Politicus Journal

The Future of Nuclear Sharing: Anglo-American Lion’s Subsidiary Concern with the Sovereign Scottish Sheep

Willow S.R. Hillman

Following the defeat of the Referendum in 2014, and the temporary hiatus in the Scottish Independence movement, claiming that the nation’s quest for independence has been defeated would constitute an impetuous conclusion. Borne of a certainty that the issue will resurface, the purpose of this paper is to examine the systemic change that the suppositional Scottish sovereignty would have on the ‘special’ relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). This paper claims that Scottish independence would neither significantly, nor permanently, adversely affect the Anglo-American special relationship. The important role that nuclear deterrence plays in supporting a legitimate claim to permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), aids in demonstrating the paper’s position. This is clear in that, neither the geographic location of the UK’s nuclear arsenal in , nor ‘lost’ tax revenues that would result from this secession, serve as sufficient factors to significantly impact the Anglo-American special relationship in terms of the UK’s capacity to maintain its role as a useful nuclear ally to the US through the key institutions of the UNSC and NATO.

Introduction

In the wake of the defeat of the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014 and the resultant, albeit momentary, lull in the winds of change in the United Kingdom, it would be hasty to conclude that the nation’s quest for independence has been quashed. When the issue resurfaces, the domestic changes that would occur in the UK in the case of Scottish sovereignty provide urgent grounds for analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to examine, not the domestic changes within the two prospective countries, separately, but rather the effects that the systemic change in the UK, arising from the possible secession of Scotland, would have on the ‘special’ relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. The first part of this paper will be divided into two main sections; the first of which will outline the history of Scotland’s quest for independence from the UK. Interposing these two sections will be a brief mention of some modern concerns that are,

15 Politicus Journal while important, currently indeterminate, such as Brexit, the Supreme court ruling on UK Prime Minister May’s actions in the matter and the fledgling Trump Administration. The second section of this first part will demonstrate why the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is considered special. While the justifications for the classification as special vary greatly, a select bloc of scholars, including theorists such as Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, think of this ‘specialness’ as owed to the unusual nuclear sharing between the two countries which was initiated towards the end of the Second World War. They argue that the existence of these nuclear sharing arrangements and, in particular, the subsistence of them has led to a longevity that indeed makes the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) special. The second part of the paper will demonstrate that, in the hypothetical case wherein Scottish sovereignty is realized through referendum, the AASR would be neither significantly, nor permanently, adversely affected. This will be done by first shedding light on the notion that a case wherein an independent Scotland would create tensions between itself and the UK, by deciding to appropriate the UK nuclear arsenal, which is docked on Scottish soil, is, while ill-advised, an example of a near-impossibility. Second, the more salient issue, borne of a concern about ‘lost’ tax revenue will be discussed and found to be far less potent than one would think. Using these two examples, it will become clear that the UK’s ability to perform its duties as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, which is a position that has become synonymous with nuclear ‘have’ countries, and is one of the most illustrious members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will not be affected in significant enough a degree to permanently affect the AASR.

Part 1: The Players Scotland: Nationalism and its Quest for Independence

To “… foster and maintain Scottish Nationalism by securing self-government for Scotland…”1: this is the objective that was present on the membership cards of the Scottish Nationalist Association, circa September 1927. While the desire for Scottish home rule can be traced to the mid-19th century, the modern mobilization of Scottish nationalism, aimed at home rule and later,

1 “Independence Referendum: The story of Scotland’s Historic Vote,” The Scotsman, accessed October 21, 2015.

16 Politicus Journal independence, begins in 1927. Founded by 22-year-old law student, John MacCormick, the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association is recognized as one of the forbearers of the National Party of Scotland, which formed in 1928. The merger of Glasgow University’s Scottish Nationalist Association, the Scots National League and the Scottish National Movement - all of which were individual Scottish nationalist associations - yielded the UK’s first Scottish nationalist party. The ideological underpinnings of this ‘National Party of Scotland’ were Scottish nationalism and Scottish independence/home rule. The that exists today in UK politics was created on December 14, 1933 as the result of the amalgamation of the National Party of Scotland and the smaller (1932). The story of the Scottish National Party’s quest for Scottish independence begins with drafting of the Scottish Covenant in April 1949. It reads, in part, "... we solemnly enter into this Covenant, whereby we pledge ourselves... to do everything in our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs.”2 Despite the fact that the petition was not far from two million signatures strong, the UK dismissed the petition, as was their right. On Christmas day of the following year, a group of Scottish students, frustrated with London’s decision, stole the Stone of Destiny from ,3 attempting to return it to its rightful home in Scotland. The Stone of Destiny, sometimes called the ‘Coronation Stone’ is a Scottish artifact, historically used in the coronation of monarchs of Scotland, England and now Great Britain. The Stone is still used to this day. While the students’ attempt to return the Stone to its home in Scotland failed, Scotland’s quest for a measure of home rule did not. Pressure for ‘devolution’ (the UK Parliament granting powers to a Scottish Parliament) came in the form of a referendum held on March 1, 1979. While a majority of 51.6% voted in favour of a Scottish Assembly, this first referendum failed, due to the fact that the majority only translated to 32.9% of the total vote, falling short of the required 40%.4 The second devolution referendum, held on September 11, 1997, however, proved successful in securing a ‘Yes’ to Scottish Parliament with a majority of 74.3%. This referendum resulted in the UK Parliament’s creation of a Scottish Parliament via the November 17, 1998 Scotland Act. Today, the Scottish Parliament has power over ‘devolved matters’ which include agriculture, forestry, fishing, education, the environment

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

17 Politicus Journal and health to name a few, while the UK Parliament retains ‘reserved’ powers over matters such as immigration, trade, defense, foreign policy and energy.5 While the UK is not a federal parliamentary constitutional monarchy like Canada, the separation of powers between the Scottish Parliament’s devolved powers and London’s reserved powers is strikingly similar to the separation of powers in Canada between “provincial” and “federal”. Following a few separate attempts at drafting independence legislation, the Scottish Independence Referendum Bill was published on March 21, 2013 and outlined that the referendum for Scottish independence would be held on the 18th of September of the following year. This bill was passed on November 14th, 20136, thereby fixing the date for the referendum. The months leading up to the referendum consisted of extensive campaigning by two different groups in Scotland. The ‘Yes’ campaign represented the separatist camp and the ‘Better Together’ campaign represented the anti-secessionist camp. On the ‘Yes’ side, the Scottish National Party published the comprehensive document entitled Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland. While this document outlines much of the rationale underlying the Scottish independence movement, the result of the 2014 referendum was conclusive. Of the 85% voter turnout, 55% represented the ‘No’ vote. As it stands, Scotland remains part of the UK. Officially, however, the Scottish National Party “... remains committed to Scottish independence as [they] believe that it is the only way to create a socially just, progressive and successful country.”7 While the party has not divulged any plans for future referendums for Scottish independence, it is not unreasonable to think that another will be held in the future. Given the strong response to the question posed by the referendum, the expressions of nationalism on both sides as well as the high voter turnout, the issue will undoubtedly resurface at some future date. If one considers the Canadian example of secessionist ideology, Québec’s quest for independence has been rather tenacious, resurfacing every few decades.

5 The Scottish Parliament, “What are the powers of the Scottish Parliament?,” The Scottish Parliament, accessed October 21, 2015. 6 “Independence Referendum: The Story of Scotland’s Historic Vote,” The Scotsman. 7 , “Our Vision,” SNP, accessed November 19, 2015.

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The Wild Cards: Brexit, the Supreme Court, and Trump

While the main actors in this examination are clearly the UK and the US, concerns regarding recent events have been brought to light. First, the question of what the results of the ‘Brexit’ vote will mean for the UK’s role on the world stage, and the Scottish nationalist movement is concerning to some. Given the lack of clarity in this, one cannot presently hope to comment on the larger implications that Brexit may have on the Anglo-American special relationship. Second, the Trump Administration’s foreign policy objectives may come to bear on this discussion, but discussing this too hastily constitutes mere speculation. Away from such uncertainty and nonacademic practice, this paper wishes to stay.

The US and the UK: The Anglo-American Special Relationship

When the day comes that Scotland’s quest for independence re-emerges, the United Kingdom will undoubtedly face a number of obstacles, which they will need to overcome. Certain changes will need to be made in order for this to happen. The important question, however, is what this systemic change would mean for the special relationship that exists between the US and the UK. The origin of this Anglo-American Special Relationship is heavily debated amongst scholars. The most convincing of these proposed origins is, as scholars, such as Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, claim, the uncommon nuclear/information-sharing relationship that is postulated as existing between these two countries. Dobson and Marsh argue that “… if one state willingly agrees to share the means of mutual destruction with another when there are no compelling national security reasons of its own for doing so then one might suggest that a prima facie special relationship exists.”8 In saying this, they suggest that despite the fact that one reading of realist thought would say that the special relationship should have never emerged between the two nations, it should have certainly ended following the fall of their common enemy, the Soviet Union. Let us look at the emergence of the nuclear/information-sharing relationship between the US and the UK. First, the atomic bomb’s creation was made possible by the splitting of a uranium

8 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?,” International History Review 36, no. 4 (2014): 681.

19 Politicus Journal atom in 1938, by three chemists in Berlin.9 In order to harness the tremendous power that they had discovered for use as an explosive, further discoveries were required. In an attempt to prevent the realization of the German aspirations to pursue this and gain the upper hand in World War II, Albert Einstein contacted US President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, in December of 1941 authorized the Manhattan Project; the US’s own nuclear program. This year also marked the beginning of a British nuclear program. By 1943, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt had agreed to work together on the Manhattan Project.10 At the first Québec Conference of 1943, the leaders had “... agreed that the atomic bomb would be used only by ‘mutual consent’,”11 and almost a year later at the second Québec Conference, Roosevelt promised that after the war, full collaboration between the two countries would occur. Dawson and Rosecrance’s claim that, “Britain had accepted American domination in atomic weapons developments after 1942, but it had placed great store on Roosevelt’s promise- given at Hyde Park in 1944- of ‘full collaboration’ after the war”12, epitomizes the relationship that arose between these two nations. While this collaboration was promised to occur immediately following the war, it wasn't until more than a decade later that legislation was implemented to this effect. This was partly due to a setback, which took place in 1946 when the US introduced the McMahon Act, which effectively ended the nuclear relationship.13 This, however, didn’t stop Britain from pursuing its own nuclear program, which proved to be successful. Finally, in 1958, the Mutual Defence Agreement re-invigorated the relationship. In 1961, the UK gave up on independently pursuing their nuclear program and, rather, opted to join the US Skybolt program. This provided them with US delivery-system technology that their own program had been lacking. When the program was cancelled the following year by the US, UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan “… persuaded President Kennedy to provide the submarine- launched Polaris instead.”14 Eventually, “[w]hen the United States moved on to the longer-range

9 “The Manhattan Project,” American Museum of Natural History, accessed November 19, 2015. 10 “Fact Sheet 5: The History of the UK’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” Ministry of Defence, accessed November 19, 2015. 11 Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, “Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance,” World Politics 19, no. 1 (1966): 24. 12 Ibid. 22. 13 “Fact Sheet 5: The History of the UK’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” Ministry of Defence. 14 William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,” International Affairs 85, no. 2 (2009): 265.

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Trident missile [in 1982], the UK modified the Polaris sales agreement to purchase these.”15 These Trident missiles and their submarine-based launching systems make up the modern UK nuclear arsenal. Currently, four British submarines are nuclear-capable and moor at Her Majesty's Naval Base, in Clyde, Scotland. The missiles that they are capable of launching represent the only nuclear weapons that the UK possesses. The nuclear missiles themselves are called Trident missiles and are carried by four British Vanguard-class submarines. Each submarines carries 16 missiles at a time, each of which are designed to carry up to 12 nuclear warheads.16 This means that each submarine could realistically carry 192 nuclear warheads. This was, however, made impossible by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, which restricted the number of nuclear warheads that each submarine could carry to 48.17 This number has been further reduced to 40 by the UK government in recent years. Only one of the four vanguard submarines is on patrol at any one time. While the Trident missiles themselves are the only part of the UK nuclear arsenal with the name ‘Trident’, the entire nuclear system is most frequently referred to as Trident. When people speak of the need to replace Trident at the end of its 30-year lifespan in 2024,18 they refer to the need to replace the Vanguard-class submarines as opposed to the missiles themselves. Despite the impediment imposed by the US on the UK’s path to the development of a nuclear arsenal, the UK is the only country in the world that shares a special nuclear relationship with the US. Regardless of the opinions and the underlying rationale of those who lobbied for the relationship to be avoided, the fact remains that it did come to exist. Not only did it come into existence, but it also remained in place after the fall of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. This fact, according to Dobson and Marsh, breaks realist cannons and demonstrates the weakness of realist thought.19 Given the conditions present in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union, no country has provided a significant enough threat to the US to warrant the maintenance of a nuclear alliance with any one country. This is especially true given the existence of NATO, which serves as a military alliance between its 28 member states. Article 5 of the NATO treaty asserts that an

15 Ibid., 269. 16 “Trident Missile Factfile,” BBC News (London, UK) Sept. 23, 2009. 17 Ibid. 18 James Cook, “Daily Question: How Much Does Scotland Pay in Tax and How Much Does it Spend?,” BBC News (London, UK), Aug. 25, 2014. 19 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations,” International History Review.

21 Politicus Journal attack on one member country ought to be considered an attack on all member countries and be responded to as such. In the case of an attack on one, it is the duty of the others to provide aid. While in certain, more extreme circumstances this may be constituted by militarily involvement, it is important to note that Article 5 does not require this sort of involvement. Especially given this broad and strong military alliance, the US-UK nuclear relationship emerges as anomalous and special in its own right. Provided the rise of a credible threat, the US has as many as 26 allies (of 28 current members) other than the UK to rely on. Even in 1949 when NATO was formed, the US had 10 allies other than the UK. Despite this, the US saw fit to enter into a special nuclear relationship with the UK. To this day, “... Britain remains the only American ally allowed preferential access to US nuclear technology.”20 As one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, thereby possessing veto power, and also one of the five recognized nuclear states in the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the UK has certain obligations to the international community, and more importantly, to its most powerful ally, the US. The question that lies here is whether or not the effects of hypothetical Scottish sovereignty on the UK would prove to be significant enough to warrant a failure to uphold the obligations that they have to the US. In effect, the assumption is that a UK without a nuclear weapons arsenal or in possession of an unreliable arsenal, is a UK that is unable to maintain its role as a reliable ally.

Part 2: The Breakdown

This second part will dismantle two issues surrounding the UK nuclear arsenal that could suggest that Scottish sovereignty would affect the usefulness of the UK to the US. The first is an issue born of the fact that the military base that plays host to the UK nuclear arsenal is located in Scotland. The second is a more practical issue dealing with the supposed loss of tax revenue associated with Scotland becoming a sovereign nation. In effect, the thought is that losing the collective income tax revenue generated by Scotland would hinder the UK’s ability to invest in certain things such as replacing the Vanguard Submarines by 2024, thereby potentially affecting its status in the UNSC and NATO.

20 David Reynolds, “Re-Thinking Anglo-American Relations,” International Affairs 65, no. 1 (1988-1989): 110.

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Before looking at these possibilities- which are endowed with the potential to affect the UK’s usefulness to the US as an ally in terms of nuclear capabilities- a discussion of the ostensible nuclear arms-reliant relationships that the UK has, ought to be facilitated. In determining the associations and characteristics that appear to be contingent on the UK’s possession of a nuclear arsenal, progress can be made in determining the effect, if any, that Scottish independence could, potentially, have on the UK’s possession and/or maintenance of their arsenal. This would go to great lengths to determine whether the UK would be capable of maintaining its special nuclear relationship with the US. As has already been stated, the UK is one of the five permanent members (the others being China, Russia, France and the US) of the UNSC and also one of the recognized nuclear states by the NPT. The UK’s importance to the US can be examined through the lens of their UNSC permanent membership and status as one of the most powerful of the NATO allies. The UK’s importance to the US through the UNSC is relevant, at least while weapons of mass destruction exist. The maintenance of nuclear weapons stores by each of the five permanent members of the UNSC looks to be important in remaining a legitimate permanent member. Given that the five permanent members have historically been thought of as nations with the ability to affect and manage international security threats and risks the most effectively, it is only logical that each of the individual five ought to possess the means to influence even the most extreme security issues. This sort of logic is likely the origin of the common “... fear that abandoning the UK's nuclear weapons would loosen... [the UK’s] grip on permanent membership.”21 Even today, there is much speculation about the permanent members’ legitimate claim to their positions, due to the fact that there is belief that the five no longer represent the global situation and the power distribution therein. While it is unclear what the impact that a nuclear-weaponless UK would have on the AASR- in terms of the traditionally nuclear states that comprise the UNSC- would be, it is clear that the legitimacy of the UK’s claim to its permanent membership would likely come into question. Because the permanent members of the UNSC have traditionally been nuclear ‘have’ states, it is not absurd to entertain the notion that other players might begin to question, not only the military fortitude, but also the usefulness a nation would have without its most powerful weapons. This, of course, is only important were the UK to somehow, either lose their weapons,

21 Rupert Meyers, “Why Britain Needs Nuclear Weapons,” GQ, Sept. 29, 2015.

23 Politicus Journal or become unable to maintain a reliable arsenal. There is, perhaps, more of a potentially problematic scenario when it comes the impact that a nuclear-weaponless UK would have on the AASR through NATO. NATO is, among other purposes, a military security alliance that holds collective defense close to the heart of its existence. While it is clear that not all NATO members are nuclear states, some of the most powerful of the member states are recognized nuclear states (US, UK and France). While the alliance would not be without nuclear weapons if the UK became weaponless or simply had reduced nuclear capabilities, the overall number of effective weapons in the alliance would decrease. This reduction in overall weapons holdings could potentially reduce the effectiveness of the organization as a whole. If one state, such as a less nuclear-effective UK was deemed to be the cause of a weakening NATO, it is not a stretch to entertain the notion that the special relationship that exists between the UK and the US would certainly be affected.

An Appropriated Arsenal?

Returning now to two possible issues that could affect the UK’s nuclear arsenal and, therefore, its usefulness to the US, it can first be seen that the secession of Scotland would only marginally inconvenience the UK with regards to the housing of the nuclear capable submarines. Formally, in the 2013 document Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, the Scottish National Party expressed disdain for the Trident program, describing it as, “... affront to basic decency with its indiscriminate and inhumane destructive power.”22 This statement is not off-base given the indescribably catastrophic effects that they are known to have on their victims. Given this and the very fact of their existence, nuclear weapons play a key role on the international stage. Due to the interplay of alliances and the reality of mutually assured destruction, the use of nuclear weapons by any one state is highly unlikely. Their possession, however, regardless of the likelihood of their use is important as a deterrent. Therefore, in the case of the UK, the weapons would need to be relocated onto UK soil in the case of Scotland’s secession. One misguided worry associated with the UK’s re-appropriation of their property is, on the view, posed by a Scotland that would aim to retain the UK’s missiles, appropriating them for their

22 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, Edinburgh: St. Andrew’s House, 2013, accessed October 21, 2015, 232.

24 Politicus Journal own use. While the concern warrants some merit given the example of Ukraine, Scottish aspirations would be ill-advised for a new country faced with a slew of exceedingly more important decisions and concerns. First, a discussion of the merit of concerns that Scotland would seek to appropriate the UK’s arsenal for their own use is pragmatic. Misguided as the concern may be, it is not a completely unwarranted one, especially when one considers similar concerns held by Ukrainian officials following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Following the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, 1994 marked Ukraine’s decision to surrender the one third of the formerly Soviet nuclear arsenal in their possession and subsequently sign on to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.23 Despite the fact that the Russian Federation is one of the signatories of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which commits it to respecting Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty (among other obligations)24, the world saw its annexation of Crimea a mere 20 years after Ukraine had made the decision to give up its nuclear weapons. Reiterating the fact that Ukraine had given up nuclear weapons because of the Memorandum, Ukrainian official, Pavlo Rizanenko of the Udar Party notably communicated “... the strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake.”25 Even given this historically-warranted concern, misgivings in the UK/Scotland dynamic remain misguided. Put simply, Scottish nationalists would not want the UK’s arsenal to remain on their soil. Scottish nationalists who comprise the SNP, which would be the most likely candidate for forming government in Scotland made a few things exceedingly clear in their attempts to sway people’s opinions leading up to the 2014 Referendum: one, that “... the decisions which affect Scotland should be made by the people who live and work here”26 and two, that any and all decisions will be made with the Scottish people in mind; and also that they have no desire for Trident to remain on their soil.27 While the SNP’s disdainful stance on nuclear weapons is clear here, the official policy, communicated via their Scotland’s Future document, demonstrates, not only the lack of

23 UNODA, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Accessed January 30, 2016. 24 General Assembly Security Council, Ukraine: The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 (New York: United Nations, 19 December 1994). 25 Oren Dorell, “Ukraine may have to go nuclear, says Kiev lawmaker,” USA Today (Tyson’s Corner, VA), Mar. 11, 2014. 26 Nicola Sturgeon, “Our Vision,” SNP. 27 Ibid.

25 Politicus Journal desire that Scotland’s leading party would have in retaining UK weaponry, but also the intention that they have to do so, demonstrated by the claim that they “… will be able to remove Trident from Scotland’s soil.”28 Second, despite the extraordinarily comprehensive nature of the Scotland’s Future document, a great number of policies would need to be decided on by the sovereign state of Scotland and a number of positive relationships and alliances would need to be created. Therefore, even in the case that Scotland had the goal of appropriating the UK arsenal, it would be highly inadvisable to create tensions with the UK, especially in the unstable state in which it would temporarily exist. Again, as far as the SNP’s official policy is concerned, a sovereign Scotland would wish to maintain good relations with the UK and they would continue to work with them “... in defense alliances to promote peace and security...”.29

The Purported Impact on the UK’s Tax Revenue

The second more practical concern with regards to how Scottish independence would affect the UK’s ability to fulfill its obligations as a useful ally to the US lies in the problem of tax revenue and the impact that the revenue lost would have on the UK. Given the UK’s need to replace the current Vanguard submarines by 2024, the issue of determining the source of the funds needed to replace them is particularly salient. In terms of income tax revenue, it is assumed that Scottish independence would result in a significant loss of total tax revenues in the UK. This impact is not nearly as drastic as most would aim to suggest. Scotland itself generated £53 billion in income tax revenue in the 2013 tax year. This represents 9.1% of the UK’s total income tax revenue for that year.30 It is important to note, however, that Scotland was home to only 8.3% of the population of the UK at this time. Alone, this information would seem to support the original assumption, that Scottish secession would mean huge losses in tax revenue. On this end, Scotland appears to generate more revenue that it would in a hypothetical system where tax revenue generation was proportional to the population of a given area. In this hypothetical, proportional tax system, it would appear that Scotland generates £5 billion more than it is due. Such a first impression is just

28 Ibid. 29 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future:, 2013. 30 James Cook, “Daily Question: How Much Does Scotland Pay in Tax and How Much Does it Spend?,” BBC News.

26 Politicus Journal that: an impression: an appearance. In the case of Scotland, this addition of spending into the account represents the point at which Scotland’s appearance is juxtaposed with the reality of the situation. Using the same tax year of 2013, it was seen that Scotland spent £65.2 billion of the generated income tax revenue, or 9.3%.31 This means that Scotland spent 0.2% more than it generated. This deficit works out to be about £1.16 billion. Granted, running a deficit is a problem with roots at the national level, the point stands. While a single year’s data is not an all- encompassing representation of the trends present in a county’s account, it can be seen that the aggregate loss in income tax revenue that would be incurred by the UK’s loss of Scotland would not be as much of an issue as it is assumed to be. In fact, a fairly convincing argument could be made to the effect that, at least in 2013, the UK would have been better off, economically, without Scotland and the deficit it created. The important implication of this tax concern is the effect that it would have on the UK’s ability to allocate tax revenue in replacing the submarines that carry Trident missiles. It can be seen here, that the loss of Scottish tax revenues would, by no means, economically cripple the UK, rendering it unable to invest in the upkeep of its nuclear arsenal. While a reordering of the finances would be in order following a referendum resulting in Scottish independence, the UK would retain the ability to upgrade their arsenal. So long as part of their nuclear arsenal could be replaced before 2024 and the other two were earmarked for future replacement, there is no logical reason that the UK would not be able to fulfill its role as a permanent UNSC member, thereby fulfilling its obligation to maintain a legitimate claim to the role, perceived or otherwise; or the nuclear deterrence and collective defense that its NATO membership requires. As was previously discussed, it is uncertain what the effects that a nuclear-weaponless UK would have on the AASR through the UNSC, but its legitimacy as a permanent member should not be called into question and especially in no greater measure than it already is, provided that it is able to maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent, irrespective of size. The same sort of logic applies to the effect that Scottish independence would have on the UK’s ability to maintain its obligations to NATO, thereby, retaining its status as a valuable US ally. So long as the UK is able to maintain a reliable nuclear arsenal, regardless of its size, throughout the period of time that it will take to fully replace all four submarines, there is no reason

31 Ibid.

27 Politicus Journal that it would not be able to fulfill its collective defense obligations to its fellow NATO member- states. Given that this is the case; it would necessarily remain a useful ally to the US.

Conclusion

Scotland has a long history of desire for home rule and independence, one that cannot be easily subdued. The systemic changes that would occur within the UK in the case of the realization of this goal would be minor and, therefore, concern for the continuation of the AASR and its health proves less imposing than it might appear. The nuclear capabilities of the UK that make it a useful ally to the US through the UNSC and NATO would be neither significantly nor permanently affected to a degree that would affect the strength of the AASR. It would be able to fulfill its obligations to both organizations and, therefore, the US with or without Scotland. While all potential effects warrant consideration, even if only in passing, certain actions do not pose serious enough concerns to warrant belaboured consideration. The Anglo-American Special Relationship is a lion that ought not be overly concerned with the actions or opinions of a weaker entity such as Scotland. The impact that this nation’s potential independence has had on the strength and persistence of this strong relationship is negligible.

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