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Modern History MODERN HISTORY Leon Trotsky – A Biography Lev Davidovich Bronshtein was born on the 7th November 1879 in Yanovka, Ukraine, the fifth child of eight. His parents, David and Anna Bronshtein, were wealthy Jewish peasants, who “strained every muscle and directed every thought towards work and saving”1. In his autobiography, Trotsky described his childhood as “the grey childhood of a petty bourgeois family in the country side, in the sticks, with wide open spaces and narrow, mean interests and values.”2 At the age of nine, David sent Lev to Odessa (a Ukrainian sea port) to be educated. He was top of his classes in high school, extremely self-assured and self-assertive - “everywhere and always he had to be first”3. Even though he was attractive, smart and popular, Lev “had no close friends, for friendship demands equality. From childhood on, Trotsky was unwilling to recognise his intellectual equal in anyone, except possibly Lenin.”4 In terms of his personality, this meant he was arrogant, demanding and impatient with those who were slower or did not meet his high expectations. Trotsky’s revolutionary activities began after finishing high school in 1896, aged 17. Lev was introduced to Marxism at this stage, and at first was sceptical. However, after seeing the injustice suffered in Russia between the different classes, Lev became a supporter. In March 1897 he joined the illegal South Russian Worker’s Union, which was disbanded ten months later, as all two hundred members were arrested. For the next two years, Lev was held in prison, awaiting trial. It was here he met his first wife, Aleksandra Sokolovskaya, whom he married in 1899. In 1900, his first daughter, Zinaida was born. That same year, he was sentenced to four years exile in Siberia, of which only two he served, escaping in the summer of 1902. His second daughter, Nina, was born in 1902. After he escaped, he changed his name to Leon Trotsky, which is said to be the name of his jailer in prison. Leaving Russia, Trotsky went to London where he met Lenin for the first time. He joined Lenin, working at the paper Iskra (The Spark) and writing regularly. Also that year, he met Natalya Sedova in Paris, who was to become his second wife and life companion - they married later that year. In 1903 he attended the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP). At this meeting, the Party split into two, forming the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks were led by Lenin, the Mensheviks by Martov (another Russian revolutionary). Trotsky initially joined the Mensheviks, becoming their chief spokesperson. He soon clashed with the Mensheviks, believing the working class would bring about the world revolution [Bolshevik belief] rather than the middle class [Menshevik belief]. Trotsky then left the Mensheviks in 1905, staying neutral between the two, until in 1917 when he joined the Bolsheviks. After the events of Bloody Sunday, Trotsky returned to Russia in and was an active participant in the revolution. He joined the St Petersburg Soviet, becoming president that year. In 1906, Trotsky’s first son (to wife Natalya Sedova), Lev, was born. He stayed in St Petersburg until 1907, when he was arrested for his involvement in the 1905 revolution, and exiled to Siberia for the second time. Again, he escaped, fleeing to England. Here he attended the Fifth Congress of the RSDLP in London (meeting Stalin for the first time), then moved to Vienna with his family. 1908 brought him his second son, Sergei. In 1910, his mother Anna died. During WW1 he worked as a war correspondent for socialist newspapers in the Balkans and as a reporter in Paris. In 1916 Trotsky was deported from France to Spain, due to his anti-war views, where he was then deported to the US. In early 1917, he went to New York City, but moved back to Russia in May after the March revolution (end of Romanov reign). He joined Lenin and the Bolsheviks in July, and was arrested later that month during the “July Days”, a series of demonstrations against the government. They were not released until September, when the Provisional Government needed the Bolshevik’s support in defending against Kornilov and his attempt at a coup. As described by Trotsky in his autobiography, “The Bolsheviks stepped into the harness, and were everywhere in the first line of the defense. The experience of Kornilov’s mutiny completed that of the July days: once more Kerensky and Co. revealed the fact that they had no forces of their own to back them. The army that rose against Kornilov was the army-to-be of the October revolution.”5 In November, he helped organise and played a major role in the second revolution of 1917 when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government. Although Lenin was leader, it was mainly due to Trotsky’s superb organisation and execution of plans that the Bolshevik triumph was so easy (amongst other factors). As Marxist philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948) describes it, “Without doubt, Trotsky stands head and shoulders above all other Bolsheviks, except Lenin. Lenin of course is more important and more powerful. He is the head of the revolution, but Trotsky is more talented and brilliant.” After the Bolsheviks took control, Lenin appointed Trotsky as People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In this role, Trotsky negotiated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans, from December 1917-March 1918, thus ending Russia’s involvement in the war. The negotiations dragged on, as Trotsky waited and hoped for a revolution in Germany, which would lower the reparations Russia had to pay. However, as the Germans then began to march on Petrograd in early March, the Bolsheviks had no choice but to sign. The terms had become so harsh by now, that Trotsky resigned, unwilling to sign the treaty. He was replaced by Georgy Chicherin, who signed the final agreement. In March, civil war broke out in Russia and Trotsky was appointed People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. In this position, he created a 5-million strong army – the Red Army. Over the next three years, Trotsky and his army successfully defeated the numerous White armies, defending Russia from the west, south and east. Even though lacking in military skill and training, Trotsky was very good at organising and won the respect and loyalty of his troops (he also used death threats and terror to ensure the soldier’s loyalty). From both his involvement in the November Revolution and the Civil War, a very positive image of Trotsky was created and he was greatly admired. In 1919 he was elected as one of only five members of the Politburo. However, the image was somewhat tarnished at the Kronstadt Rebellion in 1921, where Trotsky had to use his Red Army to crush the rebelling sailors. Trotsky, the idealist he was, deeply regretted the losses, as the sailors were among the strongest groups of supporters of the Bolshevik takeover in 1917. In late 1921, Lenin became sick, suffering three strokes between May 1922 and March 1923. Trotsky seemed to be the obvious choice to take over from Lenin, and in his Testament, Lenin “spoke of Trotsky in immeasurably higher terms of praise than he did of any other leaders.”6 Lenin described him as “probably the most able man in the present Central Committee” with “outstanding capabilities”7. However, the testament did not clearly state who was to take Lenin’s place, and this created the opportunity for a power struggle between Trotsky and Stalin. In 1923, Stalin (newly elected to the position of General Secretary in 1922), Zinoviev and Kamenev formed a triumvirate, intent on destroying Trotsky’s credibility and any chance of succeeding Lenin. “They were ambitious, especially Stalin and Zinoviev”8 describes Russian historian Dmitri Volkogonov (1928-1995). He goes on to say, “The triumvirate was well aware that, in order to up seat Trotsky, he had to first be distanced from Lenin, then compromised in the eyes of the Party by greatly exaggerating his weaknesses and shortcomings.”9 With Lenin’s death in January 1924, the triumvirate’s “campaign” could now be brought into the open, and a number of actions were taken to discredit him and force him from his positions. Firstly, Stalin had understood the importance of appearing as the defender of Lenin and his heritage. Trotsky was away when Lenin died, and Stalin purposely gave Trotsky the wrong details to him about Lenin’s funeral, so Trotsky did not attend. This created a very unfavourable impression among the population, and allowed Stalin to claim himself as the “true heir” to Lenin’s heritage and legacy. Trotsky immediately understood that his position as second to Lenin was compromised by his failure to attend the funeral. However, it was only later that he fully realised the extent to which Stalin had manipulated this mistake to discredit him. Later, Stalin further strengthened his connection to Lenin by claiming his theory of Socialism in One Country was an extension of Leninism. Secondly, newspapers slandered Trotsky, by beginning to omit the title, “Trotsky, leader of the Red Army”, while mentioning Stalin more and more often. Articles condemned Trotsky, labelling him as “a factionalist who wanted to revise Bolshevism in a Menshevik direction”10, criticising his every move and his past, especially his Menshevik history. Dozens of articles appeared in the press in a short space of time. The criticism escalated from cool analysis to insinuation and outright abuse11. Trotsky did attempt to send in replies to these attacks, but with Stalin’s increasing influence and control, they were never published, and Trotsky could not redeem himself.
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