IN the SUPREME COURT STATE of NORTH DAKOTA State of North Dakota, Appellee, Vs. Samuel Elliot Hansford, Appellant. ) ) ) )

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

IN the SUPREME COURT STATE of NORTH DAKOTA State of North Dakota, Appellee, Vs. Samuel Elliot Hansford, Appellant. ) ) ) ) 20180179 FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF SUPREME COURT SEPTEMBER 14, 2018 IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA ) ) State of North Dakota, ) Supreme Court No.: 20180179 Appellee, ) ) vs. ) ) Samuel Elliot Hansford, District Court No.: 17-2017-CR-1 ) Appellant. ) APPEAL FROM THE SOUTHWEST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, GOLDEN VALLEY COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA HONORABLE JAMES D. GION BRIEF OF APPELLEE THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA FROM THE ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT DATED MAY 4. 2018 OF GOLDEN VALLEY COUNTY, DISTRICT COURT BY THE HONORABLE JAMES D. GION, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN GOLDEN VALLEY COUNTY. By: Christina M. Wenko ND State Bar ID No.: 06884 Golden Valley County State’s Attorney c/o Mackoff Kellogg Law Firm 38 Second Avenue East Dickinson, North Dakota 58601 Ph: (701) 456-3210 email: [email protected] Attorney for the Appellee TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. iii STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ......................................................................................... ¶1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... ¶2 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ....................................................................................... ¶3 STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................... ¶12 LAW AND ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... ¶13 I. The district court properly denied Hansford’s Motion to Suppress because there was sufficient evidence to support its finding that Hansford’s due process rights were not violated based on the testimony presented. ....................................................................................................... ¶13 A. The district court did not err in admitting Hansford’s statements at trial because his Due Process rights were not violated as his statements were voluntary and not a result of coercion or intimidation. ...................................................................................... ¶14 1. Hanford’s free will was not overpowered by law enforcement as there was no evidence that he was susceptible to manipulation, rather he articulated coherent responses and understood the consequences of his statements. ........................................................ ¶19 2. Hanford’s free will was not overpowered by law enforcement as there was no evidence that the details of the setting in which he confessed overpowered Hansford’s will. .......................................... ¶28 II. The district court properly denied Hansford’s Motion to Suppress because there was sufficient evidence to support its finding that Hansford’s rights under Miranda and the Fifth Amendment were not violated based on the testimony presented..................................................... ¶35 A. The district court did not err in admitting Hansford’s statements at trial because his Miranda and Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when Hansford was not in custody at the time of questioning. ....................................................................................... ¶37 1. Hansford was not in custody because a reasonable person would believe that he was free to leave where the door was closed but unlocked, Hansford was seated closest to the door, and Helmer explained that Hansford was free to leave at any time. ..................................... ¶38 i 2. Because Hansford was not in custody, Helmer was not required to cease questioning upon Hansford invoking his right to an attorney because Hansford’s statements were voluntary. ............................... ¶42 B. Alternatively, the district court did not err in admitting Hansford’s statements because, even if Hansford was in custody or Helmer was otherwise required to cease questioning, Hansford properly waved his Miranda rights. .................................. ¶45 1. Hansford voluntarily waived his Miranda rights for all statements made prior to his request for an attorney when he acknowledged he understood his rights after Helmer reviewed the Miranda rights line by line at the beginning of the interview. .................................. ¶47 2. Hansford voluntarily waived his Miranda rights for all statements made after his request for an attorney because Helmer made statements while Hansford decided if he wanted an attorney and Hansford initiated conversations with Helmer until he decided to sign a voluntary statement form. ................................................... ¶49 III. The district court properly denied Hansford’s Motion to Suppress because Hansford’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because Hansford was not under arrest, no formal charges had been filed, and there were no restrictions on his liberty at the time his statements were made. .............................................................................................................. ¶55 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ ¶56 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................... ¶57 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................ ¶58 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 921, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944) .................. ¶16 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) ...................................................................... ¶46 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940) ........................ ¶16 City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578 (N.D. 1994) ............................................. ¶12 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 6 L. Ed. 1037 (1961) ........ ¶15, 24 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 77 S. Ct. 281, 1 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1957) .............. ¶16 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, L. Ed. 2d 405, 121 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) ....... ¶36 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) ......................................................................... ¶46 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S. Ct. 281, 1 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1957) ......................... ¶16 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S. Ct. 1420, 1424 (1969) .......................................... ¶22 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 (1948) ................................ ¶16 Jenner v. Smith, 928 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1993) ............................................................... ¶24 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489 (1964)....................................................... ¶35 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150, 11 S. Ct. 486 (1990) ............................ ¶49, 54 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct 1602 (1966) ...... ¶36, 38, 42 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1140-41 (1986) ......................... ¶46, 47 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 (1979) ................................................ ¶46 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 469 U.S. 1039 (1983) ................................................................... ¶50 Oregon v. Bradshaw¸ 54 Ore. App. 949, 636 P.2d 1011 ................................................ ¶50 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) .......... ¶37, 41 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S. Ct. 844, 2 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1958) ....................... ¶16 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S. Ct. 1541, 6 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1961) ............................... ¶16 iii Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 171 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2008) .. ¶55 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973) ............... ¶14, 15, 16, 32 Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2002) ........................................................... ¶24 State v. Brickle-Hicks, 2018 ND 194 ..................................................... ¶17, 19, 29, 36, 46 State v. Goebel, 2007 ND 4, 725 N.W.2d 578......................................... ¶17, 18, 19, 28, 29 State v. Golden, 2009 ND 108, ¶2, 766 N.W.2d 473 ............................................... ¶39, 41 State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, 632 N.W.2d 1........................................................... ¶22 State v. Helmenstein, 2000 ND 233, 620 N.W.2d 581. .................................................. ¶18 State v. Huether, 2010 ND 233, 790 N.W.2d 901 .......................................................... ¶38 State v. Kirkpatrick, 2012 ND 29, 882 N.W.2d 851 .................................................. ¶19, 29 State v. Pitman, 427 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1988) ............................................................... ¶37 State v. Sailer, 500 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1993) .................................................................. ¶18 State v. Tallion, 470 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1991) ......................................................... ¶42, 44 State v. Tollefson, 2003 ND 73, 660 N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1988) ...................................... ¶12 State v. Walden, 336 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1983) .............................................................. ¶23 United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2000). .................................................. ¶42 United States v. Kilgore, 58 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 1995) .................................................... ¶24 United
Recommended publications
  • NPS Investigative Services Branch HIGHLIGHTS of 2015 HIGHLIGHTS of 2015 from the NPS INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES BRANCH
    National Park Service US Department of the Interior NPS Investigative Services Branch HIGHLIGHTS OF 2015 HIGHLIGHTS OF 2015 FROM THE NPS INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES BRANCH The view from Storm Peak in Rocky Mountain National Park. NPS photo by C Brindle. The Investigative Services Branch of the National Park Service provides critical investigative and other law enforcement support to a wide range of customers. Our core mission is the immediate and long-term protection of park resources, visitors, assets, employees, and residents. We accomplish this through detection, investigation, apprehension, and successful prosecution of persons who violate laws of the United States of America while within, or while affecting, the National Park System. from the ISB Mission Statement HIGHLIGHTS OF 2015 FROM THE NPS INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES BRANCH Map and Organizational Structure of ISB The Investigative Services Branch (ISB) of the National Park Service is led by a Deputy Chief stationed in Washington, DC, and by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC). The SAC directly oversees ISB’s five Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASACs), and each ASAC leads a field office covering multiple states. The Special Agents of the Investigative Services Branch are geographically distributed across the National Park System, pre-positioned to conduct investigations as efficiently as possible. Larger operations are often carried out by Special Agents from multiple field offices. In its first full year with this single SAC organization structure, the team saw closer cooperation, coordination,
    [Show full text]
  • Drawing a Line Between Terry and Miranda: the Degree and Duration of Restraint Katherine M
    Drawing a Line between Terry and Miranda: The Degree and Duration of Restraint Katherine M. Swifit INTRODUCTION A felon answered the door in his underwear. Three police officers and three parole officers were there to search his apartment for a gun on the basis of a tip from his mother.! The police handcuffed him in the hallway outside his apartment, but told him he was not under ar- rest; the handcuffs were for his safety and the safety of the officers. Then they took him inside and asked about the gun, which he told them was in a shoebox on the table. The police never read the suspect his Miranda warnings. Was he "in custody"? Or was this merely a tem- porary detention? Mirandav Arizona' held that police may not interrogate a suspect who has been taken into custody without first issuing the familiar warnings Investigative stops, valid under Terry v Ohio,' are not sub- ject to Miranda's notice requirements.! Courts have not settled on a workable rule for determining custody in Terry stop cases. Part of the problem is that custody cases involve so many factors.! But more im- portant, coercive police behavior that would have required Miranda warnings in 1966 often is deemed reasonable under Terry today. This has led to a circuit split over whether coercive Terry stops constitute Miranda custody. The First, Fourth, and Eighth circuits hold t B.A., BJ. 1998, University of Missouri-Columbia; J.D. 2006, The University of Chicago. I The facts used in this example are drawn from United States v Newton, 369 F3d 659, 663 (2d Cir 2004).
    [Show full text]
  • Transportation Security Administration Agent Arrested for Conspiracy to Transport Illegal Aliens
    U.S. Department of Justice Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez United States Attorney District of Puerto Rico 350 Carlos Chardon Avenue, Suite 1201 Hato Rey, PR 00918 PHONE: 787-766-5656 FAX: 787-772-4012 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: U.S. Attorney’s Office Date: September 12, 2013 Lymarie V. Llovet-Ayala Public Affairs Specialist (787) 766-5656; (787) 340-1835 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION AGENT ARRESTED FOR CONSPIRACY TO TRANSPORT ILLEGAL ALIENS San Juan, Puerto Rico – Today, David Alexander Díaz-Torres, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Officer, was arrested by special agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) in Orlando, FL, for conspiracy to transport illegal aliens within the United States, announced U.S. Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico, Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez. Díaz-Torres was charged on September 10, 2013, in a 13-count superseding indictment with five other individuals for bringing, transporting, harboring and shielding illegal aliens within the United States. On August 7, 2013, Rafael Severino, Eduard Bueno-Beltrán, Luis Raul Sierra-Conde, Juan Severino-Basora and Esther Mary Sánchez-Cruz were indicted for participating in a scheme to bring illegal aliens to the United States. On March 24, 2012, a group of Brazilian nationals were smuggled by an unidentified female to New York through the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It is alleged that David A. Díaz-Torres assisted two co-defendants in smuggling the group of Brazilians by allowing them to pass the security checkpoint area without being questioned. The group continued to New York, Boston and Philadelphia on board commercial flights.
    [Show full text]
  • (OIG) Investigation Closing Report Concerning Hubbell Trading Post, 2008 and Memo from National Park Service (NPS) in Reply to Investigation, 2009
    Description of document: Department of the Interior Inspector General (OIG) Investigation Closing Report concerning Hubbell Trading Post, 2008 and memo from National Park Service (NPS) in reply to Investigation, 2009 Requested date: 24-December-2013 Released date: 30-December-2013 Posted date: 26-May-2014 Source of document: FOIA Officer Office of Inspector General U.S. Department of the Interior 1849 C Street, NW MS-4428 Washington, DC 20240 Fax: 202-219-1944 (Attn: FOIA Officer) Email: [email protected] The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR VIA EMAIL December 30, 2013 Re: OIG-2014-00015 This is in response to your letter dated December 24, 2013, which was received by the Office oflnspector General (OIG) on December 26, 2013.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Derick Garcia Complaint.Pdf
    Case 1:20-mj-02038-KBM Document 1 Filed 12/11/20 Page 1 of 6 '*,r*ffirH***. AO 9l (Rcv. I l/l l) Criminal Complaint CoURT ffi * 420 UNrren Srerrs DtsrRlcr ll,llTcHp, for the , District of New Mexico United States of America v. caseNo' Derick GARCIA (YOB 1988) A>-N\X-ao3b Defendant(s) CRIMINAL COMPLAINT I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. in the District of New Mexico , the defendant(s) violated: Code Section Offense Description 18 U.S.C. S 111 Assault of a Federal Officer 18 U.S.c. S 92a(c)(lXAXiii) Discharge of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence. 18 U.S.c. SS e22(sxl) Felon in Possession of a Firearm This criminal complaint is based on these facts: See attached Affidavit, attached hereto and incorporated herein. d Continued on the attached sheet. Prinkd name and title Electonically Submitted and Telephonically Sworn to me on this date. Date: December 11,2020 fu^^-e/rL-*, Karen B. Molzen, U.S. Magistrate Judge City and state: Albuquerque, New Mexico Pinted narne and title Case 1:20-mj-02038-KBM Document 1 Filed 12/11/20 Page 2 of 6 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AND ARREST WARRANTS I, Lorraine Hardy, being duly swom, depose and say: INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF' TIT['- Atr'FTDAVIT l. I am currently serving as an FBI Special Agent assigned to the FBI Albuquerque Field Office, Violent Crime Task Force (VCTF), where I primarily investigate violent repeat offlenders, armed robberies, kidnappings, and FBI fugitives.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 AFFIDAVIT I, Tyler J. Rempel, Special Agent
    Case: 5:20-cr-00112-PAG Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 01/31/20 1 of 22. PageID #: 2 AFFIDAVIT 0- I, Tyler J. Rempel, Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice (DOJ), being duly sworn and deposed, state the following: INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND 1. This Affidavit is submitted in support of an application under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a warrant pursuant to a criminal complaint to arrest the person known as ALLEN MARTIN KENNA (hereinafter “KENNA”), further described below. 2. Your Affiant is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and as such, is an investigative or law enforcement officer of the United States within the meaning of Rule 41(a)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Your Affiant is engaged in the enforcement of criminal laws and is within the category of officers authorized by the Attorney General to request and execute search warrants pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3052 and 3107; and DOJ regulations set forth at Title 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 and 60.2(a). 3. Your Affiant has been a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation since April 2010, and is assigned to the Cleveland Division. I have been involved in the investigation of numerous national security cases involving individuals advocating violent jihad, individuals seeking to join terrorist organizations, terrorist fundraising, and individuals intending to conduct terrorist attacks within the United States. Additionally, I have completed FBI administered counterterrorism classroom and online training, at the FBI Academy, and at other FBI facilities.
    [Show full text]
  • Police Miranda Warning and Waiver Draft
    GENERAL POLICE ORDER CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE ORIGINAL EFFECTIVE DATE : REVISED DATE: NO. PAGES: NUMBER: 8-20-2018 1 of 6 SUBJECT: MIRANDA WARNING AND WAIVER ASSOCIATED MANUAL: RELATED ORDERS: CHIEF OF POLICE: PURPOSE: To establish Cleveland Division of Police guidelines so that all questioning of criminal suspects comply with the Constitution, federal, and state laws. POLICY: It is the policy of the Division to respect the fundamental rights of all individuals. When a person is taken into custody, or otherwise deprived or his or her freedom of action in a significant way, and when he or she is to be questioned, the Division shall afford him or her the procedural safeguards required to protect his or her Fifth Amendment right against involuntary self-incrimination. DEFINITIONS: Custody: When an officer has arrested that individual or when a reasonable person in the individual’s position would not feel free to leave based on a totality of the circumstances. Questioning incident to a routine traffic stop are not considered custodial. Interrogation:Interrogation is any conduct that the officer knows or reasonably knows would elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. Interrogation is not just direct questioning but also any words or actions (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the officer knows or reasonably knows is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Juvenile: An individual under the age of 18. PROCEDURES: I. The Miranda Warning General Requirements. A. The Miranda Warning is required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and applies only to sworn police officers who will be questioning or interrogating a suspect who is in custody.
    [Show full text]
  • SWAT Operational Guidelines and Standardized Training Recommendations D
    CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING MMISSIO O N C P G E A N I C N E I A O R F T F IC D E N R A S S TANDARD S .W. A .T. Operational Guidelines and Standardized Training Recommendations © 2019 California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Published July 2005 Revised August 2006, September 2019 All rights reserved. This publication may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical or by any information storage and retrieval system now known or hereafter invented, without prior written permission of the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), with the following exception: California law enforcement agencies in the POST peace officer program and POST-certified training presenters are hereby given permission by POST to reproduce any or all of the contents of this manual for internal use within their agency/school. All other individuals, private businesses and corporations, public and private agencies and colleges, professional associations, and non-POST law enforcement agencies in-state or out-of- state, may print or download this publication for non-commercial use. Infringement of the copyright protection law and the provisions expressed here and on the POST website under Copyright/Trademark Protection will be pursued in a court of law. Questions about copyright protection of this publication and exceptions may be directed to Publications Manager. POST Mission Statement The mission of the California Commission on Peace
    [Show full text]
  • General Order
    Lexington Police Department Lexington, Kentucky GENERAL ORDER BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE G.O. 2014-02 Interviews, Interrogations and Confessions Rescinds: SOP BOI 1993-26A References: CALEA Chapter(s) Effective Date: 02/19/16 Distribution Code: B All Department Employees Originally Issued: 2016 I. PURPOSE The purpose of this policy is to provide officers with legally sound procedures for conducting custodial interrogations and to establish guidelines and procedures for the electronic recording of custodial interrogations and confessions. The purpose of this policy is also to provide officers with procedures for interviewing and interrogating juveniles that are both legal and consistent with the limitations in maturity and emotional development characteristic of juveniles. The purpose of this policy is also to establish procedures that ensure that all suspects are accorded their constitutional rights. II. POLICY It shall be the policy of the Lexington Police Department to acknowledge that statements and confessions must be given freely and voluntarily and with due consideration for the suspect’s right to silence and right to counsel. It shall also be the policy of the department to acknowledge that the U. S. Supreme Court has recognized the emotional and developmental differences between adults and juveniles and the implications that this has on the conduct of juvenile interviews in general and interrogations in particular. These differences must be taken into account when an officer conducts an interview or interrogation of a juvenile. It shall also be the policy of the department that all officers observe due process and legal rights of suspects, including juveniles, and protect against charges of police coercion or intimidation during interviews and interrogations.
    [Show full text]
  • UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the ______Southern District District of of Indiana ______
    Case 2:21-mj-00026-CMM Document 1 Filed 07/08/21 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 1 AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the __________ Southern District District of of Indiana __________ United States of America ) v. ) ) Case No. ) 2:21-mj-26 Shane M. Meehan ) ) ) Defendant(s) CRIMINAL COMPLAINT I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. On or about the date(s) of07/07/2021 in the county of Vigo in the SouthernDistrict of Indiana , the defendant(s) violated: Code Section Offense Description 18 U.S.C. § 1114 Premeditated Murder of a Federal Agent This criminal complaint is based on these facts: See attached Affidavit. u✔ Continued on the attached sheet. /s/ Matthew Cook Complainant’s signature Matthew Cook, Special Agent/FBI Printed name and title $WWHVWHGWRE\WKHDSSOLFDQWLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI)HG5&ULP3E\ WHOHSKRQLFFRPPXQLFDWLRQ UHOLDEOHHOHFWURQLFPHDQV Date: 07/08/2021 Judge’s signature City and state: Indianapolis, IN Hon. Doris L. Pryor, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title Case 2:21-mj-00026-CMM Document 1 Filed 07/08/21 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 2 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT I, Special Agent Matthew Cook, do declare and state as follows: Introduction and Agent Background 1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and have been so employed since March 2010. Previous to that, I was a practicing attorney in the Kansas City, Missouri area. I am a “federal law enforcement officer” within the meaning of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(a) and 41(a)(2)(C).
    [Show full text]
  • Miranda Warning and the Tax Fraud Investigation
    THE MIRANDA WARNING AND THE TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATION I. INTRODUCTION In 1966 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Miranda v. Arizona,' holding that prior to custodial interrogation, the police must warn a suspect of his right to remain silent, that if he does speak anything he says may be used against him, that he has a right to consult an at- torney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. The effect of the Miranda decision has been a shift in the conceptual basis of the fourth,2 fifth,3 and sixth4 amendments by creating a conclu- sive presumption against voluntariness when a person divulges self- incriminating information while subject to custodial interrogation if he is not warned of his fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment rights prior to ques- tioning. The purpose of this article is to question the broad application of Miranda and its nontax progeny to initial tax fraud investigations in a taxpayer's home or office. The thesis of the article is that in view of the noncustodial, nonaccusatory nature of the tax fraud investigation prior to the taxpayer's arrest and in view of the safeguards provided by the In- ternal Revenue Service (IRS) to protect the taxpayer's constitutional rights, there should be no broad application of Miranda and its nontax progeny to pre-arrest tax fraud investigations. To apply Miranda to these cases would be to use Miranda beyond its factual limitations and would be contrary to the theory of our self-assessment income tax system which re- quires a fairly free exchange of information between the taxpayer and the IRS.
    [Show full text]
  • Developments in Federal Search and Seizure Law
    FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER DISTRICT OF OREGON LISA C. HAY Federal Public Defender Oliver W. Loewy STEPHEN R. SADY 101 SW Main Street, Suite 1700 Elizabeth G. Daily Chief Deputy Defender Portland, OR 97204 Conor Huseby Gerald M. Needham Robert Hamilton Thomas J. Hester 503-326-2123 / Fax: 503-326-5524 Bryan Francesconi Ruben L. Iñiguez Ryan Costello Anthony D. Bornstein Branch Offices: Irina Hughes▲ Susan Russell Kurt D. Hermansen▲ Francesca Freccero 859 Willamette Street 15 Newtown Street Devin Huseby + C. Renée Manes Suite 200 Medford, OR 97501 Kimberly-Claire E. Seymour▲ Nell Brown Eugene, OR 97401 541-776-3630 Jessica Snyder Kristina Hellman 541-465-6937 Fax: 541-776-3624 Cassidy R. Rice Fidel Cassino-DuCloux Fax: 541-465-6975 Alison M. Clark In Memoriam Brian Butler + Nancy Bergeson Thomas E. Price 1951 – 2009 Michelle Sweet Mark Ahlemeyer ▲ Eugene Office Susan Wilk + Medford Office Research /Writing Attorney DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW Stephen R. Sady Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender October 2020 Update Madeleine Rogers Law Clerk TABLE OF CONTENTS Page A. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3 B. What Constitutes A Search? ............................................................................................ 3 C. What Constitutes A Seizure? ......................................................................................... 14 D. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ..............................................................................
    [Show full text]