Erdoğan and Öcalan Begin Talks WP a Paradigm Shift in Turkey’S Kurdish Policy and a New Strategy of the PKK

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Erdoğan and Öcalan Begin Talks WP A Paradigm Shift in Turkey’s Kurdish Policy and a New Strategy of the PKK

Kevin Matthees and Günter Seufert S

The ceasefire between the Turkish government and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is more than just a new attempt by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s administration to bring an end to the asymmetric war that has been waged for nearly 30 years in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish south-east. For the first time, the Turkish government has demonstrated its willingness to recognise PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned since 1999, as the chief negotiator for the Kurdish side. Although the negotiations are being held as unofficial talks under the aegis of the Turkish intelligence services (MİT), the prime minister himself and members of his cabinet have directly commented on their progress. Of no less significance are the changes on the part of the Kurdish movement. Under Öcalan’s influence, representatives of the pro- Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) have backed away from seeking to establish a Kurdish national state. Öcalan himself has even been voicing doubts about the whole idea of the nation state as such. Thus, the outlines of a new vision for Turkey and for the country’s future role in the Middle East, shared by the Turkish government and the militant Kurdish opposition, are beginning to emerge.

After month-long negotiations with the would not take advantage of a truce to carry Turkish intelligence services, the leader out attacks against PKK fighters withdraw- of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), ing from Turkish territory to northern Iraq Abdullah Öcalan, marked the start of the and Syria. This practically amounts to an ac- Kurdish New Year on 21 March 2013 with ceptance of the PKK’s long-standing demand a call for an end to the armed insurrection. for a mutual ceasefire. On the very same day, Murat Karayılan, A series of confidence-building measures commander of the armed wing of the par- had preceded this change in policy. On ty, ordered an indefinite ceasefire. In ex- 13 March 2013, armed PKK militants in the change, the Turkish air force has since sus- Kurdish region of northern Iraq near the pended its strikes on PKK positions in the Turkish border had released eight Turkish Qandil mountains in northern Iraq. Prime civil servants, some of whom had been held Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had stated captive for more than one and a half years. several times that the Turkish military It seems that the Turkish intelligence ser-

Kevin Matthees is an intern at SWP’s EU External Relations Division SWP Comments 13 Dr. Günter Seufert is a Senior Associate in SWP’s EU External Relations Division April 2013

vice had been engaged in secret talks with completed their withdrawal by early Öcalan on behalf of the government since November, Turkey is supposed to change as early as November 2012. With Ankara’s laws that exclude Kurds from politics and blessing, two parliament members from criminalise Kurdish political positions. This the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party should include, for instance, lowering the (BDP) had visited Öcalan in early January 10-percent threshold for parliamentary rep- 2013 at the high-security prison on the resentation to a level that is more in line island of İmralı, where he is being held. A with the standard European practice, for- second BDP delegation that had met with mulating a clearer – and more restricted – Öcalan on 23 February delivered letters definition of terrorism in both the counter- from him to top officials of the BDP, to terrorism law and the penal code, as well as the current PKK military leadership in the releasing political prisoners. Local authori- Qandil mountains of northern Iraq, as ties should receive more powers and in well as to the PKK’s inner circle of leaders regions with significant Kurdish popula- in Europe. In these dispatches, Öcalan tions, native language instruction should explained his decision to halt the armed be provided and Kurdish declared the campaign, specified the reforms he ex- second official language. These reforms pected from the Turkish state and outlined should find their symbolic expression in the steps to be taken in the withdrawal of the removal of references to “Turkishness” PKK militants from Turkey. After receiving and thus ethnic criteria from the Constitu- responses from the BDP as well as from PKK tion’s definition of citizenship. Once the leaders in northern Iraq and Europe, on unchecked pursuit of Kurdish political 21 March Öcalan called for an end to the interests, including those of former PKK fighting. members, is possible within the civil-politi- The peace process did suffer a setback, cal process, the PKK will, according to Öca- however, in early April. Erdoğan pressed for lan’s roadmap, lay down its arms for good. the PKK fighters to lay down their weapons One of the government’s first reactions and leave Turkey whilst at the same time to the plan was to admonish the PKK mili- refusing to seek parliamentary approval for tants to complete their withdrawal by late his policy, as demanded by the Kurdish June or, at the very latest, early November side. The government wants to prevent the when budget deliberations begin. PKK from gaining legitimacy as a result of This peace plan of the PKK leader basi- the negotiations. Yet it will not be possible cally represents a slightly watered-down to keep this from happening. In an effort to version of the measures that he already build public support for the initiative, the proposed in 2009. So why is the Turkish government has established a “council of government now embracing a course of the wise” consisting of 63 prominent public action that it rejected in the past? figures, which is set to begin its work in the coming days. The peace plan proposed by Öcalan re- Domestic policy: an about-face on quires armed militants to withdraw from central convictions and positions Turkey to bases in northern Iraq and Syria. Many observers have answered this ques- The pull-back is to be overseen by parlia- tion by saying that Prime Minister Erdoğan ment and monitored by civil society orga- seeks to move Turkey to a presidential sys- nisations. At the same time, Turkey is sup- tem of government and is therefore alter- posed to initiate confidence-building ing the constitution for just this purpose, measures like setting up a truth-finding with the ultimate aim of becoming the commission to address past human rights country’s first president with expanded violations and political murders in the powers in August 2014. They have pointed Kurdish region. Once PKK militants have out that as his party lacks the qualified

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majority needed to make changes to the ernment is aware of the limited reach of charter on its own, Erdoğan needs the sup- its former military and political strategy of port of the pro-Kurdish BDP and is promis- marginalising the PKK. The present decision ing to give the Kurds greater local auton- to change course can only be understood omy in return. against this backdrop, which compels Tur- Yet as accurate as this description of key to fundamentally revise its previous Erdoğan’s personal motivations may be, it positions on the Kurdish conflict as well as alone cannot explain the current strategic its very conception of itself. shift. Too great is the risk that Erdoğan This explains why Ankara is allowing runs if his initiative fails; too deeply in- the legal pro-Kurdish BDP to take part in grained are the taboos that this new policy the current talks the government is con- challenges. ducting with Öcalan and the PKK, thus Through the present negotiations with recognising the BDP as the official political the PKK, the government has implicitly arm of the PKK. It was precisely the refusal turned against its previously held notion to make this concession that led to eight that a 30-year armed guerilla movement pro-Kurdish parties being either outlawed could be permanently defeated and the or forced to dissolve over the last 21 years. Kurdish problem solved by military means The second taboo that has been broken alone. The PKK consisted of only around concerns Öcalan himself. In the past 30 150 recruits when it began to mount years he was cast as the arch enemy of the attacks in 1984. It is assumed that 1,500 to Turkish people and nation. To negotiate 2,000 militants are active in Turkey today. with him means crossing a psychological Öcalan also claims that the PKK has 10,000 barrier – probably the most emphatically militants in northern Iraq, 40,000 in Iran drawn red line of the former Kurdish and another 50,000 in Syria. After three policy. Yet today the government is com- decades of hostilities and some 40,000 lost mitted to having Öcalan, previously vilified lives, Ankara has come to the conclusion as the head terrorist, serve as the main link that the PKK would still be a force to be between the BDP and PKK, thus recognising reckoned with even if it succeeded in re- him as representative of the Kurdish na- ducing the movement to its original size. tional movement. What is more, by enter- The resumption of negotiations also ing into negotiations with Öcalan and the testifies to the dwindling confidence of the PKK, the government implicitly accepts the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) idea that the sovereign state of Turkey is in its ability to maintain strong support made up of two peoples – the Turks and from broad segments of the Kurdish elec- the Kurds. torate. Erdoğan’s AKP may have garnered As all of this represents a radical depar- roughly half of all votes cast throughout ture from earlier views, it has produced a the predominantly Kurdish populated strong reaction among nationalist oppo- regions in the last two parliamentary elec- sition parties in Parliament. The Nationalist tions, but support within its base there has Movement Party (MHP) has been organising experienced a sharp collapse in the past few demonstrations in the western part of the years. For the first time, explicitly Kurdish- country commemorating the founding of Islamic parties have been formed, which the Republic of Turkey as a state of the from now on will compete with the AKP Turks and branding the peace negotiations for the votes of pious Kurds. On top of that, as a step toward the dissolution of this the secular ideology of Kurdish nationalism same state. The MHP has accused Erdoğan is spreading among the religious-leaning of treason and threatened to bring him to Kurdish population that has normally trial before the supreme criminal tribunal. voted for the AKP. Ankara’s negotiations The secularist Republican People’s Party with the PKK are a clear sign that the gov- (CHP), which leads the opposition, is also

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not in favour of involving Öcalan in the attractiveness in the region. Bashar negotiations. In the parliamentary com- al-Assad’s refusal to implement reforms, mission that has been drafting a new con- however, made clear just how little in- stitution since May 2012, both parties have fluence Turkey retained over Syria. Now been putting up stiff resistance to any we may even see an erosion of the common revisions that would alter the ethnically ground that initially existed between defined concept of citizenship and to the Ankara and Washington concerning sup- use of Kurdish as a language of instruction port for the Syrian opposition. Unlike the in schools, thereby underscoring their United States, Turkey has been advocating rejection of the entire peace plan. for some time the creation of no-fly zones The government’s decision to work with and humanitarian corridors, in other the PKK is also highly controversial among words, for military measures to be carried the population. A survey in Istanbul – out against Assad. Also in contrast to the which provides a good picture of Turkey as United States, Turkey rejects negotiations a whole because its residents come from all with the regime on principle. Moreover, parts of Anatolia and represent different Ankara has given little consideration to the social segments – showed that a majority of dangers associated with weapons financed respondents were opposed to negotiations by Saudi Arabia and Qatar falling into the with Öcalan; only a fourth welcomed the hands of radical Islamic groups. talks. This policy even fails to find support Turkey’s cooperation with the Sunni among the majority of AKP voters. powers Saudi Arabia and Qatar on Syria Erdoğan is taking a significant risk by has also resulted in worsening its rift with letting Öcalan participate in the negotia- Shiite-controlled Iraq and in increasing tions with the PKK. The goal of securing tensions with Shiite Iran. Both of these domestic peace does not sufficiently ex- countries support Assad. Davutoğlu’s plan plain why this step was taken. In fact, for Turkey becoming the decisive power foreign policy challenges and opportunities in the Middle East through closer ties with have played a crucial role in bringing about Syria has failed for the time being. this change of course. Yet the developments in Syria have not only proved to be a hurdle to Turkey’s regional ambitions – they have once again The Syria factor made Ankara aware that the Kurdish policy It was in Syria that the so-called new for- it has pursued so far is unsustainable. No eign policy pursued by Turkish Foreign natural border divides Turkish and Syrian Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu hit the rocks Kurds, which have close historical and for the first time. Syria had been the poster family ties. The PKK has been recruiting child for the strategy of economic penetra- Kurdish youth from Syria for two decades. tion and its corollary of countries in the The Syrian regime’s retreat from the border region forging strong political links with region with Turkey has enabled Kurds Turkey – which is seeking to establish itself living in northern Syria to take control of as the new central actor in the Middle East. local government in large parts of their Some of the measures taken toward this population centres. In the usual rhetoric, goal included regular government con- the Turkish government initially declared sultations, military and cultural collabora- in summer 2012 that they would not toler- tion with Damascus as well as free trade ate any form of Kurdish self-government in agreements and the mutual lifting of visa Syria and threatened with military inter- requirements with Damascus, Amman and vention. It then focused on persuading Beirut. Before civil war broke out in Syria, Masud Barzani, president of the federal Ankara had believed that the upheavals in Kurdish state in northern Iraq, to use his the Arab world would increase Turkey’s influence to push the Syrian Kurds in a

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direction favourable to Ankara’s interests. This new wealth has unleashed a veri- But the Kurdish National Council, a coali- table consumer frenzy, which has been tion of twelve smaller parties founded in particularly profitable for Turkey. Around 2011 under the patronage of Barzani, has 80 percent of the food and clothing bought not proven capable of altering the domi- by the Kurds in northern Iraq comes from nant role of the Democratic Union Party Turkey, and around 60 percent of all the (PYD) among Syrian Kurds. foreign companies registered in the region The PYD shares the same ideology as the are Turkish. In 2011 no less than 1,200 PKK and regards Öcalan as its intellectual Turkish companies were active in Iraq, in- mentor. After Iraq, Syria is the second coun- cluding 300 construction and civil engi- try in the region whose ongoing disintegra- neering companies, and were developing tion is turning Turkey’s Kurdish problem whole new districts in the city of Erbil. into a regional and even international issue Today, Iraq is Turkey’s second largest – one that cannot be resolved with the tra- export destination after Germany, with ditional Turkish-nationalist policy. Unlike growth averaging 18 percent in the first the Kurds in northern Iraq, the Syrian eleven months of 2012. Kurds lack a single strong figure and are Impressive as these figures are, the closely aligned with the PKK leader. region’s economic prospects for the future are even more significant. Northern Iraq has the energy resources that Turkey lacks. The Iraq factor Gas imports from northern Iraq would give In the run-up to the war against Saddam Ankara more leeway to negotiate with Hussein’s Iraq, in Turkey both the advo- Russia, on whose supplies it is heavily de- cates and opponents of joining the US-led pendent. Importing oil from Iraq would “coalition of the willing” were agreed that free Turkey from its awkward position the establishment of a Kurdish state in between Iran, its main oil supplier, and the northern Iraq should be avoided at all costs. US, its strategic ally. It is not without cause Today, the Kurdistan Regional Government that the Turkish government is talking (KRG) in Erbil is Turkey’s most important about two “compatible economies” and ally in the region. For the (Sunni) Kurds pressing for economic integration between in Iraq, close ties with Turkey are the best the two countries. hope they have of maintaining their auton- The Kurdish Regional Government’s omy from the central government in Bagh- minister of trade and industry has already dad now the US has pulled out of the coun- told Turkish journalists that the region’s try. Erbil and Baghdad are at loggerheads gas reserves could supply Turkey with over the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, the ex- enough gas for 300 years, based on today’s act borders of the Kurdish settlement area, consumption of 40 billion cubic metres per and the Kurdish regional government’s year. trade and defence policy competences. Despite opposition from Baghdad, Erbil They are also divided on the issue of Syria. has signed exploration and production Turkey’s U-turn in its policy on Erbil was agreements with companies like Gazprom, initially due to US pressure and its expec- Total and Exxon Mobil. The Kurdish Re- tations that Turkey should help secure the gional Government is also touting with stability of Iraq. An additional factor was the huge oil deposits in Kirkuk province the increasing need to restrict the PKK’s (around 7% of the world’s oil reserves), even influence in northern Iraq. Today, econo- though the status of the province is far mic cooperation is thriving between Ankara from clear. and Erbil. Between 2004 and 2011, the in- Turkey has not been standing by idly come per capita in Kurdish northern Iraq either. In a bid to better equip itself in the rocketed from around $300 to around $4,500. dash for the fossil fuel reserves in Iraqi

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Kurdistan, Ankara has reorganised the Turkish nation-state and wish to transform division of tasks between its three major their concept into a programme aimed at state-owned exploration, production and establishing a new type of statehood in the distribution companies, TPAO, TPİC and Near East. In this quest they are aligned BOTAŞ, and has increased their capital and with the foreign policy programme of For- production capacity. eign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The Iraqi Kurds are thus becoming a key factor in Turkey’s economic future. Even now the boom in northern Iraq is having The end of “Sykes-Picot” and the a positive economic impact on the under- authoritarian nation states of developed Kurdish provinces in south- the Middle East eastern Turkey. In an interview on 5 March 2013 in pro- government newspaper Yeni Şafak, Davu- toğlu directly linked the search for a settle- Cross-border “threat” and ment with the PKK with the approaching “potential” end of the Sykes-Picot era in the Middle The Syrian-Kurdish “threat” and the Iraqi- East. The term refers to the agreement con- Kurdish future potential are both cross- cluded by France and the United Kingdom border in nature. Whereas the Syrian in 1916 that provided the basis for defining “threat” shows Turkey’s limited options the borders of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon to shield itself against undesirable devel- and south-eastern Turkey. According to opments outside its territory, the Turkish- Davutoğlu, the European powers intention- Iraqi border stands in the way of complete ally drew the borders between the region’s integration of the economies of Turkey and different Muslim peoples in a way that Iraqi-Kurdistan. Both “threat” and “poten- served their own interests and made bloody tial” are closely linked with the existence of conflicts between the various groups in- the Kurds in Turkey. From a wider perspec- evitable. He said that it was now time to tive, the scattered Kurdish minorities in rethink the artificial borders that have Turkey, Iraq and Syria and the cross-border separated the peoples of one shared civili- integration of these nations’ economies sation for so long. He went on to say that reveals the dysfunctionality of existing the region’s history would not allow for nation-states and their current borders. such geographical borders and that Indeed, the real motive behind the modern Turkey would put an end to this Turkish government’s decision to risk nego- period in which its fate and that of the tiating with Öcalan is to counter this dys- Middle East’s was determined by foreign functionality of the (Turkish) nation-state. powers. Davutoğlu did not neglect to add It is based on a new vision of the Turkish that existing borders would be accepted. Republic and its relationship to the Kurds However, according to opinions from his of the region. circle of political associates, it is possible Needless to say, moves to solve the that five to ten years down the line, the Turkish-Kurdish problem would lessen the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria could “threat” from Syria and raise the prospects become part of an entirely restructured of tapping the economic potential of north- federalised Turkey. ern Iraq. There is also consensus that in In fact, the idea of joining northern order to solve the Turkish-Kurdish problem, Iraq to Turkey is not new. When Saddam the Turkish nation state must revise its Hussein was driven out of Kuwait in the ideology and reform its administration. early 1990s, Turkish President Turgut Özal Today Erdoğan and Öcalan share a common toyed with the idea of Turkey forming a fed- vision which stands out in that both sub- eration with the Kurdish region of northern scribe to the need to actively reshape the Iraq, under the proviso that the Turkish

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statehood would remain unchanged. Özal cifically excluded pious Muslims and other was, in fact, drawing on a position that has ethnic groups, notably the Kurds, from the existed in Turkey since its very foundation political process. Erdoğan’s AKP represents as a republic. After World War I when the integration of pious Muslims into the the Muslim organisations in the Anatolia country’s political and economic elite. This region signed the “National Pact” (Misak-i process has been flanked by criticism of the Millî) and joined together in a freedom nation state and an idealisation of the cul- movement to liberate themselves from tural diversity of the Ottoman Empire. It their European occupiers, Mosul province thus stands to reason that the settlement was also involved and was to become part with the Kurds is being considered and of the new state. legitimised within these same parameters, In his declaration on 21 March 2013, which have become firmly established in Abdullah Öcalan explicitly referred to this Turkey. In this respect, the Kurdish settle- “National Pact”, which was jointly con- ment complements Davutoğlu’s concept of cluded by the Turks and Kurds of the Otto- a Turkey that is plural in ethnic terms and man Empire. Öcalan called on the “Kurds, Muslim dominated in terms of religion, and Turkomans, Assyrians and Arabs who are which sees itself as the central power in the separated despite the National Pact and region. This concept is a regional version of today have been condemned to live … in global developments, which are leading to a conflict with one another within the Syrian critical re-evaluation of the nation state and and Iraqi Arab Republic” to show solidarity its political and economic premises all over with one another. Like Davutoğlu, Öcalan the world. It then also becomes necessary is not referring to ethnic or religious soli- to redefine the demos in a way that is not darity here, but a solidarity based on a based on ethnic distinctions. New common common history and civilisation. Öcalan ground must be found, and thus the ref- was also speaking in a very similar vein to erences to a shared history, civilisation and Davutoğlu when he said that it was time to religion are not altogether surprising. move beyond the authoritarian politics of At the domestic policy level, this solu- the last 100 years, which negated ethnic tion to the problem of the Turkish, Iraqi and religious differences and assimilated and Syrian Kurds seems to be the only people by force. He said that in the early realistic option at the present time. The 1920s Turks and Kurds fought side by side majority of the Turkish population, with its for the freedom of Turkey, and that today strong sense of nationalistic pride, will only Turks and Kurds represented “the main support a solution to the Kurdish problem strategic powers in the Middle East”. He that promises increased power and eco- called on them to play a leading role in nomic advantages for Turkey. For the PKK, defining the new democratic era in the this kind of solution allows it to do more region. Öcalan also holds “the imperial- than just save face after 30 years of fighting ists” responsible for establishing author- and gives it a chance to share power. For itarian nation states in the Middle East the Kurdish population in Turkey, it opens and, like Davutoğlu, does not fail to up the prospect of an end to the war and of point out the two peoples’ shared one- economic growth. With regard to regional thousand-year history “under the banner policy, this “alliance” of the Turkish and of Islam”. Iraqi Kurds with Turkey (despite all the rhetoric about Islam) provides a Sunni- secular counterweight to the Shiite arc of World view, strategy and tactics Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah. A To make it possible to found a secular significant number of observers in Turkey Turkish nation at all, Kemalism, the state also see a connection between the peace ideology of the Republic of Turkey, spe- plan and Israel’s recent apology for killing

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Turkish citizens during the attack on the Gaza aid flotilla in June 2010. However, Turkish and Kurdish nationalism could still shatter this common vision of the Republic of Turkey and its previous greatest foe, the PKK. Erdoğan is therefore remaining as vague as possible about the concessions he is actually prepared to make once the PKK fighters have withdrawn. For the same reason, Öcalan, the PKK and the BDP are showing unprecedented modera- tion. Nonetheless, the PKK leadership in the Qandil mountains and in Europe is insist- ing that Öcalan’s prison conditions be im-

These Comments reflect in order to convince them of his new solely the authors’ views. strategy.

SWP That is just one of the stumbling stones Stiftung Wissenschaft und on the path to success. If the current pro- Politik German Institute for cess fails, we will see new and harder International and battles, as no alternative concepts or con- Security Affairs siderations are in sight. The skirmishes in Ludwigkirchplatz 34 recent months between the Arab-Sunni 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 groups supported by Turkey and Syrian- Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Kurdish PYD fighters show that sooner or www.swp-berlin.org later this conflict will also spread to Syria [email protected] and create yet another war front there. This ISSN 1861-1761 would also endanger Turkey’s good rela-

Translation by tions to northern Iraq, which would in turn English Express e.K., Berlin open the doors to an expansion of Iran’s

(English version of influence in the region. SWP-Aktuell 25/2013) European politicians should therefore do everything in their power to support the negotiation process, even if its success would put an end to all discussions about Turkey becoming a member of the Euro- pean Union.

SWP Comments 13 April 2013