Curriculum Vitae
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Calendar of AMS Meetings and Conferences
Calendar of AMS Meetings and Conferences This calendar lists all meetings and conferences approved prior to the date this insofar as is possible. Abstracts should be submitted on special forms which are issue went to press. The summer and annual meetings are joint meetings of the available in many departments of mathematics and from the headquarters office of Mathematical Association of America and the American Mathematical Society. The the Society. Abstracts of papers to be presented at the meeting must be received meeting dates which fall rather far in the future are subject to change; this is par at the headquarters of the Society in Providence, Rhode Island, on or before the ticularly true of meetings to which no numbers have been assigned. Programs of deadline given below for the meeting. The abstract deadlines listed below should the meetings will appear in the issues indicated below. First and supplementary be carefully reviewed since an abstract deadline may expire before publication of announcements of the meetings will have appeared in earlier issues. Abstracts a first announcement. Note that the deadline for abstracts for consideration for of papers presented at a meeting of the Society are published in the journal Ab presentation at special sessions is usually three weeks earlier than that specified stracts of papers presented to the American Mathematical Society in the issue below. For additional information, consult the meeting announcements and the list corresponding to that of the Notices which contains the program of the meeting, of special sessions. Meetings Abstract Program Meeting# Date Place Deadline Issue 876 * October 30-November 1 , 1992 Dayton, Ohio August 3 October 877 * November ?-November 8, 1992 Los Angeles, California August 3 October 878 * January 13-16, 1993 San Antonio, Texas OctoberS December (99th Annual Meeting) 879 * March 26-27, 1993 Knoxville, Tennessee January 5 March 880 * April9-10, 1993 Salt Lake City, Utah January 29 April 881 • Apnl 17-18, 1993 Washington, D.C. -
Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploitation: a Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective Stéphane Gonzalez, Fatma Rostom
Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective Stéphane Gonzalez, Fatma Rostom To cite this version: Stéphane Gonzalez, Fatma Rostom. Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploita- tion: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective. 2019. halshs-02430751 HAL Id: halshs-02430751 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02430751 Preprint submitted on 7 Jan 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. WP 1937 – December 2019 Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective Stéphane Gonzalez, Fatma Zahra Rostom Abstract: The article explores the implications of natural resource scarcity in terms of global cooperation and trade. We investigate whether there exist stable international long-term agreements that take into account the disparities between countries in terms of geological endowments and productive capacity, while caring about future generations. For that purpose, we build an original cooperative game framework, where countries can form coalitions in order to optimize their discounted consumption stream in the long-run, within the limits of their stock of natural resources. We use the concept of the recursive core that satisfies both coalitional stability and time consistency. -
Bondareva, Olga (1937-1991)
Bondareva, Olga (1937-1991) By Myrna Wooders This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition. The definitive publisher-authenticated version, Wooders, Myrna. "Bondareva, Olga (1937–1991)." The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 12 November 2013, is available online at: <http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_B000323> doi:10.1057/9780230226203. 0144>. Bondareva, Olga (1937–1991) : The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Page 1 of 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online Bondareva, Olga (1937–1991) Myrna Wooders From The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, 2008 Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume Keywords balancedness; approximate balancedness; Bondareva, O.; clubs; coalitions; cooperative games; core equivalence; cores; duality; essential superadditivity; game theory; linear programming; local public goods; market games; price-taking equilibrium Article Olga Nikolajevna Bondareva was born in St Petersburg on 27 April 1937. She joined the Mathematical Faculty of the Leningrad State University in 1954, and completed a Ph.D. in mathematics at the Leningrad State University in 1963, in part under the supervision of Nicolaj Vorobiev. Her thesis was entitled ‘The Theory of the Core in an n-Person Game’. Bondareva rose through the ranks at Leningrad State University to become a senior research fellow in 1972 and a leading research fellow in 1989. Because she sympathized with a student who wished to emigrate to Israel, however, she was prohibited from teaching from 1973 until 1989. -
Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-Based Climate Protocol Barbara Buchner and Carlo Carraro
Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol Barbara Buchner and Carlo Carraro NOTA DI LAVORO 61.2004 APRIL 2004 CCMP – Climate Change Modelling and Policy Barbara Buchner, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Carlo Carraro, University of Venice, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, CEPR, CEPS, CESifo This paper can be downloaded without charge at: The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=XXXXXX The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol Summary The present stalemate in climate negotiations has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion. This idea – recently proposed among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001) – is based on the insight that incentives to free-ride are much smaller in the case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control. This paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcingness (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out by using a model in which endogenous and induced technical change are explicitly modelled and in which international technological spillovers are also quantified. -
John Wooders
JOHN CHARLES WOODERS November 2016 Office Address: NYU Abu Dhabi Social Science Building (A5) – 165 Saadiyat Campus P.O. Box 129188 Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Phone: +971 26285802 Email: [email protected] Home page: http://www.johnwooders.com EDUCATION: PhD Economics, Cornell University, August 1992. Supervisors: David Easley, Larry Blume, and Robert Jarrow B. Sc. Economics and Mathematics, University of Toronto, June 1986. EMPLOYMENT: September 2016 – Present Professor, NYU Abu Dhabi June 2011 – Present Distinguished Research Professor, University of Technology Sydney August 2004 – June 2011 Professor and Freshwater Group Fellow, University of Arizona August 1999 – July 2004 Associate Professor, University of Arizona. August 1991 – July 1999 Assistant Professor, University of Arizona. VISITING POSITIONS August 2014 – Visiting Professor at University of Arizona December 2014 Visiting Professor at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid June 2009 Visiting Professor at Waseda University, Tokyo January 2007 – May 2007 Visiting Professor of Economics, National Univ. of Singapore. May 2005 – August 2005 Visiting Professor of Economics, ISER Osaka. August 2001 – August 2002 Visiting Associate Professor of Economics, HKUST. May 2000 – August 2000 Visiting Professor of Economics, Univ. Carlos III de Madrid. January 2000 - March 2000 Visiting Associate in Economics, Caltech Fall 1994 Visiting Professor of Economics, Univ. Carlos III de Madrid. EDITORIAL BOARDS Associate Editor, Economics Letters, 2012 – present. Associate Editor, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2011 – present. Associate Editor, International Game Theory Review, 2013 – present. Associate Editor, Journal of Dynamics and Games (AIMS), 2013 – present. Associate Editor, Economics Bulletin, 2000 – 2006. Associate Editor, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2013 – 2015. Guest Editor (with Ahmet Alkan, Jesús David Pérez Castrillo, and Myrna Wooders) for a special issue of Journal of Dynamics and Games dedicated to Marilda Sotomayor, 2015. -
CV in PDF Format
JOHN WOODERS July 2021 Office Address: NYU Abu Dhabi Social Science Building A5 – 165 Saadiyat Campus P.O. Box 129188 Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Phone: +971 26285802 Email: [email protected] Home page: http://www.johnwooders.com EDUCATION: PhD Economics, Cornell University, August 1992. Supervisors: David Easley, Larry Blume, and Robert Jarrow B. Sc. Economics and Mathematics, University of Toronto, June 1986. EMPLOYMENT: September 2016 – Present Global Network Professor of Economics, NYU Abu Dhabi 2020 – Present Co-Director of the Center for Behavioral Institutional Design 2020 – Present Director of the Social Science Experimental Laboratory August 2019 – August 2022 Honorary Professor, University of Technology Sydney June 2011 – 2019 Distinguished Research Professor, University of Technology Sydney August 2004 – June 2011 Professor and Freshwater Group Fellow, University of Arizona August 1999 – July 2004 Associate Professor, University of Arizona. August 1991 – July 1999 Assistant Professor, University of Arizona. VISITING POSITIONS January 2018 – May 2018 Visiting Professor at New York University August 2014 – Visiting Professor at University of Arizona December 2014 Visiting Professor at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid June 2009 Visiting Professor at Waseda University, Tokyo January 2007 – May 2007 Visiting Professor of Economics, National Univ. of Singapore. May 2005 – August 2005 Visiting Professor of Economics, ISER Osaka. August 2001 – August 2002 Visiting Associate Professor of Economics, HKUST. May 2000 – August 2000 Visiting Professor of Economics, Univ. Carlos III de Madrid. January 2000 - March 2000 Visiting Associate in Economics, Caltech Fall 1994 Visiting Professor of Economics, Univ. Carlos III de Madrid. ACADEMIC HONORS • Fellow of the Econometric Society, 2016 • Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, 2016 EDITORIAL BOARDS • Associate Editor, Economics Letters, 2012 – present. -
An Analysis of Adaptation As a Response to Climate Change
COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE An Analysis of Adaptation as a Response to Climate Change Francesco Bosello, Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE An Analysis of Adaptation as a Response to Climate Change Francesco Bosello, Carlo Carraro, and Enrica De Cian University of Venice and FEEM Acknowlwdgement: This report has been prepared for the Copenaghen Consensus 2009. AD-WITCH, the model used in this study, has been developed by FEEM in cooperation with the OECD. The authors gratefully acknowledge their financial support. They are also grateful to Shardul Agrawala, Rob Dellink, Kelly de Bruin and Richard Tol for helpful comments. Nonetheless, the views expressed in this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. Finally, the contribution of all colleagues who worked to the development of the original WITCH model – in particular Valentina Bosetti, Emanuele Massetti, and Massimo Tavoni – is gratefully acknowledged. Corre- spondence address: Carlo Carraro, FEEM, Castello 5252, 30122 Venice, Italy. E mail: [email protected]. Copenhagen Consensus Center Copenhagen Business School Solbjerg Plads 3 DK-2000 Frederiksberg Denmark +45 3815 2255 [email protected] www.copenhagenconsensus.com COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE PREFACE ABSTRACT Climate change is likely to have relevant effects on our future socio-economic systems. It is therefore important to identify how markets and policy jointly react to expected climate change to protect our societies and well-being. This study addresses this issue by carrying out an integrated analysis of both optimal mitigation and adaptation at the global and regional level. Adaptation responses are disentangled into three different modes: reactive adaptation, proactive (or anticipatory) adaptation, and investments in innovation for adaptation purposes. -
GIORGIO BARBA NAVARETTI CURRICULUM VITAE January 2019
GIORGIO BARBA NAVARETTI CURRICULUM VITAE January 2019 Department of Economics Management and Quantative Methods, University of Milan, Via Conservatorio 7, 20122 Milano, tel +390236683850, mob +393487064160, email [email protected] Born in Torino, Italy, the 5th of June 1960, Nationality: Italian – French EDUCATION 1987/1991 University of Oxford, D. Phil. in Economics 1985-87 University of Oxford, M.Phil. in Economics 1982 ESSEC, Cergy Pontoise (Paris), Exchange 1979-1984 Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi Milano, Italy, Laurea in Business Economics, CAREER ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH 2012- SciencesPo, Paris, Distinguished Visiting Faculty 2001 - Università degli Studi, Milano, Full Professor in International Economics 1987- Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, Milan and Turin, Scientific Director since 1998 1998- 2001 Università degli Studi, Ancona, Associate Professor in Economics 1993-1998 Università degli Studi, Milano, Assistant Professor in Economics 1992- 2001 Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, Research Programme Coordinator and Scientific Editor 1984-85 Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan, Italy. Researcher and teaching assistant in industrial economics Paris School of Economics (2009) and Boston College (2005) Invited Visiting Professor The World Bank (1995-6 and 1999-2000) Invited Visiting Researcher CORPORATE 2015- Ricerca e Studi (R&S), Mediobanca, Non-Executive Director 2006 - Aon Italia, Non-Executive Director 2012-2018 Banca Sistema, Non-Executive Director (member of the Executive Committee 2012- of the Internal Control and Risks -
Curriculum Vitae
CURRICULUM VITAE Professor CARLO CARRARO Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia President, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Ph.D, Princeton University www.carlocarraro.org PERSONAL INFORMATION AND ADDRESSES Professor President Department of Environmental and European Association of Environmental Computer Science and Resource Economists (EAERE) Science Campus, Via Torino 155 Edificio Porta dell'Innovazione - Piano 2 30170 Venezia-Mestre, Italy Via della Libertà, 12 - 30175 Venezia- Tel.: +39 041 2348198 Marghera, Italy E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eaere.org Website: www.unive.it/persone/ccarraro President Vice-Chair, Working Group III HforHuman Foundation Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Via Sile 6, 31056, Roncade (TV) Italy Change (IPCC) Tel: +39 0422 789611 C/O World Meteorological Organization E-mail: [email protected] 7bis Avenue de la Paix, C.P. 2300 Website: https://hforhuman.org/ CH- 1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland E-mail: [email protected] Co-Chair, GGKP Scientific Director Green Growth Knowledge Platform Fondazione Nord Est International Environment House Via Torino 151c 11-13 Chemin des Anemones 30172 Venezia-Mestre, Italy 1219 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: 041 2517556 http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org Website: www.fondazionenordest.net SHORT PROFILE Professor Carlo Carraro is President Emeritus and Professor of Environmental Economics at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. He holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He was President of the University of Venice from 2009 to 2014. Previously, he was Director of the Department of Economics from 2006 to 2008 and Vice-Provost for Research Management and Policy from 2001 to 2005. He is President of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE) for the biennium 2018-2019. -
Monotone Comparative Statics: Changes in Preferences Vs Changes in the Feasible Set
Munich Personal RePEc Archive Monotone comparative statics: Changes in preferences vs changes in the feasible set Kukushkin, Nikolai S. Russian Academy of Sciences, Dorodnicyn Computing Center 15 June 2011 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31612/ MPRA Paper No. 31612, posted 16 Jun 2011 13:19 UTC Monotone comparative statics: Changes in preferences vs changes in the feasible set∗ Nikolai S. Kukushkin† June 15, 2011 Abstract Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing condi- tions are necessary and sufficient for a monotone reaction of the set of optimal choices from every chain. Actually, there are several interpretations of monotonicity and several corresponding single crossing conditions. We describe restrictions on the preferences that ensure a monotone reaction of the set of optimal choices from every sublattice whenever a perturbation of preferences sat- isfies the corresponding single crossing condition. Quasisupermodularity is necessary if we want monotonicity in every conceivable sense; otherwise, weaker conditions will do. JEL Classification Numbers: C 61; C 72. Key words: strategic complementarity; monotone comparative statics; best response corre- spondence; single crossing; quasisupermodularity ∗This is a revised and extended version of MPRA Paper #18237 “Another characterization of quasisupermodularity” (2009) †Russian Academy of Sciences, Dorodnicyn Computing Center, 40, Vavilova, Moscow 119333 Russia E-mail: [email protected] 1 1 Introduction The concept of strategic complementarity was first developed in a cardinal form, around the notion of a supermodular function (Topkis, 1978, 1979; Veinott, 1989; Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Milgrom and Shannon (1994) gave the idea an ordinal expression and obtained a neat char- acterization result, Theorem 4 in their paper. -
International Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Stabilization
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers 8-21-2007 International Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Stabilization Valentina Bosetti Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, [email protected] Carlo Carraro Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, University of Venice, CEPR, CESifo and CMCC, [email protected] Emanuele Massetti Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, [email protected] Massimo Tavoni Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei , Catholic University of Milan and CMCC, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://services.bepress.com/feem Recommended Citation Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele; and Tavoni, Massimo , "International Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Stabilization" (August 21, 2007). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 138. http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper138 This working paper site is hosted by bepress. Copyright © 2007 by the author(s). Bosetti et al.: International Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Gre International Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Stabilization Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti, and Massimo Tavoni NOTA DI LAVORO 82.2007 JULY 2007 CCMP – Climate Change Modelling and Policy Valentina Bosetti, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and CMCC Carlo Carraro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, University of Venice, CEPR, CESifo and CMCC Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, -
1 Introduction
1 Introduction Scott Barrett, Carlo Carraro and Jaime de Melo1 Columbia University; University of Venice and Feem; Ferdi For the first time ever, in Paris at COP21, almost all of the world’s countries will commit to reducing or controlling their own greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, cities, business organisations and major companies will also commit to reducing their own emissions. This will represent an important success of diplomatic efforts to address the climate change problem. However, preliminary assessment of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted so far shows that the agreement being prepared for adoption in Paris in late 2015 will need to create incentives for parties to pledge to do more in the immediate future. Incentives will also be needed for parties to actually do more. These incentives may come not only from within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, but also from other sources, such as the effort currently underway to amend the Montreal Protocol to limit hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The emerging regime for limiting climate change will therefore consist of multiple agreements, policies, and actions adopted at the local, regional, and global levels. In Paris, but also beyond, attention will probably focus on whether similar countries are making similar pledges to limit their emissions. It will also focus on whether the sum total of all pledges will put the world on track towards meeting its common goal. The current goal is to prevent mean global temperature from rising by more than 2°C relative to the pre-industrial level. Attainment of this goal may already be beyond our reach, but the bigger point is that limiting temperature change to any level will require reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to zero, or removing CO2 directly from the atmosphere.