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LESSONS from the BOER WAR Review of an Article by Dr C Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 19, Nr 4, 1989. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za LESSONS FROM THE BOER WAR Review of an article by Dr C. de Jong* Review of: Jay Stone and Erwin A. Schmidl, The 1. Small Army. The British army was small and Boer War and Military reforms, Volume 28 of the intended for the colonies. The Navy would series "War and Society of East Central Europe", protect the mother country. The regular University Press of America, Lanham: New York army numbered 216 000 men and with the - London, 1988, 345 pp. reserves 667 000. Sometimes the army in Numerous studies exist of the lessons to be India had to send troops to other colonies in learnt from the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 by trouble (pA). There was no military cons- students of 20th Century Warfare. These studies cription. Immediately after Black Week vol- date back from the days of that war up to the unteers from the reserves in Britain and present. In many cases these studies are titled from the Dominions in South Africa, Ca- "Lessons from the Boer War". In the book under nada, Australia and New Zealand were sent review Jay Stone examines the War's impact on to the fronts in South Africa. At the end of Britain and Erwin Schmidl its effect in Austria- the war almost 440 000 soldiers were sta- Hungary. I shall confine this review to Stone's tioned in South Africa. findings. According to him Britain entered the 2. General Staff. The Secretary of War and his war full of self-confidence in the hope of termi- officials dominated Army affairs. The Gen- nating the conflict within a few weeks, but was eral Staff (GS) was small, subordinated and totally unprepared. The reason was that the last ill-informed, so that it was caught unawares war she waged against a European power was when the war in South Africa broke out. The as long ago as 1855-56. That was the Crimean GS was decidedly understaffed for such a War against Russia. Thereafter she had fought vast area as South Africa. only local, colonial wars against badly drilled, Stone explains that soon after the war little disciplined and primitively armed non-Euro- started the GS was augmented with eminent pean armies. Some of these used to attack in specialists such as Henderson for intelli- large hordes and were shot or ridden down en gence, Girouard for railways and Benson for masse. This had happened recently at Omdur- flying columns. Nevertheless, the GS re- man in 1898 where Kitchener defeated the Su- mained small, although its influence in- danese. The British ultimately were victorious in creased during the war. all the colonial wars. 3. Rivalries. The high-ranking officers at the War Office and the GS were divided into two The war in South Africa, however, started with a opposing camps: the veterans of African series of serious defeats for Britain, culminating campaigns, led by G. Wolseley, and those in "Black Week" (Magersfontein 11, Stormberg of Asian campaigns, headed by F.S. Ro- 12, Colenso 15 December 1899), followed by berts. Initially the African group was in com- more reverses (Spioenkop 24 January, Vaal- mand in South Africa and Wolseley's krans 5-7 February 1900). Stone writes choice, Buller, was commander-in-chief. A (1.c.pA4): The defeats of the "Black Week" col- few days after Black Week he was super- lectively had a greater impact than Dunkirk (port seded by Roberts as C-in-C. He gradually of British retreat June 1940). Britain, at the peak eliminated most of the ineffective officers, of her powers, had been mauled by a nation of such as Buller, Gatacre and Baden Powell, farmers. The many adversaries of Britain's but he retained some Wolseley-men of the power gloated because the defeats revealed initial war phase, such as Methuen, Ian serious weaknesses in the British army and its Hamilton and McDonald. tactics. The Government and the Army immedi- 4. Amateurs. Most British officers came from ately took measures to correct these defects. A the aristocracy, earned low pay, behaved long drawn-out process of military reforms more like amateurs than professional sol- started, which laid the foundation for Britain's diers and thought more of horsemanship preparedness in the First World War. and valour than of a knowledge of drill, tac- tics and examinations. They had little con- Stone's extensive survey of defects and of cor- tact with the ordinary soldiers and left them rective measures during the war can be sum- to the tender mercies of noncommissioned marised under the following points: officers (NCOs). They enjoyed comfort and 37 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 19, Nr 4, 1989. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za sport, even during campaigns, and since Boers, the British divided batteries into sec- the Napoleonic Wars the British army was tions, firing independently, covering and notorious on account of the large quantity of camouflaging the pieces and sometimes baggage they hauled along with them. dispersing them. The war in South Africa started in the same 7. Tactics. Initially the British tactics were to way, e.g. with Buller's many cases of cham- launch direct, massive attacks in dense or pagne, disguised as castor-oil. But accord- late opening lines along a relatively small ing to Stone, Roberts and Kitchener front. They preferred night marches before changed the situation. They reduced the the assault, after the example of Wolseley at quantity of luggage drastically and sent un- Tell-el-Kabir, Egypt 1882. But these suc- soldierly gentlemen home. The Boer War cesses could not be repeated in the face of virtually brought to an end the era of the the exceedingly strong firepower of Boers' amateur army-officer in Britain. repeating Mausers with smokeless power'. Heavy losses and defeats were the result of 5. The Ordinary Soldier. The common British these tactics. Night marches, such as at soldier was drilled to obey commands; not Nicholson's Nek, Magersfontein and Storm- to think or to show initiative. This was to be a berg led to disasters. The aim of the British great disadvantage in the Boer War. Be- was to engage in hand-to-hand-fighting, the cause of their conspicious dress and beha- infantry with the bayonet, the cavalry with viour, many British officers were shot and as' lance and sabre. But the Boers disliked there was no-one to lead them the soldiers cold steel, which was the way savages were helpless. Soon, however, they were fought, and they usually retreated before drilled to act on their own initiative and care hand-to-hand-fighting could start. for themselves, to set their rifle sights as Roberts did away with these tactics. He they thought fit, to seek cover and camou- discarded the lance and sabre with the cav- flage, to advance by crawling and making alry, but the infantry retained the bayonet. short bounds instead of standing or march- He ordered advances in more open and ing in formation, and to fire individually in- thinner lines and in alternating bounds - stead of in volleys with sights set after each tactics which had already been introduced command. piecemeal. He replaced direct frontal at- 6. Ordnance and Small Arms. Initially British tacks by outflanking movements, which no ordnance and rifles did not have the same Boer commando could withstand for long. range as the new Boer guns of Krupp and The cavalry had to go over to reconnais- Creuzot and the Mauser rifles with smoke- sance work instead of shock tactics and less powder. The British had fewer quick- charges and the lance and sabre were re- firing Maxim-Nordenfeldts (pompoms) than placed by rifles. the Boers. The British artillery was initially 8. Mobility. At the beginning of the war the mounted in open terrain and in batteries of 6 British infantryman and cavalry horse were guns, which fired simultaneously at one tar- over-burdened. The cavalry horse had to get. In contrast, the Boers dispersed their carry 450 pounds, the Boer pony much less fewer guns and mounted them behind hills. - 250 pounds (Stone, p.92). I suppose the They were well camouflaged and, when horseman included. All fighting Boers were necessary, frequently moved to other desig- mounted. They could easily escape from nated positions. They were very effective. the British infantry and also from their Stone praises Boer gunnery, with their Creu- heavily burdened and quickly tired cavalry lOts of Long Toms, but omits to mention that horses. When the war broke out, the GS a third or half of the heavy Creuzot shells preferred infantry to mounted troops - to did not explode, which reduced the Long their cost. Tom's effectiveness. When Roberts arrived in South Africa he He describes how the British artillery soon reduced the weight of equipment of the made up for its shortcomings. Long-range infantryman and cavalryman substantially. guns were ordered, more howitzers for at- He introduced the Mounted Infantry (MI) - tacking deep trenches, more pompoms and already in existence, in small numbers - to the first machineguns were introduced. At- keep up with the very mobile Boers and to tention was given to more details, e.g. the fight the Boers in their own way, on foot as gunshield to protect the exposed artillery- dismounted horsemen. The MI were a men. Following the example set by the mixed lot, ridiculed by the infantry who aver- 38 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 19, Nr 4, 1989.
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