Korean War
2nd Infantry Division - War Diary - November 1950
Headquarters
Korean War Project Record: USA-4
Folder: 050003a
Box: 05
File: 03a
National Archives and Records Administration
College Park, Maryland
Records: United States Army
Unit Name: Second Infantry Division
Record Group: RG407
Editor: Hal Barker
Korean War Project
P.O. Box 180190
Dallas, TX 75218-0190 http://www.koreanwar.org
Korean War Project 2ID-00100167 SECRET .. · 0117
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'I 2oiNFANTRY DIVISION·._ .- ,. .. -
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Throu:::h: 30 ~ovembsr 1950
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The follov1i:n.s -is quoted f'cr t~1e i:;:u-.ormation and guidance of ~ll concerned:
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The combat 1nfant.rymen of the 2d Infantry Div~si_on-, ·fi.sht~ng against a deiermined enemy, h&4 faced and overcome defeat 1n the Nakto:cg ru.ver zone, baa Yll.l1:qa1ahfld t,hs eneDl1. / "" ·- -,.,~ ' . ',' . , aDd 4r1Ven his broken remnants tio t~ <:4-.:e:i- of tae ~ut~ ' ' ' ; ,, ' . ; . . . l . ':'.' . ·· · h.t"ean ·Jif)u.nta1ns. liJ the end er OetDllet',,. di:ds101W.l Cdi.a . ". . \ . ' . . . - -..
• e t;.qbg to bring, :order otii .· ot, the ob&us o.f a :d:1;$~U:j1lf, .... · · pel;tt,s...a. and econom1.c ~ystem. Aa Elshth Atmr -r.Gene• I» ' ...... ~1valy stable situation, t.be aivi.~ ,.~-. -~- ·-·· ,. ' ~---\ .. -\;,) --~ ·. ..·:··.((',',. -. .. ~ ~~-~ _al'l4_tb.e morale ot an ~ .. ,:wa.a J.dab. .:·· · •,";.~ ,,,~: ~~!;':':.:, / • ); . . <> c • ...... , . ·• . ;V~;,~\f:~:;J;;':} . • : ,. .. · . ;:;,~· >'" ./5e ~11HJnt:s. moving not'tb _waz.-tt )11~ ;.by"· . .. . .· :: "•{ '.· .. t~---·. ·, ' . ,,,~ ., .....'f.
Korean War Project 2ID-00100174 .. ~--~
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te.r clothin[ "vVO'Jld b~f£TBut plans wer·e alrc.;aJ.y be ins rns.de to as8'i:mble the division north of' Pyongyang, at- tach it once rno.r;::. to the IX COrps, to "i'l(Jicq it had. previ
ou~ly been assisned after its brilliant actions in the
southern sector, and commsnce G. drive north intende:i to Dring thE· Korean Police Action to an end. Problems "I'Thich had not existed in the Naktong fi(.ht- ins were to become of paramount importance in the operations -. ahead. As the division moved north it met the advancing ..... ,,.._,. 1.' .. '* -- .... ,...... ' 't·•· . ' "\' ...... co•d ·or~~he cib§rian h15h pressurd mass mov1~ ~outh in the monso.onal chEtnge of season. Winter clothing was in short supply; not only were a>:;pot stocks limited, but the supply line was, lone s.nd poorly maintained. Transportation facil- i ties VAiU.'ii...P.l.sc-. ~e: .h~ivJJ.y ta~ ments for ammuni~ion, food, POL, and replacements. The initial dispersion of divisional units aggravated this prob lem (?d Division Headquarte·rs and Division Artillery Head quarters were over 120 miles apart). ~lhile division and higher headquarters were drawine; up their plans for the comins advance, the remnants of the . . North Korean Army crossed the Yalu to reorganize and resupply in the sanctuary of Manchuria. The Armies of Communist China ...... later to be facetiously referred to as "Volunteer E1.ementsu --were crossint_: the rive.·r in the ~posite ~~.;.eq.tion under c_ov- ...... ,...... ~·~...... , " ~l"""' er of darkness and cloudy weather to positions from which . they intended to wipe out the attacking UN Forces. , - • Korean War Project 2ID-00100175 _,.-· U.lfl;l2~, ' . ·;.. .. ·. ~ . ·- ... t .r-"-"'' =~r~:;.,.·~-•.. !:. ·~.•.• fS=r~t."· ... c:::..,_-- ~~-. -~<---· ,_. .. '._. ~· ·.. . . t Korean War Project 2ID-00100176 ' ... ,-' ..... -~· The 2d Infantry Di•iision vtas attached to I Corps on 1 N~vember. Althouzh its mis~ion--security of the area be- hind the frontline elements ctnd the blocking of enemy pene- tration from the east--remained unchanged, the altered tac- tical situation greatly increased the importance of this mission. Heavy enemy pressure against the front line u.nits of th.e l.st Cavalry Division c:md the R.OK II Corps wa.z cre ating a dangerous threat which Eighth Army directed the 2d . ' Division to counter. As it was anticipated tr~t all organic units of the division would be needed in. the major _defense effort, the 187th Airborne RCT was attached to take over the security miscions in the Fyongyc.ng and' Chinnampo areas. The initial notification of the new chc..nge in mission had been phoned to the division on 1 November and confirmed by radio message the same day. The division was to move as quickly as possible to the. Sunchon ar,::a from where it was to effect security of the Eic;l1tl1 Army east flank. Upon comple- tion of movement to its new defensive s·ector, it was to com- mence preparations for of:.i:'ensi ve operations in coordination w:i._th the American I Corps and to the right of its zone ·~of responsibility. The 1e>7th Airborne ROT was released from attachment to th~ division and was directed to take over the security mission in the Pyonc:yang area. -7- - CEC~-:::r ,, I • Korean War Project 2ID-00100177 • ...... • ..... < • '. faEtl'Y e.ncl Division ..'u'tillery Eeadc.t..r>rtar·.s ·,·;ere otill in First of the 2d Division units to be effected by the chanced tacticc.l situatioil w:::..c the 9th ·Infa::Jtl"Y Reeimont wh,ich commenced its movement to .Sunchon on 1 Hovembsr in compli&nce wit~1. the telepb.oneJ Eighth Army directive. As ·' ... " .. ..., ..,_,...... ,.,.-._ . ,, ...... -.... ,...... """" its battalion:.; left :Cor th~ :north, ·::.lcments of' ths 187th Air·borne RCT besun to t~::~~:: over' its former area. ~ The L;t Battc.lion, 9th Inf::.:..:;:1try, completed th:::· move to Sunchon by lD.te afternoon, the 2d Batts.lion, utilizinc: tr~ck~· ~f the IG7th, a·r;r.:ived in' 1:y·o11fiyang prepa .. r.ea to continue the move to Sunc:J.on as soon as ore; nic transportation VJ'Ci.c r:uade av::::.ilD.bls. The mission of the, 1st Be,ttalion was to set up e. road blocl:: at Tokchon, the hub of an impo.!."'tant roc::;.d nEt'i.VOl~k. El- ernents of' thc- battalion tl:.:.-~n moved t.:> ro2.d ju::.1ctions located t ' at BU929G cmd BV8910* from i'T~1ich th;sy could int.ercept enemy units moving from the north or east. Air observers report;;d larse enemy units rnovinz to- ,. ,. wards Tokchon on the 2d and Oomuanies A and B v1ere nle,ced ...... , ... ~~' .... ~...... _,....' 1!> ~· ...... ··~,....~!Ill "'f' ....,. .. 'If...... under heavy small grms fire. As the -r.erra2n in the Tol:>:- ~!-The UniVGl'Scd Transverse 1-'iercato.r cr-id syctsm Vvill be utiliz.e::'i :t:n t:jis n::::.rrative vlb.enever Gl"'id coordinDtes c,re necessary to pin-point a .;:::eoc;rc:phicc:.. l loc2tion. 't Korean War Project 2ID-00100178 chon L'l' _e. T!.1 ~ -,-."! ,·.v, '• ;.-' -4. ·~· ..L- •-J e ·"''- feet. Air Co~trol Parties t leDJ:3 ed from <::.ttachment. £icith Army, on the U!'(3311t rec__ u est ono to be as~i~nel to the 9t~ RCT end the ot~er to je rc- tc.il1 c l Div~_,ion. the ~ove to the r 2~02 2t Tc~to-ri on the 3d. I Corps, irL:~i.J·t.:;;n~.::, o::.-: the: -c:::~.::'lY co:ltact jet\·reen ito • "'Th s vilLt:_:: s o:f ICunu-ri ·.va:• e:.bscrb e·J. oy K:..ecl·10n ::cfter \'/orld. ,far II end t;E ~--L L>:: :l.:: no lon~:er include -10- 'f • Korean War Project 2ID-00100179 chon on 2 F;ovember to E;~;,taolL:-i1 2, defense p..:rimster .::ct the ferry crossin:::: near .Sc,uso-ri. ;,. pe:~trol of Comps.ny K con- tinu north with ord2rs to cont&ct the l~t Cavalry Div:sion. Contact w:..-;,;: effected ·.ritC'1 Ta:~i: F'or·ce Allen in Kunu-ri on the . ' '·• / an indication th?,t·' the ROK officer·~"- 11arS. rep:ained contr·ol of • ~ <11'.1 '_, their units and 'tTere movin,_ th-sm oacl:: to front line positiono. The 1st and 2d Bs.tt..::.lioJ.-:s o-:: t',le 9th Infc:mtr;; had established stron[ defensive positions soutl1 of Kunu-ri by mornins of the. 3d • The truc~s utilized to transport these ...... !'\ ... : .,..fo ...... _ ...... batt~lions were immedi:.:.tely -··-.returned. .. ~..o 'S!!rf~h-orftcr bring up the 3d Battslion of the 9th. Transportation limitations seriously impeded move- f i 1 ment durin·_: this p,.riod as over 350 divisione:.l truc::s had I been organized into th::: "Red Be,ll .Expr•ess 11 to support I Corps supply services and were un2vailable on such short notice. "ilitb th~ e:x:"c,enE\ ion of' the zons of' responsibility and the relinquishmont of re·sponsioili ty for tl~e Pyongyang sec- tor to ths 187th Airborne RC'r OD. 3 November, l t became ne- I cessary to displ<::c.e the co •. __ _., -11- ,. 'f .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100180 0134 The ~~d Reconno.iss~~~ Comp""ny h::d. bes11 sent on a - set up 2c raad block c;,J~ Pu~;:c~1:::1nc:-ni; here it was reinforced by Company L of the 23d Infantry whic~ continued its attach- ment until the 11th of' i:ovembe.r ',then it again reve.r't to t~1e 23d. Th? 38th Inf'aDtry was told to assemble its for-ces at Samso-ri, approximately 12 miles north of Sunchon, and com- . pleted its move "oy late c;.fternoon of th·..: 3d. At t.lis ·time, it was pl<:L:,neJ. to commit both the 9th ' RCT and the 38th I~1ant~y in the I Corps sector while the .. ~~3d was to remain in the vicinity oi' Sunchon as division re serve with the additional mission of protectinf::; the right flank. The 9th RCT v;as to contact the 5th Cavalry Ret;:iment on its left, just east of Yongbyon. The 38th was to .. tal:e a' sector• to the ric;ht of th'q 9th Rar. These plans were chanc;ed on 5 November when the 2d was relec:;.sed from attachment to I Corps and reverted to operational control of' IX Corps w2:..ich established its com- mand post in Chasan, five wiles z,outh of Suncl1on, on that day. Th.J IX Corps ..,.,as :::;_1 ven the responsibility for the r~ght flank of the Zishth A.r.ruy zone while the I Corps con- tinued its operations i:n the ar·ea :northwest of the Chong- chon River'. The 9th ROT was detached frotn the 2d Divisian ' and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, I Corps. -13- -. Korean War Project 2ID-00100181 ... ;' '·<>· 0135 j ' ...... ,...... ,..· .. As th:c. re.··im::nts v;ere to ouer·ate as combat teams, 3bt:1 3.CT wa::···reco:ast~~~t..[~c-" ..::. rccoDstiiut·;:d comb&t team waa compoa0j of: the 38th Infantry Re~imen~; the 38th E'ield iu:"tille2y .battalion; Company C, 2d En[ineer (G) Battalion; and Battery C, 82d A.AA Automatic l~eapons Be.ttalion (SP) • . Intellizence reports indicated that the enemy forces opposins tns ~ichth Army included eleme11ts of over eight North Korean infantry divisionD and large unide11tified combat Chin~se Communist Army. }iiost of' tht;:se forces ...... ':- ,...... ,.. ~-:~'"-··~...... _..~ . .. . -.. ._\• .. ~ ...... , ....· were co.:.centrc::.ted in the IX Corps sector and many were sus pected· to oe in .the arE:a nortl1 of' a line drawn between Tal\:- chon and Yongwbn. The ROK II Corps was the only friendly element in this area at the time and tl:ie tao.t.ical importance ortbe rca({ ·net "'emar/at,.I}~-f'roul ~'b.it-' sec'ttir••rnad"~ "1mmediate. defense implementation of great importance. Not only did I roads from tbs TokcL1on roa:.l hub lead directly to Kunu-ri, Sunchon, and .i'yongyang, they also led into the X Corps area, crossin;_:: the l!;ichth Army-X Corps. border at the tuwn of Ha- dongsan-ni. ' Th~a 38th ROT was directGd to establish its command post at Pukchang-ni f.rox which it could contr·ol counter th.r>usts. dO\ro· any _of the numerous .roads. The 1st Battalion of the 38th had establisherS olocl!::1:nc; J?OSi tions at Yongdong- ni by lit~ "afternoon of 5 November. Tl;:l..~., f~.~~t... talion took up a defensi ve·'positton at an important roa~ junction ap ...... proxim&:tely five miles south of the 1st Battalion on 6 -14- , 2!E ..... C ,.. . .,. - -·•• I~ Korean War Project 2ID-00100182 ~··-. Novewbe.r. '.I'hc:: ;;c. too~;;: up po.:::l.tiol;.:.; to tll.c left of the 2d .Battslion o:n the follo~iMJ#J The mis:.sion of ·::.h._ ::;.::th RGT du.rinc; the time i·~ h::ld in the sc.1.me ar·:::a, e.n:l to initiate: :mG. continue a·s.ressive patrol activities, ooth combat aDd .reco~naissance. the no.rthec,.s t corner oi' th:::; J::.;ichth Jir'my line, the 23d Infan- try, witn its command post at Sunchon, was reconnoitering all ma.in s.nd subsidiary roads t.o the eastern flanlr of t.he extensive 2d Division zone. On·:: of the p.rime.ry rnis:cc,ions of' the 23d. Inf::o~ntry. \vas the :pstrol of Doth the northern and southern road3 to ths •tovm of La.ngdok which was supposedly a center of cotrHIJUEist activL:.y D.nd :J.n important rc:il sup:ply ma.rshallin2 point, s.. s vvell as bein~~ e.. major· point on a p.ri- mary road O\:'tween Pyoncyarlg and ~'ioncan on the east coG";.St of Korea. Initially, the 23:1 dCT attempted to re<.:.ch the to•;m via the no.rthcrn rout·s :i:'ror:; i3w.:crJ.on. Although successful in reachinc: the tovm of Chune;-ni, a little over ten miles north of Yangdok, the road beco.me impassable and tr~is attempt '\'las abandoned. Another patrol. attempted to reach the to-vm from the south on 7 November; this patrol was successful. It not .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100183 "' ... ,.. .,, .-, .~ ,, ,., ' H:i. tn Nor·th .tCor·sa.n munition~:; and me.ct1lne to ole used by the communiDts in the construction of ~~ussian type iieapons cmd aa:m,uni t ion. IX Ool"p3 vr:~s notified of the. enemy ec:;uipment uncov- ered ~oy the patrols to p::.;:rmi t notification of .R.OK units should they desire to utilize c..rjy of the ca:;tur.:;d mctsriel. Al tiouch they liid ta~;;:G over ?OL thG other ec~uipDJEmt ivas com::icL-:red usels·ss s~nu· destroyed. ··~~"lil'."' ...... ~~'~,· ... ..,. --··· ''• ....,,, ...... --··-."'- ~ ...... ·~ ~a;·~·· ... In an attempt. to contact sler.uent,s o.i:' the ;~ ·Jorps, patroL:; of' thG 23d RCT advc::.nced to th·:; extreme rir_:ht flank of th:: .SiLhth Army sector at o. point appro}:imately f'i ve I miles east pf Ysnsdok. X Corp:.. po.trols , .. hovve'Ver·, never ·• - • • ...... -,1 ...... ' ' .l"'·· ,.. ,...,,·~~ re;.::,coeG tcus point. There was much enemy activity in both the 23d and the 38th RCT sector throushout th(:> period. Attacks, o-.;th nisL:t ' c:nd day, against the 38th ROT roadblocks vlere frec:uent and a st'lorta;:::e o:· hand srensdss was 2-lleviated only by rnal~ine levies on other divisionG.l u:ci t: not so heavily engaged. A patrol o.:::' 17 mc::n from Company E, 38th -In:I:'antry, \'/C:~.s tricli:ed into an '-uubus :1 hi ths town of ·ruam-ni at. noon on 8.l~ovemoer. A::_s the pe:ttrol a-pr·oac~led the to'dn, a civilian ,, at th·c:: outskL:·ts turned an~~ .ran. The ~at~ol tried. to catch him but W&i.G c'a~:;ht' in i'-mu1-de1'bus""c.r~S~ fl'J.fb' as it passed between th9 first two buildin~s. The patrol entered one oZ 't • .. " Korean War Project 2ID-00100184 0 v 1!.0:i: •·' .... ,... the juildl~ s ~nd succsssZully beat off .--·· f... ; ...... •· .;:- ,., " · t ·· ·.L"' ,...,.,.. ,.,.. n.'f',.._ ·1_)/~.:_.,. n·, ,:·11. or un esGlmc 2~ s~smy ~~~ 1 v- ~ Ths p3trol 1 ~r t~en dirscte1 a brea~ out of the trap; fir.ns all weapons, the p2trol mambero rushed from the buildin~ tow~rd the edce of' tovm. successful in breakin£ their: to the 38th R.CT ar·s&. All ui' thew H·s.r·c \{OUn·ied • • on the 9th t? recover tha r2muinder o~ the patrol. They found four, on.:: :leJ.d c:.:::l~i the reme.ininc; three wounJed; They were lyinc on a hill~ide, strippe~ of all clothing, ba.yoneted, <:::.n-2 beaten ~>lith .rifls butts. Th: remainder of •. were i'lOUnJed, three •.1er0 uec:~:l. These, too, hc;.d been strip- p8c1 C,l1·:i ls~ft tc d.ie i11 the freezi11g cold. Ten minutes ~fter th: 2rmored p3trol cleared ths 'tl1s~ town abL:ze, firiD:_. rocket:: an::1 napalm. r,c,tcr, t;J.,,: 1· s.,rtiller·y, i'irinc hi[b explocive s~1clls, leveled the tovm. " Other- pc;, t.r·oL;, .rcsturni.nc. from the north, brought back Ohh1ese pri,so:cers who, undeL' interrogation, implied RCT send a. woto.cize6. pe.trcl to the vill3,r:e o: Badungsan-ni .. -·- -19- SECE?FT • "' Korean War Project 2ID-00100185 0142 saced by enemy units. n, '1rc:s to j;;: :follo;,red oy a strons ~~- :,.., ,•- combat p2trol o: Vl..!.:::..: t~e many craters an: bouldt~s in thE road. uation of a coo~d~natei sr:ve to ths north and diiision notified t~h' 3Cth ROT on ·ths lOt£.1 to pull back to an s.s- ., sem0ly s.r :D. ns:c1r 0uncnon EOon as ths F.CK forces could take over theil" position.:;. This directive was rescinded I. b:y IX Cor:?::.~ orCi.sr. The IX Corps directed that the 38th assewble at Pukcbanc-ni where it could still ~uickly come to the aosistc;.r:ce of t.he ROK elements in the event of a major attack. The 38th RCT .92tr'olo dB.ily investiGated civilian r'"eportz: of heavy enemy ·':1Ctivi ty in the are_ but made few *By coincidence, the 65th ii.CT (.Puer;t.o Rican) was the same orEc:.nization v,r,:ic~1 had takc;n over· tha Hill 409 sector ' on the :l:~aktons River' line I{C.iETJ tnE.'l 38th had J..;:wnched its dX'ive -v1est ir: September. -2.1- I Korean War Project 2ID-00100186 " 0143 milit~ry protscticn. contact pa.trol~::;. It bezc.n to turn coL.: tovr"'a'cl. 0(J.c: mid~tle of' lJovr::moer equipment frow freezi~c bcc~~e serious. All medical units -v;ere issuGj oil stoves "17'"ich v1ere used to i:ec·p plasma .:md other me.Jiaal sup:~:::lies, sensitive to freezin;::, useable. ~{inter· clothin.::: 1,·/:C'.S issuc::.l i¥1 tb 'i:.Op priority £1V911 to the cou!bc;,t sle,Jents. A <.;.u:;r·tErmaster teSLm, ecuip.)ed iV"ith samples of all tyr;:ec of \'linter clothint; issued, then toured the di visio::..'lo.l unit proper use of the new clothinc -v;ith an explanation of "'che layer princi:pls HL1icn pL<.ced th.:: stress for i·t&rmth to meet any cold condition on the numoer· of layers oi' clottling rather than 6n their weicht or thickness. Frostbite and foot troubles vwr·e imuor•tant problems "" ' dur-L,z this period. La.cl;: of circulationji excessive sweating periods contriouted to foot tl'Oubles, some of wcich were ...... , serious enou;.:_:h to l'orce 2V' F<:ilUl",: of ~'ll p2.r-ticip::::tin.z diVifiions to complete prepccra.tions f'or th·:o propo~;c.:: dri vs en 15 November forced cs.ncello.tion o:e· the drive: <::c.nd a per·ioc of fuN.her planning. Korean War Project 2ID-00100187 ;._--~· -· 014~ . ' ...... ··'··~ Althouti.1 IX Gorp::.; c.:.nd ~?d D.ivi:~:io:n staffs ".JGX'e corn- pletinc_ pla.n;;.; f'or ti:K coor·_:insted J:!Jichth Apmy dr7_ve, Chere was rnucb p;:;;.trol :o'.ctivity L1 t·ne Gclstern sector of' t:·J.G Clivi- sion zone in the :;,Jerio(i. 15-2~~ Novsrube.r. Enemy units were tacts 1:ier-e v?it~'l smctll cm.it:::., Korean civilLms conti:nuej to rep~.c~ ~ ac;i.~v.~-~L ~f lu.r·t;e Cainese bo.nds, ~>lll.~_ch included • ' • ·~·t~ ~·~···---~~ •.· ...... --·-···· -~ • cavalry. Th:: ~:d Reco:maic:sance Oompu.ny contacted one such force southeast or Soncc~on on 16 Hoveober. Contact wit~ ~h~ Chinese Zorces was not limitei ~o ooerc.tino: unje.r - '- I Cor·ps contr·ol nol-·t;:we:::>t of ~~h2 Choncc'::on .21 ver r·eported heavy opposition l'ro:i.i thE Chinese in the vicinity of Tons- don5 on the 16th. seemed um1illin::.: to ;_,roloY<: th·.; encasements G.nd usu;:.:.lly , unit action in the t..::vm of Hoechans vlhltch comtnenced when Cpmpcmy K, 23d Infantry, on e:~ small unit ps.trol a.o·,,n a subsidiary l'oad, entered t~~is vrc::u·ehouse center of" ths IioJ'ttl Korean rnili tar'Y. The snemy unit put up a determine::: defense .,. .. .• '. ' .. ~ ... ,...... *' ,,..... ""' ...... ,; ...... ,_ .. 'r·'t",.. ,...... ~. and two ~a.ttallons of the 23d, supported by air, v1ere re- -c.:.:J-n~ t' ·~--- .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100188 0146 1-, - 2 F. ~r up' • • ~ teL: encm;r forces in the "ric:..ruty or l-io ec:L:..::1;.: cons i:::;t ed oi lour o.r· five rec ir.uents but a fOI'C e villac;e Oi-. Sc.min-ni, 4 miles 11ortc1 of Ho ec£1ans, the oodles of 56 Koreans •;vho hau besl~ rnussacred by the Comwunists. This \'>las one:: o:i:' mc.my atroc::.. tie;:; uncovered durinc the period. Staff Jude;e Advocate .Section revealed tnat they i·lere plotted as a matter of' policy by the Gomr.nunist hierarchy. Communist spies •..:auld be installed in the tovms :md villagc.:s to ob- serve and repo.r·t on the activities of all pr•ominent per- sonnel. If their activities deviated from the sts,Ddards considered acceptable by the Communists, they were executed. AS the :&orth Korean Forces ifere driven oac1;: they l-dlled the heads of all f::::.milieG sus);ected of bei:nz anti-Communist. The 2d Di vi sian moved its comm&Dd post to a drall one mile northeast -of .Kunu-ri on the l[)th of Eovember in preparation for the coming attacl;:. IX Corps displ::1.ced its corm:and post. from Ghasan to Unhune;-ni on the road bet1.teen Kunu-ri and Anju, on the The 23d RCT, '\'i~lich had been placed on an alert status on the 17th •.vas initially din~cted to assemble at Sunchon; ho·~1ever, t~~-:.s pl:J.:n was chanced and, on 21 November, the regiment commenced movement to an assembly area north of Kunu-ri. On the 2::2d, the recimental combat team was dis- -27- - .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100189 0147 ""-..... ,,,•••. "1••·'.;.,, .. '1\., ...... . solved anr.J. the attact1ed units r·.:vsrtej to t(J.eir :pa.rent or .-a'!-rn~r1 ganization:.:;. Jomp:.1ny C ·~·Ua~ J:t"rected to tal::s over the job o:f' IX Corps Command Post guc:.rd on that day. The 9th RCT reverted fr·om I Corps control to the 2d DiviBion at lC;OC hours on 22 iJovember. Its combat team structure was ciissolved at 0800 on the 23d and its mission wc:.s continued--to drive to the nortl1.east from positions on the left bank of the Cbongci:1on River. Recim ents on 24 Hovern·oer was slo1:l c:~nd cautious. Coord in:;;.- tion was ;:sood, not only bet-v;een the two 2d Division units but .also between these units and the ROK II Corps advancing l . ·¥ on~"&~~~~~, ~nd t.~ ... ~S.;th Dj.yi~o11. a._dVjp'ieiDG on the left flru1k. Opposition '1-U:ts sliGht and it was anticipated that appreciable advances 1-rould be made on the following day. The 23d Infantry col'.ltinu sd prepa.ra tions to replace the 9th Infantry in the advance on 26 November. Al thou,sh th·a operat-ion seemed to be progressiiig smooth- ly, there vre.re many disturo~_ng indications of an impending ' enemy thr•ust. Escapees from the Chinese Communist Forces who entered the UN lines on the 23d stated that a very large Chinese force was mascing near Uhyon-dong, ap:proxi- mat ely f~ ve miles east of the .right flank of the 38th Infan· ',:·t··;y71;d' lm~~Jlately nort'l1 ortTj.e ~Rdlt .. '!!' ~!i~ :~-The road from Uhyon-dong ,to Tonschang cave this reported force easy "' •• "* • , ;·.••• ...... access to the 2d Division zone ln th~ event of defection or -28- ------~ Korean War Project 2ID-00100190 ..... ~... ·r.a 0149 reported by aer·iG.l observer·s v.rbo stated that l&rge enemy m~sses were asaewblins in nrotected~ areas ' alon~c; the divi- sion front. The nisht of 24-25 November was very quiet. Norale at all levels r~:::m hish despite i:rhe ominous indications of a:n .s.,ll-out Cb.inese intervention. This was the Ch.ristmc:"s offensive desit::ned to carry the UN Ii'orces to the Yalu Rivel''. "Let' c get the job done" wac the prevailin9 attitude and the Yalu had become almost synonymous witL1 home. The oi tter· iJovember col~:'!. took its toll, but could not daunt the spirit provol-ced by impendi:Cl[; victory. Tt1rout;i~out the 25th, the 9th and 38th Infantry Re£1- ments continuee:~ the advc::~nce. However, gains 1-vere r·estricted by a noticeable ll1Cl''ease i::.'l enemy op:posi tion. Shortly be- fore midni3~1t, 25 November, the enemy offensive began. Heavy attaclm ae:ainst the 9th Infa:'"ltry forced a wi tO.drav-ral of sever·al thousm1d yards. The attacks spr•ead to the east across the 32th Infailtry front, and by midnight, 25 November, all front line elements were hea.vily engel;eed. Little doubt remained that this was the beginning of an all-out effor-t by the Chinese Communist Fo1"'ces. The attaclts subsided at daylight, 26 November-, in the 9th Infantry sector; however', the enemy maintained hes.vy I ...... pr-essure_pn .the 3Stb. Infe.n~.:,.ry and the ROK II Corps to the -30- ~E~~op_ f, • Korean War Project 2ID-00100191 p 0150 ties in th~ 9tn r~r~~tr;, 1st an~ 2d 3att:lions, 2 to tiL gtl.1 In:J:'21.Ict.i."Y to oolster' i::.'c:r: :iivision' s wEst fls.nk e.lons in the dis- position of units frow west to e~at aG follows: 9th Infantry, two :S.:. t t::.licns of tr1c: ;:-~~.d ID.f'a:LJ.try, s.:1d the 35th Infantry. The four miles ::.1.orth of' !£uJans-J.o:.:1:.:... Thr..o 3Gth Infantry pos:J.. tions \.Yere particularly vulner~ole Cue to the l~c~ of a north-south road leadinG into ths sector. ~ The only 2::dt route availa.ble to the -::; !J/, / 38th InfaDtry rc,n souti1es:.st t:-"rou;:;)1 Tokchon or lc:;.terally across th6 division front to E:u~anc-donc:, then SOL'th throuch Ku.nu-ri. All reports indicated th<:t the ROK II Corps vvould be unable to hold the Tol';:chon-Sunchon axis. Therefore, it became imperative that the line be held :north of' Kujar:::;-dons. The n.:!.::ht of 26-27 :~overi.Jber foll01.ied much the same pattern as the previous one. Th::-: enemy attacked in mass alan;: the entir·s f.r·ont and despite the many actz of' i:adividu6i.l, and unit heroism, heavy casualties -v;er·''" su::tc:i:ned by the di·Jision. The command post of' ths 23d Infantry '.vas qve.t,run and subsequently retaket.l by counter-at .:,2.ck. Small units held their e;round wi tbout. exception until a:1J~unition sup __:;lies on position wer·e expended or until positions '.lel''e cornplstely overrun. 1 On the 27th, the ROK II Corps collapse5 exposing the ...... -31- ~~~ r~~r,~T, ,. .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100192 0151 divi:_,ioD .rJ.:_;',1t fL.:..l:,~:;: "'.Ll_, en:.i.:.:.nc_:s~·i:n th·::. .:::.i,·::;hth .t':..r>rny to envelop meat s.,lon~ the Tokchon-Su:nci:~J;i~T Durin·.::: the ni::_ht of 26-27 :C1ovetubei', the enemy had inf'ilt.r\..;te~·~ t~:.r-ou~8 the 36th Infa11ti>y 0.nd arounc'. th.c e:::pos 'sl ri~)lt fL:;.nl~ makinc the :former positions unten- able. The 3d ROK Re;::inLsnt we..:::, <::~ttachcl to t:lc 2d Jivision and, '\ back to the southvvest to deny this flanl:;: to enemy envelopment. To . counter> this threat to ths Eie:;::th Army, IX Corps dispatched the newly ai•riveJ Tur·l:ish Armel ~·'o.r·ceo..: Cormnani to the east alons the ' ' Kunu-ri-'I'oltchon Road. EVel"Y effor't w:cs made to halt c:md reg.roup strac()lers from the ROK II Corps, L1owever, this soon proved futile. The Tur·l~:is h unit became heavily ensac: ed appx•oxima tely ei;sht miles east of Kunu-I'i. Cn 28 November, the 2d Division published its Oper·ation Order No. 12 \vhich dir·ecteci a:r" Ol"dc;rly withdravtal to be covered by the.23d Infantry witr~ the 2ci Battalion, 9th Inf'antry, and the 72d Ta:O.:r Batts.lion attached. Ths 9th In::.:"'<:mtry vta.s o.rd ered to -v;ithdraw a3 quickly as possibla to ilon-ni vthere it vmuld take up d..ef'ensive positions. The 38th Infantry w.::;.s ordered .to withdraw to th€ west tb.roush .ci:ujans-dons and thsn sout::1 to talie· up positions northeast of Kunu-ri. The 38th withdrev; u11cler- heavy prGssure from the north • and east icV'hile the 2:-:'ld held the vital Kujang-dong junction. This operation placed. the entire traffic load on the Kunu-ri road and traffic was often lite·rally eoliCi fr•om h:ujang-dons to Kunu-ri. This traffic con:iition uer-iously jeopardized the rear elements of the column and only by the skill:.'ully conaucte6. rear gue.rd action -32 c -- "'··DJ:T T' --.. • Korean War Project 2ID-00100193 ..... f 0152 Batt.::;;,lion, ;~::;d Inf'::nti>y, \vD.s tbc el1smy prevsnt ed f r·om ~ The situation at this in:l:'lict in,: / time ti&s ver·1rv fluid un1J . the 3~-th InfaLtr'vv found the enemy. in posession of ito assi¢l1G·d defe:nsive positions 1wrtheast of K~nu-ri, and was forced to tc:L~e up positions short of ths assic;ned line. The Turkish unit had been Ul"J3ble to stem ths enemy advance from the northeaDt. Ths rnUCLl battered 9th Infantry estaolisl:led posi-. tions in the vicinity o1' won-ni with its left flank on the Chong- cl1.on River o.nd the 23d Infamtrry moved thx·ouch and. toolr up positions on the 9th 1 s rie;ht flank. The 3d ROK Rec:t.ment was employed on the left flank of the 3Cth Infantqr in an effort to tie in \vi th the 23d. This disposition formed an arc nortl1east o:C .Kunu-ri with remnants oftthe Turks on the extreme riGht flank. The Division Command Post moved to a new location ap- proximately six miles south of Kunu-ri during the night of 28-29 Novembel"'. On 29 lJove.mber, with all of its units under heavy at- tack, the 2d Infantry Division learned of a road block approx- imately 10 miles south of Kunu-ri along the Kunu-ri-Sunchon life- line. The 2d Reconnaissance .Company tias dispatched ,to eliminate this block. Ho\vever, its efforts iiere futile and Company C, 38th Infant;y, was sent south to help. The combined efforts of these units were fruitless and IX Corps was requested to dispatch a force from the south to assi3t in breaking this block. One battalion of the 27th British Brisade was dispatched to provide this assistance. I ..: $.,gortly after _nict}tfall, Ganeral Keiser directed the 9th Infantry to ! If • Korean War Project 2ID-00100194 0153 attack south astride "c,:1= Kunu-.ri-.Sunc~-:or.!. Roc..d c.t 0730. hours, 30 • :;:=::: ... 1 ;.,-'Ci l~ovember, and des;:,.r·oy the eneruy Sloane, Jr., Comn1andlne; O:~'ficer, 9th Infs.ntr·y, orco.nizsd his .re- , · mainir::.E 400 men into a tasl::: f'o.r·c::: d.u.ri:15 the remainder of the • night and p.r;_; that unless a speedy vvitl1d.rav1a.l \·l'a3 effected, the 2d Division vvould 'be annihilated by the ov(;:,rwbelmin::. weight ot the attacking Chines e. By this time, Eie;hth Army units opera tin:~: to the west had successfully v/i t~'ldr·ai-'ln exce9t for· rear e;uard units, and the lst Cavalry Division W83 protsctin:::: Sunchon witn its i'our effec- tive bat.talions. Intellic;ence repol"ts indicated tt1o.t the Chinese ll2th and ll3th Divisions of ths 3btb .Army were attackinc the \'lest flanlr c:mJ front; the llbth, 120tb, a.nd tentatively identified 119th Divisions were pressine:; acainst the r,ight flank. DurinG tb.e ni:c::ht of 29-30 Novemjer, as the 23d and 35th Ree;iments wi ti1drew to th'3 hie ~1 eround south of .Kunu-ri, the 2d Division Command Post was attacked. On the mornii.J.f3 of' the 30th, the situc.tion was becoming ' desperate with pressure increasin::_: from all sides. Conflictinc; repor·tc filtei>ed ii."l regariiLE the. Kunu-ri--Sinanju Road as a pos- sible route of uithdrawal; th::: 9th Infantry attack against the road olocl~ ·was proc.re;::;:::ins slowly ainst fanatic resistance; the es- timatE:d strene;th of the enemy roaG. olock r·ose viith each report. It was decided to beEin the withdrawal by no~n. The . order of units t.o .:f'ollovi tl'le Stb I:nfo.ntry through was the ROK .3d -34- .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100195 ' 015~ tho 2d Reconnaia- S2.YJC6 ,an-1 the .Divi::::ion Artillery --the remaj_nder of the~, 3etb. Inf'cc::try, t':J.e 2d En.cineeJ• (C) Batts:.lion, EU!d the 23d Infs.:utry fout;ht the d.elayinc action. RemnaDts o:t' other R.::o,pork: fr'or.n tb.. s 9th Infantry t.o the :coutL1 i::.Ci.iceted thet the enemy at:Lll firrnlv e~tr~nc~ed astriGe t~~ exit route. . ~ end flanl::: of its oos i "::.ior:: sout~-:; of r~unu-ri. Intense sniper fire from all directions bec:•n fc:lliD:~: in the DivL.:;ion 0omillt:UH5. l-ost area. By 1300, the remalniDc;; ltnovn:J a.lterns.tives wer·e limited to either fit;hting soutb. to ;Jreak the ros.d bloel::: or to button up in the vi- cinity of ihe Division Command foat for a futile last-ditch stand. The decision 1r1as rn9.de to fi::~tt. out to the so.uth &nd at 1330 the dolumn moved .out. (C) Battalion held the high I ground to the southwest and ::::outh of the Division Command Post as units moved t~rou~h. The lead elements of the column had moved approximately three-fourths of a. mile south vJ'hen heavy· enemy fire r,• + 'ne' l~i,-.:h fro ~.ot.J U L..i. (.~ •..t. sr·ound on ootl1 sides of the road wa.s received. Pro- gress was ae:onizinc;ly slow for, in addition to enemy fi.r·e, the column was f.rsc~uently fcrce5 to balt to clear the road of destroyed or disabled vet:icl;,es. Burnint: c:.mmunition vehicles effectively blocked the road in several pls.ces. Vehicles soon became lo::J.ded ,vrith viounded e:::n,:l the dead vle.l:''2 of' necessity left at,revm along the -35-. ( .,_ ..... ,.... '"": ...... ~ Korean War Project 2ID-00100196 0155 siQe·s o:e ~ct:E:; r·c~:~j • .~::.. t eo_c~~"" rk:;4l·t, lJer·:'.or1r.:.2l r:.2.2·LlJou.rrt,t::Cl, ·too~·;: U.lJ '':' r- f" r~ ~"T~ po:;itior:u:, on oo·~h :.:,Ll.::s o::· -:~1.1c· r-6 ..'0.,' ~nj returned t~1s :rirc;;. Tac- colum::.1. As eDch flicc1t o:.:. :ti_.·ters exper:.J.ed it~; load, succGs..cive fli2)1ts c:::cme in liltz clocl;:vmr~;: 'dOrkin'; ove.r ridg..:;; li:1es over·lool;,:inE the road. Progress came in s~ort spurts and wit~ each movement came the feelinc t[1 ·heavy fi:.;htinc, ti.1e lEad elem;::c,t:::~ of the column cleared the .road bloc.i:: and began to move ::-;outc1. ·The .r~c:u· of' tc1e column was blocked in sever·-=~1 place;::; by explodi:r.;.c; &:;1rJunition trucks and as· nit;ht fell the enemy clos eO. in u cine bayonet::::, sr;jall arms, hand grenades, and mortars. · The hopele:.::: snes:;::, oi' c (:'t tine the heavy ec;uipment out v.ras readily a.p_arent. and small croups i,)esan moving cross-country. The 2d mc:ineer (a) Battalion C0:..1t ::..Lu C:::i. to hole. the two cri tic,s:.l hills southwest of the old 2d Division Command Post until vJ'ell after dark- ness. Not a. Dlc.n escapeci. fr·o:'J th::::.. nort~1s.rnmost of the tv.,ro llills. Artillery pieces vrer·e lJUt in~o action on the r·oad. i'lithin the blocked column and direct fire was'Gmploy~Ci by both 105mm.and 155mm crews. While the units moved south throuch the l"'oad block,_ the 23d Infantry vr&s fi;:)it.in~: e" holdin:: action soutb of Kunu-ri. When given the order to iv1 tl1draw, the_ Commanding Officer, Colonel Paul Ji Freeman, Jr., directed his tanlrs. and artillery to fire their reserves of amr;mnition while the preparc:,tions for· the motorized 1/iitLJ.dra\vGl were completed. Over 3000 rounds of artiller·y were fired durii:is the 2;~ minute concentration. ...... In. tb...e opinion of' Colonel Freeman, this terrific -36- \ Korean War Project 2ID-00100197 Ut:GLA~::>IritU volume of fire pov,rer ls'd ths Chine'S e to believe that the regiment was about to cour1ter_:attack ~inece started to d -in. The 23d was, tb.e.ref'ore, erHiol to carry out 1t2 vii thdrawE1l in a,n or- derly fash.ion and by ni(3htfall the column had cleared the blocking position held by the 5th RCT east of .Anju and v.ra.s in the clear. Use of the Kunu-ri--Suncf:10n road wc;,s clearly impossible at this time. As the period came to a. close, the battered 2d Infantry Div+sion i~as as::;emolins at Cbasan and plans W61"6 be in[ made for .., -!· another move to Chune;hwa vvbere .I.V 'l<'las to e;o into Eighth Army re- serve. Strasgler collectint; points 'iV'ere set up in Sunchon and teams i'iere sent north as far as possible to piclt up wounded strag- glers. Losses in personnel and equipment had been very severe. The casualtie1::1 fol" the month totalled over 5,000 men, of which approximately 905i occurred durins the period from 25-30 November. I ' Losses in equipment rifere also extremely heavy. The 2d Division had met, the full impact of an overwhelmiP.g Chinese force, had sloii'ed an attack lltlich might have destroyed ·t,he Eighth Army, and -withdrmm with its basic or•ganization intact. It novJ' needed a · period of rest to r·ee;roup and r·esupply, and to rest the men VJ'ho had served so valiantly. I -37- '..._,, "'-~----·····- ~------ .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100198 ,r.··· ...... ~ Ol-s7 -· ., ••.1 ~I _...-~.. IDUVER.Sn.L T"R.f~}.£';¢J;;;.: .E II Anju (YD2988) Sinanju (•YD2386) Anyang-ni (CS1641) So min-dong (BU5818) Ohasan (Y.D5059) Song chon (BU6048) Chinnampo (Y00989) Sunchon (YD5267) Ohunghwa (YD4205) Tapto-ri (YD5183) ;f Cb.ung-ni (BU9358) Tokchon • (BV6903} Hadongsan-ni (0Ul383) Tong chang (BU9189) Hoechang (BU803l} Tong-dong ('YE-5011) Haeju (YC3713) Tuam-ni (BU'9302) Kaechon (YD4898) Uhyon-dong ' (BU7221) ·Ku j a:ng -dong (BU4517) Unhung-ni • (YD4094) Kunu-ri (YD4898) Won-ni (YE5005) Pukchang-ni {BU7184) Yangdok (BU9643) Pyongyang. (YD3822_) Yongb}IJOn (YE40ll) Sarnin-ni (BU8036} Yongdong-ni ... (BU8797) Samso-ri (YD5385) Yongdungpo (081654) Sariwon (YC4064) Yongwon (Bil8912) -;:' *All place names are shown on the Korea 4:250,000 AI,:t:S :V.~ap Series L552 (Sheet Numbers: NJ51-4, NJSl-8, tJ52-l, and NJ 52-5). They also appear on the Ko.ttea 1:50,000 L751 se.tties of the same area. -38:.. Korean War Project 2ID-00100199 for period 1 Novembe:c 1950--30 Hovember 1950 Ivlaj C.'Ten Lc:.ur•enc e B Keiser . 05316 USA Asst Division' Commander Joseph B Bradley 01242S USA .Artille~y Offic.ex' Gen Loyal VI Haynes 08379 USA Chie:f of' Staff Colonel G6,l"ald G Epley 01.3770 G·SC Asst Chief of Staff, G-1 Lt Col Jame;:; D TanJ~ier 05213':::: .}30 Asst Chief of Staff, G-~~ Lt Col R:tlph L Foster 022669 GSC Asst Chief of Staff, G-3 Lt Col Haurice 0 Holden· 0~?453Lt GSO As~:Jt Chief o:t· Staff, G-4 Lt Col Frca11;;:: C Sinsel 023993 GSC Adj utc:~J:::.t G~e:t1e.r~a.. l Colonel Ler:;t,;:;r• Vl Teter· 05131~~ AGD Air Officer Robert L ffman I ""1~ .7_...,..6a FA' v .L,OO ;;c ' (Major 16:Nov50 ) • Chaplain Colonel J DeMars . 02912'3 OhC CheiDic:c:l leer Lt Col 3.iehard 0 Gordon 024440 · Cml C · Civil Aff& Officer ColoD.•?.l Jo h:n C Ooughlin . 01C392: Inf I'{J..jor Gharles A JJ'ry, Jr (ll\Tov-21'\ov) 01101833 CE Lt Gal Alarich L Zache.r·le (2Hov-30Nov) 042CU7 CE E'inaJ.lCe Officer Lt Col Orville A Lesley O.,.,/-"':.r.a6~Jb --_,., F·D jar 3umter R Nelson 0420~2L}Q Inf Ins9ector Genoral or' I:Iex•man C Duvall o.:~36250 IGD Judce Advocate Lt Gol Max Yf Hazelhu.rst 03f3723 JAGC Ordnance O:tfice.r Lt Col Jack L Grubb 021180 Ord lViaj or· Henry C Becker 031944 ClviP (Lt Col l7Nov50) ·~ Korean War Project 2ID-00100200 Public Informhtion Officer ro£.:eRtcnfford R Buckbee (ii:Iov-24-J:Tov) v '- 9th RCT Co1one:l Cha.r.~les C Sloane, Jr 016456 · In! 23d ROT Colonel Paul L Freeman 017704.. /Inf 38th RCT Colonel Georges B Peploe 016246 Inf I .; Korean War Project 2ID-00100201 .,, ./: ... ,. ..G-:2·... . . iofr v-f'.t:rJ!:s .itEPo:RT . ·· ·... · · t:.or~ tlie ., .... ·.· ·· ····.:Mo:t'l,~h.,~f,lf~~p~er•. 1s5o . , . \r= ~ "<':' ,, ... :'"'n;: ;:"'~ ,.t~ r~ <' •• , i i, ·' ' {\ ",: <;:- ~ ' ~;-. ~·~.·) 1 -.· ~.7 1 November· 195Q;, '!ihe.G~2'' S~cticn ·made plans for the coi lection and eva.luatian '(>:f!: i'!itelll&t~ll.ce concerning the enemy a.ctiv i ties on the right fl$!lk .of' the :Eigli:t.h Army zPne.. Intelligence disseminated cons~ste ···~ :~ Korean War Project 2ID-00100202 I k~~rity. ,:J/1) 185701_ i 8y...,-B NARA Da\5~ ~--.-..-.-..,.~-~-""~"'-~---- ],.,, : ~~-i>~<·.::i·_;-.:c~:~:~'-~'\_~;; ~-~· 4 llfovem'b~r.• ; .. '~he ~~~~ll::i;.~en~;e ~ecti. on :published four annexes to :the. pe;r,i:~di,~- ~,.in:-te;t];igepce report published on the 4th. These re:port!E\. inol1l~ed +"esults of interrogation of PWs, which ind.ioated th~t the ~ortb;,Kt~~a.rls~:wer~: anticipating augmentation by several Chinese A:nJ,±eef:'t:,lle ·tr,an$lation of a. North Korean mili tary ma.nual on co:m.mlDliQa.ji,o!l~.·'~f"':::~4·within guerrilla units; a series of mieci'llar:lef)~.ekrei?P,~r,te.,~~. enemy medical. na teriel, atroci ties, and tra.itoro~~: S•'-ith·21$;0'J,"e~s,; ra.nd.. an order of battle report which tenta.ti-v:ely ;·4~n.:!:t~;fii~;fP~-:pc!:Divieions as having entered the Eighth .!:my· se~t,or.·;;:.OJl;~ti-<7MnR.P~.~::al-·t new informatiom. of the enemy activ:ities .. w~~ts ~he; r~PP17t.<:QJ:_,the. 2d Reconna.issa1 ce of the o:perati.on of a hor.s~ mo~t.~q,\en;e'"jlj .unit near the tovm of Tokcho:n. ~ ' ' ,, ' . . - . ' 5 .November: T}ie e~:~!!Lb:t.J~~bD}!Ut. of defensive sectors in the Eighth Amy zon~ ma,n;ned~bY: Chinese Communist Fer ces and the proximity of the a.rea;::~P th.e s~f~e enemy base of Manchuria, indi ea.ted the probabUi.t~... of,1 a determined defense and possible counter attack by the enemy f) reee. .The,"impossibili ty cf' an accurate evaluation of the numbe~ o:t\;Ch~nese.a.vailable for commitment makes it almost impossibl-e :t.~:.,asse.ss. 'tii~ P:::resently availall e strength of the enemy O:Pr.: ~~r'""'""'·~•.:--:=.=:: .<::r~:: .. ._, , ; ~ -2~ '-----~-. ·---· Korean War Project 2ID-00100203 , : ·· .. ~-_r>:·.~._---~- ..f::_·:.-'-:~·~-:·n·j:-J',·~:?-;1-V);·~ .... :_>;..-. .. . ground no;rt1:J. of, To¥;~.orJ..; {:}3tp·~9,:4J~y.·, Jm6lfl.Y. entrenchments were re ported, in. th~L ytcipit;r··of ··f~~P49;e;~. a1ld near :BV6904. One patrol of Compaa,y. E~ 38th~i:rlfJ.f¥J,tl;:f·:V!Tjs, ~oushed in .Tuam-ni. 9rNovemb~r{ .· ~~.t~ll,~g~~«;;~-~~por.ts disclosed that a tota.l of over 26.00 12 J:Tovember: !!To enemy outa.et was made by divisi. on units during the period. ·J?at.rols of the 58th Infantry-Regiment patrol ling to Yongwon, Socha:ng•ni, M'tll'lP,: aanggye-ri, a,nd .Namyaa. g-ni reported no contact_. ··An interestini new enemy tactic was dis clo ~ed by :=;, })ri S> ner of W$r. Small enemy units would advance / Korean War Project 2ID-00100204 UI.\.IL.f\o.JI../11 II..LJ I k~'-mi~lk 1-JJJ> 19S10I \ By\f3 HAM 0(.\~ ,. -~~ r~, T' . 'i>s?;;;:_·;. . . t/n .. :~-·,·t;' .: -~ boldly: Q;ul,'~ng, d~:li.'~lat).::~p i;th8.~~,~~~lS'W~Ul,d be vif.lible to aerial observers. Then, uncre:t:··cov:e:r: Qf .. ;d~.r~e~E, the main enemy force would move up •. TJ;J.~,.ait@er.\~!~f,ro~Q'&;.would .. then be of sufficient stret?-gth t.q .. 1;lntlihil~}e~?~lle,,tJ~9Aeg:u.?-~1a::VE' Fa ce sent forward to . elimJ.na.~e tlJ.e. origin~lc'ffllr.t~~! .,Att.~c;ks ,~gi:tinst the fl·ontline elements of th~ RQK. ;t;L;C!otps;:in.o~ea~e a;.u~il g tll.e day. > ,;, ."• : T \·'"<.; :~~.. -·J .: .:··:,·.,.,'>"''"'•" : J•'' •' :<_;':~':··~-, .. :,·..,,,·.~·"··· ~ r.!.~.':.-].::~:~\.. ~.... ,).:.r_.-.>--·.-_·:; .. ··. ~ : 13 l'l'ovembe;r: . ·D'tvisioP. ", .' ': · , •J.'._::·\. }~o:C.":}" :'" ~"! f:.: --~:.{_.. ,-;,.;·_~'..l; .-· :'" ' 16 lifovembe,F:l,.'-:.:.~~v;Uj~1 'ai)ft9.,s ,l'Etported that an esti.matei 2,000 Chinese Co.I!llllU.~is,t:. sf),l.;d~~~f!l,,.J;!a,d-·b~.en obseqed crossing tile Sunch~n-Ya~.gook <;r:oad;.•ltJ.~,t~e~~:J..~~:t,·:· t;~'W.:.day·s,. moving sGuthwest to the v~cinity of Chaha•&an•{J;~~{4:3l-~ ,,,.~e v.~lla.ge of Sachon (BU7232) was reported to be in tb,e 'laaild.s',·c)f: 'the Communists. There were severe,l small pati:9l,;;en~a&;~.:At~•~ · }'atrols uncovered seva- al im- J)rovi sed road mine'$ tn~~de by,;lo:~ol.:rl;":iag 120mm it ells9 · '•' ' " o" J. ',.( "' :: ':. :· ~'· ~·: ~:·. 0 ::~·-- ·~" ~.~"~~;',,.it~·.·' • '• ' 17 Novem'be~r: ·. l>id:·~ie'.m::e't":~n: Korean War Project 2ID-00100205 20 November: g6m:P~.P.Y 'K J •· . ' i ;, {; .,;,;¥(' c . •c, :·· C ; ·• . • .. ·; :23 1:rovemb elf:> , ,Snlal~ .:~rni.~r.}j. u· au tqm~tfc weapons fire re... ceived in the .9th .. Inf'~:i:tri:~··E3.~c·t.ct~;.p.e.al!. mtfl18. Advance continues.· . . ' ·. --.,: .. .,.--·:. ~:'"··.:.-····":--~ -'" '"".:_,:.:::::;.:;. ' -~:.-.;.~,: 24 November:.. :rcij~y.· r,es~;~~-an.9e continued light throughout the division see.tcr.". ;:s~vera,~ .. ·sni~~l .. enemy gr,oups were observed and disper.. s'8d by air ac.t:i:Qn.~ ·1m~ :6$t~ml3.ted 150 enemy in the vicinity of F147:30 were disper,s•d b;r.•. a:r:;Ji~]try fire at 1430 hours. y- •• - 25-26 N,ovem'ber;;·, :E;he~ ~.t,,~;vi ty d,ur ing the daylight hours of 25 November was. l~m~~e4~: :•;·~y«~v;~.. t~ ia,)l.p:u,t 2200 hours, enemy units beg~Ul to nake .hea,yy: s.of:J;'ik,e;s: ·~c):O:.~s the entire division front •. T.wo enamy. r~gi!i,~"lt·a./". q:t!;e. teri:tatively identified as the 359th Regiment, 12~v;tS::i.on,•, atta.cJred the 2:3d. and 38th RCT on ~the, c~ter .and .,rig~~~~.:t'~a,nk. · J?Ws indicate a.tta.ck mission was to. estal:>lish ro.a.d ·bioCiiS:::.O:n: 'the ~SinhtU'J.g .... dong (BV5122) --Ta.enam dong {J3V6420 :r.oad:~.~ -J.no,the:~.' :e~t..¥n.~t.ed ):egiment attacked the 9th RC'l' on the d.ivision Je:ft fil.ank.: Attack subsided during daylight on the morning of 26 ]l'overnber. b1ict ~re.s:umed Jn .the afternoon with the major en,emy,.effort dir.f?'cted·a·gainst the 3d Battalion sector of the 9th RCT. T.he aj;ta:c]:ts, ,·,f:o~n.ceel~ .fri.endly withdrawals to more favorabl ~ d,ef'eneive 'po~~tiQ~$:!·_~... ;~:,~·1:)..€:!~f:LWere increasing reports of enemy us..e of booby tra];).s.. Prol)aganda lea.nets printed in both Korean and English werP:,:p.:i;.oked:.~p~ The te;xt of the English leaf lets is as follows.:., ."Off;icElrA :..and, ~n of the US Armed F J forc:i.ng the 1 ?t .and 2d ·~a.t,t~·ica'.!.~ to ~q.i splace 300 yards until r~grou:ring ~nd B. countE=/1'."-t::tttack $,t o400 hottrs stemmed the enemy a,ttack. No enemy resi'stance ·WB,s enc ..:.:untered in the reoccu:pa.tion ~-:~~/~$~' :-; .. ~~rr··'~;;·'fa~:·{~· ~---~- .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100206 of the Sriendlf.~po-s~,X~e;ts;(·:~g Q~O.~J::lio~~s •..,, An. enemy force of re inforce com:pany. ~i:~~'. ~t!l]:);.~t~.7it~. i?Rlfe~e;. ~d ~eco~lles~ wea:pons, a.tta.cked the 2d ..-a~f.alp>n,t?~h· .. !~~·~-pry, . 9-~rn1g J. ts wl. thdrawal· across the ChongtLon· Rl:~er;r;;~ ~~{l'~~~. :BT4921. On the right flank an estima:te1:l GCF~;-eg~m$pt ··a~t~c~ed the 38th Infantry po si- • · - .~,.. ,_ ''--•l,··-·,·;. ,"",'·~-·tc•;''''{,t·,.~-~.·,··,.c·.···- · ·,'< • t1.ons from 262145 ... unt~:t;·· a4't.$;r\:dit,)r'l.l.ght on the 27th. The 38th Infant;y ,1:1\lC()eedeq·'~~:.~reg~~ii~n~}~D~~j·~rity of i,ts former posi- ti one on high ,gr,oul}d ~~· 160(?·)19.~1:~ Stgainst moderate resistance by a.n estimated 800 .to 9()Q .. OaF.,·· ., . . · ' . ; ' - ,_,._,.,:;o-·y - :v• -- , .r . ' < 2s' Novem1H~;~: ·: T~e:.~Ohilles~~CG>~i st Forces continued to attack in strengt}f ~~ng ~~~:; d~v~sion ·m:.R during the night of 2'7-28. An estim ted two tO thiee~ccdF .. regiinents attacked and overran :positions gf the lst Ji3a~telc;i,on,, 38th Infantry, resulting in a. friendly withd;ra.wa.:;t..)';_,~ E;N:,~tli,Uated GOF regiment, attacking a.t 0710 h9-1 rs in cthe ·V4:cii11:f.;y·... q,f~)?'V:".5.513:t forced ROK Wli ts attached to the 58th Infantry. to 'w:ithcb~a:w~:frfim-. posi tiona on the southern a.nchor of the regimen t~itl ]BJ;~;~hc ·" "~ ,.,,, ;, .. •_, _, :->;_: •. ',_~:··:-·~. ""·~---- ·., -~:-'; ·f,-.,·ri'i-'-;· ,_·-/-__ , ,-< : -:·. "· ·_ . . · :. 29~~0 Normi.Pe~k"i ~,lt ·~~ ~~~)~riod, all tmi ts of the dl.v~aion were heavgt.::~ng~s~~ :by: ~e, Il2th and 113th CCF Divi sions of.tb.e 58th A~y .~:m ~'h,e :J..~f~>f,la.nk· and front; by the ll8th, 120th, and possibly 119thf.C,Oli',J)i,T~sions of the 40th A'fm.Y to the fron~; and ,by c two ·d~!i~ion$,;,l'io~:.l;!Q,si1;1y~ely identified on the ' right flank.. .At 2~22QQ ~ ,-unmo.~ ·~~ber of enemy delivered mortar, AW, .and .SA f~e ;in;;~ :~:tf'?:r·t to probe defensive positions of the Divieion CF. An eneniy '8.rib}lsh at YD47S7, 4 miles south of the Division CP, wa$ investigated by a reinforced patrol which reported. the XP ett'etrtively deni.ed to friently f()rcea. A two day air a.ssa;.lt failed to. disloge the well dug-in ensy. Sniper fire was placed. on the l)ivision OJ[ 'throughout the morAing of 30 November as prepara.ti .o:qs w$r~ being ccmpleted to breach the enemy blockade of tbe "M:SR~ At ~p:proximately 301400, the lJivision WC'U3 engaged b;r two :CeF reginlent··s, possibly the 1;25th or l26th Divhdon of the 42cf Amy d:ep1cjed on high ground in well dug-in, concealed positions a.long.~Jlarr,o:w:,.~a:vine in the vicinity of YD4787 ( aprrox:imately ten~ ,,lP'3;aS::::~o~,1;J;i,,o:f K~u-ri); and for a. d.i s tance of approxbnat.eJ,.y $1X:~ilef31,··:c;qn~eJ:ttrated ·fireblocks were encountered which 'oeti~is-fe~J:)f'. ma~tar., grenade, SJ?, auad inter d.icting AW a.nd SA iire.· Em:~i"cked out vehicles blocking the road ca.. used numerous halts and the resUJ.,tant loss in person:a.el and equipment was heavY:• . ClosEa· 'ta,c;tical air support was effective in aesisting th~? 'Di 'Visioa to break through enemy defensive po sitions. Mortar and MG fire from enemy entrenched on high ground ~.t YD4~82 we,s, received at, 3Ql70Q .J.?.cu,-.r.,s. ··-,t Korean War Project 2ID-00100207 .... , .. , .:A.;~ ... ····· ~AcTrrv-:crrn;s 14~6::+ .. ~O,l\ t:Q.~, ;, , ,·. :rt!onth · 9.f !{rp.vember, .1950 . - ...... ' ··- \ ··~.~E:f'~·~.. As the November );lerio40 9perieq., d.ivisional units were :primarily· c:-:nce~ned ,ii~'h.·'tge'. pe~f9;•!'1.lil.ance of security mis2ions ip. the t:~.:re a e:x:tendi~g fi'Om tl}e MSr b~tweenJ?yongy~ g a..nd Seoul west ·-· ~ ··. ··:·~ :~>.i'~.,J.:;~:_::-~<:_ .r:r~~---~i~-<·.:-¥·-~ '-~> _ -.~~:.:;j~-( -· to the coa,st, the:lr '§'Scon.d~r~.;conce~rn was s.n extensive training ·' ~ . "'"',- ' < - J~~~ -- ~·~·.:.~ .· -~'}_~ ·;:~~ ·h:/L~~~ ~. . · :program to im:prove t1ie p:r;,o'fic:ien,:c:Y: ·o.f replacements and to elimin- ,_ { . • l- '·, •< . ~: : " r " , ,,y :" -. ate the wekknesses 'Which.nad·:~~emnoted during the combat period :pr ecenin'g. the d:i~is:i:on' · eomrzitt~'~t to reserve. . The G-~ Section wa.s, however,· ~irea.J:1,:Y: plami1ng for a mission north of J?ywngyan~, where the appearance of Chinese Force·s threatened the e.dvanci. ng 1Jni ted. Nai. ens :Fo.rces. T~e division 1a d been directed to move as quickly ~·s pos~:ib~e to 'the Su.nchon area from where it wa.s to effect security i th·e.Jif~t'.b. A:rmy ea~t fJ.ank. Upon completion of movement to·its:'l1~\V ·d,e.f~~.siy~·.·~~otor, it was to commence p1-e- ',' "J;; :·: "•, . ' ,·'1 . ', ' ' .. : ' ·. . .···, :: -."':'-,~: ""'-:!. :· ' . "' ' ' . pg,rations for offensJye' o:Pe=at·io.rr~ inc.Jord).natio!lwi th the Ame:r:·i- ~ ' - ": :, .. ·~~~--;: __ ;~:~~-·,~:~~::.:~2'':';~~-~~:~'~ ~~.: . can I Co:t':ps a.nd ;to ~hk ri)~t~·~:f.f ~t'$; zone of responsi. bili ty. As the 1S7th Airbo~nei'if{CT wiifl:' :i-.~~ ;~k"e over the security of the vacated area,, close lia,fs'on wt th the operations staff of tb.is ' •'.: organizati. onwe,s i!fl:pot.tant. J?lanning at ~his time .ryquired the closest coordination with th~ G-4 Sect1~n a,s the :ai:Visional uits were dispersed over an extrem.ely wid.e area and i't wa.::i ne ces1utry to ineu re not only Korean War Project 2ID-00100208 I k~~-~ri~/. PJJ> 79S10I ~ B)'-"1'6 HAM Da\e ~ ~----.,--.... --_ .. ~~------ tr~msport:'1tion to rii.o~e :th~ ~niit_~;rcir~a!'d but also to equip the..m. for thA colt=!· we<:Jth~r ·o:f No.ftli .!Core~. Th(!> i'l'eakest ::point'in thl!> 1Jn:l.ted. Nation~ line during the - ' ·o. ~,-, <:'.. ,, - - ,·· • ' • e~.rly p~.rt of the r(:'!);)ortirig ::r;~±?iga v{as in the sector· assigned to thr-- RO:K II Cor..Ps .~c!' th~_'ftc.;.~t U,nits to be co.mmitted were assigner! to tli~ Tokcli~-ri· a.:':J~_·fi., t~>·b'a.'ck_ .U""' .1:' ·the Koreans... To more clo~r7ly ~u:perviee tp,e t,acticfr-ilunit~:?.t 'the 2d Division Command Post W!!.S 'm.OVE'd to Sundhon' compi~'ti~g its move on :3 November, '· ., ~..nr'! res.Ponsibilftj for; tb:e 'Pjob.gy~.ng a.rea was assigned to the 18'7th Airborne RCT, w~ic1{\;~~~· .relieved from attachment to the -',:'). Tl1e 9th Infp.ntry 'was thl?. fi:rst unit to mcve ~orward, its let :Ba ttslion takfng over c:m.trol of the 'I'okchon area on l November. As it j s strength was' 'inadequate tc. stem a major , >~-y- ~~ ~~- --·:- c~~ o:~ ·~::-·:;~ -~_._-~~~ :.:; _c .- brc:akthrough ann as th13 ~th Infantry ;Was sla_ted to support the ,_ ',, , } _,·_·; •. Sunchon ~md the fJl ttre 38th. Infantry Regiment was moved to ?ukchang-ni from ~1h ere it .g?:~1J,d, .cot.u,t er any enemy thrust toward To:·~dlon, which \va~. a];fpro~imkJtiiy:'"io miles north, a.nd the ex- • • > -'' • -'. 'o:.·~:; ~. -: ·•. " ~; - teneive ros>d network of which Pukchang-ni '.Vas the hub. The 23d Infantry, ·in the meGntime, was assigned the dual mi!'lsion of 2d Divi sipn reserve ,:1:nd. th,.. p The Chinese. counter-attack Ws.s quickly Korean War Project 2ID-00100209 ment in the proj r.:>cted. "End ,of "t1~e We..r" offen~d ve, which was initially schectul .::>d ~P j1llnp off or.i the 15th of November. '' ,: ,; . ·' . '· ' As the, in:ftn {~y, reg'L~~pts 6petc.ted 01 er widely sepa.rFted areas, it was decided "to 'h8:~e tpe.lJ1 operate ae combat teaills. The 38th RCT was the first teain ·'t:o· 'be reeonsti tuted. Its or ganiza.ti on, .r _, ·:· < ' '· •• l , . • ':38t!1. ?ield Artille:ry :B~tt1Ci9dkc9m]ua.ny c, 2d Engineer (C) Bat t;l ion; and :Ba.tte .cy· C, 8?d "A.AA At:l~tomati c 'weapons Battc-,lion (SF). Enemy forces o:ppoi ng the IX Corps during thilS :Period inc,lucled elements af ~-;,·ghtk No~tb.;korean infantry div:'csions and ·-l-arge unidentified combat tu1its' of the Chinese Comm.UL'list Army. - .~ ~, f"; i. The roa,d • t existing in the area, :mi:tde it difficult to detennine tlie' zoneR most grC:,vei'y '.tbXeatened by 'the enemy units. Difficulty in obtai. ning reliable intelligence· informationof the strength and morale of the enemy units was a:1 0 t..tler factor which the division " . .. ._ he.d to consider in pr epar.ing its plan.s to repulse enemy atta.cks ., ,J s.nd to carry out the divisionaseign'tl.Ent in the coming attack. 'When it was ~arned· that the 25th Division wo-J. d not be " able to com:ple te it-s,movem;e'nt··.~,:W t.he jump-off area. in time for the proposed e.tt~,ck on 15 November, it was postponed and ;plan ning cont:i.nuecl for the dela.yed offenflive. The Intelli~ence Sec- ti on reported_ mt?ny indications of a Communist build-up during. thiP. l;e::-iod, R.s · did aerial 'obsa- vers, out pe.trols sent out to ' ' :probe the front-lines met: little opposition p.Jld all enemy units. enge.ged quickly ·withdrew. M2 ny attempts were made to effec~ contact between the 2d Korean War Project 2ID-00100210 I k~~-rJri~/.IJJJ> Jijs-/01_ ! By\1!1 HAM 0~\e ~ ~~?.-""7'-""':" •• _ _,._,·!'·~.__~--- ' .. ,,' .. -1 .! ~' ... -~ . ..--. !' ~--· ' '. ;.. ';__ :.·.:-·. _.'' .-~-- Di'Vi. ~ion 8.nd units O.!-:th:e,,X·,Oo-:r::ps ...?.ncr contact was made by c;dr but t'he grouna units. never did in closing the gap between .a~qde.ed-~ • . • • . i: ' the X d'orps and Eighth ArrrJ.y. '_ · .. - ·. {.' .·"1- Dur.i'ng th.e J?f,ri?d o:( ~J..a.nning fo:r.~ the advance, the 38th • ' • -, .. -~>-·: :,'-~-~ . ' . .' .• __ ,_, :: ;:"· ''. RCT c ant~nued 1. ts oJ,pck1ng m1ss~p.p, e.li the northeast corner of the Eighth Army sector .iie th.e 2:3d carried out its mission of clearing out the ene.my' strongpo:in.ts behind the Eighth Army lines. ThP t,vo most impor·t~nt' cent~;·s 'o:f'~~eny activity in the 23d RCT sector w·ere the tci~·s ·:of Y'an·g(i6;k·:~§.~d·Hoechang. Yan gdok was a.n im:portant re,flhead ~d the .combe.t patrols ·of the 23d RCT f ~--,~ ,~~ :.·~~ 1?.!11!!l.Uni tion and Pot. The POL supplies were' turned or er to the ROK ]'orces whiie . tli~. ammuni·t:i?on ~wa~ Jest.royed. The enemy. st'rong:pof:n.f' a,t Ho 1echang was first discovered by a com:pm y sized :patrol ·of '.the 23d In fan try. The oppod tion was very determined a,~d it took .the effort of two bat tal ions of the r e..gfmm.t supported. by a.ir qover to take this importm t supply center of the 'N'orth~K.orJilans •... · . ,'(" ,:,-, .. ""::: ·.L" ~:·:: ;: ~- ~~-"-· __ ,._, .•. ·- ··-, The coordinated a,ttack of I sad IX Corps and supporting ROK uni.te was launched. on .the 24th. of Novembe:. The IX Corps sector wa.s extended to the left t.o. include the 9th RCT, wbich bad been detached. from the 2d Dl:rrisionand attached to the 1st Ca.VJ!I,lry on the 5th of November. This a.ltera:~ion iln boundary ·gav~ the 2d Division a. f) ne of' action which straddled the Chona' chon River. !!ovement forward during the 24th and 25th was slow but Korean War Project 2ID-00100211 ~ -•' would soon be breach,ed, p~rmittJng. a subsequent rapid adV:o1nce. -=.:-·~1 -~r~- <~. -.-·>· '·· · · , However, on the nfght of' 25-26 november, the enemy sud- . -, . ' ;· ( ~ ''. . ·. \ ,, c., ' . ' ' ' ' . ,. \:--:·:' .:. ,:·· ._,.-... '_ .. ..: denly struck a heavy counte;r-:-s.ttg,ck and by moi'lling of the 26 it h~.c'l become ap:pam ~t t~at the __ oJ~ensi ve could not be continued. The crisis became extremely 'gra:ve when the ROK II Corps 'disintegrF.l.ted an{ th~- 'Jn~lre 1):g~~:f"l.;,nlC of the 2d Division was exposed to enemy atta.c;k.- ~:The !Turkish Armed Fer cee Command, which had been ;recently attached .to th'e' IX, Corps,was thrown into the breach to ha.l t the ~d~ance of 'the Chl.:oe se and did extremely well during the initial pha~e of .it~ d~nunitment but became disorgan- .·. . ;~~~ .-. ized F~nd 8J. .eo fell back. . ~ At thi R time th~ a:ivisional 'units commenced a wi thdrawa.l .. in co!npli:mce vd th Ope!'ai. on Order ITo. 12, published and di ssemin- . :~· -~. --~ -, ' . -~ . a. ted on 28 November. The 38_th of ·withdrawal in the ass~gned sector of the division. G-3 ini ti:?~ted e_.. request to IX Corps for a.uthorization ·to move 2d DiviE~ion units do·v,'l;'J. the.Kunu-ri-·Sin?..nju road e.nd Korean War Project 2ID-00100212 IX Corps .stated th::' t it W.Q1l:ld clee"r with I Corps. In the ne sn time, the 2d Recorin:J.7.sf:lanC~ ;crihf:p,~rly 'wa,s directed to eliminate ' - ••• ·'·· < , •• ,· • • ·' the road block. ~en it 'r\:d.led _:i.ri :ft·~ attempt, Company C of the "' '; ' . . ' \'; 38tn Infantry wa.e sent 'to ~ssist it. Their combined efforts :proved fruitless.. Shortly afte!'' nightfall, the 9th Infantry was directed to attack and destroy the roadblock. The combined remnants the 'and 3d ion l!U nched an attack which of 2d ' :B~ttti:. /• . '- . . . - ;). " contL nued ~til .the e~ty niorningrplt~ 'of the ;30th, but they were u..11successful. · ;,__ ,. ,.,,., As a wi thdr:&WP1,l ~~s tii~ only al tema.tive to annihila- ~ ·~ ,., --~; ~ ,.. --~ tion, the lomman cling Gene£s,1 ordered the divisional units, less ;. ; the 23d :ReT which was 'directed t~ ·cover the withdrawal, to move south to Stlnchon 'with the infa.ntry bat tali ens of the 38th RCT in tb.e lead. This move, aLthough extre.mely costly in men and equipment, wae successfully completed and, by the end of the period, the div5.sion w~s· assembling at Chas~m. The 23d Infantry . F:~Uccessfully disei\l,g~ged from the enemy a..nd rejoined the divi- s ion in this area. The 2d Divisio-a J:B~;a -s.ut:t!~r.ect a serious reverse but, on 30 I>ecemba." , the G~3 Sectiolll was prepe,ring plans for the next di vi?ion mission-~t Chunghw.a whAre the division was to go into Eig't!t~ Anny reserve. . . -6 ... Korean War Project 2ID-00100213 f u:.· .... L,.-.~· ·) · r :LJ _ I :;•Jc-,o:,y- llJ%2?'_/_ LE:l~ ~ ~ ,~ ~::_~· ~' ~.:~ Sl2;) Korean War Project 2ID-00100214 Korean War Project 2ID-00100215 (, v -- 0 20 ~I ·~ • ) . . '.~ t 1 , r' 1:, ...... , ·. .., __ , .·, ·,) ·. . ~ ~-··· a.:tihumn .sun_, :a aol.d;t:_. ,~~2·e ~l11dd*J;o )./ c·r 'C!U.i:et i:ead~~g -'t.ne ::ieif;;:·, ~!:lia(m ( ., Korean War Project 2ID-00100216 Korean War Project 2ID-00100217 .. Korean War Project 2ID-00100218 ·'\m.!- Korean War Project 2ID-00100219 It to ~ ..) - ~-~~ I Korean War Project 2ID-00100220 0148 Korean War Project 2ID-00100221