Africa Report

ISBN 978-84-947465-7-4

Fundación Alternativas Fundación Alternativas La Fundación Alternativas, fundada en 1997 con voluntad de ISBN 978-84-947465-7-4 configurarse como cauce de incidencia y reflexión política, social Fundación alternativas (alternatives www.fundacionalternativas.org y cultural en España y su entorno europeo, es hoy un lugar indis- Foundation) was created in 1997 to Fundación Alternativas cutible de encuentro y elaboración de ideas y propuestas. serve as a channel for political, social El presente informe opera con una perspectiva diferente a las anteriores, es la La Fundación Alternativas, fundada en 1997 con voluntad de and cultural research and advocacy The COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly shaken the world in 2020, with repercussions La Fundación consta de varias áreas de trabajo: el Laboratorio configurarse como cauce de incidencia y reflexión política, social in spain and europe. since its foun- perspectiva desde los Estados. No es una opción casual. Asistimos a lo onque the podríamos political, economic and social transformations that Africa is undergoing. It would de Alternativas, el Observatorio de Cultura y Comunicación, www.fundacionalternativas.org llamar “resurgimiento de los poderes nacionales”, expresado en fenómenos como el y cultural en España y su entorno europeo, es hoy un lugar indis- dation, we define ours as a progres- be problematic, however, to assume that the pandemic has put a halt to pre-existent Estudios de Progreso y el Observatorio de Política Exterior, que sive think tank advocating an advan- nacionalismo populista, el autoritarismo o el proteccionismo. cutible de encuentro y elaboración de ideas y propuestas. Africa centraR su eportanálisis en la política exterior y su seguimiento a nivel ced democracy based on the values El presente informe opera con una perspectiva diferente a las anteriores,trends, evenes la if we need more perspective to understand how the pandemic will impact EL ESTADO Laeuropeo Fundación e internacional. consta de varias áreas de trabajo: el Laboratorio of freedom, equality and solidarity, perspectivaEste conjunto desde de hechoslos Estados. alienta No la es enfermedad una opción quecasual. más Asistimos puede dañar a lo que anda la podríamos condition Unión: la the processes that are taking place on the continent. The chapters in this de Alternativas, el Observatorio de Cultura y Comunicación, El objetivo central de los impulsores de este proyecto, en el que defending the general interest and llamardivisión “resurgimiento entre los Estados de losmiembros, poderes la nacionales”, vuelta a la Europa expresado de Westfalia. en fenómenosReport como shed el light on the transformations, mobilization and continuities that, either sep- Estudios de Progreso y el Observatorio de Política Exterior, que leading the world in a progressive di- Transformaparticipantions, los autores más dinámicos y avanzados de nuestra nacionalismo populista, el autoritarismo o el proteccionismo. centra su análisis en la política exterior y su seguimiento a nivel rection. From the onset, we have be- arately or in combination, and to varying degrees,DE have shaped LA new contexts UNIÓN in Africa; EUROPEA sociedad, ha sido y sigue siendo el análisis y la definición de Es verdad que existe el otro lado de la moneda, que es innegable el deseo de los europeo e internacional. come a vital forum for the exchange the authors have made an effort to introduce in ELa cross-cutting ESTADO way some reflections on nuevas ideas en el marco de la mundialización creciente que vi- Esteciudadanos conjunto yde ciudadanas hechos alienta europeas la enfermedad de permanecer que másen la puede Unión dañar y su satisfaccióna la Unión: porla mobilization and continuity of ideas and policy development that Elvimos. objetivo Unas central ideas de que los pretenden impulsores abarcar de este lasproyecto, políticas en públicas el que the possible impact of COVID-19 on the studied phenomena. nd continuity www.fes.de divisiónformar parteentre dellos Estadosproyecto miembros, europeo (másla vuelta del 70a la % Europa como mediade Westfalia. de la población). Pero offers insights for decision-makers in a participandesde un enfoquelos autores nacional, más dinámicos así como y europeoavanzados y global, de nuestra y ser la UE necesita reformas para afrontar los retos de la globalización. Los Estados europeos ante las every sphere of society, from govern- Es verdad que existe el otro lado de la moneda, que es innegable elThe deseo objective de los of this 2020 Africa Report has been,DE following theLA footsteps UNIÓN of the first re- EUROPEA sociedad,incorporadas ha ensido la ytoma sigue de siendo decisiones el análisis de los gobiernos,y la definición partidos de ment leaders and political parties to a

tion nuevaspolíticos ideas y otros en actoresel marco económicos de la mundialización y sociales. creciente que vi- wide and extensive network of other ciudadanos¿Qué reformas? y ciudadanas Básicamente europeas cuatro deaspectos: permanecer el euro, en lala EuropaUnión ysocial, su satisfacciónport la políticapublished por de in 2019, to extend the analysis of the continent as a whole, from a holistic a vimos. Unas ideas que pretenden abarcar las políticas públicas economic and social stakeholders. www.fes.de formarasilo y partela seguridad del proyecto y defensa europeo en una (más Europa del 70 posbrexit % como. media de la población).perspective Pero that doesn’t deny the specific realitiesreformas of the different regions, dediaspora lain- Unión En definitiva, el conjunto de profesionales y académicos que in- desde un enfoque nacional, así como europeo y global, y ser We pride ourselves in working hand la UE necesita reformas para afrontar los retos de la globalización. Los Estados europeos ante las tegran la Fundación Alternativas pretende contribuir al verdadero cluded. The report tackles multiple dynamics, domestic and transnational, through 11 incorporadas en la toma de decisiones de los gobiernos, partidos in hand with the most innovative and Para llegar en las mejores condiciones a las elecciones de 2019, los Estados de la desarrollo social, económico, cultural y político de la sociedad chapters that underscore issues such as the reconfiguration of intra and extracontinen- políticos y otros actores económicos y sociales. forward-looking thinkers in spanish ¿QuéUnión reformas? han de mirarBásicamente hacia un cuatro horizonte aspectos: de largoel euro, alcance la Europa y superar social, estala política coyuntura de española y europea. society. asilocon tantosy la seguridad componentes y defensa nacionalistas, en una Europa proteccionistas posbrexit. e insolidarios. Precisamentetal relations, la the mobilization of African societiesreformas and communities, the demands de and la Unión En definitiva, el conjunto de profesionales y académicos que in-

tions, mobiliz the think tank consists of various alternativa a ello es el proyecto europeo. struggles for the transformation of social realities, and some aspects of the continent’s tegran la Fundación Alternativas pretende contribuir al verdadero a Para llegar en las mejores condiciones a las elecciones de 2019, los conflicts,Estados de such la as the relationship between conflict and climate change or the existence desarrollo social, económico, cultural y político de la sociedad areas, focusing on public policy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung culture and communication, sustai- • El estado de la Unión Europea 2011. Unión han de mirar hacia un horizonte de largo alcance y superar esta coyuntura española y europea. of long-standing conflicts. Other texts give special attention to the bilateral and multilat- nability and foreign policy. the ob- El año de la gran prueba La Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) es una institución cultural privada con tantos componentes nacionalistas, proteccionistas e insolidarios. Precisamente la servatory on Foreign Policy (oPex) eral relations of the continent, its subregions and states, vis-à-vis its European neighbors nsform sin fines de lucro. La Fundación fue creada en 1925 como lega- alternativa a ello es el proyecto europeo. a has coordinated this report, in line • El estado de la Unión Europea 2013. at the opposite shore of the Mediterranean, Spain being one of them. r do político del socialdemócrata Friedrich Ebert, primer presidente T Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung with its long-standing commitment alemán elegido democráticamente. • ElEl estadofracaso de de la la Unión austeridad Europea 2011. towards the analysis and interpreta- La Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) es una institución cultural privada El año de la gran prueba La FES está comprometida con los principios y valores básicos de tion of international politics through sin fines de lucro. La Fundación fue creada en 1925 como lega- • El estado de la Unión Europea 2014. la democracia social y su misión se puede resumir en cuatro its characteristic bifocal lenses, com- do político del socialdemócrata Friedrich Ebert, primer presidente • ElLa estado ciudadanía de la enUnión tiempo Europea de crisis 2013. conceptos fundamentales: cultura democrática, innovación y par- bining its european spirit and its dis- El fracaso de la austeridad alemán elegido democráticamente. tinct spanish perspective.

EL ESTADO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 2018 EL ESTADO ticipación, cohesión social y globalización solidaria. • El estado de la Unión Europea 2015. La FES está comprometida con los principios y valores básicos de Estos principios y valores orientan el trabajo de la FES, tanto en • ElNueva estado legislatura: de la Unión 11 Europea desafíos 2014. de Europa eport 2020 la democracia social y su misión se puede resumir en cuatro

R Alemania y en Europa occidental y oriental, como en el mundo La ciudadanía en tiempo de crisis conceptos fundamentales: cultura democrática, innovación y par- • El estado de la Unión Europea 2016. a entero. Actualmente, la Fundación tiene más de 100 oficinas,

EL ESTADO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 2018 EL ESTADO ticipación, cohesión social y globalización solidaria. • ElLa estado encrucijada de la Uniónpolítica Europea de Europa 2015. repartidas en África, América, Asia y Europa. Estos principios y valores orientan el trabajo de la FES, tanto en Nueva legislatura: 11 desafíos de Europa La Fundación estableció su delegación en España en 1975. Afric Alemania y en Europa occidental y oriental, como en el mundo • El estado de la Unión Europea 2017. Durante varias décadas, su labor en el país estaba dirigida prin- entero. Actualmente, la Fundación tiene más de 100 oficinas, • ElRelanzar estado deEuropa la Unión Europea 2016. cipalmente a la consolidación de la democracia y del Estado de Coordinated by: repartidas en África, América, Asia y Europa. La encrucijada política de Europa Derecho. Hoy en día, el trabajo se centra en la promoción del Itxaso DomíNguez de Olazábal Ladiálogo Fundación sobre estableciópolítica económica su delegación y social, en yEspaña sobre política en 1975. exte- • El estado de la Unión Europea 2017. Elsa Aimé González Duranterior y de varias seguridad, décadas, con suénfasis labor en en el el contexto país estaba europeo dirigida e interna prin-- Relanzar Europa cipalmentecional. a la consolidación de la democracia y del Estado de 2018 Derecho. Hoy en día, el trabajo se centra en la promoción del diálogo sobre política económica y social, y sobre política exterior y de seguridad, con énfasis en el contexto europeo e interna- Cover photography: “People Walking Outdoors”, Blue Ox Studio, Arusha, Tanzania, cional. 2018 2020 2018. xxxxx informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 1 10/11/20 9:39 informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 2 10/11/20 9:39 AFRICA REPORT 2020 Transformations, mobilization and continuity

Coordinated by: Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal Elsa Aimé González

Coordination assistant: Mateo Peyrouzet García-Siñeriz

FUNDACIÓN ALTERNATIVAS

informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 3 10/11/20 9:39 All rights reserved. According to the law, you may not copy, modify, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication. Any other uses require the prior written permission of Fundación Alternativas.

ISBN: 978-84-122331-7-9

Legal deposit: M-26948-2020 IBIC: JPHV

Translation by Antonio Galán, Richard Preston, Arianne Sved and Samuel Tremlett Assistant editor: Ana Raya Collado

Designed and printed by Lúa Ediciones 3.0, S. L. www.luaediciones.com

PUBLISHER: Fundación Alternativas Calle de Don Ramón de la Cruz 39, 1.º izq. 28001 Madrid Tel: 34 913 199 860 | Fax: 34 913 192 298 | www.fundacionalternativas.org

informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 4 10/11/20 9:39 Table of contents

Introduction 7 Diego López Garrido

1. The Maghreb’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa: new challenges and interdependencies 11 Laurence Thieux and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi

2. EU-Africa economic relations in the post-Cotonou era 25 Artur Colom Jaén

3. Europe’s multiple strategies towards its South 37 Youssef Cherif

4. The challenges facing African and Afro-descendant communities in Spain 47 Antumi Toasijé

5. Feminist activisms in Africa: trends and strategies of the new movements 59 Celia Murias Morcillo

6. Political resistance in Africa through art. A means of expression of today’s social activism 71 Sebastián Ruiz-Cabrera

7. The multiple facets of forgotten conflicts in Africa: the Central African Republic and Western Sahara 81 Irene Fernández-Molina and Enrica Picco

8. Reforms in North African countries: from change to continuity 95 Chahir Zaki

9. The strengthening of authoritarianism in Egypt 111 Bárbara Azaola Piazza

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10. Climate change and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa 123 Alfonso Sánchez Carrasco and María Ángeles Alaminos Hervás

11. Africa and its intra and extracontinental relations and the possible impacts of COVID-19 133 Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal and Elsa Aimé González

Authors 141

Acronyms 145

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At the time of writing of this introduction to the 2020 Africa Report, various events that have taken place in the past twelve months have a direct impact on the African continent and its relations with the European Union, with the Covid-19 pandemic above all else. There have been a number of other significant developments, however, such as Ursula von der Leyen’s trip to Addis Ababa in December 2019, marking her first official visit as president of the European Commission. The chapters in this Report refer to the impact of these and other events on African countries, starting with a pandemic that has infected millions of people and taken thousands of lives on the continent. This pandemic inevi- tably conditions, to a certain degree, social and political developments–for example, it is having and will have an effect on the EU-Africa summit that Youssef Cherif touches upon in his chapter, and that was supposed to take place in 2020, now postponed until 2021. Decisions by governments to tackle the spread of the virus, both at local and national levels, have generated different responses from civil society, including from the artistic community that Sebastián Ruiz-Cabrera focuses on in his chapter, as was the case with XCollectiv denouncing Cape Town’s treatment of homeless people with a video that went viral. The pandemic is certainly having a disproportionate impact on women, as mentioned by Celia Murias, and while it’s clearly having negative economic effects that add onto the already fragile economies of North Africa that Chahir Zaki analyses, it has also been used by some governments as an opportunity to further entrench authoritarian regimes, as with the case of Egypt, which is analysed by Bárbara Azaola. I referred earlier to Ursula von der Leyen and the symbolic importance of the destination of her first official trip, Addis Ababa. Ethiopia is the most influential political nucleus in the Horn of Africa, as well as the seat of the African Union, and its selection as the first destination taken by Von der Leyen as president of the European Commission is a reflection of Africa’s increasing importance for the EU. Among other objectives, the EU aims to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region and place Africa higher up among the priorities in the supranational foreign policy strategy. Artur Colom explains what this implies, particularly in what concerns the treaty that shall update the Cotonou Agreement. Europe’s strategies vis-à-vis its South are explored in Youssef Cherif’s chapter. The evolution from a EU-Africa relationship of an eminent economic

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nature–the EU is Africa’s main commercial partner–to one more focused on security issues is tangible.In any case, the EU has to take on the pending subject of its relations with the North African region, something which is of special importance to Mediterranean countries such as Spain. The concern for regional security has been manifested in the approval by the EU of a naval mission that will substitute Operation Sophia in Libya. Through this initiative, the EU stated its objective of reinforcing the arms embargo and not allowing Russia and Turkey to become hegemonic in the war-torn country. Along with these current events, the Report touches upon other issues that affect Africa but are not as present in the mainstream social, political and economic literature on the continent. In this sense, Alfonso Sánchez Carrasco and María Ángeles Alaminos dedicate a chapter to climate change and to its connection to armed conflict as a ‘risk multiplier’, giving a detailed account of the different hypotheses on the connection between the two. In the chapter “Feminist activisms in Africa: trends and strategies of the new movements”, Celia Murias emphasizes the advances in women’s rights in Sudan and South Africa, one of the countries with the highest incidence of cases of sexual violence. The topic of this chapter is linked to social movements such as the Hirak in Algeria, in which there is a prominent participation of women. This dynamic goes beyond the case of Algeria. As Leyla Dakhli (Le Monde, 28.2.2020, p. 20) pointed out, women are on the forefront of the current protest movements in the Arab world, from Tunisia to Bei- rut, not only to demand political reforms but also to demand their rights as women living under patriarchal regimes. The chapter written by Antumi Toasijé takes a closer look at the “Chal- lenges facing African and Afro-descendant communities in Spain”, tackling a topic of great importance for Spain’s future as a country, not only for said communities. In their chapter, Irene Fernández-Molina and Enrica Picco delve into the “forgotten conflicts” of the Central African Republic and Western Sahara, in a comparative analysis of these two long-lasting conflicts. I want to refer as well to a chapter that is of special relevance for “inter- African” relations, the one written by Laurence Thieux and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, “The Maghreb’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa: new challenges and interdependencies”. This analysis is connected to themes that are explored in other chapters, such as the North Africa/sub-Saharan Africa division that runs deep in Brussels’ perspective (as pointed out by Youssef Cherif); commercial difficulties; and the institutional instability in North African states (commented by Chahir Zaki), with the consequences of the protests that took place in Sudan and Algeria in 2019, as well as in Lebanon and Iraq. Before concluding this introduction, I would like to briefly reflect upon the relations between the EU and African countries. Europe has entered a new political cycle, with the European Council agreement on the Recovery Fund standing out as a landmark. It is a positive sign in terms of integration and solidarity, after the departure of the United Kingdom and amid a tre-

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mendous crisis, both sanitary and economic. As for the African Union, we see the institution developing a more ambitious integration policy. It is true, however, that Africa is characterized by a double fragmentation, between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa and between heterogeneous countries. Meanwhile, China, Russia and the United States vie to take their commercial and political struggle to the African continent. In this context, the strategic lens from Europe and towards the upcoming new framework with Africa should approach the latter as a political subject with a distinct personality and with several common characteristics among its countries, despite their diversity, and should also consolidate relations with Africa beyond the commercial lens. The building blocks of this agreement must share, at the bare minimum, the dual perspective that is present in the Recovery Fund: climatic and digital. Regarding the latter, Africa can lead a new digital revolution, as Jack Ma argued in December 2019 in The New York Times. To this we may add the widespread adoption of a policy of monetary condonement of the staggering public debt that weighs upon Africa, which has multiplied in the last decade. The G-20 should boost the liquidity that is needed for Africa’s growth. All of these require integration on both sides, Europe and Africa, and in the case of the latter a special effort to integrate North Africa in this agreement. There are promising signs, such as the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTFA). The EU should decidedly insert in its preferential agenda a new and comprehensive Europe-Africa strategy that may be a catalyst for public and private investment, but also of robust partnerships in security and migration.

Diego López Garrido Executive Vice-president Fundación Alternativas

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Laurence Thieux and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi

Relations between the Maghreb countries and live in extreme poverty.1 The continent’s weight in the rest of the African continent have intensi- world trade is limited. In 2014, Africa accounted for fied and diversified throughout the last decade. only 1.2% of world trade, far behind Asia’s 33.3%. Their evolution cannot be analysed without tak- The total value of Africa’s exports to the rest of the ing into account the transformations in which world has risen to $760 billion between 2015 and the international society is immersed within the 2017, a modest sum compared to the $4.109 bil- globalisation framework. These relations were lions of exports from Europe, the $5.140 billions monopolized by states until recently and have from the United States and the $6.801 billions from become more complex as a consequence of the Asia.2 Moreover, the continent’s incorporation in emergence of new stakeholders and the devel- the global economy brings scarce benefits, since opment of new links between societies. In this most of it represents the last link in the value chain chapter, we will try to analyse the major trends (Falola and Kalu, 2018). that guide these interactions in a context in which On the other hand, it is no less true that the the African continent increasingly attracts extra- multiplication of international forums devoted regional actors. to the region bears witness to the growing ap- During the 1990s, references were made to peal of the continent. Several events took place Africa as a forgotten continent. In the 21st cen- throughout 2019: the European Union-African tury, however, the territory materialises as the Union Summit (January 2019), the Forum on point of convergence of the ambitions of both China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (July 2019) established and emerging powers. Its demo- and the Russia-Africa Summit (October 2019), graphic evolution, new business opportunities, among others. Great powers such as China have the importance of its natural resources and its developed ambitious projects on the continent prospects for economic growth are some of for a long time. The FOCAC summits have led to the factors invoked by Afro-optimists to justify the signing of hundreds of cooperation agree- a renewed hope for the continent. This vision ments. China reveals its ambitions vis-à-vis the is countered by Afro-realists. The latter caution continent through major projects, such as the that the African continent faces globalisation from a situation of inferiority, both in terms of 1 View World Bank’s webpage: https://www.bancomun- development and of its weight in trade relations dial.org/es/region/afr/overview (Nubukpo, 2019). 2 Data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and The African continent is home to the ten poor- Development. Retrieved from: https://unctad.org/fr/Pag- est countries in the world. 416 million Africans still es/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=520

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Silk Road. Add to these forums the interest of Over the last decade, the Maghreb states have other stakeholders such as India (Wagner, 2019), strengthened the African dimension of their foreign Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emir- policies. This trend stems, on the one hand, from ates (UAE), which also have aspirations towards the need to diversify its international relations by the continent, in their search of new market op- reducing dependence on Europe, which continues portunities and investments, purchases of land, to mark much of its external agenda. On the other or strategic influence in a context of erosion of hand, the trend is a consequence of the need to the European powers’ weight in their hitherto find a response to the significant challenges play- reserved areas of influence. ing out in the continent, on which both those coun- North African countries try not to be outdis- tries’ economic development and security depend. tanced by exploiting their African identity and The interdependencies of the globalised world reposition themselves in the new scenario. Beyond define the contours of the powers and pose new other historical links, the interest that the coun- challenges to states and their sovereignties (Badie, tries of the Maghreb have shown in the states 2019). The analysis of North Africa’s relations with south of the Sahara dates back to the period of sub-Saharan countries calls for the reckoning of the struggles for independence. At that time, variables that are increasingly important in the the new states took part in the construction of global agenda, such as migratory movements, the an incipient regionalism in the continent with fight against terrorism and climate change. the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. In the 1980s, the attraction exerted by Europe, Strengthening the relations between the Maghreb as a result of the implementation of new spaces and Sub-Saharan Africa and frameworks for cooperation with the then European Economic Community, accentuated The continuity of the continental space between the disconnection between the Arab and African the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, conditioned economic areas (Mezouaghi, 2014). In the case of by the desert strip that separates them, has been Morocco, this disconnection was heightened by influenced by the colonial heritage that, with the Rabat’s decision to leave the OAU in 1984, in reac- drawing of artificial borders, contributed to a tion to the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Demo- fragmentation of the African continent into two cratic Republic (SADR) to the OAU. At the end of geopolitically disconnected spaces. The priority the 1990s, some international economic initia- accorded to an Arab identity as a defining feature tives attempted to reverse this trend, such as the of the new North African states that emerged after New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NE- independence also contributed to this outcome. PAD), launched in 2001 by the OAU, in which Alge- Mauritania is the exception to the rule, as the ria took an active part. However, these proposals country has tried to preserve its dual member- were limited in scope and did not transform the ship in sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world. clear European orientation of the Maghreb econ- Its first president, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, joined omies. The only Maghreb country that prioritized both the Arab League in 1973 and the Economic relations with sub-Saharan Africa during that pe- Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in riod was Libya, which promoted the creation of 1975. The latter regional organisation aims to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Af- promote the creation of an economic and mon- rica (COMESA)3 and, in 2001, the transformation etary union in West Africa (Freire, 2019). Maurita- of the OAU into the African Union (AU). nia’s withdrawal from ECOWAS, in the context of

3 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa ing the newly created South Sudan) that stretches from (COMESA) is a twenty-member customs union (includ- Libya to Zimbabwe.

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the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) did interactions have gone hand in hand with com- not prevent the development of economic rela- mercial exchanges, making the relations between tions with its southern neighbourhood. the Maghreb and the rest of the African continent The dynamics of transformation of African so- more complex and denser. cieties and the processes of “globalisation from Inter-African mobility is not a new phenom- below” (Tarrius, 2007) nevertheless erode the enon, but has intensified over the last decade. continental fragmentation. The phenomenon is The transformation of the Maghreb countries, as also challenged by the stance of international a result of the sealing of European borders, into stakeholders who stress the interdependence countries of immigration and not just transit has between North Africa and the Sahel in security led to the presence of large sub-Saharan commu- matters. The United States promoted Pan-Sahel nities in Maghrebi societies, in a dynamic that has enterprises, such as the Trans-Sahara Counterter- highlighted problems such as slavery and racism. rorism Initiative (TSCTI) in 2005. The European The attack on three Congolese students in Tunisia Union believes its southern border has shifted to- prompted the adoption in 2018 of a pioneering wards the Sahel strip. Those stances mirror a per- law in the region to criminalize any form of racial ception of growing instability in the region after discrimination (Bobin, 2018). This transforma- the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 (Ghanem, 2018). The on- tion has also put the different governments in going renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement,4 a quandary about how to reconcile their desire which regulates the cooperation between the Eu- to promote relations with the rest of the African ropean Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific continent and accept their role as protectors of countries, has led to a growing number voices the European border (the latter as a result of within the African Union reclaiming the incorpo- their having assumed the task of controlling and ration of the Maghreb into this framework. The repressing migratory flows from sub-Saharan Af- Maghreb countries so far articulate their relations rica). Morocco has tried to respond to this con- with Brussels in the Mediterranean framework of tradiction by presenting itself as a leader on the the European Neighbourhood Policy. migration issue, which has led Rabat to promote Nonetheless, the destabilisation of Libya and a new migration model for the continent within Mali from 2011 onwards highlights the inadequa- the AU. The country’s incorporation into the AU cy of the responses of the continent’s states con- in 2017 was preceded by a second phase in a pro- fronted with liquid threats that spread across the cess of regularization of - mainly sub-Saharan – traditionally porous and militarily challenging immigrants. Morocco sought to differentiate itself Saharan borders. In this context, the states are with this initiative from neighbouring countries, no longer the sole protagonists. African societies, such as Algeria, where the security approach still through their mobility, protests or actions, have prevails in its migration policy (Mesa, 2018; Her- an increasing role to play in these relationships nando de Larramendi, 2019). shaped by a dynamic of globalisation from below. Part of the dynamics of mobility in search of new opportunities are university exchanges, perceived by the Maghreb states as the way to form Migrations and mobility an elite and create affinities and links with a new generation of young Africans. Morocco and Tu- Human mobility between the Maghreb and sub- nisia5 compete to become the regional hubs for Saharan Africa has been an essential feature of bottom-up integration. Religious and human 5 Although the number (7,000) of sub-Saharan students in Tunisia is relatively modest, it has grown substantially 4 For further info, view Artur Colom’s chapter in this report, since 2017, with an increase of 272% compared to the “EU-Africa economic relations in the post-Cotonou era”. previous year. For further information on this matter,

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higher education and training. In 2020, 85% of the Sahara) with business dynamism. In this sense, 20,500 international students in Morocco were Af- the holding of companies linked to the monarchy rican, half of them on scholarships,6 mostly from has played a critical role in the attempts to con- French-speaking West Africa. The creation of an solidate the presence of the country south of the Agency for the Reception of African Students in Sahara. This priority is reflected since 2019 in the Tunisia in 2018 and the launch of a Franco-Tuni- new name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sian University for Africa and the Mediterranean African Cooperation and Moroccans Expatriates. in the same year are steps taken in the same di- In the case of Algeria, the internal political pa- rection.7 ralysis following the stroke suffered by President Bouteflika in 2013 has limited the country’s capacity to project itself economically towards the rest Economic exchanges of the continent, despite the recurring desire of the private business sector to strengthen its pres- The economic sphere also appears as a space of ence in sub-Saharan Africa by promoting initia- opportunity where new agendas and interests tives such as the Forum Africain d’Investissements are being consolidated and where new private et d’Affaires, organised in 2016 by the Forum des stakeholders are emerging to take advantage of Chefs d’Enterprise (Mignot, 2017). the vacuum left by Libya after its collapse in 2011. In Tunisia, the rhetoric of an opening towards Although economic exchanges between North Af- sub-Saharan Africa has not led to a significant rica and the rest of the continent are still much increase in economic relations and investments, lower than those with the European Union, their despite initiatives such as the Forum Econom- volume is growing. Market and investment oppor- ique Africain, organised by the Tunisian govern- tunities in Africa offer new prospects for stagnant ment in April 2018. The financial difficulties that Maghreb economies, characterised by one of the the country faces since the fall of Ben Ali in 2011 lowest rates of regional economic integration in and the process of consolidation of the demo- the world. The Maghreb countries are trying to cratic transition have limited the possibility of take advantage of their geographical position to allocating public resources to the intensification strengthen their role as a hub for the rest of the of relations supported from the private sector by continent. Notably, Morocco intends to benefit initiatives such as the Tunisian African Business from a status of a gateway to the markets of sub- Council (TABC) (Augé, 2019). Saharan Africa. Rabat is casting itself as a platform In Libya, the dynamism experienced during to access the rest of the continent by strengthen- the Gaddafi period, characterized by significant ing South-South cooperation with the sub-Saha- investments in sub-Saharan Africa (4 billion in ran Africa countries, an objective set out in the 2003) (Martinez, 2019, pp. 167), has disappeared preamble to the 2011 Constitution (Sarton, 2014). as a result of the internal conflict that has been In its offensive to return to the continent, Mo- shaking the country since 2011. rocco has combined diplomatic aspects (linked to Beyond their traditional areas of contact in the search for support on the subject of Western French-speaking Africa, the economic diploma- cies of the Maghreb countries seek to expand their influence and economic ties to other areas of the vid.: https://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/actualite-nation- continent. This will to diversify the economic and al-tunisie/296158/la-tunisie-ambitionne-d-accueillir- trade relations of the Maghreb countries also re- 20-000-etudiants-africains-en-2020 sponds, in part, to the Eurozone financial crisis 6 In 2018, Morocco had 20,000 sub-Saharan students. Vid.: https://www.lafactory.ma/le-maroc-hub-regional- that started in 2008. The crisis had a considerable des-etudiants-africains/ negative impact on economies highly dependent 7 Website of the University: http://uftam.net/ on European markets, and exposed their vul-

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Tabla 1. Foreign trade of the Maghreb countries with the rest of the continent (2017)

Exports to the rest Imports from the rest Total % of its exports Total % of its of the continent* of the continent* in Africa imports Algeria 1,800 1,200 5% 3% Libya Morocco 2,200 1,600 9% 3% Mauritania 137 196 7% 6% Tunisia 1,500 1,300 10% 6%

*Value: millions of $. Source: compiled by the authors based on Tralac data: https://www.tralac.org/resources/our-resources/13143-algeria- intra-africa-trade-and-tariff-profile.html

nerability and sensitivity. However, the efforts In any case, the launch of the African Conti- completed in this direction have not altered the nental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), announced in relationship of dependence that the Maghreb March 2018 and functional since May 2019, offers countries have with the EU (Fernández-Molina, new perspectives and opportunities to increase 2019a, 2019b). Trade with the rest of the continent the volume of intra-African trade in the medium is still weak, as shown in Table 1, although exports term.8 have gained weight. In 2017, they represented 10% of Tunisia’s total exports, 9% of Morocco’s, 7% of Mauritania’s and only 5% of Algeria’s. Security and religious diplomacy Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Maghreb countries are facing their approach to Sub-Sa- The disunity in the economic field is also reflected haran Africa in a disjointed manner, as Table 1 in security cooperation initiatives, as can be seen shows. In the economic field, Morocco and Tu- in Table 2. The pattern of rivalry between Alge- nisia have obtained observer status in ECOWAS, ria and Morocco, which has blocked the process which aims to promote regional economic inte- of regional integration in the Maghreb, has been gration in West Africa. Mauritania was one of the projected into the African space. Both countries founding countries of the organisation in 1975, are competing to gain influence in a region in- although in 2000 it decided to leave the organi- creasingly perceived by the European Union as a sation to engage in the construction of the AMU. border for its security (Hernando de Larramendi, In 2017, it signed a new partnership agreement 2019). This context has reinforced the strategic with the organisation, which, among other meas- importance of the Maghreb states as crucial part- ures, established the free movement of persons ners in managing the European security agenda and goods. The absence of a joint strategy is also on issues such as cooperation in the fight against reflected in the participation of the Maghreb terrorism, the externalisation of borders and the countries in other regional economic integra- control of irregular immigration. tion initiatives. Tunisia and Libya, for example, Invoking the geographical argument that are part of the Common Market for Eastern and Morocco has no direct border with the Sahelian Southern Africa (COMESA), but that is not the case countries, Algiers has tried to keep Rabat out of of Algeria, Morocco or Mauritania. The Commu- nity of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) includes 8 Mauritania, Egypt and Algeria have ratified the treaty Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya, but not while Morocco and Tunisia have started the ratification Algeria. procedure at the time of writing this essay.

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Tabla 2. Membership of Maghrebi States in African regional economic and security organisations

Regional economic organisations** Security organisations AU AMU ECOWAS CEN-SAD COMESA CEMOC*** UFL G5-Sahel AU/APSA Algeria X X X X X Libya X X X X X X Morocco X X Observer status (2017) X X Mauritania* X X Association Agree- X X X X X ment (2017) Tunisia X X Observer status (2018) X X X

* In 2017, Mauritania signed an association agreement with ECOWAS aiming to its readmission to the organisation from which it had withdrawn in 2000. ** Regional economic organisations have also established internal structures that deal with security issues. *** CEMOC: The Comité d’État-major opérationnel conjoint involves Argelia, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

the various security initiatives put forward in the countries to combat processes of radicalization region since 2001 (Zoubir, 2009). This was the and terrorism. Following the footsteps of Gaddafi case in 2004, when Algiers promoted the creation in Libya, who in the 1990s was one of the first of the Centre Africain d’Études et de Recherche leaders to use religious ties in his foreign policy, sur le Terrorisme (CAERT). In 2010, Rabat was Algeria and Morocco are also giving a new impe- excluded from the Joint Military Staff Commit- tus to religious diplomacy. The export of the Mo- tee Headquarters (CEMOC), based in Tamanras- roccan model of an Islam of a juste milieu, used set. Morocco’s non-membership status in the AU to combat what are considered as misinterpreta- was the argument put forward to keep Rabat tions of Islam has become a powerful soft power out of the Nouackchott Process,9 launched in tool Morocco uses to gain influence in its relations March 2013, which involves 11 countries from with African countries, both in West and East Af- the Maghreb, the Sahel and West Africa (Inter- rica. Algeria, for its part, has promoted the crea- national Crisis Group 2015, p. 11). On the other tion of a League of Ulema, Preachers and Imams hand, Algeria’s reluctance to become militarily of the Sahel with the aim of establishing itself as involved in Mali and Niger, ignoring some of its a reference institution in the fight against radical- officers’ requests, justified its exclusion from the ism and violent extremism in the Sahel region, G5 as an institutional framework for coordinating coinciding with the launch of Operation Serval in and monitoring regional cooperation for devel- Mali. Both countries also make use of the trans- opment and security policies created in 2014 by national links that exist between the followers of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Sufi brotherhoods, such as the Tijaniyyah, which The religious dimension has also been a privi- has a significant presence south of the Sahara. leged tool in the African policies of the Maghreb

The African policies of Algeria and Morocco 9 Started by the African Union Commission in March 2013, the Nouakchott Process was inauguratd on March The interest shown by the Maghreb countries in 17th. It is a mechanism for strengthening security cooperation among the countries of the Sahel and the opera- sub-Saharan Africa has not been uniform. Until tional implementation of the African Peace and Security 2011, Libya led the attempts to strengthen rela- Architecture (APSA) in the region. tions with the rest of the continent’s countries by

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competing with the role played by Algeria, espe- resorted to a voluntarist discourse that, on the cially in the Sahel region. Tripoli took advantage one hand, tried to minimise its impact and, on of Algeria’s withdrawal during the civil war years the other hand, sought to compensate it by pro- (1992-1997) to pursue a policy that sought to moting selective bilateralism with the countries compensate for its international isolation due to of French-speaking Central and West Africa that its involvement in the Lockerbie attacks. The cre- supported its theses on the Moroccan nature of ation in 1998 of the Community of Sahel-Saharan Western Sahara (Hernando de Larramendi and States (CEN-SAD), a multi-sectoral framework for Tomé, 2017). South-South partnership made up of six member Although sub-Saharan Africa was a priority for states, which later became twenty-five (COMESA), Mohamed VI since his accession to the throne in from which Algeria was excluded, was part of this 1999, Morocco’s attempts to reassess its position logic.10 Libya also promoted the re-founding of as a bridge between Europe and the African conti- the OAU and opened its doors to African migrants nent clashed with a policy that made bilateral co- (Haddad, 2000), in addition to devoting signifi- operation dependent on the positions adopted by cant resources to the financing of major projects the different African states on the subject of West- south of the Sahara. The vacuum left by the fall ern Sahara, thus limiting the country’s marge of of Gaddafi in 2011, as well as Algeria’s reluctance manoeuvre in East and Southern Africa (Cologán to become militarily involved beyond its borders, and González-Massieu, 2017). The decoupling of have been utilised by Rabat to try to reposition the two issues only occurred in 2017, when Mo- itself on the African scene, competing with Algiers rocco joined the AU by agreeing to coexist with to increase its influence in the region. the SADR in the organisation. This pragmatic turn has allowed Morocco to expand its relations with the rest of the African states. Moreover, several Morocco’s return to the African continent countries that recognized the Saharawi Republic, such as Rwanda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ni- Although Morocco played an active role in the geria and Southern Sudan, have improved their process that led to the creation of the OAU in relations with Morocco thanks to the visits that 1963, its relations with the continent were con- Mohamed VI has undertaken around the conditioned by its territorial claims on other African tinent since then, with which he has sought to states that questioned the principle of the intan- strengthen the country’s role as a leader in South- gibility of colonial borders set out in the founding South cooperation. charter of the pan-African organisation. Morocco’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa The admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democrat- are based on two main axes: economic coopera- ic Republic (SADR) as a full member of the OAU in tion and religious and cultural diplomacy. The 1984 led to Morocco’s withdrawal from the organ- intense diplomatic activity of Mohamed VI in the isation. Its absence from this multilateral forum African continent (50 visits in 30 countries since prevented the country from participating in the 2000, accompanied by business delegations) has re-founding of the organisation in 2001, when it resulted in the signing of a thousand cooperation was transformed into the African Union (AU). It agreements, increased public and private invest- also prevented it from being part of initiatives for ment and the launch of joint projects such as the Africa’s regional development, such as the New gas pipeline between Morocco and Nigeria or Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). To the construction of a fertilizer mega-factory in make up for this absence, Moroccan diplomacy Ethiopia. In order to support the development of these projects, the Ithmar Capital Sovereign 10 � From 2011, Morocco and Tunisia joined the initiative, Fund was created in November 2016. As a result but not Algeria. of the foregoing, Africa receives 60% of Moroc-

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can direct investment abroad. These investments of the Maliki school of law, predominant in the are concentrated in the sectors of telecommuni- country, of the Ash’arist theological doctrine, and cations, banking and finance and public works. a deep-rooted Sufi tradition present in brother- Geographically, the destination of 55% of invest- hoods, such as the Tijaniyyah, with a strong ments is West Africa, 25% North Africa, 15% Cen- presence in other African countries. Within the tral Africa and 5% Southern Africa (Ministére de framework of this religious diplomacy, Morocco l’Économie, 2018, p. 17). has financed the construction, maintenance and Morocco was, in the 2015-2017 biennium, the restoration of mosques in African countries, as world’s fifth-largest investor in the continent, and well as the creation in 2015 of the Mohammed VI the first at the regional level. With this deploy- Institute for the training of Imams, a centre where ment, Rabat intends to reinforce its attractiveness a thousand African students were trained in 2019. as a commercial and financial platform for sub- The deployment of tools used to exercise this Saharan Africa (Mbaye, 2019). This objective is Moroccan soft power in sub-Saharan Africa in- furthered by the expansion of Tanger Med, which cludes the mobilization of the media. An example has turned this port in northern Morocco into the of this is the creation in 2014 of the Atlantic Feder- leading African port in terms of volume of con- ation of African Press Agencies, coordinated and tainers, ahead of Port Saïd (Egypt) and Durban chaired by the official Moroccan News Agency to (South Africa), strengthening the country’s posi- have a key influence tool in the continent, giving tion as a platform for trade with sub-Saharan Af- visibility to the big Moroccan companies. rica. 40% of Tanger Med’s traffic comes from West It is also worth noting the presence of media Africa, and its destination is China and Europe.11 such as MEDI 1 radio, Hit Radio or Eco Media in The expansion of Casablanca airport, which Mo- countries such as Gabon, Burkina Faso and Sen- rocco intends to turn into one of the continent’s egal. The presence of cinema through the Centre air connection hubs, is part of the same direction. Cinématographique Marocain is also noticeable. In 2017, Morocco applied to join ECOWAS. The This soft power is also exercised through an ac- attainment of its full membership, beyond the tive development cooperation policy, such as the observer status obtained in 2000, was confronted delivery of humanitarian aid to sub-Saharan mi- by the Nigerian government, and, in particular, by grants expelled from Algeria (Lamlili, 2016). Dur- the opposition from the Manufacturers Associa- ing the Ebola crisis, Morocco was the only country tion of Nigeria (MAN), a powerful industrial sector to keep airlines open with Sierra Leone, Liberia business association wary of extending the free and Guinea-Conakri.12 trade zone to new members. In its relations with sub-Saharan Africa, Moroc- co also makes use of the religious leadership of Algeria’s “neglected” African policy its king as the “Commander of the Faithful” (Amir al-Mu’minin), who promotes a juste milieu to Is- Following its independence in 1962, Algeria’s Afri- lam (al-Wasatiyya) in contrast to the Wahhabi and can policy has been markedly ideological, based Salafist interpretations spread by Saudi Arabia on principles forged during its long and traumatic and some countries of the Persian Gulf (Baylocq anticolonial struggle: the defence of the sover- et al., 2016). According to this vision, the moder- eignty and territorial integrity of states and the ate and balanced character of Moroccan Islam the country aims to export to the rest of the continent 12 � Bourita, N.: “Notre diplomatie est globale, autonome would be a result of the interpretative openness et responsable», statements collected in Jeune Afrique, May 14th 2018, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/45437/ 11 � http://www.rfi.fr/fr/emission/20190722-tanger-med- politique/le-maroc-solidaire-des-pays-touch-s-par-ebo- devient-premier-port-conteneurs-mediterranee la-au-nom-de-sa-politique-africaine/

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support for self-determination. After nationalis- try’s ability to ensure its influence in the region is ing the hydrocarbon sector in 1971, Algeria pur- limited by its principled positions on non-inter- sued an militant foreign policy that sought to vention in military affairs outside its borders and strengthen the country’s position abroad through non-interference in the internal affairs of other active leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement, states, as enshrined in the Constitution adopted promoting revisionist initiatives in the interna- in February 2016. Although the regime, as a last tional sphere, such as the defence of a New In- resort, authorized the opening of its airspace to ternational Economic Order at the UN (Mañé et French aviation in January 2013 as part of Opera- al., 2019). tion Serval,14 its reluctance to intervene outside Since the arrival of Bouteflika to the presiden- its borders confines its possibilities of exercising cy of the Republic in 1999, the African continent a regional leadership role, itself strongly con- became a privileged space to try to reposition tested by Morocco. Algeria’s attempts to secure the country internationally after years of isola- its influence through mediation and initiatives of tion during the civil war (1992-1997). Although political dialogue clash with the foundations of Bouteflika achieved the international restoration a national security doctrine marked by its revo- of the regime by taking advantage of the post- lutionary past. The principles that guide it, such 9/11 global context, Algeria’s ability to project as non-interference in foreign affairs, prevent the its influence abroad has been conditioned by country from responding to the demands for col- the limits imposed by its foreign policy’s guid- laboration in the fight against terrorism made by ing principles (Thieux, 2018). Nonetheless, the the authorities of neighbouring countries, such country has regained its role as mediator by get- as Mali in 2012 or Niger in 2013, to stop the ter- ting, for example, Ethiopia and Eritrea to sign a rorist attacks in Agadez and Arlit. peace agreement in June 2000. It also promoted Through a policy of containment, Algeria has the launch of NEPAD in 2001, a decision which sought to ensure the security of the 6,000 kilo- enabled the country to attend the G8 summits. metres of borders it shares with Morocco, Libya, From 2013, the deteriorating state of Boutefli- Tunisia, Niger, Mali and Mauritania, in order to ka’s health, who had monopolized the command prevent the terrorist threat from spilling over into in foreign policy affairs, limited Algerian diplo- its own territory, as happened in January 2013 matic action in the continent, in a context of in- when a terrorist attack launched from Libya at- creasing instability in the Sahel. Sharing borders tacked the Tiguentourine gas plant in In Amenas. with Libya and Mali means that destabilization The attempt to seal the borders in order to end in these two countries poses major challenges to with the traditional porosity of Saharan borders Algeria’s internal security.13 has come hand in hand with the military deploy- Although the Sahel is considered by the Alge- ment of 75,000 soldiers on the southern and east- rian authorities to be a security belt, the coun- ern borders of the country. The militarisation of the borders complements attempts to promote a neighbourhood policy that would allow a hori- 13 � In January 2013, a terrorist group attacked the Tiguen- zontal integration of the Sahelian countries, with tourine gas plant in In Amenas and kidnapped 30 hos- Algeria as a pivot and protector (International Cri- tages. This was the first time that the energy sector sis Group, 2015, p. 9). In trying to strengthen its had suffered an attack of such magnitude. The attack, regional position, Algeria has also used the influ- organised from Libya, was carried out after a series of attacks against Algerian interests, such as the kidnapping of the Consul along with 6 other diplomats by the MO- 14 � Military operation carried out in Mali by the French JWA in Gao in April 2012. See https://www.jeuneafrique. army in January 2013, which ended in July 2014. Since com/138586/politique/l-attaque-d-in-amenas-et-ses- then, the forces involved in the country have been in- cons-quences-sur-la-doctrine-alg-rienne/ tegrated into a regional operation, Operation Barkhane.

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ence derived from the support given to national the African continent. Although all the countries of liberation movements during the decolonisation the Maghreb (with the exception of Libya, a coun- period. This symbolic capital is complemented by try in the throes of civil conflict) share this same financial initiatives, such as cancelling the debt of ambition, their strategies and the tools they have several Sahelian states, in the amount of $3 billion mobilised differ. The paths used to strengthen their in 2012 and $900 million in 2013. links with sub-Saharan Africa are diverse, and each The main vector of Algeria’s relations with the state, depending on its historical background and rest of the African continent has been the launching economic and political situation, draws up its own of large infrastructure projects, such as the trans- road map. The Maghreb being the least integrated Saharan route between Algiers and Lagos, marked geographical space in the world, each capital ri- by a slow and costly implementation (Kateb, 2019), vals its neighbours in strengthening its position or the trans-Saharan gas pipeline that will con- and influence, thus generating a competition that nect Nigeria’s fields with Algeria through Niger. At- ultimately subtracts or limits the benefits that this tempts to diversify exports beyond hydrocarbons regional subset could obtain if it approached its have been limited in scope, despite the creation of relations with the rest of the continent in a more a Special Fund for the Promotion of Exports man- coherent and integrated manner. aged by the Ministry of Trade. Algeria’s image south While Morocco has embedded the strength- of the Sahara is conditioned by a repressive migra- ening of its relations with Africa in a global, mul- tion policy with mass expulsions of sub-Saharan tidimensional and long-term strategy, Algeria’s migrants to Mali and Niger. external action towards the continent has been The deterioration of the situation in Libya af- less proactive and has also suffered from the pa- ter the start of the siege of the capital by Marshal ralysis of a diplomacy strongly linked to its Presi- Haftar’s forces in April 2019 and the risks of in- dent. Although the financial dimension has been ternationalisation of the conflict have reinforced at the heart of the African policies of the Maghreb the role that Algeria can play in the quest for a states, it is by no means the only one. It should negotiated solution. After a year of mobilisa- also be remembered that the level of economic tions against the regime, president Tebboune, interdependence with sub-Saharan Africa is still elected in December 2019, is trying to reinforce lower than with Europe. Suffice it to say that in- his probed leadership by intensifying diplomatic tra-African trade only constitutes about 16% of activity. In Africa, he has increased his meetings the continent’s total trade. The “inter”-depend- with leaders of the continent, taking advantage encies that the countries of North Africa have wo- of the country’s participation in the AU’s annual ven with Europe continue to carry considerable summit in February 2020. His trip to Addis Ababa weight, both in the economic and security fields. was preceded by the ratification of the agree- However, the emphasis on strengthening their ment for the creation of an African Continental ties with sub-Saharan African countries all North Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the announcement African countries share, also stems from the need of the creation of an Algerian international coop- to diversify their economic ties and decrease their eration agency with an African vocation. dependence towards Europe. The African ambitions of North-African countries seem to be more motivated by the need to Conclusions maintain or strengthen their geopolitical status on a new international chessboard marked by In a context marked by globalisation, exacerbat- globalisation, than by the need to follow a clear ed competition for resources and the opening of strategy of re-continentalisation of their inter- new markets, Africa’s lure allows North Africa to national relations with a view to playing a key strengthen its position as a gateway to the rest of strategic and economic role in the continent and

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becoming an engine of its economic, political and Blin, L.: L’Algérie du Sahara au Sahel, L’Harmattan, human development. Paris, 1990. While the foregoing is clearly part of an Afro- Bobin, F.: “Loi pénalisant le racisme en Tunisie: optimistic vision, the Afro-realists bear a more une première victoire pour la minorité noire”, pessimistic view of the future of the continent. Le Monde, 2018. Retrieved from: https:// For them, there are major challenges that some- www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/10/11/ how force North Africa to strengthen its coopera- loi-penalisant-le-racisme-en-tunisie- tion links with its southern neighbours, which une-premiere-victoire-pour-la-minorite- are more vulnerable to the emergence of trans- noire_5368149_3212.html national threats such as jihadism, food insecurity Cabestan, J.: “Les relations Chine-Afrique: nou- or climate refugees.15 velles responsabilités et nouveaux défis d’une puissance mondiale en devenir”, Hérodote, vol. 150, no. 3, 2013, pp. 150-171. References Chena, S.: “L’Algérie: de la puissance idéologique à l’hégémonie sécuritaire”. In: M. Mokhefi and Alaoui, N.: “Le Maghreb dans son environnement A. Antil (eds.), Le Maghreb et son sud: vers des régional et international; la projection économ- liens renouvelés, CNRS éditions, Paris, 2019, ique des pays du Maghreb”, Notes de l’IFRI, 2016. pp. 19-40. Retrieved from: https://www.ifri.org/sites/de- Cologan and Gonzalez-Massieu, J.: “La politica de fault/files/atoms/files/noteocpalaouidef.pdf cooperacion al desarrollo del Reino de Marrue- Augé, B.: “La politique africaine de la Tunisie. cos: nuevo actor emergente de la Cooperacion entre opportunisme et opportunités non ex- Sur-Sur y Triangular en Africa”, Revista de es- ploitées”, L’Afrique en questions, no. 49, 2019. tudios internacionales mediterráneos, no. 22, Retrieved from: https://www.ifri.org/fr/pub- 2017, pp. 55-76. lications/editoriaux-de-lifri/lafrique-ques- Falola, T. and Kalu, K. (eds.): Africa and Globaliza- tions/politique-africaine-de-tunisie-entre tion, challenges of governance and creativity, Badie, B.: L’hégémonie contestée, les nouvelles Palgrave MacMillan, 2018. formes de domination internationale, Édi- Fernández-Molina, I., Feliu, L. and Hernando de tions Odile Jacob, Paris, 2019. Larramendi, M.: “The ‘subaltern’ foreign poli- Baghzouz, A.: “La nouvelle géopolitique du Sa- cies of North African countries: old and new hel, une opportunité pour refonder le par- responses to economic dependence, region- tenariat euro-maghrébin?”, Cahiers de la al insecurity and domestic political change”, Méditerranée, no. 89, 2014, pp. 195-207. The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 24, Bensaad, A.: “Agadez, carrefour migratoire sahélo- no. 3, 2019, pp. 506-531. maghrébin”, Revue Européenne des Migrations Fernández-Molina, I.: “Global Power Shifts, Ration- Internationales, vol. 19, no. 1, 2003, pp. 7-28. al Choice and Role Conflict: Explaining the Tra- Bensaad, A.: “Maghreb, a subordinate globaliza- jectories of the Central Maghreb Countries’ EU tion”, Méditerranée. Revue géographique des Policies since 2011”, Papers IEMED/Euromesco, pays méditerranéens, no. 116, 2011, pp. 9-13. no. 19, 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ EuroMeSCo39_Global-Power-Shifts_Ration- 15 � The World Bank’s Groudswell report of 2018 estimated al-Choice_Role-Conflict_Explaining-the- that 86 million people would be climate change migrants Trajectories-of-Central-Maghreb-Countries-EU- by 2050 if urgent action is not taken. Retrieved from: https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/infograph- Policies.pdf ic/2018/03/19/groundswell---preparing-for-internal- Freire, F.: “Weapons of the weak, and of the climate-migration strong: Mauritanian foreign policy and the

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international dimensions of social activism”, rope en quête du sens, OCP Policy Center, Ra- The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 24, bat, 2018, pp. 141-250. Retrieved from: http:// no. 3, pp. 490-505. www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/ Ghanem-Yazbeck, D. (ed.): “The Sahel: Europe’s Livre%20-%20Afrique%20UE-Afrique%20 African Bordersd”, Euromesco paper, no. 8, -%20L.Jaidi_.pdf 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.euro- Kateb, A.: “Maghreb: Trans-Africa Express”, Jeune mesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ Afrique, 2019. Retrieved from: https://www. EuroMeSCo-Joint-Policy-Study-8_The_ jeuneafrique.com/mag/759105/economie/ Sahel_Europe_African_Border.pdf tribune-maghreb-trans-africa-express/ Haddad, S.: “La politique africaine de la Libye: Lamlili, N.: “Maroc: Mohammed VI envoie une de la tentation impériale à la stratégie uni- aide d’urgence aux migrants subsahariens taire”, Monde arabe: Maghreb Machrek, no. expulsés par l’Algérie vers le Niger”, Jeune 170, 2000, pp. 29-38. Afrique, 2016. Retrieved from: https://www. Hamadouche, L. D. A.: “Politique extérieure et poli- jeuneafrique.com/384288/politique/maroc- tique intérieure algérienne: la résistance révolu- mohammed-vi-envoie-aide-durgence-aux- tionnaire au service de la résilience autoritaire?”, migrants-subsahariens-expulses-lalgerie/ Maghreb-Machrek, no. 3, 2014, pp. 9-22. Nubukpo, K.: L’Urgence africaine. Changeons Hernando de Larramendi, M. and Fernández- le modèle de croissance! Odile Jacob, Paris, Molina, I.: “The Evolving Foreign Policies of 2019. North African States (2011-2014): New Trends Mañé, A., Thieux, L., and Hernando de Larramen- in Constraints, Political Processes and Behav- di, M.: Argelia en transición hacia una Segun- ior”. In: Y. H. Zoubir and G. White (eds.), North da República, Icaria, Barcelona, 2019. African Politics: Change and Continuity, Rout- Mbaye, K.: “Le Maroc, hub africain pour l’Inde”, ledge, London, 2016, pp. 245-276. Les Eco.ma, 2019. Retrieved from: https:// Hernando de Larramendi, M. and Tomé, B.: “The leseco.ma/le-maroc-hub-africain-pour-l- return of Morocco to the African Union”, IEMed inde/ Mediterranean Yearbook, Barcelona, 2017. Re- Mareï, N.: “Régionalisation entre Maghreb et Af- trieved from: https://www.iemed.org/obser- rique de l’ouest: regard géographique”, Revue vatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/ Interventions économiques, Hors-série, Trans- med.2017/IEMed_MedYearbook2017_mo- formations, 2017. Retrieved from: http:// rocco_african_union_Larramendi_alonso. journals.openedition.org/interventionsec- pdf/ onomiques/5753 Hernando de Larramendi, M.: “Doomed region- Martínez, L.: L’Afrique du Nord après les révoltes alism in a redrawn Maghreb? The changing arabes, Les Presses Sciences Po, Paris, 2019. shape of the rivalry between Algeria and Mo- Mesa, B. and Hamdaoui, Y.: “Le Maroc, un ‘acteur rocco in the post-2011 era”, The Journal of emancipé’ dans la géopolitique sahelienne”. North African Studies, vol. 24, no.3, 2019, pp. Journal of International Law and Internation- 506-531. al Relations, no. 6, 2018, pp. 131-143. International Crisis Group. Algeria and its neigh- Mesa, B.: “La nueva política migratoria de Mar- bours, Crisis Group Middle East and North Af- ruecos: papeles sin integración”. Nota de rica Report 164, 2015. Retrieved from: https:// Prospectiva, no. 54, Fundación Alternati- d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/164-algeria- vas, Madrid, 2018. Retrieved from: https:// and-its-neighbours.pdf www.fundacionalternativas.org/observato- Jaidi, L.: “Les enjeux africains de la nouvelle rio-de-politica-exterior-opex/documentos/ politique migratoire du Maroc”. In: J. Larabi e notas-prospectivas/la-nueva-politica-migra- I. Martín (coords.), Le partenariat Afrique-Eu- toria-de-marruecos-papeles-sin-integracion

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Mezouaghi, M.: “L’Afrique subsaharienne et le caines pionnières en Afrique subsaharienne”. monde arabe: des espaces agricoles décon- En A. Naciri Bensaghir (ed.), Reconnexion de nectés”. In: CIHEAM, Mediterra 2014. Logis- l’Afrique a l’economie mondiale: Defis de la tique et commerce agro-alimentaire, un défi mondialisation, 2016, pp. 129-150. pour la méditerranée, Les Presses de Sciences Sarton, R.: Tendances et opportunités sur Po, Paris, 2014, pp. 57-74. l’avancement de la coopération Sud-Sud au Mignot, A.: “Les entrepreneurs du FCE d’Algérie Maroc.Étude et consultation des parties pre- mettent le cap sur l’Afrique et la diversifica- nantes, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et de tion”, AfricaPresse, Paris, July 21st 2017. Re- la Cooperation/PNUD, Rabat, 2014. Retrieved trieved from: https://www.africapresse.paris/ from: https://www.undp.org/content/dam/ Les-entrepreneurs-du-FCE-d-Algerie-mettent- morocco/docs/GOVERNANCE/Tendances_ le-cap-sur-l-Afrique-et-la?lang=fr et_opportunit%c3%a9s_de_la_Coop%c3% Ministére de l’ Économie, des Finances et de la a9ration_Sud_Sud_au%20Maroc.pdf Réforme de l’Administration. Développement Soler i Lecha, E.: “Los países del Magreb pivotan des entreprises marocaines en Afrique: réalité hacia África y no son los únicos”, Anuario del et perspectives, Rabat, 2018. Retrieved from: CIDOB, Barcelona, 2019, pp. 157-164. http://depf.finances.gov.ma/2018/12/06/de- Tarrius, A.: La mundialización por abajo, Editorial veloppement-des-entreprises-marocaines- Hacer, 2007. en-afrique-realite-et-perspectives/ Thieux, L.: “The dilemmas of Algerian foreign Mokhefi, M. and Antil, A.: Le Maghreb et son sud: policy since 2011: between normative entrap- vers des liens renouvelés, Éditions CNRS, Par- ment and pragmatic responses to the new is, 2012. regional security challenges”, The Journal of Otayek, R.: “La production islamique de la North African Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 2019, pp. mondialisation, les relations Afrique-monde 426-443. árabe à l’ère dux transnationalisme contem- Wagner, C.: (2019). “India’s Africa Policy”, SWP porain”, Confluences Méditerranée, no. 90, Research Paper 2019/RP 09. Retrieved from: 2014, pp. 23-37. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/ Rigar, S. M. and Meite, Y.: “Intégration africaine: indias-africa-policy/ quel modèle de coopération économique Sud-Sud? Expérience des entreprises maro-

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Artur Colom Jaén

The Cotonou Agreement will expire in December Union (EU) and the 79 ACP countries (48 in sub- 2020. This agreement has regulated economic Saharan Africa, 16 in the Caribbean and 15 in the and cooperation relations between the European Pacific). Even though the agreement was set to Union and 79 countries in Africa, the Caribbean expire in February 2020, the slowness and diffi- and the Pacific (ACP) since 2000. With regard to culties in negotiating the new agreement have Africa, due to the limited achievements of the postponed the expiration to December 2020. agreement in terms of trade, and to significant Moreover, the global COVID-19 pandemic and changes on the international arena, the new the uncertainties it causes, both in Europe and framework that is being negotiated to substitute in Africa, will certainly alter again the schedule the Cotonou Agreement will not be a mere exten- and the contents of the negotiations. sion of the current agreement. Europe’s wish to extend and consolidate the Among other aspects, the 2030 Agenda for EU project to the relations between some of its Sustainable Development requires environmen- members—especially France and the United tal and social issues to be included more emphat- Kingdom until its exit from the EU—and some ically in this new agreement. Moreover, whereas of their former colonies makes sense from the the Cotonou Agreement had an interregional ba- viewpoint of maintaining their historical ties. sis expressed in the various Economic Partner- However, achievements in the area of trade have ship Agreements (known as EPAs) implemented been limited, and the benefits of the cooperation between different African regions and the EU, programmes funded within the framework of the the ongoing negotiations indicate that the new Cotonou Agreement are debatable. From a criti- framework of association will be based on a con- cal standpoint, these limited achievements could tinental Africa-EU approach. be attributed to an exceedingly optimistic view of In this chapter, we will assess the achieve- the advantages of trade liberalisation—common ments of the Cotonou Agreement in terms of its when the agreement was signed— and to an ap- contribution to Africa’s development. We will also proach that is far from what could be considered explore what course the new post-Cotonou frame- a relation among equals. work agreement between the European Union The Cotonou Agreement was conceived and and Africa, still in the negotiation phase, may take. organised based on three pillars: a trade pillar, a development aid pillar, and finally a political pillar. Back then, this approach had to do with the The foundations of the Cotonou Agreement European Union’s wish to offer a particular relation framework to ACP countries, which included The Cotonou Agreement came into effect in June not only a free trade agreement, but also a large 2000. For 20 years, it has governed the trade and financial aid programme, as well as a space for cooperation relations between the European political dialogue.

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In its trade dimension, the Cotonou Agree- the 2014-2020 term, has a total budget of 30,500 ment has been proposing the gradual disap- million Euros. The EDF’s financial capacity is con- pearance of the unilateral trade preferences siderable. It is one of the most important devel- granted by the EU, adapting instead to World opment funds in the world, and has a particular Trade Organisation (WTO) norms, which seek to relevance for Africa. According to data from 2018, reciprocally deregulate economic exchanges. In 38% of the approximately 13,000 million Euros re- other words, before the Agreement, the European corded as Official Development Assistance from Union—or the European Economic Community Europe to sub-Saharan Africa correspond to the (EEC) until 1993—granted preferential treatment EDF, and the remainder is bilateral aid (Council of to ACP countries in terms of trade that did not re- the European Union, 2019: 46). quire the same treatment in exchange. However, As to the political pillar of the Agreement, the in 2000 WTO norms were adopted to prevent such European Union sought to provide content to the preferential treatment because from an orthodox economic cooperation framework that would go approach it is considered discriminatory vis-à-vis beyond the areas of trade and aid, as a typical third countries. In the Cotonou Agreement, EPAs characteristic of relations between the European have been the tool used to implement this at- Union and developing countries. The discourse tempt of trade liberalisation reform. of “good governance”—so common in the field EPAs are defined as trade agreements be- of development cooperation in the late 1990s— tween the European Union and different regions was adopted as a key component. The intent was in the ACP group. Even though they seek to pro- to promote democracy and respect for human mote integration in the various ACP regions, it is rights by making countries’ alignment to such actually individual countries that sign the corre- principles a condition for benefitting from the sponding EPAs with the EU as a first step toward funding programmes in the above-mentioned real interregional EPAs. This is why the lack of in- development aid pillar. This political agenda has terregional agreements has been replaced with a been included in the various Country Strategy Pa- combination of interim EPAs and individual EPAs. pers that the European Union and the ACP coun- In the case of Africa, the EU has determined five tries produce to plan the aid. One of the recurring regions with which to negotiate and implement critiques of the political pillar of the Agreement the EPAs: Western Africa, Central Africa, Eastern is about the concept of “good governance” be- and Southern Africa, the East African Community cause of its intrusiveness into the political affairs (EAC), and the Southern African Development of sovereign countries and its generic conception Community (SADC). It should be noted that these of good governance, seen as insufficiently flex- regions do not entirely match previously estab- ible and adaptable to countries with low levels lished regional groups—with the exception of the of development in many cases. EAC—, which has made the situation more complicated. The difficulties in negotiating and implementing the EPAs have been considerable, mainly Precedents of the Cotonou Agreement due to resistance from the African countries, which in many cases did not see clear advantages to sign- It is interesting to study, however briefly, the ing a treaty that limited their trade policy tools. precedents of the Cotonou Agreement, as it al- In the area of development aid, the Cotonou lows us to understand its design and the diffi- Agreement relies on the European Development culties of current relations between the EU and Fund (EDF), a fiduciary fund established back in Africa. Before the Agreement, there had already 1959, which is periodically replenished through been several overall regulation frameworks per- contributions from EU member states. The cur- taining to relations between the EU and Africa. rent execution period of the 11th EDF, planned for We are referring in particular to the Yaoundé Con-

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vention (1963-1975) and the Lomé Convention third countries were gradually transferred to the (1975-2000), which essentially sought to main- realm of European community. This is why trade tain the strategic alliance with former European became the most important issue in the Yaoundé colonies, regulating trade aspects and economic and Lomé Conventions, through the implemen- assistance programmes within the European De- tation of preferential non-reciprocal arrange- velopment Fund. ments. In contrast, it should be noted that most In 1963, the EEC and 18 African countries of the European financial aid in cooperation pro- that were former French and Belgian colonies grammes remained in the bilateral realm, leading signed the Yaoundé Convention, which would to political alliances rather than meaningful long- become the precedent of the subsequent Lomé term development strategies. This is particularly Convention and, later, the Cotonou Agreement. true in the case of France, which has maintained The first Yaoundé Convention had a five-year -va its former African colonies among its main recipi- lidity (1964-1969). It laid the groundwork for an ents of bilateral assistance. economic association based on promoting trade between Europe and Africa. At the same time, it included a large financial aid programme man- The Debate About Africa’s Participation aged from Brussels. There was a second Yaoundé in International Trade Convention (1971-1975), which worked in parallel to the Arusha Agreement (1969), held between Africa’s integration in international trade has al- the European Economic Community, on one side, ways come up as one of the core issues in debates and Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, on the other. regarding development strategies on the conti- The Arusha Agreement was governed by similar nent. From heterodox theoretical perspectives, rules to those of the Yaoundé Convention. it has been argued that what largely explains The United Kingdom’s accession to the EEC in Africa’s scarce degree of economic development 1973 led to a redefinition of these trade agree- is the specific way it is inserted in international ments, which culminated in the aforementioned trade. Lomé Convention, signed in 1975. The Conven- Specialisation in the production and export tion grouped 71 ACP countries, a denomination of commodities —minerals and agricultural that has been used until today. The Lomé Con- products—, and the import of machinery and vention not only sought to harmonise the two ex- manufactured products, have remained the isting arrangements, but also to compensate for predominant patterns in most African econo- the existing imbalance in favour of former French mies ever since the colonial era. In view of this colonies. situation, and from a heterodox perspective, a The first Lomé Convention included trade strategy aimed at increasing the value and the preferences in favour of ACP countries, in line technological complexity of exports requires with what was demanded from a structuralist trade policies that protect and modulate imports theoretical approach at the 1964 United Nations through tariffs in order to enable industrial de- Conference on Trade and Development. Further- velopment. All this needs to be combined with more, the Convention included a series of rele- an active industrial policy. The logic that justi- vant financial aid measures aimed at supporting fies this approach is the non-level playing field of economic development strategies, utilising the developed countries and poor developing coun- existing EDF. The Convention was examined eve- tries, which is precisely the situation regarding ry five years and extended its validity until Febru- Europe and Africa. ary 2000. It should be noted that the approach at the As the economic integration in Europe gained successive Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions im- ground and consolidated, trade policies with plicitly accepted the above-mentioned inequality.

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In other words, the European Union (then EEC) approach implicit in the Yaoundé and Lomé Con- opened up its market through non-reciprocal tar- ventions. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and iff reduction, while allowing African countries to the Eastern European socialist bloc in 1991, to- maintain their own trade policy. However, sensi- gether with the establishment of the WTO in 1995, tive products (as defined by Europe) were subject had led to a progressive hegemony of a pro-mar- to tariff escalation. That is to say, in some cases, ket and pro-globalisation approach worldwide. the more elaborate a product was, the higher the Additionally, international trade and the global tariff it faced to access the European market. A mobility of capital kept growing. All of this led to paradigmatic case is cocoa, a key export in Côte a lively debate about the effects of globalisation d’Ivoire and Ghana. While low tariffs are applied on development strategies, to the extent that pro- to exports of raw cocoa beans to the EU by ACP moting globalisation became the main economic countries, the more elaborated the cocoa product strategy in the developing world. In this context, is (powdered cocoa, cocoa butter or chocolate), the EU’s proposal for the agreement that would the higher the tariffs. This is one of the factors that replace the Lomé Convention was to gear nego- explains the difficulties that these countries have tiations toward trade rules compatible with WTO to face when they try to industrialise, and add val- liberalising norms, to which ACP countries had to ue and technological complexity to their exports. adapt. This was partly due to an international alli- In the framework of the Lomé Convention, in- ance strategy, partly due to a conviction that glo- novative tools were developed such as the Sys- balisation did indeed favour their development tème de Stabilisation des Recettes d›Exportation prospects (Bidaurratzaga et al., 2014). In this re- (STABEX) and the Système d’Aide aux Produits Mi- gard, the most outstanding aspect of the Cotonou niers (SYSMIN), which allowed African countries Agreement is the absence of trade preferences. to access supplementary funds if there were fluc- However, the process of tariff removal set in the tuations in their export revenues, which is typical Agreement is in fact taking place very slowly, and of primary products. The STABEX was introduced is far from being completed for several reasons. in 1975 at the first Lomé Convention to stabilise import revenues in countries that were dependent on primary products such as cocoa or tea, The architecture of the economic partnership which are subject to strong price fluctuations. The agreements SYSMIN, on the other hand, was implemented in 1980 at the 2nd Lomé Convention. It consisted of In the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, the a similar arrangement, but specifically aimed at foundation for promoting trade between ACP a limited group of minerals (copper, cobalt, phos- countries and the EU are, as stated above, the phates, manganese, bauxite, tin and iron). The EPAs. These agreements consist of reciprocal lack of funds, the restricted number of exports it measures of progressive trade liberalisation, in covered and, above all, the weak starting point line with WTO regulations. Once an EPA is signed, of African economies that hindered attempts to the signing ACP country commits to opening up diversify production, led to both tools producing its markets to approximately 80% of goods and very limited results. services from Europe in a ten-year period. At the In the late 1990s, when negotiations be- same time, the EU grants preferential access to gan for what would later become the Cotonou European markets. The EPA agenda, in line with Agreement, the predominantly neoliberal ap- what can be seen in other international economic proach in development strategies resulted in the treaties, covers issues that go beyond the classic ACP-EU agreements adjusting to the pro-market liberalisation of goods and services exchanges. approach and opening up more intensely to in- It also includes patents and other intellectual ternational trade, thus abandoning part of the property rights, public tenders, investments, con-

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sumer protection, and environmental protection, The EBA scheme is especially relevant to our among other matters. analysis, as it is aimed at Least Developed Coun- When EPA negotiations started in 2002, most tries (LDC) and it guarantees full access to the African ACP countries showed no particular in- European market—with the exception of arms. terest in signing them as most of their exports Currently, 34 of the 48 African countries included already had access to European markets, and the in the Cotonou Agreement are in the EBA scheme risks of losing trade policy tools were unforesee- (launched in 1999, without an end date). This able. Some of the most obvious risks of opening reduces their incentives to adhere to an EPA, their markets to EU imports were a loss of revenue because signing an EPA means giving up the non- through tariffs, an unfair competition of subsidised reciprocal advantages of the GSP. 2 agricultural products, and thirdly the inability to compete with the import of manufactured goods from Europe, thus leaving the precarious local in- The Cotonou Agreement and economic integration dustry unprotected. Therefore, on December 31st, in Africa 2007, the deadline for the EPA negotiations, no Af- rican country had signed any of the agreements. As is explicitly stated in the Cotonou Agreement, At the time, there was a significant reaction by one of its objectives is to promote African re- numerous organisations of African civil society, gional integration. The interregional approach which tenaciously opposed the negotiation and of the EPAs is based on the idea that regional implementation of the EPAs. In late 2004, they blocs are intermediate steps toward a full mul- grouped together in the STOP EPA campaign tilateral liberalisation. This approach became a and began voicing their criticisms against the trend in the late 1990s, in the midst of a boom of EPA negotiating model, which they considered capitalist globalisation. In fact, Article 35.2 of the too opaque. They claimed that it was an unfair at- Agreement says, “Economic and trade coopera- tempt to treat economic development situations tion shall build on regional integration initiatives that are essentially unequal as if they were equal. of ACP States”, taking into account that regional Despite WTO regulations and its free-market integration is a key tool for the integration of ACP spirit, the EU maintained a Generalised Scheme countries in the world economy. The idea that the of Preferences (GSP), which granted non-recipro- EPAs promote regional integration has been one cal advantages in accessing the European market of the arguments used by the EU to drive ACP to developing nations classified as low or lower- countries to sign them. medium income countries. The existence of the One of the most complex aspects of the Co- GSP undoubtedly conditioned the negotiation tonou Agreement’s design in Africa has been the and implementation of the EPAs, because many African countries prefer the advantages of the Kenya and Nigeria; the GSP+ to Cape Verde; and the EBA GSP to the uncertainties of liberalisation that to Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African come with EPAs. Within the GSP, the EU distin- Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa, Djibouti, guishes between standard GSP (with a small tariff Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, reduction), GSP+ (with a larger discount) and the Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme.1 Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Su- dan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. 1 Besides the EU, other countries that provide preferen- 2 United Nations defines Least Developed Countries ces to the LDCs are Australia, Belarus, Canada, Iceland, (LDC) as those with an income per capita lower than 1025 Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Swit- dollars per year. Additionally, other indicators of health, zerland, Turkey and the USA. Regarding African coun- education and economic vulnerability are also taken into tries, the standard GSP applies to Congo-Brazzaville, consideration for their inclusion in the LDC category.

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issue of the overlap between different regional Central Africa EPA groups. On the one hand, there are the four geographical regions defined for the ACP group: Countries (8): Chad, Cameroon, Central African Central Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa and Republic, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Southern Africa. On the other hand, there are the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, São Tomé and five regions that negotiate the EPAs, which do not Príncipe, and Equatorial Guinea (Chart 1). coincide with the former group. Moreover, the regions defined for the implementation of coop- Chart 1. Central Africa eration programmes funded by the 11th European Development Fund, the so-called Regional Indica- tive Programmes, are just three. And to compli- cate the overlapping even further, the regions defined by the African Union for the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area are eight, which in turn overlap each other. Moreover, the goal of promoting and liberalising trade with the European Union has not come with a boost of African interregional trade, which still shows significantly low figures compared to other regions in the developing world that show a higher degree of economic integration, such as Asia.

The state of play of EPAs in Africa Source: the author. Within the ACP group, the EU defined five regions for Africa in order to establish five different EPAs: Cameroon is the only country in the region Western Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and South- having signed an EPA, in 2009, which has a fairly ern Africa, the East African Community, and the advanced process of reciprocal trade liberalisa- SADC. Only the East African Community coincides tion with the EU. This EPA became effective in with a previously established regional group. In 2014. In 2016, began the progressive dismantling three of the other cases, the groups defined for of tariffs on European exports to the country. The the EPAs overlap pre-existing groups, but do not other countries in the region—with the exception match them exactly. And, finally, in the case of of Gabon—stay in the GSP, either in the standard Western Africa, even though it coincides with GSP (Republic of the Congo) or in the EBA scheme. the Economic Community of West African States Gabon remains in the general WTO regime of Most- (ECOWAS), it adds Mauritania (which actually left Favoured-Nation. As most of Gabon’s exports to ECOWAS in 2002). In other words, the negotiation the EU consist of oil, a product with free access to and implementation of the EPAs hinders the con- the European market, Gabon has no incentive to solidation of existing regional blocks, despite the establish a non-reciprocal framework and open rhetoric according to which the Cotonou Agree- up its markets to European imports. A meeting ment’s purpose is to consolidate regional integra- is planned in Brussels between the EU and trade tion within Africa. 3 representatives from these countries by the end of the second term of 2020 to assess the progress 3 See the interactive map The European Centre for Devel- of the negotiations, although it is very unlikely to opment Policy Management: https://tinyurl.com/t39jyan be held due to the Covid-19 crisis.

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Western Africa EPA countries plus Mauritania, as we mentioned), which was ended in 2014. However, the situation Countries (16): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, becomes even more complicated as Nigeria, the Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- economic giant in the region and the continent, Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, has no interest in signing this EPA. This has put Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (Chart 2). the regional agreement on stand-by, a situation with little prospect of change. Chart 2. Western Africa The main reason why Nigeria does not want to adhere to the Western African EPA is similar to the above-mentioned reason for Gabon’s reluctance. Since the main export from Nigeria to the European Union is oil (95.6% in 2018), and this product already accesses the EU free of tariffs, Nigeria’s incentives to sign a reciprocal trade agreement are close to none. In other words, Ni- geria already has practically free access to the Eu- ropean market and, the same time, it is keeping open the possibility of having its own trade policy for imports from the European Union. The case of Nigeria is paradigmatic of the difficulties that developing countries encounter in their insertion into international trade. Nigeria’s nascent industrial policy requires using measures of protection against competition from developed countries Source: the author. such as the European Union. This is why agreements like the EPAs are not precisely aimed at favouring these kinds of policies. In this region, the EU has only managed to complete two bilateral EPAs. The first of them was with Côte d’Ivoire in 2008, which became ef- Southern and Eastern Africa EPA fective provisionally in 2016, but did not start to make the trade liberalisation effective until De- Countries (11): Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mada- cember 2019. The other completed EPA is with gascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Dji- Ghana, signed in 2016, although trade liberali- bouti, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Chart 3). sation has barely begun in 2020. The incentives The Southern and Eastern Africa group for the for these countries to sign an EPA has to do with negotiation and implementation of an EPA with cocoa exports. The EPA grants a 0% tariff for all the EU consists of a heterogeneous set of countries the products exported to Europe, including co- without geographical continuity. Six of them (Co- coa, whereas the previously applied standard moros, Zambia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles GSP involves a tariff of 6.1% for cocoa paste, 4.2% and Zimbabwe) signed a provisional EPA in 2007, for cocoa butter, and 2.1% for cocoa powder. The and only the latter four of those countries have EU has planned meetings throughout 2020 with been implementing it since 2012. Comoros joined both Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana in order to super- them in 2019. Therefore, there are five countries in vise their respective EPAs. the region (those in the Horn of Africa specifically) Concurrently, the EU managed to negotiate an for which the EPA with the EU is a pending matter. EPA with all 16 countries in the region (ECOWAS In fact, neither Eritrea nor Sudan are even part of

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Chart 3. Southern and Eastern Africa Chart 4. East African Community

Source: the author. Source: the author.

the WTO, which would certainly make it difficult to and start an EPA. To illustrate the trade pattern negotiate an EPA. A meeting by video conference that African countries have with the EU, EAC ex- took place in July 2020 between the EU and the ports to the EU include coffee, cut flowers, tea, countries in the region to continue the process of tobacco, fish and horticultural products, whereas detailing the EPAs that are currently in progress. imports consist of machinery, mechanical appli- cations, equipment and spare parts, vehicles, and pharmaceutical products. East African Community EPA

Countries (6): Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South EPA countries in SADC Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda (Chart 4). The case of the East African Community (EAC) Countries (7): Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozam- is unusual because, as we pointed out above, it bique, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini (Chart 5). fully coincides with a pre-existing regional group. Although SADC has 16 member countries, Founded in 1967, the EAC dissolved in 1977, but only 7 of them are in this EPA negotiating group. was re-launched in 2000. It initially included In June 2016, the EU signed an EPA with 6 of those five countries, and South Sudan joined later, in 7 members. Only Angola remained voluntarily 2016. In 2014, the EU and all the EAC countries outside the agreement, for the same reason as formalised an EPA, but it was then only ratified by other oil producing countries like Nigeria. As oil Kenya and Tanzania in 2016. In order for the EPA exports to the EU have no restrictions, Angola— to be effective, it has to be ratified by the remain- whose main export to the EU is oil— has no in- ing three EAC countries, a step that is currently centives to sign an EPA because it would limit its blocked. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania trade policy tools. are in the list of United Nations LDC countries, This EPA got underway after Mozambique be- which means that their products have practically gan to implement it in February 2018. The other free access to the European market. Under these six members of the SADC—Democratic Republic circumstances, they have few incentives to ratify of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,

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Chart 5. EPA countries in SADC announced on February 14th, in order to ensure that a more solid consensus is eventually reached among the participants. The slowness of the process is symptomatic of the lack of urgency and enthusiasm that this future agreement entails, particularly among ACP countries. The main reason for this lack of concre- tion is that the continuity of two of the essential mechanisms of the Cotonou Agreement (the trade pillar and the financial pillar) does not depend on a new agreement. The trade pillar (the EPAs) is still in a stage of negotiation and implementation, and the financial aid pillar (the EDF) works auton- omously from the Cotonou Agreement. In other words, many of the issues included in the Agree- ment have been moved away from it. However, both sides have committed to reach a consensus Source: the author. that allows them to continue with the strategic alliance between both blocs, as expressed in the Zambia and Zimbabwe—are negotiating an EPA negotiation directives approved in 2018. with the EU as members of other groups, either In the specific case of Africa, the joint docu- the Central African group or the Southern and ment of these directives considers aspects that Eastern African group. in the late 1990s—when the Cotonou Agreement The distinctive feature of this group is un- was negotiated—were not taken into account and doubtedly the presence of South Africa, which nowadays are important. For example, there are accentuates its heterogeneity in terms of devel- references to decent work, inequalities, climate opment. While Lesotho and Mozambique are change and migrations, among other issues LDCs, Namibia and Botswana have a medium- (Council of the European Union, 2018: 25-47). In high income level, and South Africa has the most late 2019, the Council took the controversial de- developed industrial fabric on the continent. This cision to modify these negotiating directives to EPA exemplifies the difficulties in reaching trade include a system for protecting investments, the agreements grouping countries with such dispa- growing e-commerce, and intellectual property. 4 rate levels of development due to their varying Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s exit from starting points and needs. the European Union constrains the design and the funding of the European Development Fund, although in the official exit document endorsed Prospects of a post-Cotonou Africa-European on January 24th, 2020, by the United Kingdom Union Agreement and the European Union, the British government pledges to fully comply with the financial commit- In September 2018, negotiations began for a new ments made for the 11th European Development agreement, which was supposed to become effective the day after the Cotonou Agreement 4 See the EU Council, “Directives for the negotiations of expired, on February 29th, 2020. However, since Economic Partnership Agreements with ACP countries it has not yet been possible to reach a final ac- and regions adopted by the Council of the EU on 19 De- cord, the validity of the Cotonou Agreement has cember 2019”, 9930/02, Annex 2. Retrieved from: https:// been extended to December 2020, as officially www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/epa_mandate_20191213.pdf

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Chart 6. Exports from Africa (selected origins and destinations)

Exports from Central Africa Exports from Eastern Africa

45% 50%

40% 45%

35% 40% 35% 30% 30% 25% 25% 20% 20% 15% 15% 10% 10% 5% 5%

0% 0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

European Union 15 China European Union 15 China

India USA India USA

Exports from Southern Africa Exports from Western European Union 15

45% 40%

40% 35% 35% 30% 30% 25% 25% 20% 20% 15% 15% 10% 10%

5% 5%

0% 0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

European Union 15 China European Union 15 China

India USA India USA

Source: the author, based on UNCTADSTAT.

Fund (2014-2020). In the area of trade, some steps The dramatic changes observed in the interna- are already being taken toward future agreements tional political economy since the signing of the between the United Kingdom and various groups Cotonou Agreement in 2000 demand a rethinking of African countries such as the EAC. 5 of the association between the EU and Africa. In particular, the global challenges contained in the 5 East Africa: “UK seeks trade pact with Rwanda”, EAC, UN’s Sustainable Development Goals framework, February 20th, 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.bilater- the new key role of China in Africa’s international als.org/?east-africa-uk-seeks-trade-pact trade, or the rise of global value chains will re-

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quire a thorough redefinition of future relations nor community regarding development strate- between the European Union and Africa. gies in Africa. As the consensuses and the power The increasing relevance of the African Union, relations are not the same as 20 years ago, when through initiatives such as Agenda 2063 or the Afri- the Cotonou Agreement was signed, the future can Continental Free Trade Area, foreshadows the agreement that will replace it will be substantially likelihood of a continental approach for the future different. In fact, some may even question the agreement, with a broad European Union-African need for a new comprehensive accord in view of Union accord. This reorientation of the agreement the limited achievements of the Cotonou Agree- toward a continental scale reflects the fact that the ment and the fact that its most significant con- world in 2020 is somewhat more multipolar than in tents (trade and cooperation funding) no longer 2000. On the other hand, the contents of the future directly depend on a new comprehensive agree- agreement will probably be more symbolic than ment (Petrangeli, 2020). functional as both the cooperation agreements The limited success of EPAs in promoting de- and the trade negotiations will not necessarily velopment in Africa, the questioning of the free- take place under the umbrella of a comprehensive trade approach that was predominant in the late agreement like that of Cotonou. 1990s, and the consolidation of other concerns It will be interesting to see how the political related to global public goods such as climate pillar of the future agreement is designed. As we change, migrations and, most recently, global noted above, promoting good governance was health due to the COVID-19 pandemic, condition part of the agenda of the major donors in the late this future agreement. 1990s, as reflected in the Cotonou Agreement. The empowerment of the African state and, by The limitations of the very concept of good gov- extension, of the African Union, in the context of a ernance, along with the empowertment of the multipolar world, reinforce the case for an agree- African state and its institutions—such as the ment among equals beyond rhetoric, laying the African Union— in the first two decades of the foundations for a cooperation framework regard- 21st century, and the consolidation of alternative ing the above mentioned global public goods. forms of governance like that of China, will un- Trade and financial cooperation issues will also doubtedly influence the contents of the political have to take into account the new approaches to pillar in the future agreement. development that are gaining ground in Africa, Finally, another fact that needs to be taken especially in the field of industrial and infrastruc- into account, for some African regions, is the ture policies. decrease of the relative weight of the EU-15 as a trading partner, as can be seen on Chart 6. There- fore, the centrality that trade and cooperation re- References lations with Europe used to have will now need to be shared with other partners. Bidaurratzaga, E., Colom, A. and Martínez-Tola, E.: “Are EU’s Economic Partnership Agree- ments Developmental? An Assessment of Conclusions the Southern African Region”, Word Economy Journal, no. 38, 2014, pp. 273-298. EU-Africa relations have undergone different Council of the European Union: Negotiating di- stages. From the Yaoundé Convention (1963- rectives for a Partnership Agreement between 1975) and the Lomé Convention (1975-2000) to the European Union and its Member States of the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020), these large the one part, and with countries of the African, and comprehensive treaties have reflected, at Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the each moment, the main consensuses of the do- other part, 2018. Retrieved from: http://data.

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consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST- Petrangeli, F.: Does the EU-ACP Agreement Still 8094-2018-ADD-1/en/pdf Make Sense for Africa? Istituto per gli Studi di Council of the European Union: Europe in the Política Internazionale, 2020. Retrieved from: world. The future of the European financial ar- https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ chitecture for development, 2019. Retrieved does-eu-acp-agreement-still-make-sense- from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ africa-24859 40967/efad-report_final.pdf

informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 36 10/11/20 9:39 3. Europe’s multiple strategies towards its South1

Youssef Cherif

The European Commission that assumed offi- On the long road towards an Africa strategy ce in December 2019 established new priorities and strategies, with Africa as a prime target. Geography has always forced Europe to look By March 2020, its Africa Strategy was unvei- south. For two millennia, European empires led. The “Scramble for Africa” is neither a new and states have conducted multiple enter- dynamic–Africa is mentioned since the earliest prises in Africa. During the Roman Empire, official European documents–nor a purely Eu- for instance, the southern Mediterranean was ropean aspiration: China, Russia, the United an integral part of the European realm. In the States, the United Kingdom, Japan, India, Tur- subsequent centuries, several conquests and key and several Gulf countries, all have deve- alliances linked the two shores together. Later, loped African strategies throughout the last between the 18th and mid 20th century, the Afri- years, even decades. Although the European can continent was primarily divided between Union looks partly shares the other players’ seven colonial powers. After independence in vision–as an area for investment, aid, and the 1950s-1970s, the former colonial metro- geopolitical competition–it does take into ac- poles maintained strong ties with their eman- count additional considerations when reflec- cipated territories, a role that was gradually ting on the continent, namely migration and taken over by the then-emerging European security. From the African shores inwards, Eu- Union (EU). rope is perceived by many Africans as a former Today, the EU and its member states are colonial power trying to safeguard its privile- among Africa’s most important partners in seve- ges. How is Europe offsetting between its past ral fields. A couple of examples suffice. The EU is and what looks like a complicated future? How the first trade, foreign investment and develop- is the European Union balancing between its ment partner of the 54 African countries. In 2018, claim whereby the block seeks a “partnership 36% of Africa’s trade was with Europe (compared between equals” with Africa and its securi- to 17% with China, for instance). European states ty and economic interests? Additionally, the send more than half of Africa’s Official Develop- European Commission is updating its policy ment Assistance (ODA) packages. Therefore, if towards the Middle East and North Africa. Are European Commission President Ursula von der there similarities in how Brussels addresses Leyen is going to move forward with creating the the Southern Mediterranean region and Sub- planned Geopolitical European Commission she Saharan Africa? 1 promised (Leonard, 2019), Africa would be a starting point.

1 Last version of this chapter was accepted in March 2020.

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Evolution African states that are also members of the AU (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mau- The Treaty of Rome (1957) marks the beginning ritania). The ACP group, on the other hand, ne- of the modern European-African framework ver ceased to exist. Furthermore, even though AU of relations. Two decades later, a new outline officials continue to ask to be the only represen- was introduced: the Lomé Convention of 1975. tatives for Africa in negotiating and dealing with This convention would regulate trade relations the EU, the ACP group representing the African between Europe and the Africa, Caribbean and nation states is still a critical partner (Carbone, Pacific (ACP) group of states, which separates 2018). In reality, Africa remained divided between Sub-Saharan Africa from its Arab north, until ACP and ENP in the eyes of European decision- the year 2000. The “Africa” in ACP refers indeed makers. to Sub-Saharan Africa, not the entire continent. Various Africa-EU meetings took place since The EU engaged North Africa, which comprises the year 2000, each bringing new priorities and the Maghreb and Egypt, separately, either as part directions. The first one took place in 2000 in Cai- of the Middle East or as the Southern Mediterra- ro and concluded with the Cairo Declaration. It nean. The stress on the latter was accentuated was followed by the Cotonou meeting the same under the Barcelona Process (1995), with the year. The latter witnessed the promulgation of Mediterranean taken as a pond whose southern the Cotonou Agreement which became the fra- borders are the limits between North Africa and mework for the next 20 years, i.e. from 2000 up to Sub-Saharan Africa. 2020, year in which the Agreement is supposed to Needless to say, the former colonial powers be updated. The 2003 European Security Strategy which became member states of the EU kept pre- (ESS) included some of the points adopted in Cai- ferential ties with their former colonies; France ro and Cotonou, not least the need to strengthen was the first trade–and often political and mili- the capacities of African countries and deepen tary– partner of the Francophone Maghreb and ties with the AU as an institution. West Africa, while Italy remained Libya’s first tra- Five years later, in 2005, the EU published a de partner. The United Kingdom (UK) enrolled its critical document entitled The EU and Africa: former African empire under the Commonwealth Towards a Strategic Partnership, whose stated of Nations. The EU, consequently, found itself goal was to reorganise the relationship between in immediate competition with its constituents the EU and the AU in the decade from 2005 to with regards to Africa. This apparent conflict was 2015. The Commission published simultaneously added to an inherent rivalry inside the EU struc- the first EU Strategy for Africa, aiming at getting tures, with different directorates and bodies com- Africa on track in achieving the Millennium De- peting for similar prerogatives (Bagoyoko and velopment Goals (MDG’s). Then in 2007, the se- Gibert, 2009). cond African Union-EU meeting took place in In the 2000s, the EU appeared to change cour- Lisbon. The summit marked the signing of the se, adopting on paper a unitary policy towards Joint Africa-EU Strategy2. This document stated Africa, comprehensive of the northern and as priorities the maintenance of peace and secu- southern parts of the continent. It attempted to rity, the respect for human rights and the pursuit interact with the African Union (AU), founded in of better governance, the advancement of trade 2002 as a multilateral institution similar to the and regional integration, and the focus on key de- European Union. Nonetheless, and practically velopment issues. Since 2007 onwards, high-level at the same time (2002-3), the EU introduced summits take place every three years. the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as an instrument to work with the Union’s immediate 2 https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/publication/ geographic vicinity. The ENP includes six North joint-africa-eu-strategy_en

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In 2010, the third EU-AU summit was organi- wing parties were progressing in Europe; etc. The zed in Tripoli. It resulted in the Tripoli Declaration summit’s conclusions consequently stressed the and a commitment to work on implementing the need to tackle migration and security. Millennium Development Goals (MDG)’s, with a In 2016, the EU high representative Federica limited focus, however, on issues of governance, Mogherini unveiled the European Global Strategy, human rights or migration. The Tripoli meeting an expansion of the ESS. In this document, North took place a few months before the first sparks of Africa is sometimes placed in Africa, sometimes in the Arab Spring. The participants did not suspect the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It is also what was to come. Consequently, a number of once referred to as the Maghreb, adding to the the summit’s conclusions were almost immedia- inconsistency with which this part of the world is tely put on standby in the northern African region, approached from Brussels. The fifth European- which was to undergo significant political and African summit was organised in Abidjan in 2017, social changes from 2011 onwards. Furthermo- and a particular emphasis was placed on young re, the African Union never became a structured adults. Youth discontent was indeed perceived entity, and the block lost its relevance in Libya, in as the catalyst of the Arab Spring and young dis- the face of both the death of Muammar Gaddafi satisfied adults were now seen as possible time (2011) and a multidimensional civil war, where it bombs in every country where they form a majo- was unable to play any significant role. rity–i.e. in most African countries. Following the In 2011, the EU published its Sahel Strategy, focus on migration and security of the previous dedicated to the African Sahel region and focusing summit, the Abidjan Declaration claimed to ad- on security and development (the action plan was dress the root causes of instability and improve adopted in 2015, for the period 2015-2020). During the condition of young Africans. It is this legacy the same year and following the Arab Spring, the that the new European Commission inherited as document New Response to a Changing Neigh- it prepares for the sixth EU-AU summit, scheduled bourhood3 revamped the ENP. Then, in 2014, the to take place in Brussels by the end of 2020–if the ENP was conceded a financial instrument, the COVID-19 situation permits. European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), together with a substantial budget and a plan of action for the period between 2014 and 2020. Development and trade first The fourth EU-AU summit was organised in Brussels with a delay of one year, in 2014. Subse- Between the 1950s and the 1990s, the European quently, an Africa-EU Partnership instrument was strategy towards Africa focused on development established to support the Joint Strategy of 2007, and trade. When it comes to development, the along with the announcement of the Brussels De- EU is a global leader and it has a designated declaration. Brussels was the first EU-AU summit fo- partment (Directorate-General for International llowing the Arab Spring: several states of North Cooperation and Development) for this purpo- Africa and beyond, such as Mali, became weak se. The EU and its member states are the main and fell prey to violence; thousands of migrants and most critical aid donors to Africa, spending and refugees–mostly coming from Sub-Saharan around 20 billion euro per year and 55% of the Africa and profiting from the weakening of North ODA in the continent. In 2005, when the UK held African regimes that used to police their routes– the EU presidency, a focus on African develop- crossed to Europe via Libya and Tunisia; right- ment was initiated (Holland, 2008). Moreover, although the UK left the EU in 2020, EU’s prima- 3 https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions- cy over Africa remains from a donor’s position, information-reports/opinions/new-response-changing- epitomised by a donor-recipient relationship bet- neighbourhood ween the EU and the AU. African countries end

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up thus in a situation of perpetual dependency through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Tra- to Brussels, which in turn affects how they ne- de Agreements (DCFTA), a direction analogous to gotiate economic and political agreements with the one adopted with the EPA’s. ENP states had the EU and jeopardises any attempt to conduct a nonetheless comparable reservations to those of “partnership between equals”. Moreover, EU de- the APC countries regarding these agreements, velopment policy is subject to diverse criticisms, and negotiations continue with several setbacks. not least because EU aid is often tied to European Moreover, the EPA’s and DCFTA’s are threatening interests, such as when donor countries favour the African Continental Free Trade Agreement their firms’ investment in the country (Carbone, that African countries are trying to implement, 2014). which adds to the AU’s reservations regarding As for trade, the EU is Africa’s largest trading these Europe-imposed agreements. partner. Nevertheless, EU-African relations are characterised by a significant power asymmetry. The colonial legacy and the different levels of de- Politics and security, the other priority velopment made equality challenging to achieve, even though it remains a slogan that European Up to the Cotonou accords, the relationship bet- representatives often repeat. The programs de- ween the EU and Africa was fundamentally eco- signed to adjust African economies and societies nomic. Following what was perceived as a rise in according to European standards are an instance terrorist threats, which culminated with the 9/11 of this insufficiency. They compete with the reali- attacks in the United States (US), security beca- ty of trade relations too: European companies aim me a priority, along with the economy. Cotonou to make profit and they will continue to sell their marked the entry of security–and with that, of goods to the poorer and less developed African politics–into the EU’s conditionality measures. markets, benefiting from the ease guaranteed by Parliaments and non-state actors, such as civil treaties signed between their countries and the society and business leaders, were brought in 54 African states. Conversely, African companies following the Cotonou meeting and included in have to face several hurdles–mainly lack of com- every EU-AU project. Nevertheless, most projects petitiveness and European protectionism–when were tainted with a robust Eurocentric underto- seeking to sell goods in Europe. ne. Furthermore, African states that accepted the In the 2000s, the Directorate-General for Trade new rules co-opted their respective civil society at the European Commission drafted free trade extensively; non-governmental participants were agreements with many ACP countries, known as consequently susceptible to becoming neither in- the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA’s).4 dependent nor representative (Carbone, 2012). Sub-Saharan African governments nevertheless There is no shortage of African countries complained that the EPA’s conditions were to which perceive conditionality as an interventio- Europe’s advantage, not theirs. As many African nist, even neo-colonial, instrument. Authoritarian states refrained from signing these agreements, regimes are particularly sensitive to the mecha- the Commission threatened that those unwilling nism. The conditionality in terms of democracy to do so by 2014 would no longer benefit from that characterises EU aid, and the improvement market access to the EU (Carbone, 2012). Howe- of bilateral ties, conflict with the authoritarian ver, a number of extensions have been approved systems in place in many African countries. The since. In the meantime, the EU offered some ENP rulers of such countries have consequently been countries to enter into free trade agreements, traditionally unwilling to compromise. Until 2011, for instance, European states had recurrent pro- 4 For further details, check Chapter 2 of the Report, “EU- blems with Zinelabidine Ben Ali’s Tunisia. With Africa economic relations in the post-Cotonou era”. Zimbabwe, the issues lasted until the removal of

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Robert Mugabe in 2017. Even if democracy and aid, somehow implying that they are no more political change occurred in several African coun- than Eurocentric tools aiming at Europe’s pro- tries from the 1990s on, the negative perception tection more than re-centring Africa’s priorities. of conditionality is still alive in AU corridors. The dynamics applied to Northern Africa, where the EU introduced the conditions of im- 2020 and beyond: what strategy with Africa? proved democracy and human rights when in- teracting with the ENP countries, took shape in It should be noted that 2020 is also the last year Sub-Saharan Africa. In this light, when the Arab of activity for the ENI; a new instrument will re- Spring started some argued that these countries place it in 2021. The European Commission has got a unique opportunity to improve their ties proposed, for 2021-2027, a complete reshuffle of with the EU, since the most sensitive conditions the way the funds are disbursed. In the future, were met. A decade later, ties with Tunisia and the different instruments will be unified under Morocco have indeed improved, due to the poli- the Neighbourhood, Development and Interna- tical reforms both countries undertook. In Egypt, tional Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). In other the country where the reversal of democracy was words, ENI and EDF, among others, will all fit un- the most acute,5 the EU seems to have however der the NDICI. This effort at simplification may prioritised security and stability over democracy well bring North and Sub-Saharan Africa closer and human rights, putting conditionality aside within the corridors of the European Commission (Dandashly, 2018). When the block is able to im- in the upcoming years, especially in light of the pose or encourage the adoption of its values, it significance of dossiers such as migration for the pushes in. Nevertheless, when those actions run two regions. the risk of coming to the detriment of stability, then Brussels focuses on its so-perceived security and pushes its values into the background. Sub-Saharan Africa On the military level, the EU started assuming its global role in the 2000s. Its actions, although The year 2020 marks the end of the Cotonou limited in scale, quickly reached Africa. The EU Agreement, and European and African policy- started Operation Atalanta in 2008 to protect the makers are engaged in discussions around a new maritime trade in the Horn of Africa. It also esta- framework to replace it. It is partly why Ursula blished Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean von der Leyen picked Addis Ababa as her first in 2015 to stop migration from North Africa. In trip outside of the EU on December 7-8, 2019, i.e. addition to the mentioned operations, the block one week after her mandate began. Ethiopia is launched a 100-million-euro program, the Afri- one of Africa’s booming economies and home to can Peace Facility (APF), through which a 5.000 the AU headquarters. It was a strong message, men-strong force was founded. Its members as Africa was put before many urging issues: in come from Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and effect, the visit came amid the ongoing pressu- Mauritania. The establishment of the Facility was res related to Brexit; the growing tensions with announced in 2014, funded directly from the Eu- Russia and Turkey on Libya; and before visits to ropean Development Fund (EDF). All of these pro- any EU member state. The new President of the grams were partly led, at least on paper, by the European Commission wanted to signal a shift in AU. Critics, however, worry that these initiatives European foreign policy with a focus on Africa. contribute to the securitisation of development From Ethiopia, she stressed on common themes such as the fight for women’s rights, the issue of 5 See Chapter 9 (‘The consolidation of authoritarianism climate change, or the multilateral structure of in Egypt’). both the EU and the AU. She expressed interest

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in exploring more business opportunities and an addition to the European Council’s regional avoided sensitive issues such as migration and strategies towards Africa, which encompass the security (Herszenhorn, 2019). When the COVID-19 Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel, crisis started a few months after this historic visit, excluding the North.10 the EU disbursed 3.25 billion euro to support Sub- The 2020 calendar for EU-AU meetings is burs- Saharan African economies. Brussels was swift to ting: there was a Commission to Commission react to the potential impact of the pandemic on gathering between the European Union and the the continent. African Union in Addis Ababa in February, atten- The European Commission’s focus on Africa ded by President von der Leyen–her second trip can be perceived at all levels. In her Mission Letter to Africa in three months–and High Representa- designating Phil Hogan as Trade Commissioner, tive Josep Borrell, as well as 19 Commissioners.11 von der Leyen prioritised Africa as a place to con- An Action Plan for Africa should be submitted by duct business and urged for the establishment summer 2020, to be concluded by an EU-Africa of a free trade area between the two continents.6 summit in Brussels in October 2020, if the CO- Because the African Union plans to ratify an Afri- VID-19 situation does not disturb the process can Continental Free Trade Agreement, the new further. The Brussels summit, moreover, will take Commission intends to be in the first row of part- place when Germany chairs the rotating presi- ners. Similarly, in the mission letter appointing dency of the European Council (July-December Jutta Urpilainen as the new Commissioner for 2020). Von der Leyen, herself German defence International Partnerships, von der Leyen men- minister until mid-2019, will consequently find tioned Africa as a priority region. extra support from her former colleagues in go- In early March 2020,7 Urpilainen drafted a vernment in the accomplishment of this mission. much-awaited new and comprehensive Africa Von der Leyen and Borrell, as well as the head Strategy, a document that should pave the post- of the European Council, Charles Michel, are Cotonou way.8 The document prioritised the field hence expected fly to Addis and other African of energy, with focus on green energy, digitalisa- capitals in the upcoming months if the COVID-19 tion, employment, good governance, and mobili- crisis allows it. Michel visited Egypt in January, ty.9 It is less focused on issues such as democracy six weeks after taking on his role, and met with and human rights, even if they are mentioned. the country’s leaders to talk about Egypt and The strategy is similar to European documents Africa (President Sisi being the AU president until produced prior to 2011, when security, develop- February 2020). Borrell too reiterated in a num- ment and the economy prevailed over democracy ber of statements a commitment to multiplying and human rights. Furthermore, as comprehensi- efforts towards Africa. Nevertheless, his most am- ve as it claims to be, the new strategy sustains the bitious initiative so far to address one of Africa’s sub-Saharan/North Africa division, which signals most urging problems, the Libyan conflict, failed a continuation of the old policy. The strategy is considerably. Borrell had planned to take a group of four European foreign ministers (from France, Italy, Germany and the UK) to Libya on January 7th 6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ in order to negotiate a ceasefire, but the warring files/mission-letter-phil-hogan-2019_en.pdf factions decided to escalate their conflict at the 7 https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/ moment of the visit, and the trip, which would files/communication-eu-africa-strategy-join-2020-4-final_ have been the HRVP’s first visit to the continent, en.pdf 8 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ files/mission-letter-jutta-urpilainen_en.pdf 10 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-africa/ 9 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ 11 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ en/qanda_20_375 en/ip_20_317

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got cancelled as a result.. The actual ceasefire as a pan-African leader holding the AU presidency was negotiated two weeks later, in Moscow, by rather than a North African country). Both Tunisia the Russians and the Turks, i.e. outside of Europe. and Algeria had elections by the end of 2019, but Borrell finally made it to Africa along with von der the EU seems dormant vis-à-vis both countries. Leyen in her February trip to Addis Ababa. With Tunisia, a country praised as a model for Furthermore, the EU is currently working on a years by European policymakers, a chill charac- massive uplift of the aforementioned African Pea- terises the relationship since the landslide victory ce Facility: European policymakers are allocating of President Kais Saied, a president considered a budget of 10.5 billion euro to set up a European by many Europeans as Eurosceptic, nationalist Peace Facility by 2021 which will incorporate the and isolationist. APF. Critics see the EU’s moves towards the south Nonetheless, in December 2019, the EU allo- as attempts to externalise EU’s security towards cated 389 million euro to Morocco, to support its the Sahel, in which the EU is suspected of trying reforms, development and budget.12 The money to transform the region into an effective barrier came from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Afri- against migrants who want to cross to Europe. ca, a significant financial instrument for the con- This initiative aims at perpetuating a security- tinent.13 A Euro-Moroccan Partnership for Shared migration-development nexus from which the Prosperity was announced along with the fund. EU seems unable to disassociate. It also happens that High Representative Borrell Additionally, European member states have had deepened Madrid’s ties with Rabat when he their own Africa strategies, a dynamic that creates was foreign minister, and Spain then pushed for confusion among their African partners and com- strong ties between the EU and the Kingdom of plicates the work of the EU. Spain, for instance, is Morocco (Fox, 2019). Rabat is indeed an important at its third Africa Plan, drafted under High Com- partner in countering irregular migration as well missioner Borrell’s tenure as Spain’s foreign mi- as a choice destination for European investors. nister (2018-9). France keeps a special relationship Disagreements with Europe occur occasionally in with its former north and west African colonies. In regard to human rights issues and Western Saha- January 2020, for example, French President Em- ra, but the new Commission seems dedicated to manuel Macron “summoned” the five G5 Sahel improving the relationship. Then, when the CO- heads of state (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ni- VID-19 crisis erupted, the EU was quick to offer ger, Chad) in Pau to discuss the French military-led its help to the embattled North African countries: Barkhane Operation (MEE, 2020). Berlin is energe- 1.19 billion euro. It was less flamboyant than the tic on the African front too, as shown by the Berlin Chinese masks, but of considerable help to the Conference on Libya of January 2020. In all these economies and the public health sector. But as actions, the EU appeared as a second-row guest with Sub-Saharan Africa, this move is a reminder rather than a proactive player. that the recipient-donor relationship continues to structure North Africa’s ties with the EU. Brussels looks at its North African neighbou- Northern Africa rhood from an ENP perspective. North Africa (with the exception of Egypt), along with five Eu- As of now, neither President von der Leyen nor ropean countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, France High Representative Borrell have visited the and Malta) is also included in the 5+5 Dialogue, North African region, no scheduled visits by Nor- th African leaders to Brussels were announced, 12 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/ and even phone calls are limited. Only Charles news_corner/news/eu-boosting-its-support-morocco- Michel did stage a visit to Egypt, but mostly to talk new-programmes-worth-€389-million_en about African affairs (i.e. addressing Egypt more 13 https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/thematic_en

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which is another framework considered effective focus on migration means that North Africa will on security and migration issues. The region is receive a different treatment from the rest of the furthermore part of the Union for the Mediterra- continent. The new Commission will revert to its nean, a French-led initiative which regroups the pre-2011 policies towards North Africa: stability countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. Mo- that keeps borders close and safe is preferred to reover, since the UK left the EU in January 2020, democratic adventures that may open the gates France is back as the leading geopolitical player of the unknown. inside the Union. So while President von der The European Commission continues to se- Leyen insists on working with a comprehensive parate Sub-Saharan Africa from North Africa. The continent-to-continent vision for Africa, the EU implementation of the NDICI may change this is still separating North from Sub-Saharan Africa course, but this remains to be seen. Furthermo- (Teevan and Sherriff, 2019). re, the EU does stress on questions of business, Although President von der Leyen speaks of security and migration more than on democracy a geopolitical commission, Brussels seems to be and the rule of law. These dynamics represent more interested in shaping transactional rela- a continuation of an old policy, which could be tionships. As observed by Chloe Teevan and An- considered as the EU’s traditional method to ap- drew Sherriff, when mentioning North Africa–as proach sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of North part of the ENP–, President von der Leyen avoids Africa, this is a regression: after the Arab Spring, talking about democracy and the rule of law, a EU leaders promised to listen to the peoples’ voi- clear contrast with the previous commissions ces instead of their authoritarian leaders. In 2020, (Teevan and Sherriff, 2019), especially since the they seem to be going the other way around now Arab Spring. North Africa is seen from the optics and reverting to their pre-2011 policies. Finally, of migration and security more than values. By North and Sub-Saharan Africa also continue to contrast, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the be recipients of EU aid, which puts them in the other important parts of the ENI, get a different asymmetric position of dependency vis-à-vis a treatment: rule of law is mentioned as a central mightier northern neighbour. condition for Serbia to open the gates of accession, for instance. The focus of the next few years will be on democracy and reform for the Eastern The UK. A competitor from within neighbourhood, and business transactions and security for the southern region. In the beginning, i.e. from the 1950s until the There is increased attention on migration and mid-1970s, European ties with Africa focused on on ways to cooperate with countries from where Francophone Africa. France was then the leading migration originates–mainly sub-Saharan Africa. country and strived to have its former colonies In her Agenda for Europe document presented in engaging with Europe. It is from the 1970s on- 2019,14 von der Leyen said that she intends to pro- wards that Anglophone Africa started getting pose a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and dragged into EU projects, as a consequence of reinforce the European Border and Coast Guard the UK being included in the new European con- Agency. She also mentioned the establishment of cert of nations. Nevertheless, after Brexit and as humanitarian corridors, presumably in the coun- a consequence of it, the UK is trying to regain its tries of origin. Although she did not point to Nor- independent place in world affairs. London is thern Africa specifically, it is usually there where hence reverting to its own course towards Africa, migration and European narratives coalesce. The signing new trade agreements and offering unprecedented opportunities to African countries, 14 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ whilst increasing its aid portfolio. In this sense, files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf the UK is addressing both sub-Saharan and nor-

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thern Africa, by engaging countries as diverse as Nevertheless, as African states and the Afri- Morocco, Tunisia–traditionally under French in- can Union face issues to come up together as a fluence–or South Africa. united institution with a defined strategy, the London is already playing a public relations European Union and its member states face an campaign similar to the EU’s in Africa, based on existential dilemma. EU countries have their own high level meetings, messaging via social media, approaches towards Africa, which are not always etc. A United Kingdom-Africa Investment Sum- paired with the Commission’s foreign policy di- mit took place in London in January 2020, with rectory and are sometimes even at odds with several African heads of state and foreign minis- stated European goals. Libya is a case-study: ters in attendance. It was modest by comparison France and Italy, and occasionally Germany, do to other similar summits organised by Russia or see things differently and influence the course of China, yet it marked the re-entry of Great Britain the North African country’s civil war according to in the continent. The UK, which aims to become their national interests, which are not necessarily one of the largest G-7 investors in Africa by 2022 the EU’s. Moreover, the EU itself, with its multiple (Lacqua and Monteiro, 2020), is relying on its departments and institutions, has difficulties dra- former colonies of eastern and southern Africa, fting a common vision through which to tackle using incentives that are similar to the EU’s but the Libyan question– and Africa more broadly. with less conditionality, an easier bureaucracy The European Commission presided by Ursula and historical linkages that make ties easier to von der Leyen announced during its first months deepen. The Commonwealth of Nations, under- that it would cope with Africa as a priority and used until now in comparison to the EU and other address existing issues and arising ones swiftly. international organisations (Hadfield, 2015), Yet from the statements and actions of the Presi- might be rejuvenated now that the UK will with- dent and her commissioners, it is possible to de- draw its aid contribution to the EU. It nonetheless cipher a continuity of old strategies towards the remains unclear whether London will redeploy continent. Africa, the continent, is seen as a pla- military personnel in Africa to secure its interests ce where business opportunities exist, but also and prove its geopolitical relevance, or if it will the source of migratory and security problems. align on the European security and military plans North Africa is where the apex of these issues is for the continent. located, due to its proximity to Europe. Issues of governance and democracy will hence be largely overlooked. Stability and business as usual will Conclusions be the keywords of the new vision towards Africa, quite similar to the vision of previous European Europe and Africa are two neighbours whose tra- Commission mandates. The separation between jectories are quasi opposite. Since the Industrial northern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (under Revolution, Europe took gigantic leaps and left the APC group) will consequently continue under Africa behind. Additionally, the economic and la- von der Leyen’s mandate. ter military and political subjugation of the Afri- Other countries, in between, are stepping up can continent by Europe, which lasted around their African efforts. China is the most evoked two centuries, complicated any “partnership example, especially nowadays, when many African between equals”, even after colonialism ended. countries need to repay their debt. Japan is trying Africa’s own problems, which are in part the le- to compete with China. Russia and the US are also gacy of colonialism, did deepen the gap: from seen to be in competition on the continent. Turkey authoritarian and corrupt regimes to ongoing and the Arab Gulf countries, regional players with conflicts and political instability, to natural di- considerable wealth, are moving in as well. India, seases and catastrophes, and so on. another global power in the making, is strengthe-

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ning its African connections. The UK is tracing its Fox, B.: “Spain/Africa: A Move to the Maghreb”, own path back to the continent. Europe, Africa’s top The Africa Report, 14/10/2019. Retrieved from: partner half a century ago, is now one among many. https://www.theafricareport.com/18149/ Realpolitik demonstrates that no hegemonic spain-africa-a-move-to-the-maghreb/ power is benevolent; Africa’s new partners, as they Hadfield, A.: “Commune Consensus: A Soft push Europe aside, will undoubtedly impose their Power Comparison between the Common- own conditionality policies. The examples of Rus- wealth and the European Union”, The Com- sia and China in their respective neighbourhoods monwealth Journal of International Affairs, show that coercion by military action is never out vol. 104, no. 4, 2015, pp. 397-412. of the table. All signs point to the eventuality of Herszenhorn, D. M.: “Von der Leyen ventures to African countries being abused if they end up in a the Heart of Africa”, Politico, 12/08/2019. Re- position of dependency towards the newcomers. trieved from: https://www.politico.eu/article/ Among these partners, the EU is the one whose european-commission-president-ursula-von- pressures–i.e. conditionality for better governan- der-leyen-ventures-to-the-heart-of-africa- ce, human rights, democracy, etc.–are the best ethiopia-african-union/ suited and most beneficial for Africa. Moreover, Holland, M.: “The EU and the Global Develop- Europe remains relatively respectful of rights and ment Agenda”, Journal of European Integra- laws, relying on soft rather than hard power. Euro- tion, vol. 30, no. 3, 2018, pp. 343-62. pe continues to offer decent education and create Lacqua, F. and Monteiro, A.: “UK Seeks to be the employment for Africans, either in Europe or in Largest G7 Investor in Africa”, Bloomberg, Africa proper. As the EU gradually loses Africa as a 14/10/2019. Retrieved from: https://www. consequence of its myriad strategies and internal bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-14/u- divisions, African actors may figure out that the k-seeks-to-be-largest-g-7-investor-in-africa block represented a more adequate partner than Leonard, M.: “The Makings of a ‘Geopolitical’ its newly found acquaintances. Commission”, ECFR, 28/11/2019. Retrieved from: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commen- tary_the_makings_of_a_geopolitical_euro- References pean_commission MEE Staff: “France Hosts G5 Sahel Leaders as Ma- Carbone; M.: “The European Union in Africa: In cron Threatens to Withdraw French Troops”, Search for a Strategy”. In: The Foreign Policy Middle East Eye, 13/01/2020. Retrieved from: of the European Union, Brookings Institution https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/fran- Press, 2012. ces-macron-host-g5-sahel-leaders-urges- Carbone, M.: “Much ado about nothing? The Eu- support-military-presence ropean Union and the Global Politics of Un- Bagoyoko, N. and Gibert, M. V.: “The Linkage tying Aid”, Contemporary Politics, vol. 20, no. between Security, Governance and Develop- 1, 2014, pp. 103-117. ment: The European Union in Africa”, Journal Carbone, M.: “Caught between the ACP and the of Development Studies, vol. 45, no. 5, 2009, AU: Africa’s relations with the European Union pp. 789-814. in a post-Cotonou Agreement context”, South Teevan, C., Sherriff, A.: “Mission Impossible? The African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 25, Geopolitical Commission and the Partner- no. 4, 2018, pp. 481-96. ship with Africa”, Briefing Note 13, ECDPM, Dandashly, A.: “EU Democracy Promotion and 10/2019. Retrieved from: https://ecdpm.org/ the Dominance of the Security–Stability Ne- publications/mission-possible-geopolitical- xus”, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 23, no. 1, 2018, commission-partnership-africa/ pp. 62-82.

informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 46 10/11/20 9:39 4. The challenges facing African and Afro-descendant communities in Spain

Antumi Toasijé

African and Afro-descendant, designated as black, of the dispositions for “blood cleansing”. These social, and political activism has a long tradition ordinances involved blocking access for every on Iberian soil. A manifestation of this are the texts person of origins described as “moros” (Moors), of protest against assimilation that were produced “negros y mulatos”, “gitanos” y “judíos” (Jews) by Hispanic-Amazigh authors, known as “Moor- to prominent positions. The inclusion of people ish”, at the time of the great expulsion; legal and designated as “negros y negras” (blacks) and also economic strategies to deal with the enslavement with the animalizing epithet “mulatos y mulatas” of the black social group during modernity; and (“mulattoes”), as well as Romany individuals the fight over the past forty years for document called gitanos y gitanas3, undoubtedly introduc- regularization, against Immigration Detention es a racial component that goes beyond religion Centres, and for political representation. and contradicts the arguments of traditional his- Anti-Africanity in Spain goes beyond the mili- toriography that attribute the aggressive policies tary or the political realms; it is social and cultur- against diversity at the outset of modernity in al. It aims to erase and rewrite the Hispanic past Spain solely to religious factors. based on Euro-leuco-centric1 and Ultra-Catholic Being the regions forming the Spanish State a assumptions. This anti-Africanity reaches its first frontier with both Africa and Europe, and an area pivotal point with the Habsburg dynasty and the of secular and even millenary exchanges and ten- massive expulsion of Hispanic-Amazigh popula- sions, it is not trivial to consider the social and cul- tion between 11,609 and 11,613 HE2. This was tural footprint that populations of African origin not just an anti-Muslim policy. It was also anti- have left in this land, to the point of constituting African, Africanity being considered not only a po- what we call the Africanity of Spain4. This African- litical and military threat to a Catholic European ity has been shaped either by the actual African power, but a cultural-racial threat as well. presence as a power, or through cultural, social Indeed, the expulsion of a large mass of the and political resistance to the homogenizing at- Hispanic population, mainly of mixed ascend- tempts that have been made since the emergence ancy, which would be designated as black by of modern and contemporary anti- Africanity. It today’s standards, set the stage for the spread would be very exhaustive to relay here the Afro cultural saga in Spain (a task yet to be disseminat-

1 From λευκός, which means white in Greek. 2 In order to avoid Eurocentric and Christian-centric 3 Activist Kamipnasqo Mestipén has told us in a personal frames of reference, we will use Césare Emiliani’s Era conversation that her community generally prefers the known as Holocene Era, which we call History Era. Said term “pueblo gitano”. period corresponds to 1609-1613 in the Common Era. To 4 See: Toasijé, A.: “The Africanity of Spain: Identity and convert all other positive dates in the Common Era, one problematization”, Journal of Black Studies, vol. 39, no. must deduct 10,000 years or omit the first digit on the left. 3, 2009, pp. 348-355.

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ed), even that of the past thousand years, ranging The European Context and the Figures from musical, culinary and aesthetic innovations by Abu l-Hasan Ali ibnNafi`, “Ziryab” in the court The numbers of people of visible African descent, of the Umayyad dynasty, to the production of socially known as black or of mixed black race, re- Guillem d’Efak, the most honoured Afro writer and siding in Europe are unknown. We remark the vis- musician in Spain, to the Latinist Juan Latino, the ibility of the African lineages, in contrast with the painter Juan Pareja, or the mystical devotee Tshi- social invisibilisation of the group, because this is kaba, among so many others. what configures the idea of “race” and, therefore, The event of modernity implies, from the be- the possibility of suffering the effects of racism. In- ginning, a hypertrophy of the European identity dividuals without a visible line of African descent known as white, conveyed through Christianity. do not fall within the definition of Afro-descend- In the previous period of history, the early Middle ants accepted by the United Nations and the organ- Ages, religion is more relevant as an identity trait izations for the defence of vulnerable populations. than ascendancy. However, it is precisely in the The Afro-descendant label, in addition to being Christian kingdoms that will constitute Spain— culturally descriptive, allows one to emphasise territories with a bordering tradition—where the intent of dominant groups to make other social modern racism will be formed as an instrumental groups vulnerable through various strategies, in- ideology for world domination. The key event is cluding racism, because they are identifiable. The the emergence of the above-mentioned “blood above refutes the aspiration of Afro-descendance cleansing” statutes. This practice of exclusion of any individual due to the fact that all human be- based on “blood”, which continued for most of ings ultimately come from the African continent. the 118th century HE, explains the hardly negli- In every European country there are commu- gible similarities between articles such as Article nities of African descent, called black and other 3 of the Cadiz Constitution and Article 21 of the equivalent names. However, mainly due to their current Spanish Civil Code: colonialist past and postcolonial linguistic ties, “For Spaniards who, due to any lineage, are some of these countries have significantly high- considered and reputed as originating from Af- er percentages than others. Such countries are, rica, the door to virtue and merit is open so that from higher to lower absolute figures: France, they may become citizens: in consequence, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Nether- Courts shall grant a citizen card to those who lands and Belgium. perform qualified services to the homeland…”.5 United Kingdom is the only European coun- “Spanish nationality is acquired through a try that has official statistics on communities naturalisation certificate, granted discretion- known as “ethnic-racial”.7 These statistics show ally by means of a Royal Decree, when excep- that 3.5% of the population identify as black Afri- tional circumstances concur in the interested can, black Caribbean, or any other black/African/ party”.6 Caribbean background,8 which adds up to a total May this introduction serve to destroy the of 1,904,684 inhabitants. myth that black presence on Spanish soil is recent, and to refute the belief that African and African-descendant activism is a phenomenon 7 Expressed in this descriptive way, we prefer to talk about that is unique to recent postcolonial contempo- ancestries, lineages or socially diverse communities. 8 The 2011 census in England, Wales and Northern Ire- raneity. land has been combined with the census in Scotland that same year, which presented question of different self- 5 Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy enacted attributions. Office for National Statistics (2011) Census: by the Cadiz Courts in 1812. Ethnic group, local authorities in the United Kingdom. 6 Article 21 of the current Spanish Civil Code. Published on October 11th, 2013.

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In France, as in Spain,9 laws are restrictive campaigns to raise awareness prior to the cen- when it comes to collecting data that is consid- sus as well as various data collection method- ered sensitive, such as ascendancy considered ologies that reflect as precisely as possible the to be racial. This is due to the consequences of different social definitions of Afro-descendance. the persecution of groups that were made vul- Because of the extreme simplification of ques- nerable over the last century. The majority view tionnaires, which exclude socially recognisable among the Afro population in Europe and Spain terminology to describe Afro-descendance, let is different, because it is understood that, with- us consider, both for the United Kingdom and for out figures, it is impossible to adequately assess France, that 3 million, or an even higher figure, the degree of existing social, economic and po- is closer to reality. litical disempowerment. Without statistical data, According to moderate estimations, 8 million it is hard to know, for example, to what extent is the total number of European residents of vis- the population designated as black is underrep- ible African descent, described as black and other resented in the parliaments of their respective similar names.12 We, on the other hand, do not European countries. In order to make up for this consider a range of 15 to 17 million to be exagger- lack of information, the Representative Council ated if we take into account that, as we have esti- of France’s Black Associations (CRAN) published mated, no less than 3 million live in both France in 12,017 HE an initial study that interviewed and Great Britain; and no less than 1.2 million of 13,059 French residents, of which 581 described us live in Spain, as we will see below. Just these themselves as black or of black descent10. If these three countries make up almost half of the range numbers could be extrapolated to the general proposed for the whole of Europe. population of France, individuals self-described as black would constitute about 1,865,000. However, while acknowledging the above an” groups, “Raizal de San Andrés y Providencia” and as progress, the experience of censuses in Abya “Palenquero”. However, according to Francisco Lizcano, 23.9% of Colombians were of black African and mixed Yala—the continent eurocentrically known as black descent by the end of the 119th century HE. See America—, particularly that of censuses in Brazil Lizcano Fernández, F: “Composición étnica de las tres and Colombia, tell us that the initial question- áreas culturales del continente americano al comienzo naires, most of which are from the beginning of del siglo XXI” in Convergencia: Revista de ciencias social- this century, show figures lower than the real es, no. 38, 2005, pp. 185-232. In Costa Rica, the census figures. This problem originates from the lack of showed 1.91% of Afro-Costa Ricans in the year 12,000 collective consciousness in some of the groups HE. But in the 12,011 HE census, the term “mulatto” was surveyed and from questions that are too re- included in the survey, which resulted in a percentage of 7.8%. In Brazil, the 12,010 HE census revealed for the first stricted and short.11 This reality has motivated time that Afro-descendent citizens formed the majority of the country’s population (50.7%), whereas previous 9 The current 2018 regulation, unlike the previous one censuses had shown them as a minority. See: Goés, P.: from 1995, softens and regulates limitations to data col- “Brasil: Censo ‘revela’ que la mayoría de la población lection that is considered sensitive. es de raza negra”, Global Voices, 5/12/2011. Retrieved 10 Les discriminations à l’encontre des populations noires from: https://es.globalvoices.org/2011/12/05/brasil- de France, January 1, 2017. Retrieved from: http://le-cran. censo-revela-que-la-mayoria-de-la-poblacion-es-de- fr/document-cran-associations-noires-de-france/63-tns- raza-negra-o-de-mestiza/ sofres-premiere-enquete-statistique-sur-les-noirs-de- 12 Blakely, A.: “Black European Responses to the Election france.pdf of Barack Obama”. En: European Network against Racism 11 The Colombian National Census in 12,005 HE shows (ed.), Invisible Visible Minority: Invisible visible minority: a percentage of 10.4% of Afro-Colombian population. Confronting Afrophobia and advancing equality for people In the 12,018 HE census, the percentage was 11.02%, of African descent and Black Europeans in Europe, ENAR, including the “Black, mixed-race and Afro-Colombi- Brussels, 2014, pp. 77-78.

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Estimations by associations and activists that Table 1. Estimated Afro population residing in have been published in the media since 2009, Spain in the year 12,016 HE14 for their part, have come up with a figure of be- Spanish Total tween 700,000 and 2 million Spanish residents Population born in countries in 71,789 311,134 of visible African ancestry, known as black. The Africa largest problem when collecting precise popu- Population born in countries in 168,454 306,824 lation data lies in knowing the number of peo- Abya Yala ple in a situation of migratory dissidence and Population born in United King- 4,089 12,478 the number of people of visible African origin dom + France who have been present in Spain for generations, Hypothesis of Afro-descendants 400,000 400,000 which is most frequently the case in Andalusia, born in Spain Extremadura, Zamora, Galicia or the Balearic Is- Hypothesis of Afro-descendants 200,000 200,000 lands. It is also complicated to assess the num- who are sons or daughters of ber of Afro-descendent people overlapping with Afro-descendants born in Spain social groups called gitanos (“Gypsies”) and Hypothesis of “others”, mainly Unknown 10,000 Asian and European mercheros (“hawkers”) that are designated as Total 844,332 1,240,436 “black” 13. Today, in Spain, the majority of Afro people were born in Spain of a father and/or mother who was born in Africa or in Abya Yala. The next group Afro communities in Spain at the beginning is of individuals born in Africa and Abya Yala, fol- of democracy lowed by individuals born in European countries of a mother and/or father who was born in Africa Contemporary Afro activism in Spain starts to or- or Abya Yala. We also need to take into account ganise with the recovery of democracy, and is born the unknown number of people born in Spain of mainly of associations and activities by Equatorial African descent that go back more than two gen- Guinean political exiles15. Exile during the Macías erations. Nguema dictatorship motivated, in the decade of This quadruple context configures a more 11,970 HE, the emergence of entities that arose diverse reality than what we find in the United with the aim of ending the dictatorial regime in States, the country of reference in terms of both newly independent Equatorial Guinea, although Afro activism and institutional policies and cul- some of their actions led to the fight for Spanish tural studies. Due to the different origins and his- nationality rights for Guinean expats residing in torical periods of migration of Afro populations Spain. Other Guinean entities, from the decade in the United States and Europe, the historical of 11,980 HE onward, added a cultural aspect to memory of Afro people in Europe is more linked to the experience of colonisation, whereas that 14 Made by author. Estimation done by comparing so- of the United States focuses mainly on Atlantic called “ethnical” censuses from the countries of origin, enslavement. estimations by specialists, and statistics on migrated We propose the following estimation of the population in Spain—nationalised or not—, adding data Afro population residing in Spain (Table 1). of people born in Spain, as well as those adopted with such origins, and, finally, an estimation of population with ancestors who did not migrate recently. We warn that these results cannot be conclusive as long as there 13 Gibraleón, Niebla and Cádiz are three Spanish munici- is no official census. palities, among others, where there is an Afro-descend- 15 For lexical reasons, we prefer the demonym guineoecu- ant population called “morena”, whose origin goes back atorial to guineoecuatoriano and, particularly, to ecu- to pre-contemporary times. atoguineano.

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their activities, without neglecting their political exceptional by rival European powers, but also to activism. Maleva was one of the first organisations the dimension of blackness that is visible on the in Spain to promote the fight against apartheid in bodies of the Spanish population. South Africa while reminding people of the exist- In addition to growing racism, the decade of ence of a multigenerational African community 11,990 HE would see the birth of an increasingly in Spain.16 In a study carried out in 12,003 HE, we broader collective consciousness from the per- prove the existence of a greater number of associ- spective of a Pan-Africanism19 infused with black ations among citizens from African countries than nationalism and African-American culture from among any other community recorded, based on the U.S. The hip hop culture grew in those years, their international experience. Although most whereby Torrejón de Ardoz was the initial diffuser of those entities are generally made up of small centre. Linked to this, there was an emergence of groups of people, the most numerous ones are groups and associations of young Afros and non those that have ties that are cultural-traditional, Afros, who organised around very dynamic ideas national-postcolonial, or religious. of social and cultural dissidence. The country was The Adhesion Agreement that Spain signed preparing to host two great events on a planetary with the European Communities on June 12th, scale: the Barcelona Summer Olympics and the 11,985 HE, was divulged in the media and celebrat- Universal Exhibition in Seville. The latter was jus- ed as a historical rematch. Spain had been carrying tified as a way to celebrate the 500th anniversary the burden of not being considered equal in the of the invasion of Abya Yala, based on ideological eyes of the rest of European nations. The popular assumptions connected to the imperialistic idea phrase “Africa begins at the Pyrenees” indicated of the Spanish nation. The tension between the Spain’s exclusion from an area that, together with glorification of the Spanish empire and the con- the United States of North America, was defined as tact with the anti-colonial international reality in the centre of modernity and progress. This idea of these two large events would lead to questioning a different Spain, expressed in the slogan “Spain the interpretative authority of the nation’s past is different”,17 did not hide the fact that what was and present, initially led by groups originating being reviled was the African inheritance, particu- from Abya Yala and the Canary Islands.20 larly North African, in Iberian culture and society. The year 11992 HE was crucial for the aware- Bárbara Fuchs18 goes further when she points out ness of the Afro community in Spain. Four specific that the so-called Spanish “Black Legend” refers events were decisive in the configuration of an ac- not only to the elements of tyranny, cruelty and tivism that would go beyond the initial constric- bigotry present in Spanish history, interpreted as tions, mainly based on the respective countries of origin of the Afro population in Spain. These events are: the murder of Lucrecia Pérez, the 16 The concept of “generation” is in question due to its first anti-black murder recognised as such; the potential for exclusion, but it has also served to make visible a permanent presence, see: Aguirre, B.: “Guin- opening of the film Malcom X and the dissemi- eanos de cuarta generación” El País, August 23th, 2001. nation of the biography of said activist; the fight Retrieved from: https://elpais.com/diario/2001/08/23/ madrid/998565863_850215.html 17 Slogan for tourists promoted by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, 19 Among Pan-African activists, socially based Pan-Afri- Minister of Information and Tourism under Spain’s Fran- canism is written with a capital letter, while institutional co government, from 11962 to 11969 HE. See: Cervera, pan-Africanism is written with a small letter. César: “‘Spainisdifferent!’, el eslogan que cambió para 20 See: “12 de octubre de 1991. Fuerte contestación en siempre la imagen de España” ABC, March 27th, 2015. Las Palmas a los actos al Día de la Hispanidad”, October 18 Fuchs, B.: Una nación exótica: Maurofilia y construcción 5th, 2017. Retrieved from: https://intersindicalcanaria. de España en la temprana Edad Moderna, Ediciones Polif- org/12-de-octubre-de-1991-fuerte-contestacion-en-las- emo, Madrid, 2011. palmas-a-los-actos-al-dia-de-la-hispanidad/

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by Haitian doctor Alponse Arcelín to repatriate actions of political incidence, aimed at public the stuffed corpse of a San man that was exhib- organisms and entities, as racism is growingly ited in the Darder Museum in Banyoles; and the understood as a structural problem. Such ini- identification of Spanish/US citizen Rosalind Wil- tiatives have increasingly been led by entities liams Lecraft, a recognised case of racial profiling that include communities of diverse origins, not by the police. These events inspired the rise of just coming from a single specific country. Pan- several entities such as SOS Racismo and the cur- African activism has made itself visible through rently contested Movimiento Contra la Intoleran- such activities for about a decade, as a vanguard cia. But they also meant the rise of non-registered capable of bringing together diverse identities and registered Afro entities that understood rac- to achieve common goals, through entities like ism, not just as a scourge in South Africa and the the Pan-Africanist Federation, the Pan-African United States of North America, but also as an Centre, and the Black Panther Association. The underlying problem in Spain. best-known action, led by the Pan-Africanist Federation, intellectually designed by the Pan- African Centre, has been the Parliamentary Current challenges facing afro communities in Spain Motion regarding the memory of slavery, the recognition and support of the Black, African A significant aspect of Spain’s permanence in and Afro-Descendant community, proposed in the European Union is that it has been forced to two different versions in 12,009 HE by the PP ratify and transpose European directives against (Popular Party) and the PSOE (Socialist Party).22 racism, generating a local legislation that was The final motion, resulting from the proposal previously non-existent.21 This could not have that we had the chance to write consensually been done motu proprio due to the persistence with the Pan-Africanist Federation and from the of denialism regarding the African presence and merging of the respective motions proposed the existence of racism in Spain. However, it can by the Popular Party and the Spanish Socialist also be seen that the institutional tools emerging Workers Party, includes in its final articles the from that transposed legislation are generally un- demands consolidated in the Second Pan-Afri- known by concerned communities because they can Congress in Spain, organised by the Pan-Af- are hardly linked to them. ricanist Federation at the UNED headquarters at Partially due to that structural passiveness of Escuelas Pías in Lavapiés, Madrid, in 12,005 HE. the State to confront the problem of racism, with Although a parliamentary motion is not binding, the turn of the century, claims by African and while waiting for a law, its merit is to elevate to African-descendant communities in Spain have come from explicit petitions and demands by as- 22 “Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales Serie D: Ge- sociations and unions addressed to institutions. neral”. Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales BOCG. The new framework, which coincides with a demo- Madrid: Congreso de los Diputados, Proposición no de graphic situation in which citizens of African de- Ley presentada por el Grupo Parlamentario Popular en scent are increasingly Spanish, whether by birth or el Congreso, relativa al reconocimiento de la comunidad by naturalisation, generates exclusions and disem- negra española, BOCG. Congreso de los Diputados, serie powerment that go beyond the idea of nationality. D, núm. 181, de 7 de abril de 2009, and “Boletín Oficial de The demands for effective equality are ex- las Cortes Generales Serie D: General”. Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales BOCG. Madrid: Congreso de los Di- pressed through protest events, statements and putados, Proposición no de Ley presentada por el Grupo Parlamentario Socialista, sobre memoria de la esclavitud, 21 Such as Ley 62/2003, de 30 de diciembre, de medidas reconocimiento y apoyo a la comunidad negra, africana y fiscales, administrativas y del orden social, BOE no. 313, de afrodescendientes en España, BOCG. Congreso de los December 31th, 2003. Diputados, serie D, núm. 275, de 20 de octubre de 2009.

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the Senate the recognition of the black African tions and the context that favoured it with the and African-descendant community in Spain rise of Obama to the presidency of the United due to its significant ties with the nation, as well States.25 The appropriation by political parties of as to include some of its main demands. conceptual and social achievements, emerging The contents of the above-mentioned motion from processes within organisations of civil so- and of other subsequent ones,23 particularly the ciety, has resulted in a change in the perception motion registered by Unidas Podemos but not of the Afro community in Spain, which has gone yet presented24 in the Congreso de los Diputados from being invisible to political parties, due to the (House of Representatives) in 12,018 HE, give us community’s non right to vote or to be electable, insight on the main demands of the Afro commu- to being a political actor to be considered, won nities in Spain. These requests can be summed over and even co-opted. This new perception has up as the demand for the recognition of the exist- enabled an incipient (though very scarce) presence of a black African and African-descendant ence of representatives in political institutions. community in Spain, which requires producing a The most significant example is the election of census, acknowledging the existence of a struc- Rita Bosaho Gori as a member of congress repre- tural racism that comes from a specific history senting Alicante for the “Compromís-Podemos- of slave trading and colonialism, and the need És el moment” coalition in 12,015 HE.26 However, to implement reparation measures. Besides a as can be easily seen, Spain is still very far behind general call for an effective fight against racism, regarding political representation of socially di- among the proposed reparation measures we verse communities, to the point that further find specific demands such as the ending of racial thought should be given to the composition of profiling by police, including contents on racism, electoral lists. slavery and colonialism in education, and actions The increasingly visible fight for political and of historical memory such as renaming streets institutional presence has important concomi- and erecting monuments that make visible the tances with the feminist fight, which resulted at struggle against slavery, colonialism and racism. the time in the Law for Equality,27 which made Another demand is to hold a public institutional parity electoral lists possible. However, far from ceremony in recognition of Spain’s participation having seen and accepted those concomitances, in crimes of slavery and colonialism, an essen- mainstream feminism has been strongly con- tial event in order to put Afro presence in Spain tested by Afro and Abya Yala feminism due to its in a truthful perspective that counters the argu- colonial practices over its peers of non-European ments of alienation, banishment, exoticization, descent. Afro feminist thinkers in the Spanish and threat, present in racist discourses. State have confronted attempts by traditional Eu- Certainly not all is positive on the legal-polit- ropean feminism to subordinate them and even ical side of the issue. In addition to the absence of a law that embodies the above-mentioned 25 Toasijé, A.: “La memoria y el reconocimiento de la proposals, we have witnessed the political ex- comunidad africana y africano-descendiente negra en ploitation of the first of those parliamentary mo- España, el papel de la vanguardia panafricanista”, Nóma- das: Critical Journal of Social and Juridical Sciences, no. 28, 2010, pp. 277-316. 23 Parliamentary motion on improving the coexistence 26 Today, there are two representatives of African origin and promoting the development, justice and recognition that occupy seats in the Spanish Congress: Luc André of a diverse society, with particular support for the Afro- Diouf Dioh, for the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, and descendant population, 2014). Ignacio Garriga Vaz de Concicao for Vox. 24 The Motion document can be consulted at: Toasijé, A.: 27 Constitutional Law 3/2007, on March 22, for the effec- “Reconocimiento y empoderamiento de la comunidad tive equality of women and men. Published in BOE num- Afro en España”, Africanidad.com, July 22th, 2018. ber 71, on March 23, 2007.

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appropriate icons of black feminism yet making from the Declaration and Programme of Action at their specific demands invisible.28 the Durban World Conference against Racism in To date, only the social activism carried out 12,001 HE33 and from the Durban Review Confer- by the disempowered communities themselves ence held in Geneva in 12,009 HE. This new context has turned out to be effective to change para- gives a much-needed historical legitimacy to the digms and actions even within movements that fight of populations of African descent, designated promote solidarity among diverse communities. as black, in territories of the diaspora. That fight, A recent example is the election of Rita Bosaho expressed through continuous actions against rac- as the general director for Equal Treatment and ism and exclusion, and for recognition and visibil- Racial Ethnical Diversity of the Ministry of Equal- ity, strengthens democracy in these nations. ity, after the person who was initially elected Thanks to greater communication enhanced resigned.29 The initiatives for the position to be by the Internet and to the increase in transoce- assigned to a person belonging to the commu- anic travelling, today’s Afro activism in Spain con- nities fighting racism directed against their own nects more directly than previous activism with bodies emerged from the so-called “racialized” the demands for social justice in Abya Yala. These communities,30 who have had to face the discred- demands show their closeness to political move- it of the logic of representation by peers, dissemi- ments of the new Latin American left and its aca- nated by several media.31 demic ontology, decoloniality. Family ties among The past decade has seen the rise of a renewed Afro-descendant communities in Spain that come Afro activism. This activism has emerged in the mostly from the Dominican Republic, Colombia, context created since the International Decade Cuba, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador, and the fact for People of African Descent 12,015-12,024 EH, that they share Spanish as their mother tongue, decreed by the United Nations,32 which emanates which articulates communication on both shores of the Atlantic, are the main factors that promote this connection. However, the Spanish language 28 See: Ekoka, D. (ed.): Metamba Miago: Relatos y saberes has also been a factor of distancing from other de mujeres afroespanolas, United Minds Valencia, 2019. 29 EFE Agency: “Rita Bosaho, directora general de Igual- liberating schools of thought that were more dad tras la renuncia de Alba González”, Madrid, January popular at the end of the past century, such as 16th, 2020. Retrieved from: www.efe.com/efe/espana/por- Pan-Africanism, which was more widespread in tada/rita-bosaho-directora-general-de-igualdad-tras-la- the English-speaking world, and subsequently renuncia-alba-gonzalez/10010-4151365 in the French-speaking world. This includes not 30 We have contested that concept in: Toasijé, A.: “Por qué only Great Britain and France, but most of Africa. nunca digo ‘racializada’, ‘racializado’”, Africanidad.com, It is also worth mentioning Portuguese and Arab- December 6th, 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.africa- speaking countries, with important African and Af- nidad.com/2018/12/porque-nunca-digo-racializada.html rican-descendant communities that do not always 31 Sánchez, G.: “’¿Y esto no es racismo antiblanco?’: la reacción a las políticas de diversidad que explota la ex- find global channels for their demands. This five- trema derecha internacional”, Eldiario.es, January 17th, faceted linguistic fact creates a conceptual barrier 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.eldiario.es/desalam- among different communities of African descent. bre/antiblanco-reaccion-politicas-diversidad-internac- No less important are the cultural rights of the ional_0_985852094.html Afro community in Spain. The cultural rights of 32 Proclamation of the International Decade for Afro-de- communities of African descent have been speci- scendants, resolution passed by the General Assembly fied by the action programme of the Durban Con- on December 23, 2013, 68/263. Retrieved from: https:// ference in 12,001 HE, and they are also protected undocs.org/es/A/RES/68/237. Programme of activities of the International Decade for Afro-descendants 69/16 passed by the General Assembly on November 18, 2014. 33 Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/es/events/pastevents/ Retrieved from https://undocs.org/es/A/RES/69/16 cmcr/durban_sp.pdf

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by the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural do with matters such as double African and Eu- Diversity on November 2nd, 12,001 HE. The very ropean identity, alienation, racism and sexism. dynamic cultural production of people and artist As to the form, it is usually those authors who groups in the African and African-descendant com- have spent their childhood or even their youth munities in Spain shows itself in as many spheres in African countries who show a greater interest as possible. Besides Afro identitarian music with in preserving and reinventing traditional forms. its myriad of creators, among which we highlight In this regard, it is worth noting the collection of in the past two decades Barón ya Búk-lu, el Chojín, poems in the Bööbé language by Justo Bolekia Frank T, Astrid Jones or Arianna Puello, literature Boleká.38 That international life experience also has always spearheaded this process, with con- blurs the lines between Afro literature and African solidated names such as Justo Bolekia Boleká, literature strictly speaking, considering that there Donato Ndongo, Francisco Zamora Loboch, Remei are authors who emigrated to Spain as adults, Sipi Mayo, Agnes Agboton, and other nascent vo- such as Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel, a political exile, cations such as that of Lucía Asué Mbomío Rubio, others who have spent their youth in Spain and Desirée Bela-Lobedde, Trifonía Melibea Obono, currently live in Equatorial Guinea, such as César Edjanga Jones Ndjoli, Mamadou Dia, Yeison F. Mbá Abogo, and others who frequently travel be- García López, El Chojín or Paulo Akam.34 We high- tween both geographies, such as Mamadou Dia. light here the work of Desirée Bela-Lobedde, who Theatre, film, photography and visual arts in explores the aggressions of leuco-centric beauty the Afro community are also having an impact canons toward a black woman’s body and the pro- on viewers from the community itself and on the cess of transition toward self-acceptance. general public. On one hand, filmmakers like San- As Janheinz Jahn and Marjorie Grene already tiago Zannou or Tony Romero, photographers like pointed out in 11,961 HE,35 and Wole Soyinka36 Rubén H. Bermúdez and his exploration of, not al- and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o37, among others, later the- ways obvious, signifiers of being black in Spain,39 orised, it is not enough for a work to have been or Agnes Essonti, whose photography is bound to made by an African or Afro-descendant person in the Cameroon of her father. Plastic arts are also order to consider it Afro literature. Africanity must on the rise. Especially worth mentioning, because be shown in a direct or indirect way, whether it of their increasing visibility, are Yast Solo or VRUS is in the subject matter or in the form. For ex- (Justo Aliounedine Pouye Nguema) and his con- ample, through the use of African languages or cept of art that interacts with the observer,40 or African artistic patterns. Otherwise, their litera- Monserrat Anguiano, who portrays Afro mentors in ture would be solely Euro. Considering this as- Spain and around the world. In the realm of thea- sessment, most topics covered by Afro authors tre, various Afro-North American plays have been in Spain, like those covered by other authors of adapted and new Spanish plays about migratory the African diasporas around the world, have to issues have been performed. Silvia Albert Sopale presents, in two monologues41 written by herself, a harsh and, at times, scathing journey through the 34 Martínez, X.: “La revolución de la literatura afroespañola” experience of being a black woman in Spain; the in Playgroundmag, April 27, 2017. Available at: https:// www.playgroundmag.net/lit/revolucionliteratura- afroespanola_22656036.html 38 See: Bolekia, J. B.: Löbëla, Sial, Madrid, 2019. 35 Janheinz, J.: Muntu. An Outline of Neo-African Culture, 39 Bermúdez, R. H.: Y tú, ¿por qué eres negro?, Phree, Ma- Faber & Faber, London, 1961. drid, 2019. 36 Soyinka, W.: Myth, Literature and the African World, 40 See: Pouye Nguema, J. A.: El arte de la interpretación Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976. interactiva, 2018. 37 WaThiong’o, N.: Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Lan- 41 No es país para negras (2016) and Blackface y otras guage in African Literature, James Currey, London, 2011. vergüenzas (2019).

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racism, the blackfacing, the stereotypes and the African origin were placed by pseudo-scientific disempowering social constructs. Part of this artis- racism on a hierarchic level in-between human tic production has recently been discussed by Pro- beings and all other animals. This is why there are fessor Mar García in a compilation of interviews42 identitarian groups that avoid the term “black”. At exposing a cultural dialogue that the Spanish so- the same time, other individualities and groups ciety, unlike that of other European countries, with claim that designation as a re-signified self-affir- just a few exceptions, has been eluding. mation that challenges existing prejudices, par- The difficulty of being an artist in Spain is a ticularly in Abya Yala43, but also in Spain.44 In any well-known fact. The obstacles for Afro artists are case, both ontologies of the collective designa- even bigger. The Black View group has denounced, tion refer either directly or indirectly to a histori- through influential campaigns in the media, the cal African origin. They tell us about the history of objectification that the black actor community the great enslavement and modern and contem- undergoes. Being relegated to stereotypical roles porary colonialism and of current north-south not only reduces the acting possibilities, but it has inequalities as long-term dynamics established a negative influence reinforcing the false ideations by European expansionism. that feed racism. It is imperative that the Spanish The collective African and African-descendant state protects, opens opportunities and promotes self-identification is fostered by the Pan-Africanist through direct and specific institutional support movement and also by the Afrocentricity mainly Afro creation, as is urged by the above-mentioned in the English-speaking and French-speaking Durban and UNESCO dispositions. In the mean- spheres. On the other hand, leaders of the deco- time, the already growing trend toward consider- loniality philosophy, which emerged in the Abya ing the need for a greater awareness in the African Yala countries with Iberian official languages and Afro-descendant, or black, community itself, in the decade of 11,980 HE, promote collective in alliance with other communities, of the impor- identifications that superpose to afroness or tance of consuming their own creations and gener- “blackness”. They propose the term racialized for ating their own spaces and channels of expression all those groups considered “races” that do not as a form of cultural resistance, must be promoted. have a genesis considered “white European”. They This is the idea furthered by festivals such as Con- hope that this self-description will incite solidarity ciencia Afro in Madrid or Black Barcelona, or pub- among groups that may share common interests, lishers such as Wanafrica, and bookshops such as but that do not have an obvious historical link— United Minds in Valencia. It is understood that this people from Abya Yala, Romanies, Arabs, Asians. is the only way for cultural products by Afro crea- What we have explained above is decisive to tors to reach their full potential. understand the social situation of communities of African origin in Spain, in that the choice of one identity or another has conditioned anti-racist Conclusions re-empowerment strategies. For example, in the decades of 11,980 and 11,990 HE, activism was The construction of the named “black individual” focused on fighting immigration laws due to the is a product of the process of cultural disempow- experience of migrating. This is why the terms erment that diverse African populations were submitted to during the process of enslavement 43 Campbell Barr, S.: Rotundamente negra y otros poe- and colonisation. As we know, people of visible mas, Madrid: Torremozas, Madrid, 2013 [1st edition 1994]. 44 See, for example, the entries in the “Categoría: Afro-reflex- 42 García, M.: Inapropiados e inapropiables: conversa- ión. Reflexiones en torno al lenguaje, término afro, negro, ciones con artistas africanos y afrodescendientes, Los estándares de belleza” on the blog Afroféminas. Retrieved Libros de la Catarata, Madrid, 2018. from: https://afrofeminas.com/category/afro-reflexion/

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“emigrant”, “immigrant”, and “migrant” were the years, because it places it in front of a mirror of most commonly used by disempowered groups. intrinsic realities that singles it out and removes The emergence of a growing number of Afro- it from the Eurocentric account of History. descendant people born in Spain has resulted in self-descriptions outside the realm of nationality, exposing the preferential treatment of communi- References ties of European origin that have immigrated to Spain as well, and uncovering how racism hides “12 de octubre de 1991. Fuerte contestación behind xenophobia. Both are the by-products of en Las Palmas a los actos al Día de la His- a previous history of slavery and colonialism that panidad”, October 5th, 2017. Retrieved from: persists until nowadays in muted ways. https://intersindicalcanaria.org/12-de-octu- Any area of creativity, any professional area, bre-de-1991-fuerte-contestacion-en-las-pal- every dimension or reality in Spain is influenced mas-a-los-actos-al-dia-de-la-hispanidad/ by the presence of people of African descent. Rac- “Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales Serie ism, invisibility, induced alienation and social ban- D: General”. Official Bulletin of the General ishment, political disempowerment, belittling, the Courts BOCG. Madrid: Congress of Repre- exoticization or hypersexualization of the bodies sentatives, Motion proposed by the Socialist named black, the ideas of invasion, social distrust, Party parliamentary group, on the memory of multiple identities, these are the challenges that slavery, recognition and support of the black, Afro professionals, creators and politicians face. African and African-Descendant community Ultimately, they are the ones who decide to pre- in Spain, BOCG. Congress of Representatives, sent their creations and actions as a product of a series D, no. 275, on October 20th, 2009. fighting community, a community at the vanguard “Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales Serie that opens spaces and tears down paradigms. D: General”. Official Bulletin of the General The challenges Afro communities face in the Courts BOCG. Madrid: Congress of Represent- Spanish state, as is the case with other places like atives, Motion proposed by the Popular Party the United States of North America, require the parliamentary group in Congress, regarding expansion and internationalisation of civil rights the recognition of the Spanish black com- and human rights. But there are also specific chal- munity, BOCG. Congress of Representatives, lenges of the Afro community in Spain that are series D, no. 181, on April 7th, 2009. challenges of Spaniards as a whole, challenges Afroféminas [blog]. Retrieved from: https://afro- arising from a specific history, because although feminas.com/category/afro-reflexion/ they are expressed as arising from specific com- Aguirre, B.: “Guineanos de cuarta generación”, munities, it is the sum in a specific time and space El País, August 23th, 2001. Retrieved from: of these diverse communities that constitutes https://elpais.com/diario/2001/08/23/ma- the general social fabric. The very aspiration of drid/998565863_850215.html the existence of a “majority” with common in- Bermúdez, R. H.: Y tú, ¿por qué eres negro?, terests resulting in a common historical-cultural Phree, Madrid, 2019. baggage is in itself a construction that seeks the Blakely, A.: “Black European Responses to the empowerment of those few that meet a standard Election of Barack Obama”. In: European Net- proposed from positions of power. The idea that work against Racism (ed.), Invisible Visible Mi- only dialectics between social classes explain nority: Invisible visible minority: Confronting History has already been torn down by gender Afrophobia and advancing equality for people studies. Other factors need to be added, such as of African descent and Black Europeans in Eu- race as a social construct, an analysis that Spain rope, ENAR, Brussels, 2014, pp. 77-78. has wanted to flee from for the past five hundred Bolekia, J. B.: Löbëla, Sial, Madrid, 2019.

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Campbell Barr, S.: Rotundamente negra y otros trieved from: https://www.playgroundmag. poemas, Torremozas, Madrid, 2013. [1st edi- net/lit/revolucion-literatura-afroespano- tion 1994]. la_22656036.html Cervera, C.: “’Spain is different!’, el eslogan que Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy cambió para siempre la imagen de España”, enacted by the Courts of Cadiz in 1812. ABC, March 27th, 2015. Pouye Nguema, J. A.: El arte de la interpretación Constitutional Law 3/2007, on March 22th, for the interactiva, 2018. effective equality of women and men. BOE Proclamation of the International Decade for no. 71, March 23th, 2007. Afro-descendants, resolution passed by the EFE Agency: “Rita Bosaho, directora general de General Assembly on December 23th, 2013, Igualdad tras la renuncia de Alba González”, 68/263. Retrieved from: https://undocs.org/ Madrid, January 16th, 2020. Retrieved from: es/A/RES/68/237 https://www.efe.com/efe/espana/portada/ri- Programme of activities of the International Decade ta-bosaho-directora-general-de-igualdad-tras- for Afro-descendants 69/16 passed by the Gener- la-renuncia-alba-González/10010-4151365 al Assembly on November 18th, 2014. Retrieved Ekoka, D. (ed.): Metamba Miago: Relatos y sa- from: https://undocs.org/es/A/RES/69/16 beres de mujeres afroespanolas, United Sánchez, G.: “’¿Y esto no es racismo antiblanco?’: Minds, Valencia, 2019. la reacción a las políticas de diversidad que Fuchs, B.: Una nación exótica: Maurofilia y con- explota la extrema derecha internacional”, El- strucción de España en la temprana Edad diario.es, January 17th, 2018. Retrieved from: Moderna, Ediciones Polifemo, Madrid, 2011. https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/anti- García, M.: Inapropiados e inapropiables: Conver- blanco-reaccion-politicas-diversidad-inter- saciones con artistas africanos y afrodescendi- nacional_0_985852094.html entes, Los Libros de la Catarata, Madrid, 2018. Soyinka, W.: Myth, Literature and the African Goés, P.: “Brasil: Censo “revela” que la mayoría World, Cambridge University Press, Cam- de la población es de raza negra”, Global bridge, 1976. Voices, December 5th, 2011. Retrieved from: Toasijé, A.: “La memoria y el reconocimiento de https://es.globalvoices.org/2011/12/05/bras- la comunidad africana y africano-descendi- il-censo-revela-que-la-mayoria-de-la-pobla- ente negra en España, el papel de la vanguar- cion-es-de-raza-negra-o-de-mestiza/ dia panafricanista”, Nómadas: Critical Journal Janheinz, J.: Muntu. An Outline of Neo-African of Social and Juridical Sciences, no. 28, 2010, Culture, Faber & Faber, London, 1961. pp. 277-316. Law 62/2003, December 30th, on fiscal, adminis- Toasije, A.: “Por qué nunca digo ‘racializada’, trative and social measures. BOE no. 313, De- ‘racializado’”, Africanidad.com, December cember 31st, 2003. 6th, 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.afri- Les discriminations à l’encontre des populations canidad.com/2018/12/porque-nunca-digo- noires de France, January 1st, 2017. Retrieved racializada.html from: http://le-cran.fr/document-cran-associa- Toasijé, A.: “Reconocimiento y empoderamiento tions-noires-de-france/63-tns-sofres-premiere- de la comunidad Afro en España”, Africani- enquete-statistique-sur-les-noirs-de-france.pdf dad.com, July 22th, 2018. Lizcano Fernández, F.: “Composición étnica de las Toasijé, A.: “The Africanity of Spain: Identity and tres áreas culturales del continente americano problematization”, Journal of Black Studies, al comienzo del siglo XXI”, Convergencia: Revis- vol. 39, 3, 2009, pp. 348-355. ta de ciencias sociales, no. 38, 2005, pp. 185-232. WaThiong’o, N.: Decolonising the Mind: The Poli- Martínez, X.: “La revolución de la literatura afroes- tics of Language in African Literature, James pañola”, Playgroundmag, April 27th, 2017. Re- Currey, London, 2011.

informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 58 10/11/20 9:39 5. Feminist activisms in Africa: trends and strategies of the new movements

Celia Murias Morcillo

Since precolonial times until nowadays, Afri- where these movements have defended the ad- can women have self-organised strategically to vancement of women’s rights. To that end, the advance their political, economic and social in- spheres of political representation and the fight terests, as well as to resist attacks against those against GBV will be scrutinized through some re- interests. African women’s agency is unques- cent cases. tionable. As is perhaps fairly unknown outside the specialised field, the role and participation of women in the resistance to colonial expansion A long history of activism and in the fight for independence were significant, both politically speaking and as partici- “African feminism is part of a legacy of African pants in armed conflicts, especially in those of liberation and African movements (…) African socialist orientation. More recently, in the past 25 feminism is part of Africa’s liberation.”1. During years, and especially in the past decade, there has the colonial period, groups of women—market been a boost of various movements in response sellers, farmers, etc.—constantly confronted deci- to material deprivation and defence of their hu- sions of both colonial authorities, and represent- man rights, and against structural oppression as atives of native authorities that acted in collusion a result of patriarchy and its specific features in with the former, such as the implementation of their countries and communities. taxes, hoarding of resources and limitation of ac- Current feminist movements fight for social cess to decision-making spaces. They organized justice according to their socio-cultural realities economic boycotts, held massive demonstra- and by creating global ties. They build strate- tions where they employed local techniques of gic alliances with other groups, such as LGTBIQ ridicule to challenge the colony, and were essen- movements, and they do multi-level work, link- tial in disseminating the emancipation project of ing local, national and regional struggles around liberation movements. Gender-based Violence (GBV), access to political Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, the Nigerian found- representation, or access to and enjoyment of er of the Abeokuta Women’s Union, was a preemi- human rights, making environmental concerns nent figure in the pro-independence movement and the analysis of the neoliberal global context in her country. Ransome-Kuti mobilised women’s transversal to their fight. To this end, they com- groups in resistance actions against taxes, con- bine strategies of political advocacy to impact tributed to the expansion and funding of libera- and reform institutional and legislative structures tion movements, and defended women’s access with mobilization and direct action, relying on so- to education and political representation, and cial networks. This chapter aims to reflect upon the evolu- 1 Statement by Jessica Horn during the 5th edition (2017) tion and characteristics of feminist movements in of AkeArts& Book Festival in Nigeria titled This F-Word. Re- Africa. The text also analyses some of the fronts trieved from: www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXai-BK1awk

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more generally, to the advancement of their polit- After their countries’ independence, they became ical, social and economic rights (UNESCO, 2014). part of the patronage networks of the parties in She was no exception. Mabel Dove-Danquah, power, in so-called “state feminism”, building a from Ghana, played a fundamental role in mobi- “state gender machinery” that served as an insti- lising women around the anti-colonial struggle tutional infrastructure through which to pursue of the Convention People’s Party, led by Kwame advances in women’s rights (Darkwah, Bauer, Nkrumah, and became the first female parlia- Patterson, 2017). Even though these state strate- mentarian in Africa. Vera Chirwa, founder of the gies brought numerous countries closer to inter- Malawi Congress Party,which led the country to national demands in the area of women’s rights its independence, and of the League of Malawian during the 1970s and 1980s, these often turned Women, not only fought for women’s rights but out to be counterproductive by discouraging was a major support for resistance against white mobilisations and the advancement of a gender domination (Gyamfi Asiedu, 2019). agenda with a truly transformational potential In the cases of armed struggle in the former (Tripp and Badri, 2017). Portuguese colonies, Zimbabwe or South Africa From the 1990s onward, women’s movements under apartheid, women held positions in the gained financial autonomy and broadened their propaganda apparatus, as political agents and as agendas while making them independent from members of militant wings, both on the frontlines party politics. This was partly due to the gradual and as educators and caregivers. In that context, proliferation of multi-party elections and the the fact that women exceeded their role as do- opening of the political sphere, to the decline in mestic caregivers undoubtedly threatened the conflicts and to the access to a larger participa- colonial status quo and the traditional patriarchal tion of civil society and grassroots movements. system (Murias and Caeiro, 2018). The previous decade of the 1980s and the spe- For this reason, today’s African feminists have cific impact that the Structural Adjustment Pro- primarily focused on recovering and drawing atten- grams had on women’s lives contributed as well tion to their historical figures. They have claimed to the growing importance of their movements. their legacy and relearned local pre-colonial and Thus, the Third World Conference on Women in anti-colonial resistance strategies and practices, Nairobi (1985) and, more significantly, the Fourth with the dual aim of de-patriarchalising their po- World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), litical and direct action histories, and to decolonise where the Declaration and Platform for Action narratives regarding gender relations prior to colo- were adopted, served as catalysts. Besides the nialism, which substantially distorted them.2 paradigmatic participation of African women in Despite how promising this period was, wom- leadership roles and the broadening of issues, a en’s strategies and priorities for resistance, mo- fundamental strategic turn took place, from the bilisation and organisation were co-opted and, former focus on development—mainly poverty to a certain extent, neutralised by the agenda es- alleviation, economic empowerment and po- tablished by the parties to which they belonged. litical participation—to an approach focused on women’s human rights.

2 In many precolonial societies, women carried out complex roles (economic, political, symbolic, etc.). The arrival AfriFem. Idiosyncrasy of African feminisms of colonialism brought with it the Victorian model of fem- ininity, a certain sex-based division of labour and changes African feminisms include both activism and in productive and economic relations, or the gendered separation between public and private spheres. This re- theoretical developments that, using gender as a duced women’s spaces of influence or undervalued the critical analytical tool, focus their reflections on areas where they were more preeminent. conditions and processes, problems and dynam-

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ics that are specific to the continent and its so- Western interpretation of gender relations in her cieties. However, African feminist activists have classic publication Male Daughters, Female Hus- had to confront an issue of legitimacy internally, bands (1987). especially regarding the use of the term femi- These mobilisations and reflections crystal- nism, the F-Word (Tamale, 2006). Although this lised in 2006, in Accra, with the official birth of is rapidly changing among new generations of the African Feminist Forum4, a meeting place for feminists, the word still triggers a certain social activists and scholars to collectively reflect and rejection, even among women themselves. The design common strategies for transformative term is perceived as a Western import that goes feminist action. To that end, they established against men or that looks down on motherhood, a Charter of Principles in which, accepting the family or other core ideas of power that differ diversity of positions within the collective, they from those used in Western contexts (Henríquez specified their commitment to feminism: “Our and Murias, 2017). For this reason, and because feminist identity is not qualified with ‘Ifs’, ‘Buts’, of the perceived coloniality of hegemonic femi- or ‘Howevers’. We are Feminists. Full stop”. This nism, for the past quarter of a century there has platform has simultaneously enabled the crea- been a proliferation of theoretical proposals that tion of regional and national forums in countries have offered an answer adapted to the different such as Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Congo priorities of African women, separate from those Brazzaville, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Liberia. proposed by hegemonic feminism. In the preamble to this Charter, the feminists The centrality of motherhood as an area of explicitly state: “We recognize that the work of empowerment, the analysis of polygamy, the ne- fighting for women’s rights is deeply political, and cessary collaboration of men to achieve equality, the process of naming is political too.” Indeed, or the power relations within extended families, the re-politicisation of the struggles for women’s among other areas3, have come to define Afri- rights through feminism has been one of African can feminisms according to their own realities feminists’ areas of critical production in recent and needs (Henríquez and Murias, 2017). In the decades. The urgency to place gender on the same vein, African feminists problematized the agenda and to render it transversal to essential concept of gender and its roles as defined by he- issues (of material nature and access to resources gemonic feminism, through a theoretical body of mainly) had a specific impact; the introduction of work that examined the construct of the female the so-called developmentalist feminism through subject. Nigerian sociologist Oyèronké Oyěwùmí the frameworks of “gender and development” or questioned the supposed universality of the cha- “women and development” favoured its technifi- racteristics of the female subject in her work The cation and bureaucratisation, thwarting the ad- Invention of Women (1997), and anthropologist vance of other more radical and transformative Ifi Amadiume challenged the hegemony of the feminist agendas (Mama, 2004; Ahikire, 2014). The substitution of the term feminism for the 3 For example, womanism, among other trends, stems term gender during those years also delayed the from an interpretation of the consequences of colonial- self-identification as such of many activists and ism and rejects antagonism to men, prioritising power gender experts—“I am an expert on gender, but relations of race and class, and the centrality of moth- not a feminist”—and its dissemination. erhood. African womanism refocuses this term on Afri- After decades of developmentalism, today’s can women, motherism proposes an essentialist idea of activists see feminism from a more structural per- women, as united with nature and associated to values spective, as a cornerstone of social justice move- of cooperation, conciliation, etc. Stiwanism (Social Trans- formations Including Women in Africa) sees female roles as strengths and supplementary to men in favour of progress in societies, among other characteristics. 4 More information here: www.africanfeministforum.com/

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ments, reminding us that feminism should be a rationales. Both feminism and homosexuality tool for structurally transforming power relations have been branded as non-African5, a widespread inherent to patriarchy, both locally and globally, idea in society that is exploited by certain gov- rather than a technical and bureaucratic frame ernments and political leaders6. By repressing of measures aimed at alleviating material defi- women—through laws that control or limit their ciencies. freedom—and by persecuting dissidence against heteronormativity, these make political use of misogyny and homophobia to reaffirm their Alliances of feminist movements control and identity as guarantors of a supposed African culture7. Considering the historical and social develop- The recovery and revaluation of precolonial ments and factors we have discussed, as well as gender identities and dynamics, which in many the concrete conditions of each specific context, cases break away from binarism and current rigid there are certain trends among feminist activists, structures, has also strengthened the strategic influenced both by distinct local features and by symbiosis among feminist and LGBTIQ move- the global agenda. ments, and the emergence of studies on sexu- For example, the revitalisation of analyses alities and identities. At an organisational level, from post-colonial and decolonial approaches platforms and networks of national and regional has led to a rethinking of the colonial legacy and solidarity have proliferated, both for the sake of the processes of decolonisation, as well as of une- political influence in supranational institutions, qual power relations globally. The global context and to connect the thriving scene of movements of neoliberalism and extractivism, the diasporic and synchronise resources, strategies, actions experiences, or the international neoconserva- and solidarity. To this end, the growth of social tive trend have led many movements to adopt media has been essential. an intersectional analysis. This approach em- phasises the interrelation between gender, class and race categories, among others, and sees the The advancement of women’s rights fight against patriarchy as inseparable from the fight against neoliberal globalisation and neo- The different movements and platforms are char- colonialism, if the aim is to achieve a real trans- acterised by a heterogeneity of political profiles formation of the structures of oppression. This and objectives, more or less radical and trans- approach has facilitated the creation of strategic formative, even though they converge in their alliances and common agendas with student, struggle to have international protocols and environmental and climate justice movements (think of the specific impacts of environmental 5 Pereira, C.: “Feminists Organising. Strategy, Voice, Pow- damage on rural women’s lives) and other minor- e r ”, Feminist Africa, no. 22, 2017, p. 17. ity groups. This is palpable in cases such as South 6 LGBTIQ communities are subject to so-called state ho- Africa, where a reconsideration of violence during mophobia, in reference to how states, who supposedly apartheid has led to linking economic violence— should guarantee equal rights for all, persecute these access to higher education, for example—to rac- groups resorting to state structures. 7 ism and to structural violence against women, In the context of this repression, some states have not hesitated to resort to colonial remnants in the penal code. rape culture, and against minority groups—LGT- Even though the persecution of LGTBIQ groups is better BIQ and sex workers—. known (“action against nature” laws and such) they have Moreover, feminist movements have remark- also been used to discipline women (for example, the law ably joined forces with LGBTIQ communities in that includes “insulting a woman’s modesty” and other their analysis and complaint of states’ repressive laws based on morals).

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norms adopted. They are constantly working on prise almost 62% of the parliament. Additionally, getting countries who have not yet done so (a mi- countries that have just come out of a situation nority) to sign and/or ratify fundamental frame- of conflict have tended to establish quotas and works such as the Maputo Protocol—a protocol other affirmative action measures (Tripp, 2017). added to the African Charter on Human and Peo- The case of Sudan, after Omar al-Bashir’s ple’s Rights concerning women’s rights—or the downfall in April 2019 and in the middle of an UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms intense transition process, is a live and ongo- of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The ing example not only of female leadership in the priority is to demand that such endorsements whole process, but of the sustained resolution of produce tangible national policies, endowed with Sudanese women activists to access real realms real and sufficient budgets. of negotiation and decision-making and to pro- It is complicated to address in this limited mote fundamental legislative changes that will space all the areas in which those entities are protect their rights. working. There is a myriad of actions and cam- Women were leaders at the protests that re- paigns that have focused on advancing and pro- sulted in Omar al-Bashir’s downfall (Gaafar and tecting women’s rights, especially in those areas Shawkat, 2019). An iconic image of this reality is with a substantial impact on women’s lives, in- the picture taken three days before Al-Bashir’s cluding economic inclusion, labour rights, the discharge on April 11th 2019, when Alaa Salah, status of domestic work and the misleadingly standing on the bonnet of a car, rallied the crowd called informal economy, access to land, or of protesters with her singing, and the crowd sexual and reproductive health. For example, cheered back chanting Kandaka, in reference there are two areas in which mobilisations have to the old Nubian queens8. Sudanese women been singularly relevant in recent years: access mobilised, organised and actively participated to effective political representation with effec- in the peaceful demonstrations, and performed tive legislative power, which we can see through activities of identification and condemnation of the transitional process in Sudan after Omar al- abuses by police officers during the regime’s re- Bashir’s downfall in 2019, and the fight against pressive charges. They became a specific target sexual and gender violence against women and of the regime’s repression, through a systematic girls, which we will see through the examples of campaign of intimidation, abuse, and sexual and mobilisations in Uganda and South Africa. gender violence during the arrests, as part of a deliberate strategy9 to impede their participation. Activists’ attention has focused on guaran- The struggle for political representation in Sudan: teeing that the transitional momentum enables the unfinished revolution them to advance gender justice on the whole, and in two areas in particular: ending violence and A paradigmatic objective for African activists is gaining access to decision-making positions that can guarantee the protection and the effective 8 As Sebastián Ruiz-Cabrera points out in his chapter in promotion of women’s rights in a broad sense. As this report, “Political resistance in Africa through art: a a matter of fact, African women have been exem- means of expression of today’s social activism”. 9 plary on this issue, having been at the forefront We are referring to an intentional use of sexual terror: threats of rape, actual rapes, abuses and reported ha- since the mid-1990s. 30% of Tanzania’s parlia- rassment aimed at blackmailing them based on morals ment is made up of women, 31% in the case of and reputation. “They tried to use rape to silence women Burundi, 32% in Uganda, 39% in both Mozam- protesters. It didn’t work”, CNN, May 17th, 2019. Retrieved bique and Angola, 45% in South Africa, and in from: edition.cnn.com/2019/05/17/africa/sudan-pro- the well-known case of Rwanda women com- tests-asequals-intl/index.html

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control over women’s lives, which were strictly none of their nominees had been chosen despite regulated through laws and legal rulings based their high qualifications—and they called for on Islamic law; and to ensure their effective po- women to mobilise. This also triggered their on- litical representation and participation in the line response, via the cybercampaign #50Wom- emerging institutions and in every stage of the enCampaign. transitional process, including the peace process. Finally, in the constitutional agreement The complexity of the process that began after reached on August 4th 2019 and signed on the al-Bashir’s downfall has meant that women’s or- 17th between the TMC and the FFC, it was stipu- ganisations need to stay vigilant in order to guar- lated that the Sovereign Council that was going to antee their inclusion. The civil negotiating team govern the country over the following three years versus the Transitional Military Council (TMC) would be made up of 11 members, 5 military and was made up of members of the broad coalition 6 civilian, of which two would be women, an in- led by the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) sufficient number from the standpoint of feminist movement, the main opposition alliance, which organisations’ perspective. They also complained includes over twenty other coalitions, organisa- that in the Cabinet of Ministers, with 18 members tions and civilian networks and opposition par- named by the FFC and 2 by the TMC, women only ties that had led the actions during the revolts. led 4 ministries: foreign affairs, youth and sports, Among these were MANSAM (Sudan’s Women, higher education, and labour and social affairs. Political and Civil Groups), a coalition for wom- The agreement also stipulated that women must en’s rights made up of 176 feminist organisations, hold 40% of the seats in the legislative body. political groups and other women’s associations The inclusion of women in the peace process, and individuals, as well as the organisations No according to UN Resolution 1325 on women, to Women’s Oppression Initiative and the historic peace and security, is another demand made by Sudanese Women’s Union. these groups, and one of the priorities of the tran- In April 2019, the women’s movements sitional government. On September 11th, 2019, launched an official statement, the Sudanese the government signed a peace plan with the ma- Women’s Declaration For Change No. (1)10, in jority of armed groups in the regions in conflict: which they demanded parity in the transition Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. process and government, together with meas- Following the 1989 coup and the establish- ures in favour of geographic and ethnic repre- ment of an Islamic government, there was a sig- sentation. When the negotiations began in early nificant change of priorities in debates among July, they protested the exclusion of women and, activists regarding women’s rights. The previous after strong influential actions, they managed centrality of rights linked to the public sphere— to get a woman into the eight-person negotiat- political and economic participation or access to ing team. Similarly, when the Sovereign Council education, for example—gave way to rights con- and the Cabinet of Ministers was later proposed, sidered as pertaining to the private sphere—child they raised awareness about the low female rep- marriages, female genital mutilation, freedom resentativeness. They demanded an equal share and independence from male guardianship, etc.— of positions of responsibility11—complaining that due to the urgency caused by the characteristics of the regime (Al Nagar and Tonnessen, 2017). Under the Islamic government, the inclusion 10 � The statement can be read here: www.el-karama.org/ of women in politics, their education and their news/sudanese-women-are-right-to-demand-parity-in- access to the labour market were viewed in a the-transition 11 � In 2010, the activists had achieved the implementation of a 25% quota of representatives in parliament. positions of less responsibility or in their limited ability However, they are often marginalised when it comes to to exert influence.

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somewhat positive light, as long as it was done Cyberactivism and mobilisations to stop Gender-Based with modesty and in compliance with established Violence moral precepts. However, various laws were passed that distinctly punished and restricted Violence against women and girls is multifaceted. women’s freedom in realms that were consid- It includes both physical and psychological vio- ered private, based on male tutelage as the or- lence that impact their full enjoyment of human ganisational principle in the family (qawama). An rights, ranging from forced child marriages or example of this is the 1991 Muslim Family Law FGM14, the violation of their right to healthcare or Personal Status Law, which regulates fam- and reproductive care, sexual harassment, physi- ily matters such as marriage, divorce, custody cal and sexual violence more broadly, to femi- of minors and hereditary matters, but does not cides. Due to its ability to mobilise, its strategies contemplate the violation of women’s rights on and its scale, ranging from local action to conti- issues such as child marriage, and has only re- nental networks, activism against sexual violence cently criminalised Female Genital Mutilation at and femicide, and activism to end violence and a national level12. harassment against women more generally, have A major triumph of feminist activism in Sudan, taken up all the work of activist groups in recent once the former al-Bashir cabinet was dissolved, years, in a display of their remarkable dynamism has been the revocation of the 1996 Morality and and ability to mobilise. Campaigns and calls to Public Order Law, which, among other things, action have been characterised by a considerable regulated women’s public presence, how they online component, as well as by their intersec- dressed and behaved, and caused dozens of arbi- tional approach. trary arrests, physical punishment and the denial Feminist activism in Africa has been lifted by of women’s freedom of speech and association. the convening power and coordination of social This constitutes a significant advance, as a result media: feminist cyberactivism has been charac- of decades of work by Sudanese women activists, terised, among other things, by its potential to but there are still numerous discriminatory hin- identify common themes and to synchronise drances in the criminal code as a whole.13 There- debates, coordinate actions and, most of all, fore, Sudanese women’s movements continue broaden its activist base. Through national, re- to fight for other issues such as amending the gional, and continental outreach, it connects mentioned Personal Status Law or the sections these movements to global digital activisms, to of the penal code that limit women’s autonomy such an extent that violence has moved to the and freedom. They are also pressuring the gov- digital sphere. ernment to align the national legislation with in- In addition to the global campaigns that have ternational women’s rights standards, as Sudan made reports of sexual harassment and abuse has not yet ratified essential tools in this regard, go viral, such as #MeToo, in Africa there has been such as the Maputo Protocol or the CEDAW. a broad range of actions aimed at voicing com-

12 � Sudan’s current transitional government amended on 14 � We will not get into this issue due to length limitations. April 22, 2020, article 141 of the country’s penal code. The Needless to say, there has been extensive work by African text was in contradiction with Children’s Law, to the detri- activists on this matter, from their constant fight for leg- ment of the latter. FGM had previously been criminalized islative reforms to their pressure on religious and tradi- in some regions of the country. tional leaders. See, for example, the First African Summit 13 � To review the legislation: UNDP, “Sudan. Gender jus- on FGM and Child Marriages held last June, where a fatwa tice and the law”, 2018. Retrieved from: sudan.unfpa. was achieved that prohibited FGM and set the minimum org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Sudan%20Country%20 age for marriage at 18, issued by Salah Abbas, Gran Imam Assessment%20-%20English.pdf of Al Ahzar.

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plaints by sexual or gender violence survivors based Violence, or the creation of specific follow- (#Nopiwouma—I won’t be quiet—in Senegal; up mechanisms. The campaign was replicated in #AmINext in South Africa), connecting local and different parts of the continent, such as Kenya, regional activist groups and, mainly, breaking the where the call for a #TotalShutDownKE included silence about a violence that tends to be concealed demands concerning LGBTIQ rights and the dec- by shame (#BeingFemaleInNigeria). Above all, laration of national emergency over violence. they have sought to introduce this violence into The intersectional nature in the South African the public debate and into the political agenda. case is even more significant because young femi- In the past few years, we have witnessed an nist activists are proposing a radical revision of the unprecedented proliferation of women’s dem- legacy of colonial violence that reveals the deep onstrations, rallies and strikes against sexual fractures in today’s society, as well as the intercon- and gender violence. In Uganda, the Women’s nection among different kinds of violence that run March on June 30th 201815, the first of its kind, through it in terms of race, class, gender, sexual managed to mobilise a significant number of identity, disability, and other areas of oppression. people against sexual and gender violence un- Previous campaigns such as #EndRapeCulture, der the motto #WomenLivesMatterUg16 or #Wo- launched by students against the high rates of mensMarchUg. This protest demanded from sexual violence in university environments, had the government and the security forces specific already achieved large mobilisations aimed at measures and tools to stop a series of particu- promoting legal and institutional policy reforms. larly crude murders that, since late May 2017, had caused at least 43 victims. It also asked society on the whole to stop violence against women and Stella Nyanzi’s radical rudeness, or rudeness put an end to impunity. This march, like those as a strategy against patriarchy and authoritarianism organised in South Africa, Kenya, or other parts of the continent throughout 2018 and 2019, in- The case of Ugandan scholar and activist Dr. cluded the organisational participation of LGB- Stella Nyanzi is compelling because it exempli- TIQ groups—persecuted by the Yoweri Museveni fies the current adaptation and combination government—and of sex workers. of strategies, the use of subversive anticolonial The case of South Africa—one of the countries practices, and the potential of online tools. Dr. with the highest rates of sexual violence in the Nyanzi, a researcher appointed by the Makerere world—has been paradigmatic. In 2018, wom- Institute of Social Research (MISR) at the Univer- en’s movements organised a strike that spread sity of Makerere, in Uganda, is one of the most vis- across the country, under the motto #TheTotal- ible activists in her country. She has been subject ShutDown, “my body, not your crime scene”. The to several arrests, the latest in November 2018, protesters put together 24 claims to demand the being freed in February 20th 202017. In 2016, she implementation of a comprehensive strategy denounced what she considered the patriarchal through specific measures, including the creation mode of operation of the MISR and its director, of a National Plan Against Sexual and Gender- the renowned academic Mahmood Mamdani, in a dispute about the use of her office and the time allocated for teaching and researching. Nyanzi ul- 15 � Murias, C.: “Y las ugandesas dijeron basta”, Pikara Ma- gazine, July 23rd 2018. Retrieved (in Spanish) from: www. pikaramagazine.com/2018/07/y-las-ugandesas-dijeron- 17 � Nyanzi remained in custody until her trial in August basta/ 2019, when she was sentenced to 18 months in prison, 16 � In a clear reference to the Black Lives Matter protests in and later released in February 2020. The Supreme Court the USA, which proves the undeniable global connection revoked her sentence alleging that her right to a fair trial among African feminist movements. was not respected during the proceedings.

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timately locked herself up in her office and, when she was sent to the maximum-security prison of she was about to be evicted, took her clothes off Luzira. in front of those present, including the media, This behaviour and the use of such tech- while she uttered sexual language and insults at niques, which she would call “radical rudeness”20, the director. is no coincidence. Nyanzi, who is a feminist activ- In 2017, Nyanzi launched the girls’ rights ist for women’s rights, LGBTIQ rights and against campaign #Pads4GirlsUg against the high rate of authoritarianism, and a medical anthropologist, school absenteeism18 among girls—estimated be- is aware of the roots and analyses of power that tween 10% and 30%—due to menstruation, in or- underly these actions. These strategies go back der to offer information and materials on hygiene to women’s anticolonial resistance during the and periods. This was after the Minister of Educa- 1940s, when they confronted colonial power tion, Janet Museveni—the president’s wife—an- through nudity and insults in order to expose the nounced that she would break the promise she power inequity concealed behind the norms of had made during the 2016 electoral campaign to morality and good manners. These techniques provide such materials to girls. Nyanzi is a vocal have continued to be used as a form of resistance, opponent of the current president. Having al- not only in Uganda but throughout the continent. ready participated in numerous actions against Her attacks against power are usually articulated the corruption and nepotism of the regime, she in an intentionally vulgar way, including insults wrote on her social media a series of attacks and and explicit sexual language. Feminist academic offensive rhymes using obscene language aimed Sylvia Tamale21 contextualises the subversive at the president and the minister, whom she intent of using one’s body as a political artefact, called an “airhead”. The activist was then arrested and the potential of vulgarity as a way to disrupt and accused of cyber-harassment and offensive the “moral normality” of one’s own patriarchal communication, which triggered a campaign in cultural codes and those of the Victorian morals her support called #PairOfButtocks (an insult she that still permeate both Ugandan society and its had used against Museveni). She was released af- legal system. ter one month. With these charges still pending, The context of growing repression in the on Museveni’s 74th birthday, in September 2018, country is key to understanding Nyanzi’s atti- Nyanzi published a poem on her social media, in tude. Throughout the past decade, the Ugandan which she wished he had been stillborn and, using state has increased its enforcement of repressive insults and rude language, reiterated what a curse measures, whether it be by passing laws such as he was for the country. In August 2019, when her the 2013 Public Order Law, by limiting freedom of trial was finally held, she once again became partially naked as she was sentenced to 18 months 9th, 2019. Retrieved from: https://africanarguments. in prison for the same charges19. In November, org/2019/07/09/stella-nyanzi-rude-vagina-poem-writing- hero-uganda-needs/” africanarguments.org/2019/07/09/ 18 � Although percentages vary depending on the study, all stella-nyanzi-rude-vagina-poem-writing-hero-uganda- data indicates menstruation creates obstacles for girls needs/ and teenagers’ regular school attendance.. See Miiro et 20 � Nyanzi borrows the term radical rudeness from a previ- al.: “Menstrual health and school absenteeism among ous study by historian Carol Summers, published in 2006. adolescent girls in Uganda (MENISCUS): a feasibility See: Summers, C.: “Radical Rudeness: Ugandan Social study”, BMC Women’s Health, no. 18, 2018, p. 4. Retrieved Critiques in the 1940s”, Journal of Social History, vol. 39, from: no. 3, (spring 2006), 741-770. menstrualhygieneday.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/ 21 � Transcript of the speech given at Makerere University Miiro_MenstrualHealthAbsentism_Uganda_2018.pdf on October 28th, 2016. Available at: Tamale, S.: “Nudity, 19 � Kagumire, R.: “Stella Nyanzi: The rude vagina-poem- Protest and the Law in Uganda”, Feminist Africa, no. 22, writing hero Uganda needs”, African Arguments, July 2017, pp. 52-86.

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speech and of the press, or laws limiting the right to groups that were mostly absent in the 1995 of association as well as NGOs and other grass- Declaration, such as sex workers, human rights roots organisations’ ability to carry out actions, defenders or individuals with a non-heteronor- such as the NGO Law passed in 2017. These state mative sexual orientation or gender identity22. attacks are primarily aimed at minority groups As to current courses of action, feminist agen- and women, with regressive proposals such as das point out the challenges posed by the climate the 2014 Law Against Pornography, nicknamed emergency and its specific impacts on gender. the “anti-skirt law”, which inspected women’s They are also intensifying work to promote the bodies, enabling the whipping of those dressed application of UN Resolution 1325 on women, in a supposedly inappropriate manner. Feminist peace, and security, ensuring the effective -in activists responded by launching an online cam- clusion of women in every phase of conflict and paign through the hashtag #MyDressMyChoice, post-conflict. Other ongoing intersectional work which was followed in neighbouring countries. has to do with resistance to the global neocon- Nyanzi has been able to call out the state and servative trend as well as against the persistence encourage a social discussion around freedom of certain cultural and social norms linked to tra- of speech and the state’s authoritarian tendency. dition or religion, especially regarding sexual and After the first reactions to her “insolence”, she reproductive rights. successfully triggered a debate questioning the The current crisis caused by the COVID-19 legitimacy of the Museveni government and re- pandemic undoubtedly has specific impacts on vealed the extent to which he is willing to repress gender. Activists have already pointed out that dissidence or to misuse the institutions to silence lockdown measures pose challenges in terms criticism. What is interesting about the example of sexual and reproductive health and GBV, and of Nyanzi, besides the combination of traditional in terms of the potential deepening of the femi- strategies and contemporary tools, is her use of nization of poverty due to the inability to carry eminently feminist techniques to advance social out productive activities, and to an increase in justice for the common good, with the clear po- women’s workload as caregivers. litical objective of disrupting power structures The growing expansion of social media as a that allow the regime to endure. fundamental means for mobilising and organising, and the relentless work at both institutional and grassroots level, make African feminism a Conclusions cross-cutting tool to achieve global social justice.

African feminisms have a robust genealogy that has allowed them to sustain demands for gender References equality and against violence against women on their own terms, and according to the priorities Ahikire, J.: “African feminism in context: Reflec- in their socio-cultural contexts. At the same time, tions on the legitimation battles, victories and they have been leaders in defining the agenda of reversals”, Feminist Africa, no. 19, 2014, pp. 7-23. actions globally for decades. Al Nagar, S. and Tonnessen, L.: “Women’s rights The year 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of and the women’s movement in Sudan (1952- the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Plat- 2014)”. In: B. Badri and A. Mari Tripp (eds.), form for Action. In addition to ongoing demands for the implementation and strengthening of 22 � IWHC: “Beijing+25: Young Feminists Set Agenda at Afri- the agreements reached at that time in terms of ca Regional Meeting”. Retrieved from: iwhc.org/2020/02/ political representation, fight against GBV, etc., beijing25-young-feminists-set-agenda-at-africa-region- feminists have broadened the subjects of law al-meeting/

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Women’s activism in Africa, ZedBooks, Lon- October 10th, 2018. Retrieved from: www. don, 2017, pp. 121-155. pikaramagazine.com/2018/10/de-josina- Amadiume, I.: Male daughters, female husbands. machel-a-enia-lipanga-del-mozambique- Gender and sex in an African society, Zed- revolucinario-a-la-agitacion-cultural/ Books, London, 1987. Oyěwùmí, O.: The invention of women. Making Bauer. G., Darkwah, A, and Patterson, D.: “Wom- an African sense of western gender discourses, en and Post-Independence African Politics”, University of Minnesota, Minnesota, 1997. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African Pereira, C.: “Feminists Organising. Strategy, Voice, history, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Power”, Feminist Africa, no. 22, 2017, pp. 16-29. December 2017. Retrieved from: https:// Summers, C.: “Radical Rudeness: Ugandan Social oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/ Critiques in the 1940s”, Journal of Social His- acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore- tory, vol. 39, no. 3, spring 2006, pp. 741-770. 9780190277734-e-202 Tamale, S.: “African Feminism: How should we Gaafar, R. and Shawkat, O.: “Las mujeres su- change?”, Development, vol. 49, no. 1, 2006, danesas, en el corazón de la revolución”, Af- pp. 38-41. ricaye, March 5th, 2019. Retrieved from: www. Tamale, S.: “Nudity, Protest and the Law in Ugan- africaye.org/las-mujeres-sudanesas-en-el- da”, Feminist Africa, no. 22, 2017, pp. 52-86. corazon-de-la-revolucion/ Tripp, A. M. and Badri, B.: “African influences on Gyamfi Asiedu, K.: “África ha olvidado a las lide- global women’s rights: an overview”. In: B. resas de sus luchas por la independencia”, Af- Badri and A. M. Tripp (eds.), Women’s activism ricaye, June 18th, 2019. Retrieved from: www. in Africa, ZedBooks, London, 2017, pp. 121- africaye.org/africa-ha-olvidado-a-las-lidere- 155. sas-de-sus-luchas-por-la-independencia/ Tripp, A. M.: “Women and Politics in Africa”, Ox- Henríquez, A. and Murias, Celia. “Afrifem”, Afri- ford Research Encyclopedia of African His- caye, March 8th, 2017. Retrieved from: www. tory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, July africaye.org/afrifem/ 2017. Retrieved from: https://oxfordre. Mama, A.: “Demythologising Gender in Develop- com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acre- ment: Feminist studies in African Contexts”, fore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore- IDS Bulletin vol. 35, no. 4, 2004, pp. 121-124. 9780190277734-e-192 Murias, C. and Caeiro, S.: “De Josina Machel a Unesco: “Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti And The Enia Lipanga. Del Mozambique revolucion- Women’s Union of abeokuta”, UNESCO Series ario a la agitación cultural”, Pikara Magazine, on Women in African History, 2014.

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Sebastián Ruiz-Cabrera

Six decades after many African countries gained for a change of structures after signing their new their independence, artistic expressions, be them constitutions, raising new flags and expelling co- poetry, music, theatre, photography, or painting, still lonists. The political paths that were initiated to occupy an exceptional place in understanding poli- demand new social contracts were diverse, some tical mobilisation on the continent and analysing it of them violent, and others—most of them—si- from an unconventional perspective. A variable that lent and persistent. They all pursued the well- Cameroonian professor Francis Nyamnjoh (2005, being of their peoples. 2010) has analysed in his work, indicating the need Sixty years after the proclamation of indepen- to highlight the importance of African creativity. dence of 17 African countries in 1960, the scene Today, historical dynamics are fused with new of resistances to power has changed. In Africa, visual narratives that are used and dissemina- literature that addresses the focal points of this ted owing to the multiplying effect of platforms social resistance against clientelist policies, the such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram corruption of leading elites, or foreign interferen- or WhatsApp, although we must not forget that ce in domestic affairs, is prolific. However, the -ar the Internet Penetration Rate on the African tistic variable understood as a ground-breaking continent is, in absolute terms, 39.3%, and that element that has served these fights from below users in early 2020 make up less than 11.5% of the has hardly been taken into account, even though world1. As this chapter analyses with examples in some cases it has had an unprecedented im- from South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda pact, and has contributed to social mobilisation, and Tanzania, this artivism—a neologism made forcing changes of governments and laws. up of the words art and activism popularised by The actual context in which a protest takes American critic Nina Felshin (1996)—draws atten- place is what triggers a boost in ingenuity for tion to existing creativity to develop new forms of activists to avoid prison, evade abusive fines or protest and infringe on censorship or repression. even escape death in certain countries on the continent. In other words, the dilemma between “protesting or dying” accelerates the renovation Creative protest as a transgression of resistance techniques in order to avoid puni- tive means by a power when it sees itself under The 1960s marked an historic moment in the threat. political, economic and social configuration of Martin Luther King expressed this in 1960 the African continent. The new states yearned when he planned his roadmap for “creative protest” in a context of struggle by civil rights mo- 1 Data collected from the website https://www.internet- vements in the United States. A concept South worldstats.com/. Consulted on 17 April, 2020. African Nomusa Makhubu still employs for her

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social analysis of South Africa, describing it as for 15 minutes in the morning and 15 minutes at follows: “Creative protests widen the space of night to protest President Déby’s intention of sta- contention, uncover the normalized violence ying in power for another term. entrenched in the logic of improvement dis- Music is, however, one of the artistic expres- tricts and engage with the continued erasure of sions that have been used most to confront politi- people’s histories.” (Makhubu, 2017:1) In other cians. Three recent examples in West Africa could words, when confronted with the question, serve to illustrate this. The first of them is the Se- “What forms of protest does society find against negalese group Y’en A Marre (Enough is Enough) the oppression of a certain government?”, the which, together with the country’s hip hop scene, first thing is to draw attention to injustices and contributed to ending Abdoulaye Wade’s presi- to make them attractive to society by using the dency in 2012. The second, in 2013, had to do resources available for this purpose. with the creation of a group made up of about One of the most interesting actions in this re- forty Malian musicians led by female artist Fatou- gard took place in Liberia in 2003. After 14 years of mata Diawara, who united against the imposition war, Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace orga- of sharia law by jihadists in the north of Mali. As nised a sex strike to demand the end of the conflict. if following a domino effect, the third action took Another creative protest developed in the summer place in Burkina Faso in 2014. The organisation of 2013, when thousands of people in Cotonou, the Le Balai Citoyen (The Citizen’s Broom), also made seat of the Benin government, decided to dress up of hip hop musicians, helped to achieve so- in red every Wednesday. The goal was to protest mething unthinkable: bringing down the Blaisé against the possibility proposed by the country’s Campaoré regime after 27 years in power.2 Music president, Yayi Boni, of modifying the Constitution and visual media, as a means of expression by the to remain in power for one more term. people, are being persecuted more than ever by By September, this initiative, known as the certain governments, due to their inherent ability Mercredi Rouge (Red Wednesday) movement, had to spread instantly via social media. Some artists managed to get amendments proposed by the have given their work explicitly political content opposition and civil society that rejected Boni’s in order to promote mobilisation against the op- political manoeuvre to be given lead to proceed pression of some governments and to defend at the Supreme Court. What is particularly inter- political change. And they do so by addressing esting about these demonstrations is the use of issues such as peace building, climate change, colour as a rebellious political element, as it is sexual diversity or governance. harder for authorities to prohibit it. Similarly, in Chad, during the pre-campaign of the 2016 elections, hundreds of activists came South Africa: street art as a response to inequality together under the coalition Enough is Enough to push back against President Idriss Déby’s aim of During apartheid, South African music and running for a fifth term in April of that year. Their theatre were essential to dodge censorship and first initiative, which took place in February, was create a political awareness among black socie- called Villes mortes (“dead cities”), and had a con- ty (Coplan, 1985). The same is true for poster siderable following; markets and shops stayed closed and traffic decreased. One month later, 2 For the cases of Senegal and Burkina Faso, see: Bajo on March 10th, the sifflet citoyen (“citizen whist- Erro, C.: “Nuevos movimientos sociales para una nueva le”) was called for through the following state- democracia”. In: E. Aimé González e I. Domínguez de Olaz- ment: “With your citizen whistle, you become the abal (eds.), Informe África 2019. Dinámicas transfronteri- referee of change.” The goal of this initiative was zas en un contexto globalizado. Fundación Alternativas, for people to blow whistles from their balconies Madrid, 2019, pp. 11-21.

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printing, through images that encouraged resis- a temporary street installation, but as a proposal tance against the racist policies of the Afrikaner to transform society. government in impoverished neighbourhoods in A similar type of protest via art is that of the Johannesburg and Cape Town during the 1970s group Xcollectiv, which defines itself as: “…a crea- and 1980s. Thirty years after the end of apartheid, tive incubator for collaborative multi-disciplinary artivism still prevails in South Africa, one of the projects by visual artists, writers, filmmakers and most unequal countries in the world (World Bank, performers who are exploring issues of dispos- 2018). session, trauma, memory and resistance through Political action through art by Tokolos Sten- their work. Our aim is to facilitate and initiate pro- cils and Xcollectiv, two groups founded in 2012 by jects that pose questions and draws attention to anonymous members, is an example of artivism issues; and to connect to ordinary lives through in Cape Town. They have pointed to the norma- public creative processes.” 3 lisation of violence in certain slums, as well as On April 11, 2020, through a video made in the the accelerated processes of gentrification that context of the COVID-19 pandemic, they denoun- contribute to maintaining a quasi-apartheid re- ced the city council’s actions of relocating all the gime in terms of space and geography. It is a city homeless people who had settled in areas inhabi- that is described by mainstream media as the ted by white population.4 “The councillors in the- African tourist attraction par excellence, and has se areas are under pressure from their ratepayers been planned by a white society that controls the to do so. Now under the COVID-19 lockdown they centres of economic power, displacing the black are putting it in place.” Titled “Welcome to Cape population to the suburbs. Town”, the video shows images of the touristic One of the methods of protest and reclaim part of the city in contrast with pictures of people used by the Tokolos Stencils group to denounce crammed into tents combined with pictures of the segregation experienced in Cape Town has Nazi concentration camps. been graffiti. Their actions at tourist spots in the These artistic manifestations in South Afri- city have had such a repercussion in local media ca are a response ‘from below’. Since its birth in that they have been utilised to reinforce “the neo- February 2013, the South African group Burning liberal campaign of the Cape Town Partnership Museum has been questioning museums’ ap- Central City Improvement District to sustain Cape propriation of the interpretation of history. For Town as a creative city” (Makhubu, 2017). In other them, actions in the street are their reaction to words, artistic transgression has been integrated the system: “Street art is particularly effective as a positive element by urban planners to give because the canvas is a city’s architecture. Just the impression of a democratic, plural, cosmo- as billboards affect people subliminally, by inter- politan city. vening on the city’s architecture, we can insert This kind of artivism is not commercial, as ourselves and our work in people’s everyday, or Makhubu states: “I am pointing to a creative not so everyday, routines,” explained Justin Davy, practice that does not aim at visual excitement, one of the group members, in an interview for the nor a meditative ‘art’, aesthetically pleasing and appealing. Rather, it confronts and frustrates the apparently unbreakable, unchangeable urban ca- 3 More information can be found on their Facebook page: pitalist machine through interventions that use https://www.facebook.com/pg/xcollektiv/about/?ref= page_internal artistic means to reach political ends, instead of 4 The video was posted on YouTube on April 11, 2020, using political issues to achieve artistic ends” in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. https://www. (Makhubu, 2017). In this sense, the foundational youtube.com/watch?v=8aluQXSn0kg&feature=share- rules of Tokolos Stencils are proposed, not so &fbclid=IwAR1tH9ZhAXVn0phBYlbVtXzgCWhHc1m0SQV much as a traditional contemporary art form or hkAlpyuUadwwYrJb8UijAENo

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El País newspaper5. One of their actions that had of black feminism and an inspiration to the new the most media coverage was painting graffiti on generation of writers worldwide) have been able the coaches of the train that connects the city to combine their roles as artists and activists. At centre to the outskirts. With this protest action, different points in history, all of them have turned they intended to turn around the actual imaginary their writings, translated into several Nigerian that exists about the idea or convention of what languages, into tools of pressure. should be shown at the museums in Cape Town. Another one of the most famous cases in which The forms of artivism that can be seen in South Nigerian artivism almost destabilised the political Africa are partly a response to the high levels of system involved musician and father of afrobeat inequality inherited from apartheid policies that Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, better known as Fela Kuti. In marginalised most of the black population from the 1970s and 1980s, Kuti proclaimed that “music economic opportunities. For this reason, the is the weapon”. He did not want to merely be part symbolic forms of historical reparation through of the entertainment industry. His music was poli- artivism “have opened a series of new narratives tics, with a strong element of opposition to policies together with previously marginalised stories and implemented in his country (Sithole, 2012:1-2). images for a better future.” (Minty, 2006, p.438). Through hypnotic percussion and a frenetic brass Young people between the ages of 18 and 34 section, his aim was to show his anti-capitalist, make up almost a third of the South African po- anti-colonialist, provocateur side on stage. pulation6, and they are the ones who are leading Kuti, who passed away in the late 1990s, li- the expressions of creative protest against high ved through a period that coincided with urban unemployment rates, lack of safety, and social in- development in Nigeria’s cities, accelerated by justice. The theatres they use for their performan- oil profits and the intense pressure of rural mi- ces are mainly streets, walls, or urban furniture, grants who were looking for new opportunities in because it is through these architectural enclaves Lagos or Abuja. Back then, artivism in literature that they can raise their protest actions and reach or music focused on highlighting bad post-inde- a larger audience. pendence management, the misappropriation of public funds, or the corruption that led to several armed conflicts in the country. Today, those cities Nigeria: the audiovisual virus that have grown exponentially, and that demonstrate the disparities between rich and poor, are With a population of 190 million people accor- the stage for Nigerian artivists’ performances. ding to the latest UN estimations, Nigeria pre- In light of this situation, Port Harcourt, a city sents itself to the media as the first economy of in the region of the Niger delta where oil extrac- the continent, ahead of South Africa, and as one tion plants are located, is seeing the development of the major crude oil exporters of Africa. In the of an initiative that brings together efforts by di- field of literature, Chinua Achebe (acknowledged fferent professionals, to raise awareness about as one of the fathers of modern African literatu- one of the problems caused by urban inequality, re), Wole Soyinka (Nobel Prize in 1986), or Chi- through artivism. Cut off from opulence, residents mamanda Ngozi Adichie (who became an icon of the neighbourhood of Njemanze, in the Nige- rian city of Port Harcourt, have been suffering the scourge of evictions since 2009. And to fight them, 5 Anaya, V: “Arquitectura de la ciudad como lienzo de they founded the Collaborative Media Advocacy la memoria histórica” in El País, 16 December, 2015. Re- Platform (CMAP), a group of filmmakers, urban trieved from: https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/12/16/pla- neta_futuro/1450274714_544372.html planners, researchers and city residents who use 6 Data from the South African government. See: http:// art, music and data collection to mobilise people www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12362 affected by this scourge. CMAP began by going to

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low-income communities throughout the city and In the 1980s, Fela Kuti’s message became screening films about the way forced evictions viral through his concerts. Today, in a country affect communities around the world, with the where over 120 million people have access to aim of encouraging debates about how to face the Internet—a penetration rate of 61.2%8—ar- this situation in an organised way (Solés, 2020). tists like Faltz pose a political challenge because Another example that derived from CMAP is of how far-reaching their ideas can become. This community radio Chicoco Studios, where they is why they are quickly censored; their critical work to raise awareness. The radio station pro- messages can have a very quick, viral impact duces and performs songs with local artists to among a young population that faces an uncer- discuss the problems affecting people who live in tain future. marginalised neighbourhoods in the city through music and, moreover, it organises shows for residents in their popular “Sessions at the Shed” Kenya: the art of protest in the street (Solés, 2020). In this case, the power of radio is and on the big screen combined with the power of audiovisual media, because every programme they produce is The heterogeneous artivist scene in Kenya expe- uploaded to platforms such as YouTube or Vimeo. rienced a turning point on May 14, 2013, when One of the most recently publicised examples a group of demonstrators that belonged to the of artivism may be that of rapper, actor and TV PAWA 254 group, led by photographer Boniface host Folarin Falan, known as Faltz. On May 25, Mwangi, were involved in a movement known 2018, he released the clip “This is Nigeria” 7, a pa- as Occupy Parliament. The aim was to protest rody full of political and social criticism. The song against the abusive salary raise for the new gover- sheds light on the challenges the country faces, nment that had just been elected. About 250 pro- in particular the kidnapping by Boko Haram of testors came together to demand an immediate 276 girls in Chibok, Borno State, in April 2014. response. But the methods to show their discon- 112 of them are still in captivity. The kidnapping tent were hardly predictable. PAWA 254 released brought about the birth of the #Bringbackourgirls several pigs at the Parliament entrance with the movement, a Twitter campaign that spread all acronym “(M)Pigs” painted in red on their skin. over the world. The letter M alluded to the word “ministers”, who As Nigeria has one of the highest rates of ac- they associated to “pigs”. cess to mobile telephones and the Internet in This demonstration of artivism drew media Africa, “This is Nigeria” quickly became an im- attention to this group, which defines itself as: portant song in the country’s public opinion due “A space for creatives who meet, network, share to its over 18 million views on YouTube. A viral and collaborate on social impact projects desig- production with which Faltz highlighted the cha- ned to foster social change. PAWA 254 is a hub for llenges that Nigerian society currently faces, such visual creatives in Kenya and the region. PAWA as a youth with no future and access to drugs, po- 254 stands for ‘power’ in Swahili, plus the Kenya litical corruption, civil servant bribery, traditional country code for national unity. The space will magic and, ultimately, rifts in the African giant. bring together established and aspiring pho- Three months after its release in August 2018, tographers, cartoonists, animators, video and the National Broadcasting Commission, the or- filmmakers to work, learn and share in an envi- ganism in charge of regulating television, banned ronment that inspires creativity.” 9 its broadcasting in the country, until today. 8 https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm 7 Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 9 More information can be found on their Facebook page: UW_xEqCWrm0 https://www.facebook.com/PAWA254/

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The genesis of the birth of PAWA 254 happe- work, currently banned in the country, presents ned in December 2009. Mwangi himself decided a variety of stories “intertwining journalistic re- to create Picha Mtaani, a term that literally means porting, political protest and a premeditated, “street photo gallery” in Swahili, and to hold in precious visual architecture. An anthology of seven cities an exhibition of striking photogra- five mini-dramas about the LGTBI community in phs of the post-electoral violence Kenya suffe- urban areas, but also a rural context. The provo- red between December 2007 and February 2008, cation by the group of artists had severe conse- when about 1,200 people died and approximately quences for many of its members, who still prefer 600,000 were forcefully displaced. The goal of this to hide their identity today so as to avoid possible initiative, funded by the United Nations Develop- prosecution under Kenya’s draconian anti-homo- ment Programme (UNDP), was to “create a plat- sexual laws. The executive producer of the pro- form for peace building, national healing and ject, George Gachara, was even arrested briefly cohesion through street picture galleries.” during the filming (Ruiz-Cabrera, 2016). Another successful initiative organised by A year later, after the commotion caused by PAWA 254 was its 2014 campaign “My Dress, My Chuchu’s complaint, an anonymous group of ar- Choice”, also known as the “miniskirt protest”. tists posted on YouTube a video titled Same Love The march, which occupied one of Nairobi’s main (Remix), an allegation in defence of the LGTBI arteries, led to the resignation of the Minister of community in Kenya. As its name implies, the mu- Internal Security and the Inspector General of Po- sic video was inspired by a song by the American lice. In it, over 1,000 women and men protested duo Macklemore and Ryan Lewis. In the Kenyan against the sexual harassment they suffered after version, there are various scenes of homosexual one of them was stripped of her clothes, mugged couples combined with press clips from different and violently attacked while she was travelling on African media outlets where same-sex relations- a public bus. Some passengers recorded the event hips are criminalised. on video and posted them on social media. The In his 2018 article “Citizenship of Love: The Po- impact of this campaign was such that, in 2017, litics, Ethics and Aesthetics of Sexual Citizenship three years after the aggression, a court in the ca- in a Kenyan Gay Music Video”, Klinken wonders pital sentenced the three men who had commit- if a citizenship of love can really be questioned ted the crime to life imprisonment. Moreover, the through art. And this is precisely a question that campaign managed to change legislation in order Kenyan filmmaker Wanuri Kahiu answered in the to protect any person from having their clothes screenplay of her acclaimed film Rafiki (2018). forcibly removed with a ten-year prison sentence. Her work was shown at the Cannes Film Festival, Another battle front of Kenyan artivism has but was banned in Kenya, accused of promoting been that of LGTBI rights. Homosexual relation- lesbianism. The film plot focuses on the friend- ships are still punished in the country with up to ship and love that springs between two young 14 years in prison, as the Supreme Court of Kenya women, but it also portrays the challenges this ratified on May 24, 2019. Through art, there have poses for their respective families, whose parents been different responses and strategies to try to aim to win a seat in Parliament. After an angry draw public opinion to the issue and to get Kenya reaction by audiences in both Kenya and around to become equal to other states such as Angola or the world, this contemporary view of Romeo and Botswana, which decriminalised same-sex rela- Juliet could only be seen for a week in one of the tionships in January and June 2019, respectively. cinemas in the capital. An example of this mobilisation through art Examples of artivism in Kenya are increasingly was the filmStories of our Lives (2015) by director numerous and they reflect several social challen- Jim Chuchu, a member of the The Nest collecti- ges that an especially young population faces. ve, which achieved significant media impact. This Women’s rights, LGTBI rights or raising political

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awareness among citizens are some of the objec- Bashir, has had a positive outcome. One of the tives of these manifestations of creative protest authors of the walls painted with critical messa- that attempt to dodge restrictive laws regarding ges against the regime was Galal Yousif, who sta- freedom of speech. ted: “Art wasn’t just an appendage of the uprising but was at the heart of it. The colour from the paintings created not just energy among people Sudan: from the rebellious wall to the kandaka but also boosted the inspiration for change. The art did a big thing for the revolution. We painted In the past year, Sudan has experienced unpre- on the walls and the ground but we touched the cedented social unrest since Omar al Bashir left hearts” (Latif, 2019). government after three decades in power10. Du- However, protests that had been taking pla- ring the months between December 2018 and ce in the country’s capital since December 2018 April 2019, the social and economic context wor- did not have much international impact until a sened, partly because of the austerity measures 22-year-old female architecture student was pho- implemented to try to avoid an economic crash. tographed in April 2019. The picture, immortali- The emergency plan affected two basic subsidies, sed by Lana Haroun, also a woman, went viral on those of bread and fuel, causing widespread dis- social media. The protagonist, who appears with content in Sudan and originating protests in the her finger pointing to the sky, dressed in white east of the country, which gradually spread all the with golden crescent-shaped earrings while she way to Khartoum. sang a poem, was Alaa Salah. Salah became a During the five months of protests, various ar- symbol for the protestors, who gave her the nic- tistic manifestations managed to convey different kname kandaka, a term used to refer to ancient messages of protest to the population. As New Nubian queens.11 York Times African correspondent Abdi Latif Dahir From the viewpoint of artistic political action, explains: “Artistic expression—be it poetry, mu- the photograph achieves two key things. First, it sic, or paintings—has for decades held an impor- portrays Salah herself as an icon of change, be- tant spot among Sudanese society, particularly cause she was challenging the public order laws during the crucial 1964 and 1985 uprisings. Yet that pushed women into the background and a tapestry of sociopolitical misfortunes, econo- made them invisible through fines and physical mic embargoes, censorship, along with stringent punishment. Second, it shows the role of sung religious edicts under Bashir shattered creative poetry as a social wake-up call, because, through expression, leaving many artists jailed, banned, the verses, the student encouraged demonstra- or exiled” (Latif, 2019). In this sense, the strength tors to resist while the crowded street cheered that Sudanese artivism built up in 2019 fuelled the word thawra (revolution in Arabic) in unison. the resistance and inspired the vast majority of One year after the protests, in December 2019, al- young citizens. Bashir was charged for corruption and sentenced In the Sudanese social uprising, it has beco- to prison for two years. me apparent that the binomial of the virtual (Fa- In a country like Sudan, with its recent history cebook and Twitter) and the real (expression in of oppression, artivism led by young people has the streets), which encouraged the population to presented itself as a radical and necessary expres- dream of politics that were not led by Omar el sion at the time when protests erupted in 2018. Various artists like Galal Yousif, through painting, or activist Alaa Salah, through sung poetry, have 10 Alaminos, M. A.: El levantamiento popular en Sudán (2018-2019): La lucha pacífica por la transformación po- lítica sudanesa. Work document number 98. Fundación 11 � As Celia Murias also mentions in the previous chapter Alternativas, Madrid, 2019. in this report.

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shown that cultural elements that are typical of This musician turned politician’s popularity the region could become weapons against the lies in the power of his songs, which connect to Sudanese government by means of peaceful, young audiences in the country. It also comes creative protest. The use of social media such as from his skilful use of the social channels through Instagram or YouTube, which has played a major which he spreads his messages, challenging an role in the success of their artistic demonstra- obsolete regime. For this reason, “on July 1, 2018, tions, can be decisive for defending freedom of the government instigated a so-called social net- speech in this new social and political stage that work tax, charging Ugandans 200 shillings (about has begun in the region. five cents of dollar) per day to use a package of 60 Internet apps, including WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Even though this fee may Uganda: a war of hats and songs not seem prohibitive, it is still a big structural barrier in a country where 41.7% of people were Two key elements converge in Uganda to unders- living on less than 2 dollars a day in 2018” (Le- tand art as a form of political resistance. Firstly, ver, 2019). This legislative strategy seeks to limit the country’s president, Yoweri Museveni, in the dissemination of Wine’s lyrics and messages, government since February 1986, has managed particularly in rural areas, which are mostly loyal to subdue the opposition through constant re- to Museveni. pression. Museveni’s longevity is a relevant fact However, the strategy by the former singer considering that 78% of the Ugandan population linking the colour red and a military beret to his is under the age of 35 and, thus, has not known particular political career is no coincidence in a any other leader. repressive context such as Uganda’s, where the Secondly, due to the youth of Uganda’s inha- media and its messages are controlled by the bitants, the widespread use of social media, as is state: “Wine’s choice of symbol is befitting. Be- the case in other parts of the continent, is a reali- rets are convenient: they are cheap to produce ty. Traditional political spheres have been trans- and impossible to ignore. The touch of red next formed and debates now go on in virtual spaces to his face makes its way into every photograph. such as Twitter or Facebook. This has enabled Unlike a T-shirt, a cap can easily be put away or the emergence of a rebellious force from digital thrown away during a demonstration without platforms which, in most cases, allow people to indicating immediately that one has taken off an remain anonymous. item of clothing” (Lever, 2019). In October 2019, In this context, a young man named Robert the use of red berets was banned by the Museveni Kyagulanyi Ssentamu appeared almost by sur- Government. prise in 2017 under the stage name Bobi Wine, Wine’s most recent action is related to the and stood as an independent candidate to the effects of COVID-19 in the country. On March 25, country’s Parliament. This rapper, whose fo- Wine released on his social media a music video llowers nicknamed the “King of the Ghetto”, star- to fight the spread of the pandemic, which he ted his career in the 2000s with lyrics containing performed together with another Ugandan mu- notable social criticism, a music genre he him- sician, Nubian Li. The fast success of the song self defined as “educational entertainment”. His “Coronavirus Alert” on YouTube, and its impact stunning rise to the national spotlight and micro- in the international press, contrasted with its pro- phones, as well as his international impact, have hibition by Ugandan authorities. positioned him as one of the main adversaries Uganda faces serious abuses against freedom that Museveni faces to ratify his presidency in the of speech and demonstration, which are silenced 2021 election. In 2019, Wine announced his can- by a government that has been in power for over didacy for the presidency of Uganda. three decades. Most of the population that con-

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fronts it with creative protest actions are young of telling the truth, which was censored for six and connected to the Internet. This may be the months. In November 2019, he posted on YouTu- reason why Bobi Wine has been so successful. be “Anaitwa Roma”, a song for which he received criticism by the Government because of his criticism of Magufuli’s decision to send the military to Tanzania: one-party power against the power of the countryside to mediate the price of cashews musicians with intermediaries. According to his own words, the musician sees himself as “an ambassador, as In 2015, President John Magufuli rose to the pre- the voice of the voiceless, to defend the hardships sidency of Tanzania and took the baton of repre- and the daily struggles of Tanzanian people” (Glo- senting a party with a peculiar history and that is bal Voices, 2019). known not just in East Africa, but on the broader Political oppression also motivated Diamond continent. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the par- Platinumz, one of Africa’s most international mu- ty founded by the father of African socialism, sicians, who made bongo flava (or Tanzanian hip Julius Nyerere, repeated its victory in a contro- hop) popular, to break his silence in order to de- versial election, where differences with opposi- fend freedom of artistic expression for both his tion party Chadema and the increase in Zanzibar colleagues and himself. However, this singer’s pro-independence sensibilities, represented by fame did not serve him as a safe-conduct after the Civic United Front, became apparent. These he published the lyrics of his song “Acha Nikae changes are logical from a historical perspective Kimya”, in which he openly expressed his oppo- because the actual geographical configuration of sition to Tanzanian politics. The government in- the country had changed since the 1970s, when terpreted it as a provocation and he was arrested CCM came to power. under charges of indecent exposure. In late 2018, Even though he presents himself as a refor- he was also banned from performing at a concert mist, Magufuli embodies the continuity of the re- after being warned not to sing “Mwanza” due to gime. He has restricted opposition press and has its sexual content and its criticism of governmen- tried to eliminate possible candidates to the pre- tal hypocrisy. sidential election that will be held in 2020. Among However, the influence of this musician on the abusive measures implemented, some have young Tanzanians goes well beyond his songs. sought to directly attack artists who openly criti- In April 2010, his Instagram profile had 9.2 million cised irregularities in the government. This is the followers, and any of his posts can become viral case of the imprisonment of rapper Emmanuel among a community with a high unemployment Elibariki, known as Nay wa Mitego, who was set rate that is looking for answers and a social es- free, but accused of public disorder after the re- cape route through protest music and the catchy lease of his song in Swahili “Wapo”. In it, senten- sounds of bongo flava. ces such as the following stand out: “Is there still freedom of speech in the country?” or “Who are you now? You don’t want to listen to advice? You Conclusions don’t want any criticism?” His fellow rapper Ibrahim Mussa, known as Six decades after African independences, de- Roma Mkatoliki, had a traumatic experience mands by social movements through artivism when he was kidnapped in his recording studio still continue, although methods of raising in Dar es Salam in April 2017. Still today, the iden- awareness are clearly different. The use of infor- tity of the kidnappers is unknown. A year later, as mation technologies to spread their messages, a response to his experience, he released “Kiba- especially the use of social media such as Insta- mia”, a song in which he expressed the dangers gram, YouTube or Facebook, is one of its charac-

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teristics. The artivists, as well as their audience, Lever, C.: “Politics and fashion: the rise of the belong to a generation that is familiar with the red beret”, The conversation, December 13th, Internet. 2019. Retrieved from: https://theconversa- Due to the speed at which messages against tion.com/politics-and-fashion-the-rise-of- governments are spread, repression is also a rea- the-red-beret-128333 lity that artivists face. Through critical lyrics or Lichtenstein, A.: “Regañan a rapero tanzano por music videos that deviate from the state’s moral letras sobre crisis nacional de cajú”, Global compass, musicians are in the spotlight of the Voices, December 28th, 2019. Retrieved from: governments they confront. https://es.globalvoices.org/2019/12/28/ The different cases explained above reflect reganan-a-rapero-tanzano-por-letras-sobre- how groups of people and movements that are crisis-nacional-de-caju/ traditionally ignored by the media find, in the Makhubu, N.: “Changing the city after our heart’s combination of art and activism, new and more desire: Creative protest in Cape Town”, Jour- effective formulas for social transformation. And nal of Postcolonial Writing, vol. 53, no. 6, 2017, the meeting point for the effervescence of creative pp. 686-699. protests is African cities. From these cities, which Minty, Z.: “Post-Apartheid Public Art in Cape Town: are growing at an exponential pace, many young Symbolic Reparations and Public Space”, Ur- people, both anonymous and well-known, are ban Studies, vol. 43, no. 2, 2006, pp. 421-440. trying to change the narratives concerning success Nyamnjoh, F. B.: “Racism, ethnicity and the media and the benefits of tourism, excessive building, in Africa: reflections inspired by studies of xeno- the effects of gentrification or high unemploy- phobia in Cameroon and South Africa”, Afrika ment rates among the young population. Spectrum, vol. 45, no. 1, 2010, pp. 57-93. Voices that have been marginalised until now Nyamnjoh, F. B.: Africa’s media, democracy and have found openings where they can draw at- the politics of belonging, Zed Books, New tention to their experiences without ambitions York, 2005. or rewards beyond securing themselves a place Sithole, T.: “Fela Kuti and the oppositional lyrical in history through painting, music, film, poetry, power”, Muziki, vol. 9, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-12. graffiti, or whatever means of expression they Solés, G.: “El derecho a la ciudad en África sub- may come across. sahariana”, Africaye, January 14th, 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.africaye.org/ derecho-ciudad-vivienda-africa/ References The World Bank: Overcoming Poverty and Inequa- lity in South Africa: An Assessment of Drivers, Coplan, D.: In township tonight!: South Africa›s Constraints and Opportunities, The World black city music and theatre, Ravan Press, Jo- Bank, Washington, DC, 2018. Retrieved from: hannesburg, 1985. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ Felshin, N.: But is it art?: The spirit of art as acti- en/530481521735906534/pdf/124521-REV- vism, Bay Press, Seattle, 1996. OUO-South-Africa-Poverty-and-Inequality- Latif, A.: “Sudan’s street protests have inspi- Assessment-Report-2018-FINAL-WEB.pdf red another revolution—in art”, Quartz Afri- Van, K. A.: “Citizenship of Love: The Politics, ca, July 12th, 2019. Retrieved from: https:// Ethics and Aesthetics of Sexual Citizenship in qz.com/africa/1664733/sudans-protests-ins- a Kenyan Gay Music Video”, Citizenship Stu- pire-art-graffiti-revolution/ dies, vol. 22, no. 6, 2018, pp. 650-665.

informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 80 10/11/20 9:39 7. The multiple facets of forgotten conflicts in Africa: the Central African Republic and Western Sahara

Irene Fernández-Molina and Enrica Picco

Introduction Precisely, to offer an account of the extent and the heterogeneity of these conflicts, or of how wi- This chapter discusses the multiple facets of despread the oblivion is, this chapter contrasts what are often described as “forgotten conflicts” the diametrically different cases of the Central with the aim of raising awareness. The term is African Republic and Western Sahara. On one commonplace in humanitarian language related hand, Centrafrique has been shaken, ever since to Africa and, rather than a specific category of its independence, by recurring violent crises with conflicts with shared characteristics, it essentia- identitarian elements, and it has one of highest lly denotes the intentions of those who use it: to mortality rates caused by armed conflicts recor- demand more attention and intervention from ded in the continent over the past two decades the international community. (Cilliers, 2018: 6). On the other hand, the conflict According to data from the Peace Research in Western Sahara, which originated in an unty- Institute Oslo (PRIO), 21 violent state-based pical decolonisation, whereby a third State repla- conflicts (in which at least one of the actors is ced the metropolis, has been a “frozen” conflict, the government of a State, whether they are in a situation of “neither war nor peace”, since interstate or domestic conflicts) were active in the early 1990s. Africa in 2018, matching the historic levels re- The chapter shows that the “forgotten con- corded in 2015 and 2016. The number of coun- flict” label doesn’t necessarily imply a lack of tries affected by these conflicts totalled 17. international interventions, whether by way of Africa also appeared as the continent with the peacekeeping, humanitarian aid or State (re)buil- largest number of non-state conflicts (between ding missions. However, the description takes on organised armed groups that are not linked to a different meaning when one considers other a State), which after 5 or 6 years of significant factors, which, if inadequately addressed, con- growth, stabilized at a total of 46 (Rustad and tribute to the crisis becoming deeply imbedded. Bakken, 2019). Almost all of these conflicts are, In this regard, problems of inclusion and recog- in some way, ignored by the big headlines and nition, as well as the forced displacement of a by government offices. Equally forgotten, or considerable part of the population, are keys even more so, are conflicts in a latent or frozen to understating how the oversight by the States state, with limited levels of violence (deaths in involved and the international community per- combat) which are not accounted for in inter- petuates conflicts in the Central African Republic national statistics. (CAR) and Western Sahara (Chart 1, Table 1).

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Chart 1. Seven countries with highest total fatalities (2001-2017) compared to rest of Africa

Source: Cilliers, J: “Violence in Africa Trends, drivers and prospects to 2023”, Africa Report 12, Institute for Security Studies, 30 August 2018.

Table 1. Ranking of number of fatalities com- their roots–as in many other cases–can be traced pared with fatality/population ratio back to the complex processes of nation-building and state-building that surrounded their decolo- Ranking Number of fatalities Fatality rate to population nisation (Chart 2). 1 Sudan CAR Since their independence in 1960, Central Afri- 2 Nigeria Somalia cans have not known peace. While in the capital, 3 DRC Liberia 4 Somalia Libya Bangui, power passed from one hand to another 5 CAR Sudan through military coups, in the vast suburbs of the 6 South Sudan South Sudan country, bandits and mercenaries terrorised the 7 Libya Burundi civilian population. In a territory larger than Fran- ce, inhabited by slightly over four million people, Source: Cilliers, J: “Violence in Africa Trends, drivers and the shortage of security, infrastructures and ser- prospects to 2023”, Africa Report 12, Institute for Security vices had accustomed the population to adapting Studies, 30 August 2018. to the absence of a State and to developing their own rules of coexistence. The situation started to change in 2003, when Two diametrically opposed conflicts Fraçois Bozizé’s rise to power brought about a massive presence of foreign fighters (mainly Even though they are diametrically opposed in Congolese and Chadian), which, for the first time, many ways, the conflicts in the Central African affected a considerable part of the territory. Ten Republic and in Western Sahara coincide in that years later, in March 2013, the coup perpetrated

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Chart 2. Central African Republic1

Source: United Nations. Map No. 4048, Rev. 9.1. February 2020.

by the Seleka (“alliance” in Sango, the national in motion, the international community rolled language) caused the country to fall into a per- out its military and diplomatic tools – including manent spiral of chaos and violence that still a United Nations peacekeeping mission (MINUS- endures. The abuses of the Seleka, composed of CA) – in the search for a political solution to the mostly Muslim fighters from the east of the coun- crisis. Both during the transition period (2014- try, promoted the creation of self-defence militias 2016) and after the presidential and legislative that aimed to represent the majority of Central elections in 2016, peacekeeping and national Africans from an ethnic and religious point of reconciliation initiatives have repeatedly failed. view, the Anti-Balaka (“Balaka” is a term used in Regional actors, in primis, Chad and the Republic Sango to refer to AK47 bullets). The subsequent of Congo, and international institutions such as intercommunity conflict caused thousands of the African Union and the European Union have mostly civilian deaths between 2013 and 2014, alternated in the role of endorsers of the accords. as well as the displacement of a quarter of the However, disagreements regarding an amnesty population (Picco, 2015).1 for the leaders of the armed groups have preven- Since then, the CAR has been through all the ted a true consensus between the sides, and the phases of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. ceasefires have never lasted more than 24 hours. While the machinery of humanitarian aid was put At the same time, despite electoral promises and reforms, bad governance and corruption have once again defined political life in Bangui (Inter- 1 See the interactive map on the CAR by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS): https://ipisresearch.be/ national Crisis Group, 2017). mapping/webmapping/car/v2/#5.067912858094445/22. The latest peace accord, signed between the 472077329260173/5.063368390454055/4/1/ Central African government and 14 armed groups

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in February 2019, appears to crystallise the cu- an anomalous and failed process of decolonisa- rrent situation and allows both sides to gain tion, which is still legally unresolved today. Unlike strength before the elections that are due to take in most of the continent, the decolonisation of place in 2021. On one hand, President Faustin Ar- this territory did not begin in the 1950s. It was change Touadera ensures international trust and not until 1963 that the UN included the then Spa- the conditions to be re-elected, also thanks to the nish colony in the list of non-autonomous terri- support of new allies like the Russian Federation. tories and urged the initiation of its process of On the other hand, the armed groups–mainly fac- self-determination, but the Spanish Franco regi- tions of the former Seleka–consolidate a parallel me postponed it until the last minute. The delay State in the areas under their control by taking encouraged, in parallel, the emergence of native advantage, with impunity, of natural resources Saharan nationalism, supported by the Polisario and illegal taxes. In the meantime, the civilian Front as a national liberation movement, as well population continues to be the prime victim of as the irredentism of the neighbouring kingdom the conflict. Insecurity, violence and forced dis- of Morocco, which requested an advisory opinion placement characterise Central Africans’ daily life from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) re- (Diatta, 2019) (Chart 3). garding the legal effect of its precolonial ties to tribes in the territory in dispute2. Chart 3. United Nations Mission for the Refe- The actual armed conflict broke out in late rendum in Western Sahara 1975, when Morocco challenged the unfavoura- ble opinion of the ICJ by launching the so-called Green March, 350,000 civilians who would march on the territory of the Spanish colony, while se- cretly negotiating the transfer of its administration to the late-Francoist Spanish government. Said government ended up irregularly ceding the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, whose armies divided its control between them after Spain’s withdrawal. The Polisario responded by proclaiming the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Repu- blic (SADR) and started a guerrilla war against both occupiers. Meanwhile, about half the native Sahrawi population fled across the border and settled in refugee camps in the province of Tin- douf, in the south west of Algeria. From that point on, a first phase of 15 years of armed conflict developed (1976-1991), initially between the Polisa- rio, Morocco and Mauritania. The sides in dispute that were internationally recognised would soon be reduced to two because, in 1979, Mauritania

Source: United Nations. Map No. 3691. Rev 90. April 2020. 2 The ICJ concluded that, even though there were “legal ties of loyalty” between the sultan of Morocco and “some” of the Saharawi nomad peoples, these did not imply the In the case of Western Sahara, the conflict existence of “legal ties of territorial sovereignty” that in- originated in the occupation of the territory in validated applying the principle of self-determination to dispute by neighbouring States in the midst of the decolonisation of Western Sahara.

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withdrew from the southern third of the territory, International intervention and missions which then also came under Moroccan control. The intensity of the armed combat began to In terms of international interventions, the CAR subside in the mid 1980s, after Morocco conso- holds a sad record. Since 1997, the country has lidated its military control over three quarters of accepted a dozen peacekeeping and peacebuil- the Western Saharan territory. In 1991, both sides ding missions, including several United Nations accepted a ceasefire thanks to a Settlement Plan missions, regional initiatives and military coo- backed by the UN, which foresaw a self-determi- peration agreements with France (Olin, 2015). nation referendum for the Sahrawi people and The current United Nations Multidimensional the deployment of the United Nations Mission for Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MI- the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). NUSCA) was established in 2014 to replace the Since then, almost three decades of “frozen con- African Union intervention (MISCA) that had been flict” have gone by. In the current situation, large- launched after the coup. However, over five years scale violence has ceased−which is why it does later, the Central African State hardly exists outsi- not meet the qualitative and quantitative criteria de the capital, and the mission has not achieved required to consider it a war or an armed conflict− its main goals, such as protecting civilians and but the core incompatibility between both sides supporting political dialogue between the parties is still unresolved. Just like in frozen conflicts in in conflict. the post-Soviet area, for which the expression In the case of Western Sahara, there has also was originally coined, a contested State with aspi- been a continued international peacekeeping rations and elements of sovereignty, but without intervention since the 1990s, but its protagonist full international recognition, as is the case of the has been only one UN mission, the MINURSO. The SADR, is also part of the “neither war nor peace” record, in this case, is that, after almost three de- equation (Fernández-Molina 2019, 408). cades of deployment, the MINURSO has become The implementation of the Settlement Plan one of the UN’s longest peacekeeping operations came to a dead end due to the insurmountable still underway, only surpassed by missions in Is- disagreement between both sides regarding the rael-Palestine (ONUVT/UNTSO, 1948), India-Pa- electorate who had the right to vote in the refe- kistan (UNMOGIP, 1949), Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964), rendum, which had not been previously agreed Israel-Syria (FNUOS/UNDOF, 1974) and Lebanon upon, and to the unwillingness of the Security (FPNUL/UNIFIL, 1978). Its role, initially focused Council to impose a solution. Once the irrever- on organising the referendum and the process of sible politicisation of the process of voter iden- voter identification, has gradually diminished sin- tification became apparent in the early 2000s, ce Mohammed VI and the Security Council disso- UN efforts would focus on finding a mixed “po- ciated themselves from this roadmap in the early litical solution” that combined a phase of tem- 2000s. Today, its role is limited to verifying that porary autonomy (4 or 5 years of shared power both sides are complying with the ceasefire and between an autonomous authority in Western to supplying logistical support for confidence- Sahara and the Moroccan State) and a referen- building measures (such as family visits) organi- dum to determine the final status of the territory. sed by the United Nations High Commissioner for However, Baker Plans I (2001) and II (2003) also Refugees (UNHCR). The MINURSO also supervises failed because they did not achieve the consent demining work on both sides of the verge that of either the Polisario or Morocco, respectively. separates Western Sahara, annexed by Morocco, This practically reversed the peace process back and the eastern strip, controlled by the Polisario to square one in 2007, when the Security Council and known as “liberated territory” (interview asked both sides to begin “negotiations without with MINURSO senior political advisor El Aaiún, preconditions”. June 2013).

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In the CAR, even though pressure from the go- The context restricts the possibilities of inter- vernment is advancing disarmament, demobili- national intervention through state channels. On zation, reinsertion and repatriation (DDRR) and one hand, international penetration in refugee the deployment of the national security forces camps in Tindouf is vast and vital for its endu- (Central African Armed Forces, CAAF), most of the rance, but is primarily of a humanitarian nature. territory is still controlled by armed groups,3 and On the other hand, the official international pre- the blue helmets can hardly manage to protect sence in Moroccan controlled Western Sahara the main cities. Moreover, the restoration of the has been almost inexistent for decades, with the Central African State is based on a classic state- exception of the MINURSO. Moreover, the terri- building model that is not very suited to the si- tory is included de facto, by default, in the area tuation of a chronic absence of administrations of application of many of the cooperation agree- and services in the provinces. For this reason, re- ments between Morocco and partners such as forms are taking a long time to achieve results in the European Union, which avoid demarcating sectors as important as the administration of the this State’s borders. At another level,, since mid territory and justice. Meanwhile, social services 2019, eight African States that have traditionally are still being provided by non-governmental or- been close to Morocco’s positions have backed ganisations (NGOs). Therefore, the interventions these diplomatically by opening general or hono- keep the CAR under “international perfusion” rary consulates in the Sahrawi cities of El Aaiun (Vircoulon, 2015). (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Comoros, Gabon, By contrast, in the case of Western Sahara, the CAR, Saint Thomas and Prince) and Dakhla there is no international intervention aimed at (Guinea, Gabon). state-building. The Gordian knot of the conflict is Central Africans, for their part, have not con- precisely statehood and its international recogni- cealed their scepticism regarding international tion. The situation is particularly complicated by missions for years now. Many speak of a “hidden the superposition of three forms of international agenda” by MINUSCA, according to which the (non) recognition: the non recognition of Moroc- mission is supposedly in the country for the sole can claims of sovereignty over Western Sahara, purpose of taking advantage of its natural resour- which every State in the world abides by in com- ces, or of guaranteeing its leaders’ salaries. These pliance with the legal status of this territory as a criticisms reveal the population’s frustration with non-autonomous territory subject to a decoloni- watching hundreds of international experts tra- sation process; the widespread recognition of the vel throughout the country in their Toyotas every Polisario as a national liberation movement and day while nothing substantial is changing in their a side in the conflict; and the partial recognition, own lives. With their inferences, Central Africans to date, of the State in dispute, SADR, by about sense there is a relation between the presence of 40 States, mostly African and Latin American, and international missions and the perpetuation of by the African Union (indirect collective recogni- the conflict. The following three things would ex- tion) through membership (Fernández-Molina y plain this relation: the divergence of international Porges, 2020: 383-387). interests; the desire to achieve immediate results; and the lack of national and local appropriation of the peace initiatives. 3 For further information, see the map on armed groups The latest Central African crises have all been in the CAR created by Enough Project in Dukhan, Nathalia managed by a multitude of regional and interna- (2018) “Splintered Warfare II: How Foreign Interference is tional actors, whose agendas and objectives have Fueling Kleptocracy, Warlordism, and an Escalating Vio- lent Crisis in the Central African Republic”, Enough Proj- not always been aligned. In 2017, for example, ect, retrieved from: https://enoughproject.org/reports/ several peace initiatives were launched, which, splintered-warfare-ii-central-african-republic besides competing with each other, gave free

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rein to the manipulation of local actors, both the Morocco expelled its civilian staff in 2016 to pro- government and armed groups. In parallel, the test a one-off reference by Secretary General Ban international community’s weariness regarding Ki-moon to the “occupation” of Western Sahara the Central African conflict has led to a search (Fernández-Molina y Ojeda-García, 2020). for short-term solutions that can bring immediate success, even if they do not confront the deep causes of the problem. This is the case with local Problems and national policies of inclusion peace agreements, which did manage to tempo- and recognition rarily stabilise several areas of the country, but never succeeded in addressing the roots of the The Central African conflict has often been defi- instability. Finally, the lack of will and initiative ned as an identitarian conflict. The issue of natio- of local authorities to acknowledge the politic de- nality, of who is truly Central African and thus has mands of some armed groups and to establish the right to live in the country, is key to unders- talks with them has led the international com- tanding the crisis and finding possible solutions munity to use standard peacebuilding solutions, (Lombard, 2016). On the other hand, although which are insufficiently adapted to the Central the Western Sahara dispute is an atypical conflict, African context and thus hardly sustainable. whose decolonisation is different in terms of ori- In the case of Western Sahara, the MINURSO gin (and legal framework) from internal identity/ has often been subject to criticisms and suspi- secession conflicts, its identitarian dimension has cions as well. The most widespread is that, as always been fundamental and has become more in other cases, the indefinite presence of blue relevant in the past two decades. helmets on the ground has only contributed to In a country like the CAR, where civil registries freezing the conflict, thereby delaying its resolu- hardly exist and only a few citizens hold birth cer- tion. The possibility of admitting the UN’s failure tificates due to the chronic absence of the State and ending this mission was first laid on the ta- and of public administrations, the criteria to defi- ble in 2002 by the then Secretary General of the ne someone’s identity is determined outside the organisation, Kofi Annan, but it has never been legislative definition. One’s place of birth, ethnici- carried out. The Security Council has ritually re- ty, religion and even line of work can carry weight newed its mandate every year since 2008, with a when defining whether someone belongs in the recent six-month interlude between mandates in country. Central African Muslims from remote re- 2018 and 2019. gions in the north and the east, who are ethnical Another controversial aspect of the MINURSO minorities and traders in a country of farmers, is its lack of explicit powers in the area of human have always been considered foreigners. Even rights, an anomaly compared to most peacekee- before the last crisis, many of them had to add a ping operations that the UN has performed in Christian name to their documents to avoid poli- the post-Cold War era. The initiatives to include ce inspections or to have access to employment. human rights in its mandate clashed with the Non Muslims’ perception of these citizens later opposition of Morocco and became the bone of deteriorated during the coup in 2003, when Cha- contention at debates in the Security Council dian mercenaries who helped Bozizé take power between 2009 and 2015. The result was a series were able to plunder and destroy the country of unprecedented diplomatic crises between Mo- with impunity (Martinelli, 2014). rocco, on the one hand, and the Barack Obama In Western Sahara, the problem of defining US administration together with the UN itself, on who is Sahrawi is also core to the conflict and to the other. But the role of the MINURSO ultimately the blocking of its resolution. This is one of many remained intact. The MINURSO has, in turn, been cases in which the limits of ethnical identity and a collateral victim of other clashes, such as when political identity differ. Due to their historical mo-

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bility as nomads and to the arbitrary nature of economic incentives and, especially, acceptance the colonial borders, ethnical Sahrawis inhabit on behalf of those who stayed and do not want a larger geographical area than today’s Western to see them come back (Picco, 2018). Saharan territory, which additionally covers the Reconciliation and social cohesion became south of Morocco, the south east of Algeria and popular terms in post-2013 CAR. Although a lite- the north of Mauritania. However, the Sahrawi ral translation into Sango does not exist, these political identity and nationalist movement, em- phrases became part of everyday language for bodied by the Polisario, are a relatively recent both international organisations and Central phenomenon that emerged in the colonial terri- Africans. During these years, NGOs intensified tory of Western Sahara (Barreñada, 2017: 381). In their projects for raising community awareness, their struggle for self-determination, the Polisario and the MINUSCA supported several peace and and the SADR have always abided by the princi- reconciliation commissions. However, every stra- ple of uti possidetis, or the intangibility of colonial tegy to rebuild the social fabric failed as soon as borders, and to the more limited political/natio- the first signs of tension appeared, and episodes nal definition of the Sahrawi identity. of intercommunity violence continued to occur In any case, cross-border movements of throughout the country. the population were to continue causing mu- On the other hand, the inclusion policies that tual interferences of various kinds between the the international community requested from Pre- ethnical and the political Sahrawi identity. For sident Touadera have never seen the light of day. example, Morocco’s annexation of Western Sa- At first, the lack of a clear strategy for the return hara brought about the settlement of 200,000 to of displaced Muslims, and of specific actions to 300,000 Moroccan citizens in the territory, with reduce community tensions, was attributed to the the singularity that a large portion of them were complexity of the challenges the new Government ethnical Saharwis from the south of the kingdom had to face. Later on, it became apparent that the (Mundy, 2012). Already in the 1990s, Morocco’s Central African authorities lacked the political will attempts to achieve an electorate favourable to to disseminate strong messages of inclusion and the referendum that was laid out the Settlement recognition, such as stating clearly that the coun- Plan involved the failed idea of including three try belongs to all (Christians and Muslims), and “contested” Sahrawi tribes that had not been that they all have the same rights (Picco, 2017). By previously censed in the Spanish colony. This at- prioritising political interests over the reconcilia- tempt originated many of the difficulties in the tion process, the Central African elite has missed MINURSO process of identifying voters in order an important opportunity that is unlikely to recur to determine who was and who was not a native after the upcoming 2021 elections. of the territory in dispute. In the case of Western Sahara, since the turn In the CAR, intercommunity tensions have in- of the millennium, Sahrawi identity has taken on tensified during the latest crisis. In late 2013, Anti- a new dimension within the territory annexed Balaka militias began to attack, not only elements by Morocco due to the “inward turn”, whereby of the Seleka, but also Muslim civilians accused of the political centre of gravity of the conflict and colluding with the rebels. At that time, hundreds Sahrawi activism have returned from exile in the of thousands of Central African Muslims were refugee camps to their native land (Fernández- forced to flee to neighbouring countries, mainly Molina, 2017: 10, 12). The growing protests by Chad and Cameroon, to save themselves. Today, (nationalist) Sahrawi activists from inland (Barre- despite the elections and the recent peace ac- ñada, 2012), who had been invisible until then, cord, conditions are still not favourable for Mus- were going to achieve an unprecedented impact lims from Bangui and the western provinces of on the international community and the Polisario the CAR to be able to return to their land: security, itself, which began to redirect its strategy by pla-

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cing this peaceful civil resistance at the forefront. refugees outside its borders, not knowing if they Moreover, such a de facto transformation added would be able to return to their land again. Wha- a new layer of internal identity conflict to the al- tever the cause or the manner, it is very likely that ready complex situation in Western Sahara−one every Central African has been forcefully displa- in which the main dispute or incompatibility of ced at least once their life (Lombard y Picco, 2019). goals revolves around the status of a community One of the most alarming consequences of or territory in relation to the State, in the form of the latest crisis in the CAR is that the number of autonomy, secession, etc. displaced people remains the same. Since 2013, The Moroccan State has responded to these about a million Central Africans, almost a fourth political mutations in the territory under its con- of the population, are either internally displaced trol with a series of policies of recognition toward persons or refugees (IDMC, 2019). Even though the Sahrawis that reside there. Some of them have the symbol of the current conflict, the huge dis- focused on recognising rights, such as including placement camp at Bangui M’poko airport, disap- Sahrawi victims of human right violations (until peared after the elections in 2016, the ongoing 1999) in a sui generis “transitional justice” experi- instability in the suburbs has only allowed tem- ment, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission porary or pendular homecoming. (2004), or establishing a regional commission of Although most displacements are transitory, the National Human Rights Council (NHRC, 2011) the impact on the lives of Central Africans is in El Aaiun, which involved the legalisation of enormous. While they remain under extremely an important Sahrawi pro-independence asso- hard conditions for days, with no access to water, ciation (2015-1016). At the same time, the new food or medical treatment, their homes and be- discourse of “reconciliation” with Sahrawis, the longings are usually looted or burnt. Moreover, establishment of consultative institutions such in these cases, humanitarian aid takes time to as the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs come, or only partially makes up for the losses (CORCAS, 2006), the co-opting of pro-Moroccan they have suffered. Consequently, many displa- Sahrawis, the launch of their own Autonomy Plan ced people end up in one of the semi-permanent for the territory (2006) and the reference to the camps that have been set up in cities in the north “Saharan-Hassani component” of the “unity” of and east of the country, such as Kaga-Bandoro, the kingdom in the new constitution of 2011, have Batangafo, Bambari and Bria (Chart 4). sought to suggest a certain recognition of diffe- However, over the years, tens of thousands rence. However, the instrumental, unilateral and of civilians who have fled violence have found partial nature of all these measures of recognition themselves trapped in those same camps that has made them counterproductive for Moroccan were supposed to be a safe place. On one hand, interests on the whole, further fuelling feelings of the instability has caused most of the humanita- grievance and Sahrawi pro-independence acti- rian aid to go to people inside the camps, limiting vism (Fernández-Molina, 2019: 420-423, 425-426). initiatives for rebuilding and allowing the gradual return of displaced persons (who often used to live a few hundred metres away). On the other Forced displacement and refugees hand, armed militias have used the camps to protect their bases, infiltrate their members and For decades now, forced displacement has be- extort the civilian population. Therefore, many come part of daily life for Central Africans. Some camps that were meant to provide refuge have have experienced it for very short periods of time, now become prison camps. hiding in the forests until safety conditions in villa- Nonetheless, the phenomenon of protracted ges went back to normal. Others have spent years displacement camps does not just depend on ex- in displacement camps inside the country or as ternal factors such as humanitarian aid and the

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Chart 4. Refugees and IDPs in CAR per prefecture, October 2019.

Source: OCHA.1

presence of armed groups. The current Central Western Sahara is precisely a textbook case African conflict has deeply affected pre-existing of perpetual forced displacement, which is, at personal, family and community relationships the same time, the cause and the fundamental in the country. Parents have gradually lost their consequence of the freezing of the conflict. Set authority over their children; local leaders have up in 1975-1976, the Sahrawi refugee camp in been deprived of their essential role in the com- Tindouf constitutes not only a protracted refu- munity. In this context, another reason camps gee situation, according to UNHCR criteria−one become eternalised is because, even though the which affects a minimum of 25,000 refugees from societal models that existed before are no longer the same country who have been seeking refuge viable, there is no new paradigm for communal in exile for at least five years −, but it is one of life that has been created or agreed upon by the the oldest in the world after the refugee camps population either. In the absence of a State able for Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the to lay the foundations for new ways to coexist, West Bank and Gaza (1948), for the Sudanese in many Central Africans have decided to remain in Ethiopia (1968) and for Burundians in Tanzania the camps and try to recreate their everyday ac- (1972).5 (https://reliefweb.int/map/world/global- tivities there, whether it be small shops or forms protracted-refugee-situations-7-dec-2016). of entertainment (Picco, forthcoming).4 On the other hand, whereas Central African camps for internally displaced persons have been 4 To view this and other related maps, see: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_carte_ 5 For further information, see map on global protracted deplacement_eng_28_oct2019.pdf refugee situations: https://hiu.state.gov/#global,U1458

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perpetuated in large part due to the absence of the refugees’ access to the Algerian passports the State, Sahrawi refugee camps are unique in needed to travel or emigrate to Europe (Wilson, that they harbour and materialise the State in 2016, pp. 12, 215-216). dispute, the SADR. In tandem with the Polisario, the SADR administers five refugee camps, an administrative city and the surrounding desert in Conclusions the province of Tindouf, with the permission−a kind of de facto authority/sovereignty by dele- The examples of the Central African Republic and gation−of Algerian State authorities and security Western Sahara clearly illustrate how the notion competencies shared with said State. In other of a “forgotten conflict” does not imply a lack of words, the SADR basically performs its role as attention or international interventions, whether a State from outside the territory, even though it be peacekeeping missions, humanitarian aid it controls the “liberated territory” through the or support for state-building. On the contrary, a Polisario. The SADR can be considered a State in close analysis of these two conflicts, which are exile with certain similarities to other long-las- so different in their origins and evolution, shows ting expatriated national authorities, such as the us that such interventions have gradually contri- Tibetan Central Administration in India and the buted, at least in part, to the continuation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) before crises. There are multiple reasons for this side the 1990s (in Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia). As in effect, which are generally related to the diver- some of these cases, Sahrawi displacement is not gence among the international interests invol- limited to the national leading elite or to a “gover- ved, short-termness, and the lack of national/ nment in exile”, but it also includes a significant local appropriation of peace initiatives. civilian population that the SADR governs as a On one hand, peacemaking and peacekeeping quasi-State (Wilson, 2016: 10; Fernández-Molina can go on indefinitely without providing a single and Ojeda-García, 2020). result when the international community is unwi- The current number of Sahrawi refugees who lling to address the direct causes and/or impose have settled in these camps is a controversial a solution to the conflict (the best case scenario) matter. Estimations by various humanitarian ends up becoming a frozen conflict. On the other agencies over the past two decades have ranged hand, peace-building and state-building models between 100,000 and 130,000 (Zunes and Mun- that are inadequately suited to the contexts whe- dy, 2010: 128). The Sahrawi authorities refuse to re they are applied end up entrenching the main provide their own data or to allow UN agencies to actors in the conflict in their respective positions, carry out a census, mainly due to their fear that leaving ample room for peace initiatives being humanitarian aid will be scaled down as well as manipulated and, de facto, blocking the way out the food rations on which the survival of a consi- of the crises. derable part of its population depends. In parallel, some policies that seem to enjoy Finally, Sahrawi refugee camps are not di- broad consensus, such as inclusion and recogni- rectly militarised, nor do they fully hinder their tion policies, can be used by the same actors for inhabitants’ freedom of movement. Although their own political interests in an instrumental, entries and exits are controlled by the Polisario/ unilateral and partial way, which renders them SADR, the refugees are allowed to travel around meaningless and ineffective. Additionally, out- Algeria, and there is a certain cross-border mo- side influence by countries in the region (such bility between the camps, the “liberated terri- as Algeria in the case of Western Sahara) and by tory” and the north of Mauritania, for nomad other international powers (for example, Russia shepherding activities, among other things. The in the CAR) can be an unpredictable and desta- most important restriction is that which affects bilising variable in any conflict or peace process.

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At the same time, international interventions Fernández-Molina and V. Veguilla (eds.), Glo- can also act as a curtain behind which the ac- bal, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western tors in conflict hide in order to avoid confronting Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization: When a sensitive issues, such as human right violations Conflict Gets Old, Palgrave Macmillan, New or granting an amnesty law. For example, over York, 2017, pp. 277-293. the past two decades, transnational justice has Cilliers, J.: Violence in Africa: Trends, Drivers and been part of both the negotiation agenda in the Prospects to 2023. Institute for Security Stu- CAR and the Moroccan “reconciliation” policies dies, 2018. Retrieved from: https://issafrica. toward Western Sahara, responding to expecta- org/research/africa-report/violence-in-afri- tions by international actors and mediators, but ca-trends-drivers-and-prospects-to-2023 without ever producing any genuine transforma- Diatta, M. M.: Can the Central African Republic’s tions. peace deal be saved? Institute for Security A final form of deadlock and routinization of Studies, 2019. Retrieved from: https://issa- the crises that is common to both the Central frica.org/iss-today/can-the-central-african- African and the Western Saharan conflict is the republics-peace-deal-be-saved long-lasting forced displacement of a very signi- Fernández-Molina, I.: “Towards a Multilevel ficant part of the population. This is fundamen- Analysis of the Western Sahara Conflict and tally internal in the case of Central Africa, and the Effects of its Protractedness”. In: R. Ojeda- cross-border−in the form of refugees−in that of García, I. Fernández-Molina and V. Veguilla Western Sahara, with the subsequent legal and (eds.), Global, Regional and Local Dimensions political differences in terms of the possibilities of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decoloniza- of international protection that this involves. tion: When a Conflict Gets Old, Palgrave Mac- However, both displacement phenomena coin- millan, New York, 2017, pp. 1-33. cide in their tendency to perpetuate, especially Fernández-Molina, I.: Bottom-up Change in Fro- when they converge in refugee or internal displa- zen Conflicts: Transnational Struggles and cement camps. Regarding this issue, more than Mechanisms of Recognition in Western Saha- any other, the international community faces a ra. Review of International Studies, no. 45, vol. dilemma that is typical of “forgotten conflicts”: 3, 2019, pp. 407-430. the need to not forget what situations of huma- Fernández-Molina, I. and Ojeda-García, R.: “Wes- nitarian emergency are, however normalised the tern Sahara as a Hybrid of a Parastate and a emergency may have become and, at the same State-in-exile: (Extra) territoriality and the time, the need to prevent humanitarian aid from Small Print of Sovereignty in a Context of Fro- replacing−and causing one to forget−the political zen Conflict”.Nationalities Papers, 2020. and diplomatic action that is essential in order to Fernández-Molina, I. and Porges, M.: “Western resolve the conflicts that cause these situations. Sahara”. In: G. Visoka, J. Doyle and E. New- man (eds.). Routledge Handbook of State Re- cognition. Routledge. Oxon/New York, 2020, References pp. 376-390. International Crisis Group: “Avoiding the Worst Barreñada, I.: 2012. Asociacionismo y cuestión in the Central African Republic”. Crisis Group nacional en el Sáhara Occidental. Revista de Africa Report no. 253. International Crisis Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos, no. 13, Group, Bangui/Nairobi/Brussels, 2017. 2012. International Displacement Monitoring Centre: Barreñada, I.: 2017. “Western Saharan and Central African Republic. 2019. Retrieved Southern Moroccan Sahrawis: National Iden- from: http://www.internal-displacement.org/ tity and Mobilization”. In: R. Ojeda-García, I. countries/central-african-republic

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Lombard, L.: State of Rebellion: Violence and In- Picco, E.: “The World Has Put its Faith in CAR’s tervention in the Central African Republic. Zed Leadership. It Should Think Again”. Africa Books, London, 2016. Arguments, 2017. Retrieved from: https:// Lombard, L. and Picco, E.: “Distributive Justice africanarguments.org/2017/10/24/the- at War: Displacement and its Afterlives in the world-has-put-its-faith-in-central-african-re- Central African Republic”. Journal of Refugee public-car-leadership-it-should-think-again/ Studies, 2019. Retrieved from: https://doi. Picco, E.: “I’m 100% Central African”: Identity and org/10.1093/jrs/fez012 Inclusion in the Experience of the Central Afri- Martinelli, B.: “La mémoire de la violence en can Muslim Refugees in Chad and Cameroon. Centrafrique”. Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropo- International Center for Transitional Justice, logy website, 2014. Retrieved from: https:// New York, 2018. culanth.org/fieldsights/548-la-memoire-de- Picco, E.: «Déplacement forcé et camps: le res- la-violence-en-centrafrique. senti des Centrafricains». In: M. Eudes (ed.). Mundy, J.: “Moroccan Settlers in Western Sahara: Les Camps et le Droit [en prensa]. Colonists or Fifth Column?” The Arab World Rustad, S. A. and Vik Bakken, I.: “Conflict Trends Geographer, no. 15, vol. 2, 2012, pp. 95-126. in Africa, 1989-2018”. Conflict Trends 6. PRIO, Olin, N.: “Pathologies of Peacekeeping and Pea- Oslo, 2019. Retrieved from: https://www. cebuilding in CAR”. In: T. Carayannis and L. prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=12112 Lombard (eds.). Making Sense of the Central Vircoulon, T. and Arnaud, C.: Penser et anticiper les African Republic, Zed Books, London, 2015. impacts socio- économiques de l’intervention Picco, E.: “From Being Forgotten to Being Igno- humanitaire en République centrafricaine. Ins- red: International Humanitarian Interven- titut Français des Relations Internationales, tions in the Central African Republic”. In: T. Paris, 2015. Carayannis and L. Lombard (eds.). Making Wilson, A.: Sovereignty in Exile: A Saharan Libera- Sense of the Central African Republic, Zed tion Movement Governs. Philadelphia: Univer- Books, London, 2015. sity of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016.

informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 93 10/11/20 9:39 informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 94 10/11/20 9:39 8. Reforms in North African countries: from change to continuity1

Chahir Zaki

Introduction tries–except Libya–implemented from the 1990s onwards several structural adjustment programs, The so-called MENA region (Middle East and Nor- supported by different international financial th Africa) is one unique developing region. While institutions, Their economies, however, did not it regularly bears witness to several conflicts, it experience significant changes. is also the most abundant in natural resources, This chapter analyses the main structural especially oil. Oil price volatility and insufficient characteristics of North African economies and economic diversification, coupled with a general assesses the way in which reforms did not di- inability to effectively transform their economies, rectly address most systemic problems. It first are two of the reasons why several Arab countries focuses on the main macroeconomic imbalances. have precarious economies. The pervasiveness of The text presents the main characteristics of the this precarity has been manifested by the erup- North African economies and shows how, from tion of protests across the Arab world throughout a macroeconomic point of view, the region is in recent years. 1 turn composed by two subregions presenting This chapter will focus on the North African profound differences. Second, this chapter argues region. This area is of particular interest for three that most of the implemented reforms targeted reasons. First, it experienced several economic consequences, not root causes. In other words, and political shocks that are worthy of examin- economic policies were chiefly associated with ing. Second, it is a diversified region composed stabilization policies and not structural reforms, of six countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Maurita- leading instead to a continuity of the current nia, Morocco and Tunisia. Two of them, Algeria challenges. Third, the text shows how conflicts, and Libya, are oil-abundant, while the others are corruption and deficient institutions explain why more diverse in terms of their production and ex- these economies specialize in traditional goods. ports. This analysis will identify similarities and Finally, the conclusion examines the main re- differences between both groups of countries. forms required in order to change these trends, When it comes to oil-abundant countries, Alge- move forward and achieve deeper change. ria is a populous country, Libya is not. In regard The analysis undertaken in this chapter is of to the other group, Morocco managed to slightly particular relevance in view of the outbreak of the improve the structure of its economy during the COVID-19 pandemic. The International Monetary 2000s, whereas Egypt and Tunisia did so to a Fund (IMF) described this shock as the “Great lesser extent. Meanwhile, Mauritania remained Lockdown” that will reduce global GDP by 3% somewhat stagnant. Third, all of these coun- in 2020. In addition to this, oil prices have reached the lowest level in modern history. With the pandemic sweeping across oil-rich North African 1 Last version of this chapter was accepted in March 2020. countries, their governments have to face two

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concomitant shocks, health and economy-wise. Morocco and Tunisia. Hence, the first group is com- The response to these two external shocks should posed of oil-dependent countries, while the second not be dissociated from structural reforms. North comprises more diversified economies. African countries, like other emerging countries, Since oil-rich countries rely heavily on natural will have to re-organize their priorities and adopt resources, GDP growth is affected to a greater ex- active economic and social policies in both the tent by changes in oil prices, and is consequently short and the long-term to improve their resilien- much more volatile, as Chart 2 shows. Yet, it is ce and agility and thus reduce the negative effects also essential to stress that growth in North Afri- of these shocks, as well as most surely facing fu- can economies (and the MENA region in general) ture ones. is much more volatile than in other developing regions. Such volatility increases uncertainty and hence deters investment, productivity and eco- Structural characteristics of the North African nomic growth. It can also have, in the short run, countries: a tale of two regions adverse effects on the less well-off sections of the population (Easterly et al., 2000). Macroeconomic imbalances The dichotomy between the two groups in terms of their GDP growth–according to its relian- Before presenting the main characteristics of the ce on oil–partially holds true for the level of GDP North African economies, a starting point to un- per capita. Indeed, the four countries with fewer derstand their structural features is the difference natural resources–and thus lower rents–(Egypt, between countries by their economic dependency Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania), have a low GDP on exports of fuel commodities. Chart 1 shows the per capita. GDP per capita is significantly higher in share of fuel exports in total merchandise exports. oil-rich countries. Nonetheless, it is also important While this share represents 96% in Algeria and Lib- to note that the latter are relatively heterogeneous: ya (higher than all the other countries and regions), Libya’s low density in population goes hand in it represents on average 15% in Egypt, Mauritania, hand with a higher GDP per capita (Chart 3).

Chart 1. Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)

MENA 71,1 SSA 46,3 LAC 17,4 World 13,7 Regions SA 10,5 EAP 6,6 Algeria 96,7 Oil Libya 96,4 Egypt 35,3 Tunisia 12,7 Mauritania 12,7 Non-oil Morocoo 2,4

0,0 20,0 40,0 60,0 80,0 100,0 120,0

Source: World Development Indicators online dataset. Note: MENA (Middle East and North Africa), SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), LAC (Latin American and Caribbean), SA (South Asia) and EAP (East Asia and Pacific).

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Chart 2. GDP growth volatility

Libya 33,8 Oil Algeria 7,4 Mauritania 5,9 Morocco 3,7 Tunisia 3,4 Non-oil Egypt 2,7 MENA 4,9 LAC 2,6

ons SSA 2,6 i g e SA R 2,5 EAP 2,2 World 1,6

0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 30,0 35,0 40,0

Source: author’s elaboration, using the World Development Indicators online dataset. Note: volatility is measured by calculating the standard deviation of GDP growth rate for each country.

Chart 3. GDP per capita (in thousands constant USD of 2010)

World 9,15 LAC 8,52

ons EAP 7,08 i g e

R MENA 6,73 SSA 1,48 SA 1,14 Libya 8,77 Oil Algeria 4,22 Tunisia 3,66 Morocco 2,61 Egypt 2,35 Non-oil Mauritania 1,20

0,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 7,00 8,00 9,00 10,00

Source: World Development Indicators online dataset.

At the sectoral level, GDP structure is also sector (48% and 77%, respectively), with oil and different when the two groups of countries are refineries industries as the main contributors to contrasted. Whereas a large share of the econo- production, the other economies are dominated mies of Algeria and Libya is tied to the industrial by the services sector (around 50% of their GDP,

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chiefly tourism, real estate and finance). The son, and in addition to the absence of a compe- other non-oil countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt titive industrial sector, North African countries and Mauritania) have a modest share of industry do not perform well at the level of exporting ma- to GDP, mainly regarding some traditional sec- nufactured goods in general, particularly when tors such as processed food, textile and ready- it comes to exports that are intensive in high-te- made garments and chemicals. This structure of chnology. In fact, compared to other developing production has two critical implications. First, regions (see Chart 5), manufacturing exports since both oil industries and traditional non-oil from the MENA region account for the lowest sectors are capital intensive, these economies share of merchandise exports (19%), much less have failed to generate jobs and thus reduce so- than Sub-Saharan Africa (24%), and especially cial problems. Second, while the tertiary sector of Latin America (47%), South Asia (72%) and East the economy is labour-intensive and more likely Asia and Pacific (81%). Moreover, it is important to generate jobs, it is still heavily regulated and to note that all our countries of interest are net protected, and hence more distorted (Karam and importers of manufactured products (except Tu- Zaki, 2013). The latter explains why services still nisia and Morocco, whose exports and imports have limited value-added and do not lead to the are almost at the same level). creation of high numbers of jobs (Chart 4). The poor performance holds true for exports that are intensive in high-technology, remarkably low in both oil and non-oil North African coun- Poor trade performance tries (with the exception of Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Morocco), especially when compared to In the case of economies that depend heavily on LAC or EAP countries (Chart 6). This is chiefly due oil (as it is the case with Libya and Algeria in the to four reasons. First, there is an apparent dis- North of Africa), most of their exports are concen- connection between industrial and trade policies: trated in the hydrocarbon sector. Thus, non-oil industrial strategies that could help improve the exports growth has remained low. For this rea- competitiveness of manufactured products are,

Chart 4. Gross domestic product composition

100,0 19,8 80,0 42,3 3,1 42,5 52,5 62,1 60,4 60,0 9,5 27,9 40,0 77,1 14,2 10,6 13,5 48,2 20,0 33,3 27,3 26,0 29,6

0,0 Algeria Libya Tunisia Morocco Mauritania Egypt

Oil Non-oil

Industry Agriculture Services

Source: World Development Indicators online dataset.

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Chart 5. Manufactures imports and exports (% of merchandise imports and exports)

90 81 76 79 75 80 73 70 70 7170 72 69 66 70 6263 57 56 60 52 47 50 39 40 24 30 19 20 4 10 0 3 0 A A C S N LA SSA EA P E Libya Egypt World M Algeria Tunisia Morocco Mauritania Non-oil Oil Regions

Imports Exports

Source: World Development Indicators online dataset.

Chart 6. High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)

EAP 29,2 World 19,9 LAC 13,5 MENA 8,0 Regions SA 7,3 SSA 4,6 Tunisia 7,4 Morocco 3,7

Non-oil Egypt 0,9 Mauritania 0,0 Algeria 0,5

Oil Libya

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Source: World Development Indicators online dataset.

when in existence, unclear and vague. Second, tions. Countries with high-quality institutions given the low quality of institutions (in terms tend to export more complex and more advan- of a high level of corruption, lack of property ced products and import more simple products rights, deficient business climate), these coun- (Berkowitz et al., 2006; Karam and Zaki, 2019). tries tend to specialize in traditional sectors that By contrast, bad institutions and consequent are not sensitive to the features of the business contractual incompleteness bring about the environment and the presence of good institu- implementation of less advanced technologies

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(Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman, 2007). Third, the density of those NTMs, as measured by the despite the abundance of inexpensive labour, share of products subject to NTMs (see Eibl and the workforce lacks the required skills for such Malik, 2016 for Egypt and Baghdadi et al., 2019 sectors (Aboushady et al., 2019). Fourth, exports for Tunisia). from Arab countries generally face multiple non- tariff measures (NTMs), despite a significant decline of tariffs in destination markets. Social characteristics of North African countries Focusing on non-tariff measures, Chart 7 shows that standards and conformity as- As a consequence of growth volatility, GDP struc- sessment procedures represent a severe obsta- ture and poor trade performance, North African cle among Arab countries (especially in regard countries face several predicaments at the so- to sanitary and phytosanitary measures and te- cial level. The protests that started in 2011 lar- chnical barriers). While some of these measures gely stemmed from widespread discontent and are evidence-based mechanisms aimed to pro- frustration over unemployment and low living tect the health of humans and animals, others standards. The exclusion and inequality of part of are more distortionary and imply a significant the population are essential drivers of security in cost for firms. Furthermore, some studies show the MENA region. Notably, exclusion is predomi- that within Arab States, the tax equivalent of nantly observed in the cases of the economically non-tariff obstacles to trade (including customs disadvantaged, the youth and women. procedures) represents 30–40% of the value of First, the low level of women’s participation traded goods (ITC, 2015 and Augier et al., 2012). in the labour market is a central characteristic of It is worth noting that, in the MENA region, some MENA countries in general and especially North NTMs are politically motivated for the sake of African ones. On average, women’s participation protecting companies with links to the respec- rate is 20% of the women’s population aged 15+. tive regimes. The presence of cronies is a strong Chart 8 shows that the MENA region has the hig- predictor of the introduction of NTMs, as well as hest unemployment rates of women compared

Chart 7. Burdensome NTMs applied by partner countries

100 90 25 22 27 80 42 8 70 21 60 30 50 44 25 40 38 30 32 20 27 10 26 16 11 0 6 Arab RoW Arab RoW

Agriculture Manufacturing

Technical requirements Conformity assessment Rules of origin Others

Source: constructed by the author using the NTM Firm level survey (available on the International Trade Centre website www.intracen.org).

100

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to other developing regions. As per North Afri- respectively), while Morocco and Mauritania have can countries, both oil and non-oil countries lower figures (18.7% and 16.2% respectively). (except Morocco) have a higher figure than the Political and economic systems have not evol- MENA region’s average. While MENA countries ved in a way that effectively meets the changing have laws that prohibit labour discrimination in needs of its rapidly growing young population. the workplace, the lower levels of participation In that regard, it would be imperative to boost stem from de facto discrimination rather than overall structural and high-value adding indus- from de jure discrimination (Rauch and Kos- tries; stimulate private sector-led job creation by tyshak, 2009). Women in the MENA region face supporting enterprise creation and new firms’ structural barriers in employment, in addition development; strengthen the role of the private to social and cultural impediments limiting their sector in promoting adequate skills development participation in the labour market (Klasen and for the youth, and improve vocational education Lamanna, 2009). and training (VET), on-the-job training and the Second, youth unemployment is substantially provision of quality apprenticeship. high in MENA countries, compared to other re- The MENA region also suffers from a high le- gions (Chart 8). More particularly, countries that vel of inequality and poverty. When compared experienced political instability (Libya, Algeria, to other developing regions, poverty levels are Tunisia and Egypt) have the highest level of youth lower, and inequality of opportunity is higher. In- unemployment (41.6%, 30.7%, 33.5% and 28.4% deed, as shown in Chart 9, the MENA region has,

Chart 8. Unemployment rates (%)

5,3 World $4 12,1 5,7 10,4 MENA 24,6 16,7 7,3 LAC 14,8 ons

i 9,1 g

e 6,6 R SSA 13,1 7,0 2,6 SA 8,0 3,4 4,0 EAP 9,5 3,6 10,5 Egypt 28,4 22,1 15,2 Tunisia 33,5 20,1 10,4

Non-oil Morocco 18,7 10,8 10,8 Mauritania 16,2 13,4 18,5 Libya 41,6 26,1 Oil 15,5 Algeria 30,7 20,2 0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 30,0 35,0 40,0 45,0

Total Youth Female

Source: World Development Indicators online dataset.

101

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on average, a Gini index of 37. Oil-poor countries Why did North African countries perform badly? (Tunisia and Morocco) are those who suffer more from inequality. By contrast, these figures are in An unstable region: internal and external conflicts general lower than other regions such as sub- Saharan African and Latin America. Yet, when in- The MENA region–it is also the case with North equality of opportunities is taken into account, African countries–suffer from several internal and one can notice that the problem becomes more external conflicts that have an impact on their severe. In fact, the MENA region suffers more security. An increase in the number of conflicts at both the education and health levels, which can be observed in the MENA region since 1960: negatively affects its development, increases the level of conflict was relatively moderate un- exclusion and reduces the region’s stability and til the late 1970s, mainly in the form of conflicts security. However, regarding poverty, North Afri- related to decolonization, but during the 1980s can countries in particular, and the MENA region and well into the 1990s, the incidence of conflict in general (with the exception of Mauritania), are in the MENA region increased, with the Iran-Iraq doing better than other developing regions as the war and the Algerian Civil War as the two most share of population below the poverty line ranges intense conflicts (Gates et al., 2012). While the from 3 to 4% (Chart 10). second half of the 1990s was more peaceful than In a nutshell, from a social perspective, the previous, the first decade of the 21st century unemployment and inequality are two crucial again witnessed more violence in the region. Last challenges that ought to be addressed by these but not least, MENA countries have been expe- economies. Along with these social characteris- riencing since December 2010 a revolutionary tics, North African countries exhibit a distorted wave of protests and uprisings collectively refe- scheme of production and trade hinders job rred to as the “Arab Spring” followed by a second creation. The next section will examine the main upsurge in 2019. structural reasons that help explain such a poor It is worth mentioning that the nature of vio- performance. lence has changed over time. While armed con-

Chart 9. Gini Index in the MENA Region

Iran 43 Djibouti 40 Tunisia 40 Morocco 40 Israel 39 Algeria 38 Jordan 36 Syria 36 West Bank and Gaza 36 Yemen 35 Egypt 32 Iraq 29

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Source: World Development Indicators database online dataset. Note: Data for Mauritania and Libya are not available.

102

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Chart 10. Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (% of the population)

SSA 48,9

SA 28,4

n World

ó 19,0 i g e

R EAP 18,7

LAC 8,1

MENA 3,3

Mauritania 16,2

Tunisia 4,3 Morocco Non-oil 3,6

Egypt 3,4 Algeria

Oil 3,2

0,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0

Source: World Development Indicators online dataset.

flicts were dominant until the late 1990s, the are: demands for freedom and justice and the MENA region witnessed since then the appearan- need for changes in the socio-economic model. ce of other types of violence such as non-state Chart 11 shows how the index of political stabi- armed conflicts, one-sided state violence and lity has decreased in all North African countries one-sided non state violence. Apart from the Iraqi (oil and non-oil ones) over the period 1998-2018. war and the persistent Palestinian conflict, much The literature suggests that violence can be of such violence resulted from anti-government enormously disruptive of economic growth, pro- protests, riots, uprisings and civil wars associa- ductivity, investment and international trade. A ted with the “Arab Spring”. Rulers were ousted study by Collier et al. (2003) found that, during from power in Tunisia, Egypt (twice), Libya, and civil war, countries tend to grow by around 2.2% Yemen. Civil uprisings erupted in Bahrain and less than during peacetime. Hence, after a civil Syria, major protests broke out in Algeria, Iraq, war of seven years (the average duration of a Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco, and minor protests conflict), incomes would be around 15% lower in occurred in Oman, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. comparison to a situation had the war not happe- Many demonstrations were met with violence ned, with the particularly worrying consequence and repression from authorities and counter- of a 30% increase in the incidence of absolute po- demonstrators. verty. Note that these impacts are much deeper In 2019, a second wave erupted in Sudan, than the direct loss due to the waste of resour- Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq. Similarly to 2011, ces in extra government military spending that sustained protests led the army to intervene to changes the composition of public spending (less oust incumbent presidents in Sudan and Algeria, spending on human capital and physical capital). either peacefully (the case of the Algerian Presi- Knight et al (1996) quantified the effect of military dent Abdelaziz Bouteflika) or violently (the case spending and showed that the additional 2.2% of Sudan with Omar al-Bashir). The common fea- of GDP spent on the military, sustained over the tures between the two waves of the “Arab Spring”

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Chart 11. Political stability index (1998-2018)

Morocco Mauritania Tunisia 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,3 Algeria Egypt Libya 0,0 0,0 -0,5 -0,3 -0,7 -1,0 -0,8 -0,8 -0,9 -1,2 -1,5

-2,0 -1,9

-2,5 -2,4 -3,0 1998 2018

Source: World Governance Indicators online dataset. Note: (i) Estimate ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). (ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.

seven years would lead to a permanent loss of policies, among others. A distinction needs to around 2% of GDP. be made between de jure and de facto political Growth across North African economies has power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). De facto been unstable as well. In addition to conflict in power is not allocated by de jure institutions such Libya, and unrest in other countries, political ins- as voting legislation or elections but is instead in tability in the region has been associated to migra- the hands of a social group as a result of wealth, tion flows from Syria (mainly to Lebanon, Egypt, violence, or other means. Chart 12 shows how Jordan and other European countries) and Libya economic performance chiefly depends on politi- (especially for internally displaced persons). cal institutions that shape de jure political power, as well as on the distribution of resources that determine de facto political power. Both of them Deficient institutions condition economic and political institutions that, in turn, affect economic performance. Along with political instability, economic and Conventional wisdom argues that institutions political institutions are frequently weak in the can disturb the economy through several chan- Arab World in general, in Northern Africa in par- nels. First, they curtail the ease of doing business. ticular. Institutional weaknesses help explain, at Weak institutions lead to the creation of barriers least in part, the structural problems that were to enforce contracts or start a business and are previously presented. While political institutions associated with higher red tape costs. These phe- refer to the type of political regime, alternation of nomena are represented in Chart 13 showing the power, degree of corruption, accountability and relative ease of doing business in North African independence of different state institutions, eco- economies. The data reveals that oil-countries nomic ones deal with the quality of the business are doing worse than non-oil ones. More parti- environment, competition rules, and financial cularly, we need to mention that Morocco imple-

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Chart 12. Ease of doing business rankings (2019)

Libya 186 Oil Algeria 157

Mauritania 152

Egypt 114

Non-oil Tunisia 78

Morocco 53

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Source: Doing Business online dataset. Note: The ease of doing business ranking ranges from 1 (best) to 190 (worst). The ranking of economies is determined by sorting the aggregate ease of doing business scores.

Chart 13. Control of corruption index (1998-2018)

Morocco 0,20 0,11 Algeria Egypt Libya Mauritania Tunisia 0,00

-0,20 -0,05 -0,22 -0,40 -0,24

-0,60 -0,46 -0,47 -0,59 -0,80 -0,64 -0,81 -1,00 -0,88 -0,91 -1,20

-1,40

-1,60 -1,55 -1,80

1998 2018

Source: World Governance Indicators online dataset. Note: (i) Estimate ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. (ii) Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.

mented several reforms starting the 2000s that ge. In the MENA region, institutions matter with helped improve its business environment. regards to trade operations, increasingly so in Second, institutions also condition the type of contexts of more complex or contract-dependent products in which a country specializes and hen- sectors (Karam and Zaki, 2019)2019).. Third, defideficient cient in-in- ce determine the country’s comparative advanta- stitutions are also the root cause of the so-called

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Chart 14. Domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP)

EAP 141,0 World 121,9

ons SSA 50,2 i g e MENA 43,9 R SA 39,5 LAC 38,1 Tunisia 67,6 Morocco 64,9 Egypt 36,6 Non-oil Mauritania 24,6 Libya 18,3 Oil Algeria 14,8

0,0 20,0 40,0 60,0 80,0 100,0 120,0 140,0 160,0

Source: World Development Indicators online dataset.

natural resource curse. While macroeconomic Chart 15 shows how the six North African coun- mismanagement and oil abundance are essen- tries have a low level of financial development tial determinants of performance, these factors measured by the share of credit to GDP that goes are shaped primarily by the prevailing political to the private sector. The absence of sound institu- institutions which predated resource discovery tional frameworks, including effective contractual and led to a misuse of natural resources (Selim agendas, hampers financial development. and Zaki, 2016). This observation is confirmed in Consequently, political and economic institu- Chart 14, according to which oil-rich countries tions are a central determinant of the low par- (Algeria and Libya) did worse than non-oil ones ticipation of the private sector in North African (Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) over the economies, as well as a significant factor explai- period 1998-2018 since they have a higher nega- ning phenomena such as low growth performan- tive index of control of corruption. ce, stagnant exports and low job creation. The fourth way in which institutions can disturb the economy is through their influence in the financial sector. Weak institutions, hand in hand Between allocation policies and structural adjustment with a discouraging investment climate, deter in- programs vestors from borrowing and could result in a lesser need for financial intermediation. Therefore, the In order to restore their macroeconomic imbalan- allocation of capital will be distorted, which in turn ces, Arab countries have resorted several times leads to lower demand for financial services. As to international financial institutions. Table 1 per oil-rich countries (Algeria and Libya), higher in- summarizes the number of IMF programmes (by vestments in the natural resource sector can lead approval year) implemented in each North Afri- to lower investments in the financial sector and can country since the 1960s, ranging from 5 (in can hinder financial deepening2 (Gylfason, 2004). the case of Algeria) to 20 (Mauritania). These programmes took several forms, yet their effect was 2 Financial deepening refers to the increase in the provi- rather limited due to at least four reasons. First, sion of financial services and a better access for different before the programme’s prescription, needs as- socioeconomic groups. sessments were rarely conducted, whereas these

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Table 1. IMF programs (by approval year)

Country Algeria Egypt Mauritania Morocco Tunisia Stand By and 1989, 1991, 1994 1962, 1964, 1977, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1959, 1965, 1966, 1964, 1965, 1966, Extended Stand 1987, 1991, 1996 1985, 1986, 1987 1967, 1968, 1969, 1967, 1969, 1970, By Agreement 1971, 1982, 1983, 1986, 2013 (SBA) 1985, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992 Poverty Reduc- 2003 tion and Growth 2006 Facility (PRGF) Extended Fund 1995 1978, 1993, 2016 1980, 1981 1988, 2016 Facility (EFF) Extended Credit 1989, 1992, 1995, Facility (ECF) 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2017 Structural 1993 1986, 1992, 1995, adjustment 1999 facility (SAF) and Enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) Others 2012, 2014, 2018 (PLL) Total 5 9 20 19 10

Source: IMF Monitoring of Fund Agreements Database and IMF website (History of Lending Arrangements by country) https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/mona/index.aspx

programmes need to be tailored to the real prio- All in all, despite several reforms, North African rities of the country (Oppong, 2014)3. Second, economies did not manage to improve their per- in several cases, there is a lack of commitment formance throughout the period 1990-2017. The from governments when it comes to countries fourth reason pertains to the lack of an inclusive that adopt an adjustment programme: once the social component in these programmes. They latter is finished, the post-reform era is not com- all have targeted macroeconomic management plemented by more-in-depth and more structural without genuinely addressing poverty, inequality reforms. Third, all of these programmes included or the exclusion of youth or women. more stabilization policies rather than allocation Note: Stand By and Extended Stand By Agree- policies. While the former help the economy re- ment (SBA) and The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) duce the output gap in the short term to restore are used to help countries address balance of macroeconomic aggregates, the latter help the payments difficulties related partly to struc- economy improve its structure and better allo- tural problems that may take longer to correct cate its resources (Youssef and Zaki, 2019). Thus, than macroeconomic imbalances. The Extended such a reform programme can address short term Credit Facility (ECF) provides financial assistance problems, but does not address long term ones. to countries with protracted balance of payments problems. The ECF succeeds the Poverty Reduc- 3 Oppong’s study focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, but its tion and Growth Facility (PRGF) as the Fund’s findings also apply to North African countries. main tool for providing medium-term support to

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low-income countries. The Structural Adjustment quality of their exports and hence become more Facility (SAF) was a program of the International competitive. A vital component, in terms of poli- Monetary Fund set up in 1986 and soon replaced cymaking, would be that these countries set out a by the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility medium-term economic strategy that is credible (ESAF) in 1987. As a condition of financial as- and transparent to their population, as well as to sistance, countries were required to implement both domestic and foreign investors. structural adjustment programs. Apropos oil-abundant countries, oil prices To conclude, all these programmes, notwith- and the design of macroeconomic policies are standing their positive effect on the economy in the essential in improving the region’s fate. Indeed, short run, did not address the root causes of the the decline in oil prices will have major, and en- countries’ problems, and hence failed to resolve during, effects on fiscal and external positions in their structural problems presented in section 2. oil-exporting and oil-importing countries alike. Second, fiscal adjustment programmes must be put in place so that countries can share the redu- The way forward ced oil wealth equitably with future generations and rebuild buffers equipped to deal with oil The objective of this chapter was to analyse the price volatility. The latter factor explains why di- main structural characteristics of North African fferent governments should develop macroeco- economies and explain the reasons behind their nomic policies that counter-balance the oil effect. performance and shortcomings. First, three main Third, to increase economic diversification, boos- characteristics proved to be central when analy- ting the manufacturing sector is likely to gene- sing these economies: a volatile and jobless eco- rate jobs for youth. It goes without saying that nomic growth, with a poor trade performance allocating higher amounts from current spending mainly concentrated either in oil or in traditional to productive spending (health, education and products and, consequently, high levels of unem- infrastructure) is a must to reduce exclusion. ployment, particularly in the case of women and As per the bilateral relations between the youth. Second, the main reasons behind this poor EU and North African countries, it is essential to performance can be summarized in three points: note that the biggest chunk of EU-North Africa political instability and frequent conflicts, deficient relations is chiefly related to trade liberalization. and weak economic and political institutions and, Furthermore, most amongst EU interventions finally, reforms that did not address the structural have been focusing on stabilization programmes problems of these countries’ economies. that do not address issues related to the structu- From a policy perspective, in terms of both ral characteristics of the North African countries. oil and non-oil countries and in order to move This is why, from the EU side, negotiations must forward, deeper and more inclusive reforms are be more inclusive by involving different stakehol- needed. Neither growth nor development can ders (not only governments but also civil socie- be sustained in the long term unless economic ty, commerce chambers, trade unions, private and political institutions are made efficient. Se- sector). This could lead to an agreement more cond, improving the structure of the economies tailored to the needs of all stakeholders, a first through a competitive manufacturing sector step to a more effective and mutually beneficial would help North African countries generate partnership. Second, trade negotiations should more jobs and produce more competitive pro- also go hand in hand with national industrial po- ducts that help enhance the export structure of licies. In this field, trade negotiations with the EU these economies. At the external level, it would were neither tailored to local needs nor did they be crucial to increase the participation of these reflect the industrial priorities of North African countries in global value chains to increase the countries. Third, from a social perspective, a gen-

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der perspective must be present, since past texts’ Bottom-Up Perspective”, MEDRESET, Policy effect on women’s progress was somewhat limi- Papers, no. 7, 2019. ted. Fourth, the EU shall provide technical and Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.: “The Role of Ins- financial assistance to Arab countries in order to titutions in Growth and Development”, Work- meet product requirements imposed by the EU. ing Paper, no. 10, ommission on Growth and From the perspective of North African coun- Development, the International Bank for Re- tries, three priorities could be taken into conside- construction and Development, Washington, ration. First, improving the investment climate is USA, 2008. a must in order to encourage more FDI in the ma- Amin, M., Assaad, R., Al-Baharna, N., Dervis, K., nufacturing sector in general and in high- added- Desai, R. M., and Graham, C.: After the spring: value sectors in particular. This will help these Economic transitions in the Arab world, Oxford countries upgrade and diversify their products, University Press, 2012. and hence their ability to compete for increased Augier, P., Cadot, O., Gourdon, J., and Malouche, access to the EU market. As a consequence of M.: Non-tariff measures in the MNA region: Im- the current pandemic and the phenomenon of proving Governance for Competitiveness, World de-globalization, North African countries have Bank MENA Working Paper Series, 56, 2012. a comparative advantage in the possibility of Baghdadi L., BenKheder, S. and Arouri, H.: “Im- developing regional value chains with the EU pact of non-tariff measures on firms in Tuni- and the block’s member states: European facto- sia”, Review of Development Economics, 2019. ries might try to bring the supply chain close to Collier, P., Elliot, L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Rey- customer demand with on-shore or near-shore nal-Querol, M., and Sambanis, N.: Breaking production lines (Baldwin and Tomiura, 2020). the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Notwithstanding the latter, it is no less true that Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. the coronavirus pandemic exposes the vulnerabi- Diwan, I., Chang-Po, Y. and Wang, Z.: “The Arab lity of countries and companies that rely heavily Economy, the Uruguay Round Predicament, on a limited number of trading partners: a lesson and the European Union Wildcard”. In: Nemat for North African countries is the need to further Shafik (ed.), Prospects for Middle Eastern and diversify their providers of intermediate inputs. North African Economies, Macmillan, London, Second, more focus on SMEs is needed in order 1997. to generate more jobs, and especially for women. Eibl, F. and Malik, A.: The Politics of Partial Liber- Yet, it is worth noting that, without the formation alization: Cronyism and Non-Tariff Protection of clusters between large foreign firms and do- in Mubarak’s Egypt, Centre for the Study of mestic SMEs, the latter will remain fragile and not African Economies, 2016. able to grow. Gates, S., Hegre, H., Nygård, H. M., and Strand, Finally, having a clear industrial strategy with H.: “Development consequences of armed specific instruments and goals will help these conflict”, World Development, vol. 40, no. 9, countries link their industrial policy to a solid 2012, pp. 1713-1722. trade policy, thus amplifying the positive effect Gylfason and Thorvaldur: “Natural Resources, of the latter on trade, growth and employment. Education, and Economic Development”, European Economic Review, vol. 45, no. 4-6, 2004, pp. 847-859. References Hoekman, B.: “The World Trade Organization, the European Union, and the Arab World: Tra- Aboushady, N., Zaki, C., Moisseron, J. and Gues- de Policy Priorities and Pitfalls,” en: N. Shafik mi, K.: “Assessing EU–Mediterranean Policies (ed.), Prospects for Middle Eastern and North in the Fields of Industry and Energy from a African Economies, Macmillan, London, 1997.

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International Trade Center: Making regional in- Design or Policy Implementation?”, Journal of tegration work Company perspectives on non- Empirical Economics, Research Academy of So- tariff measures in Arab States, Geneva, 2015. cial Sciences, vol. 3, no. 5, 2014, pp. 321-331. Karam, F. and Zaki, C.: “How Did Wars Dampen Rauch, J. E. and Kostyshak, S.: “The three Arab Trade in the MENA Region?”, Applied Econom- worlds”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, ics, vol. 48, no. 60, 2016, pp. 5909-5930. vol. 23, no. 3, 2009, pp. 165-88. Karam, F. and Zaki, C.: “On the Determinants of Selim, H., and Zaki, C.: “The Institutional Curse Trade in Services: Evidence from the MENA of Natural Resources in the Arab World”. In: I. Region”, Applied Economics, vol. 45, no. 33, El Badawi and H. Selim, Understanding and 2013, pp. 4626-4640. Avoiding the Resource Curse in the Arab Re- Karam, F. and Zaki, C.: “Trade Volume and Eco- gion, Cambridge University Press, 2016. nomic Growth in the MENA Region: Goods or Shafik, N.: “Economic Challenges Facing Middle Services?”, Economic Modeling, vol. 45, 2015, Eastern and North African Countries: An Over- pp. 23-37. view”, en: Economic Challenges Facing Middle Karam, F. and Zaki, C.: “Why Can’t MENA Coun- Eastern and North African Countries, Palgrave tries Trade More? The Curse of Bad Institu- Macmillan, London, 1998, pp. 1-9. tions”, Quarterly Review of Economics and Waterbury, J.: “The State and Economic Transi- Finance, vol. 73, 2019, pp. 56-77. tion in the Middle East and North Africa,” en: Klasen, S. and Lamanna, F.: “The impact of gen- N. Shafik (ed.), Prospects for Middle Eastern der inequality in education and employment and North African Economies, Macmillan, Lon- on economic growth: new evidence for a pa- don, 1997. nel of countries”, Feminist economics, vol. 15, World Bank: Claiming the Future: Choosing Pros- no. 3, 2009, pp. 91-132. perity in the Middle East and North Africa, Knight, M., Loayza, N. and Villanueva, D.: “The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1995. peace dividend: Military spending cuts and Youssef, J. and Zaki, C.: “Between Stabilization economic growth”, IMF Staff Papers, no. 43, and Allocation in the MENA Region: Are Com- 1996, pp. 1-44. petition Laws Helping”, ERF Working Paper, Oppong, N.: “Failure of Structural Adjustment no. 1319, 2019. Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy

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informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 110 10/11/20 9:39 9. The strengthening of authoritarianism in Egypt

Barbara Azaola Piazza

Almost ten years after the outbreak of anti- disease, such as the ratification of amendments authoritarian protests that forced the fall of to the Emergency Law granting more power to then-President Hosni Mubarak, power in Egypt the president and the army over civilians who has been concentrated in the hands of Marshal violate the law, are expected to have a long-term Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and the ubiquitous Armed impact in the country’s political life beyond the Forces. Since the coup d’état against Mohamed health crisis. In a context of heightened political Morsi in July 2013, al-Sisi has launched a strat- and economic fragility, al-Sisi has also utilised egy of rebuilding authoritarianism. This strategy the pandemic to improve its image on the inter- is grounded on an increase in the repression and national scene and strengthen the support of neutralisation of political space and civil society countries such as the United States, the United that has not been accompanied by a reduction Kingdom, China and Italy, through the dispatch in inequalities. Egypt has a two-speed economy of medical equipment. That equipment was nev- that perpetuates the social contrasts of a coun- ertheless lacking in the country’s inland areas, try with a population that has just surpassed the where the disease has struck with greater intensi- symbolic figure of 100 million inhabitants. The ty than in other North African states. The authori- strengthening of this process of authoritarian res- ties were forced to request emergency aid from toration has gone hand in hand with a realign- the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to alleviate ment of alliances and the strengthening of the the economic consequences of the crisis, primar- political and economic ties with Saudi Arabia and ily in view of the possibility of not being able to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the country’s further receive financial transfers from the region leading financial backers. This realignment has as a consequence of the sharp drop in oil prices. been replicated in conflicts in North Africa (Libya) and the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen). Although the disruption of the political transformation process The hegemony of the Armed Forces initiated in 2011 led to Egypt’s expulsion from the African Union (AU) in 2013, the importance The Egyptian Army was the backbone of the re- of its interests in the Nile Basin has prompted gimes of Gamal Abdel Naser (1954-1970), Anwar the country to strengthen its relations with sub- al-Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981- Saharan Africa. 2011) for nearly 60 years. In those six decades of In the manner of other authoritarian regimes, uninterrupted militarism, members of the Armed the Egyptian regime has taken advantage of the Forces enjoyed enormous economic and politi- outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic that broke cal privileges. However, part of the military elite out in the country in March 2020 to intensify the saw how this central role was under threat dur- muzzling of voices critical of its management, ing Mubarak’s last years of rule. The emergence and further restrict personal liberties. Measures of a new class of economic stakeholders linked taken by al-Sisi to control the outbreak of the to his son Gamal and the fear that their economic

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privileges would be lost partially explain the po- since 1986 from the United States as a result of the sition of the military institution during the 2011 signing of the 1979Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, protests, the so-called “January 25 Revolution”. which turned Washington into the leading sup- Faced with mobilisations that had their epicen- plier of weapons to the Egyptian Army. tre in Tahrir Square (Cairo), the leaders of the Above this business conglomerate, there is Armed Forces sacrificed Mubarak. The Army was an indeterminate number of retired officials who in charge of overseeing, from that moment on- oversee the bureaucratic apparatus of the state in wards, a process of political transformation that charge of managing the daily life of the popula- made possible the arrival of the Muslim Brother- tion (Sayigh, 2019). In al-Sisi’s Egypt, the decision- hood to the presidency of the country through the making process has been characterised by even ballot box. This cohabitation between the Army greater opacity, centralisation and militarisation. and the Muslim Brotherhood came to a head in The President has virtually no civilian advisers. 2013, when then-Minister of Defence Abdel Fat- That is also the case with governors and senior tah al-Sisi led a coup d’état against President Mo- officials in ministries. The privileges enjoyed by hamed Morsi. The episode ended a brief civilian the Army were guaranteed by the Constitution span and allowed for the return of the Army to adopted in a referendum in 2014, and reinforced the front line. The coming to power of al-Sisi has by the amendments introduced in 2019, which meant that a fourth military ruler has the reins of allow the military to intervene even more directly the country, thus further strengthening the he- in political and financial matters. gemonic role of the military. The so-called “deep The importance attached by the Egyptian state” has remained in the hands of the Armed Army to the propaganda apparatus and the con- Forces, while the daily lives of the citizens are trol of the media is worth noting. For propagan- subject to visible or invisible surveillance by the da purposes, both inside and outside the Armed military, on the grounds of ensuring their security Forces, the military has a public relations agency or protecting the nation. called the Department of Moral Affairs (Abul- These Armed Forces have built up a sizeable Magd, 2018). Through this agency, advertising business empire, accumulating capital and prop- pieces, songs and documentaries are produced erties, especially since the 1980s. This emporium to praise the work of the Army. Public radio and produces an immense range of goods and ser- television are under the direction of the Ministry vices, both military and civilian. The number of of Defence, and military intelligence agencies companies, their annual profits, and their per- have been acquiring major private media com- centage in relation to the country’s economy, panies since 2015. Others were driven out of the are fundamentally impossible to estimate, since market as military and security agencies gained companies linked to the Army are exempt from control over media production companies (Say- taxes and the audit control by the Parliament or igh, 2019). public agencies and are neither listed on the stock The regime of al-Sisi has also developed a new exchange under the profile of open companies. form of militarization, which consists of the use Studies, such as those by R. Springborg, estimate of counter-terrorism rhetoric to justify absolute that their assets can reach up to 40% of the Gross control of the population and to turn citizens’ Domestic Product (Abul-Magd, 2018). Nonethe- lives into a “battlespace” (Abul-Magd, 2018). In less, we have knowledge of the amount of the the name of the “fight against domestic terror- government budget allocated to the Army, which ism”, the military has accumulated both higher in 2015-2016 fiscal year was $5.6 billion (4.9% of profits and more repressive power. This is the the total) a billion more than in the period 2010- case mainly in the Sinai Peninsula, where the 2011. Add to this the $1.3 billion of fixed annual emergency law has been in force in different ar- military aid that has been continuously received eas since October 2014, along with the curfew,

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turning the peninsula into an “opaque territory”, the state of emergency was uninterruptedly in a virtually inaccessible area. The Egyptian Army, force and drastically affected the political life of has launched a process of securitisation of Egyp- the country. tian society’s life that was initiated decades ago. This institutionalisation of repression presents some characteristics that could be summarised in the criminalization of voices of dissent in the The security alibi name of national security and the fight against terrorism; the implementation of legal reforms to As Hosni Mubarak did, Marshal Abdel Fattah al- institutionalise previous repressive extrajudicial Sisi presents himself as the guarantor of stability practices and strengthen security control over in the region in the face of the Islamist threat. He civil society; and the harassment and defama- aims at boosting Egypt’s regional leadership, as tion of leading activists and human rights orga- well as gaining international legitimacy. Al-Sisi nizations (Brechenmacher, 2017). In the context has not only exploited this argument since com- of the so-called “war on terror”, al-Sisi enacted ing to power but has entrenched it during his two decree-laws (the “Terrorist Entities Act” and first mandate (2014-2018). His purpose is both to the “Anti-Terrorism Act”) which not only violate strengthen Egyptian foreign policy and ratify the international human rights legislation due to the firmness of his regime domestically. In that return way they are drafted but also because of how they to the security paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s, are implemented, making it possible for the state the marshal has used this argument in his rela- to repress any sign of dissent on the pretext of tions with European and American governments, national security. Both texts were ratified during which see his regime as a guarantee of stability in the first session of the Parliament elected during the face of the conflicts in Syria and Libya. October 2015 legislative elections, without any The regime has taken advantage of the prior- revision or discussion, along with more than 300 ity given by the international agenda to the fight decrees issued by the President, in what could be against jihadist terrorism following the Daesh’ ir- perceived as an example of subordination of the ruption in 2014. Exploiting this security alibi has new Chamber of Deputies to the executive power.1 allowed al-Sisi, at least until now, to avoid external pressures related to the field of human rights and freedoms. With the purpose of guarantee- 1 “TIMEP Brief: Terrorist Entities Law”, April 4th 2019. Re- ing security and under the pretext of the terrorist trieved from: https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep- threat, the regime has legitimized the prosecu- brief-terrorist-entities-law/; “TIMEP Brief: Counter-Ter- th tion of political activists and opponents, not only rorism Law”, August 15 2018. Retrieved from: https:// timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-counter-terror- from the Islamist field (members or supporters ism-law/. The Geneva-based organization Committee for of the Muslim Brotherhood, declared a terror- Justice (https://www.cfjustice.org/category/egypt/) do- ist organization for the first time in its history in cumented more than 2,000 people officially designated December 2013) but from any position criticis- as terrorists by the Egyptian State in late 2019, including ing the regime. Al-Sisi has launched a strategy Islamist politician Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, president to strengthen authoritarianism, mainly through of the Misr al-Qawiyya party and presidential candidate institutionalised repression and an attempt to in 2012, in pre-trial detention since February 2018. “Re- “normalise” exceptional measures. This reper- setting the prison clock: Aboul Fotouh charged in new case days before completing maximum two years in re- toire of mechanisms includes the state of emer- mand detention”, Mada Masr, February 4th 2020. Retrieved gency law, which has been in force throughout from: https://madamasr.com/en/2020/02/04/news/u/ the country since April 2017 and continuously resetting-the-prison-clock-aboul-fotouh-charged-in- extended every three months. It should be renew-case-days-before-completing-maximum-two-years- called that during Mubarak’s 30-year mandate, in-remand-detention/

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The neutralization of political and associative spaces ries of videos on YouTube3 in which he denounced the corruption of the Army and directly implicat- Political participation, and the multiparty system ed President al-Sisi (González, 2019). The videos that emerged after Mubarak’s ouster in Febru- were circulated on social media and went viral. ary 2011, have been neutralized. Nowadays, the The call for demonstrations, was not, as ex- single aim of democratic parties is their survival. pected, met with a significant response. Among With the Muslim Brotherhood excised from the other reasons, we can cite both the lack of organi- political and social arena, the only Islamist force zational support within the country and the fear with an active presence in the political arena, at installed in large part of the population. How- the cost of aligning itself with the regime of al- ever, the message launched in those videos was Sisi, has been the Salafist al-Nour party. At the received with ample indignation by sectors of institutional level, the regime has succeeded in society that began to lose the trust placed in the shaping a loyal Parliament, with little opposition, Army six years before and demanded responsibil- which ungrudgingly approves the decrees issued ity from their President. Faced with the possibility by the executive. Alternation in power in the short of a popular uprising, the regime intensified the to medium term is therefore not foreseeable. A repression exerted until then. Any citizen could scenario of overhaul becomes even less likely become a suspect for the simple fact of being on following the adoption in a 2019 referendum of the street.4 In September 2019, the mandate of constitutional amendments allowing al-Sisi to July 26, 2013 came to an end. Al-Sisi called for the remain in office until 2024, with the possibility of support of the population in massive demonstra- a new mandate until 2030. These amendments tions in central Cairo to legitimise his fight against also transferred greater powers from the judiciary terrorism and ensure the stability of the country to the executive, extended the authority of mili- (Naeem, 2019). Six years after 2013, security tary courts, and legitimised the political interven- forces were deployed along the same streets that tion of the military, which the text designate as witnessed the protests then, this time to prevent custodians of democracy and the Constitution citizens from demonstrating, turning them into (Rohl and Miehe, 2019). potential suspects. Police harassment completes The re-politisation of society motivated by a governmental plan to drastically change the the “January 25 Revolution”, with new forms of centre of the capital, a space that bore witness social protest and collective action, especially to a revolution and where political and affective among young people, has been curbed by de- goals converged (Wahba, 2020). Nine years later, terrent measures such as the draconian Protest the goal is to erase every trace of these affective Law.2 This regulation criminalises protest and links, particularly by preventing the humblest in- abolishes the right of citizens to demonstrate and habitants from mobilizing and transferring them assemble peacefully, curbing freedom of expres- to new residential areas on the outskirts of Cairo. sion (Hamzawy, 2017). So far, the last attempts at This is part of the project to relocate the capital a demonstration took place in September 2019, in of the country to a new city built 40 kilometres response to Mohamed Ali’s call for mobilisation. from Cairo. Ali is an Egyptian builder residing in Spain, who had until recently entered into business with the 3 Egyptian Armed Forces. He claimed 12 million eu- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LabeA7ML4Iw 4 In just three weeks between September and October ros for a subcontracted project and posted a se- 2019, nearly 4,300 people were arrested. By the end of 2019, the number of political prisoners in Egyptian prisons could exceed 100,000, according to the Egyptian 2 The text of the is law available at: http://constitutionnet. organization Egyptian Commission for Rights and Free- org/sites/default/files/protest_law_issued_nov_24.pdf doms. Retrieved from: https://www.ec-rf.net.

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The absence of feminist activism in the streets As was the case with women, and given the is also noteworthy. Egypt was once a pioneer of fact that 60% of the population is under 30, the the Arab feminist movement, with a long tradi- Egyptian authorities had included youth issues tion of associationism in defence of women’s in their official agenda. In 2015, al-Sisi launched rights. However, recent protests have not seen, the Presidential Leadership Programs, aiming to for example, the participatory protest “Un viola- “help develop job opportunities and train young dor en tu camino”, a performance by the Chilean people to be part of the political and governance feminist group LasTesis, which has been staged process”. A closer look at these strategies reveals in other countries of the region, such as Tunisia, a lack of sustainable policies that could benefit Lebanon or Morocco, throughout 2019 in a dis- from these programs (Sika, 2019). The state, play of transnational feminist solidarity. In Egypt, in implementing these programs and follow- sexual harassment of women is endemic, and ing Mubarak’s example, sponsors national and 99% of women and girls reported some form of international conferences. Those meetings are sexual harassment in 2013 (Amnesty Internation- held with associations of young people close to al, 2015). The institutional blockade of women’s the Head of State, and with an apparent propa- organizations, together with the closure of public gandistic purpose. An example is the World Youth space, makes it virtually impossible to develop Forum of 2019, held in the Egyptian city of Sharm an independent feminist agenda and activism, El Sheikh, in which the official discourse of “a especially in a global context in which feminism promising youth” contrasts with the situation of has proven to be a powerful social movement marginalization in which most young Egyptians with transnational ramifications (Moghadam, live. 2020). Despite the fact that, on paper, the 2014 Constitution guarantees broad rights to women, and that the crime of sexual harassment was in- Economic policy and inequalities cluded in the Criminal Code in the same year (Tripp, 2019), in practice, the plaintiff ends up In a general context of lack of freedom of expres- by being criminalised and detained.5 The regime sion and neutralisation of political participation, tries to stage its support for women with initia- socio-economic inequalities, one of the main tives such as declaring 2017 “the Year of Egyptian reasons that led to the mobilisations in 2011, Women”,6 instrumentalising the gender agenda have worsened. The measures imposed by the as internal and external propaganda, while fe- IMF as a condition of the $12 billion loan granted male journalists, lawyers and activists are peri- to the Egyptian government in November 2016 odically imprisoned.7 (the largest loan granted by this organisation in the region) have resulted, inter alia, in an increase in the prices of staples, the elimination of 5 One example is activist Amal Fathy, who, in 2018, after denouncing on social media the lack of protection by the fuel subsidies and the devaluation of the pound. government for women who suffer sexual harassment, Although macroeconomic indicators improved was arrested and sentenced to two years in prison. “Amal three years after the granting of the loan (the Fathy: Egypt court imposes jail term over harassment government deficit stood at 8% in 2018, infla- video”, BBC, December 31st 2018. Retrieved from: https:// tion fell below 5%, and the GDP growth forecast www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46720727 for 2019 was 5.8) the rise in the poverty rate has 6 “2017… Year of Egyptian Women”, State Information Ser- vice. Retrieved from: http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/108222?l ang=en-us Abdel Fattah (held in October 2019). On the situation of 7 Among the most recent cases, we can mention lawyer women in Egyptian prisons, see the report “Forgotten in Mahienuor El Masry (held in September 2019), journalist Al Qanater” by Egyptian Front for Human Rights organiza- Solafa Magdy (held in November 2019) and activist Israa tion. Retrieved from: https://egyptianfront.org/

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accelerated. While the average of the last two glected rail network. The hydrocarbon sector is decades was 2%, the increase in the two years the only sector in which efforts have been made following the implementation of the reform pro- to attract multinationals, such as the Italian oil gram amounted to more than 4.7%, especially in company ENI, following the discovery in 2015 of urban centres, resulting in a raise in the number the Zohr natural gas field in Egyptian Mediterra- of Egyptians living in poverty to almost a third of nean waters (Joyci, 2020). the population (32.5%) (Daly, 2019). In November 2019, informal talks were held In the major cities (Cairo, Alexandria, Port between the Egyptian government and the IMF, Said and Suez), prices of electricity, water, gas, coinciding with the date of termination of the food and services has markedly augmented. Em- loan from this institution, for the possible sign- ployment figures in these areas have, however, ing of a new agreement. According to experts, this not improved. More than 1.6 million job-seekers pact would have led to further tax increases and enter the labour market each year and become privatisations in the public sector.8 The details of part of a vast workforce in which they are con- this new agreement have not yet been specified. demned to casual occupations and which in- It is clear that it would have evinced a challenge cludes many university graduates (Sereni, 2019). the IMF faced: the absence of the private sector, in Although the most disadvantaged areas with a scenario of unfair competition by the powerful the highest illiteracy rates remain the poorest, business network of the Army that, in addition the level of poverty there has declined. Tempo- to being exempt from paying taxes, controls who rary jobs have landed in unskilled workers from can do business in the country. the most disadvantaged areas of the country. Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pan- These individuals, on receiving a minimum in- demic in March 2020, the Egyptian government come, have helped ensure that the poverty rate was forced to request emergency aid from the has not increased in these areas (Daly, 2019). IMF to deal with its balance of payments. In ear- These temporary jobs are linked to the projects ly May, this aid was granted through a loan of launched as a result of the implementation of $ 2,777 million under the umbrella of the Rapid the reform programs, based mainly on the con- Financing Instrument (RFI). The financial institu- struction of infrastructures (bridges, roads, the tion, justifying the concession, praised “the suc- extension of the Suez Canal, etc.) and residential cessful program of economic reforms” carried areas, in addition to the construction of the new out by Egypt in the past three years, as well as administrative capital, located on the outskirts the measures adopted by the country’s authori- of Cairo, with a total cost that would amount to ties after the outbreak of the pandemic to limit between 45 billion and 80 billion dollars (Sayigh, its spread and grant support to the affected peo- 2019). The launch of these mega-projects has ple and companies.9 been one of the hallmarks of the al-Sisi administration, but also one of the central causes of its indebtedness. 8 Mabrouk, N.: “Egypt eyes new IMF deal”, Al Monitor, No- Despite injections of money, not only from vember 13th 2019. Retrieved from: www.al-monitor.com/ international institutions but also from allied pulse/originals/2019/11/egypt-imf-new-non-loandeal- countries of the regime in the region such as negotiations-reform-package.html 9 Saudi Arabia or the UAE, the Egyptian authori- IMF: “IMF Executive Board approves US$ 2.772 Bil- lion in Emergency Support to Egypt to Address the CO- ties have not implemented structural changes VID-19 Pandemic”, Press Release no. 20/215, May 11st in the production system. There has been no in- 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/News/ crease in opportunities to offer skilled jobs, nor Articles/2020/05/11/pr20215-egypt-imf-executive-board- has there been any improvement in the public approves-us-2-772b-in-emergency-support-to-address- health system, the education system or the ne- the-covid19

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The regional alignment with Saudi Arabia and the hand with a deployment of troops on the ground United Arab Emirates (Azaola, 2019). The most significant disagreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia arose after the With the coming to power of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, visit to Cairo in April 2016 of the then-new Saudi some of the region’s most conservative regimes, monarch, Salman bin Abdulaziz, during which up led by Saudi Arabia, openly opted for the political to 24 investment plans were signed. However, the and financial support for counter-revolutionary re- visit was also the framework of a controversial gimes. Saudi Arabia and the UAE then became the dossier, which was seen as yet another example preferred partners of the military regime, displac- of the conditionality of Saudi financial aid: the ing Qatar and Turkey from their position as priority announcement of the transfer by Egypt to the allies of ousted Islamist President Mohamed Morsi. Saudi kingdom of Tiran and Sanafir, two islets of The realignment of regional alliances had a consid- the Red Sea that are central to Israel’s access to erable impact on the Egyptian domestic scene. Al- the sea. For Egyptian public opinion, the trans- Sisi needed the financial support of the Saudi and fer was an attack on national sovereignty and Emirate monarchies to revive the Egyptian econo- pride, and provoked the greatest protests in size, my, as well as to strengthen his repression against so far, since al-Sisi came to power (Azaola, 2019). the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, these The agreement was brought before the courts, Gulf countries needed al-Sisi to help defeat and although, finally, under Saudi pressure, the Con- prevent the expansion of the Islamist organization stitutional Court ruled in favour of the legislative in the region (Azaola, 2019). In early 2014, the inter- and executive powers on this issue (Ezzat, 2019).10 im government, backed by the Armed Forces, re- Although Egyptian-Saudi relations deteriorated ceived $12 billion from the UAE, Saudi Arabia and throughout 2016, mainly due to the islands’ litiga- Kuwait (the same amount it would later receive tion, the cooling did not prevent close coopera- from the IMF) through various types of aid: cash, tion between the two countries from continuing. oil, project financing, and deposits in the Central In 2017, Egypt would participate in the blockade Bank to boost the Egyptian pound. The figure imposed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Qa- reached over $20 billion in May 2014, shortly be- tar, citing, among other reasons, Doha’s ties with fore al-Sisi was ratified at the polls as President of the Muslim Brotherhood. the Republic, and at the end of 2015, it reached $42 This alliance between Cairo, Riyadh and Abu billion (Azaola, 2019). The economic impact that Dhabi has been felt in several territories. One ex- the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has had, ample is Libya, the borders of which have been a both in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with a sharp hotspot for Egyptian stability since 2011. In Feb- drop in the price of oil, raises uncertainties about ruary 2015, after 21 Coptic workers were killed the ability of both countries to continue providing by Daesh, al-Sisi supported the bombing of the financial support, especially in the case of Saudi UAE on targets of the terrorist organization in the Arabia, to the Egyptian regime. east of the country. In line with his firm-hand do- In a regional context of shared strategic and mestic strategy against Islamist organizations, of security interests in the fight against jihadist ter- both political Islam and the jihadist spectrum, rorism, political and financial cooperation with al-Sisi has shown his support, both military and the UAE and Saudi Arabia has increased through in intelligence, for Marshal Khalifa Haftar and security support, both on the Sinai Peninsula and his anti-Islamist campaign. Cairo considered the on the border with Libya. In return, Saudi Arabia would count on Cairo’s support in the war that 10 � This case also highlighted the crucial role of public started in Yemen in 2015. However, this episode interest lawyers (or social lawyers). They were the ones generated tensions between the two countries, who challenged the illegality of the agreement in Court given that the Egyptian support did not go hand in and led the campaigns against the transfer.

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Tobruk-based government, led by Haftar, to be where senior security officials from various Arab “legitimate” as opposed to the one recognized countries discussed increasing international in- by the international community in Tripoli. Cairo’s tervention in regional affairs and threats to the support thus facilitated the deployment in eastern unity and territorial integrity of Arab States.12 Libya of the troops of Haftar, who was inspired by Another frontier hotspot for Egypt’s sover- the Egyptian economic militarization model (ex- eignty and stability is the Sinai Peninsula. Since plained above) to organize his forces (Bensaad, 2011, one of the main challenges that the suc- 2020). In parallel to that military and strategic cessive Egyptian Governments have faced is the collaboration with Haftar, al-Sisi maintains a rhe- deterioration of security in the area. Israel was torical discourse in support of a political solution relieved by al-Sisi’s coming to power, thanks in dialogued between the different factions and de- particular to his relentless fight against Islamist fends, in his official statements, the sovereignty forces. A few weeks after Morsi’s overthrow, al- and territorial integrity of Libya (Dentice, 2017). Sisi managed to convince Israel of the need to In any case, the Egyptian support was joined deploy Egyptian military battalions on the pen- by the support of France, which, under the presi- insula (something that broke the terms of the dency of Emmanuel Macron, has strengthened appendix to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of its alliance with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. France 1979) with the aim of protecting Sinai from jihad- has engaged directly on the ground, sent weap- ist groups (Azaola, 2018). This gesture signalled ons through Egypt, and launched a diplomatic a strengthening of security relations between campaign on behalf of Marshal Haftar, portraying Egypt and Israel and underpinned the latter’s him as a statesman. The failure of Haftar’s cam- confidence in the Egyptian president. Hence, in paign for the takeover of Tripoli in April 2019 ac- al-Sisi Egypt, there has been a strengthening of celerated the internationalization of the conflict the already traditional Egyptian-Israeli relations through Russia’s support for the Tobruk-based at the strategic, security and diplomatic levels, as government by sending mercenaries, and Tur- well as the economic level. key’s support for the Tripoli government pre- However, severe anti-protest and counter- sided by al-Sarraj. Egypt is strongly opposed to terrorism laws have minimized the possibility of the Turkish military presence in Libya and has Egyptian public opinion, mostly anti-Israeli, ex- decided to play the card of the intelligence ser- pressing its rejection of the normalization of its vices. In order to contain Ankara’s influence in the relations with Israel, traditionally a reason for the Maghreb, Abbas Kamel, head of Egyptian espio- mobilisations of political and social forces, “tol- nage services, was sent on a tour of North African erated” in part by Mubarak (Azaola, 2018). Under countries in February 2020. This is the context of the al-Sisi regime, there have been no mobilisa- his meeting with senior Moroccan security offi- tions against this new phase of normalization of cials, at a time when Turkish-Moroccan relations its relations with Israel, just as there have been no are going through a phase of disagreement.11 In mobilisations against Trump’s “vision” of Palestin- line with this bet on the intelligence services, al- ian-Israeli relations, reflected in the so-called “Deal Sisi hosted the Arab Intelligence Forum in Cairo, of the Century” presented by the US President at the end of January 2020 in the White House, together with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. The 11 � “L’Egypte veut une implication des renseignements maghrébins contre l’intervention turque en Libye”, Yabiladi, February 24th 2020. Retrieved from: https:// 12 � “Al-Sisi meets intelligence chiefs participating in Cai- www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/89665/1/550920/l- ro’s Arab Intelligence Forum”, Daily News Egypt, February egypte-veut-implication-renseignements-maghrebins. 24th 2020. Retrieved from: https://ww.dailynewssegypt. html?utm_source=newsletter_actu&utm_medium=email&utm_ com/2020/02/24/al-sisi-meets-intelligence-chiefs-partic- campaign=newsletter_actus_html ipating-in-cairos-arab-intelligence-forum/

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agreement was viewed by Cairo as “an effort by the Sudan and the African Union come into play Trump Administration to achieve a comprehensive in this rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia. Al-Sisi and fair solution to the Palestinian problem” and assumed the presidency of the international or- encouraged both sides “to open channels of dia- ganization for 2019 in order to re-establish Egypt’s logue, under the auspices of the United States, for political and economic influence in Africa through the resumption of negotiations”.13 so-called “summit diplomacy” and the restoration of Egyptian soft power on the continent.15 When protests broke out in Sudan in December Arab-African tensions 2018 to demand the departure of Omar al-Bashir, the counter-revolutionary governments of Egypt, Since Ethiopia announced in 2011 the construc- Saudi Arabia and the UAE began to worry about tion of the Al Nahda Dam (the largest dam on the instability they could provoke in the region, the African continent) on the border with Sudan, despite their distance from the Islamist presi- Egypt’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa in the dent. Al-Sisi came to receive al-Bashir in Cairo in field of Nile water control have become a sour- January 2019, before he was deposed, perhaps ce of regional tension. The announcement cha- hoping that this country, crossed by the Nile, llenged Egyptian historical rights claimed on the would reciprocate by helping resolve old border Nile River in treaties signed in 1929 and 1959 with disputes and supporting Egypt in negotiations the United Kingdom and Sudan, respectively. Ac- with Ethiopia over Nile waters (Dunne, 2020). cording to these treaties, 2/3 of the Nile’s water Following the overthrow of al-Bashir in April, supplies belong to Egypt, which would have the al-Sisi changed his course and expressed support right to veto any project on its waters. The cons- for the demands of the Sudanese people, and, as truction of this dam reflects Ethiopian ambitions president of the AU, he tried to position himself to become an economic hub in Africa, so from as a mediator between the demonstrators and Cairo it has been perceived as an attempt to redu- the military. Nevertheless, al-Sisi encountered ce Egypt’s prominence on the continent (Azaola difficulties within the organization. When the Su- and Hernando de Larramendi, 2018). However, danese security services deposed al-Bashir, the the most significant threats facing the Nile are po- AU Peace and Security Council, of which Egypt is pulation growth, both Egyptian and Ethiopian, and climate change. The Egyptian population has been increasing over the past 30 years at an an- New York Times, February 9th 2020. Retrieved from: nual rate of 1.5 million. In February 2020, Egypt https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/09/ reached 100 million inhabitants, ranking as the world/africa/nile-river-dam.html 15 � Two months after assuming the presidency of the AU, most populous Arab country and the third most Egypt hosted the 64th ordinary session of the African populous in Africa after Ethiopia and Nigeria. Ac- Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, one of the cording to UN predictions, Egypt will have water highest agencies of the organization. The Egyptian gov- 14 shortages by 2025. ernment hosting a human rights summit was condemned by 15 African, Egyptian and international organizations. “Egypt: African Rights Summit Amid Dire Abuses”, Human 13 � “Egyptian official: Foreign Ministry statement on Rights Watch, April 24th 2019. Retrieved from: https:// Trump `peace plan´ slightly watered down from initial www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/24/egypt-african-rights- draft”, Mada Masr, January 29th 2020. Retrieved from: session-amid-dire-abuses ; Sallon, H.: “A la tête de l’Union https://madamasr.com/en/2020/01/29/news/politics/ africaine, l’Egypte veut se réengager sur la scène conti- egyptian-official-foreign-ministry-statement-on-trump- nentale”, Le Monde, February 11st 2019. Retrieved from: peace-plan-slightly-watered-down-from-initial-draft/ https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/02/11/a- 14 � Walsh, D. and Sengupta, S.: “For thousands of Years, la-tete-de-l-union-africaine-l-egypte-veut-se-reengager- Egypt Controlled the Nile. A new dam threatens that”, sur-la-scene-continentale_5421969_3212.html

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not a member, initially condemned the military is linked to maritime traffic in the Red Sea and takeover and the suspension of the Constitution. revenues from the Suez Canal, one of the main The organization then threatened to suspend Su- revenue streams of the Egyptian economy. dan’s membership, as it had done with Egypt at the time of the 2013 coup. Al-Sisi tried to mitigate the impact of AU pressure by extending the Conclusion time the Sudanese Army would be given to hand over control to civilians, but the AU continued to Almost ten years after the outbreak of the so- suspend Sudan after the June 2019 repression, called “January 25 Revolution” that led to the immediately following a visit to Egypt and the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is in the UAE by Sudanese military chief Abdel Fattah al- process of rebuilding authoritarianism. After a Burhan.16 brief period of civilian presidency, Abdel Fattah Together with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda al-Sisi’s assumption of power by leading a coup form another front within the AU. All of them are d’état in 2013 has meant that the Army has retur- countries that had earned more trust among Su- ned to the front line and the Armed Forces have danese demonstrators than the Gulf and Egyp- strengthened its hegemonic role in the country. tian rulers. It was with Ethiopian Prime Minister Alongside an increase in repression, they have Abiy Ahmed that both the Sudanese opposition carried out a blockade of political, associative and its Army agreed to meet. Abiy played a criti- and trade union spaces, and the social agenda cal role in mediating the agreement reached in has remained pending. summer, and the Ethiopian government gained There has also been an alignment with the regional and international recognition (the award authoritarian status quo forces in the region, led of the Nobel Peace Prize for solving the conflict by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which contribute with Eritrea) which, from al-Sisi’s perspective, with their political and financial support to the could harm Egyptian interests in the dam nego- survival of the Egyptian regime in exchange for tiations held in Washington under the mediation its involvement in regional conflicts such as that of US President Donald Trump. in Libya or the Yemeni war. Although the military Egypt, therefore, is observing with interest coup led to a withdrawal of the AU, Cairo has re- what is happening in Sudan and Ethiopia, thus versed this situation and turned to the African paying greater attention to its southern neigh- space, which Gamal Abdel Naser had already con- bours. Egypt does not want to be left out of the sidered to be one of the three circles of influence reconfiguration of alliances that is taking place that articulated his foreign policy, alongside the in this area of the African continent (Soler, 2019). Islamic and Arab circles. The disputes with Ethio- Al-Sisi continues to struggle to regain its influence pia and Sudan act as the engine of this necessary in Sudan and does not dismiss the possibility, like return to sub-Saharan Africa to try to find a sat- Saudi Arabia and the UAE, of an uninterrupted isfactory solution to the interests of the Egyptian military government in that country (Dunne, regime linked to the control of the waters of the 2020). Security in the countries of the Horn of Nile River. Africa also has strategic importance, as the area The management of the coronavirus crisis by al-Sisi’s regime will have medium and long-term consequences for Egypt’s political and socio- 16 � “Ethiopian bid for mediation, African Union suspension economic life. The amendments introduced to trouble Egypt’s play for role in Sudan’s transition”, Mada the Emergency Law to expand the powers of the Masr, June 17th 2019. Retrieved from: https://madamasr. com/en/2019/06/07/feature/politics/ethiopian-bid-for- President and army over civil society, together mediation-african-union-suspension-trouble-egypts- with firm support to the Egyptian government play-for-role-in-sudans-transition from international financial institutions, such

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as the IMF, through the granting of a new loan to Bensaad, A.: “Libia. Caos político, interferen- address the economic recession caused by CO- cia extranjera”, Orient XXI, 14 February 2020. VID-19, will foreseeably cause, as the pandemic Retrieved from: https://orientxxi.info/maga- continues, an increase in discontent, inequalities zine/libia-caos-politico-interferencia-extran- and increasing vulnerability of large sectors of jera,3623 the Egyptian population in a regional context in Brechenmacher, S.: “Civil Society Under As- which the possibility of resorting to financial aid sault: Repression and Response in Russia, from Saudi Arabia grows uncertain. Egypt, and Ethiopia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. Retrieved from: http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/18/ References civil-society-under-assault-repression-and- responses-in-russiaegypt-and-ethiopia- Abul-Magd, Z.: Militarizing the Nation. The Army, pub-69953. Business, and Revolution in Egypt, Columbia Daly, M.: “Why are Egyptians getting poorer University Press, New York, 2018. and how to stop it?”, Business Forward Di- Amnesty International: “Circles of Hell”. Domes- gest, October 2019. Retrieved from: http:// tic, Public and State Violence against Women businessforwardauc.com/2019/10/27/why- in Egypt, 2015. Retrieved from: https://www. are-egyptians-getting-poorer-and-how-to- amnesty.org/download/Documents/212000/ stop-it-2/ mde120042015en.pdf Dentice, G.: Egypt’s Security and Haftar: al-Sisi’s Azaola Piazza, B.: “The Foreign Policy of post- strategy in Libya, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Mubarak Egypt and the Strengthening of Re- Internazionale, February 2017. Retrieved from: lations with Saudi Arabia: Balancing between https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ Economic Vulnerability and Regional and Re- egypts-security-and-haftar-al-sisis-strategy- gime Security”, The Journal of North African libya-16284 Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 2019, special issue, The Dunne, M.: “Fear and Learning in the Arab Upri- “Subaltern” Foreign Policies of North African sings”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 31, no. 1, Countries, pp. 401-425. Retrieved from: https:// January 2020, pp. 182-192. Retrieved from: doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2018.1454650 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/745964/pdf Azaola Piazza, B.: “El uso de la cuestión palestina Ezzat, A.: “Challenging the Legal Ideology of the en la política egipcia (1981-2016): continuidad State: Cause Lawyering and Social Movements y adaptaciones”, Revista UNISCI, special issue in Egypt”, Arab Reform Initiative, Research Pa- 47, May 2018, Universidad Complutense de pers, May 2019. Retrieved from: https://www. Madrid, pp. 105-121. Retrieved from: http:// arab-reform.net/publication/challenging- www.unisci.es/el-uso-de-la-cuestion-palesti- the-legal-ideology-of-the-state-cause-lawye- na-en-la-politica-egipcia-1981-2016-continui- ring-and-social-movements-in-egypt/ dad-y-adaptaciones/ González, R.: “La estabilidad de Egipto cuestiona- Azaola, B. and Hernando de Larramendi, M.: da”, Afkar Ideas, autumn/winter 2019, pp. 45-47. “Egipto y el escenario regional: adaptaciones Hamzawy, A.: Legislating Authoritarianism: Egypt’s y continuidad (2011-2016)”. In: P. González del New Era of Repression, Carnegie Endowment Miño (coord.): “La (re)configuración de Orien- for International Peace, March 2017. Re- te Medio tras las rebeliones árabes”, Política trieved from: https://carnegieendowment. y Sociedad, vol. 55, no. 3, 2018, Universidad org/2017/03/16/legislating-authoritarianism- Complutense de Madrid, pp. 693-709. Retrie- egypt-s-new-era-of-repression-pub-68285 ved from: https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ Moghadam, V. M.: Globalization and Social Move- POSO/article/view/58319/4564456549077 ments: The Populist Challenge and Democratic

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Alternatives, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, magazine/egypte-l-economie-va-mieux-que- Lanham, 2020. les-egyptiens,3392 Naeem, M.: “In Egypt, nothing has changed – Sika, N.: “Neoliberalism, marginalization and but perhaps everything has”, Mada Masr, the uncertainties of being young: the case of November 2019. Retrieved from: https:// Egypt”, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 24, 2019, madamasr.com/en/2019/11/13/opinion/u/ pp. 545-567. in-egypt-nothing-has-changed-but-perhaps- Soler, E.: “Los países del Magreb pivotan hacia Áfri- everything-has/ ca… y no son los únicos”, Anuario Internacional Rohl, R. and Miehe, L.: “Egypt Engulfed by Mili- CIDOB, no. 1, 2019, pp. 157-164. Retrieved from: tarism”, Mediterranean Yearbook 2019, IEMed https://www.cidob.org/es/articulos/anuario_ 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.iemed.org/ internacional_cidob/2019/los_paises_ observatori/arees-danalisi/arxiusadjunts/ del_magreb_pivotan_hacia_africa_y_no_ anuari/med.2019/Egypt_Militarism_Politics_ son_los_unicos Stephen_Roll_Luca_Miehe_IEMed_MedYear- Tripp, A. M.: Seeking Legitimacy. Why Arab Auto- book2019.pdf cracies Adopt Women Rights, Cambridge Uni- Sayigh, Y.: Owners of the Republic. An Anatomy versity Press, Cambridge, 2019. of Egypt’s Military Economics, Carnegie Midd- Wahba, D.: “Urban Rights and Local Politics in le East Center, Beirut, 2019. Retrieved from: Egypt: The Case of the Maspero Triangle”, https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/11/18/ow- Arab Reform Initiative, Research Papers, ners-of-republic-anatomy-of-egypt-s-mili- January 2020. Retrieved from: https://www. tary-economy-pub-80325 arab-reform.net/publication/urban-rights- Sereni, J. P.: “Égypte. L’économie va mieux que and-local-politics-in-egypt-the-case-of-the- les Égyptiens”, L’Orient XXI, 12 November maspero-triangle/ 2019. Retrieved from: https://orientxxi.info/

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informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 122 10/11/20 9:39 10. Climate change and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

Alfonso Sánchez Carrasco and María Ángeles Alaminos Hervás

In January 2017, after a three-year drought attrib- warmest years registered in modern history have uted to climate change, the City of Cape Town an- occurred since 2001, with 2016 being the warm- nounced that the 21st of April would be “Day Zero”, est, followed by 2019 (NASA-NOAA, 2020). These —the day when the government would have to ongoing permanent or long-term changes to cli- close the city’s water taps due to the depletion of its mate conditions will result in profound changes water reservoir. The city registered its lowest rain- to our planet. Amongst these are rising sea levels, fall between 2015 and 2017, exhausting the water the retreat of mountain glaciers, more frequent deposits. In response, the local government im- erratic rainfall and hotter days in medium lati- posed water limits and rationing for domestic use. tudes. At the same time, extreme meteorological The inequalities associated with water privatisa- phenomena, such as hurricanes or droughts, will tion quickly became apparent, leading Cape Town become more frequent and intense. 3 residents to take to streets chanting “water for all Although Africa has contributed less than 4% or the city must fall” as they accused the local gov- of total global emissions, the continent will be ernment of not preventing the crisis.1 This example one of the most affected from a changing climate, illustrates how the effects of climate change and largely due to its poor adaptation and mitigation their political management can lead to episodes capacity (IPCC, 2014). Chart 1 shows temperature of social unrest. changes on the African continent. In most of Af- Since pre-industrial times the planet has rica surface temperatures have risen between 0.5 warmed approximately 1°C (IPCC, 2019). Clima- and 0.8 °C during the last hundred years. Some tologists have reached the conclusion that tem- of the regional tendencies observed include an peratures will keep rising in the coming decades, in large part due to human activity (IPCC, 2014; Chart 1. Temperature change in Africa bet- 2019). While the development of industrial coun- ween 1901-2019 tries has been the main force behind the emission of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, even if all countries agreed to drastically reduce emissions

today, concentrations of CO2 already released into the atmosphere are of such magnitude that temperatures will continue to rise for twenty or thirty more years.2 Nineteen of the last twenty

1 In this example, rainfall managed in the end to fill the water deposits, avoiding “Zero Day”. Source: Berkeley Earth, Professor Ed Hawkins.3 2 See Mauritsen, T., Pincus, R.: “Committed warming in- ferred from observations”, Nature Climate Change, no. 7, 2017, pp. 652-655. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3357 3 Data available on http://berkeleyearth.org/

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increase in heatwaves in northern Africa, a sig- annual growth rate of 2,55%, by 2050 the con- nificant rise in large rainfalls in western Africa, tinent will have added approximately 1300 mil- increasingly frequent extreme weather events, lion people to its population and will reach 2500 such as droughts or heavy rainfall, in eastern Af- million if demographic projections are met (US rica, and more days of intense heat and low rain- DESA, 2015). Fourth, the amount of renewable fall in southern Africa (IPCC, 2014). fresh water per capita has decreased in the last The graph shows recorded temperature two decades, and this process is expected to changes in Africa during the last century. Each continue (Pietersen and Beekman, 2006). Fifth, bar represents a yearly average temperature. it is estimated that close to 500 million hectares Some studies have found a positive statistical of land in Africa have suffered degradation since association between above average anomalous 1950, of which 45% has been caused by water temperatures and various forms of interperson- erosion (IFAD-GEF, 2002). Finally, most of the al violence, such as homicides, assault or rape. countries in the region do not have the adaptive Even though the causality is still not clear, the capacities to face climatic changes. Moreover, permanent or long-term changes in climate some are marked by the existence of tensions could act as a risk multiplier for various conflict and conflicts, which worsens the situation (Ide, processes (Ranson, Tarquinio and Lew, 2016).4 2017). Nonetheless, centring attention on Africa In 2007, the ex- Secretary-General of the United could lead to selection bias. The problem of bias Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, suggested that a decrease in analyses on Africa could be blamed on the use in rainfall caused resource scarcity in parts of by researchers of particular regions of countries South Sudan and triggered episodes of violent for convenience, rather than relevance or robust conflict between farmers and herders, which theoretical justifications, which would necessar- eventually morphed into a larger civil conflict ily narrow down comprehension and the role of (Ki-Moon, 2007). In this context we postulate the different factors involved in climate-conflict re- following question: How does climate change lations. (Hendrix, 2018). The aim of this chapter relate to conflict? While various types of linkages is, on the one hand, to analyse the influence of between climate change and conflict exist, in climate change on various types of conflict in Af- this chapter we will centre on the relationship rica and, on the other, to tackle the political and between climate change and conflicts surround- socioeconomic factors that can exacerbate (or ing natural resources and food insecurity. mitigate) said effects. Africa has proven to be fertile ground for exploring the nexus between climate and conflict. First, there are several regions in the continent Causal mechanisms between climate change which currently suffer from adverse changes due and armed conflict risk to climate change. Second, in most of sub-Saha- ran Africa agriculture depends on rainfall (with Political ecologists posit two analytical axes on the exception of South Africa and Madagascar). the debate over the links between climate and In fact, only between four and six percent of to- conflict risk. The first is centred on resource scar- tal farmland is irrigated (IFPRI, 2010). Third, more city as the source of conflict while the second, than half of global population growth between in opposition, sees resource abundance as the 2015 and 2050 will take place in Africa. With an source of conflict. Inside these two axes we find arguments of a different nature, as we will now see. 4 Climate variability refers to short term temperature and rainfall variations over the average. Climate change Firstly, political ecology presupposes a ‘zero refers to long term or permanent changes in average sum’ scenario, in which the probability of con- conditions. flict rises above the average during dryer years.

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The first argument sustains that social groups could solve the problem of scarcity and avoid po- will compete for the scarce resources degraded tential conflicts around resources. by climate change, such as arable land, water, Nonetheless, limiting the debate to scarcity fishing recourses or forests. In this way neo-Mal- produced by either supply or demand establishes thusian academics suggest that climate change an argument that is too restrictive. Some authors, could be the final blow for already fragile ecosys- without denying the importance and possible tems, while also potentially altering distribution effects of resource scarcity, hold that analysing systems subject to the pressure of a constantly whether countries with poor institutional develop- growing population (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, ment are at a greater risk of conflict is fundamental 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999). (Giordano et al., 2005). For example, when food The second argument suggests that the prob- prices rise, shows of socioeconomic and political ability of conflict falls over the average during discontent exacerbate the general feeling that the dryer years, as there are less resources for which government has failed in its duties. In other words, social groups can compete (Detges, 2016; Salehy- the availability and affordability of basic resources an and Hendrix, 2014). In this context the groups, is an undeniably essential aspect of the social con- faced with considerable environmental stress, tract between electors and political leaders. There- choose to “hunker-down” in their communities fore, the decline of renewable resources will have until they overcome the situation. clear political consequences. Likewise, political A third argument sustains that the risk of con- institutions can play an important role in the pre- flict increases after those years that are more vention of climate change and the mitigation of humid than the average, as an abundance of re- conflicts, especially non-violent ones. sources which can finance war is generated (Bu- On the other hand, some authors posit that hauh et al., 2010; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012). the survival of political leaders in certain per- In this manner some signal that, when people’s sonality-centred African regimes depend on the basic and material needs are met, they have more distribution of profits and the sponsorship of available time and energy to participate in social their support base; in these cases, political lead- and political commitments. ers will be more vulnerable to economic crises Finally, a fourth argument posits a scenario in and external shocks that normally reduce the which the probability of conflict decreases after profits available for distribution amongst client a period of wetter years, as resources are more networks (Bates, 1981; Geddes, 1999). Thus, in abundant and groups more self-sufficient. The times of renewable resource scarcity because of explanation would be that having guaranteed climate disruptions, these rulers will ration re- provisions will make communities less prone to newable resources to protect their support base participating in conflicts. from scarcity and its impacts. In this way political However, there is another academic current leaders can appease their support base and avoid which directly questions the axioms of political challenges to the regime. However, when climate ecology: “cornucopians” or resource optimists. anomalies interrupt the supply of a renewable re- This cohort of academics holds that the solution source, such as water or food, the demand for that to resource scarcity can be found in technologi- renewable resource remains constant or, in some cal innovation and human ingenuity, as it has in cases, rises. Therefore, rationing measures can the past (Lomborg, 2001). The case of Morocco, worsen structural scarcity, which further limits where the largest seawater desalinisation plant in consumer access to resources (Homer-Dixon and Africa is being built to satisfy the need of its citi- Blitt, 1998). This way, an increase in restrictions to zens, is an example of a cornucopian solution to access to renewable resources can deepen struc- environmental challenges. These types of tech- tural economic grievances and trigger situations nological innovations are, for cornucopians, what of social unrest.

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The link between conflict risk and resource scarcity caused by years dryer than average (Bu- scarcity/abundance haug, 2010; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Sale- hyan and Hendrix, 2014). The evidence which links conflicts with climate- In addition, based on the prediction that cli- induced resource scarcity varies depending on mate change will augment the frequency and in- the type of conflict. For example, the relationship tensity of climate-related natural disasters, some between climate change and interstate conflicts authors have examined whether there exists a link is, for now, insignificant. Nonetheless, some stud- between these natural disasters and the outbreak ies have signalled that, in pre-industrial times, of civil wars. Related to this, even though there is war was more probable in periods of low temper- no evidence that natural disasters contribute to atures (Zhang et al. 2007; Tol and Wagner, 2010). civil wars, Eastin (2015) considers that such disas- Studies on this topic have led some academics ters do have an effect on the lengthening of civil to argue that, as global temperatures keep rising, wars for three reasons. On the one hand, natural the risk of interstate conflicts could be reduced in disasters limit the economic resources that the high-income, politically stable countries. While state can mobilize to finance the conflict, as part history is full of examples of countries going to of the available resources have to be used to face war with one another for myriad reasons, there the consequences of the natural disaster. On the is no solid evidence of the existence of wars be- other hand, the security and defence capacity of tween states indirectly caused by long term cli- the states finds itself limited due to the participa- mate variations. In a recent study on this topic, tion of the military in the management of disaster Devlin and Hendrix (2014) propose that joint pre- zones, thus reducing the number of personnel in cipitation scarcity—that is, if both countries are the conflict. And finally, natural disasters usually experiencing dryer conditions that usual—reduc- cause important damage and destruction to in- es the probability of an interstate military con- frastructure, which limits the movement of troops flict. However, other analyses indicate that when and heavy military equipment to keep on fighting, it comes to states that share rivers, the presence drawing out these types of conflicts. It is worth of basins with upstream/downstream configura- mentioning that natural disasters can benefit or tions increases the risk of conflict (Brochmann hurt both the state and rebel groups in the con- and Gleditsch, 2012), while other authors conflict. Equally, it has been observed that extreme sider that the existence of and support to water meteorological phenomena augment state-sanc- management institutions can mitigate this type tioned repression (Wood and Wright, 2016), the of conflict (Barnauer and Siegfried, 2012). frequency and gravity of attacks, both by insur- The empirical evidence is even scanter when gent groups and governments (Eastin, 2018), and we analyse the case of civil wars. Given that the international terrorism (Paul and Bagchi, 2018).5 economies of many sub-Saharan countries are On the other hand, there is increasing em- closely linked to the agricultural sector, many pirical evidence that backs scarcity-related ar- specialists hold that scarce rainfall could result guments when referring to localized conflicts in civil conflict. Even though much solid empirical between localized communities —groups organ- evidence on the link between scarcity and civil ised around a shared “common ethnic, religious, war has been found in individual cases, these national or tribal identity” (von Uexkull and Pet- same positive results are not verified in large- tersson, 2018). Amongst them are pastoralist, scale statistical analyses. In fact, most quantita- agro-pastoralist and agricultural communities. tive analyses have reached the opposite opinion, that is, they have found a link between African 5 For an interesting debate on whether the Syrian Civil civil wars and the concatenation of years wetter War has its origin in a long drought, see Gleick (2014), than average, as opposed to the link between Kelley et al. (2015) and Selby et al. (2017).

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Nicknamed “climate change canaries” for their in the results can cause a sense of complexity vulnerability and dependence against changes or even cacophony, this diversity is usually the produced in their surrounding natural resources, product of academic technicalities (different it is believed that these communities are destined geographical research zones, differences in con- to be the first victims of a warmer climate due ceptualisation and measurement, or the use of to their strong dependence on changing ecosys- various statistical models). In spite of its complex- tems as their means of sustenance (Meier, Bond ity, the data on resources indicates that scarcity and Bond, 2007). Using primary and secondary and abundance can, in certain cases, aggravate data, Bekele (2010) states that resource dete- conflicts, especially at a local level.6 rioration (like pastures and groundwater) is the main motive for violent confrontations between the pastoral Karrayyo-Oromo and Afar communi- The link between food (in)security and conflict risk ties in Ethiopia, as they become less tolerant of territorial intrusions, especially during droughts. In general terms, food security can be endangered Similarly, Fjelde and Uexkull’s (2010) find that by three different factors. Firstly, there can be a episodes of communal violence in sub-Saharan demand-induced scarcity, linked to population Africa are associated with dryer than average growth or an increase in per capita consumption rainfall patterns. (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998). Secondly, institu- However, when examining if climate condi- tionally-induced scarcity originates in the unequal tions affect cattle rustling in pastoral communi- division of resources amongst the population, in- ties, Witsenburg and Adano (2009) have observed tentionally or unintentionally prejudicing certain that drought-induced resource scarcity has no groups. Finally, supply-induced scarcity is the apparent effect on cattle rustling and other live- result of an interruption of the total production stock theft in northern Kenya. In fact, the authors amount in the supply chain, be it because of deg- hold that in wet years twice as many people die radation or depletion of natural resources. than in dry ones, because the high grasses and Currently, the world produces enough food to dense coverage make tracking and ambushing feed every single human on earth. In fact, famines other communities easier (Adano et al., 2012). In caused by changes to climate conditions are the addition, the authors signal in their work that, exception, not the norm. On many occasions the while water scarcity can result in some violent cause of famines and other disasters is intimately clashes, these hostilities can also be dimmed by linked to the previously mentioned institutionally mechanisms for temporary dispute resolution, induced scarcity. We also have to consider that whose application allows for cooperation and al- in periods of poor atmospheric conditions food lotment of scarce resources. Nonetheless, other production can be interrupted. This can bring authors have contested these conclusions after problems in the distribution of scarce foodstuff, seeing that, in a neighbouring district in north- caused by the (poor) political decisions on who ern Kenya, cattle rustling was more likely during and when food can be obtained. droughts and dryer months (Ember et al., 2014). It can be asserted that climate change ag- The link between climate change and conflicts gravates the problem of food insecurity, in due to resource scarcity has been empirically large part because of the on-the-ground con- proven in diverse ways over various academic sequences of natural disasters. The repercus- disciplines. However, the literature shows that sions of excessive or deficient rainfall, as well there is a clear lack of consensus on how climate change could affect a wide range of resources 6 See Salehyan, I.: “Climate change and conflict: Making and, simultaneously, how these could trigger or sense of disparate findings”, Political Geography, no. 43, prolong conflicts. Even though the divergence 2014, pp. 1-5.

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as the increase in days warmer than average, Access to basic needs such as food and shel- provoke vulnerable situations, crop loss and re- ter (as well as security) can be one of the driving curring crises.7 In the African continent, as tem- forces for people who participate in a civil conflict peratures increase and rainfall becomes more and are used by both the state and rebel groups erratic, crop yields will decrease between five to drive recruitment (Bernam, 2009). However, and ten percent for every degree of warming empirical evidence on this is not conclusive. A (National Research Council, 2011). result of Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2008) study Natural disasters are undoubtedly an im- in Sierra Leone was that most polled ex-combat- portant cause of temporary food insecurity. ants considered access to food to be one of the The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the main incentives for taking up arms against the United Nations (FAO) estimates that between government. However, Taylor (2010), also using 2003 and 2013 natural disasters affected more polls of ex-combatants in Burundi’s civil war, does that 1900 million people worldwide (FAO, 2015). not find the procurement of food and shelter to Even though cyclones, floods and droughts are be fundamental causes for participation in civil a normal part of nature, it is expected that cli- conflict. mate change will multiply the frequency and According to Hendrix and Brinkman (2013), intensity of these disasters, which will increase severe food insecurity could actually have the the short-term scarcity of basic resources in some opposite effect, reducing tension and conflict, parts of the world. For example, in March 2019 for three reasons. First of all, armed groups need cyclone Idai assailed Mozambique, Malawi and food for their soldiers; given that they generally Zimbabwe. Six weeks later, cyclone Kenneth, now do not produce their own food, they mostly de- known for being the strongest recorded cyclone pend on the support of voluntary or forced con- to have affected Africa, hit Mozambique again. tributions from the population. However, in times The two natural disasters destroyed 770.000 of drought, the drops in agricultural production hectares of crops, which left 1.6 million people and crop yields usually carry with them a lower in a situation of food insecurity.8 In this situation propensity to grant the combatants food, as op- one can observe how natural disasters affect food posed to years of abundance and good harvest. insecurity, and in what contexts access to food Second, food insecurity could block full participa- depends on the capacity to pay for it, as well as tion in political activities, including civil wars. As on the presence of or absence of national or in- their basic needs are not met, many people who ternational aid programmes and on the market’s live with severe food insecurity prefer to spend ability to guarantee that food prices stay low and their time and effort searching for food, leaving accessible for the population.9 In this context, it the pursuit of political and ideological goals on is important to approach how worsening food a secondary plane. Similarly, various instances security is linked to conflict situations. have proven that, generally, people who participate in civil wars or other social conflicts are not 7 Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that different those in extreme poverty or suffering from food crops have different levels of tolerance to thermal and insecurity (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Thiesen, hydric stress. 2012). Finally, the state can withhold and deny 8 See FAO: Situation report on Mozambique, October 2019. foodstuff as a war tactic, discouraging their Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ citizens from participating in the conflict. Both files/resources/SituationReportMozambiqueOct2019.pdf weaponized state food restrictions and pressure 9 See Hendrix & Brinkman (2013) for an in-depth analysis to supply food to combatants can be counterpro- on the causal links between food insecurity and conflict. Retrieved from: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/tem- ductive for the state’s or rebel group’s objectives, plates/cfs_high_level_forum/documents/FI-ConflictDy- instigating further support for the opposite side namics-Hendrix_Cullen.pdf as a reaction to coercion.

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On the other hand, the causal mechanisms dence in the literature on whether international linking food insecurity and social unrest are dif- price variability increases social unrest in specific ferent. According to Bates (1981) the issue that countries, there is a wide consensus regarding most frequently pushes Africans to mobilise is the price hikes on food at a local level. In particular, loss or reduction of purchasing power. Not being sudden price hikes are closely linked to participa- able to buy food due to high prices would be the tion in popular protests and riots. Nonetheless, main cause of militant action in this line of argu- there is still no consensus on the causal mecha- ment. Even though this phenomenon is not a re- nisms of participation in civil wars. cent development, it has intensified in the last few decades. The ups and downs of basic food items between 2007-2008 and in 2011 culminated in pro- Conclusions tests and riots in 48 countries across the world–14 of them African–reviving the debate over the link Given its intersectionality with global and local between food prices and social unrest (Weinberg issues, climate change is currently at the fore- and Baker, 2012; Bellemare, 2015).10 front of important research on armed conflicts Furthermore, Smith (2014) considers that in Africa. In this chapter we have briefly looked a sudden state-wide rise in food prices varying at the causal links between climate and conflict, from one month to another increases the prob- the way that these links attempt to explain the ability of social unrest on the African continent. relationship with different types of conflict, and For example, sporadic protests took place in vari- the existing controversies in this field. ous Egyptian cities between 2007 and 2011 as a We think it would be interesting to, as a con- response to the shortage and price hike of baladi clusion, make a complementary note on the cli- bread, a staple food in the country. Regarding mate-conflict link in different types of conflicts. the data on international food prices Bellemare Due to resource scarcity, localised conflicts are (2015) also finds that rises in food prices have the key conflict for neo-Malthusian explana- worsened social unrest between 1900 and 2011. tions. Research on social unrest (expressed, for In addition, Jun (2017) has concluded that in sub- example, through protests or riots) has, to a large Saharan Africa between 1970 and 2012, high tem- extent, focused on analysing climate change in- peratures during the corn season decreased crop directly through food scarcity, or on how rises in yields, which increased instances of civil conflict. food prices are closely linked with rises in social Because of this it is predicted that future warming unrest. Similarly, as temperatures rise and rain- could increase the frequency of civil conflicts by fall becomes erratic, the resources of pastoral more than 30% between 2031-2050. communities will become increasingly limited, In the year 100 A.D. the roman poet Juvenal which could cause these communities to think was one of the first people to recognise the im- of participating in violent actions as a last resort portant link between food security and the stabil- to sustain their means and ways of life. ity granted by a peaceful populace. In his poems However, the causal link between climate he reminds us that Roman politicians were able change and civil conflicts is still not clear, with to gain popular support and prevent social unrest micro-level evidence in particular lacking. While by granting panem et circenses to the public. This it is true that there is some evidence that, for ex- still holds true today. While there is not much evi- ample, competition over water (data suggests that competition is greater when water is abundant, rather than scarce) can exacerbate tension 10 � Protests are non-violent demonstration, organized or not, undertaken by members of society. Riots, on the oth- between groups and is linked to more organised er hand, differ in their use of violence as a viable method political violence in Africa, the evidence of armed to achieve the objectives of a mobilized public. conflict between states because of changing cli-

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mate conditions is practically insignificant. The has more weight than that of environmental and findings of different studies on the link between demographic factors. climate and security are contradictory. In any Therefore, it is fundamental to consider the case, a panel of experts has recently signalled uncertainty on the mechanisms that link climate that while climate affects conflict potential, other and conflicts, as this nexus is still a key challenge factors, such as low socioeconomic development for research (Mach et al., 2019). In addition, current and state capacity, are considered much more research focuses on different aggregate levels of impactful (Mach et al., 2019). analysis, such as countries or regions, which carries For academics such as Homer-Dixon and the risk of reaching imprecise inferences due to the Blitt (1998), fresh water, food, fisheries,forests difficulty of separating the effect of climate change and other similar natural resources could be- from the conflicts’ other determining factors (Koubi, come conflict points given their importance for 2018). Experts seems to agree that climate change people’s welfare and survival. Scarcity of these plays a small role in various conflict scenarios on the resources can lead to agricultural and econom- continent, for now at least. However, even though ic stagnation, which then leads to poverty and climate change doesn’t currently play a leading role large-scale migration. These can be exacerbated in the various conflicts of sub-Saharan Africa, tem- by socioeconomic and religious divides, provok- peratures will keep rising in the near future, which ing armed conflicts; at least this is what the causal could increase the explanatory power of climate mechanism implies. However, except in the case change in different conflict processes. of pastoral conflicts, there exists little evidence Consequently, we find it fundamental to con- for this argument.11 While it is true that popula- tinue the academic research and debate on the tion growth leads to the environmental degrada- topic so as to progress in the search for greater tion of groundwater, deforestation, soil erosion comprehension of the complex relationship be- and other local resources, this degradation is not tween climate and conflict. In the future, climate in and of itself a leading cause of civil wars, ethnic change will continue acting as a risk multiplier re- conflicts or interstate conflicts.12 garding various conflict processes. Thus, political The latest report from the Intergovernmental decision-makers must be provided with informa- Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2019) states that tion and analysis that allows for the minimisation “current levels of global warming are associated of risk for the public and the implementation of with moderate risks from increased dryland wa- conflict prevention policies, not only in sub-Sa- ter scarcity, soil erosion, vegetation loss, wildfire haran Africa, but at a global level. damage, permafrost thawing, coastal degradation and tropical crop yield decline”.13 Nonethe- less, even taking into account climate change and References population growth, Raleigh and Urdal (2007) observe that, while population growth and density Adano, W. R., Dietz, T., K. Witsenburg, and Zaal, F.: by themselves increase the possibility of conflict, “Climate Change, Violent Conflict and Local environmental factors such as soil degradation Institutions in Kenya’s Drylands”, Journal of and water scarcity are insignificant. Effectively, Peace Research, vol. 49, no. 1, 2012, pp. 65-80. their results show that the interaction between Ban, K. M.: “A climate culprit in Darfur”, The Wash- the conflict and political and economic factors ington Post, 2007. Retrieved from: https:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.html 11 � See Gleditsh and Urdal (2002). 12 � See Deudney (1990), Gleditsch (1998), Goldstone Bates, R.: Markets and states in tropical Africa, (2002) and Urdal (2005). Berkeley, California, University of California 13 � IPCC (2019, p. 17). Press, 1981.

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Bekele, H.: “Conflicts between Afar Pastoralists and tion”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 42, no. Their Neighbors”, International Journal of Con- 1, 2005, pp. 47-65. flict and Violence, vol. 4, no. 1, 2010, pp. 134-48. Hendrix, C. S., and Brinkman H. J.: “Food Insecu- Bellemare, M. F.: “Rising Food Prices, Food Price rity and Conflict Dynamics : Causal Linkages Volatility, and Social Unrest”, American Jour- and Complex Feedbacks”, International Jour- nal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 97, no. 1, nal of Security & Development, vol. 2, no. 2, 2015, pp. 1-21. 2013, pp. 1-18. Bernauer, T., and Siegfried, T.: “Climate Change Hendrix, C. S., and Salehyan, I.: “Climate Change, and International Water Conflict in Central Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa”,Journal of Asia”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 49, no. Peace Research, vol. 49, no. 1, 2012, pp. 35-50. 1, 2012, pp. 227-39. Hendrix, C. S.: “Searching for Climate–Conflict Brochmann, M., and Gleditsch, N. P.: “Shared Riv- Links”, Nature Climate Change, 2018. ers and Conflict - A Reconsideration”,Political Homer-Dixon, T. F.: Environment, scarcity, and vi- Geography, vol. 31, no. 8, 2012, pp. 519-27. olence, Ewing, NJ, Princeton University Press, Buhaug, H., Hegre, H., and Strand, H.: Sen- 1999. sitivity analysis of climate variability and Homer-Dixon, T., and Blitt, J.: Ecoviolence: links civil war, PRIO Paper, 2010. Retrieved from: among environment, population, and secu- https://www.hbuhaug.com/wp-content/ rity, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998. uploads/2014/02/Sensitivity-Analysis-of-Cli- Humphreys, M. and Weinstein J. M.: “Who mate-Variability-and-Civil-War-PRIO-Paper- Fights? The Determinants of Participation in 2010-v11.pdf Civil War”, American Journal of Political Sci- Detges, A.: “Local Conditions of Drought-Related Vi- ence, vol. 52, no. 2, 2008, pp. 436-55. olence in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Road Ide, T.: “Research Methods for Exploring the Links and Water Infrastructures”, Journal of Peace Re- between Climate Change and Conflict”, Wiley search, vol. 53, no. 5, 2016, pp. 696-710. Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, Devlin, C., and Hendrix C. S.: “Trends and Trig- vol. 8, no. 3, 2017. gers Redux: Climate Change, Rainfall, and In- IFAD-GEF: Tackling Land Degradation and Deser- terstate Conflict”, Political Geography, no. 43, tification, 2002. Retrieved from: http://www. 2014, pp. 27-39. ifad.org/events/wssd/gef/GEF_eng.pdf Eastin J.: “Hell and high water: precipitation IFPRI: Irrigating Africa: IFPRI study examines shocks and conflict violence in the Philippines”, the dimensions of Africa’s irrigation problem, Political Geography, no. 63, 2018, pp. 116-34. 2010. Retrieved from: https://www.ifpri.org/ Eastin, J.: “Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and blog/irrigating-africa the Duration of Civil Conflict”, International IPCC: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Con- Interactions, vol. 42, no. 2, 2015, pp. 1-28. tribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth FAO: The State of Food Insecurity in the World, Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Rome, FAO, 2015. Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, IPCC, 2014. Fjelde, H., and Von Uexkull, N.: “Climate Trig- IPCC: Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special gers: Rainfall Anomalies, Vulnerability and report on climate change, desertification, land Communal Con Fl Ict in Sub-Saharan Africa”, degradation, sustainable land management, Political Geography, vol. 3, 2012, pp. 444-53. food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in Geddes, B.: “What do we know about democra- terrestrial ecosystems, 2019. tization after twenty years?”, Annual review of Jun, T.: “Temperature, Maize Yield, and Civil Con- political science, vol. 2, no. 1, 1999, pp. 115-144. flicts in Sub-Saharan Africa”,Climatic Change, no. Giordano, F. M., Giordano A. M., and Wolf, T. A.: 142, 2017, pp. 183-97. https://doi.org/10.1007/ “International Resource Conflict and Mitiga- s10584-017-1941-0.

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Koubi, V.: “Climate Change and Conflict”, The Salehyan, I., and Hendrix, C. S.: “Climate Shocks Palgrave Handbook of Climate History, 2018, and Political Violence”, Global Environmental pp. 367-85. Change, vol. 28, no. 1, 2014, pp. 239-50. Lomborg, B.: 2001. The Skeptical Environmen- Smith, T. G.: “Feeding Unrest”, Journal of Peace talist: Measuring the Real State of the World, Research, vol. 51, no. 6, 2014, pp. 679-95. Cambridge University Press, vol. 286, 2001. Taylor, G. H.: Choosing to Fight: The Dynamics of Mach, K. J., Kraan C. M., Adger W. N., Buhaug, H., Civil War Participation in Burundi, PhD Thesis, Burke, M., Fearon, J. D., et al. “Climate as a New York University, 2010. Risk Factor for Armed Conflict”,Nature , 2019. Tol, R. S. J. and Wagner, S. “Climate Change and Meier, P., Bond D., and Bond, J.: “Environmental Violent Conflict in Europe over the Last Mil- Influences on Pastoral Conflict in the Horn of lennium”, Climatic Change, vol. 99, no. 1, Africa”, Political Geography, no. 26, 2007, pp. 2010, pp. 65-79. 716-35. UN DESA, Population Division: World Popula- NASA-NOAA: NASA, NOAA Analyses Reveal 2019 tion Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Find- Second Warmest Year on Record, 2020. Re- ings and Advance Tables, Working Paper No. trieved from: https://climate.nasa.gov/ ESA/P/WP.241, 2015. Retrieved from: https:// news/2945/nasa-noaa-analyses-reveal- esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/ 2019-second-warmest-year-on-record/ Von Uexkull, N. and Pettersson, T.: “Issues and National Research Council: Climate Stabiliza- actors in African nonstate conflicts: A new tion Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and data set”, International Interactions, vol. 44, Impacts over Decades to Millennia, Washing- no. 5, 2018, pp. 953-968. ton, DC, The National Academies Press, 2011. Weinberg, J. and Bakker, R.: “Let Them Eat Cake: Retrieved from: http://www.climateemer- Food Prices, Domestic Policy and Social Un- gencyinstitute.com/uploads/NRC_climate_ rest”, Conflict Management and Peace Science, impacts.pdf vol. 32, no. 3, 2014, pp. 0738894214532411. Paul, J. A., and Bagchi, A.: “Does Terrorism In- Witsenburg, K. M. and Adano, W. R.: “Of Rain and crease after a Natural Disaster? An Analysis Raids: Violent Livestock Raiding in Northern Based upon Property Damage”, Defence and Kenya”, Civil Wars, vol. 11, no. 4, 2009, pp. 514-38. Peace Economics, vol. 29, no. 4, 2018, pp. 407- Wood, R. M., and Wright, T. M.: “Responding to 39. Catastrophe: Repression Dynamics Follow- Pietersen, K. and Beekman, H. Africa Environ- ing Rapid-Onset Natural Disasters”, Journal mental Outlook. In chapter 4: Freshwater. Unit- of Conflict Resolution, vol. 60, no. 8, 2016, pp. ed Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), 1446-72. 2006. Retrieved from: http://www.unep.org/ Zhang, D. D., Brecke, P., Lee, H. F.,He, Y. Q., and dewa/Africa/publications/AEO-2/content/in- Zhang, J.: “Global Climate Change, War, and dex.htmFiles/Key_Findings_WPP_2015.pdf Population Decline in Recent Human Histo- Raleigh, C., and Urdal, H. 2007. “Climate Change, ry”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Environmental Degradation and Armed Con- Sciences of the United States of America, vol. flict”, Political Geography, no. 26, pp. 674-94. 104 , no. 49, 2007, pp. 19214-19. Ranson, M., Tarquinio, L., and Lew, A.: “Modeling the Impact of Climate Change on Extreme Weather Losses,” no. Mc 1809, 2016.

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informe_africa_ingles_2020.indb 132 10/11/20 9:39 11. Africa and its intra and extracontinental relations and the possible impacts of COVID-19

Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal, Elsa Aimé González

Over the last few months, COVID-19 has gripped reconfiguration of intra and extracontinental rela- our attention as a society because of its immedi- tions. Second, we shall cover the dynamism that ate impacts, but also because of the uncertainty characterises African societies and communities that it triggers when it comes to our collective and their social realities and the transformations envisagement of a future in the medium to long that they demand. Third, we shall raise certain term. Naturally, this reality has had an impact on aspects that mark the unrest in the continent. the various transformations and political, eco- Throughout the work and in the spirit of the vol- nomic, and social projects in which African soci- ume as a whole, we shall offer some reflections on eties are engaged. There is a common feature of the possible impacts of COVID-19 in these areas. the numerous analyses to have tackled COVID-19 in the African continent and of the analyses on Africa in general of the last few years: many are The reconfiguration of continental relations either overly optimistic or pessimistic. and relations with the EU We need a broader perspective if we are to understand how the pandemic will impact and Over the last two decades, the rates of economic condition the continent’s political, economic and growth attained by certain African countries, the social processes, but it would be problematic to growing weight of relations with China and other assume that the pandemic will put an end to them. players, or the changes of government to have The preparation and timetable of this Africa 2020 taken place in various countries of the continent Report have been marked by this event affecting have opened the door to a consolidation of in- the global scene. The authors of its chapters have tracontinental relations and a reassessment of endeavoured to incorporate it into their thoughts extracontinental relations, as has been seen with as far as possible. Following in the footsteps of the the EU. These factors have also prompted reflec- Africa 2019 Report, our goal has been to elaborate tion on the needs and challenges associated with on an approach to the continent as a whole, an attaining a long-awaited political and economic increasingly common and accepted viewpoint, reconfiguration that enables living standards in without at any time trying to ignore the specific the continent to improve. In this report, these realities of its different regions, diaspora included. issues are addressed in particular by Laurence These conclusions are structured around the Thieux and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi in common elements of the report’s various chap- their analysis of relations between the Maghreb ters. First, we shall mention certain aspects of the and sub-Saharan Africa; by Artur Colom in his

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reflection on the reconfiguration of relations The reorganisation of certain value chains as an between the African states and the EU ahead inescapable consequence of COVID-19 has been of the end of the Cotonou Agreement; and by presented as an opportunity to include North Af- Youssef Cherif in his chapter on the EU’s differ- rica in some of the production lines of big European ent strategies towards sub-Saharan Africa and the companies that will need to find alternatives. One Maghreb. argument has been the strengthening of the Africa In this respect, we have seen a trend towards Continental Free Trade Area, the goal of which is the “Africanisation” of the foreign policies of not only to increase trade among countries by 50% North African countries over the last few years. but, and above all, to develop a solid and diverse As Thieux and Hernando de Larramendi detail industrial base that enables integrating all aspects in the first chapter, the countries of North Africa of the economy and securing the continent’s self- have developed a greater appetite for continen- sufficiency. Morocco was quick to position itself as tal regionalism, even over boosting relations with a privileged ally. During the pandemic, and while their neighbours to the east and west. Each state the other countries of North Africa addressed their has different motives, but they have all been clear considerable domestic challenges, Rabat launched about the urgency of looking to the south of the an initiative with Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire to Sahara. This revived interest may have been met provide a joint response to the threat of the new with mixed feelings in sub-Saharan Africa, whose coronavirus, with no Western presence and via the states and citizens are aware not only of past ten- strengthening of multisectoral associations. sions, but also, and above all, of the marked stra- The pandemic has spawned many uncertain- tegic nature of these decisions. ties, among other reasons because of its con- Clearly, as has already been said, the Sahara flicting impacts. Thus, for example, it has further has not been and is not a border between two reinforced the firm belief in the urgent need to opposite realities. Ties between the North African boost intracontinental trade, to develop the in- and sub-Saharan states are strengthening. That, dustrial fabric—particularly in the health and combined with the diversification of extracon- pharmaceutical field—and to produce to - con tinental relations and the failure of old policies sume regionally and guarantee food security to promoted by the EU in the continent, such as the the whole of the continent. Yet it is also true that Economic Partnership Agreements, forces the EU the impact on the economies will make it difficult and its member states to reconsider its relations to implement these measures, particularly in the with the continent’s states and institutions, as AfCFTA, for want of funds. Colom and Cherif analyse in the report. In that As has occurred on a global level, the effects of respect, Colom proposes that the post-Cotonou the pandemic have also been felt in the economy, negotiations must start out from a questioning both as a result of the shutdown of activity and of the principle of non-reciprocity that charac- its profound impact on those who work in the terised the EPAs to contribute to the industriali- so-called informal economy and because of the sation that the African states wish to undertake. drop in oil prices and the reduction in exchang- It is a goal that hangs on support for those pro- es—commercial and otherwise—with Europe and grammes in which Spain and the EU take part, other players. Without doubt the most vulnerable such as the EDF or Aid for Trade. These enable social sectors, women in particular, are the ones the fostering of structural economic change in Af- most suffering the impacts of the pandemic and rica, in line with the African Union’s Agenda 2063. they face deepening inequality. Likewise, any renewal of the economic relations The exceptional situation has made the need between Africa and the EU requires a firm com- for resistant and resilient economies even more mitment to the SDGs, the attainment of which are evident, and with it, the importance of the informal also threatened by the pandemic. economy. The latter has spared millions of families

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from the abyss and has been recognised as such in in the world. In Africa, where COVID-19 was first Morocco, for example, by an online tax declaration identified in Egypt on 14 February, there has been platform.1 This and other decisions, in theory de- a swift and determined response on the part of vised as temporary urgent measures, has led COV- the public, governments and institutions. While ID-19 to be considered an accelerator of change, as continuing to face the limitations of infrastruc- an opportunity for reforms, too, precisely because, tures and health systems, awareness of these has as Chahir Zaki’s chapter shows, the emergency also been a factor in the speed of the response. measures and programmes with international fi- In some zones, prior experience in the technical nancial institutions have proven insufficient in the management of other pandemics, such as the medium and long term. African economies, both in viral epidemics of Ebola of 2014 to 2016, have fa- the north and in the south, need reforms that move cilitated the coordination and robustness of the away from the worn-out paradigms put together for response. That same epidemic was what prompt- alien contexts and with a strong neoliberal flavour. ed the creation of the Africa Centres for Disease Youssef Cherif’s chapter asserts that the les- Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), which is sons learned from relations with North Africa playing a vital role in the coordination of the con- have not been applied to the Strategy with Africa tinental response to COVID-19, despite the fact presented by the European Commission in March that the Africa CDC needs many more resources 2020 as an introduction to a “geopolitical Com- to tackle this pandemic and other diseases that mission” that aspires to a selective reinforcement are still present in the continent. of its influence and to surround itself with solid In other cases, confinement has been used to allies capable of shoring it up as a global power. bolster authoritarian regimes. That is the case Other chapters in this report too refer to that verti- of Egypt, following the example set for years, as cal relationship and the need for a commitment gathered in the chapter by Bárbara Azaola. The to leaving behind reactive and securitising views. need for stability to facilitate the containment It is essential that the EU and its member states of the virus has been used to silence journalists do not make the same mistakes again, such as the and opponents, as well as medical profession- defence of asymmetric relations, the imposition of als who have dared to contradict the narrative models based on neoliberal principles that have of the regime led by Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. In other not borne fruit and have even been detrimental, countries such as Zimbabwe, the fight against and the lack of coherent policies. Without doubt, the coronavirus has also been instrumentalised the COVID-19 pandemic requires a local and glob- to suppress the complaints and protests over the al response based on horizontal cooperation. corruption of the regime and rampant inflation. Among other well-known figures, the investiga- tive journalist Hopewell Chin’ono was arrested Social mobilisation and political and economic after reporting a case of corruption implicating challenges the health minister over supplies to combat the coronavirus. Later the writer Tsitsi Dangarembga The handling of the pandemic on a state level has was detained after also speaking out against cor- led to extreme measures that have been mim- ruption and championing the journalist’s release. icked, with certain adaptions, by every country In Egypt, as well as in Algeria, social protests that chipped away at the foundations of the respective regimes in 2019, with varying degrees of 1 Manyami, H. : “Comment les travailleurs de l’informel success, have been forced not only to scale down pourront bénéficier du fonds de soutien”, Challenge Magazine, March 20th, 2020. Retrieved from: https://www. their activity but contend with a considerable in- challenge.ma/comment-les-travailleurs-de-linformel- crease in repression too. In Morocco, a sudden pourraient-beneficier-du-fonds-de-soutien-134908/ national consensus has also led to less social

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pressure. The suspension of mobilisations ap- pated elections that should have taken place in pears to be momentary, however, and in no way August. That, along with the as yet unresolved detracts from the social dynamism that some of murder of the singer Hachalu Hundessa on 29 the chapters in this volume reflect and which the June 2020 and the subsequent escalation of ten- Africa 2019 Report revealed too. The factors for sion in different points of the country, has been social mobilisation are still present–youth un- accompanied by a return to repressive practices, employment in particular–and they will be to an characteristic of his predecessor, that cloud the ever greater extent when the economic impact local and international hopes pinned on Abiy of COVID-19 starts wreaking havoc, in spite of the Ahmed. The promising transition towards de- social safety nets created and the urgent meas- mocracy in Sudan has also been slowed down, ures taken. There have been demonstrations in and impeded, in the months prior to the writing Tunisia already; in Algeria, the Hirak movement of these lines. Demonstrators have not hesitated is preparing a fresh onslaught; and in Morocco, to take to the streets again to prevent a repeat of civil society is beginning to voice its discontent. the setbacks already experienced in neighbour- Another prominent example of social mobi- ing Egypt, among other places. lisation to have featured in 2020 is that of Mali, All these cases reflect the importance of social where the vast majority of those taking part in mobilisation in the face of the political and eco- mass protests backed the bloodless military coup nomic challenges confronting African societies that toppled the government of Ibrahim Boubacar and communities. Those issues are covered in Keita on 18 August. The mobilisation symbolised this report particularly in the chapters by Antumi the discontent with which the population was Toasijé on the challenges facing the African com- witnessing developments in the country, from munities and communities of African descent in both a domestic and international point of view, Spain, by Celia Murias in her analysis of feminist in particular a stalled transition as an example of activism in Africa, and by Sebastián Ruiz-Cabre- the negative consequences of a markedly security ra on art as a form of political activism in Africa. oriented approach to a multidimensional conflict. This dynamism and social activism go a long way The situation in Mali, and in the Western Sahel as back, as can be seen for example in Nervous Con- a whole, helps us understand the impact that ditions, the first novel by Dangarembga, who we some conflicts—in many cases chronic, but also mentioned earlier. Published in 1988, this novel topical, as in the case of Libya—have beyond ter- is an example of the confluence of political activ- ritorial and geopolitical borders, and in particu- ism, art, and feminist struggle in its indictment of lar on the porousness of those borders when the racism, colonialism and gender discrimination in state fails to perform the functions assigned to it, Zimbabwe after independence. as the emergence and action of non-state play- As the events of recent months reflect, social ers demonstrate. Instability has marked the day- mobilisation in the continent continues to chal- to-day life of Malians over these last few years, lenge the power structures by demanding politi- something that insufficient coordination among cal and economic transformation. The capacity regional and international players and action has to mobilise of African societies requires European not helped to remedy. governments to take this reality into considera- Ethiopia is one of the key states on Spain’s tion in a consistent manner, both in their bilateral foreign agenda. Prime Minister and 2019 Nobel diplomacy and on a multilateral level. In the same Peace Prize laureate Abiy Ahmed, following a pe- way that, as Colom argues, the post-Cotonou ne- riod of hopeful euphoria over the regime open- gotiations must be transparent and participatory ing up, is facing growing objection to what some if we mean to renew the partnership, it is also see as a partial and slow process. COVID-19 has important that relations between European and led to the suspension until 2021 of much antici- African states and institutions contribute to the

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protection and promotion of human rights and their living conditions and the discrimination that the international agreements and commitments they face from an intersectional viewpoint, that on the subject. Likewise, this requires support, is to say, that takes into consideration multiple promotion and funding for international instru- dimensions of discrimination such as gender or ments such as the Beijing Declaration and Plat- origin. The fact that in Spain no such census ex- form for Action or Resolution 1325, as Murias ists means that no specific measures are taken to points out in this report. protect that community and combat the different The social mobilisation to which we are reforms of discrimination that they face. As Toasijé ferring is not exclusive to the African continent. points out, this is closely linked to the need to As we have been able to see in recent months, acknowledge the existence of a problem of struc- the African diaspora has also mobilised in other tural racism in Spanish society. parts of the world, prominently so in the United States. We should point out here that the Afri- can diaspora is recognised by the AU as the sixth Conflict beyond the rhetoric region of the continent and encompasses in its definition all those people of “African origin who Another effect of the COVID-19 pandemic has live outside the continent, irrespective of their been to divert attention away from other dynam- citizenship and nationality and who are willing ics underway. The pandemic has buried, to an to contribute to the development of the conti- even greater extent if possible, the existence of nent and the building of the African Union”.2 In “forgotten conflicts,” a controversial concept that the United States, according to the 2010 census, has been applied to conflicts with significant dif- it stands at 15 percent of the population, over 42 ferences, such as those of the Western Sahara and million people. the Central African Republic, analysed in this re- The killing of George Floyd on 25 May 2020 by port by Irene Fernández-Molina and Enrica Picco. the Minneapolis police unleashed a new phase Regarding the situation in the Sahara, Morocco’s in the struggles in the United States against Africa policy should not make us forget the urgent police brutality towards the African American need for the decolonisation of the Western Saha- population. A few days earlier we had seen the ra. Indeed, the “empty chair” policy in the OAU/ passing of Albert Memmi, a Tunisian intellec- AU was a failure that the Moroccan kingdom has tual who during the colonial period had already accepted as a lesser evil and which could become raised his voice against colonisation and rac- a starting point for not bowing to the pressure, on ism along with other African intellectuals. His the part of continental or foreign institutions and thought remains essential to understanding the players, to recognise this right. In the case of the current struggles against structural racism, such conflict in the CAR, the presence of regional and as those that erupted in the United States and international players has been constant, without their repercussions in other countries such as the it contributing to its resolution. United Kingdom, France, and Spain too, where Fernández-Molina and Picco show how it is the community of African descent faces consid- vital to not limit international interventions to erable challenges. One of those challenges, on peacekeeping or state-building operations, as which Toasijé calls attention to in this report is, they should also take effective political and dip- in his own words, the need to carry out a census lomatic action to tackle a conflict’s root, mindful of the black African population and population of of the context and specific nature of each conflict, African descent in Spain that gives an account of as well as in concert with the international and regional institutions. At present, the COVID-19 2 African Union: The Diaspora Division. Retrieved from: pandemic is threatening the funding and con- https://au.int/en/diaspora-division tinuation of humanitarian aid programmes and

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peacekeeping operations. However, despite their only contribute to the long-awaited economic shortcomings, it is imperative to keep up the sup- transformation to ensure that it is sustainable, port for them and seek a greater commitment to and to improvements in health in the short and conflict resolution and the promotion of effective long term, they can also contribute to lasting peace processes. peace processes. The immediacy of the pandemic has to a large extent diverted global and regional attention away from conflicts and tensions in the Africa after—and beyond—COVID-19 continent like those just mentioned, but from others too, such as Libya. The North African COVID-19 is having a considerable impact on the country finds itself in a context of extra-regional continent in numerous spheres, particularly the interference, with the AU pushed away, from the economy, but also on social dynamism. Howev- outset, from the attempts to resolve a conflict er, the pandemic does not bring everything to a that involves several of its members, to a greater standstill. Sometimes it even stirs discontent that or lesser degree. could become a catalyst for future domestic and Likewise, in the short term the pandemic has transnational dynamics. If this volume (and the impacted or drawn attention away from other one before it) tells us anything it is that nothing central aspects on international political agen- is set in stone for the African continent. das, such as the UN’s SDGs or the AU’s Agenda The impact of COVID-19 has also led to in- 2063, or, for example, migration and forced dis- creased debate on the idea of solidarity. There placement, the struggle against climate change has been talk of solidarity among countries of and the protection of the environment. The the same region, but also of solidarity (not just lack of resources is also capable of obstructing development cooperation) between North and the implementation or adoption of regulations South. One example is the Team Europe initiative in defence of the environment and to force that from the EU, chiefly aimed at Africa, which how- goal to take a back seat in the processes of indus- ever was based more on redirected funds than trialisation and economic transformation in the on new contributions. As the latest figures from continent. That is all the more important if we the Multiannual Financial Framework indicate bear in mind, as Alfonso Sánchez Carrasco and and in view of the economic difficulties affecting María Ángeles Alaminos Hervás point out, that all countries, it is safe to assume that there is no while the relationship between climate change desire to be more ambitious from a quantitative and armed conflicts is exceedingly complex the point of view. conflicts in the continent are closely linked to the The debate around the term “solidarity” and political and environmental situation of the set- a new Strategy with Africa from the EU are an opting in which they take place. portunity for reflection. Beyond the idea of “do- While the link between the different types maine réservé” of the EU and its member states, of conflict and climate change requires deeper solidarity should be considered in horizontal analysis, the exploitation of the environment is terms, not justified by arguing that it prevents certainly a key element in the political economy instability and other negative consequences for of conflicts. In fact, according to Sánchez and Europe (though those factors will undoubtedly Alaminos, the scientific evidence indicates that, form part of the decision), but for reasons of his- as global temperatures continue to rise, the im- torical justice, resuming conversations on the ta- portance of the relationship between climate ble for years. Solidarity could be an area in which change and conflict will become more evident. to boost EU-North Africa-sub-Saharan Africa tri- That is why environmental protection policies angulation, in view of the greater activity of the and the struggle against climate change can not cooperation agencies of Morocco, Egypt and Tu-

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nisia and the creation of an Algerian cooperation relations with our partners or giving up the realist agency. The diversification of the international perspective completely, rather including in our partners of the states of sub-Saharan Africa also strategy action that gradually knits multidimen- depends on greater exchange with their neigh- sional alliances with all the populations involved, bours to the north, be it via processes of regional not just those who govern them. A key ally here integration, or continental integration such as the are the respective civil societies, with which to AfCFTA. forge relations from a horizontal perspective. A new conceptualisation of solidarity with Af- A sustainable future must be a future that is rica also involves making progress in the defini- not only decent, but also prosperous, for which tion of new political initiatives and development reason our productive fabric is another ally, pro- strategies that take into consideration the con- viding its investments in the respective com- tinent’s geopolitical reconfiguration and which munities abide by the rules laid down by these go beyond the states, actively incorporating play- communities and endeavour to promote regional ers from Maghrebi and African civil society and integration. In the year that marks the 60th anni- their aspirations for change, visible for instance versary of numerous African independences and in movements such as Algeria’s Hirak. To escape the 25th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, the false dilemmas that endure in the collec- and with the desire for and conviction of the need tive imagination (stability/democracy; security/ to restore a 21st century version of its three bas- development cooperation), a holistic priority of kets (politics and security; economy; and society, Spain and Europe in Africa should be what could culture and humanitarian affairs), this approach be called “sustainable stability,” a guarantee intrinsically inspired by the concept of “human that our outreach and our ties to the continent security” could be entrusted to a decisive ally (or are maintained over time and they do so without group of allies), namely the various multilateral what the Foreign Ministries of the North perceive instruments that unite us with the African con- as “surprises.” This would not entail cutting off tinent.

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Elsa Aimé González Youssef Cherif Coordinator of the Sub-Saharan Africa Panel of Youssef Cherif runs the Columbia Global Cent- the Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (OPEX) ers | Tunis. He is a Tunis-based political analyst, at Fundacion Alternativas. International Rela- member of Carnegie’s Civic Activism Network, tions Lecturer at Comillas Pontifical University and a regular contributor to numerous think- and researcher of the Group of African Studies tanks, specializing on North African affairs. He at Autonomous University of Madrid (GEA-UAM). consulted previously for IWPR, IACE, the United PhD in International Relations and African Stud- Nations, The Carter Center, etc. He is a former ex- ies; BA in History, both at UAM. Has previously pert at the Tunisian Institute for Strategic Stud- worked as consultant in the third sector and as ies (ITES). He holds a Chevening Master of Arts secretary of the Group of African Studies, coor- in International Relations from the Dept. of War dinating research, teaching and consultancies Studies of King’s College London, and a Fulbright activities. Her research is linked to International Master of Arts in Classical Studies from Columbia Relations and African studies, as much from a his- University. torical perspective as on current issues and cen- tered more specifically on the study of Ethiopia Artur Colom Jaén and the Horn of Africa. PhD in Economics at University of Barcelona, lecturer at the department of Applied Economics at María Ángeles Alaminos University of Valencia. Member of both the Group María Ángeles Alaminos Hervás is Assistant Pro- of African Studies of Madrid and the Center for fessor of Political Science and International Rela- African Studies of Barcelona, he teaches regu- tions at Universidad Loyola Andalucía. European larly in masters programs related to economic Ph.D. in Political Science at Universidad Com- development and African studies (at Autono- plutense de Madrid. She has previously worked mous University of Madrid, University of Valencia as consultant for the European Commission and and Blanquerna University-Ramon Llull in Bar- for the European Union Institute for Security celona). His research is focused on the political Studies (Observatoire de l’Afrique). economy of development in Africa, from a broad point of view, with particular interest in natural Bárbara Azaola Piazza resources and South-South cooperation on the Bárbara Azaola Piazza is associate professor in continent. He has undertaken field work in Chad the Area of Arabic and Islamic Studies at Univer- and Senegal, and research at the School of Orien- sidad de Castilla-La Mancha and researcher for tal and African Studies (London), Beijing Univer- the Study Group on Arab and Muslim Societies sity and Groupe pour l’Etude et l’Enseignment de (GRESAM) at the same university. la Population (Senegal). Finally, he has published

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in journals such as the Journal of Modern African eign relations, as well as the analysis of Spain’s Studies, the European Journal of Development foreign policy towards the Mediterranean and Research and the Canadian Journal of Develop- the Arab World. He has authored more than a ment Studies. hundred articles and journals on these matters, and among his most prominent publications Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal are: Mohamed VI. Regime and social change in Coordinator of the Middle East and Maghreb Morocco (with Thierry Desrues, 2011); Spain’s for- Panel for the Observatory of Spanish Foreign eign policy in the Maghreb: actors and interests Policy (OPEX) at Fundacion Alternativas. She was (with Aurelia Mañ, 2009) and Morocco’s foreign a Researcher and Programme Coordinator at the policy (1997, translated to Arabic in 2005). His U.S./Middle East Project (London) and previously most recent works include ‘Doomed Regional- worked, amongst others, as a foreign policy advi- ism in a Redrawn Maghreb? The Changing Shape sor and at the European Delegation to the Arab of the Rivalry between Algeria and Morocco in Republic of Egypt and the European Parliament. the Post-2011 Era’, published in The Journal of She is a member of the International Mediterra- North African Studies. nean Studies Workshop (TEIM), at the Autono- mous University of Madrid, where she completed Diego López Garrido her PhD. Her research focuses mainly on Gulf and Executive vice-president of Fundacion Alterna- Mediterranean affairs and the Middle East Peace tivas and president of its Council of European Process, with a particular focus on democratic Affairs. Economist, professor of Constitutional transitions and political geography. Law and legal adviser to the Spanish legislative chambers. Secretary of State to the European Irene Fernández Molina Union between April 2008 and December 2011, Lecturer in International Relations at the Univer- coordinated in 2010 the Spanish presidency of sity of Exeter. Her research deals with internation- the EU. Spokesman of the Socialist Group in al relations of the Global South, foreign policies Congress (2006-2008) and has served six terms of dependent and/or authoritarian states, con- as representative in Congress. Participated in flicts, international socialisation and recognition, the convention that elaborated the European with a regional focus on North Africa, as well as Constitutional Treaty, the precursor of the Lis- EU foreign policy and Euro-Mediterranean rela- bon Treaty, representing Spain’s legislative tions. Her research has been published in jour- chambers (2002-2003). He has written numer- nals such as the Review of International Studies, ous books on human rights, economics, poli- International Political Sociology, Mediterranean tics, contemporary history and European law. Politics and Nationalities Papers. She is also the Frequent collaborator of El Pais. Among his most author of Moroccan Foreign Policy under Moham- recent publications are: The Ice Age. Bailing out med VI, 1999-2014 (Routledge, 2016) and the co- the Welfare State in the Era of Austerity (London editor of Global, Regional and Local Dimensions Publishing Partnership, 2015) and Tax Havens: of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonisation Twenty Proposals to end the great evasion (La (Palgrave, 2017). Catarata, 2016).

Miguel Hernando de Larramendi Celia Murias Morcillo Professor at Castilla-La Mancha University, Researcher at the Group of African Studies at where he leads the Study Group on Arab and Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (GEA-UAM). Muslim Societies (GRESAM). His research fo- Member and co-founder of Africaye.org, online cuses on the analysis of political systems in the magazine for the dissemination of analysis on Maghreb, on the study of these countries’ for- sub-Saharan Africa.

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Enrica Picco Societies (GRESAM) and the International Medi- International lawyer and researcher focusing on terranean Studies Workshop (TEIM). Over the last the central African region and a former member years she has directed, coordinated and imple- of the UN Panel of Experts on the Central African mented various research projects on civil society Republic. With almost fifteen years of field experi- in the MENA region, with a special emphasis on ence, mostly with Médecins sans Frontières, she the analysis of social movements and civil society has combined managerial and humanitarian af- organizations. She has authored several reports, fairs positions with research and lectures. Enrica papers and books, such as Islamism and democ- is currently working with a broad range of institu- racy in Algeria: United States and France facing the tions, including the United Nations, international 90’s conflict(2008) and has coordinated the pub- NGOs and think tanks. She is also the author of lication Civil Society and Transitions in Northern several journal articles and academic review and Africa for the Euromed Civil Forum. a lecturer in peace-building and transitional justice at the Ramon Llull University (Barcelona). Antumi Toasijé Her research focuses on conflict dynamics, popu- Historian, artist and writer, Antumi Toasijé has con- lation displacement and justice issues. tributed to Pan-Africanism as an academic (thesis on Afro presence in Spain from prehistoric times to Sebastián Ruiz Cabrera contemporary times) and as an activist. Current- Journalist specializing in International Relations ly director of the Center for Pan-African Studies, and sub-Saharan Africa. PhD in Communication Toasijé has been a promoter of associative, legisla- on sub-Saharan Africa at Universidad de Sevilla. tive and cultural initiatives by the African and Afro- Documentary-maker with documentaries on descendant communities in Spain and Europe. Spain, Cuba, Senegal, Kenya, South Sudan, Mo- zambique and DRC. Chahir Zaki Dr. Chahir Zaki is a citizen of Egypt. At present, Alfonso Sánchez Carrasco Chahir is an Associate Professor of Economics at Alfonso Sánchez has taught at Loyola University the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, since 2016. His research interests include climate Cairo University. In this position, Chahir teaches change, conflict processes, food security and and conducts research on trade policy and mac- migration. Alfonso has published a textbook on roeconomics. He is also the Director of the French American Government and several articles on the section at the faculty. Chahir works also for the electoral process along the United States-Mexi- Economic Research Forum (Cairo, Egypt) as a co border. Recently, during his stay as a Visiting part-time Senior Economist and as a consultant for Scholar at the University of Zürich (UZH), he col- several international organization (the World Bank laborated on several research initiatives dealing and the International Trade Center (UNCTAD-WTO, with the impacts of climate change on food secu- Geneva) and ESCWA). He holds a B.A. in Economics rity in sub-Saharan Africa. from the Faculty of Economics and Political Sci- ence, Cairo University, an M.A. in Economics from Laurence Thieux Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, and a Ph.D. Professor at Complutense University of Madrid, in Economics from Université Paris 1 Panthéon specializes in Arab and Islamic studies. Ph.D. Sorbonne. His research interests include interna- in International Mediterranean Studies at UAM, tional trade, trade policy, trade in services, applied wrote her thesis on ‘The Algerian Civil War and economics and macroeconomic modeling. He has its impact on the foreign policy of France and the published numerous studies in the International United States (1991-1999)’. She is a Senior Associ- Trade Journal, the World Trade Review, Economic ate Fellow of the Study Group on Arab and Muslim Modeling and Applied Economics.

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ACP: Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. EDF: European Development Fund. AfCFTA: African Continental Free Trade Area. EEC: European Economic Community. AMU: Arab Maghreb Union. ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument. APF: African Peace Facility. ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy. APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture. EPA: Economic Partnership Agreements. AU: African Union. ESS: European Security Strategy. CAAF: Central African Armed Forces. EU: European Union. CAERT: Centre Africain d’Études et de Recherche FAO: The Food and Agriculture Organisation of sur le Terrorisme. the United Nations. CAR: Central African Republic. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. CCM: Chama cha Mapinduzi (Tanzanian political FFC: Forces for Freedom and Change (Sudan). party). FGM: Female Genital Mutilation. CEDAW: UN Convention on the Elimination of All FOCAC: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Forms of Discrimination against Women. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. CEMOC: Comité d’État-major opérationnel con- GBV: Gender-based Violence. joint. GSP: Generalised Scheme of Preferences. CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States. HE: Holocene Era. CMAP: Collective Media Advocacy Platform (Ni- HRVP: High Representative of the European Un- geria). ion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and South- ICJ: International Court of Justice. ern Africa. IMF: International Monetary Fund. CORCAS: Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs. IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate CRAN: Conseil Répresentatif des Associations Change. Noires en France. LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean. DCFTA: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade LDC: Least Developed Countries. Agreements. LGTBIQ: Lesbian, Gay, Transexual, Bisexual, In- DDRR: Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinser- tersexual and Queer. tion and Repatriation. MDG’s: Millennium Development Goals. DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo. MENA: Middle East and North Africa. EAC: East African Community. MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Refer- EAP: East Asia and Pacific. endum in Western Sahara. EBA: Everything But Arms. MINUSCA: United Nations Multidimensional In- ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African tegrated Stabilization Mission in the Central States. African Republic.

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MISCA: African-led International Support Mission SYSMIN: Système d’Aide aux Produits Miniers. to the Central African Republic. TABC: Tunisian African Business Council. NDICI: Neighbourhood, Development and Inter- TMC: Transitional Military Council (Sudan). national Cooperation Instrument. TSCTI: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative. NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa’s Develop- UAE: United Arab Emirates. ment. UK: United Kingdom. NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation. UN: United Nations. NHRC: National Human Rights Council. UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observ- NTM: Non-Tariff Measures. er Force. OAU: Organisation of African Unity. UNDP: United Nations Development Programme. ODA: Official Development Assistance. UNED: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Dis- PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation. tancia (Spanish university). PP: Partido Popular (Spanish political party). UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific PRIO: Peace Research Institute Oslo. and Cultural Organization. PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in political party). Cyprus. RFI: Rapid Financing Instrument. UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for RoW: Rest of world. Refugees. SA: South Asia. UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. SADC: Southern African Development Community. UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer SADR: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Group in India and Pakistan. SDG: Sustainable Development Goals. UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Or- SME: Small and medium-sized enterprises. ganization. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. US: United States. STABEX: Système de Stabilisation des Recettes VET: Vocational education and training. d’Exportation. WTO: World Trade Organisation.

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ISBN 978-84-947465-7-4