14 Both sides retreated with their wounded—the white MPs to Preston, the African American troops to Adams Hall. Tempers flared in both camps. But while the handful of white officers at Adams Hall did everything they could to calm their men, the Preston-based

MPs were busy gathering help and weapons—including a machine gun—in preparation to return to Bamber Bridge.15 Shortly after midnight, the MPs appeared at the front gates

of Adams Hall intent on arresting the original offenders. The sight of the reinforced MPs

immediately shattered any calm that had been regained as the African American troops

broke into their own weapons room and prepared for battle. For the next several hours,

American troops ran throughout the village, shooting at each other—as well as at the

occasional residential house—while the residents of Bamber Bridge hid behind locked

doors in fear.16

Newspaper Trends at the Time

It is not surprising that it was the local British press that first broke news of the incidents at Bamber Bridge. What is perhaps slightly unusual is that out of a handful of competitive daily newspapers in the region, the only one to report the incident the next day was the Preston-based Lancashire Daily Post. The three-paragraph brief did not identify where the incident occurred, but it noted in all caps: “NORTH-WEST CAMP

INCIDENTS”17 on the top of page four. The lead sentence reported that the U.S. Army did not have official comments about what had occurred the night before. By making the event plural—rather than one altercation—it signaled to readers that it was more than just a singular occurrence. Chances are that by the time the afternoon paper hit the streets,

134 most people in Preston had already heard rumblings of what had happened in the heretofore uneventful village of Bamber Bridge, less than four miles to the south (see

Figure 4).

Figure 4: Outside Ye Olde Hob Inn Passersby can see the distinct pheasant figure perched on the thatched roof of the pub, located several feet from the right of the chimney. (Photo by Pamela E. Walck)

That same day, six miles south of Bamber Bridge, in the town of Chorley, The

Chorley Guardian & Leyland Advertiser opted not to publish a story about the incidents in the neighboring village, but capitalized on the opportunity to opine extensively on its editorial page about the sudden and great decay of morals among the local youth, particularly among the girls in town. The paper noted:

Many young people, especially girls, throw all restraint to the winds. We have had large numbers of American visitors in our midst. . . . Some of them have told us that on leaving their quarters they have been accosted by girls of sixteen and eighteen years of age who, when told that the men 135 were married, have retorted that that did not matter. Respectable people of the town, too, have been disgusted with conduct on the roads and in Astley Park. Drunkerness [sic] also is on the increase.18

The paper blamed the moral decay on parents who felt no obligation to force their children to attend Sunday schools and church services, and noted that now the problems lay in the hands of law enforcement agencies tasked with maintaining a level of decorum in town. The editorial concluded that perhaps one solution was for more civil police departments to “introduce policewomen, who might be more capable of dealing with their own sex.”19 Despite British women all across the country picking up jobs often

viewed as men’s work during the war years, putting women in police uniforms out on the

streets of Lancashire and interacting with American troops was still a radical notion.20

Despite the obvious racial element to the incidents at Bamber Bridge, the Chorley

editors never mentioned race in their editorial. But that did little to diminish the concerns

British leaders had in terms of women and American men of color. The nature of this

editorial also indicated that while opting not to publish news of the street fighting in

Bamber Bridge, the fact that three ATS girls were involved in the initial scene and

accompanied the rowdy group of African Americans soldiers—who had been drinking—

down Station Road in Bamber Bridge was not lost on the newspaper’s editors. The

Chorley paper’s editorial was the only British paper in this study to tackle the issue of

public drunkenness and what was perceived as the proper behavior toward American GIs.

The Lancashire Daily Post, a day later on June 26, 1943, offered readers more

details on the “fight” in the unnamed northwest town. The paper noted that American

military officials had launched a formal investigation into the fracas “between military

police and a small group of Negro soldiers.”21 The four-paragraph story also expanded on

136 what had happened, noting that when two white MPs took issue with five African

American soldiers “who, it is alleged, were behaving in a disorderly manner,” trouble

occurred, leaving one of them injured. The article reported that a total of five soldiers,

“white and coloured, were injured before the disturbance was quelled and the men taken

back to camp.”22 The paper named an African American, Private William Grosslands, as seriously injured and noted that a first lieutenant, David D. Ousset, one of the white MPs had sustained minor injuries. The remaining African American enlisted men injured in the incidents went unidentified.

The paper also reported that the residents of town were uninjured in the fighting,

“which did not take place in the centre of the town.”23 This statement is of particular

interest because much of the battle did, indeed, occur right in the middle of the village as

military reports and residents, themselves, later testified during courts martial hearings.

To be sure, several houses along Station Road, near the intersection of Mounsey Road,

still bear pockmarks seven decades later from where American bullets struck during the

gunfight.

News Spreads Across England

It took two days for news of the fighting in Bamber Bridge to spread well beyond

Lancashire. In London, a Daily Express headline blared: “Negro soldiers in street fight with military police.”24 The two-paragraph brief also noted that American military officials had launched an investigation into the street fight that left one African American soldier seriously injured and four others with minor injuries. Although the soldiers were not named, the paper stressed that the “local commander has reported that the situation was never out of control”25 and that no locals were injured.

137 Identical stories—clearly material pulled from wire services—appeared in

Northern Ireland on June 26 as well. The Belfast Telegraph ran what appeared to be a

wire story in the middle of page three, just above the fold. The headline declared:

“POLICE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS. ENGLISH TOWN FIGHT.”26 Using the same verbiage as the original reports in The Lancashire Daily Post, the Telegraph described a clash between African American troops and white MPs, after the latter “remonstrated” the former for disorderly behavior in an unnamed northwest England town. Again, the story frame of officials always having maintained control of the incident entered into the reporting, with the Telegraph noting: “The situation was never out of control, it was stated by the local commander.”27 The Irish News, also based in Belfast, reported the

exact same story on June 26, 1943. But instead of reporting the story inside the

broadsheet newspaper, the Irish News placed the story at the top of the front page, just

below the masthead. The headline blared: “NEGRO SOLDIERS AND MILITARY

POLICE CLASH”28 in all capital letters. Aside from a different headline and giving attribution in the last paragraph to the European Theater of Operations headquarters or

“Etousa Headquarters,”29 the news article was identical to that published by its

competitor the Telegraph.

Out-Scooped, but Still Reported

In terms of timeliness, two of the mainstream British papers late to reporting the

disturbances in Bamber Bridge were competitors in London: News of the World and The

Daily Mail. Three days after the Lancashire press broke the story, News of the World ran

a brief at the bottom of page two on Sunday, June 27, 1943. The headline declared:

“FIGHT IN THE STREET”30 The story subhead noted that five U.S. soldiers and an

138 officer were injured as a result of the melee in a “North-West England town.”31 The

report was one on an entire page dedicated to the seedier side of London: family disputes

over domestic abuse, sensational murder cases, and bizarre accidental deaths.

The five-paragraph News of the World story copied the same narrative used by

other papers across Britain and disclosed how the white MPs “had occasion to

remonstrate with five coloured soldiers, who it is alleged were behaving in a disorderly

manner.”32 The new brief also repeated the framing device from U.S. military officials

that claimed the incident was neither out of control, nor that it had taken place in the

center of town.

Three days after the News of the World’s rather late reportage, The Daily Mail

weighed in with a one-paragraph brief that appeared on June 30, 1943, in the middle of

page three. Under a headline that read: “Negro in Riot Dies,”33 the Mail reported that

Private Grosslands, “a coloured man” in the U.S. military who had been injured “during a disturbance in a north-west England town”34 had died from his injuries. Although only forty-three words in all—including headline—the Daily Mail brief contained two significant distinctions: It was the first publication to call the Bamber Bridge incident a riot; and secondly, it was the only British publication that noted Grosslands died from his injuries. The (London) Times, meanwhile, did not report the incidents.

Bad News Travels

Maybe it was the American press’ infatuation with the riot-aftermath photos of

Detroit that initially drew its attention to a street brawl in an unnamed northwest English town. Maybe it was the fact that African American and white soldiers were fighting somewhere other than on U.S. soil, in a year that had been turbulent with race riots

139 throughout the country. For whatever reason, news of the incident made its way across

the Atlantic Ocean—though few publications saw fit to share the incident with their

readers. Among the American newspapers, The Washington Post, the Detroit Free Press,

and the San Francisco Examiner were the only daily, mainstream publications to report

the incident. Among the three mainstream dailies, it was the Free Press that published a

three-paragraph Associated Press story on its front page edition on June 26, 1943. The

brief story’s headline declared: “Yanks Brawl; 6 Are Injured,” in a center column just

below the fold.35 The AP wire story lead with the fact that five enlisted men and one officer were injured during a “fight between military police and Negro troops” in an unnamed northwestern England town.36 The report cited an early report from military

officials that claimed the incident began when “military policemen remonstrated with

Negro soldiers behaving in a disorderly manner.”37 The Free Press’s AP wire story made a point of noting that the brawl was never out of control and concluded that one of the

African American soldiers was seriously wounded. None of the individuals involved in the incident are named. The Detroit paper did not classify the incidents as riots, but rather as merely a “brawl.”38

Not so in the San Francisco Examiner. Under a headline that declared: “U.S.

Troops in England Riot,” the West Coast daily published an AP story that was identical to the one appearing in the Detroit paper.39 The editors, however, opted to run the story at

the top of page five, rather than on the front page. The Examiner’s secondary headline

noted: “5 Injured When Negroes, Military Police Clash.”40 This difference in headlines could be a result of the fact that by June 26, 1943, Detroit was still reeling from several

140 days of rioting in the city and perhaps changed the headline to downplay the severity of the incident between African American and white troops overseas.

The Washington Post kept its editorial focus on the injured. Under a headline that declared: “Six Yanks Hurt as Troops, Army Police Clash in England,” 41 the Post also published a story with a London dateline on June 26, 1943. The brief story was placed at the bottom of page two. But unlike the Free Press and the Examiner, the Post did not identify which wire service its information came from or who authored the story. This lack of information, which was common for the period, makes it difficult to know if the reworking of the original British version of the story was done by American wire services, wartime censors, or the Post’s own editors.

The account, however, did follow the same pattern as its American counterparts in

San Francisco and Detroit, in that it offered a slightly different spin on the story, starting with the story frame. Where the British press wrote lead sentences about the pending

American investigation, the Post focused on the fact that a number of U.S. troops were injured in a brawl. The second sentence, citing a statement from American headquarters, returned to the same verbiage found in British accounts. It reported: “the fight began when military policemen remonstrated with Negro soldiers behaving in a disorderly manner.”42 And much like the British press, the Post hit on another popular frame: the situation was never out of control. The similarities between the three publications’ reportage would hint that the Post also used an AP story.

But where the Post differed from the Examiner and the Free Press—as well as its

British counterparts—was that offered deeper details about two of the injured men.

Private Grosslands was reported to be from Gibson, North Carolina; the first lieutenant,

141 Ousset, was listed from San Antonio, Texas. The newspaper also noted that Ousset “is white, as are the military police involved.”43 For most readers in Great Britain, such details as hometowns and state names would likely mean little. For the average American audience, the fact that the dead soldier was an African American from a Southern state and the injured white MP was from Texas, another Southern state would perhaps raise an eyebrow among more astute readers. For African American readers, these facts would only reinforce what was already widely known: standing up to whites—especially those from a certain part of the country—could cost you your life.44

Immediately below the Bamber Bridge story, Post editors paired the brief with the latest developments out of Detroit in a story that noted Michigan Governor Harry F.

Kelly reported there would not be a grand jury investigation into “the race rioting

Monday that brought Federal troops to restore order on Detroit streets.”45 The story noted that one of the city’s police commissioners stated that it would be difficult to “start a grand jury on hysteria.”46 By pairing the fighting in England with the update on rioting in

Detroit, it could be argued that Post editors perhaps also saw the foreign incident as a race riot—much like London’s Daily Mail did.

The African American Press’ Take

Among the African American newspapers in this study, the Pittsburgh Courier and the Chicago Defender were the only publications to report news of the incidents in

Bamber Bridge. Although both weekly newspapers published on the same day—July 3,

1943—they took very different approaches to telling the story of racial unrest abroad.

Where the Defender ran an Associated Negro Press47 wire story at the top of page three, the Courier published a bylined story by war correspondent Randy Dixon just below the

142 fold on the front page. Beyond these practices of original content versus wire stories, a

closer examination of the two stories demonstrated further differences in news routines

and approaches to reporting between the competing publications.

Much like the mainstream white press, the Defender’s wire story led with the

number of injured American soldiers “after a fight between Negro soldiers and white

military police” in the unnamed northwest English town.48 The wire story noted in the

lead that Grosslands, of Gibson, North Carolina, was seriously injured in the fight, but

did not mention the injured white officer from Texas until the seventh paragraph. Again a

common phrase in both the British and mainstream American press reports of the

incident emerged when the Defender, directly quoting ETOUSA headquarters, noted that

the incident began when “military police remonstrated with Negro soldiers behaving in a

disorderly manner in the street.”49 The article also reported that a local commander confirmed the situation was never out of control.

Where the Defender deviated from the mainstream press, however, was when it took the official U.S. Army’s newspaper, The Stars and Stripes, to task for “following its traditional policy of avoiding controversial topics” and not reporting on the incident—or any of the race riots in the U.S. for that matter. Instead, the Defender praised the British press for its handling of news about race riots in the U.S. The article noted: “British newspapers … have given prominent display to American racial disturbances, but minimize them with editorials explaining that the war effort is tremendous despite their existence along with food rationing squabbles and the strike of coal workers.”50 The wire

story explained that much of the news about racial friction was spread among African

American troops by word of mouth.51 As a result, the article noted that it was difficult to

143 determine if reports of race riots in the States had had any influence on the occurrences in

England, although American army officials were investigating this angle. The Defender

concluded by noting that African American troops had been “accorded every privilege

any other American soldier received” in England. 52 By reporting this, the Defender

reminded its readers that they still lacked these same privileges at home.

In contrast, the Courier’s Dixon, under the headline “U.S. Soldiers Overseas

Condemn Conditions Causing Recent Riots,” used the overarching news hook of current

affairs in Detroit to include the incidents in northwest England. The news story adopted a

frame that assigned blame for the race riots—in this case “the Ku Klux Klan and other

fascist organizations”—for sparking the four days of fighting in Detroit. The report took

pains to note that despite the news of race riots, “ETO morale (is) unimpaired,

particularly among colored troops.”53 Instead, the article noted, many African American soldiers surveyed said they were more resolute to secure a victory for freedom—both overseas and at home.54 From this sentiment the story transitioned into how the British

press covered the Detroit race riots. Dixon’s article also noticed that “the riot news was

accorded full and extensive display in the British dailies—with considerable comment on

the economic and labor aspects.” He then added that “coincident with the riot news—but

not because of it, a personal investigation indicated—was an incident in a Northwest

Anglican city between colored soldiers and military police.”55 The story continued, reporting that the ETOUSA issued a press release indicating that an investigation was under way and that five soldiers—four enlisted and one officer—were injured, including

Grosslands, who was in serious condition, and the incident was never completely out of control. Dixon never named the white officer who was also seriously injured.

144 Press Reports vs. Collective Memory

Despite how under control the Bamber Bridge incident was reported in the local, national, and international press, it is not how citizens of Lancashire remember the incident—or the arrival of the Americans for that matter. For many, the invasion of

American troops in 1942 represented the first time they saw any sort of widespread racial and ethnic diversity.56 For most rural, British citizens reaction to the arrival of Americans was initially a mix of intrigue and cultural curiosity.

William Waring, a local historian from Leyland, was ten years old when the war started. Seven decades later, he said he could still recall seeing his first Americans in the area—because initially, it was their planes he saw flying in and out of Burton Woods, near Warrington. The sight of the Flying Fortresses of the American Eighth Army Air

Force captured his boyhood imagination. Eventually, he saw the troops themselves. He recalled:

They were received quite well. There was no trouble locally that I remember. The only trouble I heard was in Bamber Bridge. There were probably just little bust-ups in the public houses in Chorley, because they tended to go through Chorley mostly. The air force men, occasionally we would see them here in Leyland. But there was never any problem, no problem at all.57

Waring noted that of all his boyhood memories of the war, the faces of African American troops were seldom part of that memory. He rarely saw them in Leyland, where he grew up. Instead, it was in Preston—some six miles north—where he and his brothers attended grammar school, that they would see African American soldiers on the street. “There were quite a lot in Preston, but just where they were stationed I’m not sure. They probably were at Bamber Bridge because it is only down the road.”58 As a youngster,

145 Waring said he never really thought about the color of the Americans. “We just accepted

them as they were,” he said.59

Other residents concurred. Bill Briggs, who grew up in Bamber Bridge but moved

away, recalled that race was of little consequence to area residents. “The attitude of

ordinary people in Bamber Bridge was that they couldn’t care less whether they were

black or white, yellow, or no color. They were just people.”60 He attributed this

colorblind attitude, in part, toward the fact that the British Empire spanned the globe and

included a wide range of ethnicities and skin colors, including people of African and

Caribbean descent.

In fact for many British children, skin color mattered little, if at all. Jack Ward,

also a child during the war, recalled a crowd of neighborhood children would go

scrambling every time they heard military vehicles moving. “We used to go and see if we

could scrounge some chocolate or something, you know,” Ward said.61 Both Briggs and

Ward recalled the locals had nicknames for the Americans billet station at Adams Hall,

including “Yankee Camp.” But Ward said he and his friends had a different name: “Well,

we called it ‘Yankee Dump,’ because the place sorta next door to that was where you

could go and pick up American insignia . . . discarded buttons off of uniforms and

such.”62

For both men, even some seventy years later, the memories of the incidents at

Bamber Bridge between the Americans are never far from their minds. Instead, they are fused into family folklore. Briggs recalled that his mother-in-law’s mother lived at 330

Station Road—just a block away from the firefight. His late wife was five or six at the time. He recalled:

146 The troubles started at the Hob [Inn] because the American Military Police wanted to throw out the dark lads and the Bamber Bridge locals didn’t want them chucked out, so there was a standoff between them. And I don’t know if whether someone got shot or what, but they [African American troops] broke into the arsenal [at Adams Hall] and got the guns out because they all thought they were going to get shot out of business. Anyway there was a battle as we know and they actually ran through 330 Station Road with the MP chasing them, but that’s the only thing I can remember being told about, you see.63

This family story echoed one recalled by Eunice Byers, a ninety-seven-year-old the

Leyland Evening Press named the “last living eyewitness” to the mutiny at Bamber

Bridge who was interviewed to mark the seventy-first anniversary of the incident.64 In the

feature news story, Byers recalled how her family owned a shop at 345 Station Road.

According to the article, her father came home, shortly after 10 p.m. on the night of June

24, and told his family to stay indoors because trouble was brewing with American troops

at the Hob Inn. The family then had a front-row seat to the troubles as they poured out

into Station Road, with family members even going upstairs to peek out the windows in

order to get a better view despite the gunfire in the street below.

Much like Briggs and Ward, Byers recalled, “There was a lot of antagonism

between the black and white American troops and the military policemen—but the people

round here took the black troops to their hearts.”65 She also remembered how locals

refused to adopt Jim Crow laws or use discriminating policies toward African American

soldiers, which only infuriated the white American GIs—especially when local

businesses responded to American military officials’ request for imposing segregation by

declaring their businesses for “black troops only.”66

147 Why June 24, 1943, is Remembered

For the last seven decades, residents who lived in Bamber Bridge during the summer of 1943 have kept the story alive through the tradition of oral history. Similarly, the story is included in local grammar school children’s history lessons on WWII. The local press routinely reports and re-reports the story on major anniversary dates. And regular patrons to the Hob Inn are greeted with a framed, undated newspaper clipping headline: “NIGHT OF TERROR.”67 Visitors to town might mistake the incident for

something that happened last week or last year, rather than seventy years ago.

Leyland Historic Society member and local historian Peter Houghton said part of

this vivid collective memory stems from the fact that little happened in Bamber Bridge

before WWII. For centuries, he said the small village was merely a pit stop between

Preston and Leyland in the Lancashire countryside. He noted: “There’s really not much

history in Bamber Bridge until the 1950s and 1960s, when the cotton mills came

along.”68 Whereas Leyland and Preston have longstanding manors and noble family

names—even Saxon crosses in some of the oldest sections of the cities—Houghton said

Bamber Bridge lacked both noteworthy families and historic monuments. The Hob Inn,

with its thatched roof topped by a straw pheasant, the thatcher’s insignia or signature, is

among the oldest buildings and businesses in the village. Houghton said in preparation

for a recent history presentation he was struck by how difficult it was to find information

about anything in town before 1950. He added: “There’s just not much there at all. As a

result, I believe that anything that has happened in the last fifty or sixty years is much

more relevant to them than things from two hundred or more years ago.”69 He observed that when he asked his audience of Boy Scouts about the Battle of Bamber Bridge,

148 however, the children were well aware of what had happened—despite being several

generations removed from the incidents.

Houghton noted: “Their grandparents had told them about it already, which is

quite funny, really. Because while it is indeed historical, it may not be the best story to

tell kids.”70 The result, in Bamber Bridge, is a community that has collectively created a discourse that is continually built and maintained by all who recount the night the

Americans fought in the streets—to the point that in many ways that past is not contained in time, but rather has fused itself into the present.71 The Popular Memory Group, based at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, called this phenomena

“dominant memory,”72 meaning that this particular recollection became a powerful and pervasive part of Bamber Bridge’s historical representation. Dominant memory is an important element of collective memory, a term first conceptualized by Maurice

Halbwach, who argued that memory gained its significance through social context. In an essay defining collective memory, researchers attempted to further conceptualize

Halbwach’s idea by arguing that the only real memory is collective memory.73

Sociologist Mihai Stelian Rusu expanded on Halbwach’s findings and noted that the last

fifty years have seen a “memory boom” within the social sciences and sociology.74 Rusu

argued that “collective memory consists of the common stock of personal memories of

public events plus the package of second hand memories that are historically inherited

and shared by a pool of individuals forming a social community.”75 It can be argued that

this merging of personal and second hand memories into collective recollections of a

community are evident in Bamber Bridge. In a region that was historically marginalized

during the war—compared with other British regions, such as London, which heroically

149 survived the German Blitz—the collective memory by locals of the battle at Bamber

Bridge served as a way to remember the sacrifices and scrapes with danger residents

endured during an uncertain time in world history. One local Chorley historian, Stuart

Clewlow, agreed that Lancashire’s distance from the battlefront likely played a role in

this strong oral history tradition. He observed:

With regards to the events at Bamber Bridge, I think they are remembered locally because it was such an unusual event. Whilst my region was far from the frontline, it still received attention from enemy aeroplanes and was involved in the industries of war machine engine manufacture, production of armaments, etc. However, the actual crack of rifle fire through the streets was something else! I think the events of the time took on a form of their own, as over the years, versions and perceptions of what happened got mixed and merged together. But all in all, I personally think it is remembered because of it being a gunfight rather than being a racially aggravated incident.76

The Popular Memory Group also noted that these dominant representations can be

ideological or conforming to mythical stereotypes.77 Historian Michael C.C. Adams described this as postwar mythmaking, which he has argued has been common following

WWII. He described it as “wishful thinking, the desire to retell our past not as it was but as we would like it to have been.”78 Among the more common stereotypes and mythmaking from this period are memories, such as those of local resident Bill Briggs, that recalled residents of Bamber Bridge being completely welcoming of African

American troops and quick to rise up to defend them against oppressive, white American soldiers trying to inflict Jim Crow laws in the region.

And while one might be quick to argue that this might be an idealized memory of what the region was like during what many Britons considered the “American invasion”79

of the war years, there are elements of truth to Briggs’s claims. British government

150 documents as early as 1942 noted the tendency of American troops to self-segregate.

Frustration escalated quickly among the Brits specifically in regards to how African

American troops and civilians—particularly women—who dared to fraternize with them

were treated by white American soldiers. For example, some two months after the first

African American troops arrived in Great Britain, Preston’s chief constable, A. F.

Hordern, noted in a confidential letter to Major General Sir L.W. Atcherley, the Home

Ministry’s Inspector of Constabulary:

Class distinction between coloured and white men exists between these troops and, although they are all American soldiers, they do not associate with each other. The white troops are very incensed when they see coloured troops associating with white women. Generally speaking, the conduct of these troops has been very good and whilst they congregate outside dance halls, public houses, etc. they have always been very respective to the Police and dispersed when told to do so.80

By October 1942, the North Western Region Commissioner81 reported some 17,000 U.S. troops stationed in Lancashire, of which 7,500 were “semi-static units and about 1,200 coloured.”82 The commissioner noted that while the number of African American troops

was down from what had been originally reported, “it is believed that a considerable

addition is to be expected.”83 This became an issue of great concern among local leadership—as well as across the U.K.

Excessive drunkenness among the American troops also emerged as a problem.

But many, the regional commissioner included, blamed the lack of entertainment options in cities such as Liverpool and Manchester, which tended to attract large numbers of soldiers—regardless of color—on leave from their station posts. Out of twenty-two cases involving Lancashire police, “several of the disturbances which have occurred have been

151 the result of resentment shown by White American troops at Coloured troops associating

with white women.”84

In a similar Field Office report to the Home Intelligence Division, the same unnamed North Western Region Commissioner reported in early 1943 that the public at large felt that a year after the U.S. invasion of Great Britain, Anglo-American cooperation had been “going well” and that in terms of the African American troops,

“there is occasional comment which is usually friendly.”85 These comments about the

general welcome of troops, particularly African American GIs, corroborated the locals’

recollections of the time.

That is not to say there were no concerns. The same report that offered glowing

reviews of Anglo-American relations also noted that across the U.K., “talk of girls and

coloured men is still a kind of under-current wherever coloured troops are stationed and

references to ‘the number of black babies arriving’ occur, especially in medical gossip.”86

To be sure, by January 1943, an estimated 1,737 African American troops were stationed throughout Lancashire’s North Western Region. Many were Quartermaster and Services of Supply units attached to the Army Air Force’s Eighth Division. The new year also brought a growing unease about the number of African American troops in areas that were traditionally very Anglo-Saxon. The North Western Regional Commissioner noted in his report to Whitehall there were indications that trouble was brewing in Lancashire, particularly among the races, when he wrote:

The problem of negro troops remains, and whilst many of the anticipated difficulties have not yet manifested themselves on the scale expected, I hope that the further drafts coming into the country will not include negro troops. At Liverpool the position has been greatly eased by the organisation of weekly dances at which the partners are coloured girls, and

152 there has been no record of any unpleasant incident whatever at these. But this has largely been possible because of the reduced number of negro troops and the fact that Liverpool has a certain permanent coloured population on which to draw.87

The commissioner complained that many of the white American troops did not differentiate between African Americans and British subjects originally from the West

Indies, which was spawning friction among white American troops and British citizens.

He added: “If the number of negro troops to be dealt with increase there is, in my view, little doubt that such troubles as are expected will increase quite disproportionally to the actual addition in numbers.”88 This prediction came to fruition just four months later in

Bamber Bridge.

Conclusion

Although it would be easy to dismiss the value of the collective memory89 of

Lancashire citizens who experienced—or had family members who witnessed—the

events that occurred in Bamber Bridge on the night of June 24, 1943, primary

government documents not only confirmed these events, but also affirmed the feeling of

general acceptance that African American troops experienced in the region throughout

the war years. While not all of Great Britain may have felt this way,90 there is evidence that many citizens in Preston, Leyland, Bamber Bridge, and across Lancashire were fond of the African American troops stationed there.91 These citizens often came to the defense

of African American troops, while simultaneously growing wary of the white U.S. troops

who were foisting Jim Crow laws in Britain in an effort to reflect the societal norms in

the U.S. as well as the discriminatory practices within the American armed services.92

153 In terms of the role the media played in shaping memories of the events at

Bamber Bridge, the local Lancashire press coverage lent validity to the stories circulating

around the countryside—even if the village was never named nor the specific details

published due to wartime censorship. Even a year later, news of the events at Bamber

Bridge were still being discussed among African American troops as far away as London.

Pittsburgh Courier war correspondent Roi Ottley wrote in a wartime column—dated

August 31, 1944—but edited out by military censors, the details he had gleaned from his

contacts. He wrote:

There are many cities, towns, or villages that have witnessed race rioting. The most infamous of these clashes is called ‘The Battle of Bamber Bridge’—an area in Lancaster. Negroes billeted here complained of unfair restrictions. They were burning with resentments. One night a white MP— regarded by Negroes as their mortal enemy—shot a Negro soldier in the back following a fracas. News of the killing soon reached camp. The Negro soldiers felt they had reached the limit of their endurance. So they broke into the arsenal, took arms, and barricaded themselves for battle. When the first white officers approached, they were met by a volley of gun fire.93

Although some of the details differ in Ottley’s censored account of the incidents compared with those by historian Werrell, the fact that the war correspondent arrived in

London to report on the war and heard about the incident is an indication that the news had spread far and wide—assisted in no small part by the network of Quartermasters and

Services of Supply trucks running materiel across England. A decade later, Ottley, who by then was working for the Chicago Daily Tribune, called the battle for Bamber Bridge one of the biggest stories of the century, noting it was one of the “infamous but unrecorded incidents of World War II” during a review of historian Lee Nichols’s publication of Breakthrough on the Color Front.94 Ottley’s claim was only partially true:

154 His book review was the first time an American newspaper reported the name—Bamber

Bridge—where the mutiny took place. It was not the first time the incident had been

reported in the United States, as this study found.

In terms of the British press and its handling of sensitive matters, this study found

that many regional papers opted not to immediately report the incidents at Bamber

Bridge. The Lancashire Daily Post was the first to break the news of the fighting between

Americans, but even in that reportage the paper downplayed the significance of the fracas. As news of the event spread, other regional papers picked it up and started reporting as well, but often using language that was identical to other publications. This indicated that the regional British press relied heavily on wire service stories to fill their pages—all the while closely adhering to the Home Office’s censorship parameters that dictated the press should not assist the enemy’s propaganda machine with news stories that might be controversial.

This lack of publishing about the actual news items did not mean editors and reporters were unaware of what was happening in their coverage areas. The Chorley

Guardian & Leyland Advertiser is an example of how one editorial board opted to ignore reporting the incident, but still capitalized on the events in Bamber Bridge in order to pontificate on the declining morals among local citizens—particularly the young women in town. This editorial frame blamed disturbances on British women with loose morals, rather than rowdy, male Allied troops and their tendencies toward excessive imbibing.95

Although, it is difficult to conclude that this editorial was a direct result of the Bamber

Bridge events, it does reinforce the notion that despite few individuals of African descent

155 having ever appeared in Lancashire before WWII, many citizens there saw clearly the

disparity among how their American allies treated one another.96

Compared with their British counterparts, very few U.S. newspapers opted to report the incident. It is plausible that with the vivid images and stories of race rioting coming across the domestic wires from Detroit—fighting which began just days before that in Bamber Bridge—the American newspaper editors were so distracted by the desire to out-scoop their domestic competitors that they failed to notice an incident in an unnamed city in northwestern England. In the case of the Chicago Defender, Pittsburgh

Courier, and The Washington Post, not only were brief stories about the incident reported but special attention was also paid to who was severely injured as well as where they were from. This focus is a sharp contrast to the British press, which paid more attention to the fact that U.S. military officials were launching an investigation into the incidents.

That Americans were injured or killed—and hailed from far-away places such as Texas or North Carolina—was of secondary importance to the British press and its audience.

At the same time, both the American and British press demonstrated what, four decades later, a team of mass communication scholars would call the “restoration of normalcy.”97 For the British press in particular, the focus on U.S. military officials launching a formal investigation was another avenue toward reassuring readers that everything was normal once more in Lancashire. Further by investigating and demanding proper justice, these news reports—despite being brief—assured communities that officialdom was doing its due diligence to keep Britons safe during an uncertain time.

Should events like this occur elsewhere, citizens in those areas could be assured that

American and British officialdom would step in, restore peace, and bring justice.

156 Perhaps the biggest lesson learned through this examination of media coverage of the events in Bamber Bridge is that local media can—and does—reinforce collective memories of events and incidents. In Bamber Bridge, a community that garnered very few headlines during the war and played a rather minor role in the bigger picture of the

British war effort, some seven decades later, still vividly recalls the events of June 24,

1943 as if it were a current event. Through routine post-war press coverage and the tradition of oral history, the events of that night are replayed and remembered through repetition. As a result, these remembrances are fused into the collective memory in a way that even generations who are decades removed from the original events, can recall the mutiny of Bamber Bridge.

157 Chapter 4: Epochal Change: How a Riot in the U.K. and an Explosion on a U.S.

Naval Dockyard Became Pivotal Moments in World War II

After the tumultuous year that was 1943, U.S. military and government officials alike were looking for ways to not only educate the American public about race relations, but also raise the low morale of African American troops by validating their role despite policies that continued to limit their function in the Armed Forces. Perhaps it was a first step toward acknowledging the role military policies were playing in the overall morale of African American troops. Perhaps it was out of fear that Allied Forces might be finally turning the tide against the Axis enemy in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), but losing the battle when it came to public opinion—especially popular African American opinion.1

U.S. government officials believed that they had found their solution, at least in part, in the form of a propaganda movie, The Negro Soldier. Filming had started as early as 1942, but then underwent multiple revisions before Brigadier General Benjamin O.

Davis Sr., the country’s only African American general officer, was tasked with finding distributors in Hollywood on behalf of the War Department picture. Carlton Moss, a member of Frank Capra’s military movie crew, wrote the film. It was quickly incorporated into the U.S. military’s orientation program and became required viewing for all incoming soldiers, white troops in particular.2

By July 1944, Truman K. Gibson Jr., the civilian aide to the secretary of war and an African American, felt the film’s message was still critical in terms of improving race

relations among American GIs—as well as the general American public. In a memo,

Gibson noted:

White soldiers need to know something about their colored brothers in arms. Because of the complete segregation that has existed in the training of troops in this country, our soldiers enter foreign theaters with little or no knowledge of each other. White troops . . . have developed the attitude that service jobs are “Negro jobs” and that therefore the Negro is shirking his share of the hazards that go along with active participation in combat. Negro troops, for the most part, are in service units. They work long and hard. The little glamour that there is in military service for the most part passes them by. They lose sight of the necessary nature of their jobs in the repetitious monotony of deadly physical toil, a large part of which necessarily takes place far behind the lines. They, for their part, must know that they are on a team, that there are white men doing the same jobs to which they have been assigned and that all of this work is vital and essential for final victory.3

Although many African American officials were pleased with the result of the propaganda piece, not everyone was enamored with the documentary. The Pittsburgh

Courier war correspondent to the ETO, Roi Ottley, recalled in his war diary how he had viewed the film while in London in the summer of 1944. He went to the showing, accompanied by the famous African American boxer-turned-Army-soldier, Joe Louis, who was featured in the film. Ottley noted:

I carefully watched his reactions. He was manifestly proud of the picture and the role of Negroes in it. He grunted, growled, and commented throughout its showing. Afterwards he said “Anybody who says that ain’t a good picture, is crazy.” I was one of those who said it wasn’t a good picture.4

Although Ottley did not expand in his diary on what exactly it was about The Negro

Soldier that bothered him, his exposure to both white and African American GIs in the

ETO—as a representative of both a mainstream labor newspaper, PM, and a reporter for the Courier—reinforced to him the disparity between the white war experience and that

159 of African American troops who were still very much hidden away in manual labor and supportive positions in the U.S. Army.

In reality, little had changed for African American troops since the United States first joined the conflict. And now, just as the war effort was about to hit a crescendo in northern France, even highly published comments from General Eisenhower praising the brave efforts of African American troops on Omaha and Utah beachheads could not counter the reality that in the greatest demonstration of American military might, African

American troops played extremely minor roles. Out of 29,714 U.S. troops landing on

Omaha Beach, only five hundred were African Americans.5 Similarly, out of 31,912

American GIs storming onto Utah Beach, less than 4 percent, or about twelve hundred men, were African American soldiers.6 While their white counterparts were pushing toward the German front lines, African American GIs on both beachheads, largely made up of quartermaster, engineering, and antiaircraft balloon battalions, were serving in supplementary roles that supported white, front-line troops.

While Allied Forces continued to push farther into France, the English port city of

Bristol was teeming with wartime activities in the months after the Normandy invasion.

And on the night of July 13, 1944, a city that had struggled to contain racial altercations between white and African American troops from the very beginning of World War II lost all control when a riot broke out between U.S. troops in what was perhaps the largest racial disturbance during the American occupation of the British Isles. On this night, a month and week after the Allies launched Operation Overlord, more than two hundred white and African American GIs turned the city’s Market Street into a massive brawl.

U.S. military policemen, desperate to restore order, used large vehicles to contain the

160 fighting and eventually fired randomly into the fracas to dispel the mayhem. One African

American soldier died, and seven GIs were seriously injured. And once more, the British

and American media were filled with headlines about another racial ruckus—news

significant enough to make it past military censors.

Four days later, just as news of the Bristol riot was appearing in American

newspapers along with word of political fallout in Japan following the Allies’ Pacific

victory in Saipan and Allied troops’ advancement on St. Lo,7 an industrial accident on a

little-known U.S. naval dock outside of San Francisco led to a massive explosion that

killed 320 men, injured about four hundred more, obliterated two Liberty ships, and

leveled an important ammunition depot known as Port Chicago.8

At first glance, it would seem that there is little to tie a race riot in Bristol to a massive explosion at a military base outside of San Francisco. But as this chapter will examine, both events were part of a critical period in military and U.S. history that prompted first steps toward forging social change in American military practices. For

American GIs in the ETO, the Bristol incident would mark the last major incident between white and African American troops on British soil. It will be argued that while part of this was a result of troops filtering out of the U.K. and onto the European

Continent as war efforts were wrapping up, the lack of racial altercations in the final months of the conflict can also be attributed to the elimination of the color bar as

Eisenhower opened up the army to any soldier willing to fight after devastating casualties on the beaches of Normandy.

Further, it will be argued that the success of integrating the U.S. Army in 1945 helped posture the American military for complete desegregation by presidential

161 executive order on July 28, 1948. Similarly, it will be argued that the Port Chicago

tragedy—and the subsequent courts martial of African American soldiers for refusing to

return to work after repeated complaints about poor training and even worse working

conditions—prompted the U.S. military to reexamine not only how troops were trained,

but also who did what in the war effort. Combined, these disparate events helped push the

U.S. military to the forefront of the civil rights movement in America.9

While historians have examined both the Bristol riot and the Port Chicago tragedy, previous research has largely ignored how the wartime press reported the news of both events. As such, this is the first extensive examination of media practices and routines during these seemingly diverse, yet pivotal moments in the waning years of the

ETO during WWII. Before this research, explanations of what happened in Bristol were largely limited to footnotes as part of the bigger picture of the African American experience in Great Britain during the war.

Similarly, historians examining the Port Chicago disaster have largely focused on the incident itself, oral histories from survivors, and the larger implications the dockside accident had on the U.S. military in terms of the use of manpower. Little research has examined how media reported the incident, and how, in the press’ reporting, race was revealed. As in previous chapters, it will be argued that examining media practices during these two events expands our understanding of how the press and wire services worked during the war years, and how wartime censorship—both in Great Britain and in the

United States—influenced the flow of information.

This chapter will utilize media coverage from the mainstream press in America and Great Britain, as well as that of the U.S. black press, to examine how race was

162 framed and reported during both events. It will also examine military and government

documents to see how the demands of war forced the hand of U.S. officials to rethink

their previous stances on the race issue.

Questions driving this study included: What frames did the American press, both

mainstream and African American publications, use to portray racial tensions among

troops in the Bristol riot? How did the British press report the same racial disturbance?

Were there differences in these story frames? Similarly, what frames did the American

press, both mainstream and African American publications, use to report the destruction

of Port Chicago? How did the British press report the same incident? Were there

differences in these story frames? And what evidence is there that censorship—whether

self-imposed by news workers or imposed upon them by their governments—influenced the publication of the events in Bristol and Port Chicago in the summer of 1944?

The primary sources of information for this chapter included: newspaper coverage of the racial disturbance and the naval base accident, and U.S. and British government documents, including correspondence among government leaders and military reports of both events. This study specifically examined news and editorial coverage from July 13,

1944, through July 31, 1944, in twenty-four newspapers, including local, regional, and national newspapers in both Great Britain and the United States. In the instances of the black press, the weekly publications were examined through August 5, 1944, to accommodate each paper’s news cycle.

Race Relations in the ETO

After the racial violence of 1943—including that wild night between American troops in Bamber Bridge, Lancashire, on June 24, 1943—the National Association for the

163 Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sought to see for itself how African American

troops were being treated in the ETO. In January 1944, the advocacy group sent its

executive secretary, Walter White, to the British Isles on an inspection tour, much like

the one two years earlier conducted by Brigadier General Davis on behalf of the U.S.

Army. In a confidential report issued on February 11, 1944, White described his trip,

which began on January 3, 1944, with meetings in London with U.S. and British officials

before launching a tour of military facilities—including three base sections—across the

British Isles from January 18 to February 2, 1944. His sixteen-day tour covered more than seventeen hundred miles throughout the ETO.10

White remained optimistic that steps could be taken to correct the racial problems

plaguing the U.S. military despite Eisenhower’s clear directives in 1942 that American

GIs be treated the same regardless of race. White noted: “The adoption and enunciation

of the principle that all soldiers wearing the uniform of the United States Army are

fighting for the same objective and are to be treated alike has undoubtedly lessened

considerably the number of clashes which otherwise might have made the situation

worse.”11 The NAACP executive went on to state that many of the white U.S. troops he encountered were “decent, fair-minded individuals. Most of them have given little thought to the so-called race problem, especially those coming from northern and western

States.”12

It was, in fact, White’s opinion that it was a small percentage of white GIs who

had brought deeply held racial prejudices with them into the ETO and were solely

responsible for stirring up trouble. He reported:

164 These persons, particularly officers, have spread vicious stories among the British people concerning Negroes. They have told the British such fanciful stories as that all Negroes have tails, that they are savage, diseased, illiterate and will rape their women. One variation frequently found is to the effect that the American Negro soldiers are not like British Colonial troops in that the former were picked up in Africa and brought to the United Kingdom to do manual labor only. Another variation is that American Negro soldiers bark instead of talk, and that they do not speak English. The Lord Mayor of one English town told me that he and all of the people were frightened when they heard that Negro troops were to be sent there. For days the British avoided even walking close to Negro soldiers. But one morning the Lord Mayor was greeted with a pleasant “Good morning, Sir” by one of the soldiers. Startled that the soldier could speak English he entered into conversation with him and thus learned of the falsity of the stories which [sic] had been spread in the town by white Army officers and enlisted men.13

White observed that it was the wholesale spreading of misinformation by white American peers and disparate treatment by U.S. military officials that was diminishing morale among African American troops in the ETO. So much so, he argued, that many of the men had become “so embittered that they call their white fellow-American soldiers ‘the enemy.’”14 White also reported that among the disenfranchised African American troops were some so frustrated they were close to revolting, while others were simply convinced things would never change in American culture and as such, sought comfort in alcohol and despairing talk among themselves. White concluded, “Such an attitude is bad both for the Negro soldier and for the war effort. It is tragic that the Civil War should be fought again while we are fighting a World War to save civilization.”15

White offered some recommendations for preventing future disturbances, including wholesale enforcement of Eisenhower’s directive that would abolish a practice of placing certain towns as “off limits” to African American troops—something that up until 1944 had been hindered, in large part, by Eisenhower’s own commanding officers

165 who chose to ignore the directive, or white military police officers who took it upon

themselves to bar African American troops from certain British towns or pubs. White

noted, “It has been my observation that wherever a Commanding Officer is of strong

character and sees to it that any troublemaker, irrespective of race, is punished promptly

and justly for any aggression against another soldier there is a minimum of trouble in that

locality.”16 Conversely, if a commander declared particular places off limits or showed favoritism to white American GIs, White contended, there was a greater tendency toward conflict and violence among the men.

African American Troops, Race Relations, and Bristol

In truth, like many of the communities across Great Britain, Bristol officials and citizens alike were eager to impress their allies when the U.S. first joined the war effort in large numbers in 1942. Bristol officials had established welfare committees much like those set up in Northern Ireland, and found its citizens reaching out, eager to assist with extending hospitality to the visiting troops.17 In 1942, Bristol’s Lord Mayor Henry Arthur

Wall specifically contacted social clubs across the city, inquiring about whether they

were willing to open to visiting officers in an effort to help the American command staff

better understand their British hosts.18 Wall also made efforts to ensure the Americans

had plenty of recreational opportunities, from gymnasiums and playing fields to

swimming pools.19

At the same time, Bristol’s Lord Mayor was well aware that African American

troops would be included among the GIs seeking recreational facilities and feared how

the city would be perceived in terms of segregating troops. In a July 21, 1942, letter, Wall

noted, “I think we could leave it to the officers to instruct the coloured men of the day or

166 days upon which they should parade for the baths, so avoiding our need for making any

public distinction, which the coloured men might resent.”20 Bristol officials, gravely

concerned about the influx of African American troops, also worried about the impact

large numbers of such soldiers would have upon the area—particularly among the young

women of the community. It did not take long for rumors to run rampant through the

portside town, including claims that there had been a surge of “150-300 coloured babies”

born in the Bristol area.21 The gossip prompted the Ministry of Information to inquire

into local maternity hospitals, which reported the claims to be “completely untrue.”22

British press reports about the arrival of African American Service of Supplies

troops in port cities, such as Bristol, meanwhile, duplicated the heavily stereotyped

reporting of the American mainstream press. Sometimes, these reports gushed with

quotes capturing what British readers would perceive as the strange dialect of African

American troops. The coverage, as a result, essentially turned the African American GIs

into caricatures and stereotypes British readers might be familiar with from Hollywood

films.

For example, the headline on a September 1, 1942, news article in the News

Chronicle, a national daily newspaper out of London, blared: “The Boys from Dixie

Think ‘The English is Mighty Nice People, Yassuh.’”23 The reporter, James Wellard,

went on to interview dock superintendents who gushed about how “these coloured boys

have broken several records since they started unloading here.”24 Wellard noted that several of the men sang as they unloaded the U.S. military ships docked in the quay, behavior many Britons would expect from their limited knowledge of African Americans, often in the form of Hollywood portrayals through popular movies. He wrote:

167 I cannot truthfully report that the song they sang was “Swing Low, Sweet Chariot,” or “Deep River.” It wasn’t. It was “All I need is you.” “Yes,” said the Superintendent, “these boys shift stuff faster than I’ve ever seen in 40 years on this quay.” The boys in question are big, husky, slow of speech, and mostly very black. For the majority come from the Deep South, from Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana . . . . They are the soldiers on whom the vast army which America is building up in these islands relies for food, supplies and a thousand articles of war.25

Wellard’s observation was that the African American troops were largely confined to

manual labor, seemed content in this role, and were pleased with the welcome they had

received from their British hosts. At the same time, the News Chronicle’s report

highlighted the otherness of the African American troops. Wellard reported:

All in all, these coloured soldiers are a strange mixture of modern American sophistication and ancient African simplicity. They say if you “shook down” 20 of them you would find 15 rabbits’ feet. They cling to their old superstitions and charms. Yet the largest and most expensive hotel in the town nearby holds no terrors for them, though it is frequented by white generals and the local aristocracy. They believe that there is no colour bar in Britain. “Jim Crow” and all it implies is not known over here in the battle zone. . . . They feel they are no longer cotton pickers or share croppers or mule drivers. They are conscious of being American citizens and American soldiers.26

Observations, such as these by Wellard, tended toward patronizing tones. The Bristol press, meanwhile, rarely featured African American soldiers—unless they were involved in a criminal act. Again, this representation is consistent with their American newspaper counterparts that largely ignored African Americans in the news, unless they were athletes, entertainers, or criminals.27

By 1943, Bristol was not only teaming with American troops, but was also

receiving an influx of American Mercantile Marines, which was putting additional strains

on the community as it sought to keep both foreign soldiers and merchant marines

entertained and out of trouble during their free time. American Red Cross policies

168 forbade merchant marines from entering their social clubs, which were strictly for U.S.

service personnel. In a letter to the Regional Information Officer, C.M. MacInnes,

Bristol’s emergency information officer, began as early as February 1943 to express

concerns about the growing potential for trouble in the city. MacInnes wrote: “The

question of Club facilities for American Mercantile Marine personnel is now becoming

acute in Bristol.”28 He added that two American Red Cross officials had met with him

and explained that they “feel very disturbed about this situation largely because they feel

that unless something is done these men may get out of hand and unfortunate

consequences of various sorts might result.”29 Adding to the challenge of the merchant marines was that the U.S. military police did not view them as their responsibility, nor did the Bristol police feel free to keep the seamen in line. MacInnes added:

I am told that for the past several weeks there have been on average in Avonmouth and Bristol, about 170 of these men each day and that each night in the city 30-40 of them find themselves at a loose end. They miss their buses and do not get back to Avonmouth and they have nowhere to go. They are becoming bitter because they feel nobody wants them and I imagine are a little jealous of the fact that while club facilities are provided for American citizens who happen to be in the forces they are left with nothing. Also if any of these men happen to be taken ill again apparently there is no provision for them. The military authorities refuse to take any responsibility and though our own police are very kind they will only take action when they are asked to do so.30

This highlights that despite good intentions at the beginning of the war for U.S. Army officials to maintain order among the deployed men, even when they were on liberty leave from post, the reality was that in larger British cities in particular, it was impossible to avoid instances where civilian constables were needed to maintain peace and order.

169 “Always Trouble Brewing”

Like many British communities, the Bristol region was liberal in its mixing of races and remained a sore spot for white American GIs who were unaccustomed to these practices. For example, in May 1944, one American GI writing home complained about the lack of a color bar in Tauton, a community about thirty miles south of Bristol. He wrote: “[T]he folks are pretty nice to the Americans, the only fault I find is they allow niggers to mix with whites—do the soldiers get burned up about it, there is always trouble brewing with them.”31 In fact, trouble had been consistently brewing between

African American and white GIs in the ETO during the month of July 1944. In a hand-

written document, General Davis noted that from July 5 to July 17, 1944, there were

sixteen separate racial incidents reported by the U.S. Army across the battle space,

including six fights, three stabbings, and two incidents labeled “knife play.”32 Most

notable on Davis’s list, however, was what he noted as a two-day riot in Bristol.

Among the local Bristol dailies, the Bristol Evening World was the first to report

the rioting among American troops—but only did so two days after the incidents

occurred. On July 17, 1944, in a front-page story that appeared just below another article

reporting the latest Allied bombing mission over Germany, the Evening World headline

declared “INCIDENTS IN STREET” with a secondary headline that noted shots had

been fired in the city.33 The unbylined story, consisted of seven paragraphs and noted several people were injured, including one possible fatality. Although the report noted that the altercation was between troops, it did not specify whether the soldiers were

American or British, nor was the race of soldiers involved in the fighting specified.

170 The Evening World report noted that the fighting drew the attention of a large

crowd of passersby, but observed that Bristol civilians were uninjured in the fracas. The

article, while it failed to identify the cause of the fight or the individuals involved, did

shed light on the severity of the street fight, when it noted: “Buses were drawn up across

the road to block entrance to the street in order to try to confine the area of the incidents.

It is stated that the military police had to open fire, resulting in some men being wounded

in the legs.”34 The report also made it clear that civil police were called to the scene in addition to the military police.

For readers of the Evening World, another report in the same newspaper, this time in the middle of page two, would at first glance seem to be unrelated. But upon careful inspection, one might deduce that the five-paragraph story about the arrest of a city man, named George Arundle, 48, was actually connected to the same street fight story on page one. In this brief, under the headline, “SENT TO PRISON,” an unbylined story reported that Arundle was accused of being drunk, disorderly, and assaulting a Bristol police inspector during “a disturbance at the Tramway Centre.”35 During Arundle’s court appearance, it is noted, “a disturbance was in progress when Insp. St. John saw Arundle sparring up to Service police.”36 Arundle was removed from the scene and told to stay

away when the same inspector “later came across him again sparring up to the Service

police. When the officer told him [Arundle] that as he had not taken his advice he would

be arrested, Arundle struck him.”37 A Bristol prosecutor told the court that Arundle was

drunk and “making himself an absolute nuisance because he was adding to the general

confusion”38 by fighting with the military policemen. The story concluded that Arundle was sentenced to fourteen days in prison.

171 A day later, a competing newspaper, the Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror,

also reported on what it called a “BRISTOL STREET SCENE.”39 In a report that was one

paragraph long and contained only seventy-four words, the newspaper reported that the

Saturday fighting between troops in Bristol had resulted in one unnamed man “receiving

injuries which have since proved fatal.”40 The newspaper noted: “trouble broke out

between the troops, and a large crowd of civilians.”41 Like its competitor, the Western

Daily Press reported the use of buses to block off the fighting “in order to localize the incident” and confirmed that none of the Bristol civilians were injured in the fracas.42

In that same July 18, 1944, newspaper, on page two, the Western Daily Press also

reported the case of George Arundle and his efforts to “square up” to military police

during an incident on Saturday that referenced the “disturbance between troops in

Bristol.”43 Like its competitor, the Western Daily Press reported the charges of

drunkenness and disorderly conduct leveled against Arundle. It also noted the efforts of

Inspector St. John to urge Arundle to return home “but as he did not go the officer

arrested him and was struck by the defendant.”44 Unlike the Evening World, however, the

Western Daily Press reported that the judge advised Arundle, after leveling a sentence of

fourteen days in prison that “the police had to be protected when they were carrying out

their duty.”45 The judge’s message was clear: civilian police could not allow Bristol citizens to defy the law just because they did not like how Americans treated each other.

On the same day that the Bristol newspapers reported the street fight in Bristol,

The (London) Daily Mail also published an unbylined story about the incident. In its 4 a.m. edition, the Daily Mail ran a short story above the fold on the front page with a headline that blared: “Opened Fire to Quell Army ‘Riot.’”46 By running this story on its

172 front page and above the fold, editors of the Daily Mail signified to readers that this

incident between troops in Bristol was as important as the other news of the day, which

included the latest Allied reports from the front lines in St. Lo and the British War

Cabinet’s decision to move sailors into army positions to fill vacancies in the aftermath of

Normandy.47 Among the newspapers in this study, the Daily Mail was the only British publication to label the incident in Bristol a riot. The four-paragraph story led with the fact that the military police “opened fire on the streets of Bristol last night to quell a battle between two groups of troops.”48 The London newspaper’s report also noted that there were several minor head injuries—which countered reports in the Bristol Evening

World of leg injuries among the soldiers—and indicated that the wounded were taken by ambulance to the Bristol hospital. This report, however, made no mention of fatalities.

The Daily Mail did report that the incident began at the fairgrounds in Bristol and that both civilian and military police responded. It also clarified that it was the military police who used buses to block off the street to help contain the fighting, in addition to the fact that they fired directly into the crowds to stop the fracas. Like the other British papers, the Daily Mail made a point to note that despite many civilians in the vicinity, none were involved in the fighting, nor injured in the incident.

But unlike the Bristol papers, the Daily Mail concluded by stating that military police—as many as seven men in a jeep—were seen patrolling the streets of Bristol once peace had been restored. The article concluded with a single line that would give London readers a better idea of who was and was not involved in the fighting, when it stated:

“The troops involved were not British.”49 Because the story structure and terminology

differed from the Evening World and Western Daily Press accounts, it indicated that the

173 Daily Mail was not relying on wire story accounts of the street fight in Bristol for its

news source, but might have had a staff writer or war correspondent based in the

southwestern port city who reported directly to the newspaper office.

The Bristol Riot and the American Press

The same day that news of the Bristol street-fight hit the local and national British

newspapers, information about the incident also appeared in The New York Times. But

unlike the Bristol Evening World or Daily Mail, the Times did not run the news on its

front page. Instead, the one-paragraph story appeared at the bottom of page eight, nestled

between an advertisement for Dr. Scholl’s shoe inserts and a news brief about prisoners

in Nicaragua who had been freed by the country’s president.50 The Times report, credited to the Associated Press, was only thirty-nine words long but did clarify information that had been rather vague in the British reports.

First, the headline noted “Shots Quell Soldiers’ Free Fight.”51 Unlike the Daily

Mail, the Times did not call the incident a riot, but instead described the events as a fight.

The Times report, did however, follow the Daily Mail in leading with the fact the military police fired into the group of fighting soldiers to stop the disturbance—and in fact even credited the Daily Mail with reporting that British citizens were not involved in the fracas. The only clue to Times readers about who participated in the fighting came in the second-to-last sentence: “Some American soldiers were involved in the fighting.”52 It

also repeated the Daily Mail’s claim that the injured sustained head wounds, rather than

leg wounds. And much like its British counterparts, the Times did not mention the fact

that race had been involved in prompting the fight in the first place.

174 The (Baltimore) Sun also published the AP’s report on the Bristol street fights.

But careful readers would have had to look closely to find the two-paragraph brief placed

on page four between an AP wire story about the death of Hitler’s brother and an

advertisement for Oscar Caplan and Sons engagement rings.53 The Bristol, U.K., dateline once more noted that military police fired into a crowd of soldiers in an effort to stop them from fighting. The brief noted that three soldiers were hospitalized, that “some

American soldiers were involved,” and “no British were involved in the fracas.”54 The race of the soldiers involved in the fight was not identified.

A day later, the Chicago Daily Tribune and the Detroit Free Press both published stories about the Bristol incidents. The Detroit Free Press published a one-paragraph brief about the fighting in Bristol as part of the newspaper’s “IT’S HERE,” a world-wide roundup of news located in the first two columns of page two. Under a headline that declared: “Army Race Riot Closes Bristol to Yanks,” the Free Press report noted that the

British port city had been closed to Allied troops following a “fight among 300 Negro and white soldiers.”55 The two-sentenced brief also noted that one soldier, an African

American, had been killed. The Detroit newspaper was the only mainstream, U.S.-based newspaper to frame the Bristol incident as a race riot.

The Chicago Tribune, meanwhile, ran an AP story in the middle of page six under a headline that declared: “U.S. NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS BATTLE; ONE

DIES.”56 The story, framed in terms of Bristol remaining off limits to U.S. troops after a

fight among 200 African American and white soldiers, also noted that “One Negro

soldier was killed. Three Negroes and four whites required hospital treatment.”57 The

report also stated that it was a mixed team of military police officers—both African

175 American and white—who worked to restore peace to the British port city. The Tribune

editors included in the wire story’s report a parenthetical AP editor’s note that stated:

“(The racial angle was deleted from an earlier dispatch in error by a subordinate

American military censor in London. The deletions were restored by the chief censor.)”58

The Chicago Tribune was the only newspaper in the examination of mainstream U.S. newspapers to acknowledge the role military censorship played in the initial reporting of the Bristol incident to its readers.

The Black Press Expands the Story

The black press in the United States was quick to link the Bristol riot to racial tensions. The first to do so was Baltimore-based The Afro-American, on July 22, 1944.

With an unbylined story carrying a Washington, D.C., dateline, The Afro-American reported on its front page, just below the fold, that the War Department still had no additional information about the rioting in Bristol that left one African American soldier dead, and hospitalized four white GIs and three African Americans. Again, the initial reporting from the Daily Mail appeared in the American copy. The black newspaper reported:

According to the London Daily Mail accounts of the affair, the battle took place between colored and white American troops with English civilians fighting on the side of the colored soldiers. The disturbance was finally quelled by both colored and white American military police but not before they were compelled to shoot into the ranks of the rioters.59

This is the first time readers, whether British or American, were informed that the MPs

involved in stopping the Bristol riot were mixed units. It is also the first time readers are

informed of the role British citizens played in coming to the defense of the African

American troops—information certainly confirmed by the Bristol papers in the case of

176 Arundle and his arrest and subsequent prison sentence for “squaring up” to MPs. The

Afro-American report also offered some context to readers by noting that Bristol was

home to one of the largest Red Cross centers in the U.K. and was quickly declared off

limits for American military personnel.

It would be a week later before competitors—the Chicago Defender and the

Pittsburgh Courier—reported the incident. The Courier capitalized on a press

conference, held by Brigadier General Benjamin Davis Sr. and Major Homer Roberts in

England, to inform readers of the Bristol riot on the front page of its July 29, 1944,

edition. The un-bylined story, with a Washington, D.C., dateline, noted that Davis and

Roberts were in England to “investigate the July 15th racial outbreak in Bristol between

colored and white American soldiers.”60 The news story went on to note that all U.S. military personnel were barred from the city for three days. It also quoted Under

Secretary of War Robert Patterson as saying that the MPs were assisted by “white paratroopers and Negro soldiers” in ending the riot. The Courier report expanded into a roundup of other racial disturbances in the military that were also under investigation.

Among the three black newspapers in this study, it was the Defender that not only addressed the race issue in its report of the Bristol riot on July 29, 1944—but also made a point to call out army censorship for not releasing the “race angle” to the mainstream press.61 The newspaper’s report, unbylined with a London dateline that ran on the front of the paper’s second section, noted:

Tensions that existed following the outbreak caused army authorities to cancel leaves of soldiers there and forbid other American troops from entering the town. Circumstances involved in the clash have not been revealed. Colored and white military police succeeded in restoring order after six soldiers were placed under arrest and others ordered to remain off

177 the streets. The disturbance, as first reported, failed to mention the race angle, due to army censorship. The name of the slain soldier, as well as those of the injured, have not been released.62

The Defender, like its competitor the Courier, noted that General Davis was conducting

an investigation into the incident. It also reported that while the cause of the riot remained

unknown, “white and Negro service men and English civilians were involved.”63 The article concluded with a domestic racial incident that the Army was also investigating.

Port Chicago Blast “Rocks” West Coast

Even as the citizens of Bristol were still reeling from the Saturday night fracas between hundreds of U.S. troops in its city center, another Allied port city—much smaller and half a world away—was literally blasted off the map. On the evening of July

17, 1944, U.S. servicemen were loading ordnance into the belly of the E.A. Bryan, a

Liberty-class ship, when an accident in the hull of the ship sparked a massive explosion.

Historian James Campbell described the scene:

Lieutenant Glen Ringquist was en route to the administration building when he heard a terrible crash and a “breaking of timbers.” Realizing that the second sound was probably made as the Bryan’s fifty-ton jumbo boom toppled over, he jumped out of the car that only a few minutes earlier had picked him up at the pier and ran back in the direction of the waterfront, fearing the worst. He did not have to wait long before he saw a flash of color followed by a violent discharge as the entire Bryan, with its 4,370 tons of ammunition and explosives, blew. A column of smoke and fire shot thousands of feet into the air, producing a brilliant flame that rose even higher. Then red-hot fragments, chunks of molten steel, and body parts cartwheeled through the sky.64

Campbell noted how an Army Air Force pilot, flying above Port Chicago at the time of

the explosion, saw the flames. The pilot later recalled how it looked like “a ring of fire

three miles in diameter” that burst straight up out of the ground.65 The pilot said chunks

of metal the size of residential garages blasted past his plane, which was flying at nine

178 thousand feet. Some 320 men were killed instantly and an additional 390 military

personnel and civilians were injured. Among the dead were 202 African American

enlisted men. Another 233 African Americans were injured in the blast.

The San Francisco Examiner reported the news on July 18, 1944, with a bold,

double-deck headline at the top of its front-page that read: “BLAST AT PORT

CHICAGO NAVAL ARESENAL ROCKS ENTIRE BAY AREA.”66 The unbylined story ran down the two right-hand columns on the front page in a nonstandard column width. The story chronicled how military officials feared high casualty numbers and made desperate calls across the bay area in search of doctors and nurses within minutes of the blast. The daily newspaper described the scene across the bay area:

The force of the blast was so great that it blew out most of the store windows in Martinez and residents throughout the city reported windows blown in. Plate glass windows in Richmond and other East Bay communities were shattered and one window in San Francisco’s Mission district was shaken out. Doors of an East Oakland theater were blown open and windows shattered and doors opened in Napa and Vallejo cities on the opposite shore of Suisun Bay.67

The newspaper reported that the explosion was seen in the night sky as far as thirty-five miles from the naval depot. In its very last sentence, the Examiner noted that Port

Chicago, a wartime construction, “has a large Negro sailor personnel.”68 This is the only mention of race in the newspaper’s first day of reporting. The story, written in an inverted pyramid format with the most newsworthy information in the first paragraphs, quoted an unnamed deputy sheriff from the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s department, and the reporter appeared to rely on the sheriff for most of the details about the accident. It should be noted that the first day of coverage did not cite anyone from the U.S. Navy or the War Department.

179 The following day, July 19, 1944, the Examiner led once more with a large, two- deck headline across the top of the front page, this time it declared: “322 KNOWN

DEAD AS EXPLOSION TOLL INCREASES; 500 INJURED.”69 This time the unbylined news story was accompanied by a large U.S. Navy-issued photograph of ground zero, displayed across six of the eight columns on the front page. In the center of the image were unnamed military officials surveying the devastation, while secondary headlines above the story warn readers of the many dangers that unexploded ordnances hurled across the bay area could present to civilians.

The newspaper’s lead sentence referenced Navy officials declaring that the death toll could reach as high as 372, in addition to the five hundred civilian men, women, and children injured in the blast. Although authorities were clearly in the process of seeking bodies of blast victims, the newspaper warned: “Only four bodies had been found, and

Navy officers said they expect to find few if any more. All others simply disintegrated in the vortex of an explosive force so tremendous that heavy metal deck plates turned white hot and shredded into shrapnel.”70 The story noted that martial law had been declared for the naval post, while at ground zero crews continued to search through the wreckage for unexploded ammunition. The reporter described the devastation to Port Chicago and noted that naval officials were expected to launch a formal inquiry into the cause of the accident.

On a double-truck inside—a newspaper term used to describe two pages completely dedicated to coverage of the incident and advertisement-free—the Examiner ran nine photos of the damaged dock and port town. Many of the photographs on the page were a mix of work by staff photographers and images provided by the U.S. Navy.

180 The images depicted the widespread devastation in great detail. The few photos that did contain individuals featured rescue workers searching through the rubble or volunteers examining large sheets of metal from the Liberty-class ships that had blown and embedded in roadways far from the blast site. The images reinforced the newspaper’s declaration during the first day that it was among the worst disasters in military history.

The second-day’s reporting included a map of the bay area and identified where the blast occurred and how far away the explosion had been seen. The reporter again used an inverted pyramid to explain the numbers killed and injured by the blast, then attempted to give readers a chronological explanation of what happened, noting that even naval officials had admitted that they will never know the full story since no one close to the accident survived the blast. This second day of reporting did not mention the race of the soldiers involved in the blast.

Meanwhile, less than four hundred miles to the south of San Francisco, the Los

Angeles Times ran an Associated Press wire story on its front page on July 18, 1944, under the eight-column wide headline: “NAVY DEPOT BLAST KILLS SCORES.”71

The story, also written in inverted pyramid, began with the “scores” of people killed and injured in the blast frame, then described the widespread damages reported across the bay area.72 Again, a member of the sheriff’s department was cited as a primary source of information. But unlike the Examiner, which named the Contra Costa Sheriff’s

Department, the AP story in the LA Times named Undersheriff Al Aljets as its source, but did not identify the department for which he worked. In the fifth paragraph, the story noted: “Aljets said his informant reported that some 2000 Negro work troops were quartered in the blast area between the two ships.”73 It would be the only mention of race

181 in the news story. The LA Times did not publish another report on the Port Chicago disaster for two days. On July 20, 1944, it returned to the AP wire services again when it published the financial damages from the blast (some $7 million) and released the latest number of blast victims (319 and counting).74 The story also noted that among the dead were 203 enlisted men and nine officers, but did not identify the race or ethnicities of the men killed by the blast.

Port Explosion Shakes East Coast

Coverage of the Port Chicago incident was not limited to West Coast newspapers in those first days after the explosion. News of the blast appeared in newspapers across the country beginning on July 18. Newspapers including The New York Times, Chicago

Daily Tribune, and The (Baltimore) Sun, all carried front-page stories from the same AP story used by the LA Times. The verbiage was similar, although editors clearly removed some of the original reporting details or revised copy sent over the wires before publication. Placement of the news also varied on each front page.

For example, in its late city edition, The New York Times published a four- paragraph story at the top of the front page that led with: “Scores of persons were reported killed tonight and hundreds injured in a terrific explosion in a naval ammunition dump at nearby Port Chicago. The blast was felt more than fifty miles away.”75 Although the brief story mentioned the undersheriff, it did not name him. No mention was made of the race of servicemen involved in the blast.

The Chicago Daily Tribune, still reeling from the Democratic National

Convention that had been held in town, managed to place the AP story in the exact same place as The New York Times for its final edition. The paper also ran nine paragraphs,

182 including naming and quoting Undersheriff Aljets as well as the Berkeley motorist who

witnessed the fireball in the sky the night before. The report quoted San Francisco

Chronicle city editor John Bruce, who “said that the entire town of Port Chicago, at

which the navy loads ammunition on it ships and transports, was reported leveled.”76

Similar to The New York Times, the Chicago paper did not mention the ethnicity of the

men killed or injured in the blast, nor did it note the racial makeup of the population of

Port Chicago.

In its final edition for July 18, 1944, The Sun managed to get a last-minute, two-

paragraph brief into a section headed with the headline: “BULLETIN.”77 Located at the

bottom right-hand corner of the front page, the space was regularly used for breaking

news arriving in the newsroom just before the paper hit the presses. The lead paragraph

was identical to that published in The New York Times. The number of injured was also

reported, along with information about San Francisco hospitals being “jammed” with

wounded due to the explosion at the naval base located thirty-five miles away.78 The ethnicity of the servicemen killed or injured was not mentioned in the scant two paragraphs.

Of the remaining U.S. daily newspapers in this study, The Boston Daily Globe,

The Washington Post, the Detroit Free Press, and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette all reported the Port Chicago accident for the first time on July 19, 1944—two full days after the blast ripped through the naval weapons depot. All four newspapers reported the incident on the front page. All four publications used wire service stories. Three of the four newspapers ran photos of the blast site—although the Post-Gazette opted to run photographs of the accident scene on the front page of its magazine section rather than

183 selecting one for its front page, while the Free Press decided to not run photos at all of

the leveled ammunition depot.

Although The Washington Post and Post-Gazette both appeared to use the same

AP wire story, the newspapers took different approaches on the lead sentence. The Post-

Gazette story took a more traditional inverted pyramid writing approach with its lead:

“An explosion of two naval ammunition ships in the worst disaster of its kind in the

nation’s history left a toll of dead approaching 350 today as rescue workers poked

through the rubble in search of more bodies.”79 The wire story noted that two blasts, just

seconds apart, destroyed the town of Port Chicago in addition to wrecking two Liberty-

class ships, the Quinault Victory and the E.A. Bryan. Attempting to put the disaster into

context, the story observed:

The blast sprayed hot metal over a two-mile area. One ship’s anchor was found a half mile away. Most of the dead were Negroes, members of navy loading crews at the Port Chicago ammunition magazine. In addition, possibly 70 members of the crews of the two ships lost their lives. A number of civilian workers on the docks were killed.80

The story quoted Captain N.H. Goss, a commanding officer from Rockville, Indiana:

“Captain Goss explained that enlisted men are used in loading ammunition at the depot, and ‘yesterday’s operation was merely a routine one, as we have loaded many, many ships at the port.’”81 The Post-Gazette concluded its coverage with three large photos that ran down the middle four columns on the front page of the Daily Magazine. The images, provided by the U.S. Navy, included two that had been published a day earlier in the San

Francisco Examiner.

In the following days, the Post-Gazette followed the blast story, pushing it further inside the newspaper. On July 20, 1944, the paper ran an AP story on page three. Four

184 paragraphs in length, the article noted that the death toll was up to 319 and damages

totaled $6.3 million.82 A day later, the newspaper noted on page sixteen that among the

six regional men missing from the blast and feared dead was a North Braddock sailor.

The Post-Gazette went on to name the men from their readership area who were counted

among the blast victims, but did not identify the race of the men.83

Editors at The Washington Post also used the AP wire story for its first day

coverage. The paper’s lead sentence stated: “Amid scenes of devastation and desolation,

names were added today to a list which may grow to 350—a list of men killed as two

ammunition ships exploded in thundering blasts that were felt more than 50 miles

away.84” The report then returned to a more traditional inverted pyramid story structure that included the same details as the Post-Gazette in terms of the ship anchor found half a mile away, the names of the ships destroyed in the blast, and the fact that a majority of the dead were African American sailors tasked with loading ordnance into the hull of

Liberty ships. The front-page photograph, sent over the wires courtesy of the U.S. Navy, was the same published a day earlier in the San Francisco Examiner, depicting two cars smashed to pieces, surrounded by bits of wood that once served as barracks.

It should be noted that The Washington Post also addressed the disaster on its editorial page on July 19, 1944, when it noted that the accident at Port Chicago brought to mind the “Halifax disaster of December 6, 1917.”85 The editorial opined:

We may be grateful, however, that the principal differences are of scale. The highest estimate of those killed in California is less than half the number killed at Halifax, and the number of buildings and homes destroyed less than a third. Nor was the rescue work in California impeded by bad weather and by a general conflagration, as was the case in Nova Scotia 27 years ago. All the same the explosion at the Port Chicago

185 ammunition depot is probably the worst that has ever occurred in the United States.86

The editorial noted that while many Americans might be inclined to believe there was

enemy sabotage, it did not appear likely: “As yet there is nothing to indicate that sabotage

played any part in the Port Chicago disaster. Nor is it likely that the precise cause of the

initial explosion will ever be established.”87 The editorial is striking in that, rather than focusing on the tragic loss of human life or the problems in supplying the Pacific fleet with ordnance to fight the Axis, it took a more sterilized approach and used a comparative frame to put the accident into context with other historic wartime accidents.

The Boston Daily Globe ran what appeared to be an AP story, although the paper does not identify it as such. The only clue that it was indeed the AP was that it read identical to the lead that ran in The Washington Post, which had identified it as an AP story. Like the D.C. daily, the Globe’s report noted in the third paragraph that “most of the dead were Negroes” tasked with loading ammunition into the ships.88 Just above the

one-column story, Globe editors ran a four-column-wide wire photo of what remained of

the E.A. Bryan and the SS Quinault in Suisun Bay—hunks of metal protruding from the

water.

In that same day’s newspaper, Globe editors attempted to put the loss of life into

context of the total war in which America was engaged. The editorial noted:

War is attended by so many disasters far from the fighting fronts—the Port Chicago explosion is only a major incident in a series which includes such disparate tragedies as notice of the death of a son on Saipan, the heartless robot bombing of civilian London, and a fire in a South Portland trailer camp—that public figures who go on mistaking optimism for complacency must sometimes blush for their blunder.89

186 The editorial opined that too many American civilians have been personally touched by

the loss that was part of total war. The accident in California, the editors offered, was a

harsh reminder of how fragile the world and life can be. The editors also urged readers to

long remember “the horror felt now.”90

In the Globe’s July 20, 1944, follow-up story—this time a clearly identified AP story—the headline noted: “Only 4 Bodies Found Out of 319 Dead in Explosion.”91 The

four-paragraph story appeared at the bottom of the first column on page three of the

newspaper. This short story did not expand on the ethnicity of the men involved in the

blast, but mentioned that navy officials did not anticipate finding additional bodies due to

the extreme heat of the blast on the loading dock.

The Free Press, meanwhile, turned to the United Press wire services to report the

blast on July 19, 1944. Under the headline: “Toll in Blast Reached 350,” the newspaper’s

wire story framed the disaster in terms of human loss and injuries. It noted that more than

three hundred people were injured from “flying window glass and debris” and that

hospitals had received so many wounded that medical officials had lost count.92 The UP wire story made no mention of race, but reported that as many as 250 enlisted men and nine officers were “missing and presumed dead.”93

The report also noted that the American Red Cross had been mobilized and was

preparing as many as fifteen-hundred meals for displaced residents of Port Chicago. A

day later, the Free Press ran an AP story on the front page of its July 20, 1944, edition,

that reported the latest from the blast site. But the three-paragraph report was framed as a

round-up of carnage, noted the latest death toll, tallied the number of injured, and

estimated the damages.94 Again, the ethnicity of the blast victims went unreported.

187 Port Chicago: From the Black Press Perspective

The headline on July 22, 1944, screeched: “Blast Toll Mounts” across six

columns at the top of the front page of The Afro-American newspaper, based in

Baltimore.95 In a secondary headline, the newspaper noted the death toll had reached 250 sailors and in boldface type declared: “MEN WERE LOADERS.”96 Although the story

did not carry a byline, it noted:

Commander Lovette [chief of the office of Navy public relations] told the AFRO that the explosion of two ammunition-laden ships Monday night had caused the instant death of both crews and a detail of 200 colored enlisted men, and had brought injury to 200 others. . . .The disaster, unparalleled in American naval history, occurred 50 miles north of this city. Immediately killed were the men assigned to the detail loading ammunition on one of the two destroyed ships, together with their nine white officers.97

The Afro-American quoted eyewitnesses who recalled hearing men screaming from under

the collapsed barracks walls and interviewed doctors who treated the injured at nearby

hospitals.

A week later, on July 29, 1944, The Afro-American had two staff reporters on the

scene writing follow-up stories about the Port Chicago blast in an article laden with

eyewitness accounts of the naval disaster. Pauline A. Young and J. Robert Smith

described the scene:

From the air and from the ground we saw the devastation and waste of war as we viewed the demolished city of Port Chicago with not a single whole building standing and with its 1500 inhabitants evacuated. There were no piers to be seen and just the tip of one of the submerged vessels sticking up from the water. In Port Chicago, shattered glass, rubble, gutted houses and sites are all that is left of the town. The munition [sic] depot, about a mile away, is the scene of pathos among the colored enlisted men who lost their buddies in the explosive disaster of last Monday night.98

188 Young and Smith recounted the human carnage in one local hospital and noted that many of the 325 men receiving treatment had sustained injuries to their heads and legs— including five with serious injuries. The reporters noted: “Most of the others, about 235, according to Commanding Officer Owen, will be returned to duty within 72 hours.”99

Although The Afro-American did not directly address the Port Chicago explosion in its editorial that week, an editorial columnist, J. Saunders Redding, noted in his weekly column called “A Second Look,” that a buddy, named Joe Grier, had recently been sent to California to serve in the Navy and that they had been exchanging letters about the new station assignment. Redding wrote:

But yesterday I met a naval rating down by the gym and he asked me if I had heard from Joe Grier. “Yes,” I said, “about two weeks ago. Why?” “Well, I was just wondering about him and some more fellows who went out to California. You read about the explosion, didn’t you?” “Yeah,” I said. “But Joe’s a coxswain. He was trained for that job. He wouldn’t be loading ammunition.” “Oh, wouldn’t he!” the naval rating said, and he laughed bitterly. And since then all I’ve been able to think about is that maybe Joe won’t have to worry about after the war anymore.100

Redding’s column revealed what many in the African American community already knew: military ratings meant little in total war. The U.S. armed forces would use manpower however it needed. Too often, that meant grueling, manual labor for African

American troops while their white counterparts fought the enemy from foxholes.

The Afro-American’s competitors—both the Defender and the Courier—wouldn’t report on the Port Chicago blast until July 29, 1944, as both publications focused editorial attention and news space on the Democratic National Convention, which had been held in

Chicago during the time of the naval accident. But by the time the newspapers did start

189 reporting, both utilized their own staff writers to report from the decimated naval base

rather than the Associated Negro Press wire services.

J. Robert Smith, this time writing as a Defender staff correspondent rather than

for The Afro-American, took a dramatic approach in the lead sentence of his July 29,

1944, front-page story, when he wrote:

The United States Navy did not have to sound taps or perform the last rites this week for the 250 Negro seamen who died in the line of duty in the explosion here last Monday night, for not a single body of the sailors who were loading the SS Quinault Victory and the SS E.A. Bryan has been recovered, either on land or sea.101

Smith noted that the navy was launching an investigation into the explosion, but military

officials held out little hope of ever learning what had caused the blast. His story

expanded to retell the story of that fateful night through interviews with survivors. Just

above Smith’s byline, in tiny agate type, the Defender noted that a casualty list was

available on page fourteen. Smith also noted that the sailors had been sent back to work

already, using words rich in patriotic imagery, when he reported:

Living up to the traditions of their forefathers, the Negro seamen assigned to jobs similar to those that cost the lives of their buddies the day before, quickly answered the call and reported to other cargo ships to fill their holds with live ammunition for the fighting forces. True to naval tradition the Negro seamen are back on the job once more—and as their buddies who died on the beaches of Guadalcanal and Tarawa—they are taking the places of those who fell for America’s cause here at home.102

The Defender listed the names of African American sailors who had received commendation medals for their actions on July 18, when the accident prompted the massive explosion. It would be the only story to appear in the Defender about the Port

Chicago incident, as by the following edition the weekly newspaper had moved on to stories about General Eisenhower who had praised the efforts of African American troops

190 on Normandy’s shores; reports of how African American troops had routed Nazis out of

France; and the latest criticisms from British courts on the American insistence of

maintaining a color bar in the U.K.103

The Courier reported the Port Chicago explosion for the first time on the front

page of its July 29, 1944, edition. Under a photograph of four women—one holding an

infant and all identified as women who had lost loved ones in the port explosion—the

Courier’s Pacific Coast correspondent E.F. Joseph noted the navy’s top echelon had

nothing but praise for the heroic efforts of African American seamen on the night of the

Port Chicago explosion. The navy’s top officials also praised the group for volunteering

to continue the important work. Joseph reported: “The captain said more than 200 colored

sailors volunteered at once at the ammunition depot, but that it is practically impossible

to single out individuals who took part in the rescue and preventive operations here,

though he did make special reference to four men.”104

Joseph’s dispatch pointed out that the Courier was “one of the first—among

newspapers or news services or radio—to put an eye witness on the scene of the

explosion.”105 He described that first impression of the port by visualizing “a war film where bombs are making direct hits on ships and buildings, leaving them in a battered, twisted shambles.”106 Joseph then returned to the subjects in his photograph from the

front page, noting that the wives of sailors had begun to show up at Port Chicago’s front

gate seeking any information possible about their loved ones. Many of the women, he

noted, cried and carried babies. On page eighteen, the Courier ran a wire story out of

Washington, D.C., that listed the names of men whom the Navy considered either

missing or dead. In agate type, the paper listed the Port Chicago victims, by state.107

191 The newspaper, much like its staunch competitor the Defender, did not publish a

follow-up to the Port Chicago disaster the following week. Instead the paper reported an

exclusive interview with Harry S. Truman and the latest news out of the ETO and the

Pacific.108 That week’s editorial page, however, commented on the incident:

The tremendous fact that Negroes, thousands of them, are dying in this war of confused aims, must escape most white Americans. Men, regardless of color, do not sell their lives cheaply. The American people, white people, did not want to go to war, did not wish to participate in this great wastage of blood. But when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, millions of American realized that they had a concrete cause for which to give their lives. It was easy then for Congress to declare war. It was easy then to speed the building of a vast army and navy. The security of the Nation was threatened. The American “way of life,” with all its imperfections, was threatened.109

The editorial noted that despite the persistence of Jim Crow laws, both at home and abroad, African American soldiers went off to war in defense of the country. And just like their white counterparts, they were dying. But the editors questioned just what the

African Americans were fighting for—particularly in the absence of any progress in the form of social reform. The editorial opined:

As many black men died in the service of their country at Port Chicago as were required to establish a beachhead on Guam. Sixteen of the survivors won hero awards. What did they die for? Why did these heroes risk death for themselves? Ought not this sacrifice, occurring daily on worldwide battlefronts, touch the conscious of America? Ought not there be enough Americans, ashamed that they should take the lives of human beings in common defense without just recompense, to unite and forever ban the cheating of which the Negro is the victim?110

The editorial concluded that African American servicemen would have no regrets when it

came to personal sacrifice, as long as they knew they would receive a reward for their

effort in the form of equality and fair opportunities on the home front after the war.

Although the Courier editorial did not explicitly say it, readers understood from perusing

192 the column that African American servicemen were making the same sacrifices, but not

getting the same reward as their white counterparts. Similarly, the Courier’s coverage

insinuated that if it had not been for the explosion at Port Chicago, most white Americans

would have remained unaware of the effort and sacrifice made by African Americans.

Disastrous News Travels Fast

Just as news of the riots in Bristol was spreading across the U.K., so was news of

the ammunition accident a world away at Port Chicago. The Bristol Evening World, The

Lancashire Daily Post, and Belfast Telegraph were the first British publications to report

the U.S. naval accident on July 18, 1944—the same day that many American newspapers

were doing the same. But the news did not receive equal treatment in each newspaper.

Nor did the reports equally address the number of African American soldiers involved in

the incident.

The Evening Post was the most deliberate in terms of identifying race. Its front

page headline declared: “EXPLOSION KILLS 600: Mostly Negroes.”111 In the lead of the five-paragraph story, placed in the middle of the front page, the Evening World markedly noted that African Americans were among the majority of men killed in the two explosions that were “estimated to have killed at least 650 men.”112 The article reported:

“Many of the men who were killed were working on the shop and on the dock loading

ammunition. Others were sleeping in nearby barracks flattened by the blast.”113 The short

story concluded by noting a Martinez official who had confirmed that nearly “2,000

negro troops were quartered” at Port Chicago. It should be noted that the Evening World

report did not identify the article as a wire story, although the last paragraph is identical

to what ran in both The Lancashire Daily Post and the Belfast Telegraph that same day

193 and were accredited to Reuters, the British news wire service equivalent to the Associated

Press.

The Daily Post ran the four-paragraph Reuters story in the middle of page four on

July 18, 1944. The story headline, a column wide, reported: “MANY DIE IN U.S.

EXPLOSION.”114 The wire service story noted that an estimated fifteen-hundred people

were involved in the incident, including as many as three hundred deaths reported. But

the only mention of race was in the final paragraph: “The Sheriff’s Office at Martinez

said that the small town of Port Chicago was ‘virtually levelled’ by blast. It is reported

that 2,000 Negro troops were quartered there.”115 This last sentence was the only one to

mention that African American troops had been among the servicemen involved in the

blast.

The Belfast Telegraph took a similar approach in its Reuters story, which ran over

two columns on page four, under a headline that nearly duplicated the Daily Post:

“Hundreds Killed in U.S. Explosion.”116 The article, which appeared with a New York dateline, reported that some two thousand African Americans were stationed at Port

Chicago. It also noted: “A Naval Lieut-Commander was quoted by an Associated Press message as saying that at least 650 men, mostly negroes, were killed.”117

The Irish News, which reported the incident at the top of its front page on July 19,

1944, made no mention of race at all in its story. Again, Reuters was the source for the report, and the article’s three-paragraph story mimicked the wire reports from a day earlier: “Many of the men who were killed were working on the ships and on the docks, loading ammunition. Others were sleeping in nearby barracks, which were flattened by the blast. The hospitals at Martinez are filled with injured, most of them sailors.”118

194

The verbiage was nearly identical to the earlier Reuters report, minus the information that

some 2,000 African American servicemen were stationed at Port Chicago. At first glance,

it might seem that perhaps the Irish News had removed the race element from the wire

report. But the Belfast News-Letter ran the exact same Reuters story on page five of its

July 19, 1944, edition—a report that also excluded any mention of race.119 Based on this information, it would appear that as the Port Chicago disaster story developed and reporters sent additional stories over the wires, either Reuters or British censors, themselves, removed all mention of the African American sailors killed in the blast.

Despite having its own correspondent in New York, The (London) Daily Mail also avoided any mention of African Americans in its reporting of the Port Chicago disaster. The newspaper’s headline, at the top of page three on July 19, 1944, declared:

“AMMO SHIPS BLOW UP: Half a Town Wrecked.”120 The ten-paragraph story went

into great detail for its British readers and described the carnage in the port town as

resembling “the worst of the war-blitzed cities” when it noted that moments after the first

ship exploded:

A second later a larger ship, moored nearby, blew up. This detonation shook the ground for miles around, devastated the dock area, sank two small coastguard vessels, and flattened all buildings in the immediate area. The explosion was felt 35 miles away as a violent tremor—people thought it was an earthquake. Flames and red-hot metal leapt into the night air, “Like a mile-high sky-rocket,” one eye-witness said.121

The fact that The Daily Mail’s correspondent failed to report the number of African

Americans killed or injured—during a time when the American press was widely reporting this information—would support the argument that British censors kept those details from subsequent reports, perhaps out of fear that the vast number of African

195 American troops in the country would react adversely after hearing such devastating

news.

It should be noted that the only British paper to follow the story beyond the initial

day of reporting was the Irish News, which ran a follow-up story on July 20, 1944, this

time on page three with a headline that declared 319 U.S. servicemen had died in the

incident.122 Again a Reuters report, the single-paragraph story quoted the Navy

Department and bore a San Francisco dateline. It also noted that previous reports had

listed the number of dead at 250.

The (London) Times was the last of the British papers to report the initial news of

the Port Chicago accident—on July 20, 1944, some three days after the fact. In a headline

that declared: “DEATH ROLL AT PORT CHICAGO,” the single-paragraph report noted

in agate type, just above the New York dateline, that the report was “FROM OUR OWN

CORRESPONDENT.”123 Like the Irish News report, The Times correspondent cited the

U.S. Navy department official who confirmed 319 servicemen had died in the dockside

blast. The Times report also had a more thorough breakdown of the casualties, when it

noted that among the dead were: “nine naval officers and 204 ratings, 31 members of the

naval guard, five coastguardsmen, and about 70 seamen.”124 Despite this detailed tally,

The Times report did not mention that the vast majority of deaths and injuries were among African American servicemen. Race was either insignificant compared with nationality or simply censored from the report.

Conclusion

Although the Bristol race riot and the Port Chicago tragedy, at first glance, appeared to be very disparate WWII events, the evidence strongly suggests that

196 similarities arise when media coverage is examined more closely. This is particularly true in terms of the way mainstream news organizations identified nationality and race. In terms of both the Bristol race riot and the Port Chicago explosion, the evidence suggests that race became an issue in the press only when it was impossible to avoid—such as the disproportionate number of African American victims in the Port Chicago explosion.

There is also strong evidence that the lack of racial identifiers in news reports were a result of overly ambitious wartime censors, rather than media practices.

In an undated cable to London, Philleo Nash, a special assistant in the Office of

War Information who focused on race and race relations, asked American officials to keep him updated on the Bristol incident. Included in Nash’s dispatch was a two-sentence blurb from the International News Service wire, dated July 13, 1944, that noted the events in Bristol between “unidentified” troops and the use of force by MPs.125 Nash drafted another undated cable to London—this time attached to an AP wire story dated

July 18—again asking for more details.

The AP news wire report fleshed out the incident further and noted that troops were banned from Bristol “since a fight among 200 Negro and white soldiers there”126 on

Saturday night. Nash’s cable with the AP report also contained an editor’s note: “The racial angle was deleted from an earlier dispatch in error by a subordinate American military censor in London. The deletions were reinstated by the chief censor.” This information suggests that someone in the U.S. Army’s censorship office intentionally omitted the role race played in the Bristol riot from the initial dispatches arriving in

American newsrooms. It was not of case of newspapers self-censoring this significant

197 detail. Nash’s cable also helps explain why both The New York Times and The

(Baltimore) Sun lacked this key element in their news reports.

Unlike the mainstream newspapers, the American black press was quick to jump on the race frame, in large part because it was an advocacy press and in the habit of calling out American officials on disparities in the treatment of African Americans. All three black publications in this study made it a point to stress that both black and white

MPs were involved in stopping the riot between the two races. 127 The use of what this study conceptualizes as a unified race story frame is also an indication that by 1944, changes had indeed occurred in the U.S. military in terms of how it handled racial discord among the rank-and-file. This is a departure from just a year earlier, when white MPs stormed back into Bamber Bridge with white reinforcements to bring disorderly African

American soldiers back under military control.

British Press Censorship

The evidence strongly suggests that not only did the British press go to great lengths to downplay the role of race, but it was in the habit of using vague language to explain what had occurred. For example, neither the Evening World nor the Western

Daily Press & Bristol Mirror clearly identified the street names where the incidents occurred, despite even the most routine of police reports during this time typically containing these basic details. This could easily be blamed on the strict self-censorship that the British press followed during the war years out of fear that any news demonstrating anything other than a united front among the Allies could be used by enemy propaganda. The Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror’s July 19, 1944, editorial further hinted at the role censorship played in the city’s newspaper coverage of the

198 incident and the subsequent misinformation that swirled about the port city. Editors

opined:

Since this war began newspaper men have become accustomed to scrapping news stories if they give information to the enemy. Such an instance occurred during the past week-end in connection with certain unpleasant incidents at Old Market Street and the Centre involving Allied troops. The full story would have placed events in their proper perspective and Rumour, the lying jade, would not have flaunted her exaggerated tales on idle tongues.128

This rather blunt editorial assessment of wartime censorship also demonstrated the

British press’ growing frustration with the continued impediment of passing along

information to readers nearly five years after the war first started for Britain. Similarly,

this editorial hinted that the Bristol papers’ failure to link the massive street brawl among

the American troops to other incidents that occurred in the city, such as the arrests of

citizens fighting military police, was a result of censorship as well.

That said, even for contemporary readers, it is understood that these are indeed

related incidents. It could be argued that certainly Bristol readers would have been aware

that the street fight among U.S. troops and the arrests of Bristol citizens at the Tram

Centre were related.129 This vagueness of initial reporting, however, had ramifications.

For national British papers, and by default the mainstream newspapers in America, this lack of finer details meant readers had to fill in the blanks, but without the assistance that the rumor mill in Bristol would have provided. As a result, readers of regional and national American and British newspapers were at a greater disadvantage since they did not reside in Bristol and were not privy to street gossip.

Unlike the Bamber Bridge incident in 1943, where newspapers widely reported the incident and used identical verbiage to relay the information to readers, there were

199 enough structural differences in the British newspapers to indicate that these publications

did not rely on wire services for the news, but rather had correspondents in Bristol who

reported the incident. This suggests that after the initial launch of Operation Overlord,

Bristol became a vital port in terms of transporting goods and manpower to the front

lines. The U.S. Army also found it critical to balance the number of African American

and white stevedores assigned to the port city.130 This delicate balance became the topic of great discussion—both publicly and behind closed doors—among members of the

Bristol Watch Committee.131

In terms of timeliness, the two black newspapers, the Chicago Defender and

Pittsburgh Courier, that prided themselves on being the first to report the latest in

African American news failed to report the Bristol race riot in their July 22, 1944, editions. Although it is impossible to know for certain, it can be surmised that the Port

Chicago explosion and subsequent news of the high number of African American victims in the blast trumped a race riot between black and white troops overseas. Perhaps editors at both papers anticipated follow-up stories about army investigations into the Bristol riot and figured they would break the news about Port Chicago at the expense of Bristol. In terms of proximity, certainly hundreds of dead and injured African American troops on the West Coast were of greater news value to U.S. newspaper audiences than stories about one African American soldier’s death and a handful of injured GIs on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

This study found that the Associated Press’s reports of the Port Chicago explosion were widely published across the newspapers. As such, both the wire service and the newspapers who used it, fell into the same pattern of reporting routines that mass

200 communication scholars decades later would describe as typifications of “what a

story.”132 While the shock of the Port Chicago tragedy was fresh, it remained on the front pages of major newspapers and reports were filled with official voices trying to offer reassurances in the chaos. But as time distanced itself from the actual accident, the story progressed off the front page and eventually out of the newspaper.

In terms of the black press, when it came to the Port Chicago accident, the publications conducted their own independent reporting rather than use the ANP wire service stories. Through this independent reporting some trends emerged: including the use of fewer official voices such as sheriff’s deputies or naval officials, and the inclusion of nonofficial voices such as blast survivors, the families of victims, and passersby. This finding supports similar studies about black press news coverage and news routines during the pre-civil rights era. For example, one scholar found that unlike the mainstream media, the black press was more likely to interview nonofficial voices.133

In the Port Chicago accident, censorship again arose in terms of the British press.

This study found that as the first newspapers to report the naval depot accident, the

Bristol Evening World, Lancashire Daily Post, and Belfast Telegraph used what appeared

to be Reuters news service and included the fact that African American seamen were

among the majority of men killed in the blast. Just a day later, this detail was eliminated

from British newspaper accounts of Port Chicago. There could be several reasons for this

omission, including the fact that just days before the naval disaster, one of Britain’s

largest port cities had been rocked by a race riot and officials feared that African

Americans would once more take to the street if they knew that it was their kinsmen who

had died in the blast.

201 It is argued here that both the Bristol riot and the Port Chicago explosion became part of an epochal moment in U.S. military history. In terms of the ETO, Bristol was significant because it marked the last time American GIs would take to the streets to settle the brewing differences between whites and African American servicemen. This is not to say that there were no racial conflict among U.S. troops after Bristol. But, rather, that the altercations were minor and never to the point of making major newspaper headlines across the globe. It is argued here that one reason for this decline in racial tensions was a result of the Supreme Allied Commander of the ETO, General Dwight D.

Eisenhower.

In the spring of 1945, nearly three years after African Americans first deployed to the British Isles, news stories began appearing in the black press about the movement of

African American troops out of support positions and into traditional combat roles as the

Allied armies swept further across France. There was an almost jubilant tone in the news reports that appeared in the American black press weeklies. Under a front page headline declaring: “Red Ball Drivers Now Combat Troops in France,” Defender war correspondent Edward B. Toles wrote: “They’re in the infantry now!”134 Toles reported that after years of driving trucks and cooking meals, African American troops from

Service of Supplies had undergone an intensive six-week program to prepare them for combat. Toles reported:

This week for the first time since the invasion of France, Negro infantrymen made their appearances here ready to take part in the Battle of the Rhine. Formerly Red Ball Express drivers, cooks, bakers, stevedores and service troops stationed in the non-combat rear echelons, Negro troops last week completed six weeks of combat infantry training. They were allowed to volunteer as combat reinforcements in early January.135

202 Although Toles credited the U.S. Army’s only African American field officer, Benjamin

O. Davis Sr., for the army’s “long awaited innovation,”136 Army Historian Ulysses Lee

noted that General Lee, for whom Davis worked, had begun consulting with Eisenhower

in December 1944 on how to resolve the manpower issues on the Western Front. Lee

noted that “General Davis responded enthusiastically” and so, on Christmas Day 1944,

work began to create a plan that would retrain African American volunteers to serve as

individual replacements in the infantry.137

In a January 4, 1945, draft of the order seeking voluntary replacements,

Eisenhower noted that his plan “extended to all soldiers without regard to color or race but preference will normally be given to individuals who have had some basic training in

Infantry.”138 Further, Eisenhower ordered that only men with a rank of private or private

first class would be considered, although noncommissioned officers with the rank of

sergeant or above who were willing to take a rank reduction to fight, were also

welcomed. Ulysses Lee observed about Eisenhower’s proposal: “The plan itself

represented a major break with traditional Army policy, for it proposed mixing Negro

soldiers into otherwise white units neither on a quota nor a smaller unit basis but as

individuals fitted in where needed.”139 Uncertain of how many men would volunteer for

combat, U.S. Army officials were inundated with 4,562 African American volunteers by

February 1945.140

Likewise, Port Chicago became a pivotal moment as well. According to historian

Ernest L. Perry Jr., “the criticism that erupted after the Port Chicago incident centered more on the events that followed than the explosion.”141 Less than fourteen days after the blast claimed the lives of 320 men, injured four hundred more, and leveled an important

203 ammunition depot, the U.S. Navy called the remaining men back to base to return to

work. Perry noted:

[B]fore the Navy corrected any of the hazardous working conditions, the survivors were ordered to begin loading ammunition again. They refused and were placed under arrest. Some were shipped to the South Pacific, but several weeks later those who remained state-side were reassembled at Vallejo, California. On August 9, the African-American stevedores were ordered to load ammunition ships, but fifty sailors refused and were charged with mutiny.142

A month-long courts martial resulted in each sailor receiving anywhere from an eight- to a fifteen-year sentence. The incident launched an NAACP investigation and the black press responded with outrage. The U.S. Navy issued safety regulations in the months that followed. And six decades later, Freddie Meeks, one of the fifty sailors charged with mutiny, sought and received a pardon from President Bill Clinton for his role in the aftermath of Port Chicago.143

204 Conclusion

Race and ideologies of racial supremacy were at the very heart of World War II.

U.S. troops did not have to look far to see how race influenced the American war machine as African American and white troops were processed, trained, and stationed at separate but supposedly equal installations across the country. Race determined whether one carried a rifle in the infantry or drove a supply truck filled with war materiel. Race determined whether one operated the naval big guns or loaded munitions into Liberty- class ships. Race sometimes even determined whether one would deploy or not, as some

Allied nations politely refused to accept African American troops before diplomacy intervened. Even as wartime conditions chipped away at the color bar—for example, the costly battles on the beaches of Normandy spurred General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the European Theater of Operations, to open the U.S. infantry to any soldier willing to drop rank in order to pick up arms—the American wartime experience remained a highly segregated one.

Enlisted soldier Walter “Wally” Suchowiecki of New York survived the beaches of Normandy as well as the Battle of the Bulge, but said his entire wartime experience was with an all-white unit. Suchowiecki recalled: “There were very, very few blacks that

I’d seen as a unit there. When we were in France, the black units were what they called heavy whip truck drivers. They were called the Eight-Ball Express. The eight ball is black and I’m sure that is where the nickname came from.”1 The former infantryman said he and his platoon were always relieved to see U.S. Army trucks with the African

American drivers passing their way because it meant they could catch a ride to the next

battle, rather than hoofing it on foot across France. And although he never recalled seeing

animosity between U.S. troops while overseas, he knew those feelings were there.2

One did not have to don a uniform to see how racial differences played out across

the U.S. and the globe during the war years. News of atrocities committed by the Nazi

regime against European Jews were reported in both the American and British press, and

yet, this study found that when it came to reporting issues of racial tensions within their

own countries, mainstream newspapers in both nations often exercised restraint. The

evidence strongly suggests that self-censorship on racial news events was routinely

practiced in the name of patriotism during the war. This was particularly true in the

summer of 1943, when riots broke out in cities across the United States, in addition to a

small village in Britain. Unless circumstances demanded it become part of the story

frame, many mainstream newspapers omitted race from news reports or minimized the

number of photographs and types of images published during periods of social unrest.

Other times, the detail of race was intentionally omitted by wartime censors.

Minimalizing Race and Racial Tensions

The evidence strongly suggests that this effort to downplay the role of race often

came from overt pressure from government officials. This was particularly true of the

British press. As early as 1942—even as African American troops were first arriving on

the British Isles—Northern Ireland leaders and military officials gathered the editors of

Belfast-area newspapers to urge them to use “discretion” in reporting racial friction.3

Northern Ireland cabinet meeting minutes indicated that editors left the gathering with a verbal commitment to downplay any racial tensions in future news coverage. Most newspapers fell in line, but others, such as the Unionist publication the Belfast Telegraph,

206 defied those demands and regularly published reports on racial friction among U.S.

troops in blatant disregard of the wishes of Stormont or Whitehall. Indeed, as the war

continued, British citizens and news workers grew frustrated. Soon editorials and letters

to the editor in mainstream British newspapers voiced these vexations with American

duplicity in touting President Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms yet treating African American

troops as second-class citizens subjected to wholesale segregation and discrimination.

Based on the facts, British officials were increasingly wary of the American black

press and its advocacy approach to news reporting. This was particularly true of black

press editorials that regularly took Parliamentary officials to task for their treatment of

colored people in British colonies. By early 1944, the American Division of the U.K.’s

Ministry of Information was sending reports about the black press to colleagues in the

North American Department of the Foreign Office.4 Although it has been widely accepted that the U.S. government regularly monitored the black press on several fronts throughout the war—from accusations of publishing seditious materials to using the black press to measure African American popular opinion—prior to this research it was not widely known that America’s closest ally was also conducting surveillance operations on the American black press during the same period.5 In fact, by the summer of 1944, the

British Consulate General in New York was directed to attend a public event sponsored by several African Americans organizations and presented his findings in a scathing report to Whitehall officials.6

The tendency of the mainstream press to downplay the race of individuals

involved in major news stories was particularly true during the Detroit race riots, where a

disproportionate number of African Americans were killed, injured, and arrested between

207 June 20, 1943, and June 24, 1943. Many of the deaths were directly related to white

Detroit law enforcement officers firing directly into the mob in an attempt to regain control—news that both the mainstream and black press reported. Although it would be expected that the black press would report and display these stories and images, the mainstream American newspapers also ran countless images sent over the wires of

Detroit’s unraveling. Often these photographs featured images of mobs of white men brutally attacking African Americans—pulling them out of personal cars or public transportation trolleys and beating them mercilessly; attacking African Americans while white city police officers were attempting to take them away in handcuffs; and mobs of white youths chasing lone African American figures down city streets with crude weapons, such as broken bottles and lead pipes. For white readers, these images of

African Americans as victims ran counter to more common stereotypes routinely used to portray African Americans in the press.7

Just two decades later, in the summer of 1968, similar images of African

Americans enduring harsh treatment at the hands of white law enforcement officials and fellow countrymen—much like that which occurred in Detroit, Beaumont, Los Angeles,

Philadelphia, and to some extent, Harlem, in the summer of 1943—would become a searing indictment against the imbalances in American society and set the stage for the formal civil rights movement. The mainstream press’ graphic portrayals of great inequalities, beginning in the 1950s and driven by the new medium of television, prompted Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff to note in their 2006 examination of race reporting during the 1950s and 1960s:

208 The images, both still and moving, had a monumental impact on whites that few people . . . could have predicted. For white northerners, the cameras provided incontrovertible evidence of American unfairness, inhumanity, and brutality. Any suggestion by southern whites that their Jim Crow laws and lifestyle were moral, legal, or practical, or that the South’s Negroes were fundamentally happy, was demolished by the images.8

Although it can be argued that the civil rights protests in the summer of 1968 were significantly different in nature than that of race rioting in Detroit in the summer of 1943.

Yet the evidence strongly suggests that black press reports revealed the same frustrations that drove citizens to participate in peaceful protests in the 1960s—Jim Crow laws, discriminatory employment practices, imbalances in public education, and poor public housing concerns—were identical to what drove a desperate and frustrated people into the streets of Detroit and Harlem in 1943.

The reality is that when President Roosevelt touted the Four Freedoms—freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship— as rallying points for America to join the war effort, his message rang hollow in the ears of African Americans who were still seeking those same freedoms at home. It was this frustration that prompted the Pittsburgh Courier to launch the Double Victory campaign in early 1942, after a young African American factory worker wrote a letter to the editor, begging the question: Why could there not be victory over oppression overseas and at home?9 But when African Americans demanded the same American rights as something

to which they were entitled, the “white man often regarded [these demands] as a threat—

to his job or to his whole way of life. The result was increasing hostility between blacks

and whites and, during the closing weeks of spring, frequently violence.”10 In the decades after WWII, sociologists would examine events in Detroit and Harlem for clues about

209 why 1943 was such a volatile year. Their conclusions would be largely the same: African

Americans were frustrated by the lack of political will to forge social changes that

guaranteed equal treatment even as they were fighting to secure those rights for others.

Sociologist Benjamin D. Singer and several of his colleagues concluded that race

riots were a direct result of a collective group of people feeling that they had few options

left in terms of seeking justice. Rioting was, in itself, an act of desperation. The

researchers concluded: “[T]he likelihood of violence being utilized as a collective

defense is greater when institutionalized means of redressing grievances are, or are

believed to be, absent or ineffective.”11 Some could argue that the desperation that drove

African American men and women into the streets in 1943 to act out against a system that refused to give them justice was akin to the frustration that drove men and women back into the streets of America to protest a series of police shootings of unarmed, African

American men in several U.S. cities during the summer of 2014 and the spring of 2015, while this research was being conducted. And much like Singer and his colleagues found that the use of police in these volatile situations only increased the violence in Detroit and

Harlem in 1943, the same could be said of Ferguson, Missouri, and Baltimore, Maryland.

But unlike the summer of 1968—when newspaper stories, photographs, and television broadcasts repeatedly told these stories, reinforcing the inequality and harsh treatment of African Americans in frames counter to the popular stereotypes—the evidence suggests that the mainstream and the black press in America self-censored images of African Americans as victims in 1943. This was particularly the case in the press coverage of Harlem. Not only did mainstream newspapers, such as The New York

Times, limit the number of stories and photographs it published, none of the images

210 depicted the riot as it was happening. This was a sharp departure from news routines two

month earlier when the U.S. press reported events in Detroit. Even the black press curbed

its Harlem coverage, with the Chicago Defender blatantly telling readers the images were

too graphic to publish. Instead, over the following weeks, what few photographs the

Defender did publish were ones that framed African Americans and whites working

together in unity during crisis. In other instances, the evidence suggests that the

mainstream press sought to “bury the lead”—a newspaper term used to describe when a

writer hides or buries important information in a story. In the case of the Port Chicago

accident, the fact that African Americans made up the majority of the casualties when

two Liberty-class ships exploded on a fateful night in July 1944 was often among the last

details to be reported—if at all.

British Press Routines

The evidence also found that the British press was often late to report—or never reported—certain events regardless of whether those events occurred in the British Isles or in the United States. Sometimes, this delay was a direct result of wartime censors hindering the release of information, such as was the case during the Harlem riots of

August 1943. Other times, it was a lack of information or the wire services, perhaps, that downplayed the significance of an event. This was evident with all three events that occurred in the U.K. In these instances, few British newspapers outside of the coverage area—whether it was Antrim, Bamber Bridge, or Bristol—bothered to publish news about fighting between U.S. troops. It is impossible to say whether this was a direct result of wartime censorship. Other obvious factors included too many other news stories

211 fighting for priority and wartime paper rationing that forced editors to examine how news values, such as proximity and prominence, applied to their readers.12

Another major difference between the American and British press during this time was the volume of stories reported about local news events. For example, in the instance of the Bristol race riot, the number of U.S. troops involved in the fracas and the scope of the fighting was significant enough that local officials discussed it in weekly meetings for months to follow. And while the Bristol press dutifully reported these initial incidents, as well as the meetings of officials disturbed by the violence within their city, the scope of the news covered paled in comparison to the volume of news stories published by the

Detroit Free Press when riots broke out in its city. Both cities had multiple newspapers competing for readership. Both cities were rattled by the violence. Both cities formed committees to investigate the matter. That said, the scope of the Free Press’s reporting easily eclipsed that of the Bristol Evening Post, Bristol Evening World, and Western

Daily Press & Bristol Mirror combined.

The evidence also strongly suggests that despite the sometimes tempered British coverage of racial incidents, in Bamber Bridge in particular, the local press’ routine of publishing anniversary stories decades after WWII has forged this event into the collective wartime narrative of the region. The result is that, despite the diminishing number of citizens who were alive during the Bamber Bridge mutiny in June 1943, the story continues through a tradition of oral history, press nostalgia routines, and local acknowledgement of the events that occurred there. The evidence suggests that in this instance these press routines reinforced the collective memory of this memorable event.

212 Black Press Routines

Unlike the mainstream press, the black press in America served a different but

critical function in society. In his examination of the black press in America, H.G.

Nicholas perhaps described it best when he noted:

What the Negro press means to the Negro is best summed up by Roi Ottley in his recent book “New World A-Coming”: The Negro press “makes no bones about its policy of protest and propaganda – a line from which it rarely two-steps. But the solid importance of this agency to the Negro community lies not in its editorial harangues alone, but in the fact that it provides a vast platform for the Negro leaders, serves as the coordinator for any mass action the race is impelled to take” and is an instrument of public education.13

To be sure, it was on the pages of weekly publications, such as the Pittsburgh Courier,

Chicago Defender, and The (Baltimore) Afro American, that readers received a mix of

news and unapologetic commentary on issues pertaining to African Americans in the

U.S. as well as people of color across the globe. This different approach to reporting

news prompted skepticism at best—and unabashed surveillance at worst—by government

officials in both the U.S. and Great Britain.

The black press not only reported events of interest to African Americans, but

also sought to assign blame to officials and agencies who were not doing their part to

advance the race. Three popular targets for black press ire were President Franklin D.

Roosevelt, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis

Sr.14 Ironically, the evidence strongly suggests that the latter two were perhaps the least deserving of these harsh criticisms. One of the first items of business tackled by

Eisenhower as commander of the European Theater of Operations in 1942 was to issue an edict to all servicemen that there would not be a color bar implemented in Great Britain.

213 He rather naively believed that the military’s institutionalized leadership would allow for

the enforcement of this policy—and perhaps influence white soldiers returning home

after the war to “take back this comradeship, mutual respect, and the spirit of helpfulness

developed during his service with us.”15 Eisenhower also broke with heavily debated

military policies leading up to WWII, when in early 1945, he eliminated the color bar and

opened the infantry to African Americans after the devastation of human life on the

beaches of Normandy. It was an achievement Eisenhower remained proud of throughout

his life. In a May 29, 1967, letter to General Bruce C. Clarke, he wrote:

A number of negroes volunteered—as I recall—something like 2,500. These men were intensively trained in the school of the solderie [sic] but obviously there was no time to carry their training further. I decided to infiltrate them, as individuals, into units already in the front lines. Some of the commanders, one of whom was George Patton, strongly objected on the grounds that some of our units were from the South and trouble would result. Our experience was just the opposite. There was not a single objection brought to my attention. On the contrary from all sides there came heart-warming reports of the success of the experiment, including from George.16

If anything, the evidence suggest that perhaps Eisenhower’s greatest error was his unwavering belief in the ability of the U.S. military to change American society. To be sure, even after President Harry S. Truman signed a presidential executive order on July

28, 1948, officially desegregating the U.S. military, it still took more than two decades before American society would be forced to adopt policies that stepped in line with those already implemented by the U.S. armed forces. And some five decades later, it can be argued that U.S. society still struggles to realize the full intent of these policies of equality.

214 The evidence also found similar complaints in some quarters of the black press

over what was perceived as a softness on the part of Davis for not pushing for racial

equality within the U.S. Armed Forces during the war years. However, as the only

African American general officer during WWII—tasked with investigating racial

unrest—Davis was keenly aware of how demoralizing segregation had been for African

American troops. At the same time, he was astute enough to know how far he could push

an American institution steeped in traditions. Davis also keenly understood how difficult

reintegrating into American society would be for many African American service

members—especially those who had served overseas during WWII. During a speech to

an African American civic club in August 1946, Davis noted:

These approximately half million colored men and women who have served abroad have in spite of the attempted planting of segregation by some white Americans, experienced a freedom unknown to them in their homes here in the United States. . . . These people will never forget this freedom and it is not going to be an easy task to compel them to get back into old patterns. Already we have read of the revival of certain organizations and of crimes committed by mobs with a view of restraining the returning veteran from enjoying the freedoms for which he was called to the colors to fight to maintain.17

Davis’s frankness continued, when he noted that during the war, every time he heard the

Star-Spangled Banner sung, he “couldn’t help but think that here in this land of the free there does not yet appear to be a sufficiently large number of brave men sufficiently interested to secure that freedom to all the members of our population.”18

It is impossible to say whether it was the conclusion of the war—and with it, an

end to fears of the Axis propaganda machine twisting commentary—that loosened

Davis’s tongue to speak more frankly in public about racial issues and race relations. It

should be noted that at the time of Davis’s speech he was still in uniform, working as an

215 assistant inspector general, this time under the command of General Dan I. Sultan.19

Perhaps his comments were motivated by a frankness that comes with age. Or perhaps

Davis, having investigated highly publicized racial incidents throughout the war, saw what many could not: that the African American experience in WWII inevitably marked the beginning of the civil rights movement in America.

216 Endnotes

Preface 1 Pamela E. Walck, “Fort Stewart’s 2nd Brigade Honors WWII Veterans,” Savannah Morning News, April 28, 2009. Accessed March 6, 2015, at http://m.savannahnow.com/intown/2009-04-28/fort-stewarts-2nd-brigade-honors-wwii- veterans#gsc.tab=0. 2 Ibid. 3 Wilbur Dickens died on June 14, 2010, at the age of ninety-three. In his obituary, the Tifton Gazette noted how he enjoyed participating in army reunions and was often acknowledged as the “oldest living veteran in the community at Memorial Day celebrations.” See Wilbur Dickens, Obituary, Tifton Gazette, June 16, 2010. Accessed March 6, 2015, at http://www.tiftongazette.com/archives/wilbur- dickens/article_4a230a07-ace0-5f29-9297-f23378a4852c.html. 4 James Campbell, The Color of War: How One Battle Broke Japan and Another Changed America (New York: Random House Inc., 2012), xiii. 5 “By the Numbers: the U.S. Military,” Accessed March 6, 2015 at http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by- the-numbers/us-military.html. 6 Ibid. 7 Michael C.C. Adams, “Postwar Mythmaking about World War II,” in Major Problems in the History of World War II, eds. Mark A. Stoler and Melanie S. Gustafson (Boston: Wadsworth, 2003), 428. 8 Ibid., 429. 9 The Tuskegee Airmen were perhaps the highest profile all-African American unit given press coverage in both black and mainstream newspapers during WWII. But unlike their white counterparts, the Tuskegee airmen had a rather unusual military status. They were subject to the rules of the Army Air Force (AAF), but not considered “full-fledged members,” meaning that they could practice landing at any of the AAF’s fields, but once there could rarely find meals or lodging because of Jim Crow laws in the towns where the airfield were located. See Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1986), 144. 10 Several U.S. Army generals have been credited with declaring that WWII was no time for social experimentation, including General George C. Marshall, who argued that desegregating the military would require military leaders to “solve” a societal issue that had challenged and haunted American leaders since the country’s founding. See J. Todd Moye, Freedom Flyers: The Tuskegee Airmen of World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 26. 11 See Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2007), 141.

Introduction: Gaps in the Narrative of World War II

1 James G. Thompson, “Should I Sacrifice to Live ‘Half-American?’” Pittsburgh Courier, January 31, 1942, 3. All stories in the Pittsburgh Courier were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 2 Ibid. 3 Pittsburgh Courier, February 7, 1942, 1. 4 Patrick S. Washburn, The African American Newspaper: Voice of Freedom (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2006), 144. For additional studies examining the role of the Double V campaign, see Patrick S. Washburn, A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the Black Press during World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 100; and Neil A. Wynn, The African American Experience during World War II (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2010), 40. 5 Pamela E. Walck, “How the Pittsburgh Courier Campaigned to Change America and the World” (research paper in progress presented at the annual meeting for The Joint Journalism & Communication History Conference, New York City, New York, March 9, 2013). 6 “18 Cited for Aiding Race Relations,” The New York Times, February 7, 1943, 48. All stories in the New York Times were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 7 Less than three months after James Thompson bared his soul to the editors of the Pittsburgh Courier, the U.S. government under the guidance of Philleo Nash, a special assistant assigned to the Office of War Information, launched a massive survey of four thousands citizens—half white, half African American—in five cities in March 1942 in hopes of better understanding the status of race relations in the country. Among the questions posed to African Americans and whites alike: “Are Colored People getting as Much Chance as They should to Help Win The War?” The responses of participants demonstrate just how wide a gap existed between the perceptions of white Americans and the realities of life for African Americans. Some 57 percent of the white respondents answered in the affirmative: Yes, their African American counterparts were getting as much of a chance to assist in the war effort as they should. Only 20 percent—some four hundred people—responded that African Americans were not being given a fair chance to support the war efforts. When the same question was posed to African Americans, however, an overwhelming 68 percent—some 1,360 people—responded in the negative. They did not feel that they were being given as many opportunities to help the U.S. win the war. In fact, only 19 percent agreed that they were indeed getting every opportunity to help in the war efforts. The survey, launched during the first two weeks of March 1942, included four hundred white respondents and four hundred African American respondents each from the U.S. cities of Detroit, Chicago, Raleigh (North Carolina), Birmingham (Alabama), and Oklahoma City. See Negro Opinion Study: Negro and White Communications and Attitudes, October 1942-January 1943, Box 20/Minorities- Negro, Philleo Nash Papers (henceforth PNP), Harry S. Truman Library (henceforth HSTL), Independence, Missouri.

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8 I have chosen to use the term “African American” to describe U.S. troops of African descent who were deployed to England during World War II in an attempt to restore dignity to a group of American veterans whose military service, in the words of historian James Campbell, “does not conform nicely with the celebrated stories of white heroism and sacrifice.” See James Campbell, The Color of War: How One Battle Broke Japan and Another Changed America (New York: Random House Inc., 2012) xiii. Terms more commonly used during this period, such as “black,” “Negro,” and “colored,” appear in this research only in direct quotes from official government reports or published news articles of the day. 9 Perhaps the most comprehensive example of this is the work of Ulysses Lee, an African American officer who was tasked by the U.S. Army to examine its policies involving African American troops in WWII. Historians following in Lee’s footsteps have cited his work, conducted from 1947 to 1951, ever since. In a foreword to a reprint of Lee’s work in 1994, Brigadier General Harold W. Nelson noted: “If the now much-cited title has an echo of an earlier period, that very echo testifies to the book’s rather remarkable two-fold achievement: that Lee wrote it when he did, well before the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, and that its reputation—for authority and objectivity—has endured so well.” See Harold W. Nelson, “Foreword: to the First Paperback Edition,” in Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2004), vii. 10 Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (London: The Free Press, 1986), 9-19. 11 Ibid., 33, 43. 12 Ibid., 58. 13 A. Russell Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II (Oxford: Clio Press, 1977), 59. 14 Ibid., 4. 15 After World War I—and the blatant lack of follow-through by white politicians—Du Bois expressed extreme embarrassment and frustration over what had become known as the “Close Ranks” editorial he had written in the summer of 1918 and expressed his “shame and bitterness for the next forty years.” See Mark Ellis, “‘Closing Ranks’ and ‘Seeking Honors’: W.E.B. Du Bois in World War I,” The Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (June 1992): 96. 16 See Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, 5; and Wynn, The African American Experience during World War II, 5. 17 Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, 5. 18 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 5-6. 19 Ibid., 11. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 15. 22 Ibid., 12. 23 Ibid., 21. 24 Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, 59-60. 25 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 6.

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26 Ibid., 32. 27 Ibid., 36. 28 Ibid., 37. 29 Ibid., 46. 30 Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts 1939-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 44. 31 Ibid., 47. 32 Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, 61. 33 Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes & Color Lines (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 47. 34 Ibid., 47, 61. 35 Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 44. 36 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 182. 37 See Phillip McGuire, “Judge Hastie, World War II, and Army Racism,” The Journal of Negro History 62 no. 4 (October 1977): 352; and Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 46. 38 Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 46. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., 49. 41 Ibid. 42 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 51. 43 Walter Lippmann famously noted that media create images in the minds of the public that, in turn inform them of the world around them. His argument was that not only do media emphasize one story over another, but also that the space, time, and priority they lend any given subject, in turn, reinforce in the minds of the masses what is important. See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), 7. This observation is significant, because, in a democracy, scholars have argued that the issues emphasized by the media become foremost in the minds of the voters, and in turn influence policy makers and leaders. This process has been conceptualized as agenda setting. Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw defined agenda setting as a media effect that occurs whenever the mass media sets an agenda, then influences the “salience of attitudes” any given audience might have about a particular issue or subject as a result of repeated media coverage. See Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 36, no. 2 (Summer 1972): 177. W. Russell Neuman expanded on agenda setting by noting that the act of reporting an event caused an amplification of a particular issue. Neuman contended that the media filtered topics and distorted importance through story placement in newspapers or broadcasts. Amplification also sent messages to audiences. For example, a story on the front page held greater importance than one on an inside page, or a brief buried deep within a newspaper. He argued that while it would be easy to blame media alone for any media effects that resulted from certain coverage, information consumption was “dynamic and context-dependent”—meaning that audiences played an active role because they decided which stories to attend to and which to ignore. See W. Russell

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Neuman, “The Threshold of Public Attention,” Public Opinion Quarterly 54 (Summer 1990): 612. Timing also plays a role in what audiences think about. James P. Winter and Chaim H. Eyal noted that when a story runs—and whether it resonates with the audience—are equally important in agenda setting. In their study of civil rights coverage, the researchers found it took up to six weeks for agenda setting effects to be seen in audiences. Sometimes, the researchers argued, it took four weeks just for an issue to reach critical mass among the general public. See James P. Winter and Chaim H. Eyal, “Agenda Setting for the Civil Rights Issue,” Public Opinion Quarterly 45 (Fall 1988): 376. From an historical perspective, these findings would indicate that because the black press wrote about African American troops and race relations, it sent a clear and consistent message to readers that these activities were significant. The editors of the black press reinforced story significance by placing photos of black troops in various activities, from basic training to landing in countries overseas as an accompaniment to these stories. The media effects from these routines stand in stark contrast to the minimal effects in the mainstream press, where papers rarely acknowledged the ethnicity of troops supporting the war effort and photos of African Americans were rarely included. As a result, for a majority of its war coverage, black troops were invisible in the mainstream press. This was not unusual. For the vast majority of mainstream newspapers before the civil rights movement, blacks didn’t make the news unless they were exceptional athletes, actors, or criminals. See Carolyn Martindale, The White Press and Black America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1980); Washburn, A Question of Sedition; Wayne Dawkins, Black Journalists: The NABJ Story (Merrillville, Indiana: August Press, 1997); and Pamela E. Walck, “The Search for the Lost Archive: Tracking Down the Historic Records of the Pittsburgh Courier,” Pittsburgh Quarterly (Spring 2012), accessed April 16, 2014, http://www.pittsburghquarterly.com/index.php/Features/the-search-for-thelost- archives.html. 44 See Dominic J. Capeci Jr. and Martha Wilkerson, “The Detroit Rioters of 1943: A Reinterpretation,” Michigan Historical Review 16, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 49; Jeffery Shantz, “‘They Think Their Fannies Are as Good as Ours’: The 1943 Detroit Riot,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 40, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 77; and Karen Huck, “The Arsenal on Fire: The Reader in the Riot, 1943,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 10 (March 1993): 24. 45 See Laurie F. Leach, “Margie Polite, the Riot Starter: Harlem, 1943,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 40, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 25. 46 The Pittsburgh Courier’s wartime correspondents in the European Theater of Operations included: William R. Dixon and Theodore Stanford; the Chicago Defender’s ETO correspondents included: David H. Orro and Edward B. Toles; and the Baltimore Afro-American’s European-based war correspondents included: Ollie Stewart, Bettye Phillips, and Vincent Tubbs. The Associated Negro Press also had Rudy Dunbar and George Padmore based in the ETO. See John D. Stevens, “From the Back of the Foxhole: Black Correspondents in World War II,” Journalism Monographs 27 (February 1973): 10. A third correspondent for the Courier, Roi Ottley, was officially listed on the government’s roster of U.S. accredited correspondents for World War II as writing for

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PM, a popular labor magazine. See Colonel Barney Oldfield, U.S.A.F. (Ret.), Never a Shot in Anger (Santa Barbara, California: Capra Press, 1989): 327. 47 On July 26, 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981 that officially desegregated the armed forces of the United States. Truman’s order stated, in part, that “it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those show serve in our country’s defense.” The order went on to declare that opportunities would be afforded “for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.” See “Executive Order 9981,” HSTL. Accessed online March 15, 2015, at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/9981.htm. 48 Thompson, “Should I Sacrifice to Live ‘Half-American?’”

Chapter 1: First Impressions: How an Antrim Bar Fight Introduced John Bull to an American Institution 1 It should be noted that by 1942, it had been less than a decade since Northern Ireland split off from the Republic of Ireland and remained a territory of the United Kingdom. Among British documents, Northern Ireland is often referred to as Ulster. This division also meant that many hard feelings remained between the Irish Catholics and the British Protestants, as this chapter will further explain. The arrival of U.S. troops to Northern Ireland sparked anger among leaders of the Republic of Ireland, who remained neutral throughout the war. See David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945 (New York: Random House, 1995),117. 2 See “American Troops Arrive in Northern Ireland,” Belfast News-Letter, January 27, 1942, 3. 3 Ibid. 4 “Welcome!,” Belfast News-Letter, January 27, 1942, 2. 5 “IN FIRST CONTINGENT OF AMERICAN NEGRO TROOPS ABROAD,” The New York Times, July 29, 1942, 8. All stories in The New York Times were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 6 For a deeper semiotic breakdown of the two images, see Pamela E. Walck, “Reporting Jim Crow Abroad: Press Images and Words for African-American Deployments in World War II” (research paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Educators in Journalism and Mass Communication Conference, Montreal, Canada, August 2014). 7 British historians have estimated that before World War II, the number of British Colonial citizens of African descent totaled around eight thousand with the majority settling in coastal port cities such as Cardiff, Bristol, and Liverpool. For most British citizens, particularly in Northern Ireland, it was the first time they would see people of African descent outside of the movies. See Reynolds, Rich Relations, 216; and Juliet Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here”: The American GI in World War II Britain (New York: Canopy Books, 1992),152. 8 See Dehra Parker, O.B.E., Member of Parliament, Clonmore, Northern Ireland, to Robert Gransden, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, undated letter, Cabinet Secretariat

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(henceforth CAB), Record Group (henceforth RG) 9/CD/225/19, Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (henceforth PRONI), Belfast, Northern Ireland, U.K. 9 See Simon Topping, “Laying Down the Law to the Irish and the Coons: Stormont’s Response to American Racial Segregation in Northern Ireland during the Second World War,” Historical Research 86, no. 234 (November 2013): 775. 10 Historian Graham Smith noted that the incident in Antrim was the “first casualty” in the civil war brewing among U.S. troops station in Northern Ireland. See Graham Smith, When Jim Crow Met John Bull (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 140. Fellow British historian Reynolds also lists the incident as the first of many in the U.K. See Reynolds, Rich Relations, 222. 11 “MORE AMERICAN TROOPS IN ULSTER,” Belfast News-Letter, May 19, 1942, 1. 12 “ARMOURED FORCE LANDED,” Belfast News-Letter, May 19, 1942, 1. 13 See “Visit to United States Naval Operations Base at Londonderry,” Belfast News- Letter, July 2, 1942; and “Baseball in Belfast,” Belfast News-Letter, July 27, 1942. 14 “American Forces in Northern Ireland, 1942,” report, CAB, RG 3a/46, PRONI, Belfast, Northern Ireland, U.K. 15 Ibid. 16 See, for example, Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here,” 6. 17 Welfare of Colonial People in the U.K.-Relations with American Forces in the U.K., letter dated June 24, 1942, Colonial Office (henceforth CO), RG 876/14, Public Records Office (henceforth PRO), Kew Gardens, U.K. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 J.L. Keith file note, June 30, 1942, Welfare of Colonial People in the U.K.-Relations with American Forces in the U.K., CO, RG 876/14, PRO. 21 J.L. Keith to Sir Charles Jeffries, July 30, 1942, CO, RG 876/14, PRO. 22 Ibid. 23 See Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here,” 152. 24 Keith file note, June 30, 1942, CO, RG 876/14, PRO. 25 T.E. St. Johnston to F. Newsam, July 22, 1942, Home Office (henceforth HO), RG 45/25604, PRO. 26 Concerns about making the British policy on race and race relations more widely known among the country’s leaders and officials were constant in the summer of 1942. Of similar concern: American autonomy, particularly when it came to dealing with misconduct among U.S. troops. These worries among American leaders prompted British officials to approve the 1942 Act and Defence Regulations, which permitted their Ally to handle all disciplinary matters involving troops—including incidents with British civilians—through U.S. military courts. One British official noted to Newsam that during a briefing among staff to explain the 1942 Act, questions were voiced about whether British officials had a formal position on the race issue. The author noted: “I explained that, as I understood it, the Home Office policy is that there shall be no discrimination based on colour, race or creed.” Further, the staff member urged Newsam to issue a formal government policy on the matter as soon as possible, so “that there can be no

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question of deviation from the general principle, if that be the Government policy, that we are not prepared either to impose or to assist in enforcing any regulation which discriminates on the basis of colour, race or creed between members of the American forces in this country.” See Note on “United States of America Visiting Forces. Coloured Troops,” to Mr. Newsam, August 7, 1942, HO, RG 45/25604, PRO. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. In his memoir, Truman K. Gibson Jr., who replaced William Hastie as a civilian aide to the War Department, noted that white American troops often “bristled at the absence of Jim Crow social norms and segregation in the British Isles.” See Truman K. Gibson Jr., with Steve Huntley, Knocking Down Barriers: My Fight for Black America (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 102. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Harry Haig, “Confidential: U.S.A. COLOURED TROOPS,” August 10, 1942, HO, RG 45/25604, PRO. 32 Ibid. Emphasis was in original text. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 The author does not identify himself, but initials appear on the lower right-hand corner of the document in ink: JMS, along with “Bristol, 12.viii.42.” “Note on Sir Harry Haig’s Memorandum,” August 12, 1942, HO, RG 45/25604, PRO. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. According to Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, an ell is an old textile industry form of measurement that roughly equals forty-five inches. See “ell,” Merriam- Webster Collegiate Dictionary, Eleventh edition. Accessed March 25, 2015 at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ell. 40 F. Newsam minutes notes, August 20, 1942, HO, RG 45/25604, PRO. 41 F. Newsam to General Eisenhower, August 31, 1942, HO, RG 45/25604, PRO. 42 Ibid. 43 John E. Dahlquist to Mr. F.A. Newsom, September 3, 1942, HO, RG 45/25604, PRO. 44 Ibid. 45 Fred A. Meyer, “Policy on Negroes,” July 16, 1942, Report of investigation of racial relations in U.K., RG 498/UD372, Series 291.1, box 1600, National Archives and Records Administration (henceforth NARA), College Park, Maryland. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 For a reprint of the original pamphlet, see Instructions for American Servicemen in Britain 1942 (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2012). The pamphlet is in the Bodleian Library.

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50 In his foreword to Instructions for American Servicemen in Britain 1942, a reproduction of the original U.S. War Department pamphlet, John Pinfold, a librarian at Rhodes House, University of Oxford, noted that the original text also “emphasises the British virtues of tolerance and fair play, shows Americans how to cope with everyday situations in the pub or on public transport (where for example blacks and whites might be sharing the same railway compartment, something outside the experience of many of those coming from the Deep South), and presents a picture of a people stoically coping with the problems caused by rationing or the blitz and quietly determined to see the war through to a victorious conclusion.” 51 Ibid., 14. 52 Ibid., 30. This line was both italicized and boldfaced in the original pamphlet. 53 “Command and Leadership of Colored Troops,” to Base Section Commanders, Com Z, undated, Benjamin O. Davis Papers (henceforth BODP), box 5, folder 1, U.S. Army Military History Institute (henceforth USAMHI), Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 “USE OF AXIS RADIO,” Office of Facts and Figures, report, March 23, 1942, box 26/ Race Tensions, Bureau of Intell, Memorande, Reports and Correspondence (2 of 2), January 1942-43, PNP, HSTL. 57 Ibid. According to wartime censorship historian, Michael S. Sweeney, President Roosevelt eventually divided the U.S. war information machine into three elements: a “voluntary domestic news censorship program,” a “mandatory censorship operation for news originating in the combat zones,” and a “global propaganda and publicity campaign” directed toward wartime morale (p. 65). Sweeney noted, however, that the bureaucracy created inherent conflicts between civilian and military officials as to what information was fair game and what should be censored. The ultimate result was that FDR was able to craft the wartime narrative. See Michael S. Sweeney, The Military and the Press: An Uneasy Truce (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2006), 65-66. 58 Michael S. Sweeney, Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War II (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 92. 59 Starr’s appointment was considered controversial because of his Southern roots and business dealings in the segregated South. See Lauren Rebecca Sklaroff, Black Culture and the New Deal: The Quest for Civil Rights in the Roosevelt Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 210. 60 Although Milton Starr’s report was undated, based on information contained in the document that referred to a May 1942 public opinion survey and recalled the March on Washington Movement “last summer” it is believed this report was submitted sometime during the summer of 1942. See “REPORT ON NEGRO MORALE,” written by Milton Starr, p. 1, box 20/Minorities-Negro-Negro Morale Report by Milton Star, Philleo Nash Papers (henceforth PNP), Harry S. Truman Library (henceforth HSTL), Independence, Missouri.

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61 Ibid. 62 “REPORT ON NEGRO MORALE,” 4. 63 Patrick S. Washburn, A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the Black Press during World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 67. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., 13. 66 Parker to Gransden, CAB, RG 9/CD/225/19, PRONI. 67 Ibid. 68 The use of parentheses was in the original text. See Topping, “Laying Down the Law,” 743. 69 See “Bulletins!,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 1, 1942, 1; “Bulletins!,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 7, 1942, 1; and “Bulletins!,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 8, 1942, 1. 70 Simon Topping, “‘The Dusky Doughboys’: Interaction Between African American Soldiers and the Population of Northern Ireland during the Second World War,” Journal of American Studies 47, no. 4 (2013): 1135. 71 The volunteer groups, led by Lady Gladys Stronge, were disbanded when the U.S. troops left for the North African Campaign in late 1942, but by October 1943 had been restarted as U.S. and Canadian troops started returning to Northern Ireland. See Topping, “Laying Down the Law,” 746-47. 72 “SPECIAL COMMITTEE MEETING,” undated, CAB, RG 9/CD/225/19, PRONI. 73 Ibid. 74 “WELFARE COMMITTEE,” September 10, 1942, CAB, RG 9/CD/225/19, PRONI. 75 Postal Censorship Report, December 6, 1942, Foreign Office (henceforth FO), RG 371/34123, Public Records Office (henceforth PRO), Kew Gardens, U.K. 76 Postal Censorship Report, November 14, 1942, FO, RG 371/34123, PRO. 77 Postal Censorship Report, February 8, 1943, FO, RG 371/34123, PRO. 78 Kathleen Rajan, interview by Pamela E. Walck, June 30, 2014. 79 Ibid. 80 “American File,” August 21, 1942, CAB, RG 9/CD/225/19, PRONI. 81 Secrets of Victory, 2. 82 Anthony Smith, The British Press Since the War (Totoaw, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1974), 109. 83 Mick Temple, The British Press (Maidenhead, Berkshire, England: Open University Press, 2008), 44. 84 Temple noted that the British government regularly went after publications that were vocal against the war. For example, it shut down the communist Daily Worker in January 1941, which was allowed to reopen in August 1942, only after the Soviet Union had joined the Allied forces. Ibid., 44-45. 85 “American File,” August 21, 1942, CAB, RG 9/CD/225/19, PRONI.. 86 See “Russians Advance Along West Bank of Don N.W. of Stalingrad,” and “BELFAST SHOOTING AFFAIR,” Belfast Telegraph, October 1, 1942, 3.

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87 “U.S. SOLDIER WAS KILLED: KNIFED IN RUMPUS,” Belfast Telegraph, October 1, 1942, 3. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 “AMERICAN SOLDIER KILLED IN ANTRIM STREET FRACAS,” Irish News, October 2, 1942, 1. 92 Ibid. 93 “U.S. SOLDIERS: One Killed in Brawl in Antrim,” Belfast News-Letter, October 2, 1942, 5. 94 Ibid. 95 See “When Patience is Wearing Thin,” Irish News, October 2, 1942, 2. 96 See “Eyes on Egypt,” Belfast Telegraph, October 2, 1942, 4. 97 “U.S. SOLDIER KILLED IN ANTRIM, The (London) Times, October 2, 1942, 2. 98 Ibid. 99 D. Davie-Distin, “COLOURED SOLDIERS,” The (London) Times, October 2, 1942, 3. 100 Ibid. 101 “U.S. SOLDIER KILLED IN BRAWL IN IRELAND,” The New York Times, October 2, 1942, 3. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 “Yank Killed in Ireland,” The Washington Post, October 2, 1942, 4. All stories in The Washington Post were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 105 Ibid. 106 “Yankee Soldier Dies in Irish Brawl,” Detroit Free Press, October 1, 1942, 2. 107 Ibid. 108 See “BRITON SAYS TEEN AGE GIRLS ‘THROW SELVES’ AT OVERSEAS TROOPS,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 3, 1942, 7. All stories in the Chicago Daily Tribune were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 109 “Identify Soldier Killed in Ireland as Indiana Negro,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 8, 1942, 19. 110 Just prior to the outbreak of WWII, the Courier and Defender joined founding newspaper member, The (Baltimore) Afro-American, in subscribing to the ANP wire services. See Lawrence D. Hogan, A Black National News Service: The Associated Negro Press and Claude Barnett, 1919-1945 (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1984), 57. 111 “SOLDIER KILLED IN IRELAND,” Pittsburgh Courier, October 10, 1942, 21. All stories in the Pittsburgh Courier were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 112 “U.S. SOLDIER KILLED IN BRAWL IN IRELAND.” 113 “SOLDIER KILLED IN IRELAND.” There was significant debate among editors of the black press in the United States in terms of how to identify race, particularly in the

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1930s and 1940s. In his memoir, Enoch P. Waters recalled the great debate in the Defender newsroom over which adjective to use. He noted: “One of the vexing and persistent questions editors had to face in those days what that of racial identification. [Robert S.] Abbott didn’t like the words ‘Negro’, ‘Colored’, ‘black’, or ‘Afro American’. He tried to force the adoption of ‘The Race’ as a capitalized adjective as in Race man or Race woman. . . . Even though other Negro publishers held Abbott in high esteem, not one was persuaded to use, ‘the Race’, either capitalized or lower cased” (p. 222). Waters added that while the term Negro was most commonly used among both black and mainstream newspapers (although he notes that The New York Times did not start capitalizing Negro until the late 1930s or early 1940s), use of the term was not “unanimous.” The publisher of The (Baltimore) Afro American preferred Afro-American, while other publications, such as the Courier, used colored. Eventually, the Defender editors returned to using the term Negro rather than the Race. See Enoch P. Waters, American Diary: A Personal History of the Black Press (Chicago: Path Press Inc, 1987), 222. 114 “SOLDIER SLAIN DURING KNIFE FIGHT IN EIRE,” The Chicago Defender, October 10, 1942, 2. All stories in The Chicago Defender were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 115 Ibid. 116 “Soldier Dies of Knifing in Ireland,” The Chicago Defender, October 17, 1942, 12. 117 Ibid. The parenthetical “tavern” was used in the original text by newspaper editors to help readers unfamiliar with the English term “pub.” 118 Ibid. 119 “Identify Soldier Slain in Fight in Ireland,” The (Baltimore) Afro American, October 17, 1942, 3. All stories in The (Baltimore) Afro American were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 120 See “Negro General in England,” The (Baltimore) Sun, September 29, 1942, 8; “Only Negro General Arrives in Britain,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 29, 1942, 3; General B.O. Davis on Duty in Europe,” The Afro American, October 3, 1942, 1; and “Gen. Davis Overseas With Troops,” The Chicago Defender, October 3, 1942, 1. All stories in The (Baltimore) Sun were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 121 Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis to Sadie Davis, September 30, 1942, BODP, box 8, folder 13, USAMHI. 122 Marvin E. Fletcher, America’s First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis Sr., 1880- 1970 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 102-03. 123 Topping, “Laying Down the Law,” 749. 124 Smith, 153. 125 Fletcher, 95-97. 126 Ibid., 103. 127 Miss M. Lyall to Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, October 25, 1942, BODP, box 3, folder 7, USAMHI. 128 Ibid.

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129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 Gardiner, 111-13. 132 Extract from Army Mail Censorship Report, No. 57, December 11-31, 1942, FO, RG 371/34123, PRO. 133 Neil A. Wynn, The African American Experience during World War II (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2010), 29. 134 “Command and Leadership of Colored Troops,” to Base Section Commanders, Com Z, undated, BODP, box 5, folder 1, USAMHI. 135 Ibid. 136 President Harry S. Truman would take steps toward forging societal changes through the military when he signed Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the Armed Forces in 1948. It would take, however, two more decades before American society would follow with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson. See “Executive Order 9981,” HSTL. Accessed online March 15, 2015, at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/9981.htm; and “Civil Rights Act of 1964,” NARA. Accessed online March 30, 2015, at http://research.archives.gov/description/299891. 137 George Padmore, “Race Problem Cause of Great Concern in Britain, Padmore Says in Dispatch,” The Chicago Defender, October 3, 1942, 1. 138 Ibid., 2.

Chapter 2: Casting blame: The black press becomes a target following riots in Detroit and Harlem 1 J. Edgar Hoover, “WARNING” memorandum, undated, Philleo Nash Papers (henceforth PNP), box 5/Office of Strategic Services, May-August 1943, Harry S. Truman Library (henceforth HSTL), Independence, Missouri. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 “Current Inter-Racial Tensions,” June 21, 1943, PNP, box 27/Race Tension-Jonathan Daniels Files, HSTL. 6 Dominic J. Capeci Jr., The Harlem Riot of 1943 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), 68. 7 Ibid., 69. 8 Robert Shogan and Tom Craig, The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in Violence (Philadelphia: Chilton Books Publishers, 1964), 89. For a detailed narrative of the incident, also see Dominic J. Capeci Jr. and Martha Wilkerson, Layered Violence: The Detroit Rioters of 1943 (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), 3- 86; Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, Race Riot: Detroit, 1943 (New York: Octagon Books Inc., 1968), 20-48; and Capeci, The Harlem Riot of 1943, 34-97. 9 Laurie F. Leach, “Margie Polite, the Riot Starter: Harlem, 1943,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 40, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 25-48. 10 The Harlem Riot of 1943, 102.

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11 Ibid., 68. 12 Throughout 1942, the U.S. Army and the Justice Department, among other U.S. government agencies, began to target the American black press for news articles they considered seditious in nature because of content that often criticized the U.S. government for its inequitable policies and practices. Investigations were launched against a wide range of African American-owned publications, including the New Negro World, the Pittsburgh Courier, and the Chicago Defender. See Patrick S. Washburn, A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the Black Press during World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 98-135. 13 “Current Inter-Racial Tensions,” 1. 14 Ibid., 2. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 In his theory of identification or “Other,” Roland Barthes argued that “The petit- bourgeois is a man unable to imagine Other. If he comes face to face with him, he blinds himself, ignores and denies him, or else transforms him into himself” (p. 101). According to Barthes, otherness threatens social hegemony, prompting majorities to reduce Other to sameness. See Roland Barthes, “(i) Operation Margarine; (ii) Myth Today,” in Media and Cultural Studies: KeyWorks, ed. Meenakski Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, (Victoria, Australia: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 99-106. Dick Hebdige expanded on Barthes theory of identification by observing that there are two basic strategies that the majority have developed to deal with the threat of otherness. He wrote: “First, the Other can be trivialized, naturalized, domesticated” or “transformed into meaningless exoctia” (p. 157). See Dick Hebdige, “(i) From Culture to Hegemony; (ii) Subculture: The Unnatural Break,” in Media and Cultural Studies: KeyWorks, ed. Meenakski Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, (Victoria, Australia: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 144- 62. In the context of WWII, otherness—such as Mexican American youth dressed in zoot suits or African Americans disgruntled by social inequalities—became points of struggle within American society because each social group threatened the status quo. Propaganda often sought to ignore or simply deny Other his place in society, which only increased the frustrations among these particular ethnic groups to the point of violence. 19 “The ‘Zoot Suit Riots’ Reveal the Race Tensions on the West Coast, 1943,” in Major Problems in the History of World War II, eds. Mark A. Stoler and Melanie S. Gustafson, (Boston: Wadsworth, 2003), 222. 20 Ibid. 21 In 1943, Newsweek described the zoot suit as “bizarre details of drape, pleat, and cuff” that “outdazzled” African-Americans relocating to Southern California from Harlem. For the young Mexican-American men wearing these suits, their distinctive style of dress quickly became a target of violence among U.S. service members, who would roam the streets of Los Angeles looking for anyone in the baggy suits and attack them. See “Zoot Suits and Service Stripes: Race Tensions Behind the Riots,” Newsweek, June 21, 1943, pp. 35-40.

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22 Major Problems in the History of World War II, 223. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 224. 25 Benjamin D. Singer, Richard W. Osborn and James A. Geschwender, Black Rioters: Studies in Social and Economic Process (Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath Lexington Books, 1970), 14. 26 Ibid. 27 “BEWARE RUMORS!,” Chicago Defender, June 26, 1943, 1. All stories in Chicago Defender were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 “DETROIT DEATH TOLL REACHES 15 IN CLASHES,” Chicago Defender, June 26, 1943, 1. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 4. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 “STOP WORK AT RUBBER PLANT TO STAVE OFF RACE INCIDENTS,” Chicago Defender, June 26, 1943, 4. 36 “CURFEW LAW HITS SILSBEE AS RACIAL CLASH LOOMS,” Chicago Defender, June 26, 1943, 4. 37 “Leaders Ask FDR to Quell Riot Disorders,” Chicago Defender, June 26, 1943, 3. 38 “Ask FDR to Make radio Appeal Against Violence,” Chicago Defender, June 26, 1943, 3. 39 “AMERICA’S ‘SOFT UNDER-BELLY’,” Chicago Defender, June 26, 1943, 14. A “Coughlinite was a term used to describe a follower of Father Charles Coughlin. A Roman Catholic priest and a powerful political force in the U.S., Coughlin published Social Justice, an “anti-Soviet, anti-British, and anti-Semitic magazine” that stopped publication in April 1942, after the Office of Censorship arranged for the archbishop of Detroit to urge him to either “give up the priesthood or his platform in the mass media.” See Michael S. Sweeney, Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War II (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 76-78. 40 Ibid. 41 Walter Atkins, “Detroit Starts Rebuilding After Worst Race Riot,” Chicago Defender, July 3, 1943, 1. 42 Ibid. The Black Legion was a splinter group from the original Ku Klux Klan, founded by William Shepard in east central Ohio. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., 4. 45 “Mayor Jeffries Blasted for Weakness in Riot,” Chicago Defender, July 3, 1943, 6. 46 “Detroit Seeks to Return to Normalcy After Riot,” Chicago Defender, July 3, 1943, 7. 47 Ibid.

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48 “BLAST DETROIT MAYOR IN COP WHITEWASH,” Chicago Defender, July 10, 1943, 1. 49 See “Randolph Blames Roosevelt for U.S. Wave of Rioting,” Chicago Defender, July 10, 1943, 1; “Urban League Blames Housing in Detroit Riot,” Chicago Defender, July 10, 1943, 6; J.J. Johnson, “Detroit Police Blasted for Riots,” Chicago Defender, July 10, 1943, 14; and Private Conrad Clark, “Feels Riots Will Unite All Americans,” Chicago Defender, July 10, 1943, 14. 50 Tony Jackson, “Who’s He Kidding?,” Chicago Defender, July 17, 1943, 14. 51 John R. Williams, “RACE RIOTS SWEEP NATION,” Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943, 1. All stories in the Pittsburgh Courier were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. Although William Randolph Hearst started his newspaper career as a young man with liberal ideals, as he got older, he grew more conservative, while still enjoying the same yellow journalism approach to news that he had perfected in the 1880s at the New York Journal. Having built a newspaper empire, publications in his newspaper chain used similar approaches, which could explain why it was a Hearst newspaper that was suspected of fanning the flames of race in Detroit. 55 Ibid. 56 William G. Nunn, “RIOT MUST BE PROBED,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943, 1. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., all-caps for added emphasis appeared in the original newspaper text. 60 Ibid., use of ellipses is original to Nunn’s published report. 61 Randy Dixon, “U.S. Soldiers Overseas Condemn Conditions Causing Recent Riots,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943, 1. It should be noted that while Coughlin was an American fascist, and so were the Silver Shirts, but contrary to Dixon’s report, Coughlin was not a Silver Shirt. The Silver Shirts were headed by William Dudley Pelley. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 “Detroit Disorders Hailed by Nazi Radio; Japanese Get Busy, Too!,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943, 1. 65 Ibid. 66 “NEWS COMMENTATORS DECRY DETROIT RIOTS,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943, 5. 67 “It Took a Race Riot in Detroit to Make Mr. Martin Dies Talk,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943, 5. 68 “Disgraceful but Inevitable,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943, 6. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 “‘WHITEWASH’ OF POLICE DURING RIOT IS SCORED,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 10, 1943, 1.

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72 See “DETROIT LEADERS DRAW UP ANTI-RIOT STRATEGY,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 10, 1943, 5; and “DETROIT RIOT COST 1,000,000 MAN HOURS,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 10, 1943, 5. 73 “Of All People!,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 10, 1943, 6. 74 Ibid. 75 T. John Wood, “Detroit Riot Toll 25,” The (Baltimore) Afro American, June 26, 1943, 1. All stories in The (Baltimore) Afro American were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., 24. 79 “This Is Detroit’s Race Riot at Its Height,” The Afro American, June 26, 1943, 1. 80 Ibid. 81 “Detroit Dead: 25—Here’s How Terror Raged 36 Hrs.,” The Afro American, June 26, 1943, 24. 82 “Nazis Gloat over Riots,” The Afro American, June 26, 1943, 2. 83 “A Nation Divided,” The Afro American, June 26, 1943, 4. 84 Ibid. 85 “The Lesson of Beaumont, Texas,” The Afro American, June 26, 1943, 4. 86 M.S. Lewis, “Police Kill 20 of 27 Detroit Riot Victims,” The Afro American, July 3, 1943, 1. 87 Ibid., 9. 88 “Exception to the Rule,” The Afro American, July 3, 1943, 9. 89 “Race Conflicts Blamed on Lax U.S. Policies,” The Afro American, July 3, 1943, 9. 90 “Can’t Blame Ku Klux Klan,” The Afro American, July 3, 1943, 9. 91 “ONLY GOVERNMENT CAN END RIOTS,” The Afro American, July 3, 1943, 4. 92 “TIME TO DO SOMETHING BESIDES ROLL UP YOUR SLEEVES,” The Afro American, July 3, 1943, 4. 93 “STRIKE CRIPPLES WILLOW RUN,” Detroit Free Press, June 21, 1943, 1. 94 “Call 50 Police to Bridge Riot,” Detroit Free Press, June 21, 1943, 1. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 “MARTIAL LAW AT 10 P.M., U.S. TROOPS MOVE IN,” Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1943, 1. 98 “11 Dead, 500 Hurt; Rioting Goes On,” Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1943, 1. 99 “Mobs Rove the City to Stir Trouble,” Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1943, 1. 100 “Riot Foes Fraternize at Hospital,” Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1943, 1. 101 James S. Pooler, “3 Years of Strife Behind Disorders,” Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1943, 1. 102 Ibid. 103 See “Lists of the Injured in Detroit race Riots,” Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1943, 7. 104 “Cars Overturned and Burned, Negroes Beaten by Rioting Crowd on Woodward,” Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1943, 13.

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105 “Victims Jam Receiving Hospital as Rioting Mob Sweeps Negroes Off Woodward,” Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1943, 20. 106 “KELLY RELAXES MARTIAL LAW,” Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1943, 1. 107 Ibid. 108 “Troops and Police Move to Forestall Renewal of Sniping,” Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1943, 1. 109 “Thomas Asks 8 Steps to Put an End to Riots,” Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1943, 1. 110 “Linking of Southerners to Detroit Riot Protested,” Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1943, 1. 111 Ibid. 112 Hub M. George, “Mayor Asks All Citizens to Get Back to Routine,” Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1943, 11. 113 “Debate Plan to Keep Boys off Streets,” Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1943, 11. 114 “And Race Riots,” Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1943, 6. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Frank B. Woodford, “Kelly Moves to Fix Blame in Race Rioting,” Detroit Free Press, June 24, 1943, 1. 119 See “Two Deaths Raise Riot Toll to 31,” Detroit Free Press, June 24, 1943, 1; “Courts Work Feverishly to Handle Riot Cases,” Detroit Free Press, June 24, 1943, 1; and Lyford Moore, “TROOPS FOIL GRADUATION RIOT,” Detroit Free Press, June 24, 1943, 1. 120 Moore, 1. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 See Daniel L. Wells, “Ford Strike Is Ended; All to Return to Jobs,” Detroit Free Press, June 25, 1943, 1; and Lynn Heinzerling, “ALLIES POUND INVASION WALL,” Detroit Free Press, June 25, 1943, 1. 124 See Frank B. Woodford, “Riot Grand Jury Now Appears Sure,” Detroit Free Press, June 25, 1943, 1; and “Civic Group Plans Racial Harmony,” Detroit Free Press, June 25, 1943, 1. 125 “Governors End Conferences in Jeeps – Taverns and Belle Isle Bridge Reopened,” Detroit Free Press, June 25, 1943, 28. 126 It should be noted that Baltimore was not among the sixteen U.S. cities listed as places with racial tensions during the week of June 21, 1943, which might have helped account for the editorial decision to delay publication of the events in Detroit, although nearby Washington, D.C., was on the list. According to the federal report, the Washington Committee on the Employment of Negroes in Public Utilities had organized what it called a “Capital Transit Week” in preparation for Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) hearings on Capitol Hill. The committee was established by an executive order issued by President Roosevelt in 1941. Rallies and picketing were included in the planned activities. The report noted: “A mass-meeting and rally was organized and advertised in

234 the Negro Press, but not in the White press.” Soon rumors circulated in town that a riot was planned for that Friday night, but “Thanks to skillful police handling and prompt action in declaring the area out of bounds for service men, the rally was peaceful; and no unusual violence occurred anywhere in the city.” See page 8, “Current Inter-Racial Tensions,” June 21, 1943, PNP, box 27/Race Tension-Jonathan Daniels Files, HSTL. 127 “Troops Curb Detroit Riots, 23 Are Dead,” The Washington Post, June 22, 1943, 1. All stories in The Washington Post were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 128 “ARMY RULES DETROIT; 23 DIE,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 22, 1943, 1. All stories in the Chicago Daily Tribune were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 129 “Dragged from Detroit Street Car,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 22, 1943, 2. 130 “23 KILLED; U.S. ARMY RULES DETROIT,” The Boston Daily Globe, June 22, 1943, 1. All stories in The Boston Daily Globe were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 131 Ibid. 132 “Army Called to Detroit Race Riots,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 22, 1943, 1. 133 Ibid., 2. 134 “ARMY CALLED IN DETRIOT RIOTS,” San Francisco Examiner, June 22, 1943, 1. 135 Ibid. 136 “Street Battles Flare in Race Riots,” San Francisco Examiner, June 22, 1943, 9. 137 “TROOPS ROUT MOBS IN DETROIT RIOTS,” Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1943, 1. All stories in Los Angeles Times were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid., A. 140 “Several Killed and Hundreds Injured in Detroit Rioting,” Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1943, B. 141 George Fielding Eliot, “Strikes and Riots in U.S. May Be Nazi Inspired, Eliot Says,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Wednesday, June 23, 1943, 2. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 See “Axis Points to Detroit Riots as Evidence of U.S. Distress,” The Washington Post, June 25, 1943, 9; “Longtime Detroiters Blamed for Race Riot Which Cost 34 Lives,” The Boston Sunday Globe, June 27, 1943, 12; “Negro Councilman Warns Mayor of the Dangers of Race Riots Here,” The New York Times, June 25, 1943, 8; “Racial Conflict Unlikely Here,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 29, 1943, 22. All stories in The New York Times were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 146 “TRAGEDY IN DETROIT,” The New York Times, June 22, 1943, 18. 147 Ibid. 148 “Detroit Tragedy,” The Washington Post, June 23, 1943, 8.

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149 Ibid. 150 “Prompt Action Restores Order in Detroit Riots,” Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1943, 4. 151 Ibid. 152 “Internal Stresses,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 24, 1943, 8. 153 “Symptoms of War Tensions in Detroit," The (Baltimore) Sun, June 23, 1943, 12. All stories in The (Baltimore) Sun were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 154 Paul Patterson, “London Gets Detroit Riot News by Slipup,” The Sun, June 25, 1943, 1. 155 See “MARTIAL LAW IN DETROIT,” Irish News, June 22, 1943, 1; and “RACIAL RIOTS,” Belfast News-Letter, June 22, 1943, 2. 156 Ibid. 157 “RACIAL RIOTS IN DETROIT,” Lancashire Daily Post, June 22, 1943, 1. 158 “Troops Suppress Racial Rioting,” Bristol Evening Post, June 22, 1943, 4; also see “23 DEAD IN DETROIT RIOTING,” Bristol Evening World, June 22, 1943, 3. 159 “RACIAL RIOTS: RENEWAL FEAR,” Lancashire Daily Post, June 23, 1943, 1. 160 Ibid. 161 John Leonard, “RIOTS AND STRIKES CAUSE CRISIS IN U.S.,” Irish News, June 23, 1943, 1. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 C.V.R. Thompson, “A CITY HEARD A RUMOUR: And 28 died,” Daily Express, June 23, 1943, 1. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid., 4. 169 Ibid. 170 Don Iddon, “Troops Out in Detroit: Army Ends Riots,” Daily Mail, June 23, 1943, 1. 171 Don Iddon, “AMERICAN UNREST,” Daily Mail, June 24, 1943, 2. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 “6 DEAD IN HARLEM RIOT,” Chicago Defender, August 7, 1943, 1. 176 Billy Rowe, “6 DEAD IN HARLEM RIOTING,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 7, 1943, 1. 177 Melvin Johnson, “False Report That Soldier was Killed Leads to Outburst,” The Afro American, August 7, 1943, 1. 178 “Harlem 2-Day Riot Ends, 6005 Police Patrol Area,” The Afro American, August 7, 1943, 1. 179 Rowe, 1. It should be noted that the heavy use of ellipses is original to the initial report.

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180 Ibid., 4. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid. 183 Johnson, 2. 184 Ibid. 185 6 DEAD IN HARLEM RIOT,” 1. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 See “GRADUATION DAY AT TUSKEKEE AIR FIELD,” Chicago Defender, August 7, 1943, 1. 190 “THE RIOT PHOTOS,” Chicago Defender, August 7, 1943, 1. 191 Ibid. 192 “Hotheads in Harlem,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 14, 1943, 1. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid., 4. 195 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the Pittsburgh Courier’s scathing front page editorial against the Harlem “hoodlums” appeared at the bottom of the broadsheet, just above the two-column “Your Public Conduct” tip of the week: “Overcrowding wartime transportation is nerve-wracking and leads to unpleasantness.” By late summer 1943, these etiquette tips to readers had begun appearing weekly on the front page of the Courier. See “Your Public Conduct,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 14, 1943, 1. 196 “Peace Settles Over Harlem as Leaders Seek Solution to Rioting,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 14, 1943, 1. 197 “Harlem Riot Censored,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 14, 1943, 1. 198 Carl Murphy, “The Week,” The Afro American, August 14, 1943, 2. 199 “Critical Home Front Period,” The Afro American, August 14, 1943, 4. 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. 203 “THE HARLEM INCIDENT,” Chicago Defender, August 14, 1943, 14. 204 Ibid. 205 See “BIG RUMANIAN OIL FIELD BOMBED BY 175 U.S. PLANES IN LONG FLIGHT; BADOGLIO PACIFIES NORTH ITALY,” The New York Times, August 2, 1943, 1; and George Axelson, “Berlin Evacuation Ordered; Hamburg’s Fate Stirs Fears,” The New York Times, August 2, 1943, 1. 206 “HARLEM DISORDERS BRING QUICK ACTION BY CITY AND ARMY,” The New York Times, August 2, 1943, 1. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid. 209 “HARLEM IS ORDERLY WITH HEAVY GUARD READY FOR TROUBLE,” The New York Times, August 3, 1943, 1. 210 Ibid.

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211 “HARLEM AFTER A NIGHT OF RIOTING: IT BROUGH DEATH, DESTRUCTION AND LOOTING,” The New York Times, August 3, 1943, 10. 212 “MAYOR IN COMMAND OF HARLEM FORCES,” The New York Times, August 3, 1943, 9. 213 “RACE BIAS DENIED AS RIOTING FACTOR,” The New York Times, August 3, 1943, 11. 214 Ibid. 215 “HARLEM’S TRAGEDY,” The New York Times, August 3, 1943, 13. 216 Ibid. 217 In an editorial appearing that same day, Free Press editors questioned what would drive five individuals—one African American, four white—into blind rages that would lead to murder. The editorial called for a grand jury investigation to get to the bottom of these two particular cases, and urged civic organizations to continue their task of guiding the community toward better interracial relations. See “FIVE RACE RIOTERS,” Detroit Free Press, August 2, 1943, 4. 218 “Harlem Fight Brings Police,” Detroit Free Press, August 2, 1943, 1. 219 “Lights on in Harlem after Riot,” Detroit Free Press, August 3, 1943, 18. 220 Ibid. 221 See “New York’s Harlem Scene of All-Night Battle between Negroes and Police,” Detroit Free Press, August 3, 1943, 26. 222 “Life in Harlem Nearly Normal,” Detroit Free Press, August 4, 1943, 1. 223 For Baltimore’s initial news coverage, see “Shooting of Negro Soldier Stirs Trouble in Harlem,” The Sun, August 2, 1943, 9. A follow-up AP story appeared the next day as well, see “HARLEM QUIET UNDER GUARD,” The Sun, August 3, 1943, 7. 224 “Harlem Guarded after Wounding of Soldier,” Boston Daily Globe, August 2, 1943, 9. 225 “Guard of 6000 Police, Curfew Regulations Bring Peace to Harlem,” Boston Daily Globe, August 3, 1943, 1. 226 Ibid., 13. 227 See “U.S. Liberator Bombers Blast at Jap-Held Wake Island,” Los Angeles Times, August 3, 1943, B. 228 “First Lady Asks for Calm Action,” Los Angeles Times, August 3, 1943, 2. 229 See “Harlem Riots Take 5 Lives, Last 16 Hours,” The Washington Post, August 3, 1943, 7; “Harlem Riot Toll Five Dead, 534 Injured,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 3, 1943, 5; “CURFEW IMPOSED IN HARLEM AFTER FIVE DIE IN RIOTS,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 3, 1943, 11; and “5 KILLED, 543 HURT, 500 HELD IN HARLEM RIOT,” San Francisco Examiner, August 3, 1943, 3. 230 See “Fatal Rioting in Harlem,” San Francisco Examiner, August 3, 1943, 16. 231 “Harlem,” Boston Daily Globe, August 3, 1943, 11. 232 Ibid. 233 “Riots in Harlem,” The Washington Post, August 4, 1943, 10. 234 “London Finally Hears of Riot,” The New York Times, August 5, 1943, 28. 235 “‘Secret’ riot in New York,” Daily Express, August 5, 1943, 1.

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236 Newell Rogers, “MILLION-POUND RIOT KEPT SECRET,” Daily Express, August 5, 1943, 3. 237 Ibid. 238 Ibid. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid. 241 “NEGRO RIOTS IN NEW YORK,” The Times, August 5, 1943, 4. 242 Don Iddon, “Harlem Gangs Beat up Police, Pillage Shops in Night Riots,” The Daily Mail, August 5, 1943, 3. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid. 245 See “FIVE KILLED DURING HARLEM RIOTS,” Belfast News-Letter, August 5, 1943, 2; “5 KILLED, 500 INJURED IN HARLEM RIOTS,” Irish News, August 5, 1943, 4; and “FALSE REPORT STARTED HARLEM RIOT,” The Western Daily Press, August 5, 1943, 1. 246 Ibid. 247 The black press was not alone in its questioning of white authority. Even as calm was returning to Detroit, civil rights organizations, led by the NAACP, were turning to Detroit to better understand the conditions that led to such destruction of life and property. The driving question: Could this happen again somewhere else in the United States? What could be done to prevent it from happening again in Detroit or in any other American city? Among those investigating the riots was Thurgood Marshall, special counsel for the NAACP. On July 10, 1943, Marshall presented his report and list of recommendations to Charles Mahoney, a representative for Governor Kelly, noting that in addition to wild rumor—“many of the leads have turned out to be false”—the actions of the police and law enforcement officials inflamed rather than helped the conditions in Detroit. In his report, Marshall noted that the NAACP’s national office opened an emergency office in Detroit and conducted an independent investigation of the riots that ran from June 24, 1943, to July 9, 1943. Rumors were chased down, individuals interviewed under affidavit and formal recommendations made to the governor with much of the focus on problems within the Detroit police department and the Michigan State Troops. Among Marshall’s list of recommendations to the state was to increase the number of African American officers in both the state militia and state police; launch departmental investigations into the actions of individual officers who had been involved in instances where African Americans were either severely injured or killed; and urged Governor Kelly to use his influence to request a grand jury investigation into the activities of members of the Detroit police department during the riots. Although Marshall’s committee published a brochure on their findings, it appears that the recommendations gained little traction among white leaders. According to the Chicago Defender the brochure, entitled “What Caused the Detroit Riots?” was available to the general public the second week of August. See Thurgood Marshall, special counsel of the NAACP to Honorable Charles Mahoney, representative of Governor Kelly, July 10, 1943, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, group II, box B 57, folder 6, Legal file, Detroit

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Riot/Affidavits, reports, other, 1943, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; and “NAACP Pamphlet on Detroit Riots Ready,” Chicago Defender, August 14, 1943, 13. 248 Nunn, 8. 249 Mr. Nichols, Ministry of Information, to Mr. Malcolm, AM 64, February 14, 1944, “THE NEGRO PRESS,” page 1, Foreign Office, Record Group 371/38653, Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom. 250 Ibid., 3. 251 Ibid., 4. 252 See Patrick S. Washburn, A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the Black Press during World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 98-135. 253 Perhaps one of the most outspoken writers in the black press on the subject of anti- colonialism was George Padmore. The Trinidad-born writer was based in London during WWII—publishing for both the Defender and the Courier—frequently took English officials to task for discriminatory policies toward non-white natives across the empire. See Patrick S. Washburn, “George Padmore of the Pittsburgh Courier and the Chicago Defender: A Decidedly Different World War II Correspondent,” in War, Journalism and History: War Correspondents in the Two World Wars, eds. Yvonne T. McEwen and Fiona A. Fisken (New York: Peter Lang, 2012), 112-13. 254 Perhaps where the Defender and the Courier went separate ways was in terms of commentary on how African Americans behaved in society and were perceived as a race. For the Courier, it was not just the backward whites who were to blame for outbursts, but also hotheaded African Americans who acted improperly in public. In an effort to battle this, Courier editors started running etiquette tips, for the lack of a better term, for readers each week. For example, on July 3, 1943, just under the story about the Detroit race riots, editors offered this gem: “Let’s help race relations by better conduct on street cars. Subdued conversation and decent manners denote good breeding.” A month later, on the same front page as news of the Harlem riots, the Courier reminded readers: “It is tragic but true, the whole race is judged by the misconduct of a few.” The public conduct tip went on to urge readers to be goodwill ambassadors on behalf of the race. It is impossible to know how or if these tips were read, or adhered to by Courier readers, but these public conduct tips continued throughout the turbulent year of 1943. See “Your Public Conduct,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943, 1; and “Your Public Conduct,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 7, 1943, 1. 255 “The Destiny of America,” Chicago Defender, July 10, 1943, 14. 256 “Police Laxity,” Detroit Free Press, June 26, 1943, 6. 257 Ibid. 258 Iddon, “AMERICAN UNREST.” 259 For more details on this period of press censorship during WWII, see Sweeney, Secrets of Victory, 88-91. 260 See Sharon Dunwoody, “Science Writers at Work,” in Social Meanings of News, ed. Dan Berkowitz, (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Inc., 1997): 155-71.

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Chapter 3: A Riot ‘Never Out of Control’: How the Press Reported A Night of Terror and How Bamber Bridge Remains in British Collective Memory 1 Ken Werrell, “The Mutiny at Bamber Bridge,” After the Battle, 22 (1978): 1-11. 2 See Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2004), 51. 3 Paul Patterson, “London Gets Detroit Riot News by Slipup,” The (Baltimore, Maryland) Sun, June 25, 1943. All stories in The (Baltimore) Sun were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 4 See Juliet Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here”: The American GI in World War II Britain (New York: Canopy Books, 1992), 152-58; David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945 (New York: Random House, 1995), 302-6; and Graham Smith, When Jim Crow Met John Bull: Black American Soldiers in World War II Britain (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 118. 5 See “POLICE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS,” Belfast Telegraph, June 26, 1943, 3; “FIGHT IN STREET,” News of the World, June 27, 1943, 2; “Six Yanks Hurt as Troops, Army Police Clash in England,” The Washington Post, June 26, 1943, 2; and “MPs Battle Race Soldiers in Britain,” The Chicago Defender, July 3, 1943, 3. All stories in The Washington Post and Chicago Defender were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 6 Smith alleges that less than ninety-six hours after friction in Detroit began, “black Americans commandeers weapons and trucks from their quarters in Bamber Bridge in Lancashire, smashed through the gates and drove into town determined to open fire on all military vehicles and military police.” See Graham, When Jim Crow Met John Bull, 412. 7 “NORTH-WEST CAMP INCIDENTS,” The Lancashire Daily Post, June 25, 1943, 4. 8 Ibid. 9 Walter Lippmann famously noted that media create images in the minds of the public that, in turn inform them of the world around them. His argument was that not only do media emphasize one story over another, but also the space and priority they lend any given subject signifies to the masses what is important and what is not. See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), 7. 10 British historians, such as Reynolds and Gardiner, noted that Americans were widely viewed as being “overpaid, oversexed, and over here.” Often, the disparities between British soldiers and their American counterparts—particularly in terms of pay—led to friction and even fisticuffs. Similarly, the equality experienced by African Americans in Great Britain often prompted fights with white U.S. troops. See Reynolds, Rich Relations, 184; and Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here,” 155-56. 11 Werrell goes into extensive details about the incident in “The Mutiny at Bamber Bridge,” 1-11. 12 The idea of members of the British public coming to the defense of African American troops was not uncommon during the war years. Gardiner noted, “Many British people were genuinely disturbed by the treatment they saw meted out to the blacks by their white compatriots. They responded at a human level to their humiliation, and some also felt that such prejudice sat ill in a war being fought to destroy Nazism and its racial attitudes.” In

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her interviews with WWII-era residents, she found many a Brit concerned about everything from the terrible name-calling they overheard from the white Americans toward African Americans to the white troops insisting on instituting a “colour bar” during their time in the U.K. Often, she noted, publicans would respond with signs declaring their pubs off limits to white Americans. See Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here,” 152-54. Similarly, Smith noted that all too often a Briton would find him or herself “drawn into disputes between black and white Americans by being in a pub or restaurant at the wrong time.” See Graham, When Jim Crow Met John Bull, 180. In Bristol, a year later, the local press wrote about a married British woman who was fined a pound for attacking a white U.S. military policeman who was attempting to arrest an African American soldier on leave from his post. See “At BRANDON HILL,” Bristol Evening Post, July 13, 1944, 4. 13 Rosie Swarbrick, “Everyone Supported the Black Troops and the Whole Thing escalated,” Leyland Evening Post, June 24, 2014, 15. 14 Werrell, “The Mutiny at Bamber Bridge,” 2. 15 Ibid., 4. 16 Ibid., 4-8. 17 “NORTH-WEST CAMP INCIDENTS,” The Lancashire Daily Post, 4. 18 Editorial, The Chorley Guardian, June 25, 1943, 4. 19 Ibid. 20 Lancashire’s Chief Constable A.F. Hordern noted, in a letter to the Home Ministry’s Inspector of Constabulary that it would be unwise to send female police officers to American military camps in the region to deal with loitering British women for fear it would only create “disturbances.” A.F. Hordern to Major General Sir L.W. Atcherley, August 8, 1942, Home Office (HO), Record Group (RG) 45/25604, Public Records Office (PRO), Kew Gardens, United Kingdom. 21 “FIGHT IN NORTH-WEST TOWN,” The Lancashire Daily Post, June 26, 1943, 4. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 “Negro Soldiers in Street Fight,” Daily Express, June 26, 1943, 3. 25 Ibid. 26 “POLICE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS,” Belfast Telegraph, June 26, 1943, 3. 27 Ibid. 28 “NEGRO SOLDIERS AND MILITARY POLICE CLASH,” Irish News, June 26, 1943, 1. 29 Ibid. 30 “FIGHT IN THE STREETS,” News of the World, June 27, 1943, 3. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 “Negro in Riot Dies,” The Daily Mail, June 30, 1943, 3. 34 Ibid. 35 “Yanks Brawl; 6 are Injured,” Detroit Free Press, July 26, 1943, 1. 36 Ibid.

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37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 “U.S. Troops in England Riot,” San Francisco Examiner, June 26, 1943, 5. 40 Unlike the other U.S. newspaper reports, the Examiner’s headlines reported only five injured, despite the news story stating that five enlisted men and one officer were injured. This discrepancy could be a result of editors on deadline not reading the story completely before writing the secondary headline. Ibid. 41 “Six Yanks Hurt as Troops, Army Police Clash in England,” The Washington Post, June 26, 1943, 2. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 For example, on January 20, 1942, a mob of more than six hundred whites in Sikeston, Missouri, stormed the local jail and captured Cleo Wright, who had been charged with breaking and entering the home of a white woman, who was injured during an altercation. Wright was shot three times, then his body was strung up to the bumper of a car and dragged through the African American section of town at speeds exceeding 70 miles per hour, according to news reports. See “ANGRY MISSOURI GOVERNOR ORDERS ARREST OF LYNCH FIENDS,” Pittsburgh Courier, January 31, 1942, 1. All stories in the Pittsburgh Courier were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 45 “No Probe in Detroit Riots,” The Washington Post, June 26, 1943, 2. 46 Ibid. 47 Enoch P. Waters, in his memoir, noted that the Defender—like many newspapers during the height of the wire services—had a particularly close working relationship with the Associated Negro Press. Waters wrote: “The service was so vital that the papers, except for the larger ones, could not have operated without ANP.” During the war years, even the larger papers relied on the wire service to help widen its coverage area with reports from war correspondents stationed abroad. See Enoch P. Waters, American Diary: A Personal History of the Black Press (Chicago: Path Press, 1987), 422. 48 “MP’s BATTLE RACE SOLDIERS IN BRITAIN,” The Chicago Defender, July 3, 1943, 3. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 This news report reinforces Smith’s findings, decades later, that often because African American soldiers were working for the Army’s Services of Supply, and subsequently driving all over England to deliver war materiel, they had greater access to information about what was happening across their host country, back home, and on the frontlines even if they were stationed in remote posts in the English countryside. It was news and gossip they eagerly shared with buddies back on post as well as those they met along the way. See, Graham, When Jim Crow Met John Bull, 138-51. 52 Ibid. 53 Randy Dixon, “U.S. Soldiers Overseas Condemn Conditions Causing Recent Riots,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1943, 1. 54 Ibid.

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55 Ibid. 56 According to Reynolds and Gardiner, there were approximately eight thousand citizens who claimed African ancestry before WWII in all of England and a majority of them lived in portside towns, such as Liverpool and Bristol, where they worked the docks. See Reynolds, Rich Relations, 216; and Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here,” 152. 57 Interview, William Waring, June 24, 2014. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Interview, Bill Briggs, June 22, 2014. 61 Interview, Jack Ward, June 22, 2014. 62 Ibid. 63 Briggs interview. 64 Swarbrick, “Everyone Supported the Black Troops and the Whole Thing Escalated.” 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 During a June 2014, visit to Ye Olde Hob Inn, the author saw the framed newspaper clipping on prominent display inside the pub, next to the bar. 68 Telephone interview, Peter Houghton, February 7, 2015. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Bruce E. Gronbeck, in an essay, notes: “Social memory is a collectivized discourse … built by everyone who recounts a socially advisory or constraining story about the past” (p. 56). He argues that by doing this, communities use the past to help guide them in the present and notes that Maurice Halbwach, who wrote the first book on collective memory, contends that for participants in the collective memory, “the reality of the past is no longer in the past.” See Bruce E. Gronbeck, “The Rhetorics of the Past,” in Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases, ed. Kathleen J. Turner, (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1998), 56-57. 72 See The Popular Memory Group, “Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method,” in The Oral History Reader, eds. Albert Perks and Alistair Thomson, (London: Routledge, 1998), 44. 73 See Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam, “Collective Memory – What is it?,” History & Memory 8, no. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1996): 37. 74 See Maihai Stelian Rusu, “History and Collective Memory: The Succeeding Incarnations of an Evolving Relationship,” Philobiblon, 18, no. 2 (2013): 261. 75 Ibid., 262. 76 Stuart Clewlow, e-mail message to author, February 26, 2015. 77 The Popular Memory Group, “Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method,” 45. 78 Michael C.C. Adams, “Postwar Mythmaking about World War II,” in Major Problems in the History of World War II, eds. Mark A. Stoler and Melanie S. Gustafson, (Boston: Wadsworth, 2003), 428-29. 79 See, for example, Gardiner, preface to “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here,” 6.

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80 A.F. Hordern to Major General Sir L.W. Atcherley, August 8, 1942, HO, RG 45/25604, PRO. 81 During the war years, British officials divided Great Britain into eleven regions that were represented by commissioners. Among their tasks was keeping government officials in Whitehall apprised of what was happening with the arrival of Americans and about Anglo-American relations. Initially the reports started out as monthly then went to quarterly. For examples of monthly and quarterly reports, see Mr. B. Collins, Ministry of Home Security, to Mr. Evans, February 20, 1943, Foreign Office (FO), RG 317/34123, PRO. 82 Ministry of Information to Mr. Evans, January 12, 1943, FO, RG 371/34123, PRO. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ministry of Information, January 5, 1943, FO, RG 371/34123, PRO. 86 Ibid. Often, these rumors proved false or highly inflated. Gardiner estimated that between 1942 and 1945, some three million American soldiers passed through the U.K., out of which 130,000 were African American. During this same period, an estimated 22,000 children were born out of wedlock, with between 1,500 and 1,700 infants fathered from African American soldiers. See Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed & Over Here,” 139-47. 87 Mr. B. Collins to Mr. Evans, February 20, 1943. 88 Ibid. 89 Historians researching African American genealogical ties to Africa have found that in societies with rich oral history traditions, the telling and retelling of oral histories can indeed present modern-day historians with accurate accounts of events that occurred centuries ago. See Alex Haley, “Black History, Oral History and Genealogy,” in The Oral History Reader, eds. Albert Perks and Alistair Thomson, (London: Routledge, 1998), 14-24. 90 An unnamed Region 4 commissioner wrote in his monthly report: “Black troops in one district where they are stationed seem popular with the inhabitants – regarded as children and liked for their singing, their smiles and their kindness to children. The few girls who go out with them, are, however, eyed uneasily.” See American Forces in the U.K., March 9, 1943, FO, RG 371/34123/142, PRO. 91 Harold Pollins, “The Battle of Bamber Bridge,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/85/a3677385.shtml. 92 Pittsburgh Courier war correspondent Roi Ottley recalled in his wartime diary: “Generally speaking, Americans are not liked by the English—because they are crude, loud, pompous, and display very bad manners. They walk the streets and enter restaurants with the feeling, ‘We’ve come to save your country.’ . . . Negro troops are very popular here. I think mainly because they generally have good manners . . . they do not come here to ‘take over’—instead, they adjust themselves to the customs and do well for themselves.” See Roi Ottley, Roi Ottley’s World War II: The Lost Diary of an African American Journalist, ed. Mark A. Huddle (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 77.

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93 Ottley was referring to Lancashire when he stated that there were African American troops billeted in Lancaster. See ibid., 100. 94 Roi Ottley, “One of the Biggest Stories of 20th Century,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 28, 1954, B3. All stories in the Chicago Daily Tribune were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 95 Leanne McCormick, “‘One Yank and They’re Off’: Interactions between U.S. Troops and Northern Irish Women, 1942-1945,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 15, no. 2 (May 2006): 238. 96 During an interview with a lifelong area resident, Bill Briggs, many locals—himself included—said he saw the American uniform rather than the ethnicity of the individual wearing the uniform. For British citizens, he said, “American” was the ethnicity. Interview, Briggs, June 22, 2014. 97 In a 1989 monograph, Richard C. Vincent, Bryan K. Crow, and Dennis K. Davis identified three narrative theories that demonstrated how the media wields its power in terms of guiding audiences through “the social construction of reality,” particularly during periods of crises. In the “restoration of normalcy” theme, the researchers argued that media coverage depicting or by reporting officials as taking control of the situation, it helps reestablish normalcy even in extraordinary circumstances. The more banal, the better. The use of this theme is evident in all the press reports cited local commanders declaring the fighting at Bamber Bridge as something that was never out of control. This statement makes the fight seem unimportant and banal. It also serves to reassure audiences that all is well in that Northwestern English village—regardless of what wagging tongues might say to the contrary. See Vincent et al., “When Technology Fails: The Drama of Airline Crashes in Network Television News,” in Social Meanings of News, ed. Dan Berkowitz (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications Inc., 1997): 357-58.

Chapter 4: Epochal Change: How a Riot in the U.K. and an Explosion on a U.S. Naval Dockyard Became Pivotal Moments in World War II 1 In a statement issued to the American Newspaper Publishers’ Association (ANPA) for its annual convention, General Dwight D. Eisenhower told the nation’s top newspaper editors that, “It is as true now as ever that public opinion wins wars.” Eisenhower was keenly aware that the media played a vital role in this effort to sway public opinion, and much of this had to do with how war correspondents reported the war to audiences back home. See Dwight D. Eisenhower to the American Newspaper Publishers’ Association, April 19, 1944, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers (henceforth DDEP), Pre-Presidential Papers, 1916-1952, box 149, message 28, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (henceforth DDEPL), Abilene, Kansas. 2 Historian Marvin E. Fletcher noted that by February 1944, The Negro Soldier had already been incorporated into the military orientation program for all incoming white troops. Fletcher wrote: “It was well received by both black and white soldiers. Some suggested that it be made available to white and black civilian audiences, and in April 1944 the War Department agreed” (p. 126). This launched Davis on a new task of finding

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civilian distributors of the film, and by July 1944 the U.S. Army had agreed to film a sequel to the original film. See Marvin E. Fletcher, America’s First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis Sr., 1880-1970 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 125- 28. 3 Thomas K. Gibson Jr., memorandum to Assistant Secretary of War, July 7, 1944, Benjamin O. Davis Papers (henceforth BODP), box 20, folder 2, U.S. Army Military History Institute (henceforth USAMHI), Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 4 Roi Ottley, Roi Ottley’s World War II: The Lost Diary of an African American Journalist (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 90. 5 Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2004), 637-38. 6 Ibid., 638. 7 See, “Tojo Relieved of One Post in Crisis Shakeup,” The Washington Post, July 19, 1944, 1; “TOJO AND CABINET OUSTED,” The Detroit Free Press, July 20, 1944, 1; and “YANKS BEAT OFF ST. LO COUNTERATTACK; ROAD TO PERIERS THREATENED,” The (Baltimore) Sun, July 18, 1944, 1. All stories in The (Baltimore) Sun and The Washington Post were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 8 For an in-depth narrative description of the explosion at Port Chicago, see Campbell’s The Color of War: How One Battle Broke Japan and Another Changed America, 278-88. 9 Contemporary history has frequently credited the defiance of a seamstress refusing to give up her seat to a white man on a public bus in Montgomery, Alabama, as the watershed moment that sparked the American civil rights movement. And the timing, it would seem, makes sense. Just a year earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that segregated schools were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. military had been integrated by presidential order in 1948, and critical momentum toward social change in American was building. This popular belief about the beginning of the American civil rights movement is perhaps fueled by the fact that when Rosa Parks stood her ground on December 1, 1955, her plight was quickly embraced by another pioneer whose name had little recognition at the time but would become synonymous with the movement: the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. See Enoch P. Waters, American Diary: A Personal History of the Black Press (Chicago: Path Press Inc., 1987), 409. However, a growing number of historians have posited that it was World War II and America’s participation in the global fight against tyranny and racial supremacy overseas that marked the start of the long civil rights movement, rather than Parks’s highly publicized defiance more than a decade later. They have argued that it was the united battle cry of African Americans seeking equality and thoroughly reported by the black press during the war years that first sparked the flames of social revolution that would go on to become the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. For more on the long American civil rights movement, see Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts 1939-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 105; J. Todd Moye, Freedom Flyers: The Tuskegee Airmen of World War II (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2010), 185; and

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Patrick S. Washburn, The African American Newspaper: Voice of Freedom (Evanston, Illinois: Northwest University Press, 2006), 8-9. 10 Walter White, “Observations and Recommendations of Walter White on Racial Relations in the ETO,” page 24, Record Group (henceforth RG) 498/UD372, series 291.2, box 1600, Report of Investigation of Racial Relations in U.K., National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), National Archives Annex, College Park, Maryland. 11 Ibid., 2. 12 Ibid., 2-3. 13 Ibid., 3-4. 14 Ibid., 4. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 7. 17 Lord Mayor’s (Acting) Secretary, July 17, 1942, letter to J.A.H. Wilson, RG BBC/A/LM/C/X16/34, Public Records Office-Bristol (henceforth PROB), Bristol, U.K. 18 In a letter dated July 22, 1942, Bristol’s Lord Mayor wrote to the chairmen of the Clifton Club, Bristol Club, Constitutional Club, Literary and Philosophical Club, and Bristol Savages Red Lodge, inquiring if they would be willing to open up to American officers. The Lord Mayor noted, “The officers understand perfectly well our difficulties about food and drink and do not expect meals or liquor to be served them but I am sure they would be glad if your membership could be open to them so that they could get to know our City people.” See Lord Mayor, letter to chairmen, July 22, 1942, RG BBC/A/LM/C/X16/34, PROB. 19 See Lord Mayor letter to Colonel Woodcock, July 21, 1942, RG BBC/A/LM/C/X16/34, PROB; Lord Mayor letter to E.H. Higgins, R.W. Moore, and F.C. Williams, July 22, 1942, RG BBC/A/LM/C/X16/34, PROB; and Lord Mayor letter to F.C. Williams, July 23, 1942, RG BBC/A/LM/C/X16/34, PROB. 20 Lord Mayor, letter to Colonel Woodcock, July 21, 1942. 21 These rumors ran rampant throughout the Bristol gossip mill in late February and early March 1943, according to British Ministry of Information intelligence reports that monitored topics in both civilian and military mail coming and going from the country. The timing of the rumors was conveniently around the eight- and nine-month mark of the first deployment of African American troops to the British Isles, when the earliest units arrived in June 1942. See “American Forces in the U.K.: Intelligence reports 23rd February – 2nd March, 1943,” Ministry of Information, FO, RG 371/34123, PRO. 22 Ibid. 23 Although the newspaper clip does not name Bristol as the port where the news story originated, it was a newspaper clipping found in a collection of news clippings at the Public Records Office-Bristol and as such, it could be assumed that the News Chronicle reporter, James Wellard, either reported from Bristol or it was at the very least a popular article among citizens of Bristol who would have started seeing more African American troops arriving in the port city around the same time the story was published. See James

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Wellard, “The Boys from Dixie Think ‘The English is Mighty Nice People, Yassuh,’” News Chronicle, September 1, 1942, 3, RG BBC/A/LM/C/X16/34, PROB. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 See Carolyn Martindale, The White Press and Black America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1980); Patrick S. Washburn, A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the Black Press during World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Wayne Dawkins, Black Journalists: The NABJ Story (Merrillville, Indiana: August Press, 1997); and Pamela E. Walck, “The Search for the Lost Archive: Tracking Down the Historic Records of the Pittsburgh Courier,” Pittsburgh Quarterly (Spring 2012), accessed April 16, 2014, http://www.pittsburghquarterly.com/index.php/Features/the-search-for-thelost- archives.html. 28 C.M. MacInnes letter to Regional Information Officer, February 9, 1943, RG BBC/A/LM/C/X16/34, PROB. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 “United States troops in the United Kingdom,” Field Censor report May 1-31, 1944, p. 5, FO, RG 371/38625, PRO. 32 “Racial Incidents,” General Davis notes, BODP, box 4, folder 12, USAMHI. The items listed on Davis’s notes were not the only incidents to occur between white and African American GIs in the ETO during July 1944—or in Bristol for that matter. Bristol newspapers widely reported stories about a local, married, mother of three who was fined two-pounds, ten-shilling in police court on charges she assaulted a white American MP during an incident at Queen’s Parade, Brandon Hill, on July 12, 1944. According to July 13 reports in both the Bristol Evening Post and the Bristol Evening World, Mary Read, 28, was charged with “behaving in a ‘disorderly manner,’ using obscene language, and assaulting an American military policeman” after she and “a coloured soldier” accompanying her, witnessed white American MPs attempting to arrest three African American soldiers. News reports stated Read ran up to the MP and started striking him in the chest. See “At BRANDON HILL: WOMAN STRIKES U.S. ARMY POLICEMAN,” Bristol Evening Post, July 13, 1944, 4; and “Disorderly Scene on Brandon Hill,” Bristol Evening World, July 13, 1944, 4. A day later, the Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror offered more details about the incident, noting that Read pleaded guilty of disorderly conduct but claimed she was “not guilty” for assaulting the MP. The paper went on to report: “The policeman stated that in the course of his military duties he was arresting a coloured solider, and was placing him in a jeep when the accused strolled past with another coloured soldier and shouted ‘You whites are always picking on the blacks and I am going to stick up for them.’ Thereupon she struck the military policeman in the chest.” A witness to the incident, War Reserve Constable Lewis told the court that read “hit the military policeman in the chest. She was waving her arms wildly and using obscene language.” Reed was fined ten shillings for her language and two pounds for

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assaulting the MP. See “Assaulted Military Policeman, Bristol Woman Fined £2,” Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror, July 14, 1944, 3. In an unrelated incident that occurred on June 24, 1944, this time on the docks of Avonmouth, Bristol papers reported a police court hearing in which an African American Seaman was fined £5 for “unlawfully and maliciously wounding” an American merchant marine during an altercation between the two men. Harold Craft, 28, told the court that he struck merchant marine Robert Lister Ernst because he saw the man going into his pocket and feared that he had a gun or a knife. Craft also told the court that “he did not intend to cut Ernst but only to scare the men, who were crazy with drinking” according to a report in the Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror. The newspaper added that the judge “told the accused that he had committed the offense under great provocation and they were taking into account the fact that he had been remanded in custody since June 25.” See “COURT SEQUEL TO STREET AFFRAY,” Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror, July 15, 1944, 6. In a report on the same incident a day earlier, the Bristol Evening Post quoted Craft as saying that “the white men seemed to be closing in on him, and one said ‘Give him the works’.” See “Avonmouth Scene: SEAMAN’S STORY OF STABBING AFFRAY,” Bristol Evening Post, July 14, 1944, 1. 33 “INCIDENTS IN STREET,” Bristol Evening World, July 17, 1944, 1. 34 Ibid. 35 “SENT TO PRISON,” Bristol Evening World, July 17, 1944, 2. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 “BRISTOL STREET SCENE,” Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror, July 18, 1944, 3. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 “‘SQUARED UP’ TO POLICE: Bristol Man Gets 14 Days,” Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror, July 18, 1944, 2. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 “Opened Fire to Quell Army ‘Riot’,” Daily Mail, July 18, 1944, 1. 47 See “Floods Loosed on St. Lo Germans” and “SHOCK FOR NAVY: Sailors to be Sent Into Army,” Daily Mail, July 18, 1944, 1. 48 “Opened Fire to Quell Army ‘Riot’,” Daily Mail. 49 Ibid. 50 See “Somoza Frees Prisoners,” The New York Times, July 18, 1944, 8. All stories in The New York Times were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 51 “Shots Quell Soldiers’ Free Fight,” The New York Times, July 18, 1944, 8. 52 Ibid. 53 See “Brother of Hitler Is Reported Dead,” The (Baltimore) Sun, July 18, 1944, 4.

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54 “3 Soldiers Hospitalized after Fight in England,” The (Baltimore) Sun, July 18, 1944, 4. 55 “Army Race Riot Closes Bristol to Yanks,” Detroit Free Press, July 19, 1944, 2. 56 “U.S. NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS BATTLE; ONE DIES,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 19, 1944, 6. All stories in the Chicago Daily Tribune were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 “Riot in England,” The (Baltimore) Afro-American, July 22, 1944, 1. All stories in The (Baltimore) Afro American were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 60 “WAR DEPARTMENT PROBES RACE CLASH IN ENGLAND,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 19, 1944, 1. All stories in the Pittsburgh Courier were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 61 “Colored, White Soldiers Clash in England; 1 Dead,” Chicago Defender, July 29, 1944, 11. All stories in The Chicago Defender were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Campbell, The Color of War, 280-81. 65 Ibid., 281. 66 “BLAST AT PORT CHICAGO NAVAL ARSENAL ROCKS ENTIRE BAY AREA,” San Francisco Examiner, July 18, 1944, 1. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 “322 KNOWN DEAD AS EXPLOSION TOLL INCREASES; 500 INJURED,” San Francisco Examiner, July 19, 1944, 1. 70 Ibid. 71 “NAVY DEPOT BLAST KILLS SCORES,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1944, 1. All stories in Los Angeles Times were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 “Ship Blast Loss Near $7,000,000; 319 Known Dead,” Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1944, 4. 75 “Heavy Death Toll Reported in Blast,” The New York Times, July 18, 1944, 1. 76 “Coast Blast Kills Scores, Fire in Douglas Plant Here,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 18, 1944, 1. 77 “BULLETIN,” The (Baltimore) Sun, July 18, 1944, 1. 78 Ibid. 79 “Toll in Ship Blast Nears 350 Dead, 1,000 Injured,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 19, 1944, 1. 80 Ibid.

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81 Ibid., 7. 82 “319 Counted Dead in Blast,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 20, 1944, 3. 83 “District Man Lost in Blast,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 21, 1944, 16. 84 “350 Perish on Pacific Coast As Ammunition Ships Explode,” The Washington Post, July 19, 1944, 1. 85 “Port Chicago,” The Washington Post, July 19, 1944, 6. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 “Blast Shatters Whole Town in California,” The Boston Daily Globe, July 19, 1944, 1. All stories in The Boston Daily Globe were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 89 “Remember Port Chicago,” The Boston Daily Globe, July 19, 1944, 12. 90 Ibid. 91 “Only 4 Bodies Found Out of 319 Dead in Explosion,” The Boston Daily Globe, July 20, 1944, 3. 92 “Toll in Blast Reaches 350,” Detroit Free Press, July 19, 1944, 1. 93 Ibid. 94 See “Explosion Toll Now is 322,” Detroit Free Press, July 20, 1944, 1. 95 “Blast Toll Mounts,” The Afro-American, July 22, 1944, 1. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Pauline A. Young and J. Robert Smith, “Survivors Describe Horror of Blast,” The Afro-American, July 29, 1944, 1. 99 Ibid., 6. 100 J. Saunders Redding, “A Second Look,” The Afro-American, July 29, 1944, 4. 101 J. Robert Smith, “Navy Blast Dead Mount; No Bodies Found in Ruins,” Chicago Defender, July 29, 1944, 1. 102 Ibid., 4. 103 For examples, see George Padmore, “‘IKE’ LAUDS NEGRO SOLDIERS,” Chicago Defender, August 5, 1944, 1; Edward B. Toles, “NEGRO TROOPS HELING ROUT NAZIS IN FRANCE,” Chicago Defender, August 5, 1944, 1; George Padmore, “Britishers Hit Jim Crow Bar on Weekly Dances,” Chicago Defender, August 5, 1944, 11; and George Padmore, “British Judge Slaps U.S. For Color Bans,” Chicago Defender, August 5, 1944,2. 104 E.F. Joseph, “16 CITED AS NAVY HEROES,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 29, 1944, 4. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 See “Navy Lists Negro Victims in Big California Disaster,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 29, 1944, 18. 108 For examples, see “COURIER INTERVIEWS TRUMAN,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 5, 1944, 1; Ollie Harrington, “War Correspondents Cover Battlefronts: Tell How ‘Our Boys’ Are Fighting in Italy, Normandy, South Pacific and Middle East,” Pittsburgh

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Courier, August 5, 1944, 1; and George Padmore, “Blame Army for Racial Feud Abroad,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 5, 1944, 1. 109 “Port Chicago Heroes,” Pittsburgh Courier, August 5, 1944, 6. 110 Ibid. 111 “EXPLOSION KILLS 600: Mostly Negroes,” Bristol Evening World, July 19, 1944, 1. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 “MANY DIE IN U.S. EXPLOSION,” Lancashire Daily Post, July 18, 1944, 4. 115 Ibid. 116 “Hundreds Killed in U.S. Explosion,” Belfast Telegraph, July 18, 1944, 4. 117 Ibid. 118 “MANY KILLED IN U.S. MUNITION SHIPS’ EXPLOSION,” Irish News, July 19, 1944, 1. 119 “U.S. EXPLOSION: 260 Dead or Missing; Port Wrecked,” Belfast News-Letter, July 19, 1944, 5. 120 Daily Mail Correspondent, “AMMO SHIPS BLOW UP: Half a Town Wrecked,” The Daily Mail, July 19, 1944, 3. 121 Ibid. 122 “319 DIED IN MUNITIONS SHIPS EXPLOSION,” Irish News, July 20, 1944, 3. 123 “DEATH ROLL AT PORT CHICAGO,” The (London) Times, July 20, 1944, 3. 124 Ibid. 125 “Cable to London Office,” July 13, 1944, Philleo Nash Papers (henceforth PNP), box 27/Racial Tension, England, Bristol, Harry S. Truman Library (henceforth HSTL). 126 “Cable to London Office,” July 18, 1944, PNP. Box 27/Racial Tension, England Bristol, HSTL. 127 In a follow-up story the Courier’s London-based correspondent George Padmore blamed the U.S. Army in a column explaining why racial disorder was still a problem in the ETO. Padmore charged that the Army was permitting “white only” dances and by doing so, creating scenarios that acted as touchstones of contention among white and African American GIs. Although Padmore did not name the city where the clash occurred, it can be assumed that Bristol is most the likely incident he refers to in his column. See Padmore, “Blame Army for Racial Feud Abroad,” Pittsburgh Courier. 128 “Rumor and Report,” Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror, July 19, 1944. 129 For modern readers, it is helpful to read historian Graham Smith’s account of the events in Bristol. Smith noted that after several days of small altercations between white and African American troops in Bristol, things reached a boiling point on July 15 when a large fight broke out among African American GIs near Park and Great George streets. After additional MPs were brought into the area—some estimates put the number of MPs at one-hundred and twenty, calm was restored, and the MPs forced the offending African American troops to march down the main streets of the Bristol to the City Centre, also known as the Tram Centre. Arundle, much like the Bristol mother of three charged with disorderly behavior, appeared to have disagreed with the American MPs so much so that

253 he was attempting to assist the African American soldiers—disrupting the peace in the process. For a more detailed narrative of these events, see Smith, When Jim Crow Met John Bull, 146-47. 130 The Employment of Negro Troops, 627-28. 131 The Bristol Evening World reported on July 18, 1944, that the city’s aldermen and lord mayor alike were disturbed by the violence in the city. Alderman W.H. Hennessay was quoted in a public meeting as stating: “There are a great many rumours flying about the city as to what actually happened. There is no question but that large crowds of people were involved and that a shot or shots were fired. There is no question that some people were injured.” See “SPECIAL DEBATE ON CITY SCENE,” Bristol Evening World, July 18, 1944, 1. 132 According to Gaye Tuchman, newsworkers turn to the same routines that have proven successful in reporting everyday stories, from relying on official sources to writing with particular story frames, when major, breaking news stories occur. By using these routines, Tuchman noted, “They impose order upon events as the raw material of news and thus reduce the variability of events as the raw material of news.” See Gaye Tuchman, “Making News by Doing Work: Routinizing the Unexpected,” in Social Meanings of News, ed. Dan Berkowitz (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 1997), 185. Dan Berkowitz expanded on these typifications, noting that in the course of a major disaster, stories disrupt the normal flow of news. By relying on official sources, reporters adopt story frames that assure readers that everything is under control and that order will be restored shortly. Similarly, as the story expands from the initial day of coverage to the following days, frames of normalcy and explanations as to why enter into the coverage. According to Berkowitz, news organizations in competition with each other also feed this process and help determine whether the story stays on the front page or at the top of the broadcast, versus slowly creeping inside the paper or at the end of the program. Berkowitz concluded: “[E]ven when faced with non-routine news, newsworkers were able to accomplish their work in a more or less routine fashion. Improvisation and negotiation were important in this instance, but those elements mainly shaped the choice of overall work modes.” (p. 373). In other words, regardless of how unroutine a story might be, newsworkers find ways to negotiate a way that resembles their daily routine in terms of chasing down a breaking story and reporting it to readers or audiences. Likewise, the slow progression of a story off the front page and deep into the newspaper serves as an indicator to readers about what is important and what is not. See Dan Berkowitz, “Non-Routine News and Newswork: Exploring a What-a-Story,” in Social Meanings of News, ed. Dan Berkowitz, 362-75. 133 See Camille Kraeplin, “Two Tales of One City” How Cultural Perspective Influenced the Framing of a Pre-Civil Rights Story in Dallas,” American Journalism 25, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 73-97. 134 Edward B. Toles, “Red Ball Drivers Now Combat Troops in France,” Chicago Defender, March 10, 1945, 1. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid.

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137 The Employment of Negro Troops, 688-689. 138 In his draft copy, Eisenhower underlined this entire sentence to emphasize his stance on the color bar. See Dwight Eisenhower draft order, January 4, 1945, DDEP, Pre- Presidential Papers, 1916-1952, principle file, box 71, DDEPL. 139 The Employment of Negro Troops, 689. 140 Ibid. 141 Ernest L. Perry Jr., “It’s Time to Force a Change: The African-American Press’ Campaign for a True Democracy during World War II,” Journalism History 28, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 94. 142 Ibid. 143 Edwin Chen, “From Peril to Pardon,” Los Angles Times, December 24, 1999. Accessed online April 20, 2015 at http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/24/news/mn- 47024.

Conclusion 1 Interview, Walter “Wally” Suchowiecki, April 10, 2014. 2 Suchowiecki said his only negative experiences concerning racial differences occurred when he was Stateside. When he was first inducted into the Army in 1943, he was stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. And while most of the guys in his unit were from the North, there were a handful of men from the South, including a guy from Georgia. He recalled of the Georgian: “It was typical to hear some of the remarks he made toward the soldiers from up North, he’d say stuff like, we were ‘nigger lovers’ and ‘it was a good thing they were migrating up there and not staying down South.’ He was very bitter and outspoken.” Suchowiecki was quick to add that another guy, from Alabama, was “level headed” and never made those kinds of comments. Interview, Suchowiecki. 3 On August 10, 1942, British Lieutenant Colonel Turnham, along with representatives of the U.S. Forces in Northern Ireland and British Ministry of Information censor, gathered the editors of the Belfast News-Letter, Belfast Telegraph, and the Northern Whig, to discuss how the local newspapers would report frictions that might arise between the British and American troops. During the meeting, it was noted that Axis propaganda would aim to “create dissention between the forces of the United Nations fighting side by side against them.” The editors left the meeting, verbally agreeing that they “would deal with great discretion with stories that might occur regarding friction between the two Armies.” See “American File,” August 21, 1942, CAB, RG 9/CD/225/19, PRONI. 4 Mr. Nichols, Ministry of Information, to Mr. Malcolm, AM 64, February 14, 1944, “THE NEGRO PRESS,” page 1, FO, RG 371/38653, PRO. 5 For examples of how the U.S. government monitored the black press, see Patrick S. Washburn, A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government’s Investigation of the Black Press during World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 98-135. 6 One example of British surveillance of black press activities and African American civic events can be found in a report G.T. Corley Smith dated June 27, 1944, describing the Negro Freedom Rally, held at Madison Square Gardens and sponsored by the Negro

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Labor Victory Committee and the Peoples’ Committee. In his three-page report, Smith noted: “On your command, I suffered four hours of oratory and pageant in the sticky atmosphere of the Negro Freedom rally. . . . If I wanted to describe the tone of the meeting in one word I should call it ‘shrill’. This applied to most of the minor speakers and even more so to the principle orators.” Smith noted that while several topics were addressed during the rally, one of the primary purposes was to drum up support for President Roosevelt’s fourth term. He observed: “The occasional reference to the President brought considerable applause, but no frenzy. On the other hand the solidarity reference to Dewey’s refusal to back anti-discrimination laws brought a terrific yell from all sections of the audience. This supports the opinion we have advanced ion recent reports that although the Negroes feel that Roosevelt has not done what he could for them, there is no one else who looks like doing more, and he is probably the best friend they can find in an imperfect world.” Smith also reported that the audience was less interested in foreign affairs. “[T]hey wanted to hear about Jim Crow. It was talk of white supremacy, segregation, job discrimination, colonialism, imperialism and poll taxes that brought the crowd to the pitch of frenzy which the mob orators desired.” See G.T. Corley Smith to MacKenzie, June 27, 1944, “Observations on the Negro Freedom Rally at Madison Square Gardens,” FO, RG 371/38653, PRO. 7 As stated earlier in this study, for the vast majority of mainstream newspapers before the civil rights movement, African Americans did not make the news unless they were exceptional athletes, actors, or criminals. See Carolyn Martindale, The White Press and Black America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1980); Patrick S. Washburn, A Question of Sedition; Wayne Dawkins, Black Journalists: The NABJ Story (Merrillville, Indiana: August Press, 1997); and Pamela E. Walck, “The Search for the Lost Archive: Tracking Down the Historic Records of the Pittsburgh Courier,” Pittsburgh Quarterly (Spring 2012), accessed April 16, 2014, http://www.pittsburghquarterly.com/index.php/Features/the-search-for-thelostarchives. html. 8 Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff, The Race Beat: The Press, the Civil Rights Struggle, and the Awakening of a Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 321. 9 See James G. Thompson, “Should I Sacrifice to Live ‘Half-American?’” Pittsburgh Courier, January 31, 1942, 3. All stories in the Pittsburgh Courier were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 10 Robert Shogan and Tom Craig, The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in Violence (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964), 7. 11 Benjamin D. Singer, Richard W. Osborn and James A. Geschwender, Black Rioters: Studies in Social and Economic Process (Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath Lexington Books, 1970), 14. 12 Editors and reporters have use several news values over the years to help them determine the newsworthiness of stories, photographs, and other items for possible publication. Since the professionalism of the news industry, it has been widely accepted that there are several different values that guide their decisions, including: timeliness, meaning something that happened today is more important to readers than something that

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occurred the day before; proximity, which argues that an event that has occurred nearby is of more value to readers than something that happened geographically or physically farther away; prominence, which is the belief that people who are popular or hold elected positions are often newsmakers just because of who they are; relevance, meaning that the greater the influence on readers the greater the significance of the story; unusualness, which argues that a story can be newsworthy simply because it is “out of the ordinary;” conflict, meaning that regardless of whether it is personal or institutional, the drama of issues with multiple, opposing sides can be newsworthy; and human interest, which refers to stories that touch people’s lives and therefore have news value to a wider audience. For a more in depth explanation, see Dorothy A. Bowles and Diane L. Borden, Creative Editing, sixth edition (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011), 12. 13 Nicholas, “The Negro Press,” 5. 14 For examples, see “Eisenhower to Blame for Race Friction in England,” The (Baltimore) Afro American, October 24, 1942, 1; and Ollie Stewart, “Gen. Davis Explains Mission in London Press Conference,” The Afro American, October 17, 1942, 1. All stories in The (Baltimore) Afro American were accessed via the Proquest database at www.proquest.com. 15 “Command and Leadership of Colored Troops,” to Base Section Commanders, Com Z, undated, BODP, box 5, folder 1, USAMHI. 16 D.D. Eisenhower to Bruce Clarke, May 29, 1967, Papers, post-presidential, 1961-69, Secretary Series, box 20, folder Cla, DDEPL. 17 “Speech to be delivered by Brigadier General B.O. Davis before The Frontiers of America,” August 15, 1946, BODP, series IV/speeches, box 31, folder 2, USAMHI. 18 Ibid. 19 See Marvin E. Fletcher, America’s First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis Sr., 1880- 1970 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 150.

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Belfast News-Letter

Belfast Telegraph

Boston Daily Globe

Bristol Evening Post

Bristol Evening World

Chicago Daily Tribune

Chicago Defender

The Chorley Guardian

The Daily (London) Express

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(London) News Chronicle

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Pittsburgh Courier

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

Pittsburgh Quarterly

San Francisco Examiner

Savannah Morning News

The (London) Times

The New York Times

The (Baltimore) Sun

Tifton Gazette

The Washington Post

Western Daily Press & Bristol Mirror

Unpublished Materials

Walck, Pamela E. “How the Pittsburgh Courier Campaigned to Change America and the

World.” Presentation at the annual meeting for The Joint Journalism &

Communication History Conference, New York City, NY, March 9, 2013.

—. “Reporting Jim Crow Abroad: Press Images and Words for African-

American Deployments in World War II.” Presentation at the annual meeting of

the Association for Educators in Journalism and Mass Communication

Conference, Montreal, Canada, August 2014.

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