ROUND 2 IN : How the IDF Focused Exclusively on COIN and Lost the Ability to Fight Manuever War

CAPTAIN JONATHAN D. ZAGDANSKI

srael has defeated larger Arab The Tactical Situation repeatedly since its creation Mission — The mission and purpose of Iin1948. The Israeli Defense Forces the IR was to launch missiles at Israel in (IDF) enjoyed a reputation of invincibility order to cause physical and psychological among its Arab neighbors until last year. damage to the country. Israel’s mission was Israel got bloodied and bogged down in to stop from launching missiles Lebanon by a stateless military while minimizing friendly casualties. organization: Hezbollah’s military wing, Equipment — Hezbollah was no longer the Islamic Resistance (IR). The Israeli a guerrilla force. The IR fighter’s individual high command expected the air force weapon was the AK-47 . IR alone to crush the IR. Instead, the air force fighters were also armed with individual killed many civilians and destroyed anti-tank weapons such as the RPG-7, property but could not stop the IR rockets RPG-9, TOW, AT-3, AT-4, AT-5, AT-13, and and missiles that rained daily on Israel. the AT-14. The IR anti-aircraft arsenal When IDF troops tried to push their way consisted of the SA-7 Strela-2, ZU-23 AA into a well-prepared defense, they failed. guns, S-60 57mm AA guns, and possibly It seems that the Israelis have lost their the SA-18 Grail. IR medium and long- ability to conduct high-intensity range rockets consisted of the 122mm maneuver warfare. What happened to the Katyusha, the 240mm Fajr-3, the Fajr-5, IDF? the Zelzal-2, and the Syrian-made Uragan missile. IR anti-ship missiles consisted of the C-802 and C-701. IR air assets consisted The Strategic Setting of the Mirsad-1 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which is capable On July 12, 2006, IR forces executed a deliberate ambush inside of surveillance and observation. On the other hand, the Israeli Israel against two IDF armored vehicles using anti-tank mines military is a modern, fully-equipped force with the latest weapons and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The attack killed three and and equipment. Israel has a lot of U.S.-manufactured equipment wounded two. The IR also captured two Israeli soldiers. The IDF and produces top-quality military systems of its own. immediately dispatched a tank and a mechanized platoon Terrain — is mountainous, and its in order to free the two POWs. The tank hit a massive (500-600lbs) canalizing terrain provides good concealment despite the sparse improvised explosive device (IED), which instantly killed the four- vegetation. IR forces had the advantage of terrain to emplace man crew. An eighth Israeli soldier was killed during a firefight preplanned counter-mobility obstacles, such as tank ditches and with IR soldiers. On that day, the Hezbollah inflicted the highest mines. IR fighters knew the terrain of southern Lebanon; IDF fatality toll against Israel since 1987. soldiers did not. Since the mid-1980s, Israel has had border skirmishes with Troops Available — IR forces committed 600-800 full-time Hezbollah. In May of 2000, Israel decided to pull its troops out fighters and 5,000 to 7,000 part-time fighters. Israel committed from southern Lebanon, thus satisfying one of Hezbollah’s key 8,000 ground troops. demands. Following the withdrawal, Israel warned the Hezbollah Time Available — Israeli political and military leaders knew that any cross-border offensive action would result in full military they had only a few weeks before the United Nations Security retaliation. After six years of relative quiet on the border, Israeli Council and world pressure intervened to stop Israeli military political and military leaders grew complacent about the Hezbollah action in Lebanon. Also, long military campaigns are extremely threat. Their focus was on destroying the Palestinian terrorist costly to the Israeli economy. The Hezbollah, on the other hand, infrastructure within Israel? had no such time constraints. Quite the contrary, the longer the In the meantime, IR forces had been building conventional IR could withstand Israel, the more public support would be gained, defensive positions to counter any future Israeli incursion. Iran especially in the Arab world. delivered large amounts of weapons to the IR and provided military Civilians on the Battlefield — The IR structured its defenses training to IR forces. By the summer of 2006, the IR was no longer within civilian population centers. They designed their defense a rag-tag guerilla organization; it was a highly trained and combat- knowing the Israelis were reluctant to inflict high civilian ready force capable of conducting a determined defense. casualties among its enemies. The IR’s defense forced the Israelis

32 INFANTRY September-October 2007 to engage in dangerous house-to-house used sophisticated fiber-optic fighting and suffer a high number of Traditionally, the primary role communication equipment that resisted friendly casualties. of the IDF has been to defend Israeli electronic jamming and Israel in a conventional high- countermeasures. Individual IR fighters Comparison of Opposing Forces intensity war. However, years of used encrypted Motorola two-way radios to The IDF — The troop strength of the low intensity conflict with the communicate with one another. Hence, IDF is approximately 125,000 active duty Palestinians modified their every level of command had control of troops, of which 40,000 are career soldiers. training to focus mostly on ongoing fighting and knew the status of The IDF can also call up to 600,000 reserve urban counterinsurgency. adjacent fighting positions. The Hezbollah soldiers. also made extensive use of the internet for Israeli ground forces have nearly 4,000 information warfare and propaganda in tanks and 11,000 armored vehicles at their leaders have had years of combat order to promote their message and gain disposal. There are three active duty experience while senior leaders lack support throughout the Arab world. armored brigades and four infantry operational experience. Hezbollah had an advanced intelligence brigades. The infantry brigades are similar General Halutz, a former air force apparatus. Hezbollah gathered human in training and organization. Every infantry commander, focused IDF doctrine and intelligence mainly from Israeli Arabs and brigade is made up of three infantry training solely on counterinsurgency Druze who had served in the IDF. Thus, IR battalions, a signal company, and a operations in urbanized terrain. He believed forces knew exact locations of certain reconnaissance battalion. that “targeted killing” from the air was the military installations throughout Israel and Prior to the war, the IDF chief of staff, preferred technique to fight terrorists. targeted them during the war. The General Dan Halutz, launched a new cost- General Halutz diverted much-needed Hezbollah also used large sums of money saving logistical system called “regional funds from the ground forces to the Israeli and drugs to recruit informers within Israel. logistics.” The initiative stripped units of Air Force. Ground forces became secondary Finally, IR forces used UAVs to gather their organic logistics support elements and in importance in the fight against terrorism. intelligence against Israel. proved to be a significant liability during Despite this, IDF troop morale was high the war. at the beginning of the war in Lebanon due The Action Traditionally, the primary role of the IDF to repeated successes against Palestinian On July 12, the day of the ambush, the has been to defend Israel in a conventional terror groups. Israeli soldiers were eager responded with air raids high-intensity war. However, years of low to fight and defeat the Hezbollah once and aimed at cutting IR supply lines. IDF intensity conflict with the Palestinians for all. ground operations started on July 17 in the modified their training to focus mostly on IR Forces — IR forces numbered vicinity of Maroun Al-Ras (See Figure 1, urban counterinsurgency. The second between 600-800 full-time fighters and Inset 1). IR forces surprised the IDF with intifada increased the operational tempo to 5,000-7,000 reserve soldiers. The an effective defense consisting of the point that regular units had to Hezbollah could have called up to 25,000 bunkers, tunnels, and firing positions. It significantly reduce their training time. reserve fighters. took six days of intense close-quarter Most training exercises involved only The IR was the most technologically combat for the IDF to secure the town of platoon and company-sized elements. advanced para-military force in the world. Maroun Al-Ras. The battle cost the IDF six Battalion and brigade-size exercises IR fighters were equipped with advanced KIAs and 18 WIAs. Once secured, Maroun became a rarity. Severe budget cuts affected night-vision and communications equipment. Al-Ras became the IDF’s launching site for the training and readiness of reserve units. IR forces use advanced technology to gather follow-on combat operations against the In 2003, reserve units did not conduct any intelligence, such as the Mirsad-1 UAVs towns of Bent Jbail, a large Shia town training at all! leaders decided to equipped with infrared cameras and GPS bordering Israel (see Figure 1, Inset 1). limit large-scale training exercises for navigation. During the war, Israeli soldiers Prior to entering Bent Jbail, Israeli reservists to once every three years. found rooms full of Iranian-made equipment artillery hit targets in the vicinity of Bent Prior to the war, Israel had demonstrated including listening devices, computers, and Jbail with approximately 3,000 shells. an impressive intelligence gathering communications devices. Despite the artillery preparation, the IDF capability against its enemies. However, Hezbollah’s supply of arms and equipment met stiff resistance. IR fighters conducted now, the IDF attacked using limited and mainly came from Iran. Hezbollah used a numerous lED and anti-tank ambushes inaccurate intelligence concerning IR’s complex of tunnels and bunker systems to while remaining concealed in the city ruins. strength, activities and capabilities. store weapons, ammunition, food, water, They successfully destroyed a Merkava Political and budgetary factors were the and medical supplies. The intent of IR tank, killing two of its crew. The 35th main reasons for the IDF’s lack of commanders was for every bunker system Airborne Brigade was tasked to setup intelligence about the IR. to be completely self-sufficient. blocking positions north-west of the city Since the “Yom Kippur” war of 1973, Hezbollah had an effective command, but were unable to reach their objective. Israel has been mainly involved in medium control, and communications system in The moved east of the city and low-intensity conflicts. These types of place prior to the war. The IR divided but came under intense anti-tank missile, conflicts are mostly fought at the company southern Lebanon into different sectors, RPG and mortar fire, which caused 30 level and below. Therefore, junior combat each consisting of 12-15 villages. IR forces casualties. The narrow streets made it

September-October 2007 INFANTRY 33 difficult and dangerous for Israeli armored vehicles to maneuver. to be of little tactical value. On August 14, all combat After eight days of intense fighting, the town of Bent Jbail was operations ended, and Israel started to redeploy its troops back to still not completely secured. Consequently, IDF ground Israel on August 16. commanders put combat in Bent Jbail on hold and shifted their During most battles in Lebanon, IDF troops were operating focus to the town of Aita el-Shaab (Figure 1, Inset 2). There, too, with limited close air support (CAS) at their disposal. The Israeli IDF troops were faced with a solid IR defense. This time though, air force (IAF) decided early on to limit the use of the AH-64 IR soldiers inside the town used hit and run tactics while IR soldiers Apache helicopter and the AH-l Cobra helicopter in Lebanon. This in the surrounding hills conducted near and far ambushes. was due to a belief among senior IAF leaders that the IR had the On August 11, the IDF launched a major offensive against the capability to shoot down helicopters with the SA-18 Grail. Instead, village of al Ghandourieh in order to seize a strategic road junction the IAF used more armed UAVs to support troops on the ground. south of the Litani River (Figure 1, Inset 3). A brigade of “” The IAF used fighter jets against deeper targets. infantry troops conducted an air assault mission into the vicinity to provide security for an armored force approaching from the IDF’s Failed Strategy east through Wadi Saluki. The mission of the armored force was It is important to point out that Israel never perceived Hezbollah to destroy IR rockets, firing positions, and hidden bases. IR forces as a threat to its existence. Unlike previous wars where large armies quickly deployed in the vicinity and setup ambush positions in threatened to invade, Hezbollah’s sole aim was to harass Israel by the dense undergrowth. Once in position, IR forces detonated an shooting missiles into its territory. Therefore, the Israeli military lED which destroyed the commander’s tank. The detonation adopted a strategy of gentle force escalation. initiated a massive anti-armor ambush with IR fighters firing anti- Initially, Israel tried to force the Lebanese government to take tank missiles, RPGs, and mortars. The ambush killed 12 Israeli care of the Hezbollah problem. The IAF did this by bombing key soldiers and damaged 11 tanks. Despite these setbacks, the IDF Lebanese infrastructure. This tactic guaranteed the least amount was eventually able to secure al Ghandourieh, which turned out of Israeli casualties since ground troops would not be involved.

Figure 1 — IDF Actions in Southern Lebanon

34 INFANTRY September-October 2007 deeper into Lebanon. The IDF stepped right Finally, IR forces were able to dominate and into the IR’s trap. Once there, IR forces control the battle by keeping the IDF unleashed their prepared defenses. constantly off-balance. They achieved this Israeli ground troops were often playing by ambushing IDF troops relentlessly. a cat-and-mouse game with IR fighters. Israeli forces would often capture an IR Conclusion fighting position just to discover that its Israel relied too much on airpower alone defenders had escaped to another fighting to get the job done. After days of bombing position. IR fighters moved around the southern Lebanon, hundreds of missiles battlefield quite freely. were still raining on Israel. When the IDF During the war, the senior IDF high command realized that ground forces http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Israel-Lebanon_conflict commanders decided to use Israeli armor were needed, they launched them without Residents survey damage done to a building in a combat supply role instead of a direct proper training, equipment, and following a rocket attack in Haifa, Israel, July combat role. Thus, Merkava tanks were intelligence. Essentially, the IDF was set 17, 2006. often tasked to escort medical or supply up for failure. The IDF had been focused However, it became quite clear that the vehicles at low speeds. This made Israeli solely on counterinsurgency for the past 16 Lebanese government was in no position tanks quite easy to target and destroy. For years. Now, it was time to maneuver on to confront the Hezbollah. this reason, the IDF lost a significant regular terrain except the IDF was no The IAF’s next move was to heavily number of tanks. longer trained for that type of combat. bomb the IR targets from the air. This tactic In retrospect, had the IDF taken the time The IDF discovered that terrorist would also minimize Israeli troop exposure. to properly identify the IR’S main defensive organizations and armies adjust their tactics Unfortunately, days of heavy bombardment positions, they could have flanked the and doctrine based on the adversary’s proved to be futile. The damage caused by strong points and overwhelmed them with strengths and weaknesses. The IDF now many countries to lose sympathy for Israel. precision fire while rolling up the flanks. realizes that air power alone cannot win a After days of failed results, the IDF By failing to do this, the Israelis played war and that their soldiers should be fully decided to initiate limited ground operations right into the IR’s game and experienced a trained in maneuver warfare as well as using battalion-size combat elements. But, replay of Verdun! counterinsurgency operations. the lack of soldier training and preparedness IR Forces — IR forces succeeded in Israel fought a stateless army, not a in high-intensity warfare, coupled with the inflicting many casualties on the IDF by guerrilla force. Israel was surprised to find small size of units, undermined the success being creative and flexible in their tactics a versatile enemy that was comfortable of these operations. It was only towards the and techniques. The IR did not attempt to fighting in the defense. The war was a end of the conflict that the IDF decided to fight the IDF head-on with battalions and definite wake-up call for Israel. It use larger combat elements with more brigades of armored vehicles and infantry. highlighted the dangers of specializing in firepower into Lebanon. However, at this Five Arab-Israeli wars have proved that certain war-fighting skills while neglecting point, it was too little, too late for Israel. concept to be foolish. Instead, the IR chose other skills. Emphasizing only a particular The world would not allow more fighting, to fight in a prepared defense in-depth. type of training can be disastrous in combat. and Israel was pressured to accept a UN- Knowing Israeli weaknesses, the prepared Military leaders should not focus all sponsored cease fire. defense seemed like the best tactic to use. training to meet today’s threats, for In sum, the overall Israeli strategy was Israeli weaknesses were: tomorrow, the threat may change. one of escalating force. The Israeli 1) Israel’s reluctance to inflict many IDF soldiers could have been more escalation was slow and gradual, which civilian casualties. successful on the battlefield had they been gave IR fighters much flexibility and 2) Israel’s reluctance to sustain many trained properly. The immediate cost for freedom to carry on operations. Ironically, friendly casualties. Israel was tragic: 117 soldiers and 41 by being so careful to prevent friendly 3) The IDF’s lack of recent experience civilians died and Israel suffered a huge casualties, Israel’s feeble strategy probably in regular or mountainous terrain. psychological blow. More dangerously, the caused more casualties than a robust Several key factors contributed to the war in Lebanon II gave terrorist states and strategy would have. IR’s success on the battlefield. First, IR organizations renewed hope that modern In retrospect, had the IDF secured a 40- commanders issued clear and achievable armies, like the IDF, can be defeated. kilometer area to the north of the Lebanese missions to their front-line combatants. Captain Jonathan D. Zagdanski is currently border, it would have been much easier to Their sole objective was to survive and keep a Chaplain Candidate in seminary in Israel. He began sweep the area and destroy IR targets within shooting missiles at Israel. IR soldiers his military career in 1996 when he enlisted and the area. IR fighters would have been accomplished these missions well while attended Basic Combat Training and Airborne School trapped without the ability to escape north. inflicting IDF casualties. Second, IR at Fort Benning, Georgia. He then served three years with the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. After IDF’s Failed Tactics — Initially, the soldiers had excellent knowledge of the graduating Ranger School, he attended IDF thought that the IR’s main defensive terrain and were more committed to fight Candidate School and was assigned to Task Force line would be right at the border with Israel, and win than the average IDF soldier. 1-30, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division. when in reality, they were much deeper Third, the IR fought the IDF with the A list of references for this article is on file and available through Infantry Magazine. inland. IR forces baited the IDF into coming minimum amount of fighters needed.

September-October 2007 INFANTRY 35