Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare
NY DISCUSSION of doctrine and asym- A metry must begin by acknowledging the ten- Tactics are employed against an sion inherent between the role of doctrine and the asymmetric opponent in the course of combat, nature of asymmetry in warfare. Doctrine should but there can be no set of tactics checklists succinctly express the collective wisdom about how for asymmetric warfare, since each application U.S. Armed Forces conduct military operations. In is unique. Tactics are whatever we do against 1923, historian J.F.C. Fuller wrote that “the central an asymmetric opponent when we arrange idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to forces to counter that opponent. be sound must be principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mu- antidotes, and the ability to attack or defeat the tation in accordance with change in circumstance. enemy’s delivery means, civil support, and so on. In its ultimate relationship to the human understand- Such preparation serves to deter the use of biologi- ing this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than cal weapons, because the opponent’s original asym- common sense—that is, action adapted to circum- 1 metric advantage has been reduced. stance.” Unfortunately, uncertainty is inseparable from the While asymmetric warfare encompasses a wide nature of warfare, and asymmetry increases uncer- scope of theory, experience, conjecture, and defini- tainty. Those who expect doctrine and tactics, tech- tion, the implicit premise is that asymmetric warfare niques, and procedures (TTP) to provide solutions deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, and checklists for action are soon disabused of that ways, and means. The more dissimilar the opponent, notion during actual operations. If and when the en- the more difficult it is to anticipate his actions. If we emy surprises us with a capability, our response is knew in advance how an opponent planned to ex- necessarily ad hoc and less effective. Depending on ploit our dissimilarities, we could develop specific our preconceptions and ability to adapt, the advan- doctrine to counter his actions. Against asymmetric tage an opponent enjoys might persist. Doctrine must opponents, doctrine should provide a way to think prepare the military force with a mindset to deal with about asymmetry and an operational philosophy that uncertainty quickly and effectively. The Japanese would take asymmetry fully into account. navy’s Long Lance torpedo illustrates our failure to One way to look at asymmetric warfare is to see deal with an asymmetric threat. it as a classic action-reaction-counteraction cycle. Our enemies study our doctrine and try to counter Japan’s Long Lance Torpedo it. Any competent enemy will do the unexpected, if In the years between World War I and World he believes it will work. When we understand the War II, the U.S. and Japanese navies pursued dif- asymmetry, we counter it, and so forth. For example, ferent technical and tactical solutions to naval sur- if a potential opponent has biological weapons and face combat. The U.S. Navy focused on very long- the United States does not, our preparation occurs range daylight gunnery, supported by seaplane across a technological, doctrinal, and operational spotters and sophisticated analog computers.2 For the range in terms of force protection, development of computers to calculate a firing solution, the firing
18 July -August 2003 MILITARY REVIEW ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ship had to maintain a steady course to allow the ing the term doctrine are referring to the whole body computer to “settle down” and provide accurate data of doctrine and fail to separate out each com- to the turrets. ponent’s specific role. Defining each component’s The Japanese Navy developed the Type 93 Long role is a seemingly minor distinction, but it is impor- Lance torpedo that carried a large warhead and tant to understanding since each component plays could travel 20,000 yards or more at speeds of up 3 to 45 knots. The Japanese had an ideal fire-and- Examples of asymmetry and adaptation forget system. In consequence, the Japanese trained to it can be found in insurgency warfare and the to fight at night, with radically maneuvering destroy- development of counterinsurgency forces and ers and cruisers that fired torpedoes. doctrine. At a tactical level, we can see the For more than 2 years after the U.S. Navy en- effects of the machinegun, accurate indirect countered the Long Lance in early 1942, it did not artillery, and barbed wire during World War I. appreciate the weapon’s capabilities. The two navies We can study the development of storm tactics had proceeded down different asymmetric paths, and and the armor with which to counter them. U.S. torpedo development had many shortcomings. We can analyze U.S. air attacks on the Serbs in U.S. torpedoes were quite slow, carried a smaller Kosovo and appreciate the Serbs’ deception warhead, had a range of less than 10,000 yards, and and camouflage tactics. often failed to explode even when striking a target. In consequence, the U.S. Navy projected its poor capabilities onto those of the opponent’s and refused a different part in how the military operates. More to believe that the Japanese could deploy a superior germane is that each component has a slightly torpedo. Eventually, U.S. air power, radar-directed different role with respect to asymmetry, and gunfire, and other tactical adaptations restored some each has a different cyclic rate in terms of its de- balance, but throughout the war, the Japanese tor- velopment and useful life. pedo baffled Navy planners. The U.S. Navy suf- Effective doctrine explains how we expect to fered an asymmetric technological and tactical fight and operate based on past experience and surprise. Because we did not anticipate the a best guess of what lies ahead. Doctrine— weapon and, indeed, could not accept that the Japa- Provides the link between research, theory, nese had it, we had no easy answers, and it took history, experimentation, and practice. years to adapt. Encapsulates a body of knowledge and ex- perience so it can be applied. Developing U.S. Doctrine Provides common understanding and a com- To get beyond the tension inherent between mon language, which allows us to articulate clearly asymmetry and doctrine, our focus is on two obser- and succinctly what Army forces should accomplish. vations about asymmetry that to many of our po- The narrow definition of doctrine is “fundamen- tential opponents we are highly relevant to the de- tal principles by which the military forces or elements velopment of U.S. doctrine. The first is the thereof guide their actions in support of national ob- requirement to understand that to many of our po- jectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in tential opponents we appear to be as asymmetric application.”4 To distinguish between the broad con- as they appear to be to us. To the al-Qaeda fighter, cept, including all four components, and the more cowering in a cave in a remote part of Afghanistan, narrow definition, we can italicize the latter. fuel air explosives, dropped with deadly precision As Fuller noted, Army doctrine should provide an from aircraft miles away and thousands of feet up, operational concept, a philosophy of how the Army directed by laser designators wielded by highly operates.5 In doing so, doctrine must reconcile op- trained and stealthy special operation forces (SOF), erational requirements with the force’s perceived is as asymmetric to him as his tactics are to us. The strengths. Armies operate best when capitalizing on second point is that doctrine cannot predict the na- demonstrated capabilities and asymmetric strengths. ture and form of asymmetric conflicts, but it can History contains many examples of military failure forecast the necessary traits and body of concep- occasioned by attempts to match an enemy’s style tual knowledge necessary to cope with a chaotic of warfare despite friendly forces being ill-suited to asymmetric operational environment. the challenge. To understand the role of doctrine, we must dis- Tactics. Tactics deals with how units are em- tinguish between doctrine and TTP. Most people us- ployed during combat.6 The actual application of
MILITARY REVIEW July -August 2003 19 Tactics vary constantly with the situa- A Japanese Type 93 torpedo tion. There is no playbook of tactical so- fired from a destroyer blew away the bow of the heavy lutions; the tactics manual only offers a cruiser USS Minneapolis on menu from which to choose. Tactics are 30 November 1942. Only the crew’s high level of training employed against an asymmetric oppo- kept the ship afloat. nent in the course of combat, but there can be no set of tactics checklists for asymmetric warfare, since each applica- tion is unique. Tactics are whatever we do against an asymmetric opponent when we arrange forces to counter that oppo- nent. What differentiates tactics against an asymmetric opponent is that we might not have ever used that particular com- bination of options before, or we might have to incorporate new and novel op- tions to counter asymmetry. When con- fronted by a situation, leaders must choose from a variety of possible solu- tions and adapt their solution to circum- stances at the point of engagement. Techniques and procedures. Tech- niques are the general, detailed methods US Navy The Japanese Navy developed the Type 93 troops and commanders use to perform Long Lance torpedo that carried a large warhead and assigned missions and functions, specifi- could travel 20,000 yards or more at speeds of up to 45 cally methods of using equipment and knots. The Japanese had an ideal fire-and-forget system. personnel. Procedures are standard and In consequence, the Japanese trained to fight at night, detailed courses of action that describe with radically maneuvering destroyers and how to perform tasks. Techniques and cruisers that fired torpedoes. procedures, the lowest level of the broad term doctrine, are internal to the force. They are specialized to particular types tactics is highly circumstantial and is both science of units based on organization, equipment, and and art. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tac- environment.9 This is the standard operating pro- tics, states, “The science of tactics encompasses the cedures (SOP) level of warfare, or as the Marines understanding of those military aspects of tactics— refer to it, the “technical” level of war. Techniques capabilities, techniques, and procedures—that can and procedures are a standard of operating instilled be measured and codified. The art of tactics con- through training. sists of three interrelated aspects: the creative and The adage that forces “fight as they train” is ap- flexible array of means to accomplish assigned mis- plicable. Armies cannot afford to make everything sions; decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty up as they go. Of necessity we apply existing tech- when faced with an intelligent enemy; and under- niques and procedures against asymmetric oppo- standing the human dimension—the effects of nents, and with some adaptation, they work. In other combat on soldiers. The tactician invokes the art of cases, if there are no existing techniques and pro- tactics to solve tactical problems within his cedures, and innovative combinations of existing commander’s intent by choosing from interrelated techniques and procedures will not work, we develop options, such as forms of maneuver, tactical mission new techniques and procedures to integrate into ex- tasks, and arrangement and choice of control mea- isting ones to solve a unique problem. If it appears sures.”7 Note, in particular, the description of the art the situation that prompted the change might recur, of tactics—“decisionmaking under conditions of un- we must tell other forces about the solution so they certainty when faced with an intelligent enemy”— do not have to learn from bitter experience. One for this is almost a direct link between tactics and would believe that U.S. Army soldiers in Afghani- asymmetry.8 stan are still adapting and applying the drills and
20 July -August 2003 MILITARY REVIEW 7th Infantry Division troops use a flame- thrower to rout out Japanese snipers on Kwajalein, February 1944. US Army
Marines and soldiers developed specialized drills for eliminating Japanese caves and underground fortifications during the war in the Pacific. Making changes to techniques and procedures that will be effective across the force requires experimentation, training, and dissemination. These actions are part of the adaptive nature of combat.
SOPs they learned before they deployed. be lessened as a function of improved command and Every competent military force adapts. Units control and intelligence, but as events demonstrate modify techniques and procedures constantly ac- in Afghanistan and indeed in every conflict in which cording to circumstance and knowledge gained America has fought, it cannot be eliminated. Uncer- through experience. This is certainly not new or tainty is an enduring facet of warfare and arises unique to dealing with dissimilar opponents. When from— confronted with anti-handling devices on mines and A lack of intelligence about enemy intentions, other booby traps in Italy in World War II, the Army such as whether or not Saddam Hussein’s intent developed procedures for clearing and marking ar- was to attack Saudi Arabia. eas as well as specific techniques for disarming the The timing, location, or even the existence of devices. Similarly, Marines and soldiers developed a plan of attack, such as the German Ardennes Of- specialized drills for eliminating Japanese caves and fensive. underground fortifications during the war in the Pa- The effectiveness or even existence of a new cific. Making changes to techniques and procedures weapon, such as the Type 93 Torpedo. that will be effective across the force requires ex- The development of a new form of warfare, perimentation, training, and dissemination. These ac- such as the blitzkrieg. tions are part of the adaptive nature of combat. Ad- Some would argue that uncertainty, as a function aptation is critical to military success, since warfare, of asymmetry, has increased with the spread of whether asymmetric or not, deals with uncertainty. technology and the juxtaposition of conflicting aims, not only between nation-states, but also between Uncertainty and the Unexpected nonstate actors. Certainly evidence exists that the German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz potential for asymmetric operations increases as a noted that uncertainty is fundamental to warfare.10 function of the number of potential conflicts and To some greater or lesser degree, uncertainty might combinations of opponents, technical means, cultural
MILITARY REVIEW July -August 2003 21 XX US Army
Twenty-first century Information-Age operations in full swing as computer-savvy troopers of the 101st Air Assault Division attempt to search animal- transport, Narizah, Afghanistan, July 2003. We have assimilated and adopted ideas from Jomini, Clausewitz, Fuller, and others who explain the phenomena of combat. Added to this collection of principles and classical theory are things like battlefield operating systems and battlespace. But, have we really examined the nature of 21st-century operations and the theoretical implications? To what extent is current frustration with asymmetric opponents and operations the product of industrial-age theory attempting to direct Information-Age operations? perceptions, and values. Potential opponents under- nor opportunity to do more than prescribe the sev- stand that picking a conventional fight with U.S. eral tasks of the several subordinates. . . . If they forces is tantamount to suicide. As the potential for are reluctant to act because they are accustomed asymmetry increases, so does the level of uncer- to detailed orders and instructions—if they are not tainty and the potential for tactical, operational, and habituated to think, to judge, to decide and to act for strategic surprise. themselves. . . , we shall be in sorry case when the Asymmetry is really nothing more than taking the time of active operations arrives.”11 Doctrine must level of uncertainty, or surprise, to a new level that embrace a philosophy of initiative and creative think- involves novel ways, means, or even ends. From a ing to counter uncertainty. The more asymmetric the doctrinal perspective, our response is the same, opponent, the more important this is. Training must whether the enemy’s asymmetry is a low-level tac- complement a philosophy of operations that empha- tical innovation or a completely novel strategic ap- sizes uncertainty. Training doctrine must stress sol- proach. We must be astute enough to recognize that diers and leaders by putting them in unfamiliar cir- something has changed and then be flexible enough cumstances and forcing them to think creatively. to create an effective response. Doctrine must fa- To remain relevant, doctrine must recognize the cilitate this. elements of uncertainty and the unexpected. Of Dealing with the unexpected requires rapid ad- course, doctrine cannot predict the unexpected, yet justment to the actual situation. To the degree that it must go further than banalities. Doctrine must of- doctrine becomes overly proscriptive, it becomes ir- fer the educational foundation and the tool set re- relevant. Worse, it instills in the service a penchant quired to comprehend and effect successful opera- for proceeding by the book whether warranted by tions, not in spite of but because of their increasing circumstances or not. World War II Chief of Naval asymmetric nature. Imparting the tool set is a func- Operations Admiral Ernest King warned against this tion of training, education, and self-study. Applying in 1940 when he said, “There will be neither time the tools is a function of leadership. Army doctrine
22 July -August 2003 MILITARY REVIEW XX should embody a philosophy of operations that recognizes uncertainty as a fundamen- tal aspect of warfare. Doctrine must illus- trate the adaptive nature of a thinking, will- ful opponent and stress the absence of prescription in doctrine. But, doctrine can- not stop there. Initiative and Adaptation An enduring lesson that doctrine must emphasize is that warfare is about adap- tation when confronting asymmetry. Ex- amples of asymmetry and adaptation to it can be found in insurgency warfare and the development of counterinsurgency forces and doctrine. At a tactical level, we Australian soldiers gassed can see the effects of the machinegun, by the German Army await medical attention in France, accurate indirect artillery, and barbed wire circa 1917. during World War I. We can study the development of storm tactics and the ar- mor with which to counter them. We can analyze U.S. air attacks on the Serbs in Kosovo and appreciate the Serbs’ decep- tion and camouflage tactics. Australian War Memorial The Army’s experience at the height of Military history provides numerous examples of the Indian wars is illustrative. The plains the failure to exploit advantages gained through asym- Indians were nomadic tribes who em- metry. The British use of tanks at Cambrai in 1917, the ployed guerrilla tactics against Army units. German use of chlorine gas in 1915 at Second Ypres; the The Indians’ skill and mobility allowed Union failure at the Crater at Petersburg in 1864; and our them to strike swiftly and elude pursuit. inability to couple our asymmetric mobility through Army units lacked the mobility and intel- helicopters in Vietnam to a corresponding strategy. Such ligence to force the Indians into a set-piece case studies involve the application of asymmetric means engagement where Federal forces could that failed to achieve operational or strategic success. apply superior firepower. General George Crook studied the relative strengths of op- posing forces and concluded that the In- dians lost their mobility in winter because they could adapted his forces to execute doctrine in new ways. not move far from their camps. By substituting har- We must demand this kind of creative thinking and dier mules for horses, Crook could operate over ex- initiative from our leaders. tended distances in winter and, thus, was able to at- As we write doctrine for an era of asymmetry, tack the Indians in their remote winter camps. With we must recognize the necessity of countering the their camps destroyed, the warrior bands had little asymmetry that potential and actual adversaries choice but to move to the reservations or starve.12 practice, and we must adapt our asymmetric capa- Crook’s solution was not a case of developing ex- bilities to capitalize on things to which the enemy otic technology to solve a military problem. What cannot easily respond. This is important because the was critical to success was the conscious selection U.S. military has an immense array of asymmetric from the available tools to fit the situation. Crook rec- capabilities, which are worthless if we cannot apply ognized that during the “campaigning season” the them effectively. Indians had an asymmetric advantage that the U.S. Military history provides numerous examples of Army could not easily overcome. He countered by the failure to exploit advantages gained through recognizing that the Indians had a corresponding asymmetry. The British use of tanks at Cambrai in weakness during the winter. He developed an asym- 1917, the German use of chlorine gas in 1915 at Sec- metric approach that the Indians, in turn, could not ond Ypres; the Union failure at the Crater at Pe- counter. The means selected emphasized relative tersburg in 1864; and our inability to couple our asym- strengths and complementary means to protect metric mobility through helicopters in Vietnam to a weakness. Crook did not rewrite Army doctrine; he corresponding strategy. Such case studies involve the
MILITARY REVIEW July -August 2003 23 application of asymmetric means that failed to Opportunity for unintended consequences increases achieve operational or strategic success. While with uncertainty and, in some linear fashion, with military experts might debate details, for purposes asymmetry. Army doctrine must treat asymmetry as a two-sided street. In military capabilities, U.S. forces might be the most asymmetric military force [General George Crook] concluded in history, if one enumerates specific capabilities and that the Indians lost their mobility in winter then seeks their equivalent in other armed forces because they could not move far from their around the globe. Doctrine must emphasize U.S. camps. By substituting hardier mules for horses, strengths and how to capitalize on them, applying Crook could operate over extended distances them asymmetrically. in winter and, thus, was able to attack the Doctrine must include a system able to rap- Indians in their remote winter camps. . . . He idly reassess current TTP against emerging threats, developed an asymmetric approach that the capture innovative solutions to new tactical problems, Indians, in turn, could not counter. and promulgate new TTP to the field. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) already has something that does this fairly well. CALL actively of measuring doctrine, we must understand that and regularly collects lessons learned in the form of asymmetric action could have second- and third- new and modified TTP and produces and dissemi- order effects that superficial study might not re- nates reports that capture new TTP. We need to sup- veal. These and other examples also emphasize port this effort and improve its already superb abil- the rapidity of adaptation and the fleeting oppor- ity to get the word out quickly. tunity for exploitation that might follow. Promulgating New Doctrine Characteristics Where do we stand right now in terms of Army of Effective Doctrine doctrine for operations against increasingly asymmet- Effective doctrine in an era of increasing asym- ric opponents? The June 2001 version of FM 3-0, metry must have the following characteristics: Operations, as the Army’s keystone doctrine, sets Doctrine must have an operational concept that the stage for more specific doctrine.13 The manual, includes more than high-intensity conventional war- which differs from its predecessors in that it is written fare. In an era of conventional American superior- from the perspective of dominant U.S. power, rec- ity, opponents are unlikely to try to match our ognizes that U.S. dominance stimulates asymmet- strengths and fight symmetrically. However, this is ric assaults on U.S. forces and interests. The only an advantage as long as we maintain the ca- manual offers an operational concept constructed pability. If we delete a capability, then we must re- around offensive, defensive, and stability and sup- place it with something that can counter any similar port operations. This focus is quite distinct from the enemy capability, or we will be left with an area of strong focus on warfighting in earlier manuals.14 The vulnerability. manual emphasizes subordinate initiative and the po- Doctrinal philosophy must emphasize the fore- tential for advanced technology to complement in- casting, vice predictive, nature of doctrine. As the dividual initiative. The manual also initiates explora- Army’s doctrine producers, we must forecast future tion of operational concepts such as noncontiguous operations. Like a weather forecast, ours should be operations that might reinforce U.S. asymmetric a reasonably accurate assessment in the near term, strengths. Thus far, we believe, the manual has suc- less so over extended time. We must provide an ar- cessfully anticipated the environment and types of ticulate, succinct discussion of why things happen operations occurring in Afghanistan and elsewhere. in combat (theoretical, historical, and empirical), so Where the next operations manual might need em- leaders and soldiers can understand the forecast’s phasis lies in the presentation and understanding of basis. second- and third-order effects associated with All doctrine has to emphasize creativity and asymmetric land operations, and that should be predi- preparedness to deal with an adaptive, cunning, and cated on a thorough review of military theory. typically asymmetric enemy. Doing so requires stat- Field Manual 6-0, Command and Control, now ing the problem and identifying the best available awaiting approval, should advance the climate of sub- remedy—disciplined leader initiative from the high- ordinate initiative even as the technical means of est to the lowest levels of command. control improves.15 The manual’s fundamental Doctrine must educate the Army to the fact premise is mission command defined as “the con- that military actions often have second- and third- duct of military operations through decentralized ex- order effects (the law of unintended consequences). ecution based upon mission orders for effective mis-
24 July -August 2003 MILITARY REVIEW ASYMMETRIC WARFARE sion accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons ex- Dealing with the unexpected requires ercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s rapid adjustment to the actual situation. To the intent to accomplish missions. It requires an atmo- degree that doctrine becomes overly proscriptive, sphere of trust and mutual understanding.”16 Field it becomes irrelevant. Worse, it instills in the Manual 6-0 and FM 3-90 stress creative thought in service a penchant for proceeding by the book applying current TTP to new situations, and they whether warranted by circumstances or not. highlight that some situations will require entirely new TTP for effective solutions.17 While this might suitably frame the doctrinal premise for leadership systems and battlespace. But, have we really ex- adapted to increasing asymmetry, it does not by amined the nature of 21st-century operations and the itself guarantee that training and operations reflect theoretical implications? To what extent is current the concept. That remains a collective challenge frustration with asymmetric opponents and opera- for the Army. tions the product of Industrial-Age theory attempt- Having a body of doctrine suited to the contem- ing to direct Information-Age operations? Are there porary operating environment is not sufficient. indications that older doctrinal concepts are becom- Where we need to improve is in promulgating new ing invalid? This is not to decry and expunge all cur- doctrine in the field and in the Army’s educational rent military theory and concept, since much might centers. Electronic publishing and Internet distribu- still be valid. But, we cannot be certain until we un- tion can make doctrine available faster than ever, dertake a comprehensive study of current opera- but they cannot get individual users to read and study tional theorems and recent operational experience. it. A humanistic program of education, professional What we cannot afford is to be drastically wrong development, and assimilation is still necessary. or to engage with a doctrine that has no valid an- When considering the implications for increasingly swers for asymmetric challenges. In an era of asymmetric operations, we need to initiate a com- asymmetry— prehensive review of the basic theories that under- Doctrine must create flexibility of thought and pin doctrine. Today’s doctrine traces its antecedents action by stressing the creative application of force. back to the study of military operations in the after- Doctrine must be predicated on uncertainty and math of the great European wars, particularly the not tied to prescriptive solutions to problems. Napoleonic Wars and World War I. We have as- Doctrine must be constantly reviewed at all lev- similated and adopted ideas from Jomini, Clausewitz, els to ensure we retain the useful concepts and throw Fuller, and others who explain the phenomena of out those rendered useless by opponents. combat. Added to this collection of principles and Doctrine must capitalize on our asymmetric classical theory are things like battlefield operating advantages. MR
NOTES 1. J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 8. Ibid. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1993), 254. Reprinted from the origi- 9. Ibid., par. 1-13. nal 1926 edition. 10. The actual passage reads, “War is the realm of uncertainty; three-quarters of the 2. The development of Navy gunnery computers allowed the U.S. Army Air Corps to factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncer- perfect the famous Norden bombsight and provided some of the stimulus for electronic tainty” (Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book Two, On the Nature of War, chap. 6). computers developed later in World War II. 11. Admiral Ernest King quoted in FM 6-0, Command and Control, DRAG ed. (Fort 3. For more information about the Type 93 61-centimeter (24-inch) diameter torpedo, Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate). At the time he made the state- see Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Historical Center, on-line at
Colonel Clinton J. Ancker III, U.S. Army, Retired, is Director, Combined Arms Doctrine Direc- torate (CADD), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy; master’s degrees from Long Island University, Stanford University, and the Naval War College; and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CO- NUS), Vietnam, Kuwait, and Albania, where he was Chief, USEUCOM, Military Liaison Team. Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Burke, U.S. Army, Retired, is a Military Analyst, CADD, CAC, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. from the University of California, Los Angeles, and master’s de- grees from Long Island University and CGSC. He has served in various command and staff posi- tions in CONUS, Germany, Korea, and Southwest Asia.
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