Country Information and Guidance Libya: Ethnic Minority Groups

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Country Information and Guidance Libya: Ethnic Minority Groups Country Information and Guidance Libya: Ethnic minority groups Version 2.0 June 2016 Page 1 of 25 Preface This document provides country of origin information (COI) and guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies. Country Information The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, dated July 2012. Feedback Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please email the Country Policy and Information Team. Independent Advisory Group on Country Information The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office‘s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office‘s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN. Email: [email protected] Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/ Page 2 of 25 Contents Guidance ................................................................................................................... 4 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Basis of Claim .......................................................................................... 4 2. Consideration of Issues ................................................................................... 4 2.1 Credibility .................................................................................................. 4 2.2 Exclusion .................................................................................................. 4 2.3 Assessment of risk ................................................................................... 4 2.4 Protection ................................................................................................. 6 2.5 Internal relocation ..................................................................................... 6 2.6 Certification .............................................................................................. 7 3. Policy Summary ............................................................................................... 7 Country Information ................................................................................................. 8 4. Background ..................................................................................................... 8 4.1 Demography ............................................................................................. 8 4.2 Legal and Constitutional Framework ........................................................ 8 5. Treatment of ethnic minorities.......................................................................... 9 5.1 Overview .................................................................................................. 9 5.2 Tawerghans/Tawarghans/Tawurghans .................................................... 9 5.3 Tuareg .................................................................................................... 13 5.4 Tuareg/Tebu conflict ............................................................................... 14 5.5 Tebu/Toubou/Tabu/Tubu ........................................................................ 17 5.6 Black Libyans ......................................................................................... 19 5.7 Amazigh (Berber) ................................................................................... 20 5.8 The Mashashiya ..................................................................................... 22 Version Control and Contacts ............................................................................... 24 Page 3 of 25 Guidance Updated 30 June 2016 1. Introduction 1.1 Basis of claim 1.1.1 Fear of persecution or serious harm by the Libyan authorities or by non-state actors because the person is a member of an ethnic minority. 1.1.2 For the purposes of this guidance, ‘ethnic minority’ and ‘ethnic minority group’ means Tawerghans, Tuareg, Tebu, black Libyans, Amazigh and the Mashashiya. Back to Contents 2. Consideration of Issues 2.1 Credibility 2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see sections 4 and 5 of the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. 2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). 2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). Back to Contents 2.2 Exclusion 2.2.1 Members of Gaddafi’s security forces have been responsible for serious human rights abuses and acts of terrorism against the Libyan people and the international community. If it is accepted that the person was an active operational member of the security forces then decision makers must consider whether one of the Exclusion clauses is applicable. 2.2.2 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses, discretionary leave and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, the Asylum Instruction on Discretionary Leave and the Asylum Instruction on Restricted Leave. Back to Contents 2.3 Assessment of risk 2.3.1 Ethnic minority groups suffered discrimination under the Gaddafi regime and continue to be marginalised, facing societal discrimination and instances of violence. On 9 April 2013, the General National Congress (GNC) adopted a law mandating punishment of not less than one years’ imprisonment for anyone guilty of discrimination on the basis of class, group, region, gender, or colour. However, the interim governments enforce neither the prohibitions Page 4 of 25 nor the punishment effectively, particularly with regard to women and minorities. 2.3.2 Some members of ethnic minority groups have been accused of supporting, or are perceived to have supported Gaddafi during the uprising. Perceived supporters of Gaddafi and his regime are at risk of extra-judicial killings, abduction, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, including in unofficial detention centres, torture, ill-treatment and death in detention. These abuses have been perpetrated by the authorities of the Interim Government or its armed affiliates, as well as by armed militias operating outside of government control (see Tawerghans/Tawarghans/Tawurghans and Tuareg). 2.3.3 Communities perceived to be loyal to Gaddafi based on their ethnicity have also experienced harassment, violence, intimidation, discrimination forced displacement, indiscriminate shelling, looting and the burning of homes. Camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) housing minority ethnic groups have been attacked by militias resulting in arbitrary arrests, abductions, deaths and the re-displacement of their residents (see Tawerghans/Tawarghans/Tawurghans , Tuareg, Black Libyans and The Mashashiya). 2.3.4 In the country guidance case of AT and Others (Article 15c; risk categories) (CG) [2014] UKUT 318 (IAC) (14 July 2014) the Upper Tribunal held that (see paragraph 215) (7-9): ‘(7) A ‘Black Libyan’ is a Libyan of black African appearance, and includes a person who may not actually possess Libyan nationality but for whom Libya is their country of former habitual residence. There is endemic racism within Libyan society towards Black Libyans. However, Black Libyans who are not Tawergha or Tuareg are not per se at risk of persecution or Article 3 ill- treatment on return, and will only be able to establish the need for international protection with reference to some additional factor
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