Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare NY DISCUSSION of doctrine and asym- A metry must begin by acknowledging the ten- Tactics are employed against an sion inherent between the role of doctrine and the asymmetric opponent in the course of combat, nature of asymmetry in warfare. Doctrine should but there can be no set of tactics checklists succinctly express the collective wisdom about how for asymmetric warfare, since each application U.S. Armed Forces conduct military operations. In is unique. Tactics are whatever we do against 1923, historian J.F.C. Fuller wrote that “the central an asymmetric opponent when we arrange idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to forces to counter that opponent. be sound must be principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mu- antidotes, and the ability to attack or defeat the tation in accordance with change in circumstance. enemy’s delivery means, civil support, and so on. In its ultimate relationship to the human understand- Such preparation serves to deter the use of biologi- ing this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than cal weapons, because the opponent’s original asym- common sense—that is, action adapted to circum- 1 metric advantage has been reduced. stance.” Unfortunately, uncertainty is inseparable from the While asymmetric warfare encompasses a wide nature of warfare, and asymmetry increases uncer- scope of theory, experience, conjecture, and defini- tainty. Those who expect doctrine and tactics, tech- tion, the implicit premise is that asymmetric warfare niques, and procedures (TTP) to provide solutions deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, and checklists for action are soon disabused of that ways, and means. The more dissimilar the opponent, notion during actual operations. If and when the en- the more difficult it is to anticipate his actions. If we emy surprises us with a capability, our response is knew in advance how an opponent planned to ex- necessarily ad hoc and less effective. Depending on ploit our dissimilarities, we could develop specific our preconceptions and ability to adapt, the advan- doctrine to counter his actions. Against asymmetric tage an opponent enjoys might persist. Doctrine must opponents, doctrine should provide a way to think prepare the military force with a mindset to deal with about asymmetry and an operational philosophy that uncertainty quickly and effectively. The Japanese would take asymmetry fully into account. navy’s Long Lance torpedo illustrates our failure to One way to look at asymmetric warfare is to see deal with an asymmetric threat. it as a classic action-reaction-counteraction cycle. Our enemies study our doctrine and try to counter Japan’s Long Lance Torpedo it. Any competent enemy will do the unexpected, if In the years between World War I and World he believes it will work. When we understand the War II, the U.S. and Japanese navies pursued dif- asymmetry, we counter it, and so forth. For example, ferent technical and tactical solutions to naval sur- if a potential opponent has biological weapons and face combat. The U.S. Navy focused on very long- the United States does not, our preparation occurs range daylight gunnery, supported by seaplane across a technological, doctrinal, and operational spotters and sophisticated analog computers.2 For the range in terms of force protection, development of computers to calculate a firing solution, the firing 18 July -August 2003 l MILITARY REVIEW ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ship had to maintain a steady course to allow the ing the term doctrine are referring to the whole body computer to “settle down” and provide accurate data of doctrine and fail to separate out each com- to the turrets. ponent’s specific role. Defining each component’s The Japanese Navy developed the Type 93 Long role is a seemingly minor distinction, but it is impor- Lance torpedo that carried a large warhead and tant to understanding since each component plays could travel 20,000 yards or more at speeds of up 3 to 45 knots. The Japanese had an ideal fire-and- Examples of asymmetry and adaptation forget system. In consequence, the Japanese trained to it can be found in insurgency warfare and the to fight at night, with radically maneuvering destroy- development of counterinsurgency forces and ers and cruisers that fired torpedoes. doctrine. At a tactical level, we can see the For more than 2 years after the U.S. Navy en- effects of the machinegun, accurate indirect countered the Long Lance in early 1942, it did not artillery, and barbed wire during World War I. appreciate the weapon’s capabilities. The two navies We can study the development of storm tactics had proceeded down different asymmetric paths, and and the armor with which to counter them. U.S. torpedo development had many shortcomings. We can analyze U.S. air attacks on the Serbs in U.S. torpedoes were quite slow, carried a smaller Kosovo and appreciate the Serbs’ deception warhead, had a range of less than 10,000 yards, and and camouflage tactics. often failed to explode even when striking a target. In consequence, the U.S. Navy projected its poor capabilities onto those of the opponent’s and refused a different part in how the military operates. More to believe that the Japanese could deploy a superior germane is that each component has a slightly torpedo. Eventually, U.S. air power, radar-directed different role with respect to asymmetry, and gunfire, and other tactical adaptations restored some each has a different cyclic rate in terms of its de- balance, but throughout the war, the Japanese tor- velopment and useful life. pedo baffled Navy planners. The U.S. Navy suf- Effective doctrine explains how we expect to fered an asymmetric technological and tactical fight and operate based on past experience and surprise. Because we did not anticipate the a best guess of what lies ahead. Doctrine— weapon and, indeed, could not accept that the Japa- l Provides the link between research, theory, nese had it, we had no easy answers, and it took history, experimentation, and practice. years to adapt. l Encapsulates a body of knowledge and ex- perience so it can be applied. Developing U.S. Doctrine l Provides common understanding and a com- To get beyond the tension inherent between mon language, which allows us to articulate clearly asymmetry and doctrine, our focus is on two obser- and succinctly what Army forces should accomplish. vations about asymmetry that to many of our po- The narrow definition of doctrine is “fundamen- tential opponents we are highly relevant to the de- tal principles by which the military forces or elements velopment of U.S. doctrine. The first is the thereof guide their actions in support of national ob- requirement to understand that to many of our po- jectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in tential opponents we appear to be as asymmetric application.”4 To distinguish between the broad con- as they appear to be to us. To the al-Qaeda fighter, cept, including all four components, and the more cowering in a cave in a remote part of Afghanistan, narrow definition, we can italicize the latter. fuel air explosives, dropped with deadly precision As Fuller noted, Army doctrine should provide an from aircraft miles away and thousands of feet up, operational concept, a philosophy of how the Army directed by laser designators wielded by highly operates.5 In doing so, doctrine must reconcile op- trained and stealthy special operation forces (SOF), erational requirements with the force’s perceived is as asymmetric to him as his tactics are to us. The strengths. Armies operate best when capitalizing on second point is that doctrine cannot predict the na- demonstrated capabilities and asymmetric strengths. ture and form of asymmetric conflicts, but it can History contains many examples of military failure forecast the necessary traits and body of concep- occasioned by attempts to match an enemy’s style tual knowledge necessary to cope with a chaotic of warfare despite friendly forces being ill-suited to asymmetric operational environment. the challenge. To understand the role of doctrine, we must dis- Tactics. Tactics deals with how units are em- tinguish between doctrine and TTP. Most people us- ployed during combat.6 The actual application of MILITARY REVIEW l July -August 2003 19 Tactics vary constantly with the situa- A Japanese Type 93 torpedo tion. There is no playbook of tactical so- fired from a destroyer blew away the bow of the heavy lutions; the tactics manual only offers a cruiser USS Minneapolis on menu from which to choose. Tactics are 30 November 1942. Only the crew’s high level of training employed against an asymmetric oppo- kept the ship afloat. nent in the course of combat, but there can be no set of tactics checklists for asymmetric warfare, since each applica- tion is unique. Tactics are whatever we do against an asymmetric opponent when we arrange forces to counter that oppo- nent. What differentiates tactics against an asymmetric opponent is that we might not have ever used that particular com- bination of options before, or we might have to incorporate new and novel op- tions to counter asymmetry. When con- fronted by a situation, leaders must choose from a variety of possible solu- tions and adapt their solution to circum- stances at the point of engagement. Techniques and procedures. Tech- niques are the general, detailed methods US Navy The Japanese Navy developed the Type 93 troops and commanders use to perform Long Lance torpedo that carried a large warhead and assigned missions and functions, specifi- could travel 20,000 yards or more at speeds of up to 45 cally methods of using equipment and knots.