Softice 2.8 (DOS) User's Guide
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Lecture 1: Introduction to Reverse Engineering
Boston, 2001 Table of Contents Table of Contents Table of Contents............................................................................................. 2 1. Introduction................................................................................................. 5 1.1 About the Course and Notes ............................................................................ 5 1.2 Definitions...................................................................................................... 5 1.3 Typical Examples ............................................................................................ 6 1.3.1 Hacking ................................................................................................... 7 1.3.2 Hiding Information from Public .................................................................. 7 1.3.3 Cell Phones ............................................................................................ 10 1.3.4 Computer Applications ............................................................................ 10 1.4 Requirements............................................................................................... 12 1.5 Scope .......................................................................................................... 13 1.6 Ethics .......................................................................................................... 13 1.7 Miscellaneous Information ............................................................................. 14 2. Programming Processors -
Beyond MOV ADD XOR – the Unusual and Unexpected
Beyond MOV ADD XOR the unusual and unexpected in x86 Mateusz "j00ru" Jurczyk, Gynvael Coldwind CONFidence 2013, Kraków Who • Mateusz Jurczyk o Information Security Engineer @ Google o http://j00ru.vexillium.org/ o @j00ru • Gynvael Coldwind o Information Security Engineer @ Google o http://gynvael.coldwind.pl/ o @gynvael Agenda • Getting you up to speed with new x86 research. • Highlighting interesting facts and tricks. • Both x86 and x86-64 discussed. Security relevance • Local vulnerabilities in CPU ↔ OS integration. • Subtle CPU-specific information disclosure. • Exploit mitigations on CPU level. • Loosely related considerations and quirks. x86 - introduction not required • Intel first ships 8086 in 1978 o 16-bit extension of the 8-bit 8085. • Only 80386 and later are used today. o first shipped in 1985 o fully 32-bit architecture o designed with security in mind . code and i/o privilege levels . memory protection . segmentation x86 - produced by... Intel, AMD, VIA - yeah, we all know these. • Chips and Technologies - left market after failed 386 compatible chip failed to boot the Windows operating system. • NEC - sold early Intel architecture compatibles such as NEC V20 and NEC V30; product line transitioned to NEC internal architecture http://www.cpu-collection.de/ x86 - other manufacturers Eastern Bloc KM1810BM86 (USSR) http://www.cpu-collection.de/ x86 - other manufacturers Transmeta, Rise Technology, IDT, National Semiconductor, Cyrix, NexGen, Chips and Technologies, IBM, UMC, DM&P Electronics, ZF Micro, Zet IA-32, RDC Semiconductors, Nvidia, ALi, SiS, GlobalFoundries, TSMC, Fujitsu, SGS-Thomson, Texas Instruments, ... (via Wikipedia) At first, a simple architecture... At first, a simple architecture... x86 bursted with new functions • No eXecute bit (W^X, DEP) o completely redefined exploit development, together with ASLR • Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention • RDRAND instruction o cryptographically secure prng • Related: TPM, VT-d, IOMMU Overall.. -
Computing :: Operatingsystems :: DOS Beyond 640K 2Nd
DOS® Beyond 640K 2nd Edition DOS® Beyond 640K 2nd Edition James S. Forney Windcrest®/McGraw-Hill SECOND EDITION FIRST PRINTING © 1992 by James S. Forney. First Edition © 1989 by James S. Forney. Published by Windcrest Books, an imprint of TAB Books. TAB Books is a division of McGraw-Hill, Inc. The name "Windcrest" is a registered trademark of TAB Books. Printed in the United States of America. All rights reserved. The publisher takes no responsibility for the use of any of the materials or methods described in this book, nor for the products thereof. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Forney, James. DOS beyond 640K / by James S. Forney. - 2nd ed. p. cm. Rev. ed. of: MS-DOS beyond 640K. Includes index. ISBN 0-8306-9717-9 ISBN 0-8306-3744-3 (pbk.) 1. Operating systems (Computers) 2. MS-DOS (Computer file) 3. PC -DOS (Computer file) 4. Random access memory. I. Forney, James. MS-DOS beyond 640K. II. Title. QA76.76.063F644 1991 0058.4'3--dc20 91-24629 CIP TAB Books offers software for sale. For information and a catalog, please contact TAB Software Department, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17294-0850. Acquisitions Editor: Stephen Moore Production: Katherine G. Brown Book Design: Jaclyn J. Boone Cover: Sandra Blair Design, Harrisburg, PA WTl To Sheila Contents Preface Xlll Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii Chapter 1. The unexpanded system 1 Physical limits of the system 2 The physical machine 5 Life beyond 640K 7 The operating system 10 Evolution: a two-way street 12 What else is in there? 13 Out of hiding 13 Chapter 2. -
NASM — the Netwide Assembler Version 2.09.04
NASM — The Netwide Assembler version 2.09.04 -~~..~:#;L .-:#;L,.- .~:#:;.T -~~.~:;. .~:;. E8+U *T +U' *T# .97 *L E8+' *;T' *;, D97 `*L .97 '*L "T;E+:, D9 *L *L H7 I# T7 I# "*:. H7 I# I# U: :8 *#+ , :8 T, 79 U: :8 :8 ,#B. .IE, "T;E* .IE, J *+;#:T*" ,#B. .IE, .IE, © 1996−2010 The NASM Development Team — All Rights Reserved This document is redistributable under the license given in the file "LICENSE" distributed in the NASM archive. Contents Chapter 1: Introduction . .15 1.1 What Is NASM? . .15 1.1.1 Why Yet Another Assembler?. .15 1.1.2 License Conditions . .15 1.2 Contact Information . .16 1.3 Installation. .16 1.3.1 Installing NASM under MS−DOS or Windows . .16 1.3.2 Installing NASM under Unix . .17 Chapter 2: Running NASM . .18 2.1 NASM Command−Line Syntax . .18 2.1.1 The −o Option: Specifying the Output File Name . .18 2.1.2 The −f Option: Specifying the Output File Format . .19 2.1.3 The −l Option: Generating a Listing File . .19 2.1.4 The −M Option: Generate Makefile Dependencies . .19 2.1.5 The −MG Option: Generate Makefile Dependencies . .19 2.1.6 The −MF Option: Set Makefile Dependency File . .19 2.1.7 The −MD Option: Assemble and Generate Dependencies. .19 2.1.8 The −MT Option: Dependency Target Name. .20 2.1.9 The −MQ Option: Dependency Target Name (Quoted) . .20 2.1.10 The −MP Option: Emit phony targets. .20 2.1.11 The −F Option: Selecting a Debug Information Format . -
Softice Patch
Softice patch click here to download SoftICE is a kernel mode debugger for Microsoft Windows up to Windows XP. Crucially, it is Newer versions of SoftICE patch deep into Microsoft Windows. i have installed softice along with the windows xp patch. When i go to start softice however i get a message stating 16 bit MS-DOS Subsystem. THE SOFTiCE PRESERVATiON SOCiETY - NuMega SoftICE v NT with XP patch & French keyboard. Compuware DriverStudio v Compuware. WindowsXP-deadlyxdose crack Softice +Patch&Serial keygen >> Download Actual patch SoftICE Depositfiles. SoftICE from "SoftICE Driver Suite " is used for debugging my program. Even I try the patch, softice still doesn't break!! mesfet. 年11月18日 Softice patch serial. It is designed to run underneath windows such that the operating system isconvert softice v3. Softice patch serial. SoftICE/Win 95 Patch clavier QWERTY -> AZERTY 4 APR 97 SoftICE Command Reference 30 MAR 97 SoftICE User Guide 30 MAR Even if Softice is not running, Skype complains with this error message and then exits: "Skype is not To patch Skype, I've used Ollydbg, a free debugger. Loading SoftICE for Windows 9x. .. Using Windows NT//XP Symbol (DBG) Files with SoftICE. to prevent SoftICE from patching the keyboard driver. SoftICE can be used for local kernel debugging, which is a feature that is very Very useful for patching, disassembling, and debugging. www.doorway.ru accessories: ice iron on patches cute soft ice applique as iron-on badge made of denim to embellish your jeans jacket or repair your pants as knee patches. An uninstall of Softice is required for correct. -
User's Manual
User’s Manual P/N 064673-004 ® JANUS 2.4 GHz Installation Utility (4MB) Intermec Technologies Corporation 6001 36th Avenue West P.O. Box 4280 Everett, WA 98203-9280 U.S. service and technical support: 1-800-755-5505 U.S. media supplies ordering information: 1-800-227-9947 Canadian service and technical support: 1-800-688-7043 Canadian media supplies ordering information: 1-800-268-6936 Outside U.S. and Canada: Contact your local Intermec service supplier. The information contained herein is proprietary and is provided solely for the purpose of allowing customers to operate and/or service Intermec manufactured equipment and is not to be released, reproduced, or used for any other purpose without written permission of Intermec. Information and specifications in this manual are subject to change without notice. 1998 by Intermec Technologies Corporation All Rights Reserved The word Intermec, the Intermec logo, JANUS, IRL, TRAKKER, Antares, Duratherm, Precision Print, PrintSet, Virtual Wedge, and CrossBar are either trademarks or registered trademarks of Intermec Corporation. Throughout this manual, trademarked names may be used. Rather than put a trademark () symbol in every occurrence of a trademarked name, we state that we are using the names only in an editorial fashion, and to the benefit of the trademark owner, with no intention of infringement. Manual Change Record This page records the changes to this manual, which was originally released as version 001. Version Date Description of Change 002 12/96 New information was added for the JG2050 and for UDP Plus terminal emulation. 003 9/97 New information was added to describe using the installation utility on a JG2010. -
NASM — the Netwide Assembler
NASM — The Netwide Assembler version 2.12.02 © 1996−2016 The NASM Development Team — All Rights Reserved This document is redistributable under the license given in the file "LICENSE" distributed in the NASM archive. Contents Chapter 1: Introduction . .16 1.1 What Is NASM? . .16 1.1.1 Why Yet Another Assembler?. .16 1.1.2 License Conditions . .16 1.2 Contact Information . .17 1.3 Installation. .17 1.3.1 Installing NASM under MS−DOS or Windows . .17 1.3.2 Installing NASM under Unix . .18 Chapter 2: Running NASM . .19 2.1 NASM Command−Line Syntax . .19 2.1.1 The −o Option: Specifying the Output File Name . .19 2.1.2 The −f Option: Specifying the Output File Format . .20 2.1.3 The −l Option: Generating a Listing File . .20 2.1.4 The −M Option: Generate Makefile Dependencies . .20 2.1.5 The −MG Option: Generate Makefile Dependencies . .20 2.1.6 The −MF Option: Set Makefile Dependency File . .20 2.1.7 The −MD Option: Assemble and Generate Dependencies. .21 2.1.8 The −MT Option: Dependency Target Name. .21 2.1.9 The −MQ Option: Dependency Target Name (Quoted) . .21 2.1.10 The −MP Option: Emit phony targets. .21 2.1.11 The −F Option: Selecting a Debug Information Format . .21 2.1.12 The −g Option: Enabling Debug Information. .21 2.1.13 The −X Option: Selecting an Error Reporting Format. .21 2.1.14 The −Z Option: Send Errors to a File. .22 2.1.15 The −s Option: Send Errors to stdout ............................22 2.1.16 The −i Option: Include File Search Directories . -
The Shellcoder's Handbook
80238ffirs.qxd:WileyRed 7/11/07 7:22 AM Page iii The Shellcoder’s Handbook Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes Second Edition Chris Anley John Heasman Felix “FX” Linder Gerardo Richarte The Shellcoder’s Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes (1st Edition) was written by Jack Koziol, David Litchfield, Dave Aitel, Chris Anley, Sinan Eren, Neel Mehta, and Riley Hassell. Wiley Publishing, Inc. 80238ffirs.qxd:WileyRed 7/11/07 7:22 AM Page ii 80238ffirs.qxd:WileyRed 7/11/07 7:22 AM Page i The Shellcoder’s Handbook Second Edition 80238ffirs.qxd:WileyRed 7/11/07 7:22 AM Page ii 80238ffirs.qxd:WileyRed 7/11/07 7:22 AM Page iii The Shellcoder’s Handbook Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes Second Edition Chris Anley John Heasman Felix “FX” Linder Gerardo Richarte The Shellcoder’s Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes (1st Edition) was written by Jack Koziol, David Litchfield, Dave Aitel, Chris Anley, Sinan Eren, Neel Mehta, and Riley Hassell. Wiley Publishing, Inc. 80238ffirs.qxd:WileyRed 7/11/07 7:22 AM Page iv The Shellcoder’s Handbook, Second Edition: Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes Published by Wiley Publishing, Inc. 10475 Crosspoint Boulevard Indianapolis, IN 46256 www.wiley.com Copyright © 2007 by Chris Anley, John Heasman, Felix “FX” Linder, and Gerardo Richarte Published by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana Published simultaneously in Canada ISBN: 978-0-470-08023-8 Manufactured in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except as permitted under Sections 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 646-8600. -
On Improving Cybersecurity Through Memory Isolation Using Systems Management Mode
On Improving Cybersecurity Through Memory Isolation Using Systems Management Mode A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy James Andrew Sutherland School of Design and Informatics University of Abertay Dundee August 2018 i Abstract This thesis describes research into security mechanisms for protecting sensitive areas of memory from tampering or intrusion using the facilities of Systems Man- agement Mode. The essence and challenge of modern computer security is to isolate or contain data and applications in a variety of ways, while still allowing sharing where desir- able. If Alice and Bob share a computer, Alice should not be able to access Bob’s passwords or other data; Alice’s web browser should not be able to be tricked into sending email, and viewing a social networking web page in that browser should not allow that page to interact with her online banking service. The aim of this work is to explore techniques for such isolation and how they can be used usefully on standard PCs. This work focuses on the creation of a small dedicated area to perform cryp- tographic operations, isolated from the rest of the system. This is a sufficiently useful facility that many modern devices such as smartphones incorporate dedic- ated hardware for this purpose, but other approaches have advantages which are discussed. As a case study, this research included the creation of a secure web server whose encryption key is protected using this approach such that even an intruder with full Administrator level access cannot extract the key. A proof of concept backdoor which captures and exfiltrates encryption keys using a modified processor wasalso demonstrated. -
Compuware.Com
Using SoftICE® Version 3.2 Technical support is available from our Technical Support Hotline or via our FrontLine Support Web site. Technical Support Hotline: 1-800-538-7822 FrontLine Support Web Site: http://frontline.compuware.com This document and the product referenced in it are subject to the following legends: Access is limited to authorized users. Use of this product is subject to the terms and conditions of the user’s License Agreement with Compuware Corporation. © 2004 Compuware Corporation. All rights reserved. Unpublished - rights reserved under the Copyright Laws of the United States. U.S. GOVERNMENT RIGHTS Use, duplication, or disclosure by the U.S. Government is subject to restrictions as set forth in Compuware Corporation license agreement and as provided in DFARS 227.7202-1(a) and 227.7202-3(a) (1995), DFARS 252.227-7013(c)(1)(ii)(OCT 1988), FAR 12.212(a) (1995), FAR 52.227-19, or FAR 52.227-14 (ALT III), as applicable. Compuware Corporation. This product contains confidential information and trade secrets of Compuware Corporation. Use, disclosure, or reproduction is prohibited without the prior express written permission of Compuware Corporation. DriverStudio, SoftICE Driver Suite, DriverNetworks, DriverWorks, TrueCoverage, and DriverWorkbench are trademarks of Compuware Corporation. BoundsChecker, SoftICE, and TrueTime are registered trademarks of Compuware Corporation. Acrobat® Reader copyright © 1987-2003 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All rights reserved. Adobe, Acrobat, and Acrobat Reader are trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated. All other company or product names are trademarks of their respective owners. US Patent Nos.: Not Applicable. Doc. 11577a December 10, 2004 Table of Contents Preface Purpose of This Manual . -
The Measured Performance of Personal Computer Operating Systems
The Measured Performance of Personal Computer Operating Systems J. Bradley Chen, Yasuhiro Endo, Kee Chan, David Mazi&res Antonio Dias, Margo Seltzer, and Michael D. Smith Division of Applied Sciences Harvard University Abstract dews. The differences between the OS platforms used in research and mainstream OS products makes some systems research mrele- This paper presents a comparative study of the performance of vant with respect to the current needs of the software industry. At three operating systems that run on the personal computer archi- the same time, researchers ignore important problems in non- tecture derived from the IBM-PC, The operating systems, Win- UNIX systems. dows for Workgroups, Windows NT, and NetBSD (a freely The operating system most commonly used on PC platforms available variant of the UNIX operating system), cover a broad is Microsoft Windows. Windows lacks many features that the OS range ofs ystem functionalist y and user requirements, from a single research community takes for granted, most notably preemptive address space model to full protection with preemptive multi-task- multitasking and protected address spaces. New operating systems ing. Our measurements were enabled by hardware counters in for the PC market such as Windows NT and 0S/2 incorporate the Intel’s Pentium processor that permit measurement of a broad multitasking support found in modern UNIX operating systems, range of processor events including instruction counts and on-chip while also supporting Windows applications. Though the operat- cache miss counts. We used both microbenchmarks, which expose ing systems community is familiar with the benefits of features specific differences between the systems, and application work- such as separate protected address spaces, little attention has been loads, which provide an indication of expected end-to-end perfor- given to systems without them. -
Attacking the Windows Kernel
Attacking the Windows Kernel Jonathan Lindsay ([email protected]) An NGSSoftware Insight Security Research (NISR) Publication ©2007 Next Generation Security Software Ltd http://www.ngssoftware.com Abstract Most modern processors provide a supervisor mode that is intended to run privileged operating system services that provide resource management transparently or otherwise to non-privileged code. Although a lot of research has been conducted into exploiting bugs in user mode code for privilege escalation within the operating system defined boundaries as well as what can be done if one has arbitrary supervisor access (typically related to modern root kit work), not a great deal of research has been done on the interface between supervisor and non-supervisor, and potential routes from one to the other. The biggest problem arises when trying to protect the kernel from itself - for example, under the IA32 architecture implementation of Windows, the distinction between user mode and kernel mode from the user mode perspective is easily enforced through hardware based protection. However, as the kernel is running as supervisor, how does the kernel make distinctions between what it should be accessing? This would be irrelevant if the supervisor was not exposed to interaction with supervisee; but that would defeat the purpose of having a kernel. This paper is focused on Windows and the Intel Architecture, and will briefly outline the current supervisor boundaries provided. Different attack vectors, along with relevant examples, will be provided to demonstrate how to attack the supervisor from the perspective of the supervised, as well as an outline of what possible architectures could be used to mitigate such attacks, such as the research operating system Singularity.