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How China’s Quest for Political Reform Is Undercut by the China Model

By Yawei Liu

t the 13th National Congress of the economic growth, accomplished without Chinese Communist Party, Secre- tinkering with the political system, has A tary General Zhao Ziyang laid out changed China’s discourse on the necessi- an executable plan to launch China’s polit- ty of political reform and emboldened ical reform. If implemented, this plan many Chinese officials and scholars to would have put Deng Xiaoping’s dual- declare that the China model (or the Bei- track reform into action. After all, Deng jing consensus) is not only a solution for Xiaoping believed that without political China but can be the key for development reform, all other reforms would eventually for all developing countries. This deve- fail. The 1989 incident derailed the plan, lopmental hubris will further delay China’s sent Zhao Ziyang into political exile, and long overdue political reform and may almost terminated China’s economic eventually make the glorious China model reform. Deng’s Southern Tour in 1992 unsustainable. managed to revive the economic reforms, but Deng was never able to put political This paper argues that a political reform reform back on track. He had neither the plan was always part of the initial reform political capital nor the determined per- package, but that its priority on the CCP sonnel to help realize his vision. agenda has been in decline as China’s economic lot continues to In the next 15 years, through Jiang Zemin prove. When Joshua Cooper Ramos in- and Hu Jintao, despite a very brief trial troduced the Beijing consensus, the Chi- with direct elections of township magi- nese who have always been suspicious strates, political reform was largely about political reform seized upon the shelved. Meanwhile, the economy has concept and turned it into a perfect wea- roared, and China is now the 3rd largest pon of idea slaughter. While Westerners economy in the world. This tremendous are largely dubious about the meaning and

Dr. Yawei Liu is Director of the China Program at The Carter Center. This article is abridged from a paper presented to the International Conference at Bucknell Univer- sity on "The People's Republic of China at 60: Internal and External Challenges"

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significance of the China model, many the so-called reform and opening up Chinese scholars have joined the efforts in [gaige kaifang] in December 1978 was the molding and publicizing it. The campaign gigantic effort to swing back to pragmat- to pitch the China model to both domes- ism, although this effort was still couched tic and overseas audiences is so intense in the rhetoric of building a new socialist and effective that the need to debate polit- country with Chinese characteristics. The ical reform has been swept aside. next 10 years saw phenomenal economic development and impressive improve- The slow decline of CCP’s interest in ment in the living conditions of the Chi- political reform nese people.

By the time Mao Zedong passed away in Deng Xiaoping had another reform agen- 1976, China was inching toward a general da on his mind. He wanted to couple political and economic paralysis, if not a economic reform with political dire collapse. Its economic development reform. He believed all reform efforts was at a standstill, its universities admitted would eventually be bottled up if political only those who were born “red,” regard- reform was not initiated. Deng saw the less of the fact that they were conducting relationship between economic develop- no research, and its politi- ment and political cal system was as byzan- Deng Xiaoping had reform as that between tine as one could im- the superstructure and agine. Mao’s successor, another reform agenda economic foundation, Hua Guofeng, realized on his mind. He wanted as was argued by Karl that China’s moderniza- to couple economic Marx in many of his tion must be put on the books. Deng had a front burner, but he was reform with political strong feeling that not able to move away reform. without reforming the from the “two whatev- political structure: 1) ers.” In a series of shrewd the accomplishments of political maneuvers, through the help of the economic reform could not be pro- some old guards of the Chinese Commun- tected; 2) further deepening of the eco- ist Party (hereafter as CCP) and progres- nomic reform could not be secured; 3) sive elements in the media and propagan- productivity would be blunted; and 4) the da apparatus, Deng Xiaoping managed to four modernizations of China would be assert himself into the decision-making not achieved.2 process of the Party, the state, and the military.1 But Deng Xiaoping also understood how important a politically correct ideological With senior CCP leaders coming to a ten- façade was in order to widen the tative consensus, Deng Xiaoping presided reform. To move forward, he had to put over the historic Third Plenum of the 11th himself in a politically unassailable posi- National Congress of the CCP in Decem- tion first. On March 3, 1979, in a speech ber 1978 and made the momentous deci- to CCP’s theoretic work, he introduced sion to disengage in irrational class strug- the concept of insisting on four cardinal gle and focus on economic develop- principles, namely: 1) insisting on the so- ment. The foundation for the launch of cialist road; 2) insisting on the proletarian

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dictatorship; 3) insisting on the leadership ratus; 2) improve cadre selection proce- of the CCP; and 4) insisting on Marxism, dures; 3) establish mechanisms for societal Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. consultation; and 4) perfect the system of This was as good a political cover as one democratic politics.5 could ever get, but to make each and every decision in accordance with the The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 “four cardinal principles” alone would be derailed the long-planned political self-defeating. A new framework had to reform. Zhao Ziyang was removed from be developed; it was called “one core and his position and put under house ar- two fundamentals.” The core was “devel- rest. Jiang Zemin was abruptly promoted oping the economy is the top priority” to General Secretary of the CCP. Jiang and the two fundamentals were: 1) “four would be in this position until 2002, for a cardinal principles will always be adhered total of thirteen years. Busy consolidating to,” and 2) “reform and opening up can- his power and scrambling to deflect at- not be abandoned.”3 tacks from the left, Jiang made a hard turn to the left. Collapse of the communist By the fall of 1986, Deng Xiaoping began regimes in Eastern European countries his push for political and the disintegration of the Soviet Union reform. At the 6th Plenum convinced the CCP top leadership that the of the 12th National Con- train of reform had to be slowed gress of the CCP, details of down. Not totally sidelined but losing … Not only was the political reform package political clout as a result of the crackdown, Deng’s political began to emerge. One Chi- Deng felt powerless, and he was unable to reform tabled, nese scholar believes that intervene and reverse the rising tide of Deng had identified two political conservatism. Not only was his economic main areas for the proposed Deng’s political reform tabled, his eco- reform was to political reform, namely the nomic reform was to be frozen as well.6 be frozen as separation of the CCP and the state in decision-making In 1992, at the age of 87, isolated and not well. and the transformation of often consulted in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping the role of the govern- headed south, visiting Wuhan, Shenzhen, ment. Another scholar lists Zhuhai and Shanghai, where he talked to three areas that were of ex- local officials. Initially, his tour was not treme concern to Deng: sources of legiti- even reported by the media outlets of the macy, concentration of power in the central government. When newspapers in hands of the CCP, and the lack of a sys- Shenzhen and Shanghai began reporting tem of checks and balances.4 The final Deng’s visits and his remarks, the top package was put out by Zhao Ziyang, Chinese military leadership vowed to sup- general secretary of the CCP, at the first port reform and opening up. This session of the 13th CCP National Con- “southern tour” jump-started the stalled gress. In the political report submitted to reform.7 This was the second time that the Congress on October 25, 1988, Zhao Deng pulled the government back to the listed eight tasks in the soon-to-be- middle from the left using a pragmatist launched political reform. Four of the approach. He said there were only three eight were the most important: 1) initiate measures that could determine if a policy separation of the CCP and the state appa- was right or wrong: 1) if it was beneficial

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to increase socialist productivity; 2) if it platform was ever introduced. The 14th was conducive to increase the compre- CCP Congress was held in 1992 after hensive power of the nation; and 3) if it Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour. It was helpful in improving the living condi- pledged to continue the reform. Five tions of the people. Deng’s tour caused a years later, in the political report of the panic in Beijing. Jiang and his supporters 15th CCP Congress, Jiang Zemin declared stopped their turn to the left and decided that the CCP would build a socialist China to come back to the center, returning to with rule of law.11 Before and after the 16th the reform and opening up started by CCP Congress, there was a flurry of ac- Deng Xiaoping back in 1978.8 Unfortu- tivities. First, Jiang invented “the three nately, Deng Xiaoping was no longer in a represents,” effectively changing the mis- position to oversee the launching of the sion of the CCP, which used to be to political reform. His ideas, well defined represent the industrial workers and far- by Zhao Ziyang in 1988, were diluted mers in China. Second, there were talks beyond recognition. China moved into a of adding “political civilization” to the new era of economic liberalization and two existing civilizations that the CCP had political tightening, a development that vowed to build, namely “materialistic civi- later would be a salient component of the lization” (economic activities) and “spiri- so-called China model. tual civilization” (ideo- There were talks of add- logical purification). In Political reform did not his political report deli- come to a complete ing “political civiliza- vered on November 18, stop. They were contin- tion” to the two existing 2002, Jiang Zemin out- ued in ways that could not civilizations that the CCP lined the tasks of politi- and would not even leave cal reform as the fol- a dent on the supremacy had vowed to build. lowing: 1) adhere to of the CCP. According to and perfect the socialist Xu Yansong, a Tsinghua democratic system; 2) University political scientist, strengthen the construc- political reform since 1992 has followed tion of the socialist rule of law; and 3) four trajectories: 1) improving the admin- reform and improve CCP istrative efficiency of the government ship. Jiang further added that political through restructuring; 2) introducing a reform means “perfecting the democratic civil servant system; 3) extensive research system, enriching democratic formats, ex- on source of power and its legitimacy; and panding channels for citizens’ orderly par- 4) promoting rule of law.9 At the same ticipation in politics, guaranteeing people’s time, direct village elections were man- entitlement to democratic election, demo- dated by the Organic Law of the Villager cratic decision-making, democratic man- Committees of the PRC, promulgated on agement and democratic supervision, a provisional basis by the National making more rights and freedom available People’s Congress (NPC) in 1986 and to the people, and respecting and defend- made into a basic law in November ing human rights.” He also said that only 1998.10 by adhering to and perfecting the People’s Congress system could laws and decisions Jiang Zemin presided over three CCP Na- represent the will of the people. Lastly, he tional Congresses, but no new political said that other democratic parties in China

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could only provide consultation under report to be delivered by Hu in October CCP leadership.12 2007.

After Jiang delivered his swan song report, The 17th CCP Congress came and Hu Jintao was “elected” by members of went. There was no big bang proposal in the CCP Central Committee as the new Hu’s report. In terms of the significance Party Secretary. In March 2003, he was of conducting political reform, Hu said “elected” by deputies to the NPC as pres- that expanding socialist democracy was to ident of China. This was the first smooth serve the purpose of defending people’s power transition in the CCP history, a sign interests and maintaining social fairness of political progress. However, not until and justice. Without political reform, 2004 was Hu able to assume the chair- China would become politically dis- manship of the CCP Central Military oriented, the Party and the state would Commission (CMC). What many had lose their vitality, and the initiative of the hoped to be a new deal began to emerge people could not be unleashed. On how quickly. Hu Jintao acted quickly to deal to proceed with political with the case of Sun Zhigang, abolishing reform, Hu listed a total of an old regulation designed to detain and seven tasks, including ex- deport migrants in the cities and enforced panding people’s democracy, … Hu could not accountability through removing the promoting grassroots de- do anything un- mayor of Beijing for failing to prevent the mocracy, implementing rule SARS epidemic. However, the long an- of law, and building a ser- til he was able ticipated political reform was not vice-oriented govern- to consolidate 14 launched. Of the two public faces of the ment. power. new leadership, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the premier of the State Council, the latter Parallel to the increasingly was more vocal and specific in talking vague discourse on political about details of political reform. It is also reform in China, a new con- true that the two rarely touch on the topic cept began to emerge. This unless they are meeting with foreign visi- is concept of “heping jueqi” tors.13 [peaceful rise]. In 2003, at the Boao Fo- rum, Zheng Bijian, former secretary of Hu Observers of Chinese politics tended to Yaobang and vice president of the Central believe Hu could not do anything in the Party School, gave a speech entitled “The area of political reform until he was able New Road of China’s Peaceful Rise and to consolidate his power. Since he was the Future of Asia.” In the speech, Zheng not able to obtain the CMC chairmanship described the nature of China’s develop- until 2004, he did not have the time and ment. First, China has 1.3 billion people, resources to prepare for a systemic over- which will make China a developing na- haul of China’s political system. All hope tion for a long time to come. Second, in was pinned on the 17th CCP Congress. A the 25 years since the launching of reform group of officials and scholars from vari- and opening up, China has invented a new ous government agencies and think tanks model of development. Third, this new in Beijing were assembled in the western model could be characterized as actively suburbs of Beijing to draft the political participating in globalization, being independent, and not seeking conquest and

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hegemony. China’s peaceful rise will not [peace] is the paramount mission of the only solve the development issue for the CCP: pursuing peace outside China, build- most populous nation in the world but ing harmony domestically, and seeking will also make an enduring contribution to reconciliation across the Taiwan world peace and prosperity. However, in Strait. Zheng emphasizes that Moscow order for China not to deviate from this and Beijing took divergent roads largely path, there are three strategies that have to because it was against the very essence of be adopted. 1) Economic and political Chinese culture to use force or violence to reform had to move forward simulta- expand territorially, develop economically, neously because the market economy and and influence ideologically. Yes, China is political democracy are the twin engines a socialist nation, but its unique socialism of China’s growth. 2) There must be cou- is to increase productivity at home and rage and vision in absorbing all advanced wage peace abroad. The CCP’s mission achievements of mankind, since China’s does not go beyond protecting territorial rise needs spiritual pillars. 3) Maintaining integrity and securing development and the balance of different in- modernization for China.16 terests groups, keeping the harmony between mankind To a certain extent, Zheng advanced what and nature and reducing later became a trademark of Hu Jintao: the Political reform friction between domestic idea of harmony. Obviously, one of is not only political need and interna- Zheng’s goals was aimed at dismissing the needed; it is a tional demand are all too China threat theory in general and disarm- important to be neg- ing the Americans who felt uneasy about must for China lected.15 It must be noted China’s growth in particular. In the to sustain its that Zheng was giving equal process, he actually hit upon something growth. emphasis to both the market that greater. His treatise on China’s economy and political de- peaceful rise was the first step toward democracy. In other words, fining an emerging China model, building political reform is not only a new consensus and identifying the uni- needed; it is a must for Chi- queness of China’s develop- na to sustain its ment.17 However, Zheng did not discredit growth. the necessity of political reform. He was one of a few CPP thinkers that have had Two years later, in an article that appeared access to the top leadership. Like all lead- in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, ers at the top, they are only absorbing Zheng Bijian tried to define the nature ideas from their advisors selectively. Hu and orientation of the CCP. First, he Jintao likes the idea of harmony but ap- stated, the CCP is different from the pears to dislike Zheng’s emphasis on the Communist Party of the former Soviet urgent need to carry out political reform Union. It does not seek conquest; rather, and economic development with same it denounces wars. Second, it is economic force and determination. In October globalization that has contributed to the 2006, at the 6th Plenum of the 16th CCP China miracle. Therefore, destroying the Congress, a resolution was adopted to go existing power balance and challenging all out in pursuit of social harmony. the United States are not in the interests of the CCP. Third, seeking three “和 s”

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The idea of harmony is a new turning part of the CCP’s top leadership. 19 Rhe- point for the CCP engineered by Hu Jin- toric on political reform can still be found tao. The first generation of the CCP lead- on the lips of CCP leaders and in the ar- ers applied the ideas of continuous revolu- ticles penned by scholars from thinks tion and class struggle in pursuit of har- tanks and universities. However, as the mony. They ran into a dead end with CCP is completing its historic transition enormous social and human costs. Deng from “war and revolution” to “peace and Xiaoping put the brakes on that frenzied development,” less and less attention is quest for a Communist utopia and swung being given to political reform. Deng’s the nation onto a path of creating material success was to instill the CCP with the wealth for the people. His efforts to se- idea that development is the hard cure economic development through po- truth. Hu’s achievement is to inject a no- litical reform were derailed by an unfore- tion of social justice and equitable devel- seen event. After a few years of wavering opment into Deng’s formula. Deng had and hesitation, Jiang Zemin began to dee- intended to use political reform to prepare pen the economic reform the CCP and the gov- without giving too much ernment for new chal- thought to political Hu’s achievement is to lenges down the reform. China’s GDP inject a notion of social road. Hu may believe soared. Hu Jintao and justice and equitable de- the same goal can be Wen Jiabao came in with a attained without over- new playbook. They un- velopment into Deng’s hauling the political derstand reckless pursuit formula. system. All he needs to of revolution was as bad do is make small ad- as reckless pursuit of justments, get CCP of- GDP. While it was glo- ficials to pay more at- rious to be rich back when Deng first tention to people’s concerns, and make started the reform, it is prohibitively dan- people feel happy, indebted to the CCP, gerous when the gap between the haves and thankful to the top leadership for eve- and have-nots becomes too wide. The rything. resolution of the 6th Plenum of the 16th CCP National Congress adopted a six- The China model/Beijing consensus talk point package, including: 1) a people- surfaced against this backdrop. It has be- focused policy-making orientation; 2) come increasingly high-pitched since adoption of the outlook of scientific de- 2008. In January 2008, there was a severe velopment; 3) no retreat from reform and snowstorm that paralyzed most of South- opening up; 4) moving toward democracy ern China, but the Chinese government and rule of law; 5) balancing the relation- responded quickly and no riots took place. ship between development and stability; In May, the Chinese nation rallied to pro- and 6) maintaining CCP suprema- vide relief to the people victimized by the cy.18 Although democracy was still part disastrous earthquake in of the package, it was moved to the back- chuan. Throughout the spring, the nega- burner. tive response to China’s Olympic torch relays in Europe and the United States All in all, there has been a precipitous de- triggered an unprecedented patriotic fer- cline of interest in political reform on the vor. In August, the Beijing Summer

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Olympic Games awed the world. China’s and adopts an asymmetrical military strat- economy has not sunk too low as has oc- egy. A blurb at Ramo’s web site declares curred elsewhere in the aftermath of the that the paper is “based on more than 100 collapse of Lehman Brothers on Septem- interviews with Chinese officials, scholars ber 15, 2008. These events have provided and businesspeople. The Beijing Consen- the sustenance that feeds the China model sus offers a new look at what China has frenzy. accomplished in 30 years of reform and of the complex puzzles that lie ahead. Ra- The origin of “the Beijing consensus” mo’s analysis shows how the country’s emergence is unique in history, while hig- Chinese officials, scholars, and reporters hlighting the challenges China’s rapid rate are very adept at inventing new terms to of change poses for both China and the describe and define the CCP or state poli- rest of the world.” 20 cies, but they did not invent the terms “Beijing consensus” and “China mod- It seems Ramo coined the term “Beijing el.” “Beijing Consensus” Consensus” to deliberately offer an alter- was coined by Joshua Coop- native to the so-called Washington Con- er Ramo, a partner at the sensus. He writes, “China is marking a consulting firm Kissinger path for other nations around the world When Chinese Associates, founded by for- who are trying to figure out not simply officials de- mer Secretary of State Henry how to develop their countries, but also scribe the China Kissinger, who was instru- how to fit into the international order in a mental in bridging ties be- way that allows them to be truly indepen- moel, they go tween China and the United dent, to protect their way of life and polit- far beyong ra- States when China was fac- ical choices in a world with a single mas- 21 mo’s initial de- ing the unsavory prospect of sively powerful center of gravity.” having to fight a two-front finition. war with both Moscow and The goods in the Beijing consensus Washington. In 2004, Ramo basket wrote a paper entitled “The Beijing Consensus.” The When Chinese officials and scholars de- paper was published by the Foreign Policy scribe the China model/Beijing consensus, Center of the United Kingdom, a country they go far beyond Ramo’s initial defini- that pushed China into a century long era tion. They simplify the Washington con- of humiliation back in 1840 during the sensus as a combination of liberal democ- Opium War. racy and a market economy and frame the China model as the very opposite of that In this paper, Ramo identifies three un- mixture. During a recent interview, Ma derlying grids of the Beijing Consensus, Zhengang, China’s former ambassador to namely: 1) a strong commitment to inno- the United Kingdom and president of the vation and experimentation; 2) a nice Chinese Institute of International Affairs, combination of increasing per capita GDP said the core of the Western model is po- and sustainable and equitable distribution litical democratization and economic libe- of wealth; and 3) a firm adherence to na- ralization, along with promotion of the tional self-determination, which guards idea that without political democratization, against Western financial encroachments economic development cannot be se-

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cured. China has taken a different path theory is that China cannot sustain its and scored big successes. That was why economic growth without liberalizing po- Westerners are dumbfounded, upset and litically. He uses Nesbit’s recent book to scared. Ma then said that two very im- buttress his view that China has not only portant components of the China model managed to adapt to economic globaliza- are a strong and firm CCP leadership and tion but has also weathered the political the people’s keen desire to see the rise of challenge from the West. Where Western China.22 Fang Ning, director of the Insti- nations have horizontal democracy, China tute of Political Science under the Chinese has introduced vertical democracy. Since Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) said all democratic nations have different for- that two fundamental characteristics of mats of democracy, China is by all means the China model are: 1) protecting entitled to have its own democratic sys- people’s right to pursue happiness; and 2) tem. The China model should not be nar- centralizing power at the top. The first rowly defined as one-dimensional. It in- has unleashed people’s energies and initia- cludes a unique political system that will tive, and the second is the key in improv- enrich the arsenal of democracy in the ing decision-making process and marshal- world.25 ling resources to achieve predetermined goals.23 Some scholars go as far as saying Some scholars see the China that the shaping of the China model is model as an epic battle to The China mod- merely the outcome of applying Marxist crush the Western monopo- theory to the special circumstances of ly on the discourse of devel- el should not be China. Xu Chongwen, a senior researcher opment and human progress narrowly de- at CASS, said in a recent interview that and to secure a safe place fined as one- China’s contribution to the world is to for the Chinese develop- have “sinified" Marxism and solved prob- ment experience that can be dimensional. lems that cannot be effectively dealt with easily identified and unders- by any other ideology or political system tood by other developing in the world. This is a new path in pur- nations. Wang Hui, a suing progress, producing a developmen- Tsinghua University profes- tal alternative to the one offered by devel- sor, feels the key to the suc- oped nations whose rise was built on hurt- cess of this battle is the ing other nations politically and economi- CCP’s courage in maintaining indepen- cally and securing global harmony and dence and focus on developing China in world peace. What else can explain Chi- its own unique way.26 Zhang Wei-wei na’s achievement in becoming the third summarizes the China model as “strong largest economy and reducing poverty in government,” “pragmatic approach,” such a dramatic manner?24 “people focused,” and “gradual reform.” He even challenges both Chi- Hu Wei is more interested in examining nese scholars and Western experts to the political component of the China identity a single nation that has used the model. He outlines two Western theories Western political system to have success- in his recent article. One, according to fully turned itself into a more advanced Hu Wei, is that China is doing relatively nation. In his views, there are two well economically but that its political de- benchmarks to measure if a nation is suc- velopment is quite backward. The other cessful: elimination of corruption and

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achieving modernization. He sees three plied by different nations facing different major trends in the world in the past thirty challenges, and a new paradigm shift years. The first is the rise of radical Islam, whose impact is going to be felt in many which has led the current war on terror- years to come. Pan Wei, who early this ism. The second is the so-called third year called Chinese scholars to declare war wave of democratization. Countries that on Western civilization, divides the China have become democratic during this wave, model into three sub-models: social, eco- particularly Eastern European nations, are nomic and political. The four pillars that now facing serious challenges. The third support the political sub model are: 1) the trend is the modernization drive led by adept application of populist democracy; 2) China. It has triggered seismic reactions a leadership group that is progressive, un- and will eventually impact the political selfish, and unified; 3) a meritocratic civil landscape of the world.27 servant system; and 4) a system of effective checks and balances and efficient self- Other scholars see other unique aspects of corrective capacity. These four pillars the China model. He Xuefeng, an in- make up the brain of modern-day Chi- fluential researcher on China’s rural de- na. China’s different social structure con- velopment, believes that China’s econom- stitutes the body. The economic sub ic takeoff is due to the ar- model provides two tificial and deliberate divi- The China model/Beijing strong feet and huge sion of urban centers and wings for China.30 the countryside. Farmers consensus is not some- can migrate to the cities thing that suddenly Finally, the China mod- when jobs are available burst into China and be- el/Beijing consensus is and return home when life not something that becomes unbearable. The came the beacon for its suddenly burst into availability of this large development. China and became the army of cheap labor and beacon for its devel- the fact that their land opment. It is the cumu- provides a safety valve give China a lative learning, adaptation and exploration unique master key to open the door of by several generations of CCP leaders. It development without paying too high a began with Mao’s heroic effort to choose price.28 Zhang Yu, an economics Profes- and pick what was useful for China from sor of Renmin University of China, de- the classics of Karl Marx and Vladimir fines the China model as: 1) combining Lenin. It moved a step further with Deng strong and large state owned businesses Xiaoping placing bricks of pragmatism in with a vibrant private sector; 2) running a Mao’s theoretical warehouse. Jiang Zemin market economy that is subject to tough came along and supplied “the three state regulations; and 3) opening to the represents” to the CCP inventory. Hu outside world gradually with state con- Jintao introduces the outlook of scientific trol.29 development and harmony to this development treasure house. None of the four Many believe the China model is a com- have severed the relationship with Marx- prehensive tool box that can solve differ- ism, but all have made creative and posi- ent problems, a set of experiences and tive adjustments and contributions.31 As practices that can be borrowed and ap- indicated by the CCP Resolution adopted

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on September 18, 2009, at the 4th Plenum members are afraid of any real political of the 17th CCP National Congress, 88 reform, has begun to push political reform years after it was founded, 60 years after it to the side. The China model/Beijing came to power, and 30 years after it consensus provides a perfect theoretical launched reform, the CCP has trans- framework and a practical excuse to post- formed China from a weak, poor and pa- pone political reform or even to declare it thetic country into a great power of peace, totally unnecessary. This is something prosperity and harmony. Without the Joshua Cooper Ramo perhaps never ex- CCP, there would have been no new Chi- pected when he first introduced the con- na, no socialist road of Chinese characte- cept of the Beijing Consensus in 2004. ristics. In other words, the China model is undeniably a CCP invention.32 The China model/Beijing consensus is neither a sound theory nor a good set of Tentative conclusions benchmarks to design reform and measure its success. It is a highly effective sys- If we compare the Soviet tem under the domination of one political reform model to the Chinese party, through which resources can be reform model, the key differ- marshaled, dissent silenced or crushed, ence is that Moscow began its land grabbed, lakes and rivers dammed, The China mod- reform in the political arena international events paid and organized el is neither a and Beijing refused to put po- without looking into any human or eco- sound theory litical reform ahead of ecological cost, as long as the outcome of the nomic reform. From the activity makes the state and the Party look nor a good set Chinese perspective, that is good. It is a system whose declared mis- of bench- exactly why the Soviet Union sion is to serve the people but whose marks… quickly collapsed and China possible abuse of power cannot be has been able to maintain ter- checked and balanced. It is a system res- ritorial integrity, one-party ponsive to the people when pressured, but supremacy, and its economic it always blames the people for all the development miracle. How- problems in society. It is a system whose ever, this priority shift only output has awed many foreigners, de- occurred after 1989. When reform and lighted millions of Chinese, and appealed opening was launched in 1978, Deng had to leaders and elites in other developing a two-step plan in mind, and he believed countries, but the cost of this “miraculous” the success of all reforms would hinge on output is staggering and long-term. It is a the success of political reform. The pi- system that does not acknowledge the ex- votal year of 1989 saw not only the plan istence of universal values, trashes demo- of political reform dashed but also wit- cratic arrangements to hold government nessed a hard left turn in the economic officials accountable, and sees a constant sector. This retreat from reform was fi- Western conspiracy to destroy China. It is nally reversed by Deng in 1992, by which a system that recognizes constant talent at time he was too old and too tired to push the top, demands total obedience at the forward his plan for political reform. As bottom, and uses incentives or fear to rein China’s economic performance continues in those in the middle. It is a system that to shine year after year, the CCP, whose may elevate China to the global stage of top leadership and many rank and file national wealth and power, but it will not

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be able to make China a country in which West currently under the leadership of the individual pursuit of happiness is guaran- United States. The China model should teed and protected. It is a system that not be the opposite of this system, de- cannot resolve the tension between an fined by the Washington Consensus. The autocratic government and people who two development models should com- want more say in their quest for individual plement each other and benefit from each rights. The China model is an effective other. Many Chinese scholars have weapon to shatter political reform need shown a rare arrogance in describing the into pieces. The Beijing consensus is an significance of the China model and artificial consensus that democratization downgrading the usefulness of the Wash- will bring about harm and even destruc- ington consensus. What they may not be tion to China. aware of is that China’s political system and treatment of its people cannot be Scholars and the media both inside and easily accepted as it is by the developed outside China have played a very impor- Western nations and even by developing tant role in building the myth of the China countries. China may never collapse, but model/Beijing consen- its way of life can pose a sus. We praise those The China miracle is not threat to Western coun- who constantly question tries and their values. In the validity and applica- just an outcome of the other words, if China bility of the China model China model, of China’s does not change course and raise doubts about unique political, eco- and deviate from the its usefulness. We are now fixed path called the appalled by those who nomic, social and cul- Beijing consensus, it may have joined the China tural peculiarities. certainly be on a collision model chorus without course with the Washing- sound judgment or with ton consensus. It is diffi- no judgment at all. When scholars are cult to predict the fallout of this collision working with the state and party apparatus but it is not going to be pretty. It will be to advance something that may eventually an economic confrontation, a cultural hurt the wellbeing of the nation and erode clash, and a war between political sys- the liberty of the people, they are collud- tems. For China to avoid this clash, it is ing with power in a reckless way. Many necessary to revive the political reform Chinese and Western scholars are trum- that was on the CCP agenda but rendered peting the China model which, unless it is inactive by the China model. Yes, China modified significantly down the road, will will have a democratic system different hurt both China and those nations that from the United States, the United King- decide to experiment with it. dom, France, South Africa, Japan, and South Korea, but it has to have a system The China miracle is not just an outcome that can be defined as truly democratic. of the China model, of China’s unique political, economic, social and cultural peculiarities. To a large extent, China’s successes, as pointed out by Zheng Bijian, are due to existing economic globalization and rule of law, all achievements of the

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Notes:

1 “Two whatevers” refers to Hua Guo- toward goals of political reform set by feng’s declaration that 1) Whatever Mao Deng Xiaoping], Zhonggai luntan [China has decided we will carry through and 2) Reform Forum], at whatever Mao has said we will obey”. For http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. details of Deng and his supporters’ epic asp?NewsID=103302; accessed Septem- battle to move China away from old ide- ber 5, 2009. Cao cites Deng Xiaoping ology and quest for socialist purity, see Su wenxuan, Vol. II, p. 328 and Vol. III, p. Shuangbi, “Liangge fanshi shi zenme bei 131, fouding de” [How the “two whatevers” were negated], Beijing Ribao [Beijing Dai- 5 The section on political reform in Zhao ly], July 21, 2008. Ziyang’s historic political report is available at 2 See Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. III, p. 164 asp?NewsID=157257; accessed on Sep- and 176. tember 17, 2009.

3 For the Chinese language description of 6 See Xu, “Analysis of the lack of progress the pillars of Deng’s reform, please see of China’s political reform”. “Sixiang jiben yuanze” [Four cardinal principles] at 7 For details of Deng Xiaoping’s talking http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003- points during his southern tour, see 01/20/content_698005.htm; accessed “Deng Xiaoping nanxun tanhua yaodian” September 18, 2009. [Summary of Deng Xiaoping’s talks during the southern tour], People’s Daily on- 4 See Xu Yansong, “Zhongguo zhengzhi line, February 6, 2006, tizhi gaige zhihou de yuanyin fenxi” http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. [Analysis of the lack of progress of Chi- asp?NewsID=39777; accessed on Sep- na’s political reform], August 20, 2003 in tember 23, 2009. the China elections & governance web site at 8 See Qin Xiaoying, “Deng Xiaoping lilun http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. yu hexie shehui” [Deng Xiaoping’s theory asp?NewsID=18837; accessed September and the harmonious society], Ta Kung Pao, 17, 2009. For details of Deng’s political January 26, 2007. reform agenda, Xu cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaop- 9 See Xu, “Analysis of the lack of progress ing], Vol. II, p. 176 and p. 213. The of China’s political reform”. second scholar, Cao Youqin’s article is entitled “Chaozhe deng Xiaoping sheji de 10 For details of the history of direct vil- zhengzhi1gaige fangxiang qianjin” [March lage elections in China, see Yawei Liu, “Consequences of village elections,” Chi- na Perspective, Fall Issue, 2000.

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guanzhongren/; accessed September 22, 11 For details for China’s slow move to- 2009. When Wen Jiabao met with the ward political reform in terms of chang- Brookings Institution delegation in 2006, ing ideas and adopting new thinking, see he spent a long time describing China’s Yu Keping, “Sixiang Jiefang yu zhengzhi specific plan to conduct political reform. jinbu” [Mind emancipation and political He talked about elevating direct elections progress], Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], from lower levels to higher ranks of the September 17, 2007. government, building an independent 12 For details of political reform advanced judicial branch, and introducing a checks by Jiang Zemin at the 6th CCP Congress, and balances system through a free press see and other mechanisms. See John Thorn- http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. ton, “Accessing the next phase of a rising asp?NewsID=17193; accessed September China”, trip report of the Brookings Insti- 17, 2009. tution, December 24, 2006.

13 For a brief chronology of Wen Jiabao’s 14 Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th CCP Na- remarks on political reform to foreign vis- tiona Congress is at itors, see Guan Zhongren, Wen Jiabao yu http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. waiguoren taolun minzhu quanjilu [Com- asp?NewsID=120321; accessed Septem- plete record of Wen Jiabao’s democracy ber 20, 2009. To see differences of the talk to foreigners], February 4, 2009, political reform agenda of the 13th CCP http://www.chinaelections.org/Newsinfo. Congress and 17th CPP Congress, see asp?NewsID=142630; accessed Septem- Wang Xiao, “Shisanda baogao yu shiqida ber 6, 2009. In September 2005, both Hu baogao de bijiao” [Comparing the political Jintao and Wen Jiabao met with foreign reports of the 13th CCP Congress and the participants at the World Law Conference 17th CCP Congress], that was held in Beijing. When Hu talked http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. about political reform, he said the Chinese asp?NewsID=118807, November 16, government would guarantee people’s en- 2007; acceded September 16, 2009. titlement to democratic elections, democratic decision making, democratic man- 15 Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo heping jueqi agement and democratic supervision. xindaolu he yazhou de weilai” [The new Wen Jiabao was very colorful and specific road of China’s peaceful rise and the fu- in painting China’s political reform picture. ture of Asia], November 23, 2003, He told the same group, “Look, when http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.a Chinese have learned how to govern a sp?newsid=157366; accessed September village, they will then try to learn how to 22, 2009. govern a township. ‘Elections’ will move upward as planned.” See Guan Zhongren, 16 Zheng Bijian, “Zhonguo gongchandang “Hu Wen jiang minzhu baixing ting yuyin” zai ershiyi shiji de zouxiang”, Renmin ri- [Hu and Wen discuss democracy; the bao [People’s Daily], November 22, 2005, common people listen to the residual http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.a sound], sp?newsid=42130; accessed September 19, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2005/09/hu- 2009. and-wen-discuss-democracy-the-common- people-listen-for-the-residual-sounds-

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17 See Hong Zhaohui, “Zhongguo tesulun 24 Ibid. yu zhongguo fazhan lujing” [China uniqueness and China’s path of development], 25 See Hu Wei. Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China], Issue 2, 2004 at 26 See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li. http://www.chinayj.net. 27 See Zhang Wei-wei. 18 The Resolution of the 16th Plenum of the 16th CCP National Congress, 28 See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li. http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. 29 Ibid. asp?NewsID=126270; accessed Septem- ber 20, 2009. 30 Ibid.

19 Qian Gang wrote in his article “Where 31 Yan Shuhan, “Zhongong daolu de shijie is ‘political reform” that one of the most yingxiang” [The global impact of the Chi- prominent developments was the disap- nese Road], Liaowang [Outlook news- pearance of the term “political reform” in weekly], September 8, 2009. current CCP rhetoric. Qian came to this conclusion through looking at the use and 32 CCP Central Committee, “Guanyu frequency of key words related to political dangjian luogan zhongda wenti de jueding” reform in the Party reports, resolutions [Several major decisions on CCP con- and speeches. According to him, “politi- struction], September 18, 2009, cal reform” appeared in the political re- http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/ ports of the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th CCP 10128293.html; accessed September 27, National Congresses but was replaced by 2009. “democratic politics” in the political report of the 17th CCP National Congress. See Qian Gang, “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige zai nali”, http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. asp?NewsID=118562, November 11, Rule of Law and the 2007, accessed September 21, 2009. China Model: Reform,

20 See details at the Law, and the Future http://joshuaramo.com/beijing- consensus/; accessed September 1, 2009. By Jason Kyriakides

21 Quoted in http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/ 09/15/beijing_consensus/; accessed Sep- tember 10, 2009.

22 hina's remarkable ability to weath- See Tang Yaoguo. er the 2009 global economic downturn made many believers of 23 Ibid. C its development model, even among its many critics. At the end of 2009, as the

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United States faced a national unemploy- model is more amenable to governments ment rate of nearly 10 percent, a figure looking to retain control of the political not seen since the Great Depression, eco- reins instead of transitioning to or build- nomically weaker European states like ing a more democratic system. However, Greece and Ireland experienced massive many of the most ardent China model economic shrinkage, real-estate giant Du- supporters within China are quick to re- bai suddenly faced an economic implosion, mind would-be imitators that the Chinese and Japan faced its harshest economic model of development has led to many situation since the 1997 Asian financial problems, such as environmental degrada- crisis, China's growth rate exceeded the tion, official corruption, and a growing expectations of even its own leaders, ce- gap in income, and that the model needs a menting it as a “leader of the global eco- mechanism to resolve social tensions nomic recovery.” Not only was China's caused by these issues. Many are looking economy growing, but its economic reach to rule of law and a strengthened legal sys- in the level of its own investment abroad tem to fill this role. This paper will analyze reached record levels, and China became the various issues necessitating develop- the world's largest lending power. China's ment of a strengthened rule of law within investments around the world, particularly the China model and outline what a Chi- in developing African and nese version of rule of Middle Eastern countries, Despite China’s growing law might entail. suggested the ambitious reach of a global power role on the international Societal demands for rather than the more con- stage, China's internal a new means of re- servative introspection of politics have not become solving conflict a developing tion. Economic growth more open in the past Despite China’s grow- and investment were ac- five years. ing role on the interna- companied by China's un- tional stage, China's veiling of its modernized internal politics have military during its 60th anniversary Nation- not become more open in the past five al Day parade, and new action on global years. In some regards, the political system disaster relief and peacekeeping. has become more restrictive, leading to the emergence of certain social pres- These signs of a China that is increasingly sures. China has the largest community active and ambitious on the global stage of netizens in the world, with over 300 due to the apparent success of a “China million Internet users, a community that Model” of national development have faces growing challenges to its ability to drawn the interest or alarm of Westerners access and transmit information without facing economic decline and political grid- restriction on the Web. Rural Chinese lock (such as in the ongoing failure as of must confront the growing political inse- February 2010 of the United States Con- curity of local leaders, who fear the threat gress to pass needed health care reform). that mass protests pose to their careers, They have also emboldened some devel- and who are therefore often careful to oping nations looking for an alternative to manage or block out negative public sen- the current models of development pro- timent before it evolves into large-scale moted by many Westerners, as the China unrest. Some ethnic minorities, most vis-

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ibly the Uighurs and Tibetans of western Pan Wei (2006 32-40), a professor at the China, grapple with cultural decline due to Beijing University School of International the influx of Han immigrants into their Studies, famously made the claim that home territories and to growing economic China can continue to thrive as an autho- disparities between the Han majority and ritarian power long into the future by minority populations. Migrant workers to creating a “consultative rule of law regime,” the metropolises of the East continue to which would essentially strengthenthe in- struggle to subsist on meager dependence of the civil service and judi- es. These are only some of the internal ciary, and increasing independent gov- problems that the central government fac- ernment oversight in order to strengthen es while creating a development strate- institutional checks on power without gy. While the central government does ceding much power to another political respond to a certain degree to public pres- party. Pan Wei suggests that the ideal sure, as shown by its attempts to appease models for this “consultative rule of law” the public with compensation and limited are Hong Kong and Singapore, two weal- increases in openness after the riots in thy ethnically-Chinese cities Shishou, Ürümqi and Baoji, to name just that enjoy a high level of three last year – it is still determined to economic development and maintain a development regime that is internal stability, but lack … A strong legal centrally-controlled and resistant to exter- democracy. system could nal influence. potentially re- While some criticize Pan solve a signifi- As a result of these pressures, the central Wei's proposal because it government increasingly seeks to release rules out alternatives to the cant number of the steam of popular resentment and current system of gover- ongoing prob- create a way to institutionalize dispute nance in China, the basic lems. resolution between state and society. One principle of using China's possibility is to increase the capacity of growing system of law ra- China's legal system to handle the growing ther than political change number of claims being made on a range (which would likely require of issues. Whereas at the beginning of the nothing less than a serious upset within reform period in 1978 China's legal system the Party) to reform China's institutions was in shambles, China's legal system of and promote increased equity is worth today is modernizing and growing. How- close consideration. If the legal system ever, it remains to be seen whether the were strengthened by increasing the num- legal system, as part of the so-called China ber, quality and independence of its law- Model , will become similar, as many yers and courts, it would likely become a commentators and observers demand, to key part of the “China Model” of devel- common law legal systems found in the opment by acting as an oversight mechan- West – in which the law historically has ism to state-led reforms and as an inter- tended to expand rights for the individual mediary for those affected by such re- and restrict expansion of the state – or forms. In this way, a strong legal system something else that more closely considers could potentially resolve a significant China's political history and aims more at number of ongoing social problems achieving societal goals. present under the China model.

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Establishing a check on the Party’s power to better address the problems of the poor would help to reduce the dangerous lack and middle class Chinese. Jiang Zemin of cohesion between the center and local attempted to develop Party ties with the governments, which has been a persisting elites, who had been isolated in Chinese problem in China. Murray Scott Tanner society since the 1950s but were vital to and Eric Green (2007 114-6) recently dis- China’s economic and technological re- cussed a study of central influence over vival; Hu Jintao and Vice Premier Wen local officials, focusing on the police force Jiabao, on the other hand, have focused to develop claims about how power struc- their attention on disadvantaged popula- tures and political circumstances influence tions through reforms, issuing a number relations. Their analysis concluded that of directives to ease the explosion of so- despite central control over regulations, cial problems--such as pollution and lack police organization, and quotas, the center of job security--associated with the coun- fails to maintain local police try’s economic transition. Finally, the Par- discipline due to local con- ty's realization that corruption threatens trol over hiring, cadre man- both national stability and the Party legi- China main- agement, and money that timacy has resulted in harsh anti- flows into and out of the corruption programs, including increased tains a strictly local Public Security Bu- monitoring of Party members' families single-party au- reaus. In other words, be- and overseas activity (for example, “CPC thoritarian ap- cause the center doesn't pushes Party leaders to report family in- have a way to adequately formation to stem corruption ” Xinhua proach to de- monitor and control local Jan 13, 2010). velopment. police, local police serve the goals of the local elites that However, these measures have simply fund them. The develop- been reactive approaches to the ongoing ment of an independent problem of lack of accountability in the body to monitor and report system. The far-branching cracks in the on these local police, so dis- system – such as the broad reach of cor- tant politically from the central govern- ruption, renegade local leaders, a judiciary ment, could ostensibly reduce problems that still is weak and closely linked to Par- caused by the center-local divide. ty political preferences for its rulings despite growing caseloads – suggest that a George Washington University's Bruce J. systematic approach implementing a more Dickson (2006 21-51) writes that the Party highly developed system of rule of law is has unsuccessfully tried “repairing rela- necessary to increase political accountabil- tions with society” by other means. The ity and restore political legitimacy. most visible change has been village elections for village committee leaders, which Elements of the China Model have been steadily implemented in many villages across China but have little hope The “China Model,” or alternately the of being moved up, as they face conflict “Beijing Consensus,” as coined by Joshua with unelected township government Cooper Ramo, suggests an alternative to above them. The Party has also shifted its the Washington Consensus of the West, class emphasis since the 1990s from one which has for decades pushed free-market based on elite leadership to one that seeks development, liberal democracy, and a

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high level of participation by institutions Mao reforms from spilling over into large- such as the World Bank in developing na- scale disorder. The stability and certainty tions. While there is disagreement be- supposedly guaranteed by authoritarian tween scholars about the details of what government is appealing to foreign com- the China Model is or what purpose it panies looking to invest places where they serves, it basically combines export-led can be guaranteed cheap labor and a high economics, single-party politics, and an quality of capital. In order for this politi- emphasis on territorial sovereignty. The cal model to work, the CCP must main- model manifests itself in three areas of tain party discipline. However, power in Chinese policy – governance, science and China is not well-centralized - the divide technology, and economics, which togeth- between central government initiatives er form a strongly self-determined Chi- and local government plans is often great, nese model of development. and some local leaders act slowly or simply ignore directives from the center in or- First is the idea that China must conti- der to consolidate political power. Fur- nuously innovate to be successful. The thermore, corruption and pet projects of essence is that by implementing cutting- local leaders divert funds away from the edge programs or technologies in key sec- center's national programs. These were tors or industries, those industries should problems anticipated by Deng Xiaoping grow and help lift up re- when he began the related industries, leading, in … power in China is not forms; with the growth theory, to a rapid expan- well-centralized - the di- of CCP power and a sion of technological ca- lack of a checks-and- pability and professional vide between central balances system, he and skills. Ramo (17-18) cites government initiatives others worried how the the outbreak of SARS (Se- and local government Party would deal with vere Acute Respiratory popular pressure. Ro- Syndrome) in 2003, which plans is often great. wan Callick (2007) of led to a shutdown of the The American suggests country, as a central event that the Party's primary requiring the Chinese to innovate. De- solution was to guarantee a low rate of spite the fact that the country largely came taxation (which is collected laxly), which to a halt, the SARS epidemic ended up in theory makes for a looser social con- producing many unexpected benefits, as it tract between citizens and the government, enabled the government to show that it and to continue working on economic could handle a major crisis and exposed rather than social development, with the problems of media cover-ups and the de- anticipation that social welfare will “trickle ficient health care system. down” from wealthy cities and industries. The drawback of this approach has Second, China maintains a strictly single- been that development has been, as is tra- party authoritarian approach to develop- ditional in China, heavily focused on ur- ment, insisting on “stable reform” - de- ban centers and on key industries, leaving velopment that does not allow influence many citizens behind as others have pros- from outside the Chinese government - to pered. prevent protest of salary issues, corruption, pollution or other side effects of the post-

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Regarding economics, the China Model 30 years and has enabled foreign firms to promotes a strategy of kai fang （开放）， prosper there. During the 1997 economic or “opening up.” This is essentially an crisis in Asia, the highly managed nature outward-focused strategy of keeping Chi- of the Chinese economy may have played na's markets mostly free and attracting an important role in China's ability to foreign investment and companies to weather the crisis successfully. As Rowan China. In order to garner foreign invest- Callick (2007) argues, strong control at the ment, China has pegged its currency to top and an inward focus has enabled the the U.S. dollar and uses its central bank as Chinese economy to adapt more quickly a powerful management tool to prevent to changing global economic circums- its currency from inflating, thereby keep- tances, especially shifts in the ability to ing input prices for foreign businesses secure credit internationally. The stability low. This has earned the criticism of of the Chinese yuan, ensured by the na- economists around the world. One econ- tional bank's intensive management of the omist that continues to gain the spotlight currency, assured foreign investors who on this issue is 2008 Nobel Prize in Eco- observed the massive fluctuations in other nomics winner Paul Krugman (2010), who East Asian currencies at the wrote on January 1st: time.

Short-term interest rates are close to zero; Economic growth continues The 1982 consti- to be China's strength. As long-term interest rates are higher, but tution declared only because investors expect the zero- will be discussed shortly, rate policy to end some day. China’s bond China's legal system after the the supremacy purchases make little or no difference. political reforms of the of law over the Meanwhile, that trade surplus drains 1970s was restructured much-needed demand away from a de- largely with economics in Party. pressed world economy. My back-of-the- mind, in an attempt to draw envelope calculations suggest that for the in foreign investment and next couple of years Chinese mercantilism foreign companies. The may end up reducing U.S. employment by drawback of this approach around 1.4 million jobs. (Krugman 2010) was that social and political concerns that are often ad- This is the last in a series of editorials (see dressed by law – such as the previously also “The Chinese Disconnect,” New York mentioned post-reform economic divide Times Oct. 22; and “World Out of Bal- and minority concerns about protection ance,” New York Times Nov. 15) Krugman from majority interests – were largely neg- wrote claiming that China's monetary pol- lected. As a result, the Chinese concep- icy threatened to destabilize the global tion of what “rule of law” means has his- economy and slow recovery from the torically differed from the meaning found global recession by “siphoning much- in Western common law. needed demand away from the rest of the world into the pockets of artificially com- What is meant by “rule of law”? petitive Chinese exporters.” In order to develop an idea about what China's protective economic policy has, “Chinese rule of law” would look like, it is for the most part, served it well in the past necessary to first look at what “rule of

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law” means to the Chinese and analyze The debate evolved once law gained offi- the progression of the debate on legal sys- cial legitimacy, proceeding from discus- tems since the concept was first intro- sions of feasibility to disagreements about duced in the early Deng Xiaoping what the purpose and scope of the law years. Chinese and Western conceptions should be. These disagreements are ex- of the role of law in society differ consi- emplified by the difference between the derably, and this difference has altered homophones “building a legal system,” considerably the developmental path for fazhi （法制）, and “rule of law,” fazhi their respective legal systems. （法治）. As this debate continued, the Party began to give the new rhetoric on Randall Peerenboom, UCLA School of the importance of law some teeth. With Law professor and advisor to several law the Cultural Revolution having ended only firms and organizations in China, de- three years prior, the Criminal Procedure scribes the historical development of con- Law was passed in 1979 to give defen- temporary Chinese law in China's Long dants more power in litigation with the March toward Rule of state. Defendant rights were further ex- Law. During the Mao years, panded in the 1980s, and the Criminal the legal profession was Procedure Law was followed by the Ad- The basic pur- largely discredited and iso- ministrative Litigation Law and the Ad- poses of thin lated due to its historical ministrative Supervision Regulations (Pee- position among the elites in renboom 2002, 57). theories of law society, and lawyers were are to improve declared bourgeois enemies While on the surface this was a real step in social stability of the new “socialist” socie- the right direction, in practice, these new ty. However, after the eco- and improve regulations actually afforded defendants nomic reforms of the late little protection from the govern- predictability. 1970s were instituted, it be- ment. Because the legal system is still at came quickly apparent to the least partially subservient to the political Party leadership that it goals of the Party, if a defendant finds would be necessary to estab- himself or herself on the wrong side of lish a modern legal framework to attract politics – e.g., over a politically sensitive foreign investors looking for a stable, le- issue like separatist movements in western gally-protected environment for their China, religious freedom of groups that capital. This led to the first philosophical have not registered with the government, debates in the 1970s over what such a sys- and democracy – he or she will likely be tem would look like – whether China shuffled quickly through the system rather would have “rule of law” fazhi （法治）, than receive a truly fair trial. In their rein which even top leaders would be sub- search on litigating against the state in ru- ject to law, or whether China would con- ral communities, Kevin O'Brien and Lian- tinue with Maoist “rule of man” renzhi jiang Li (2004 81) found that, （人治）. The 1982 constitution nominally made “rule of law” the official posi- Party Committees may issue internal or- tion by declaring the supremacy of law ders forbidding courts to accept suits con- over the Party and all government or- cerning sensitive matters. As a result, in gans. some locations "the people's court simply doesn't have the nerve to accept cases re-

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lated to 'hot issues' such as excessive fi- nese leaders still recall with fear the ex- nancial burdens, violations of enterprise tremes of the Cultural Revolution, when autonomy, unlawful birth control en- legal justice lost most of its formal struc- forcement, land expropriation and illegal ture and instead followed lines of personal demolition of homes." Even when such relations or personal moral claims, they prohibitions do not exist, a local court will prefer the amoral legalism of thin theo- often consult the Party Committee and ries. government at the same level before it accepts litigation on a hot- button issue. The disadvantage of these thin theories is (O’Brien and Li 2004, 81) that they do not necessarily provide for “good laws.” Thick theories, on the other This limiting of the types of cases that can hand, are based on moral claims about even be heard, in addition to continuing how law should be used to improve socie- intervention in decisions by non-judicial ty (Peerenboom 2002 68). Thick theories figures, ensures that public faith in the of law are intended to be part of a larger justice system is low, leading many Chi- social contextand depend on a shared cul- nese to believe that bringing cases before ture of values, as different the court is hopeless. However, legal re- cultures will have different forms to protect the investment climate ideas about the nature of for foreign companies entering China, natural justice. In the case Creating inclu- while incomplete, have progressed consi- of China, the diversity of the derably further than similar reforms to South and the West, where sive rule of law laws governing individual rights and crim- Chinese ethnic minorities based on shared inal law and are more than sufficient to sometimes make up more cultural norms foreign companies working in China. than half of the population, complicate majority social is more difficult. Given this context, does the China model norms and ideals due to demand a different kind of law than that competing ideas about reli- which is found in the West? Randall Pee- gion, divergent cultural tra- renboom makes an important distinction ditions, and the desire of the (Peerenboom 2002, 65) between “thick” central government to ap- and “thin” theories in his discussion of pease these ethnic groups the purpose of law in society. Thin theo- with special treatment – for example, lax ries of law require that laws be established birth control policies or affirmative action by a set procedure, transparent and ac- programs at the university level - to keep cessible to the public, applied fairly, en- them politically supportive. As a result, forced consistently, and accepted by a ma- creating inclusive rule of law based on jority of the public. The basic purposes of shared cultural norms (as in British com- thin theories of law are to improve social mon law) is more difficult. The other stability, improve predictability for indi- problem is that the idea of the supremacy viduals and organizations, and improve of the law is still new to China, making the the legitimacy of the regime. They leave transition from a system of “rules” to a out complicated discussions of morality system of “ideals” unlikely in the short and are “procedural” - focused on “gene- term. rality and rationality” rather than moral claims (Peerenboom 2002, 68). As Chi-

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Reforms that suggest a shift in China's suggesting it was the result of Liu's politi- conception of law cal ties to officials. The Supreme People's Court then retried the case and reversed In spite of the tendency in China's legal the sentence reduction (Liebman 2007 system toward a thin rather than a thick 281-2). While the execution of Liu Yong conception of the law, Benjamin Liebman in itself does not carry any obvious benefit, (2007), director of the China Center for the fact that the sentence was turned International Law at Columbia University, around by means of citizen pressure on suggests that the internet is playing an im- the SPC not to give Liu a “free pass” is portant role as a motivator for the kind of significant. reform we might expect from a “thick” legal system. First, the past decade's The use of the internet by netizens both growth of internet as an investigative and to improve the fairness of judicial deci- networking tool have enabled little-known sions on the disadvantaged and to help cases that might have otherwise been keep the powerful from escaping punish- “swept under the rug” to be ment has led courts to proactively change brought to light and dis- their own practices in order to minimize cussed by journalists. After potential public outrage and the possibility the suspicious death of mi- of unrest. Liebman argues (Liebman 2007 Since legal grant university graduate 290-2) that while judges have relied tradi- reform began in Sun Zhigang in 2003, jour- tionally on “vertical” information flows 1979, China's nalists and concerned citi- (from political superiors) for their deci- zens circumvented a gov- sion-making, they increasingly look “hori- judiciary has ernment ban on discussion zontally” to see how similar cases were remained far of Sun to bring light to his decided in other cities. This has led to the less educated. case through internet fo- gradual establishment of an informal sys- rums, which led lawyers and tem of legal precedent. Despite the fact legislators to call for the that this system lacks legal roots to govern reform of laws covering ar- its existence, it still plays an important role rest and detention of illegal in how cases are decided, especially in ru- migrant workers. The cen- ral courts, which look to more expe- tral government gave in, and replaced the rienced urban courts for guidance. arrest and detainment system with a new system designed to give migrant workers Other than the growing use of legal services (Liebman 2007, 272-3). precedent, another important development has been the growing professionali- Second, internet discussions have placed zation of the judiciary and legal profes- pressure on courts to improve scrutiny of sion. Since legal reform began in 1979, high-ranking citizens and officials, who China's judiciary has remained far less have traditionally been characterized as educated and trained than its Western being above the law. In 2003, an inter- counterparts. At the beginning of reform, mediate court sentenced crime boss Liu in order to create a judiciary from essen- Yong to be executed, but the provincial tially nothing, most judges were imported High People's Court reduced his sentence from other professions that often had to life in prison after Liu appealed the de- nothing to do with the law – many were cision. The public protested the reduction, appointed by political loyalty to powerful

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members of the Party (Zhang 2006, rect “process” of arrest, detention, and 145). Furthermore, law school graduates court summons (He 2008, 70-1). Due do not move into judicial posts; from process became even more critical in the 1984 to 1998, only 20 percent of gra- 1996 case of Tian Yong v. University of duates from schools specializing in law Science and Technology Beijing (USTB), in worked in courts after graduating due to which student Tian Yong attempted to low salaries and low professional integrity graduate from USTB after having been (2002 145). 2005 was the first year that expelled for misconduct. As the Haidian more than 50 percent of the judiciary had Court of Beijing trying the case had no a university degree, and of those, most existing regulations on which to base their held only the bachelor's degrees required decision, they ruled in favor of Tian on for judges since 2002 (Liebman 2008, 71- the basis of Tian's “right to education” 2). Judges who were appointed before and the failure of the university to give 2002 were not required to pass the na- him an explanation of his expulsion. The tional bar examination but were required Chief Justice called the rul- to receive supplemental training. There is ing “based on the spirit of strong political incentive for judges to im- the law” - in other words, prove their legal training; when issuing based on general principles There is strong court opinions, judges that are able to of law rather than China's support their decisions with legal backing existing legal code (He 2008, political incen- encounter fewer problems with popular 77). The Tian Yong case tive for judges interference in the results of the case. and others like it prompted to improve their further explorations into due He Haibo, associate professor of law at process. For example, in legal training. Tsinghua University, makes the case that 2004, the Intermediate the legal concept of due process – a key Court of Xuzhou City, element of Western systems of law - is Jiangsu Province restored also showing up in Chinese legal deci- the property rights of a sions. According to He, this “process” woman over her home after was absent from legal language in China her deed was terminated by until the Public Security Administrative the municipal government, stating that the Law of 1986, which described a “four-step fact that she had not been allowed to par- process” of administrative detention (He ticipate in a review of her right to the deed 2008, 60). The traditional view, he says, constituted a “violation of statutory was for courts to only “correctly examine process (He 2008, 98-9).” administrative acts based on laws and regulations,” not to be “flawless.” Essentially, Challenges to the expansion of “rule of courts were expected to confine their de- law” in China cisions to existing rules (which could only be changed by legislative bodies) rather If Dr. He is right about the emergence of than review based on a on a larger, more “due process” in China, the potential for a vague principle of due process (He 2008, more flexible, the establishment of an in- 62-3). This changed in 1992, when the dependent judiciary that is able to interp- Supreme People's Court (SPC) ruled the ret the law and go beyond a mere en- arrest of Chen Yingchun illegal due to the forcement of existing rules is increasingly failure of the police to adhere to the cor- likely. However, there are significant hur-

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dles remaining to the emergence of a judi- panies, these governments will pressure ciary and legal profession independent courts to slow or do away with proposed from the state, says Randall Peeren- regulation of companies by means of their boom. The primary obstacle to the su- control over judicial appointment and re- premacy of the law over the CCP and all moval (Peerenboom 2002, 311). of Chinese society is that though the Party is technically subject to the law under the Related to the issue of judicial indepen- Constitution, the legally-granted powers dence is the previously-mentioned prob- of the Party are “a matter of political reali- lem of cases on “sensitive issues” being ty” and not strictly delineated by the Con- passed quickly through the system. In a stitution or any other rules (Peerenboom report on China's non-administrative sys- 2002, 214). This leads to the state's over- tem of “reeducation by labor,” China sight of the judiciary, particularly in chang- Human Rights Defenders remarks that it ing the final outcome of politically sensi- is possible for police to move suspects tive judicial decisions, done by the Party into labor camps for three years with the Group and Political-Legal possibility of extension Committee (Peerenboom Despite these constraints to a fourth year with- 2002, 302-4). These two out any legal proceed- groups transmit policy di- from the Party, the judi- ings (CHRD 2009, rectives to courts from ciary actually faces 4). This process is in above, limiting the free more resistance from lo- fact in violation of movement of courts on China's constitution, certain political topics that cal governments. which states in Article affect large groups. Fur- 37 that “No citizen thermore, the Party con- may be arrested except trols judicial appointment, with the approval or by as appointments must be approved by the decision of a people's procuratorate or by Party Organization Department (Peeren- decision of a people's court” (CHRD 2009, boom 2002, 305). 7). However, even when they do get trials, political dissidents can be shuffled Despite these constraints from the Party, through the system without a fair tri- the judiciary actually faces more resistance al. Chen Guangcheng, a blind activist from local governments. Because gov- who exposed official extortion of villagers, ernment officials have a direct duty to was illegally put under house arrest by po- their local posts (such as solving local lice in 2006; when he was formally health, pollution or job issues) but usually charged and tried months later, he was have only minor or indirect duties to the convicted on trumped-up charges of Party (such as Party meetings), they often “damaging public property” and “organiz- prioritize the duties of their local offices ing a mob to block traffic” (Cohen and first when the two come into conflict Pils 2009). He was sentenced to four (Shiping Zheng qtd. in Peerenboom 2002, years in prison and has yet to be re- 308). Courts face some of the most resis- leased. Gao Zhisheng, one of the most tance from local governments due to the famous human rights lawyers in China, results of the economic reforms. As local was similarly detained many times without governments rely much more heavily now trial, was tortured by police, and finally than in the past on taxes from local com- disappeared altogether in 2009. Cases like

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these are a reminder of the ongoing role police involved (Liebman and Wu 2007 of Chinese courts as political actors and 280-1). transmitters of government policy – supremacy of the law over government will Finally, there is the twofold problem of demand that these cases at the very least access. Citizens face a number of chal- be tried fairly and in accordance with ex- lenges in having their cases examined by isting rules on arrest and detention the courts, and courts continue to be process. overburdened with a growing number of cases and petitions. From 1986 to 2006, Fairness does not only come from within the reported number of cases per year re- the courts. A major ongoing obstacle to ceived by courts tripled to reach more equitable judicial decision-making is ex- than 8 million (Xiao Yang qtd. in Liebman ternal influence on the court from the 2008, 67). There also appears to be a public and news media. When the Chi- growing confidence in the ability of higher nese news media began to be commercia- courts, with appeals to higher courts lized in the 1990s, news agencies realized doubling from 1996 to 2006. The growth they could profit from strong popular sen- of the legal profession – there are now timent against officials being punished for more than150,000 lawyers - has resulted in corruption or other crimes. As a result, the expansion of the kinds of claims that anti-corruption stories are widely pub- are typically brought; where the courts lished when not censored by the govern- once handled mostly criminal cases, they ment. The unfortunate result of this is now hear a growing number of civil cases that when the media runs front-page sto- on topics like wage disputes, public inter- ries about convicted officials in an attempt est, and environmental regulation (Lieb- to gain readers, they can sometimes skew man 2008, 79). All of these factors con- support against court rulings to drop tribute to the overburdening of courts charges or give more lenient sen- with more cases than they can han- tences. Seeing popular pressure against dle. This is certainly not a problem court rulings can lead the Party to step in unique to China. However, the rapid to reverse decisions in order to prevent growth of the number of cases in just 30 uprisings; the mere threat of the Party in- years, without the framework to support terfering in the ruling to appease the pub- this increase, has been a serious challenge lic leads many judges to give in to popular to the quality of China's legal system. As pressure. During the Sun Zhigang case China continues to produce lawyers, and mentioned above, in which Sun, a migrant as the quality of legal and judicial training student, was beaten to death by police and increases, the system will likely be able to public opinion was kindled against the absorb a greater portion of the petitions. officials, the primary defendant, Qiao Yanqin, was executed the day the trial Conclusion ended, raising questions about the fairness of the trial and the influence of public Consolidating rule of law promises many opinion. However, official accounts advantages to China in the midst of its praised the “efficiency” of the decision development. The state is already work- and the responsiveness of the courts to ing to improve the quality, accessibility, public opinion against Qiao and the other and responsiveness of courts to petitions for resolving apolitical matters, as shown

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by the growing volume of cases received many Westerners, backed by strong moral by the courts. Furthermore, the legal pro- considerations for the proactive correc- fession is growing to meet the challenge – tion of society's ills or the protection of China now has over 150,000 lawyers, and the disadvantaged. This was never what the quality of lawyers and judges is im- Deng Xiaoping and other post-reform proving, if still inferior to those in many leaders of China had intended. Despite other nations with better-developed legal this, China's legal system should not have systems. The growth of mass media has to adopt Western common law to succeed also led to new pressures on courts to fol- at serving the needs of the people; the in- low the legal process, preventing some creasing use of due process and growing convicted elites from using their power to professionalism of the legal community escape punishment. Finally, the idea of are encouraging signs to observers wor- due process is being used, if rarely, in ried about arbitrary rulings and judicial court decisions to broaden the decision- independence. The challenge for China's making power of courts outside of the legal system in the future will be indepen- constrained set of rules they use as a dence and the ability to produce decisions foundation. without the government’s intervention.

Despite these developments, there remain considerable challenges for the rule of law to evolve into a central force in China's development. The structure of the judicial selection process and government monitoring of judicial decisions make it highly unlikely the judiciary will become much more than apolitical mediators; where development is concerned, this References means judges will continue to rule in favor of companies against regulation and intervention of their businesses, as this benefits the local governments and Party Chinese Human Rights Defenders. 8 Feb. Committees that choose the judges. In 2009 Re-education through Labor Abuses Con- addition, public pressure on the courts to tinue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue. Chi- act in accordance with popular will, rather na Law Professors Blog. Law Professors Blog than in accordance with the law, is a po- Network. . 14 Feb. 2010. dents is problematic. The government risks endangering its long-term objective Cohen, Jerome A., and Eva Pils. 4 Dec. of stable growth when it refuses to ad- 2009 “The Fate of China’s Rights Law- dress the concerns of protestors and activ- yers.” Far Eastern Economic Review. Dow ists. Jones. .8 Feb. 2010. The Chinese legal system therefore does not possess “rule of law” as conceived by

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Dickson, Bruce J. 2006. “The Future of cal Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democra- the Chinese Communist Party: Strategies tization. Ed. Suisheng Zhao. Armonk, NY: of Survival and Prospects for Change.” in M.E. Sharpe. 58-79. Charting China’s Future: Political, Social and International Dimensions. Lanham, MD: - - -. 2006b. “Judicial Independence and Rowman & Littlefield, Inc. Judicial Accountability: An Empirical Study of Individual Case Supervision.” He, Haibo. 2008. “The Dawn of the Due China Journal 55 (2006): 67-92. Process Principle in China.” Columbia Jour- nal of Asian Law 22.1: 57-118. - - -. 2005. “Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Prob- Krugman, Paul. 2010. “Chinese New lem or Paradigm?” Columbia Journal of Year.” The New York Times. 1 Jan. Asian Law 1.19: 185-234. Hein Online Law . 25 Jan. 2010. Ramo, Joshua Cooper. The Beijing Consen- Lehman, Lee and Xu, comp. 2009. “Crim- sus. Joshuaramo.com. The Foreign Policy inal Procedure Law of the People’s Re- Centre, n.d. Web. public of China - 1996.” Lehman, Lee and . 1 Feb. 2010. Xu. Lehman, Lee and Xu,. . 28 Jan. 2010. na Quarterly ns 2008 ser. 8: 90-121.

Liebman, Benjamin. 2008. “China’s Wei, Pan. [2003] 2006.“Toward a Consul- Courts: Restricted Reform.” China Quarter- tative Rule of Law Regime in China.” ly ns 8: 66-84. Trans. Journal of Contemporary China. Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Liebman, Benjamin, and Tim Wu. 2007. Law vs. Democratization. Ed. Suisheng Zhao. “China’s Network Justice.” Chicago Journal Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 3-30. of International Law 8: 257-321. Zhang, Qianfen. 2006. “The People’s O’Brien, Kevin J, and Lianjiang Li. 2004. Court in Transition: The Propects for “Suing the Local State: Administrative Chinese Judicial Reform.” Debating Political Litigation in Rural China.” China Journal 51: Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratiza- 75-96. tion. Ed. Suisheng Zhao. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 138-163. Peerenboom, Randall. 2002. China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

- - -. 2006a. “A Government of Laws: Democracy, Rule of Law, and Administra- tive Law Reform in China.” Debating Politi-

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The “Beijing Consensus”: China’s Next Major Export?

By Jennifer Grace Smith

ow that the Washington Consen- Within China, discussion over the mean- sus has lost much of its luster, ing of the China model has only increased Neveryone has eagerly pounced in fervor since the onset of the financial upon the newest trend: trying to define, crisis. Western audiences have been less analyze, and predict the future develop- exposed to the debates that have taken ment of the so-called Beijing Consensus, place within China over the current and also called the China model. future status of this model of economic and political development. Many of the The topic has generated an increasing explanations and definitions of the China amount of interest in the West, particular- model offered by Chinese scholars root ly since the financial crisis has led to a loss the model in China's unique history, par- of confidence in the effectiveness of west- ticularly from the time of Deng Xiaop- ern economic theory. There are those, ing’s initiation of reform and opening up, such as Martin Jacques, who predict a fu- while others attempt to link the model to ture 100 years hence in which Chinese Mao's policies and sayings, or even to culture and ideals will have penetrated all classical philosophy, in order to explain corners of the globe, much as the western the evolution of the model. culture and ideals have a profound impact today. Then there are some, like Yao Yang, However, the fact that China’s develop- who predict that the China model of de- ment model appears so specific to China’s velopment will not protect China from its unique history and political culture inevit- own structural flaws if it does not even- ably leads one to wonder whether the Bei- tually implement democratic political re- jing Consensus is a model in the true forms (Yao February 2, 2010). Still others, sense of the word, that is, a basic frame- such as Carnegie Endowment’s Minxin work for a theoretical concept that has Pei, go so far as to argue that the China been simplified to its most essential com- model is unsustainable and that China's ponents that can be applied in different rise is a myth (Pei 2009). situations to receive similar results? Can the China model be applied to other de-

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veloping countries that seek economic and non-interventionist approach to interna- social gains similar to China’s? As China is tional politics, long-time China watchers increasingly viewed as a competitor to the had already spent over a decade witness- United States in the developing world, and ing the economic and social benefits that the Chinese development model is viewed were a direct cause of China’s economic by many in developing countries as an reforms and export-led growth model. attractive alternative to the western devel- Western media had begun to take an in- opment strategy of free markets and polit- terest in the country’s enormous econom- ical liberalization, an analysis of the China ic growth and its effects on Chinese socie- model’s viability outside China’s borders ty and China’s standing in the world. This seems particularly useful at this juncture. media interest in the Chinese economic After a brief discussion of the China miracle would grow to deafening propor- model’s basic framework and analysis of tions in subsequent years, competing with the model’s reception in developing coun- Chinese human rights abuses as the pri- tries, this article will address the most mary media focus regarding China. How- common criticisms of the ever, Ramo’s theory on China went model’s exportability found beyond the two narratives of economic in current Chinese literature growth and human rights. Although Chi- on the China model. The na’s internal development was important, … what is far first critique, most often of- Ramo contended, more important fered by critics of the model is that China’s in its entirety, contends that “…what is far more important is that the model is still incomplete China’s new ideas are having a gigantic new ideas are and imperfect, as it has not effect outside of China. China is marking having a gigan- resolved certain social prob- a path for other nations around the world tic effect outside lems stemming from China’s who are trying to figure out not simply economic development and how to develop their countries, but also of China. reforms and is thus unsuita- how to fit into the international order in a ble for replication. China way that allows them to be truly indepen- model proponents are more dent, to protect their way of life and polit- likely to provide a different ical choices in a world with a single mas- sort of critique, based on a sense of Chi- sively powerful centre of gravity.” (Ramo nese exceptionalism; they would argue 2004, 3) that the model is a product of China’s unique history and cultures and that the Unlike the Washington Consensus, which institutions, laws, and political cultures Ramo described as “a hallmark of end-of- found in other countries are simply too history arrogance,” which “left a trail of different from China’s, rendering difficult destroyed economies and bad feelings any effort to replicate China’s results. around the globe,” the new Beijing Con- sensus was driven not by a desire to do- The China Model: Essential Compo- minate, but rather “by a desire to have nents equitable, peaceful high-quality growth… It does not believe in uniform solutions When Joshua Cooper Ramo coined the for every situation. It is defined by a ruth- term “Beijing Consensus” in 2004 to de- less willingness to innovate and experi- scribe China’s lead in developing a new, ment, by a lively defense of national bor-

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ders and interests, and by the increasingly fense of national interests and refusal to thoughtful accumulation of tools of capitulate to foreign interests, and the ac- asymmetric power projection” (Ramo cumulation of soft-power tools to weigh 2004, 4). against U.S. hegemonic power—remain largely unchanged (Yu Keping 2005, Yao This rather rosy depiction of Chinese Yang 2010). power is very much in line with stated goals of top Chinese leaders; the focus on Westerners and Chinese alike highlight the equitable growth can be seen in Hu Jin- hardware of the China model: one-party tao’s emphasis on people-focused politics authoritarian rule, a system of mixed private and public ownership, and a market- (以人为本) and the push to “innovate driven economy. On the whole, Chinese and experiment” can be seen in the scien- scholars tend to emphasize the model’s tific development (科学发展) approach th software—the somewhat less tangible, but iterated at the 16 CCP National Con- no less defining, characteristics that derive gress. The non-interventionist stance of from one-party rule wherein that one par- “peaceful coexistence” (和平共处) in in- ty has a long-term devel- ternational politics has been present in opment strategy. In “The China’s approach to its international rela- China Model Mystique,” tionships since the 1954 agreements of Zhang Weiwei contends Ramo’s zeal for Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that the model has five between China and a newly decolonized main features. The first fea- the rhetoric of India, and has become increasingly the ture is that leaders must Chinese leaders norm since the early 1970s. consider the inhabitants, history, and culture of the overlooks the However, Ramo’s zeal for the rhetoric of country when planning a gaps between Chinese leaders often overlooks the gaps development strategy. between reality and the ideal. For example, reality and the Second is that leaders expe- equitable economic growth and the equal riment with new reforms. ideal. distribution of wealth may be the stated Before any major reform is goals of China’s leaders, and, for that mat- implemented nationally, it ter, for most leaders in most countries in should first be tested on a the world. The rhetoric does not change small-scale basis, with widespread imple- the fact that, despite a rapid increase in mentation dependent on small-scale suc- China’s middle class (Ding 2010), under cess. Third is an emphasis on gradual China’s current economic model the gap reform and a refusal to make any revolu- between the richest and the poorest in tionary changes that risk causing instability. Chinese society continues to grow wider, Fourth is that the developing country and social tensions arising from this gap chooses the sources from which it wants grow increasingly fraught. Although to learn and does not allow other coun- Chinese scholars have attempted to flesh tries to force a development strategy upon out Ramo’s initial conception of the Bei- it. Fifth is that the leaders should carefully jing Consensus, the main components de- prioritize its reforms (Zhang 2006). scribed above—the focus on high, yet

equitable, economic growth, the willing- These features form a system that is high- ness to experiment in policy-making and ly dynamic in policy implementation and to change course when needed, the de- that gives the government much flexibility

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in its policy design, both domestically and “Coordinated development requires an internationally. Domestically, the govern- effective mechanism to concentrate on a ment can experiment broadly with poten- number of complex objectives in society, tially risky initiatives and reforms around to prioritize certain objectives in accor- the country and focus its resources in dance with their gravity, and, through dif- whichever areas are in the most need or ferent policies and divisions of resources, on whichever initiatives show the best to achieve all of these objectives to vary- results. Yao Yang argues that because the ing degrees of satisfaction. In western- government is “disinterested,” or neutral style democratic politics, different political (i.e., not indebted to voters or to any one parties represent the interests of different set of interests), it can undertake sweeping, factions, and it is impossible for a party to unpopular changes that have negative ef- play the role of a strong and just coordina- fects on large groups of people—for ex- tor between these interests, making it dif- ample, the privatization of state-owned ficult to achieve this sort of coordinated enterprises, the building of the Three development. …In fact, the West has long Gorges Dam, and the regional water been caught in the contradiction between transfer of the North- the government and the South Water Diversion The Communist Party market. In recent years Project —at low political can decide to do just this has obviously led to cost, with social unrest chaos, as the global the only real (yet potent) about anything, includ- economy finds itself in threat (Yao 2008). More- ing a 180-degree rever- collapse due to financial over, if an experiment sal of its previous path, interest groups.”(Liu fails, either on the local 2009) or national level, the pol- and it will succeed. icy can be reversed with For all of its benefits, the little political blowback. Internationally, democratic process can be messy and Chinese leaders can build up national de- chaotic, and long-term plans for economic fense and develop a foreign policy ap- development, reforms, or international proach with little accountability to their relations can be easily derailed when a new citizens. party comes to power or public opinion shifts. Environmentalist Wu Changhua Although this type of concentrated power describes the relative political dependabili- could obviously lead to disaster in the ty associated with the China model during hands of incompetent people, it could also the run-up to the Copenhagen conference lead to many long-term benefits if wielded on climate change in late 2009, stating: by competent individuals following a “'In China, if the President says it, we long-term development strategy. Liu Nai- know it will be done. In the US, it does qiang described the benefits of the high not necessarily mean action'” (Huei level of efficiency that can be achieved 2009). “With the efficiency of the Chi- under one-party, authoritarian rule in a nese system, Liu Naiqiang argues, “The controversial article that appeared in the Communist Party can decide to do just December 2009 edition of Zhongguo Pin- about anything, including a 180-degree glun, arguing that such a system is optimal reversal of its previous path, and it will for a complex society such as China’s: succeed” (Liu 2009).

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Reception of the China Model in the report in Foreign Affairs, many African Developing World leaders and entrepreneurs are making increasingly savvy and informed deals with The China model, as Joshua Ramo pre- their Chinese business partners. Accord- dicted in 2004, is proving increasingly at- ing to the report: tractive to other countries struggling to achieve a high level of economic growth “Angola required Chinese companies to while maintaining political stability, par- subcontract 30 percent of the work to lo- ticularly to African countries, Russia, and cal firms and insisted that the Chinese so- India. licit at least three bids for every project they planned to undertake… According to Africa some reports, the Congolese government has stipulated that 10 to 12 percent of all The enthusiasm in African countries for the infrastructure work undertaken under the China model is unsurprising, as eco- this arrangement must be subcontracted nomic ties between China and African to Congolese firms, that no more than 20 nations have been increasing steadily in percent of the construction workers in- the last decade, giving Africans many volved be Chinese, and that at least one- chances to witness China’s development half of one percent of the costs of each model. China’s pressing need for re- infrastructure project be spent on worker sources to sustain its economic growth training.” (Brautigam 2010) has led it to become a net importer of oil. As of 2008, about one-third of China’s oil The benefits reaped from such investment imports came from Africa, with the Re- have led many Africans to conclude that public of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and there is an alternative to western aid, Sudan its largest trading partners on the which often comes with many strings at- continent. In return, China has invested tached. heavily in the infrastructural development of its trading partners, concluding deals of Although developed western countries nearly $14 billion. For example, using oil- and western-led organizations have sent backed loans, Chinese companies have more than $300 billion in aid to African helped Angola rebuild its infrastructure countries since 1970, that aid is seen as following the end of that country’s 27- having produced few tangible results in year-long civil war in 2002, constructing economic development and a lack of a roads, highways, hospitals, schools, and corresponding rise in living standards. In water systems (Hanson 2008). an editorial that appeared in The Financial Times of London in January 2008, Senega- There has been much criticism of Chinese lese President Abdoulaye Wade stated his investment and foreign aid to Africa— belief that Chinese investment and aid specifically, that Chinese companies work- have produced better results than had ing in Africa often use Chinese instead of western aid, in a much shorter period of local labor; that when local laborers are time, asking: employed, they receive lower wages; that construction of infrastructure is often “If opening up more free markets is a goal shoddy and labor conditions are frequent- that the west prizes - and extols as a path ly unsafe. However, according to a recent to progress - why is Europe fretting

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about China’s growing economic role in living standards China has seen in just the Africa? The expansion of free markets last two decades, it is not surprising that has indeed been a boon to Africa. But as I African leaders, scholars, and the media tell my friends in the west, China is would begin to consider the benefits of doing a much better job than western ca- attempting to follow in China’s footsteps pitalists of responding to market demands in implementing economic reforms. Addis in Africa.” (Wade 2008) Ababa argues that African countries share many similarities with pre-1978 China, Complementary to the belief that Chinese including “a predominantly illiterate agra- investment has been, as one editorial in rian population with chronic food insecur- Africa News states, more effective than all ity and insufficient clothing, as well as an aid from all Western countries combined, urgency to meet the demands of legiti- is the belief that the conditions placed on mately expected public services in the aid from Western developed countries-- form of infrastructure, education, and se- for example, that countries receiving aid curity” (Ababa 2009). implement free market reforms, respect human rights norms, and institute demo- Ababa believes many Chinese policies im- cratic processes--was counterproductive at plemented post-1978 could prove success- best. In a December 14, 2009, editorial in ful for African countries, particularly, Africa News, Addis Ababa, “Expanding protection program coordinator at and space for private the African Union Com- Ababa believes many property, welcoming mission and the executive Chinese policies imple- foreign investment in director of the African mented post-1978 could areas where the Chinese Rally for Peace and De- could not effectively velopment, supports this prove successful for participate, providing often-stated view on the African countries. tax waivers for foreign misguided nature of the investments, and en- Western approach to aid hancing job opportuni- in Africa: ties and joint ventures.” Regarding specific ways in which agrarian The urgently needed developments of African countries could emulate Chinese Africa in areas like infrastructure, health- economic reforms, Ababa cites a 1997 care, and education, which have quick and article for the International Monetary visible benefits to the population, are sup- Fund titled “Why is China Growing So ported by the Chinese development mod- Fast?”, in which authors Zuliu Hu and el... The bottom line is that traditional Moshin Khan explain the importance of Western conditionality is irrelevant to China’s encouragement of rural enterprise economic development and, thus, has un- growth, which moved millions of surplus dermined the role of the state in the so- rural laborers from farms into the indus- cio-economic life of countries. (Ababa trial sector without creating an urban cri- 2009) sis. Ababa, like Senegal’s President Wade, concludes that Africa has much it can Given the apparent effectiveness of the learn from the China model, and that “it Chinese model of development aid and does not matter if the development assis- the enormous economic gains and rise in tance and lessons come from the East or

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West, as long as Africans benefit and learn matic and widening gap between the rich from both” (Ababa 2009). and the poor, and a society in which corruption and collusion between govern- Russia ment, business, and organized crime has become the norm. African support for the China model tends to focus on the model’s potential Although Russia has a certain degree of economic benefits and China’s current political competition between multiple role in stimulating the economies of Afri- parties, a press that is relatively free when can countries without placing any political compared to China’s, and an uncensored conditions on investment and aid. There internet, these freedoms do not seem to is little, if any, emphasis in Africa on the have produced tangible, positive im- need for African countries to emulate provements in the living standards of China’s one-party political system. Rus- many Russians, and Russian leaders are sia’s current preoccupation with the China looking to their Chinese neighbors to as- model, on the other hand, is very focused certain how the latter has seen such posi- on learning from China’s tive results to their economic reforms. unique combination of rapid Their conclusion seems to be that democ- economic growth, authorita- racy is the problem. Russian President The Russians, rian one-party rule, and rela- Dmitry Medvedev has denied that leaders tive political and social sta- are looking to the China model for an- and others, seek bility. In October 2009, Rus- swers, saying that the model is unsuitable tips on how to sia’s majority political, Unit- to Russia’s economic development and combine growth ed Russia, convened a meet- national character (People’s Daily Online ing with senior Chinese 2009). However, according to Peh Shing with improving Communist Party (CCP) Huei of The Straits Times, “What the Rus- the lives of their officials to “hear firsthand sians, and the others, are seeking to pick citizens… how they wield power” up are tips on how to combine economic (Levy 2009). growth with improving the lives of their citizens, and at the same time avoid the Russia’s current eagerness to disruptions of democracy. In other words, learn from the Chinese ex- a United Russia that can rule as long as ample is an ironic turnaround from the the CCP has - 60 years and counting” initial days following the establishment of (Huei 2009). the PRC, during which China adopted Soviet-style reforms and looked to Mos- India cow for advice on their implementation. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in As the world’s two most populous coun- 1992, Russia’s move toward a democratic tries and fastest growing economies, India political system and a capitalist market and China are often set in comparison to economy that, while raising the living one another. With its successes in main- standards of many people, has also led to taining democratic institutions and relative a shrinking economy with high unem- social stability despite staggering poverty ployment, a quickly decreasing life expec- levels, widespread illiteracy, and dizzying tancy that is poised to create a demo- ethnic and linguistic pluralism, India graphical crisis in the near future, a dra- seems to be an irrefutable counter argu-

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ment against the commonly heard Chinese one manages its upkeep and cleaning (Yao claim that democracy could not be suc- 2008). cessful in China because of the country’s large population of lowly-educated, “low India is making similar comparisons be- quality” citizens. tween the Indian and Chinese development models. Many among the Indian On the other hand, Chinese scholars fre- left and business elites have praised Chi- quently cite India’s high poverty and na’s flourishing special economic zones, widespread human misery to support their high worker productivity, and the CCP’s argument that democratic institutions do tight-fisted control over all elements of not in many cases translate into an in- Chinese society, suggesting that India crease in living standards and that the could learn from this example (Venugopal Chinese development model has found 2009). Speaking to Business Standard, more success in this regard than has In- Planning Commission member Narendra dia’s. In a speech given to Beijing Univer- Jadhay disputed strongly the idea that the Chinese model would be suitable for India, but he admitted that “ China had developed faster than India India is making because it followed a centra- similar compar- lised system of governance and there were fewer checks isons between and balances in place” (Ra- the Indian and wat 2009). Chinese models.

Others argue, however, that sity National Development Research In- India’s lag behind China in stitute in 2008, Yao Yang discusses the terms of development is a necessity of democratic reforms to ensure function of its late start in the success of the China model but relates implementing economic re- that China must find a “new path toward forms. China’s reforms began in 1978; by democratization.” Yao’s principle argu- contrast, breakthrough reforms of India’s ment against Indian-style democracy is economy, including opening for interna- that it has brought few benefits to the tional trade and investment, deregulation, lives of ordinary Indian citizens. He cites initiation of privatization, tax reforms, and the average area of living space for the inflation-controlling measures, were only average Indian--1.8 square meters--and implemented in 1991, following the Inter- the low level of public good provided by national Monetary Fund’s bailout of the local governments. Yao’s main anecdote then bankrupt state (“India’s government regarding the lack of attention to the pub- wobbles” 1997). Planning Commission lic good involves a local official who is member Jadhay contended that although elected because he promises to build a the China model has produced more im- public toilet for a community. The toilet is mediate positive results, India’s develop- eventually built but quickly turns into an ment will prove more sustainable in the unusable, polluting cesspool because no long term, both in terms of economic policies, in which India has focused on do-

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mestic sources for funding development, be replicated?” 2009). An article from the as opposed to China’s manufacturing-led Xinhua News Agency questioned the economy financed mainly by portfolio and prospects for Russia’s adoption of the foreign direct investment, and in terms of China model, concluding that the model India’s parliamentary democracy, in which was unsuitable for Russia, due to the “things may move comparatively slower, countries’ different political structures, the but it ensures a holistic development high level of connections between busi- model, which will complement us when ness and government in Russia, and Rus- things go out of hand such as the recent sian government’s lax response to ram- meltdown” (Rawat 2009). pant, debilitating corruption (He 2009).

Chinese Doubts as to the Model’s Other supporters stress that the strength Replication of China’s development experience lies in the fact that China found its own devel- As we have seen in the last opment path that suited its history and section, many African national conditions instead of adopting countries are accepting the path traditionally encouraged by the Deng Xiaoping’s adage West. They contend that trying to package … the consensus that it doesn’t matter if a a development model for exportation to among Chinese cat is black or white as long other developing countries would go scholars is that as it can catch mice and are against the core identifying feature of the looking toward both West- China model—its respect for the sove- China model ern and Eastern models as reignty and ability of countries to deter- should not be examples for their devel- mine their own destinies (“China offers promoted to opment. Russia is studying new growth pattern” Chinadaily.com, closely China’s ability to November 19, 2009). According to a se- other countries. maintain one-party rule ries of commentaries in The Study Times, a and high economic growth. publication affiliated with the Central Par- Certain elements in India ty School, China should not try to “re- are similarly debating the make the world in its own image.” Rather, merits of Chinese authoritarian system “each country should seek its own deve- and relative national unity versus their lopmental path, one that fits its norms and own democracy and pluralism. However, people” (Peh Shing Huei, December 19, the consensus among Chinese scholars 2009). China model supporters, such as Li and media sources—from supporters and Jianhua, also agree that the model is not critics of the model alike—seems to be perfect and has left many unresolved that the China model should not be pro- problems, such as environmental degrada- moted to other countries. tion and the growing gap between the rich and poor, which should make other coun- Some China model supporters believe the tries consider carefully whether they want model has worked extremely well for Chi- to blindly follow China’s example (Li na, but they emphasize that China’s uni- 2009). queness—its large population and long history of “uninterrupted” civilization— Other Chinese scholars, such as Zhang will make it difficult to replicate the model Chuanwen and Yuan Weishi, argue that in other countries (“Can Chinese model the China model is too imperfect, too un-

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finished, and too resistant to political “exceptionalists” who argue that China’s reform to replicate in other countries. In situation is too unique ignore the nature an opinion piece that appeared on Zao- of a model—a simplified pattern that does bao.com and was later removed by cen- not fit all data points or subtleties of the sors, Zhang Chuanwen contended that complex concepts or realities it attempts contemporary China is not a model for to describe, which can be replicated to socialism with Chinese characteristics, but produce similar results in different situa- rather a capitalist system with feudal cha- tions. The Xinhua article on the China racteristics, in which the rights of the gov- model in Russia used Russia’s heavy ties ernment and individual government offi- between government and business and cials are too great. Even setting aside Chi- weak response to corruption to argue that na’s lack of democratic reforms, argues Russian attempts to replicate the China Zhang, China’s institutions are moving in model were not practicable (Xinhua 2009). a backward direction, with widespread However, this is circular logic. Any deci- corruption representing a severe threat to sion by Russian leaders to attempt to rep- the country’s future (Zhang 2010). In an licate the positive results of interview with Hong Kong Commercial Daily, the China model would Yuan Weishi also criticizes the economic surely pay close attention to aspects of the China model, arguing that, these very differences. After due to the persistence of monopolies, lack all, any development model “Exceptional- of fair competition, and corruption, one that allowed for a continued ists” who argue cannot say that a Chinese economic mod- weak response to corruption China is too el actually exists (Yuan 2010). and close government- business ties would not re- unique ignore solve these two major prob- the nature of a Flaws within These Arguments lems that are holding back model. Russian economic growth. A Chinese reasons for circumspection in Russian version of the China international promotion of the China model would very likely model are understandable, given China’s study the policies China has history with foreign intervention, the non- put in place to combat its interventionist spirit and rhetoric of the own significant corruption problems and model itself, as well as the failure of the to restrict ties between top leaders and Western model (or, for that matter, the commercial circles. If transmission of a Soviet model) to take root and gain lasting development model required similar histo- credibility among developing countries. ries, cultures, and institutions for the However, if China’s economic growth and countries in question, it seems unlikely relative political and social stability remain that India and Japan—or, for that matter, constant, the fact that China does not ac- Taiwan Province—would have been able tively promote any one development to adapt the institutions designed by de- model might not mean very much, as oth- veloped Western countries or to adopt er countries will strive to follow what they political and social ideals developed during see working. the European Enlightenment.

Many of the arguments that mention Chi- Arguments that mention the China mod- na’s uniqueness seem flawed. The Chinese el’s imperfections as reasons against the

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spread of the China model are also some- amass by efficiently providing public what naïve. In their search for the perfect, goods for the last thirty years. If similar they forget the lure of the “better –than,” dramatic economic reforms were to be or any sort of improvement over the sta- coupled with one-party rule in countries tus quo. Although countries attempting to with less popular trust in authority, leaders follow China’s example must take into would have to take this difference into account the model’s flaws, it is unlikely account. In addition, although ethnic ten- that a country with negative economic sions arise occasionally in China’s western growth and debilitating social problems regions, China’s 92% Han majority and would choose not to consider the Chinese high degree of national identification faci- experience as a model because it is imper- litate the government’s calls for unity and fect. support during times of dramatic policy shifts. Countries with more fractious pop- Other Potential Difficulties ulations and deeper ethnic divisions might have greater difficulty in that respect. It seems likely that, in the absence of an unforeseen Chinese crisis, Conclusion the China model will con- … the economic devel- tinue to be held up in de- The Beijing Consensus veloping countries as a opment path taken un- has become an attractive viable alternative to the der the China model model for many in the Western model of eco- would be almost imposs- developing world, par- nomic development and ticularly in its emphasis political liberalization. ible in the absence of on promoting economic However, while it does single-party rule. development and main- not seem particularly use- taining self- ful to focus on historical determination. It seems and institutional differences between Chi- likely that African states, especially those na and other countries in arguing the dif- with heavy trade relations with China, will ficulty of the model’s exportation, there look to the China model as well as the are certain demographic and cultural dif- Western model in deciding how best to ferences that are worth considering. First, design their development strategies. Rus- as has been mentioned above, the eco- sian leaders have been focused on the nomic development path taken under the more political aspects of the China model China model would be almost impossible as well, trying to determine how to move in the absence of single-party rule. Single- toward a more thorough domination by a party rule and centralized power have single political party. It is less likely that produced a degree of social unrest in Chi- China model proponents in India will suc- na, with daily small-scale protests against ceed in significantly changing India's polit- specific policies or corrupt behaviors oc- ical landscape, as that country's political curring throughout the country. However, institutions and economic reform strategy this unrest has not boiled over, perhaps have been in place for a considerable due to the Chinese population’s relatively length of time. high degree of trust in governmental authority and the level of credibility and legi- However, as China responds to changing timacy the government has been able to international dynamics and its own inter-

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ests in the international arena, it is likely Ding, Zhaowen. 2010. “Shekeyuan: oguo that the Beijing Consensus will change as 23% renkou kuaru ‘zhongchanjieceng’ well. The principles of non-interference (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: 23% and self-determination, which are key to of Chinese people have entered the ‘mid- the China model, are highly beneficial for dle class’).” Beijing Evening News, 2 Febru- a country concerned primarily with de- ary, NP. fending its own interests within its own . Accessed: more heavily involved in Africa or other February 2, 2010. areas in the world, it may begin to see that its core interests have become entangled The Economist. 1997. “India’s govern- with the interests and decision making of ment wobbles.” The Economist, 27 Novem- its counterparts in those regions. Even as ber 27, NP. other developing countries accept with . Accessed: February 20, already outdated. 2010.

Hanson, Stephanie. 2008. China, Africa, and Oil. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations. . Accessed: February 20, 2010.

He, Wenping. 2009. “China Offers New Growth Pattern.” China Daily, 19 Novem- References ber,

NP.. Ababa, Addis. 2009. “Chinese Econom- Accessed: February 20, 2010. ics-Example for the Continent.” Africa News, 14 December, Levy, Clifford J. 2009. “In Chinese Com- NP. http://allafrica.com/stories/200912 munist Party, Russia's Rulers See a Role 150826.html.> Accessed: February 20, Model for Governing.” The New York 2010. Times, 18 October: A1.

Brautigam, Deborah. 2010. “Africa’s Li Jianhua. 2009. “Bubi mangzhe gei faz- Eastern Promise: What the West Can han zhong guojia chuanshou zhongguo Learn From Chinese Investment in Africa,” moshi (No need to busy ourselves selling Foreign Affairs, January 5, NP. the China model to developing nations).” . Accessed: February 21, 2010. 27, 2010.

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Liu, Naoqiang. 2009. “Juguo tizhi reng shi Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2005. “The Beijing zhongguo jueqi de mifang (A nationwide Consensus.” London: The Foreign Policy system is the secret of China’s rise).” Centre. Zhongguo Pinglun, 14 December, NP. < . Accessed: Feb- asp?Newsid=163557>. Accessed: De- ruary 10, 2010. cember 15, 2009. Rawat, Virendra Singh. 2009. “China The National. “India’s chaotic democracy is model not suitable for India.” Business good for us all.” 2009. The National, 16 Standard, 14 November, April, NP. NP. . 0416/OPINION/499134208/1033>. Ac- Accessed: February 19, 2010. cessed: February 20, 2010.

Pei, Minxin. 2009. “Think Again: China’s Xinhua News Agency. “Zhongguo moshi Rise.” Foreign Policy, July/August, NP. bu shehe Erluosi (Russia cannot fit China . November, NP. Accessed November 20, 2009. .Accessed: Jan- World.” Newsweek, 8 December, NP. uary 28, 2010. . Accessed: January 28, 2010. Venugopal, K. 2009. “India, not China is the model.” Deccan Chronicle, 3 October, People’s Daily (English). “Can Chinese mod- NP. el be replicated?” 2009. People’s Daily (Eng- .Accessed: February 20, 2010. 1/90780/91342/6761416.html>. Ac- cessed: January 30, 2010. Wade, Abdoulaye. 2008. “Time for the West to Practice What it Preaches.” Finan- People’s Daily Online. “Eluosi yao fuzhi cial Times, 29 January, NP. Embassy of ‘zhongguo moshi’? Meideweijiefu chu- the People’s Republic of Chi- mian fouren (Medvedev denies Russia na: . Accessed People’s Daily Online, 28 October, NP. on February 20, 2010. . Accessed: January 28, 2010.

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Yao, Yang. 2008. “Shifou cunzai yige zhongguo moshi? (Does the China model exist?)” Speech given before Beijing Uni- The Successes versity National Development Research of the China Model Institute. May 14. . Accessed: By Wanlu Hu February 12, 2010.

Yu, Keping. 2005. “Guanyu ‘zhongguo moshi’ de sikao (Thoughts on the China model).” China Elections and Gover- ctober 1, 2009, marked the 60th nance.. Accessed: Othe People’s Republic of China. January 27, 2010. While there were countless celebrations held throughout China, Chinese intellec- Yuan, Weishi and Gu Anan. 2010. tuals celebrated the 60th anniversary in “’Zhongguo moshi’? Tai zao le!” Hong their own way: by recounting China's suc- Kong Commercial Daily, 2 February, NP. In- cesses since 1949. They analyzed and terview with reporter Gu Anan. summarized the new developmental mod- http://chinaelections.org/printnews.asp?n el that has evolved during the 60 years ewsid=168214. since the establishment of new China, or what is called the “China Model.” Many Zhang Chuanwen. 2010. “Jidai tuibian de Chinese scholars argue that China took a ‘zhongguo moshi’ (The urgent transfor- developmental path that no other coun- mation of the ‘China model’)” Lianhe Zao- tries have taken, and although they agree bao, 9 January 9, NP. Not published that there is no exact definition of the China Model, they have studied the many Zhang Weiwei. 2006. “Zhongguo moshi aspects of the Chinese pattern of devel- de moli (The Charm of the China Model).” opment. Western media and academic cir- China Elections and Governance, 13 No- cles have also focused on China’s rise and vember, NP. its model of development. However, there http://www.chinaelections.org/printnews is still very little understanding in the West .asp?newsid=98250. Accessed: January 28, of Chinese perceptions of the China 2010. Model. This paper seeks to analyze Chi- nese scholars’ perceptions and interpreta- tions of the China Model, with particular emphasis on arguments in support of the model.

From the Beijing Consensus to the China Model In 2004, Joshua Cooper Ramo published “The Beijing Consensus,” in which he proposed an alternative economic development model to the Washington Con-

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sensus. “The Beijing Consensus” was lenges of globalization, China has gained published when the world was witnessing valuable experience and paid a considera- China’s dramatic economic success. Ramo ble price. Learning from past experience is emphasized that the main characteristic of of great significance for the development China’s development model is its capacity of China and other developing countries to formulate quick responses and develop (Yu 2005, 13). solutions to problems and that innovation has been the foundation of China’s eco- Economic Development under the nomic success (Ramo 2005, 6). China Model Although Ramo used the terms “Beijing While many scholars and national leaders Consensus” and “China Model” inter- speak of China’s recent development with changeably in a speech in 2006 (Ramo reverent tones, the extent to which the 2005, 6), many scholars prefer using the country has developed is often argued. term “China Model” rather than “Beijing However, China’s economic successes Consensus.” They argue that constitute its most obvious form of de- the term “consensus” has velopment. been abused, with too many However, there have been debates on “consensuses” having been There is no sin- what factor played the largest role in this proposed after the idea of economic success. Most scholars believe gle definition of the “Washington Consensus” that privatization and the market-driven the China Mod- was put forth in 1989 by economic reforms of the past 30 years John Williamson. Moreover, el, but most have led to China’s enormous economic the term “Beijing Consensus” success. However, after the financial crisis scholars agree has been similarly overused. that affected most countries, especially Anything related to Beijing on its basic ele- those that insist on market economies, can be granted the title “Bei- ments. China’s economy was only slightly af- jing Consensus,” regardless fected. Therefore, this has given rise to of whether it is relevant to the argument that China’s economy, China’s development model. though not a classic market economy, Compared with the Beijing might work better than the “invisible Consensus, the term “China Model” en- hand.” compasses more aspects of China’s development, such as China’s social and histor- China’s Economic Model ical background, mechanisms of economic development, and the welfare system Pan Wei offers a good summary of the (Zhan 2005, 176). Chinese economic system in his paper on contemporary Chinese economic structure. There is no single definition of the China Pan argues that the main features of the Model, but most scholars agree on its ba- Chinese economic system include: (1) sic elements. Yu Keping states in his 2006 government control over the land and li- article, “China Model: experience and les- mited land usage rights for individuals; (2) sons,” that the China Model constitutes a state-owned financial institutions and oth- system of development strategies and a er government-sponsored institutions; (3) governing model that has developed Chi- a free labor market; and (4) a highly com- na gradually through reform and opening petitive commodities market. The Chinese (Yu 2005, 11). When facing the chal-

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system differs from the British or Ameri- many challenges; among them were land can “market economies,” as the latter in- reform and the restoration of social order. sist on private ownership. Similarly, the A state-owned economy was established. Chinese system deviates from the “com- Learning from the Soviet Union’s expe- modity economy” of the Soviet Union rience in industrialization, China mobi- because the Chinese model does not rely lized its resources and organized heavy on “ownership by the people.” China’s industrial construction in the planned economic model is also not a “social mar- economy. Despite the low incomes of ket economy,” like those found in north- Chinese workers, China established a ba- western European countries, because it sic education system, constructed a basic does not have a high tax rate or a high healthcare system, and invested heavily in level of welfare. Furthermore, China’s infrastructure. All of these efforts laid the economic model is also different from foundation for China’s future economic that of Japan and Germany because its success. Even though the Chinese econ- economy is not dominated by a small omy was greatly affected by the mass po- number of privately-owned companies, litical campaigns and the Cultural Revolu- which is also known as tion, China achieved 6.4% “national capitalism.” In- … China’s economy is average increase in na- stead, China’s economy is tional income per year unique; officially, it is unique; officially it is from 1952 to1978 (Gao called a “socialist market called a “socialist mar- 2009, 96). After correct- economy with Chinese ket economy with Chi- ing the “leftist” mis- characteristics.” (Pan 2009, takes made during the 10) nese characteristics.” Cultural Revolution, China focused on eco- Merits of the Pre-1978 nomic development China Model through reform and opening of its economy. These reforms There are two distinct stages of China’s unleashed the economic potential that had economic development: before and after built up over the years and helped achieve the reform and opening in 1978. Many stable economic development. contemporary scholars such as Wen Tie- jun and Dong Xiaodan believe that Chi- The Urban-Rural Divide under the na’s economic success cannot be simply China Model attributed to the reform and opening. Ra- ther, they argue, China’s economic re- Critics of the China Model in both China forms before the implementation of Deng and the West cite the social ills stemming Xiaoping’s reform and opening policy are from the model’s urban-rural divide. equally significant to China’s current eco- However, some China Model supporters nomic success. argue in favor of this divide. He Xuefeng, an expert in rural policy, stresses the im- China was a poor agricultural country portance of the urban-rural dual structure when it began the process of moderniza- to China’s overall economic success. He tion after the founding of the People’s argues that the urban-rural dual structure Republic of China. Per capita income was has served not only as the prerequisite of only $27 USD, 40% lower than the aver- China’s fast development during its first age in Asia. The new government met 30 years, but also the “secret” that has

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allowed China to achieve great economic tems, the people’s commune system im- success since reform and opening (He proved substantially China’s ability to feed 2009, 181). In China, there are two dif- its massive population and provided a ferent systems for economic activity and modest accumulation of capital to support residence in urban and rural areas. The China’s industrialization (He 2009, 187- urban-rural distinction is the result of dif- 190). ferences in policies implemented in urban and rural areas. Because of the different According to the land use system current- policies in urban and rural areas, the eco- ly in place, rural land is owned by the col- nomic development in urban and rural lective, and each rural family has the right areas has also proceeded differently. Ur- to contract land. By farming on the collec- ban residents enjoy a higher quality of tively-owned contract land, rural house- educational services, more employment holds can subsist and provide food and opportunities, greater social mobility, de- clothing for their families, but it is difficult veloped infrastructure, and higher per ca- to accumulate wealth. Given pita incomes. the surplus labor in the countryside, young people One argument in support of the urban- from rural families seek rural divide contends that the people’s work or business opportuni- In China, there communes, which were the dominant sys- ties in urban areas, while are two differ- tem of organization in rural areas from older family members farm ent systems for 1958-1978, helped bring China to the ad- in their home villages. Thus, vantageous position in which it finds itself a peasant family will have economic activi- today. Each commune consisted of ap two sources of income. Be- ty and residence proximately 4,000-5,000 households and cause young farmers can go in urban and had governmental, political, and economic back home if they fail to functions. He Xuefeng argues that the find jobs in urban areas, rural areas. people’s commune system was not only China has no large-scale ur- efficient in providing a large number of ban slums, which gives Chi- urban and industrial workers with a mod- na the ability to cope with est accumulation of capital, it also im- the economic cycle and prevent economic proved agricultural production conditions issues from developing into political and using mainly its own organizational social crises. strengths. Taking into account the serious surplus of the agricultural labor force In addition to the urban-rural dual system, stemming from the large rural population another positive aspect of China’s eco- and limited land resources, the most nomic development was in its improve- pressing issue of the people’s commune ment in human capital. Human capital is era was not how to stimulate the enthu- reflected in the quantity and quality (i.e., siasm of individual farmers, but how to the skill level and proficiency) of labor. In mobilize the large surplus labor force and practice, human capital is usually meas- use this force to improve the basic condi- ured by the number of workers, their edu- tions for agricultural production. By orga- cation level, and their overall health. Be- nizing the rural labor force to carry out fore 1949, China had a very low level of the construction of agricultural infrastruc- human capital. Between 1949 and 1978, ture, such as reservoirs or irrigation sys- China took full advantage of its socialist system and made great improvements in

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human capital (Li 2009, 210). Improve- peaceful development, China’s unique po- ments in health and education, a decline in litical and cultural background requires the fertility rates, and increased equality for adoption of the third path (Zhao 2009, women all helped to raise the perfor- 298). The third path would maintain one- mance of China’s human capital. As a re- party rule and involve a gradual expansion sult, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, of political participation. some indicators of human capital in China reached the level of those in developed Institutionalization countries (Li 2009, 210). Human resource Institutionalization is one of the most im- input can contribute to productivity gains; portant aspects of political reform taking at the same time, human capital is a place in China. It stresses the establish- source of technological progress and long- ment of normative rules and procedures term economic growth. and is essential in establishing a working The China Model’s Politi- legal system and rule of law. The institu- cal Developments: Insti- tionalization of the leadership system tutionalization, Accoun- dates back to 1980, when Deng Xiaoping tability, and Rule of Law recognized that the absence of effective China is not systems and of checks and balances on ready for the The China Model is not only authority led to catastrophe in the Mao a model for the country’s Zedong era (Teiwes 2001, 74). Important first path, and economic development; it reform measures include a constitutional the second path also provides a plan for po- basis for Party and state institutions, term will result in litical transformation. While limits for top leaders, and an emphasis on democratic systems have not younger and more highly educated civil chaos. yet been established in Chi- servants. One of the most important re- na, China’s leaders have sults of institutionalization would be the been exploring the road for enhancement of institutional power and a Chinese-style political the decline in the authority of individual transition, or a so-called leaders. “third path.” The “first path” toward democratization would be to adopt western- Accountability style democratic norms, i.e., a one-person- Another direction of political reform is to one-vote electoral system and competitive establish institutional and legal mechan- party politics. The “second path” was that isms to restrict government officials in taken by Russia after the fall of the former order to make them more accountable to Soviet Union. This path entails fast-paced society and to assume political responsibil- democratic transformation, or “shock ity in the case of poor performance. Cor- therapy,” and includes the overthrow of respondingly, many systems have been communist rule and widespread accep- established for this purpose, including tance of the establishment of a liberal de- Party discipline meetings, administrative mocracy. In the eyes of the Chinese review procedures, and the petition sys- Communist Party elites, China is not tem. Among these systems, an accounta- ready for the first path, and the second bility system that has been built up in re- path will result in chaos and unrest. Many cent years is an important measure. Under among China’s elites and intellectuals be- this system, if any official is found respon- lieve that if China is to maintain unity and

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sible for an accident, ranging from the complex variety of issues in Chinese so- spread of infectious diseases to public dis- ciety. turbances, he or she will face serious punishment or dismissal. Although China Exporting the China Model has not accepted the liberal democratic Although scholars are attempting to ana- principles or an open political system, the lyze and explain the China Model, this Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao regime has indeed discussion does not intend to convince made a considerable effort to reform the other countries to attempt its implementa- system in response to the demands of tion. However, the China Model is attrac- those affected by China's economic and tive to other countries. The China Model social transitions and the effects of globa- is non-ideological and pragmatic, empha- lization. In this respect, the Hu-Wen re- sizing economic growth as well as political gime has been more responsive to the stability. This pattern is not only recog- needs of the masses than its predecessors. nized by leaders of some developing Rule of Law counties, its attractiveness is also growing in the West (Zhao 2009, The establishment of a legal system, or 299). A large part of the “rule of law,” has become the third im- attraction is due to devel- portant aspect of political reform in recent opment and changes in … The Hu-Wen years. China has formulated and adopted three areas. The first devel- four constitutional amendments. These opment is China’s econom- regime has been amendments made the Constitution more ic success under the leader- more respon- like a legal document that protects civil ship of the Communist Par- sive to the needs rights. More importantly, the constitution- ty. China has become the al amendment for the first time explicitly world’s most rapidly grow- of the masses declared the intent to establish “the rule ing economy over the past than its prede- of law” and to “build a socialist country 30 years. cessors. ruled by law” (Gao 2009, 129). According to Pan Wei, “the Constitution has been The second development is transformed from a document expressing the relative success of Chi- the rights of the Communist Party into a na in recent years, com- document limiting the rights of the Party” pared with American economic, political (Zhao 2009, 295). and diplomatic failures, which have recently caused a decline in the attractive- The transformation of the Chinese Com- ness of the Western modernization model. munist Party from a revolutionary party to Economically, because the United States a ruling party is another important aspect is now greatly indebted to China and oth- of political reform. The Party was the er countries, its solvency has been called vanguard of the working class during the into question. In this regard, it has be- Mao era and followed communist ideolo- come increasingly difficult for the United gy in order to consolidate power. Since States to present itself as a shining exam- Deng Xiaoping initiated economic re- ple of global economic development to forms, communist ideology has been the rest of the world. With regard to gradually making concessions to the American foreign policy and diplomacy, reform and opening of the economic sys- the American model uses ideology to tem in order to control an increasingly promote the democratization process but

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ignores the domestic conditions of many Model attracts and inspires people from developing countries and the effects these different perspectives. conditions may have on democratization. However, this does not necessarily mean The third development is China’s “value that the China Model will replace the neutral” foreign policy for many develop- Western model, because many aspects of ing countries. In formulating foreign poli- the Chinese Model are products of specif- cy, China, does not use a country’s level of ic historical developments that have taken democracy as the sole barometer of its place in the last ten years. Because the worth, as Western countries often appear success of the Chinese Model has not had to do. Rather, it takes into account gover- a very long history, Chinese scholars nance, transparency, rule of law and other themselves rarely claim the universality of moral principles, along with a high focus this model. China’s economic growth may on its own economic and strategic con- come to a standstill or begin to decline, as cerns. has occurred in many other emerging economies. In addition, China’s income Conclusion gap between the poor and rich has been steadily growing over the After China’s 60 years of past decade and contin- development, especially … it is far too early to ues to widen. Although in the last 30 years of proclaim that the Chi- the China Model has so reform and opening, far led to sustained eco- China has demonstrated nese Model will replace nomic growth and main- a successful development the Western Model of tained the regime’s legi- model with rapid eco- timacy, the sustainability nomic growth and rela- modernization. of these successes re- tive political stability un- mains uncertain. From der the leadership of the this perspective, it is far Chinese Communist Party. Economic too early to proclaim that the Chinese growth has generated a large amount of Model will replace the Western Model of wealth, improved the living standards of modernization (Zhao, 2009, 305). the Chinese people, and, therefore, has allowed the Chinese Communist regime to maintain legitimacy.

An evaluation of the quality and success of China’s development model should be based on objective facts and use as a standard of measurement the comprehensive development and well-being of people and society. The China Model promotes the rapid development of China’s produc- tive forces to improve living standards, promote comprehensive social development, safeguard world peace and security, and improve China’s international reputation. With these advantages, the China

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References

Gao, Liang. 2009. “Chinese Economic Teiwes, Frederick C. 2001. “Normal Poli- Development Path and Transformation of tics with Chinese Characteristics” In The Economic System” In China Model: A New China Journal. No. 45, January 2001, Pp. 74. Developmental Model From the Sixty years of the People’s Republic, ed. Wei Pan. Beijing: Cen- Yu, Keping. 2005. “‘China Model’: Expe- tral Compilation and Translation Press. riences and Lessons” In China Model and Pp.96, 129. the Beijing Consensus: Beyond the Washington Consensus, eds. Keping Yu, Ping Huang, He, Xuefeng. 2009. “Urban-Rural Divide Shuguang Xie, Jian Gao. Beijing: Social is the Core and Foundation of Chinese Sciences Academic Press. Pp. 11, 13. Development Model” In China Model: A New Developmental Model From the Sixty years Zhao, Huisheng. 2009. “Discover the of the People’s Republic, ed. Wei Pan. Beijing: China Model: Can It Replace the Western Central Compilation and Translation Modernization Model?” In China Model: A Press. Pp. 181, 187-190. New Developmental Model From the Sixty years of the People’s Republic, ed. Wei Pan Beijing: Li, Ling. 2009. “Human Capital, Econom- Central Compilation and Translation ic Miracle and China Model”. In China Press. Pp. 295,299,305. Model: A New Developmental Model From the Sixty years of the People’s Republic, ed. Wei Zhuang, Junju. 2005. “Beijing Consensus Pan. Beijing: Central Compilation and and China’s Development Model” In Chi- Translation Press. Pp.210. na Model and the Beijing Consensus: Beyond the Washington Consensus, eds. Keping Yu, Ping Liu, Baosan. 2009. “Some Thoughts on Huang, Shuguang Xie, Jian Gao. Beijing: the China Model”. China Elections and Social Sciences Academic Press. Pp. 176. Governance. March 1, 2010. NP. < http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo .asp?NewsID=154889>.

Pan, Wei. 2009. “Contemporary Chinese System” In China Model: A New Develop- mental Model From the Sixty years of the People’s Republic, ed. Wei Pan. Beijing: Cen- tral Compilation and Translation Press. Pp. 10.

Ramo, Joshua. 2005. “Why Did I Propose the Beijing Consensus” In China Model and the Beijing Consensus: Beyond the Washington Consensus, eds. Keping Yu, Ping Huang, Shuguang Xie, Jian Gao. Beijing: Sciences Academic Press. Pp. 6.

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Criticizing the China Model: An Overview of Discussions in China

By Linling Zhong

n light of the industrialization pro- (1) What is the true definition of China grams carried out by the central gov- model? I ernment of the People’s Republic of (2) How will economic development China over the past thirty years, China has continue under the China model? become one of the fastest growing powers (3) What are the social and environmental in the world. Even during the ongoing costs of the model? global economic crisis, China's economic (4) Is political reform possible under the growth accelerated to 8.7% for 2009, China model? achieving the government's full-year (5) Is the China model a valid and appli- growth target of 8% and totaling 33.54 cable model for other countries to follow? trillion RMB ($4.91 trillion) (National Bu- reau of Statistics 2009, np). Based on Chi- Beginning with Joshua Ramo’s seminal na’s fast and apparently stable economic article in which he puts forth the idea of a development and increasing power in the “Beijing Consensus,” poised to rival the world, more and more scholars are turn- Washington Consensus in terms of eco- ing their attention to China's unique mod- nomic power, China watchers have at- el of development, the “China model.” tempted to define and explain this alterna- Many developing countries in Africa and tive model. However, little attention has other regions are trying to imitate and fol- been paid in the West to the parallel de- low China’s economic and political mod- bate occurring within China. The purpose els. However, there is a major debate over of this paper is to give Western audiences whether the China model is sustainable a better understanding of the debate over for China and exportable for other coun- the China model that is currently taking tries. Within China, there are a number of place in Chinese academic circles. Empha- Chinese scholars who view the China sis is placed upon Chinese criticisms and model with trepidation and who question challenges of the economic, social, and its validity. Specifically, these scholars’ political aspects of the model. It is impor- concerns and questions include: tant for a Western audience to read these critiques of the China model and to realize that Chinese public and scholarly opinion

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on the China model is not monolithic, nor daily lives. People in China have a higher is there one decisive definition of the Chi- quality life under the systems of the new na model within Chinese scholarly circles. China model. There is a debate taking place, and the definition and meaning of the China mod- However, many scholars disagree with this el are still being formed. definition of the China model. Wenju Qian contends that the definition of the The Definition of China Model word “model” in Chinese connotes a standard formula that can be followed by The China model/ Beijing consensus others (Qian 2010, np). Qian argues that gives a broad definition of the China Yu’s definition makes no sense and is not model. According to KepingYu, a Chinese possible for other countries to follow. He scholar and China model supporter, the goes on to make the argument that, con- main elements of the model are: (1) Re- trary to Yu’s definition of the China mod- garding rights of ownership, China has el, Chinese people are not the real “own- neither a system of pure public ownership ers” of the country. People in China still nor one of pure private ownership. Rather, have very limited rights and freedoms. For it has its own unique mixed ownership example, the Chinese system. At the same time, government recently China is abandoning its …Chinese people are not banned a TV series traditional command the real “owners” of the called Wo Ju, since Wo economy and moving to- country. People in China Ju does not follow Chi- ward a socialist market na‘s mainstream, politi- economy. (2) Politically, still have very limited cally correct social China insists on the Chi- rights and freedoms. structure (主流社会). nese Community Party’s According to Qian, the (CCP) leadership while ideological diversity of encouraging a system of society in China is very “one party leads, multiple limited. He also argues that “multi-party parties cooperate.” (3) Regarding political cooperation” does not exist in China. The ideology, the Chinese leadership still in- leaders of the non-CCP parties are all sists on Marxism as the dominant political chosen by the CCP. He concludes by ideology, but nominally allows the exis- pointing out that the so-called “China tence of different schools of political, model” has nothing to do with people’s ideological and social thought. (4) Regard- freedom, which he thinks is the basic ing the relationship between the military principle of a society’s development. and policy makers, China has installed ci- vilians as military leaders. At the same Keping Yu himself admits that the China time, it insists on the CCP having control model is not yet a finished and perfect of military power. (5) Regarding the rela- model. Firstly, he contends, China is still tionship between society and the state, a in the process of finding new solutions to relatively independent society has been sustain its economy. Secondly, China’s produced, which means the economy is circumstances are very specific, making more independent, rather than controlled the model difficult to apply to other coun- by the central government (Yu 2001, np). tries. The China model is based on its tra- Also, Hu Jintao's idea of “harmonious” ditional culture and long history that other society plays a significant role in people’s countries do not have. Although Yu be-

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lieves that a China Model exists, he thinks increasing GDP comes from the increase that the model is still in its developing of government revenue, which increased stages (Yu, 2010, np). by 35% in 2008. At the same time, the GDP per capita of urban and rural citi- In general, opponents of the China model zens increased 8.4% and 8.0%, respective- tend to believe either that the model does ly, far less than the increase in government not exist or that it is too early to call the revenue. He then makes his conclusion Chinese path of development a “model.” that the difference between government They argue that to continue calling it the revenue and personal revenue is increas- China model will just serve to make Chi- ing and that the Chinese government nese people arrogant and make the coun- reaps the most benefit from the rising try lose direction. GDP (Qian 2010, np). Economic development Chen Zhiwu at Yale University makes a under the China Model similar argument in his article “Govern- ment Substitutes Individuals to Enjoy the While the West struggles to … Opponents Growth of Wealth,” wherein he explains recover from the Great Re- that the percentage of individual contend to believe cession, China is talking sumption in GDP shrunk from 69% to 35% about building the world’s either that the from 1952 to 2004. Within the same pe- fastest trains, constructing a riod, Chinese government revenue in- model does not space station, and building creased from 16% to 30% (Chen 2009, exist or that it is its own aircraft carriers np). too early to call within two years. Rapid economic growth has not it a model. Unbalanced development only vastly improved the economic well-being of In 1985, China’s top leader, Deng Xiaop- Chinese people, it has also ing, proposed that China “Let some peo- attracted followers of the ple get rich first.” He then designed a se- Chinese economic model around the ries of economic development plans for world. However, although China’s eco- China, including market allocation and the nomic model has been treated as one of establishment of special economic zones the most successful reforms in the China to attract foreign investment. (A special model, it still arouses dissent among Chi- economic zone is a geographical region nese scholars. that has economic laws that are more liberal than a country's typical economic Who benefits from the increasing GDP? laws.) Economic systems underwent sig- According to the official statistics, China’s nificant changes during Deng's time as average annual GDP growth rate reached leader, and people have continued to view 9.5% over the past 10 years. GNP in- him as “the chief designer of China’s decreased from 3,645 billion yuan to 300,670 velopment.” However, one of his most billion RMB, and GDP per capita in- important policies under the economic creased from 281 to 22,600 RMB (Qian, reform, “let some people get rich first,” 2010, np). However, Qian Wenjun has his has had grave side effects. Currently, the own interpretation of the statistics. He income gap between the rich and the poor demonstrates that the biggest part of the in China has become very large. Accord- ing to Taiwanese researcher Ma Jiantang,

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there are one billion people in China most of the benefits of economic devel- whose income is less than one dollar per opment. Second, they see the severely im- day. A person living in an urban area earns balanced development in China as a major on average 3.33 times as much as a person failure of the system. Many opponents living in a rural area, and this gap shows think that the economic model is just a no signs of narrowing (Ma 2010, np). model that has added imported modern Based on Du Xiaoshan’s research, the ma- technology to the Chinese economy, such jority of the population has experienced a as using large machines to increase prod- decline in basic welfare (Du 2009, np). uctivity instead of using laborers (Yuan and Gu 2010, np). China’s economic Wang Yukai thinks the most significant model does not create any new things, and issue for China’s economic model is not thus China has a long way to go in order narrowing the income difference, but ra- to sustain its economic growth. ther transitioning from a government- controlled economy to a free market Social Issues of the China Model: Pol- economy, avoiding monopoly and increas- lution, Left-behind Children, and Un- ing domestic consumption (Wang 2010, employment np). He believes that Chi- na’s economic model can- … According to Ma Jian- Economic policies as- not function well without sociated with the China focusing on these issues. tang, there are one bil- model have produced lion people in China certain social condi- Zhang Yusheng suggests whose income is less tions that threaten that China’s economic China’s stability. Many model is not perfect be- than one dollar per day. scholars criticize the cause it does not create a government‘s single- healthy and well- minded focus on eco- functioning market within nomic growth, which, China. He thinks the China model focuses they argue, has create many social prob- too much on opening itself to foreign lems. Pollution and “left-behind children” markets and attracting foreign investment, are among the most serious of these prob- while ignoring the development of the lems. Chinese domestic market (Zhang 2010, np). He believes this is one of the most Pollution important reasons for which the rate of One point of agreement among a majority China’s GDP growth decreased over the of Chinese scholars, regardless of whether last year. they support the China model, is that Based on the fact that China’s economic China’s development model has led to growth rate is the fastest in the world, serious environmental problems. These there is a common belief that China’s problems include water pollution, land economic model is a successful one. desertification, and China's reputation as However, opponents of the model see the the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse inefficiencies. First, they doubt that the gases. beneficiaries of the high growth rate are Ding Xueliang, a US-educated professor really Chinese citizens. Rather, they claim, at the Hong Kong Institute of Technolo- the government is the power that reaps

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gy, wrote an article raising concerns about world in 1999, seven were located in Chi- the environmental costs of the China na (Pei 2006, 175-178). model. Ding believes that China’s high level of economic development is the In the short run, the China model focuses cause of the pollution and that this model on economic development while ignoring is therefore unsustainable and dangerous the environmental costs of this develop- for other countries to imitate. For exam- ment. However, in the long run environ- ple, the environmental cost of holding the mental degradation will also incur eco- 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was four to nomic losses. Pei cites the World Bank’s five times higher than that of the Athens estimation that in the mid-1990s, the ma- and Sydney Summer Games. Ding uses jor forms of pollution in China cost the Hu Jintao’s view of scientific development country 7.7% of its GDP. If China does to issue a serious warning: it is perfectly all not lower these costs, critics contend, not right to acknowledge the amazing only will the China model become irrele- achievements of the thirty-year reform, vant to other countries, but the sustaina- but it would be criminal to be blind to the bility of China’s own eco- gigantic costs of these achievements (Ding nomic reform may become 2008, np). questionable. … The popula- In the book China’s Trapped Transition, Left-behind children tion of left- Under the China model, there are a large number of behind children workers moving from rural had reached areas to big cities in order approximately to find job opportunities. Over the past few decades, 58 million. approximately 120 million Chinese farmers have moved to the cities in search of work. Unlike in Western countries, China’s legal frame- Carnegie Endowment for International work makes it almost impossible for mi- Peace’s Minxin Pei provides statistics grants to attend school and care for their about China’s environmental degradation, children where they find work. Therefore, arguing that the cost of the China model migrant children are often left behind in is too high. Under this model, a third of rural hometowns, in the care of a single China’s land suffers from severe soil ero- parent, or with grandparents or other rela- sion. As a result, about 67,000 hectares of tives. Thus, a new group of children who farmland are lost each year. Pei expresses need to live without their parents, called equal concern about water quality; with “left-behind children,” has emerged in 80 % of water discharged from factories rural areas of China. In 2006, the popula- left untreated, three-quarters of China’s tion of left-behind children had reached lakes and about half of the country’s rivers approximately 58 million, accounting for have been severely polluted. Of the ten 21.72% of rural children under the age of cities with the worst air pollution in the 17. Of these, 40 million were under the age of 14. In the Chinese media, the phe-

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nomenon of left-behind children is received and implemented in the 1980s. In ported as one of the most serious prob- the 1990s, under Jiang Zemin’s leadership, lems afflicting China’s younger generation, the CCP did not for the most part launch as the phenomenon produces poor living any new or significant institutional re- conditions, moral problems, education forms. Pei remarks that although public problems, psychological problems, and discussion and debates on political reform safety problems for this neglected popula- were sanctioned during the Deng era, sim- tion (Ke 2008, np). Many of these child- ilar discourse was practically banned dur- ren participate in crime or are force to ing Jiang’s tenure in office (Pei 2006, 55- work at a very early age. Many girls in ru- 57). ral areas have no choice but to stay home and take care of their siblings. Although To support his argument, Pei provides this presents future generations with a statistics to show that the imbalance be- significant social challenge and could pose tween an increasingly open economic sys- problems for China’s social stability, the tem and China’s relatively unchanging po- Chinese government started to pay atten- litical system was unlikely to improve. Pei tion only recently. reports that half of the leading academics interviewed by researchers from the Chi- Political Reform and the nese Academy of Social China Model … there are serious criti- Sciences in 2003 thought the imbalance Many scholars who sup- cisms of the China model would persist, and a port the China model be- that cite its failure to third said it would wor- lieve that this new model address the need to im- sen. According to the has put an end to mass results of four polls terror, such as took place plement political re- conducted between during the Cultural Revo- forms. 2000 and 2003, a ma- lution, and has contributed jority of officials being to political stability and trained at the Central relative cohesiveness among Party School (CPS) reported that the issue the elites. On the other hand, there are that concerns them most was political serious criticisms of the China model that reform, an implicit admission of the polit- cite its failure to address the need to im- ical system’s relative stagnation (Pei 2006, plement political reforms and combat 55-57). official corruption in order to maintain social stability and political legitimacy. In Gao Ren, a columnist for China Elections addition, these critics believe that the eco- and Governance Online nomic inequalities and social problems (www.chinaelections.org), argues that the caused by the China Model could be re- China model saves no room for political solved if China implemented democratic reform (Gao 2009, np). The China model reforms. is just going through a stage of primitive molding. It was not introduced until a few Lack of political reform years ago. The model also creates many serious problems, such as expanding the Minxin Pei argues that it is worth noting gap between the rich and the poor and that the most important institutional re- rampant corruption due to the lack of po- forms to the political system were all con- litical reform.

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Another scholar, Yang Guang, thinks that total costs of corruption range from four the political reform in China does not to 17 % of GDP. Pei believes that one of touch the root of the problem. In his ar- the most serious consequences of such ticle, “China’s Defective Post-Reform Po- large-scale corruption among government litical System,” Yang relates his belief that officials in a transitioning economy is that the political reforms that are taking place it allows the ruling elite to use their politi- in China fail to address the root of the cal power to amass large private wealth country’s problems (Yang 2006, np). He through theft and market manipulation, calls upon the government to delineate the thus directly contributing to rising socioe- relationship between the rights of the conomic inequality and encouraging social people and the government, as well as be- discontent. tween the judiciary and legislature. In another article, “The Difficult Issue of the China model,” he mentions that there are many people in China who are waiting for political reform (Yang 2006, np). Contrary to Minxin Pei, who thinks political reform is very hard to initiate in China model is China, Yang believes that a combination political reform will be of a market launched eventually. Such reforms, by potentially chal- economy and a lenging two key premises of Another critic, Singaporean journalist Peh political dicta- the China model—that of Shing Huei, believes that the China model CCP supremacy and of has serious flaws in its concentration of torship. “one party leads, multiple political power. From his point of view, parties cooperate,” would the China model is a combination of a effectively nullify the politi- market economy and a political dictator- cal theory at the core of the ship. Under this flawed structure, the China model. power is controlled solely by the central government. The central government con- Rampant Corruption trols important resources such as oil and railways and has the power to fix the pric- According to Pei, the partially reformed es of these resources. Also, the fact that economic and political institutions that the leaders of the multiple “cooperating” characterize the China model provide a political parties in China are chosen by the fertile environment for official corruption, CCP and follow the CCP’s orders serves because institutional rules are either un- to generate a high level of corruption. Ac- clear or politically unenforceable in such cording to Huei, the “grey economy” of environment (Pei, 2006, 12-13). bribery and corruption is estimated to be worth US$500 billion (RMB 1.72 trillion) Pei discusses the corruption that takes a year (Huei 2010, np). place under the current model of development, with corruption by the ruling The criticism that the China model denies elite having reached endemic proportions the necessity of badly-needed political rein the late 1990s. Rough estimates of the forms is the most pervasive argument

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made against the model. In the view of The exportability of the China model many critics, political reform is the core of the country’s future development pros- Many scholars contend that the China pects. No economic or social reforms can model is a complicated model of devel- be implemented successfully without cor- opment that cannot be exported abroad to responding political reforms. At the same other developing nations. time, these China model detractors ask the Many scholars believe western countries government to pay more attention to cannot copy the China model because of problems such as corruption, to listen to a China’s unique market structure and labor greater diversity of opinions, and to be conditions. Jin Kaixuan argues that the more transparent, and not to put forward main advantage of the China model is its the imperfect China model as one for the successful promotion of rapid economic rest of the world to follow. growth. He thinks the basic elements of Given China’s impressive growth perfor- this economic model are centralized pow- mance, one might begin to wonder why, if er and the open market. In other words, the Chinese political system is so dysfunc- he believes that China’s market is a gov- tional, the country has maintained rapid ernment-controlled market. economic growth. Pei gives a detail expla- This economic model is nation in this book China’s trapped transi- based on cheap labor and tions. aims at production of low- India’s main quality goods. Therefore, difficulty in co- He gives four reasons. First, the patholo- this model cannot be mi- pying the mod- gies of a trapped transition became more micked by countries that do serious and visible in the 1990s, and dete- not have a large quantity of el is due to cul- rioration in governance has a lagging ef- cheap labor and a market ture differences fort on economic performance. It is poss- that is partially controlled by ible that the pathologies of a trapped tran- the government (Jin 2010, between the sition will have a material impact on ma- np). two countries. croeconomic performance. Second, in the short term, the growth rate can be Some scholars believe even pumped up by high savings, leading to India, China’s neighboring high investment rates and massive shifts country which also possesses cheap labor, of population from agriculture to industry, cannot successfully follow China’s model. the two major factors behind China’s rap- Liangliang He thinks that India’s main id growth in recent years. Third, growth difficulty in copying the model is due to rates may inaccurately reflect a society’s culture differences between the two coun- welfare gains. In China’s case, high growth tries. Since India was a colony of England rates have been accompanied by all these for more than a century, its social struc- symptoms of low-quality growth. Finally, ture and level of democratization are very he believes China should have a faster different from China. However, contrary growth rate if the political structure goes to other scholars, who believe China well. Given China’s size, low starting base model cannot be imitated by any other and high savings rate, he concludes that countries, He does thinks that countries contrary to official Chinese data, the Chi- like Vietnam and North Korea could suc- nese economy barely grew during the pe- ceed in following China’s path, due to riod of 1998 to 2000 (Pei 2006, 206-215). their similar social and labor structures

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and to their shared cultural traditions and pective. Li believes it is absurd to try to history (He 2010, np). spread the China model through a think tank summit, and that it is ironic for a na- When China enjoys its rapid growing tion that has always denied universality of economy, another of its neighbors, Russia, any development models to trumpet the is not growing. According to Xinhua China model as an attractive model for News Agency, Russia’s economic outputs other nations. China itself has suffered a decreased dramatically from 2008 to 2009. great deal in adopting development me- Russia has tried many different economic thods. It is hard to understand why so reforms in the past eight years, but none many Chinese officials and scholars are in of them have been worked very effective. such a hurry to sell the China model. Therefore, some members of the Chinese media have suggested that Russia could Conclusion benefit from emulating the China model. The debate over the China model within However, the Xinhua article postulates China is focused on four different topics. that Russia cannot copy the model, basing Firstly, scholars question whether the its argument on the following reasons. China model actually exists. Supporters First, the article talks about the different treat the China model as one of the most political structures in the successful models in two countries. It argues … critics believe that the world, combining that while China is con- calling China’s develop- elements of socialism trolled by one political ment path a model is as and China’s unique tra- party, the CCP, Russia is ditions. On the other controlled by the bureau- bad as labeling Ameri- hand, critics believe crat-capitalist class. ca’s rise to power a that calling China’s de- Second, unlike Russia, the velopment path a mod- connection between Chi- model. el is as bad as labeling nese government leaders America’s rise to power and business is weak. For a model. Both nations example, there are no CCP leaders who have different cultures, political systems are also the heads of corporations. Third, and economic elements. As Yawei Liu the article contends that Russia’s most mentions in this Review, the China model serious problem is government corruption is neither a sound theory nor a good set of (He, 2009). Even though China also faces benchmarks to design reform and meas- serious corruption, the Chinese govern- ure its success. ment is working aggressively to deal with the situation, while Russia's punishment It seems to be instead a highly effective of corruption is lax. According to the in- system under the domination of one polit- ternational corruption perceptions index ical party, through which resources can be in 2009, China’s ranked 79th out of 180 marshaled, dissent silenced or crushed, countries, while Russia ranked 146th land grabbed, lakes and rivers dammed, (www.transparency.org). and international sporting events organized without looking into any human or Li Jianhua, a Chinese scholar, cautions ecological costs as long as the outcome of Chinese scholars not to be so enthralled the activity benefits the Party. (Liu 2009, by the China model that they lose pers- 23)

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Calling China’s path of development a As Yawei Liu mentions in his article, “model,” these critics contend, will just found earlier in this journal, the China make Chinese people more arrogant and miracle is not just an outcome of the Chi- likely to ignore the substantial problems na model, or of China’s unique political, generated by this development. economic, social and cultural peculiarities. The China model may be instead just one Second, most China model opponents path of economic development. The Chi- argue that China has not experienced suf- na model is going through a stage of pri- ficiently strong or effective political re- mitive molding, but China has a long way forms. Even though Deng Xiaoping, the to go in order to sustain and strengthen its primary designer of China’s development “model.” path, believed that without political reform all other reforms would eventually fail, its priority on the CCP agenda has been in decline as China’s economy has continued to improve. Opponents believe a lack of political accountability and government responsiveness, combined with collusion and corruption under the current political system, lead to substantial social ills that pose a threat to the country’s stability. Many people view China’s References economic model as successful, due to the high rate of GDP growth that this model has produced. The main concern is that the economic model is unsustainable be- Zhongguang news. “China’s GDP differ- cause of its associated social costs: envi- ence.” 2009. Zhongguang news, 25 July, NP. ronmental costs, the unbalanced devel- . Accessed: cause of a lack of political reforms that February 8, 2010. might serve to resolve some of these issues. Ding, Xueliang. 2008. “Zhongguo moshi weishenem buhao tuiguang (Why the Chi- Last, almost all of the opponents of the na model is difficult to export).” China China model think that the China model Election and Governance, 19 September, NP. cannot be followed by other countries due .Accessed: nature of its market, and the traditions January 28, 2010. and culture that are unique to China. They also argue that the China model is a prod- Gao, Ren..2009. “Mei ren weidu zhong- uct of this particular period of time in his- guo moshi (No one is containing the Chi- tory. The success of the China model, es- na model).” China election and governance. pecially its economic model, does not NP.. Accessed: lated by others. February 8, 2010.

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He, Liangliang. 2009. “Yindu fuzhi 201002/130474.html>. Accessed: Febru- zhongguo moshi bu keneng chenggong ary 8, 2010 (India’s copy of China model cannot be success).” China Election and Governance. NP. Nankivell, Nathan. 2005. “China’s pollu- . Accessed: al stability.”AFAR. NP. September 19, 2009. . Accessed: January 29, 2010. Huei, Peh Shing. 2010. “Listen to Bei- Peh, Shing Huei.2009. “Listen to Beijing, jing.”Insider.NP. don’t copy the China model.” The Straits . Accessed: views/46995-listen-to-beijing-dont-copy- January 28, 2010. the-china-model--peh-shing-huei>. Ac- cessed: February 8, 2010. JIng, Kaixuan. 2009. “Zhognguo moshi de qianjing (The future of China model).” Pei, Minxin. 2006. China’s Trapped Transi- China Election and Governance. NP. tion. Cambridge: NP. .Accessed: Qian, Wenjun.2010. “Zhongguo moshi January 28, 2010. yeshi hao shi? (Is the China model a good thing).” China Election and Governance. NP. Ke, Jinling.2008. “China left behind child- . Accessed: com/ January 28, 2010. newview.asp?Newsid=522>.Accessed: February 8, 2010. Wang, Yukai. 2010. “Lengjing kandai zhongguo moshi(Observe China model Li, Jianhua. 2009. “Bubi mangzhe gei faz- objectively).” China Election and Governace. han zhong guojia chuanshou zhongguo NP. . Ac- cessed: January 28, 2010. the China model to developing nations).” Changjian Ribao. NP. Accessed: February 8, Yang, Guang. 2006. “Zhengzhi gaige: 2010. zhongguo moshi de nandi (Political reform: the difficult issue of the China Liu, Yawei. 2009. “How China’s Quest for model).” Journal of Contemporary China 10: Political Reform Is Undercut by the Chi- NP. na Model.” A Paper presented to the In- ternational Conference at Bucknell Uni- “Zhongguo gaige de zhengzhi zhangai versity on "The People's Republic of Chi- (China’s defective post-reform political na at 60: Internal and External Chal- system.’ 2006.” Modern China research 2 NP. lenges." The Chinese university of Hongkong. .Accessed: http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class4/ February 8, 2010.

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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 5| April 2010

Yu, Keping. 2009. “Wo dui zhongguo moshi chongman qidai (I have confidence in the China Model).” China Election and INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES Governace.NP.

.Accessed: Jan- and interns have the opportunity to work uary 28, 2010. for Carter Center programs that contribute to this mission. Carter Center interns make Yu, Keping. 2009 “Zhonguo moshi bing vital contributions to the Center's work. In meiyou dingxing (China model is not a turn, The Carter Center provides a subs- finished model).”. China Election and Gover- tantive learning experience that serves as a basis for interns to explore their career nance. NP. .Accessed: Jan- and seniors, graduate students, and recent uary 28, 2010. graduates (graduated in the past 24 Yuan, Weishi, and Anan Gu.2010. months). “Zhongguo mo shi? Tai zao le! (China The China Program prefers individuals model? Too early!).” China election and go- with a background or coursework in inter- vernance. NP. national relations, political science, or oth- . Accessed: municate well in Mandarin Chinese and be February 8, 2010. current in Chinese affairs and U.S.-China relations. Interns should be skilled con- Zhang, Yusheng. 2010. “Zhongguo mo versationalists and researchers, with basic shi de quexian (China model’s deficien- technological proficiency (such as Web cies).” Hubei Lilun Xinxi (Heibei theoretical page creation, PowerPoint and Excel), information). NP. Accessed: January 28, capable of working independently. Dedi- 2010. cation to the program's objective is man- datory. Zhao, Suisheng. 2009. Debating Political reform in China. New York: n.p., 2006. Interns will perform a variety of tasks, Print. including administrative assistance, document translation into Chinese and English, “Zhongguo moshi bu shehe Erluosi (Rus- monitoring media for political develop- sia cannot fit China model).” Xinhua. NP. ments in China, and delving into Chinese .Accessed: Jan- internship program, visit us online at uary 28, 2010. http://www.cartercenter.org/involved/int ernship/index.html

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