European Union Training Mission

PRESS SUMMARY 31st May 2018

“In ‘Media’ stat virtus” EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Driving EU civilian-military cooperation forward: joint meeting in Mogadishu by the EU Civilian Operations Commander and the Director of the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability

30/05/2018 - Mutual support and cooperation between the three EU Missions deployed in the Horn of Africa was discussed at the meeting between Kenneth Deane, Civilian Operations Commander and his military counterpart, Esa Pulkkinen, Director of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability on 24 May in Mogadishu. Currently, the EU deploys three Missions on the Horn of Africa. The civilian EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Somalia) supports, after 25 years of conflict, security sector institutions and related legislation for improved maritime security. The military EU Naval Force ATALANTA counters piracy off the Somalia coast and protects World Food Programme and other vulnerable vessels. The military EU Training Mission trains and advises the Somali Defence Sector. All three EU Missions are committed to making Somalia a safer country. The situation in the field is characterised by great complexity and can't be addressed by a single actor alone. Not only in Somalia, but in many theatres of operation, the military are key partners to the ten current civilian CSDP Missions. Civilian-military cooperation is one of the permanent, yet constantly evolving features of the EU integrated approach and continues to increase in response to new challenges. Director Deane and Lieutenant General Pulkkinen visited the Missions and Operations under their respective commands and seized the opportunity to discuss current and future EU civilian- military cooperation in Somalia. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/45484/driving-eu-civilian- military-cooperation-forward-joint-meeting-mogadishu-eu-civilian_en

EUTM - SOMALIA 1 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

President Kenyatta holds bilateral talks with Somalia President

The two leaders discussed bilateral issues and security matters including the continued support for African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in which Kenyan forces play a big role

By PSCU, NAIROBI, Kenya, May 30 – President Uhuru Kenyatta Wednesday held talks with President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo of Somalia who is on an official visit in the country.

The two leaders discussed bilateral issues and security matters including the continued support for African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in which Kenyan forces play a big role.

The two leaders updated each other on shared security concerns as well as progress in regional efforts to bring peace and stability back to Somalia with the help of Kenya and other nations. President Kenyatta and his guest also discussed multilateral issues including Kenya’s push for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. President Mohamed said Somalia fully supports Kenya’s bid to sit on the UNSC. After a lengthy private meeting, the two Presidents later held talks that were attended by Deputy President William Ruto and leader of Majority Aden Duale. President Mohamed jetted into the country this morning accompanied by a high-level delegation of ministers and senior government officials. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2018/05/president-kenyatta-holds-bilateral-talks- somalia-president/

EUTM - SOMALIA 2 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1001908763375423489

EUTM - SOMALIA 3 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

https://www.facebook.com/abdi.hosh/posts/10156447124699740

EUTM - SOMALIA 4 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-fahad-yasin-makes-secret-trip- to-ethiopia-to-mend-ties

EUTM - SOMALIA 5 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

https://mareeg.com/somalia-and-djibouti-sign-new-agreements/

EUTM - SOMALIA 6 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Geopolitical Change, a Rising Hegemon, and Berbera Port Deal on May 31 - Berbera Port deal has been groundbreaking; at the stroke of a pen, Somaliland took a massive step towards international recognition and permanent separation from Somalia

By Dr. Brendon Cannon and Dr. Ash Rossiter

– Brendon Cannon is Assistant Professor at Khalifa University’s Institute of International and Civil Security (IICS), Abu Dhabi, UAE. Dr. Cannon’s academic specializations are in the changing balance of power in the wider Middle East region – particularly the Horn of Africa; energy politics, policy and security (GCC and Northeast Asia); and international security.

– Dr. Ash Rossiter is an Assistant Professor in International Security within the Department of Humanities & Social Science at Khalifa University of Science & Technology. Dr. Rossiter’s current research lies at the intersection of technological change and global security with special regard to the utility of military force international affairs.

ABU DHABI

In the Horn of Africa, the Republic of Somaliland has functioned as an independent country for close to three decades. It has held multiple elections, seen four presidents take office, prints its own money and issues its own visas, and its capital city, Hargeisa, houses two parliamentary bodies that pass and enact laws. However, it remains an unrecognized country and is viewed by the rest of the world’s states as part of the Republic of Somalia with its capital in Mogadishu.

EUTM - SOMALIA 7 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

For almost an equally lengthy time, Ethiopia has been landlocked and completely reliant on its neighbors, particularly Djibouti, for imports and exports. This occurred when Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia in 1993, thereby resulting in Ethiopia’s loss of a lengthy coastline and ports. This has greatly complicated Ethiopia’s rise as a regional power and hampered the development of its 102 million people. The situation in the Horn of Africa is changing rapidly, however.

In a recent article published in Rising Powers Quarterly, we sought to demonstrate how Ethiopia and Somaliland have been able to advance their interests by taking advantage of the recent involvement of various Arab Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) in the Horn of Africa’s coastal zone. This is affecting the regional distribution of power to its advantage and reducing its dependency on Djibouti’s port for imports and exports through the refurbishment, development and use of other, regional ports: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya. It is the development of the port of Berbera that has proved the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law.

Berbera Port’s importance

From a geostrategic perspective, Ethiopia’s interest in Berbera is obvious. Of the three ports, Berbera is closest to Ethiopia proper and offers the potential of opening up the vast, albeit isolated eastern region of Ethiopia to trade, particularly in the export of livestock and agriculture. Yet because the port is located in the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland, both Ethiopia and Somaliland have experienced difficulty in attracting investors and port operators on account of the political and legal headaches associated with doing business in Somaliland. For Somaliland, development of the port would not only bring in much needed investment and jobs, but a deal signed by Hargeisa would show tacit, albeit obvious international support for Somaliland’s independence from Mogadishu. For Ethiopia, the development and expansion of the port of Berbera fundamentally support the primary pillars of Addis Ababa’s regional policy that support its aspirations for regional hegemony and are deemed essential to its very survival and indivisibility.

The first involves maintaining Eritrea’s isolation in order to weaken it to the point that it implodes, is formally reunited to Ethiopia or becomes a pliant, client state. The second pillar

EUTM - SOMALIA 8 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018 rests on maintaining the status quo in post-civil war Somalia. Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia means that Ethiopia can concentrate its attention and forces on quelling persistent internal security difficulties and continuing to isolate and pressure Eritrea. Ethiopia has, until recently, been assisted in its goals vis-à-vis Somalia as much by the international community as by internal problems within Somalia. The cross-purposes of the international community coupled with and reinforcing political instability in Somalia, particularly in the capital Mogadishu, have resulted in the inability of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to do anything substantive about the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland as well as the almost entirely autonomous northeastern region of Puntland.

Ethiopia’s efforts and Gulf Arab interest

Ethiopia has eyed the development of and access to the port of Berbera against this backdrop. However, Addis Ababa found itself unable to fully exploit opportunities to expand its influence and power — not only because of the potential legal and political headaches of doing deals with Somaliland — but also because of a paucity of critical resources and human capital. These deficiencies were partially alleviated with the entry of the Arab Gulf States to the region, especially the coastal zone beginning in the late 2000s in an effort to secure favorable trade and resources, as well as curtail Iran’s growing presence. However, it was the Yemen crisis that led Saudi Arabia to announce the beginning of a pan-Arab military operation to roll back the Iran-backed Houthis and restore the government. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — the two principal military members of the coalition — initially used Djibouti as a support hub for operations in southern Yemen. Yet difficult relations with Djibouti led the UAE, in 2015, to sign a lease with Eritrea for its Hanish Islands and facilities at the port city of Assab for 30 years.

The deal with Eritrea panicked Addis Ababa, with Ethiopian leaders viewing any expansion of Eritrean power as a corresponding loss of power for Ethiopia. Ethiopia dispatched officials to Abu Dhabi to plead for a shift in focus to Somaliland’s port of Berbera. Ethiopia’s diplomatic push and offer of economic incentives in the form of export/import traffic, coinciding with an increased UAE focus on stemming the flow of weaponry into Yemen, led to Addis Ababa’s desired results when DP World signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port for 30 years in May 2016.

EUTM - SOMALIA 9 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Analyzing Berbera Port deal

It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal over Berbera if it did not see at least some long-term commercial benefit and there appear to be strong economic incentives for both Ethiopia and Somaliland. For example, Dubai will reportedly support Somaliland’s fisheries industry; help build the road between Somaliland and Ethiopia; and build a Free Zone at the Berbera port. The port will be supported mainly by the export of livestock and import of goods to both Somaliland and Ethiopia. However, there are also military and political dimensions to the tripartite agreement.

Separate to DP World’s deal, Somaliland’s government agreed to the establishment of a UAE military installation at Berbera. The base, only 90 kilometers from the shores of Yemen, is intended to help the UAE forces tighten its blockade against Yemen.

Politically, the Berbera Port deal has been groundbreaking. At the stroke of a pen, Somaliland took a massive step towards international recognition and permanent separation from Somalia. While neither Ethiopia nor the UAE have voiced recognition, the deal inked in Dubai certainly makes it seem that way if the anger in Mogadishu is any indication. Somalia Federal Government ministers have publicly challenged the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country. The Ethiopian-driven deal means that Mogadishu’s claims over the breakaway territory have weakened substantially. The deal means that Somaliland has partially broken the glass ceiling of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners and states operating on the global stage. Mogadishu can no longer pretend it controls the government in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa.

Regardless of the dissatisfaction in both Somaliland and Somalia surrounding the UAE’s deal with Hargeisa, Ethiopia has engineered — largely behind the scenes — access to another port, thus enhancing its security and strategic economic interests. The reality is that with the growth in annual volumes of Ethiopian transit cargo — over nine million tons in 2011 — Ethiopia has long required alternative routes for its cargo from Djibouti. With the signing of the port deal, the slowly-dying port of Berbera will see investments totaling US$442 million for the management and development of a “world-class, multi-purpose deep seaport project.” The UAE has also reportedly agreed to build a modern highway between Berbera

EUTM - SOMALIA 10 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Port and the Somaliland / Ethiopia border town of Wachale / Wajaale. This will link with the modern highway on the Ethiopian side of the border.

Additionally, when the deal was signed between DP World and Somaliland, Ethiopia ensured its substantive presence in the running and development of the port in the form of Ethiopian Shipping Lines. ESL will reportedly control 19 percent share in the deal — almost twice as much as it initially expected to receive. This was partially confirmed later by Hussein Ige Dayr, a spokesperson for the president of Somaliland, who noted, that DP World had allocated close to one-fifth of the port’s capacity for Ethiopian shipments (JOC). Somaliland Foreign Minister Saad Ali Shire further confirmed the percentage, noting that DP World sold 14 percent of its shares to Ethiopia with the government of Somaliland selling five percent of its shares to Ethiopia.

Lastly, Ethiopia was able to engineer a formal, legally-binding agreement between the de- facto but unrecognized, independent state of Somaliland and the UAE. In doing so, Ethiopia further ensured the continuing Balkanization of Somalia and potentially paved the way for eventual de-jure, international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.

* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency. http://en.brinkwire.com/362050/geopolitical-change-a-rising-hegemon-and-berbera-port- deal/

EUTM - SOMALIA 11 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Statebuilding without the State: Getting beyond “chicken and egg” in Somalia

Wednesday May 30, 2018 - By Dan Honig

“The credibility of the Somali Government hinges largely on its ability to deliver for the Somali People.” International partners clearly recognise the importance of using country systems to achieve broader statebuilding goals, as this line, taken from the May 2017 Communiqué of the London Conference on Somalia, indicates. Yet, international partners continue to deliver aid primarily through parallel systems, as the Government struggles to raise sufficient domestic revenue to deliver tangible results for its people.

Of an estimated USD 1.75 billion in official development assistance (ODA) for Somalia in 2017, only USD 103.9 million was delivered on budget (approximately 6% of total ODA). Excluding humanitarian aid from this calculation, the proportion of on budget aid rises to 14%, which still lags significantly behind the use of country systems in other fragile states. For example, donors delivered between 28-44% of development-focused aid on budget in the Central African Republic, Mali and Liberia in 2015.[1]

Why the inconsistency? International partners appear to be stuck in a “chicken or egg” conundrum in Somalia. On the one hand, they recognise that using country systems is critical for building national capacity and achieving broader statebuilding objectives. Yet, on the other hand, the weakness of these systems is often the excuse donors cite for avoiding the use of country systems. Given the explicit focus on statebuilding in Somalia, prioritising short-term operational concerns over the long-term benefits of government systems building appears to run counter to the international community’s stated objectives.

EUTM - SOMALIA 12 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Our recent World Bank and United Nations joint report examines donors’ decision making about the use of country systems, exploring both the perceived and actual risks and benefits associated with such use.[2] We find that a number of factors related to internal donor decision-making practices preclude using country systems in Somalia. These include:

A narrow focus on fiduciary risks. Fiduciary risk is an important, but far from the only, consideration in determining which tools are best for achieving desired outcomes. Moreover, the risks and benefits of using country systems should be considered not in isolation but, rather, alongside those of alternative delivery channels, like the use of nonprofit, private sector or multilateral implementers. Fiduciary risk and spending efficiency are real concerns in Somalia, whatever the implementation modality. It is less obvious that these concerns, taken as a whole, augur clearly for or against the use of country systems. In short, donors’ internal “plumbing” may be undermining their own higher level policy ends and commitments.[3]

An asymmetric focus on short-term risks. Short-term risks with the potential to grab domestic headlines, like the misappropriation of funds, often weigh heavily on international partners’ decision-making when it comes to using country systems. If Somalia were to slip backwards into conflict, it would not be seen in donor capitals as an aid success story. Its collapse would also not be directly attributable to a particular donor project or even a particular donor. The mechanisms for realising reputational risk and attributing success may lead to an asymmetric focus on short-term risks, making the tactics of international partners unduly conservative.

Insufficient focus on the benefits. Using country systems can focus both donor and government attention on the quality of those systems, both financial and non-financial (e.g. payroll, human resources). Where used in Somalia, international attention and resources shift from the operational challenges of a parallel system towards those of government, creating “positive spillovers” for country systems. This approach not only uses the muscles of government systems, but also actually strengthens them, like exercise for the human body. Using country systems can also, in many cases, provide better value for money than alternatives. This is a critical consideration in a high-cost, fragile environment like Somalia where an estimated 30-60% of project funds are consumed by additional overheads related to project monitoring and delivery.

EUTM - SOMALIA 13 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

To overcome these pitfalls, international partners could pursue a more constructive way forward by replacing technical assessments of Somalia’s country systems in isolation with an explicitly comparative approach for choosing delivery modalities. Putting the short- and long-term costs, benefits and risks side-by-side of NGO implementation and government implementation, for example, and then choosing which is best, may lead to a gradual increase in the use of country systems.[4]

No delivery modality is without risk; both country systems and alternative delivery channels have drawbacks. But these options have differing strengths, depending on the type of project, sector or situation. In finding the right mix of tools, both government and international partners need to focus more on the goal to which they are jointly committed in Somalia: statebuilding.

Sarah Louis Cramer co-facilitates the Somalia Use of Country Systems Working Group made up of government and international partners, which works closely with the OECD-hosted Secretariat of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, to keep members informed and committed to tracking and advancing progress on using country systems.

Use of country systems refers to a variety of ways in which international partners can engage with national counterparts to deliver aid ranging from alignment with national priorities to direct implementation by government. https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/May/158375/statebuilding_without_the_state_get ting_beyond_chicken_and_egg_in_somalia.aspx

EUTM - SOMALIA 14 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Somali-Swedish diaspora engagement in the Somali region

Nauja Kleist 30 May 2018 - Many diaspora actors have a desire for stronger inclusion in policy processes that concern the Somali region and diaspora engagement. This offers opportunities for development agencies.

Former Deputy Mayor of Mogadishu speaks at a conference between Somali diaspora returnees and locals to promote good relations, June,2017.

Diaspora groups have been recognized as development actors in policy circles since the early 2000s. Most attention has been paid to remittances sent to developing countries, whose volume is triple that of official development assistance. However, disaster relief, development projects and knowledge transfer are significant development contributions as well. Somali-Swedish diaspora engagement in the Somali region is a case in point, with activities ranging from water provision in drought-affected areas to promotion of women’s rights. Programmes supporting such involvement may strengthen its development potential but institutional and administrative constraints risk undermining the impact.

Since the outbreak of civil war in Somalia in 1991, Somali refugees have settled all over the world, including Sweden. Somalis are well known for their transnational engagement in their erstwhile homeland, providing a lifeline in times of crisis and contributing to long-term processes of change. Sweden has become a significant hub for Somali diaspora engagement, with a rich and diverse civil society engagement.

There are numerous registered diaspora associations supporting development in the Somali region, including women’s associations, NGOs and umbrella organizations. Informal

EUTM - SOMALIA 15 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018 diasporic networks spanning several continents, mosques and businesses are also diaspora actors. Two diaspora support programmes exist, offering matched funding for Somali- Swedish diaspora associations working with development and for social entrepreneurship.

Diaspora projects receiving matched funding typically concern sustainable development, gender equality, human rights and job creation, in line with Swedish development priorities. However, many diaspora activities are self-funded through donations from Somalis in Sweden and sometimes globally. These projects tend to focus on health, education, water provision and drought relief.

No matter whether their activities receive external funding or not, many diaspora actors explain their involvement as motivated by a sense of moral obligation in the face of suffering. “It’s like you have an obligation to give back” as one female activist put it, while a man explained how his development engagement was kicked off by a visit to his native town. Being devastated by the poverty he encountered there, he decided to do something himself. “There are opportunities in Sweden and there is funding for organizations”, he said and continued, “there is nobody else; who can it be rather than us?” “There is nobody else; who can it be rather than us?”

Opportunities and challenges

Somalia is a significant partner country for SIDA, being the fourth biggest recipient in 2016. Both SIDA and Somali-Swedish diaspora groups thus have extensive engagement in the Somali region. On the one hand, SIDA has a strategic interest in cultivating a strong relationship with Somali-Swedish development actors to further contributions in alignment with overall Swedish priorities and interests. On the other hand, progress in development and reconstruction in the Somali region is of huge importance for Somali-Swedes. Likewise matched funding for diaspora engagement makes it possible to upscale certain types of diaspora involvement. There are thus mutual opportunities and interests. However, it would be naïve to think that the relationship between the development industry and diaspora groups is all roses. One challenge concerns development modalities and priorities. Diaspora engagement tends to be flexible and cross-sectoral, spanning the often strict division between development and humanitarian relief in development cooperation agencies. Furthermore, some diaspora actors are simultaneously involved in family affairs,

EUTM - SOMALIA 16 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018 collective development projects, and perhaps a political career. They do not necessarily have a detached or neutral position vis-à-vis the target areas and populations, in other words, but may be personally involved at several levels. This causes skepticism among some development professionals concerning the effectiveness and compatibility of diaspora activities with development cooperation. Some diaspora actors are simultaneously involved in family affairs, collective development projects, and perhaps a political career. Conversely, some diaspora actors question the appropriateness of Swedish development priorities and a rights-based approach that they characterize as out of touch with realities on the ground, while others emphasize the importance of gender equality, for example, and human rights. No matter what, diaspora actors call for more reconstruction and service delivery in contexts of abject poverty and post-conflict – like in much of the Somali region. Another challenge is extensive administrative procedures in combination with relatively short project duration periods of projects receiving matched funding. Most diaspora associations are run by volunteers and the excessive time spent on application, accounting and reporting constitutes a considerable constraint for many activists.

What should be done?

Diaspora engagement in development is significant, long-term, and may benefit hard-to- reach populations. While it may be upscaled by matched funding, it is not determined by such support. That said, diaspora engagement is no silver bullet to development and there are no quick fixes. So what should be done? First, introducing enhanced flexibility vis-à-vis reconstruction activities and service delivery as well as faster and simpler administrative procedures would facilitate involvement in diaspora support programmes. It would also have wide resonance among diaspora actors and in the Somali region. This is important given the continued fragile situation and occurrence of complex crises. Second, intensifying dialogue between policymakers and diaspora groups may enhance partnerships and mutual understanding. Many diaspora actors have a desire for stronger inclusion in policy processes that concern the Somali region and diaspora engagement. Here it is a final consideration that such collaboration offers opportunities for development agencies and diaspora actors alike. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/nauja-kleist/somali-swedish- diaspora-engagement-in-somali-region

EUTM - SOMALIA 17 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

NUSOJ Condemns Shutting Down Of Two Somali Tvs and The Detention of Two Journalists in Somaliland

May 30, 2018

Mogadishu, 30 05, 2018 The National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) protests against the decision to ban the two Somali Chanel televisions in Las Anod by the government of Somaliand on 27,28 May, 2018.

On Sunday, 27 May 218, Somaliland police arrested journalist Abdirahman Keyse Tungub, a Bulsho TV reporter in the town of Las Anod. The police told local journalists that Sool Governor Abdi Khayre Dirir ordered the judgment of the two journalists while SBS reporter Mohamed Ahmed Jama Bidhanshe was arrested 28 May, 2018 while covering one of the protest marches in Las Anod against the Somaliland government.

The Somaliland government announced in a communiqué today that the two TV channels, SBS and SOMNews, were banned from broadcasting for being "involved in political campaigns” and for not maintaining "the neutrality they are supposed to observe” in their coverage of protests in Las Anod, the capital of the disputed Sool region in the southeastern part of Somaliland.

Reporters Without Borders calls on the authorities in Somalia’s breakaway northwestern region of Somaliland to stop harassing privately-owned media outlets that are covering its territorial dispute with its eastern neighbor, Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region. Two TV channels have been closed and several journalists have been arrested, RSF said in statement on Tuesday.

The National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) condemns the ban of Tvs and detention of journalists on the strongest terms possible, which is a bare act to suppress and intimidate

EUTM - SOMALIA 18 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018 the other independent media and calls for immediate resumption of the television’s activities in the region.

In February CPJ calls on Somaliland's president to prioritize press freedom. In a letter sent to Somaliland President His Excellency Muse Bihi Committee to Protect Journalist said "We at the Committee to Protect Journalists, an independent press freedom organization, urge your administration to free imprisoned journalists and ensure that all news outlets can publish freely”

"The Decision to ban the television’s activities in Las Anod is a violation to the press freedom and the freedom of expression which is enshrined in the Somaliland constitution and is unacceptable term.” Mahir Jama Aden, President of the National Union of Somali Journalists said on Tuesday, "We demand from Somaliland government to unconditionally lift the ban and give respect to the media freedoms.”

"The ban not only threatens Somali Chanel but also the whole media in Somalialnd deemed critical to the administration.” Mahir added. http://hornobserver.com/articles/825/NUSOJ-Condemns-Shutting-Down-Of-Two-Somali- Tvs-and-The-Detention-of-Two-Journalists-in-Somaliland

EUTM - SOMALIA 19 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

People fleeing conflict in northern Somali town of Tukaraq fall prey to wild animals

Wednesday May 30, 2018 - More than 1,000 families in Tukaraq have been forced to flee their homes, following ongoing conflict in this part of the northern Somali region of Sool.

Local leaders told Radio Ergo most of them have moved to rural places near Kursu- Dubalay, 18 km west of Tukaraq, and others to Higlo, God-qaboobe and Faleedh-yaale

Tukaraq is in the area disputed by Puntland and Somaliland. The local council of elders told Radio Ergo that displaced families included both Tukaraq town dwellers and people who were already displaced by the drought.

They said the conflict has left these families homeless and hungry and vulnerable to challenges including attacks by wild animals.

Ibado Ali Farah fled from Higlada, 15 km north of Tukaraq, with her five children looking for a safer place. But the first night they arrived in Kursu-dubaley they were attacked by hyenas. Ibado told Radio Ergo that a 15-year-old boy suffered head injuries after being attacked by a hyena while he slept. His family managed to scare the animal off by throwing rocks and shouting. The boy was later taken to Lasanod for medical treatment.

Ibado said they had camped in Kursu-dubaley because there was water for their livestock. However, wild animals also came to the water source at night to drink, making it very dangerous.

EUTM - SOMALIA 20 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

“Besides the lack of shelter and the rains, we have been in constant fear at night, as the hyenas visit the well looking for water,” Ibado said.

Some of the families fleeing Tukaraq migrated to Daldhac, Higlada and Beerwayne on the outskirts of the town.

Abdi Mohamed, one of the elders of Tukaraq, told Radio Ergo that 600 drought-hit IDPs who were living in camps among those displaced again by the conflict.

Shugri Muse Salah, a mother of eight, fled her home in Tukaraq on 15 May. She is staying in Daldhac, 15 km west of Tukaraq, where she can access water. She said she had no time to collect any of her belongings before they ran away.

“The biggest problem is that we don’t have shelter, we don’t have food or medical care, and my two youngest children are now sick and there is no health centre or medicine. They have a bad fever and have been vomiting,” Shugri told Radio Ergo.

Shugri said her family was not able to cook for the first three days when they arrived in Daldhac after walking for four hours and then getting a ride in a vehicle. They had to ask for cooked food that other displaced families could spare. They spend their days sheltering under trees and sleep under makeshift structures they made of sticks and rags.

Shugri owned a small stall and used to earn a reasonably comfortable income for her family. The town-dwellers of Tukaraq and the IDPs are all facing similar hardships now, with lack of food and no proper shelter.

Ahmed Abdi Abtiile, of Somali Development Association operating in Sool and Sanag regions, said they distributed food to 150 families in Daldhac on 17 May, including 75kg of rice, flour, sugar and cooking oil. They are planning to distribute food for 200 families in June. https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/May/158366/people_fleeing_conflict_in_northern _somali_town_of_tukaraq_fall_prey_to_wild_animals.aspx

EUTM - SOMALIA 21 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Somalia evacuates 151 stranded migrants from Libya

MOGADISHU, May 30 (Xinhua) -- The Somali government on Wednesday evacuated 151 migrants from Libya who had been held in areas controlled by militia.

The latest evacuation brings to 176 the number of Somalis who have been returned home since the government launched the return-to-home exercise backed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the EU in December last year.

Somali Ambassador to EU Ali Faqi who received the returnees at the airport in Mogadishu said the registration and repatriation of other Somalis still stranded in Libya is still ongoing.

He said they have managed to bring back 151 Somalis out of 300 who had been registered. Faqi said the first batch of 11 Somalis arrived in the country in February followed by 13 others in March and a similar number in the same month. He said the efforts are underway to bring back more Somalis who are still stranded in the North African nation, noting however that some are not willing to return. The Horn of African nation's government has returned prisoners and Somali migrants back from Ethiopia, Seychelles and India earlier. Photos and videos of Somalis tortured in smugglers' camps have outraged the public in Somalia, prompting President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed to order evacuation of Somali migrants allegedly enslaved in Libya. According to reports, Libya's Bani Walid is a hotspot for smugglers moving migrants from sub-Saharan countries to the coast, where they then board boats in dangerous sea journeys to Italy.

EUTM - SOMALIA 22 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/30/c_137218379.htm

EUTM - SOMALIA 23 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Three al-Shabab militants sentenced to death over attacks

MOGADISHU, May 30 (Xinhua) -- Somali military court on Wednesday sentenced three al- Shabab militants to death after they were found guilty of being behind hotel bombing in October last year, officials said. Chairperson of the Military Court Hassan Ali Nur Shute said the militants admitted to charges of carrying out attack on Nasa-hablod II Hotel in which more than 30 people were killed and several others injured.

"The Court heard the cases of three terrorist militants in several sessions and found them guilty of carrying out attack on Hotel Nasa-hablod II attack on October 28, 2017, therefore the court sentenced Farhan Mohamed Samatar, Abdinasir Dhaqane Hassan and Abshir Mohamed Haji to death," Shute said.

Somali government's military court often gives death penalties against al-Shabab militants and some soldiers.

But human rights groups including the UN and the EU have condemned these executions.

The EU says it considers the death penalty to be a cruel and inhuman punishment, which fails to provide deterrence to criminal behavior and represents an unacceptable denial of human dignity and integrity. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/30/c_137218289.htm

EUTM - SOMALIA 24 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Al-Shabaab Militants on Kenyan Border Are Planning Attacks, Police Say

By Helen Nyambura-Mwaura

30 May 2018 - Kenyan police said there are rising numbers of Islamist fighters gathering on the country’s border with war-torn Somalia and some are planning attacks during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Some of the militants belonging to the al-Shabaab group have tried to cross into the northeastern Kenyan counties of Wajir, Mandera and Garissa, the National Police Service said Wednesday on Twitter. One group has been hiding in Somalia’s mountainous region and may be planning attacks on the Kenyan side, it said.

Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of al-Qaeda, has staged attacks that have killed more than 200 people in Kenya since the East African nation sent troops into Somalia in 2011 to prop up the government. Al-Shabaab has waged a more than decade-long insurgency in a bid to impose its version of Islamic law in Somalia.

EUTM - SOMALIA 25 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-30/ethiopia-to-amend-anti-terror- laws-as-charges-on-critics-dropped

EUTM - SOMALIA 26 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Weah dedicates phase one of Somalia Drive road

31 May 2018

President George Manneh Weah has dedicated phase one of a Japanese funded 13.2 kilometer Somalia Drive Road stretch between Redlight and the Freeport of Monrovia. Work on the project began during the administration of his predecessor former President Ellen Johnson - Sirleaf.

The first phase of the road dedicated Wednesday, 30 May has two lanes and the next phase for which Mr. Weah also broke grounds immediately after cutting ribbon for the completed phase will also have two lanes and might be completed in about two and a half years.

The amount for phase two of the project is about US$46m, and the total cost for the entire four - lane road project is about US$100m, according to the Japanese who are funding the project.

Mr. Weah made a call to action for the construction of phase two of the project, noting that Somalia Drive also known as the Freeway is a major [route] of a ring of road that surrounds the Capital Monrovia.

He notes that the 13.2 kilometer road is also the main link between the Freeport of Monrovia and the entire country outside of Monrovia that provides access to the hundreds of thousands of people who live on the outskirts of Monrovia.

The completion of phase one of the project according to Mr. Weah is expected to ease traffic congestion and bring new efficiency to trade and commerce and also improvement to the quality of lives of Liberians.

EUTM - SOMALIA 27 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

He expresses appreciation to the government of Japan to whom he says Liberia owes a tremendous debt of gratitude, saying the project would not have been possible without Japan’s generous assistance and cooperation.

Though not seen at the program, Mr. Weah also recognizes the foresightedness of former President Sirleaf for her efforts in initiating the project, saying his government will continue to build on what she started.

He appreciated Liberian contractors who worked on the project and expressed hope that the skills they have learned on the job and the experiences they acquired will be useful to many other infrastructure projects that his administration intends to undertake the years to come.

He says when the total project is completed; he understands that there is a requirement to rename the Somalia Drive Road as “Japan Freeway.” Earlier, Public Works Minister Mabutu Nyenpan reported to President Weah the completion of phases of the project, saying it is of the best standards. Mr. Nyenpan announced that all required arrangements have been concluded for the commencement of works on phase two of the project which would make it a modern four - lane road when completed.

He says contractors and consultants have assured that phase two will be completed in time with high standards. A senior representative of Japanese group JICA Mr. Norihito Yonebayashi says construction of the Somalia Drive Road phase one started in 2014 but later interrupted by Ebola. But he says due to the efforts of the Liberian and Japanese stakeholders, phase one of the projects is fully completed. According to Mr. Yonebayashi, phase two of the project is about US$46m, and entire project is about US$100m which he says makes it one of JICA’s largest infrastructure project in West Africa.

He says this is not the end of Japanese contribution to Liberia, and additionally notes that the project is not only physically building roads here, but also developing their Liberian counterparts’ capacity. http://www.thenewdawnliberia.com/politics/17223-weah-dedicates-phase-one-of- somalia-drive-road

EUTM - SOMALIA 28 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

AMISOM’s Hard-Earned Lessons in Somalia

May 30, 2018 - In an interview with the Africa Center, Simon Mulongo, deputy to the AU Commission in Mogadishu, says that AMISOM’s gains could never have been realized if it had continued to rely on the traditional peacekeeping template.

An AMISOM field commander in front of an armored personnel carrier.

In 2017, Somalia held parliamentary and presidential elections in a relatively stable atmosphere. The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which has been deployed to Somalia since 2007, has been a key factor in realizing this milestone. Nonetheless, al Shabaab, the militant Islamist group that has been destabilizing Somalia, remains a serious threat. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies spoke to Simon Mulongo, the Deputy Special Representative of the Commission Chairperson to Somalia (D/SRCC) at the African Union Commission based in Mogadishu to gain a perspective on the state of the mission.

What are some key lessons that AMISOM has learned over the course of the last decade?

Although AMISOM is often called a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission, in fact, AMISOM is a combat mission fighting a terrorist insurgency in Somalia. When it first deployed to Somalia in 2007, Islamist militants controlled most of Somalia and large swaths of the capital, Mogadishu. AMISOM’s first task was to push al Shabaab out of the capital and create conditions in which the Transitional Federal Government could operate. It initially used a traditional peacekeeping approach: staying encamped, conducting limited patrols, and returning fire only when fired upon. This model was quickly abandoned when al Shabaab began launching attacks on the AMISOM encampments. In 2011, AMISOM began an

EUTM - SOMALIA 29 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018 operation that dislodged al Shabaab from Mogadishu’s central business district and flushed them out of the country’s main supply routes and regional centers. By 2017, al Shabaab had been expelled from most of its strongholds in southern Somalia. Along the way, AMISOM troops took significant casualties. The deadliest attack occurred in 2016, when as many as 140 AU troops were killed in a single assault.

Al Shabaab fighters surrendering to AMISOM forces in September 2012.

AMISOM’s gains in the field could never have been realized if it had continued to rely on the traditional peacekeeping template. Ours is probably the deadliest mission of its kind anywhere in the world, and our troops and civilians have had to adapt, through trial and error, to the unique challenges of the Somalia context. Initially, we expected AMISOM to eventually transition to a hybrid UN/AU mission or a full UN mission, following the model of the African Mission in Darfur, Burundi, and others. This could not happen in Somalia because the environment has remained extremely fluid. Across Africa, peacekeepers are increasingly being deployed to highly fragile political and security environments, and the main challenge will be to adapt existing doctrines to reflect this reality. AMISOM’s experience offers valuable lessons in this regard.

What are the main challenges and constraints facing the mission?

Al Shabaab uses conventional warfare tactics in combination with urban warfare, guerilla warfare, and terrorism. In September 2017 for instance, al Shabaab fighters used car bombs and coordinated mortar attacks to overrun a Somali army base, killing eight soldiers. Two weeks later, they carried out a devastating bombing in the center of Mogadishu, involving a truck packed with 600 kilograms of highly sophisticated and homemade explosives. In November, al Shabaab militants ambushed a convoy carrying a regional governor in central Somalia, killing two soldiers. No explosives were used in that attack. In January, they killed 38 people in two car bomb blasts followed by heavy rocket and mortar fire outside the presidential palace. This ability to employ and deploy different tactics and capabilities in successive waves of attacks shows that al Shabaab is highly adaptive and resilient.

EUTM - SOMALIA 30 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

The other challenge AMISOM faces is in the area of logistics. The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) is only authorized to transport non-lethal assistance and troops to designated points known as battalion hubs. The transportation of war supplies and the onward transfer of troops from the battalion hubs to the field is the responsibility of the troop-contributing country.

A Kenyan Air force helicopter landing in southern Somalia.

However, AMISOM’s airlift capabilities are miniscule: it has only three utility helicopters to cover its entire area of operation. While there have been offers of additional aerial assets, the rate at which the UN reimburses countries willing to supply and maintain them is low, making it less attractive for them to put these vital capabilities at our disposal. Logistics are therefore unreliable and erratic, and our troops are overstretched and unable to secure the expansive territory and protect their supply lines.

Attempts to improve AMISOM’s supply system have also been hampered by the incompatibility of doctrine. UNSOA’s capabilities are civilian, not military. As such, they are structured to provide logistics in a traditional peacekeeping mission and not for combat environment. Strict restrictions on where UNSOA assets can land, for instance, have made the evacuation of our troops extremely difficult.

AMISOM operates in a “contingent-centric” environment where everything—from troop deployment to equipment—is controlled by the troop-contributing country and not the mission. As a result, force commanders do not have leeway to direct their own forces, which can delay or even hamper operations.

“Al Shabaab has much better access to intelligence than AMISOM.”

Additionally, AMISOM lacks force enablers and force multipliers. A force enabler is a capability such as transportation or communications that contributes to the success of a

EUTM - SOMALIA 31 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018 mission. A force multiplier, on the other hand, is a combination of capabilities that greatly increase military effectiveness, such as combat aircraft, infantry fighting vehicles, and heavy artillery. AMISOM still lacks the requisite force enablers and multipliers to effectively deliver on its mandate. This hampers its ability to hold liberated areas.

Finally, al Shabaab has much better access to intelligence than AMISOM given its links to the population under its control, its immersion in the local culture and language, and its knowledge of the terrain. Al Shabaab’s formidable intelligence apparatus, the Amniyat, has greatly increased al Shabaab’s resilience as well as its ability to anticipate and plan.

How would you characterize the progress made in building the Somali National Army (SNA)?

Efforts to build the Somali National Army date back to 2007. The SNA’s core weakness stems from the collapse of the Somali government in 1991 when the military splintered along clan lines. Today, rival clans are the primary sources of recruits and clan divisions remain pervasive in the force. The government’s 2017 Operational Readiness Assessment lays bare the logistical, financial, and operational gaps facing the military. Among other things, it found that 30 percent of soldiers in the bases do not have weapons. Furthermore, the army lacks vehicles, communications, and shelter. Some soldiers live in the bush. Very little has been done to address the report’s findings.

Training for the SNA is mainly provided by Turkey, the United States, and United Kingdom. A United Arab Emirates (UAE) program that had trained and paid some SNA troops since 2014 was recently halted after a dispute between the government and the semiautonomous regions of Jubaland and Puntland, which leased their ports to the UAE without Mogadishu’s authorization. This violated Somalia’s policy of neutrality in the ongoing Gulf rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Somalia cut military ties with the UAE in protest.

A Kenyan soldier plotting troop movements on a map during an Africa Contingency Operations Traning and Assistance (ACOTA) training course.

About 800 soldiers finish their training each year under the Turkish, U.S., and UK training programs. This number is too low for the SNA

EUTM - SOMALIA 32 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018 to be able to conduct effective operations. Somalia needs about 50,000 well-trained troops if it is to take over its own security after AMISOM leaves in 2020, according to the recently approved Transition Plan. Additionally, the training is not coordinated, and the partners have not developed common standards, doctrine, and curricula. The SNA will require a professional and well-developed officer corps with the leadership, discipline, and equipment that coordinated training is meant to achieve.

What non-military tasks does AMISOM undertake and how do they support the mission’s larger goals?

When we began dislodging al Shabaab from its strongholds, the population came to our bases in droves seeking medical attention, food, and security in their areas, and even assistance in solving disputes. It became clear to us that al Shabaab’s residual popular support in many of these communities was due to the semblance of order and services it provided. Communities tolerated them because public services were nonexistent after the state collapsed in 1991, and there was a general state of lawlessness where warlords preyed on the population with impunity. The Ugandans, who had deployed to Somalia before AMISOM was established, stepped in to provide medical doctors and veterinarians to meet some of the needs, but this became untenable and diverted troops away from their core tasks. That is when we prioritized the need to develop a strong civilian component as a critical part of the overall mission.

Today, AMISOM deploys about 70 civilian peacekeepers at the community level to serve as a link with the local population. They undertake a range of activities, including political affairs, gender mainstreaming, public information dissemination, counter propaganda, legislative reform, and security sector reform. All these are aimed at developing the government’s capacity to deliver services and consolidate its local support. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) has a civilian component of about 500 people but operates mainly in Mogadishu and some regional centers due to security restrictions. AMISOM staff, on the other hand, operate more freely and have greater access in the field. There is a need for the AU and UN to work more closely together to better leverage UNSOM’s superior resources and AMISOM’s flexibility to enhance our civilian work.

How do you see the future of the mission changing, and what does success look like?

EUTM - SOMALIA 33 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

“The lack of predictable financing has compelled the AU to endure the consequences of partners whose interests and priorities may not always be in tandem with those of the region.”

AMISOM was founded in the spirit of resolving African problems using African solutions. The Somali government needs to become efficient and accountable to its people. It can only do that if it commits itself to pursuing local development rather than remaining reliant on foreign assistance. On the military side, AMISOM requires more support to address its operational and logistical needs. The AU’s quest to access assured and predictable sources of funding remains a major challenge. The continental approach to addressing conflicts coupled with the willingness of African countries to put their professional and dependable troops in harm’s way should be steadfastly supported by the UN. This is because in situations like Somalia the AU is carrying the burden of the UN Security Council, which is the custodian of international peace and security. The lack of predictable financing has compelled the AU to endure the consequences of partners whose interests and priorities may not always be in tandem with those of the region.

The current drawdown of force AMISOM force levels has been criticized by troop contributing countries as counterproductive given the increased threat level in a huge operational area. There is a fear that the planned annual reduction that started in December 2017 may compromise the gains made so far and even lead to the mission’s defeat. For the current transition strategy to succeed AMISOM needs to partner with credible, professional, and capable Somali security forces that are loyal to a democratic, accountable, and legitimate government. Some progress has been made in these areas, but there is still a long way to go. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/amisom-hard-earned-lessons-somalia/

EUTM - SOMALIA 34 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Counter Daesh Insight Bulletin 21 – 28 May

May 30, 2018 - This summary includes notable items of Daesh propaganda from the previous week, including threats against Suriname and releases about East Asia. It is intended as a quick overview for those who do not have time to follow monitoring services on a daily basis and is not a comprehensive listing of every piece of Daesh propaganda released. Daesh often make fictitious claims which should not be taken as fact.

Overview

Daesh claimed attacks in Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Afghanistan. Threats of attacks were made against Suriname if two Dutch brothers are not released. Amaq released a short video showing the aftermath of the alleged Israeli airstrikes on civilian homes in Egypt’s Sinai region. Al-Naba featured an infographic claiming operations in Indonesia and the Philippines and an article criticising the construction of a buffer zone in Sinai region. A video released by Amaq and a photo report under the ‘al-Barakah Province’ brand, claimed to show the harvesting of wheat in Daesh controlled parts of Syria.

Output from unofficial Daesh brands included an English newsletter with updates of Daesh military activities. Further threats were made on the World Cup, with one graphic portraying Russian President Putin as a prisoner a warning for attacks. A campaign was set up by Daesh supporters, calling individuals to target Egyptian forces. A pro-Daesh media outlet threatened Christians in Cairo with an image depicting St George’s Church as a future target.

Video showing guerrilla tactics

A 26 minute video, distributed on Telegram, is entitled ‘Crushing the Enemy’. It shows guerrilla tactics adopted by Daesh fighters in Kirkuk along with the execution of prisoners. The narration and speaking segments call for perseverance. Footage claims to show operations against an Iraqi intelligence base and barracks, an ambush in a village and the capturing of enemy forces, who are shown being brutally killed by gunfire.

EUTM - SOMALIA 35 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

In Al-Naba, operations claimed in East Asia

Daesh’s al-Naba newspaper, released on 25 May, featured an infographic claiming operations in Indonesia and the Philippines, including a prison riot and a suicide operation by a family of six on three churches and a police station in Indonesia. In the Philippines, it claims to have killed 60 during clashes with the army. An article gives a version of the history of Sinai and criticises the construction of a buffer zone in the region which it claims is causing widespread destruction and the deaths of many people.

Typically for Daesh, there is no mention of its recent loss of Yarmouk, the Palestinian refugee camp near Damascus. Elsewhere, media reports were of a deal with the Syrian government to evacuate Daesh militants and their families.

Daesh supporters translate propaganda into English

A group claiming no affiliation to Daesh released the twelfth issue of an English language newsletter on 22 May on Tumblr, with links to MediaFire. The newsletter consists of translations of Daesh propaganda, reporting on military activities and providing justifications for the group. It also provides commentary on unrelated events such as the school shooting in Santa Fe, Texas. http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/counter-daesh-insight-bulletin-21-28-may/

EUTM - SOMALIA 36 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

FSNAU Somalia Early Warning, Early Action: Trends in Risk Factors, 2015-2018 (Indicators in Alarm Phase)

January February March April May June July August September October November December

2018

2017

2016

2015

Note: FSNAU EW-EA database and dashboard (http://dashboard.fsnau.org) was developed through a consultative process and uses data on a diverse range of Legend No Alarms 5-7 Alarms 8+ Alarms 1-2 Alarms 3-4 Alarms indicators (climate, market, nutrition, health and population displacement) that have been assigned individual thresholds for Normal, Alert and Alarm. The EW-EA time series maps show trends in the number of Early Warning indicators that are in ‘Alarm’ phase month-on-month from 2015 to 2017. The varying degrees of red coloration on the map corresponds with how many indicators are in the Alarm phase in each district during a given month. The red bands in increasing intensity are 2, 4, 6, 8+ Indicators in Alarm Phase. Areas displayed in predominantly yellow color reflect less than 2 indicators in Alarm phase.

Data Source: FSNAU/FEWS NET for market data; USGS/JRC for rainfall and NDVI; Nutrition Cluster for data on admissions, WHO and Health Cluster for data on health indicators and UNHCR for population movement. EUTM - SOMALIA 37 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Tropical Cyclone Sagar with winds between 110 -115 km/h formed in the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and Somalia on 19 May. It made landfall on the northwest coast of Somaliland as a Tropical Storm with 56 km/h winds, resulting in a year’s worth of heavy rains and flooding (ADAM 19/05/2018). The storm caused extensive destruction, including loss of livestock and crops, destruction of homes and critical infrastructure, and mass displacement (OCHA 23/05/2018; OCHA 20/05/2018). Damage to livelihoods, especially the death of livestock, the key source of income and sustenance for a majority of the pastoral popualtions residing in this region, is likely to aggravate existing food insecurity. Current outbreaks of AWD/Cholera also pose a health risk to affected populations. There is urgent need for WASH, shelter and NFIs, food and health assistance (World Vision 24/05/2018).

Source: OCHA 23/05/2018

Key priorities Humanitarian constraints Anticipated scope and scale

Access is restricted due to flooding and is 700,000 (est.) The disruptions to key trade routes caused by damaged hampering aid delivery to affected people affected in Somaliland roads are likely to result in increases in the price of populations, particularly in rural villages in essential commodities in the coming weeks and months. the Awdal region. Access is possible by

WASH helicopter (OCHA 23/05/2018). Conflict in Sool and Sanaag regions is also restricting Latrine damage widespread and high humanitarian operations. risk of water contamination

Food Insecurity Limitations Limited information on specific sectoral needs on a granular level. The food insecure communities affected number of affected is still uncertain as authorities are yet to establish the full extent of damage caused.

EUTM - SOMALIA 38 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Crisis impact the price of food and other essential commodities in the coming weeks and months (CARE International 24/05/2018). Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) described Tropical Storm Sagar Livelihoods: The government of Somaliland indicates that at least 80% of livestock in as one of the strongest ever recorded in Somalia. The storm produced wind gusts of up some of the most affected areas were killed and about 700 farms destroyed (Government to 102 km/per hour and rains of up to 200mm, which severely damaged homes and key of Somaliland; OCHA 23/05/2018). infrastructure such as roads, airstrips, schools, and sea ports (Floodlist 25/05/2018). The full Education: At least 33 schools in Awdal and Woqooyi Galbeed have either been impact of the tropical storm is still unknown but the Somaliland government estimates completely destroyed or had their roofs damaged, restricting access to education for that at least 670,000 people are affected (Government of Somaliland 21/05/2018). At least 25 about 25,000 students (Radio Ergo 29/05/2018; Somaliland Education Ministry). people have been killed, 12 injured and 27 are missing, according to the disaster management authority NADFOR. Most of the dead were from Baki, Lughaya, and Gargaara in Awdal region (Radio Ergo 29/05/2018). Farms were destroyed and livestock were Humanitarian and operational constraints killed, which is particularly devastating to the majority pastoral populations who rely Roads connecting Lughaya, Abdi-Geedi, Ido-Adays and El-la-helay are impassable due to heavily on their livestock for their livelihoods. Lughaya and Zaylac districts in Awdal region floods, preventing humanitarian aid workers from accessing the worst affected were the most affected, with extensive damage to transport and communications communities by road (Radio Ergo 29/05/2018) There as well has been significant damage infrastructure (OCHA 23/05/2018). done to sea ports and airstrips (Floodlist 25/05/2018). The only means of access has been The levels of food insecurity were already high due to drought, and the Humanitarian helicopter (Radio Ergo 29/05/2018). Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA) had previously appealed for urgent The storm damaged critical communications infrastructure, particularly in coastal areas, aid for over 600,000 drought-affected people in February 2018 (OCHA 23/05/2018). Lost livestock, damage to farms, losses of food stocks, damage to markets, and loss of other forms of making communication with these areas difficult. In addition, the lack of extensive livelihoods is likely to further increase their vulnerablilities and impact food security. assessments of the damage in affected areas makes it difficult to plan adequate humanitarian response (Somaliland Press 23/05/2018).

Renewed fighting on 24 May in Puntland over the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag is Sectoral Needs restricting humanitarian access, further aggrevating the humanitarian situation (UNAMIS WASH: Affected populations are in need of clean water and hygiene kits (World Vision 24/05/2018). In addition, the Puntland Ministry of Security has imposed restrictions on 24/05/2018). The flooding only increases the risks of waterborne disease, outbreaks of civilian and public transport movement between Garowe and Laascaanood since 21 May cholera, malaria, amoeba and dysentery (Care International 24/05/2018). (OCHA 23/05/2018). Health: There is need for health assistance but access to some severely affected populations is restricted due to road damage. Response capacity Shelter and NFIs: Flood displaced families are seeking shelter in public buildings such as schools, mosques and madrasas and have set up temporary camps. They are in need of Local and national response capacity various household items, including blankets (World Vision 24/05/2018). Many shelters in IDP The Government of Somaliland is providing food assistance to populations in need with settlements have been washed away, displacing several IDP households (OCHA 23/05/2018). the assistance of humanitarian partners. The Ministry of Health, in partnership with Flood affected populations in Gargaara, 20km south of Lughaya district in Awdal region humanitarian organisations are also providing health assistance in the form of medical are in need of adequate shelter and are currently camped on higher ground in close supplies and monitoring for potential outbreaks of disease due to the floods (OCHA proximity to flooded waters (Radio Ergo 29/05/2018). 23/05/2018). NADFOR is working on flood response in both Awdal and Woqooyi Galbeed Food: Supply stores and food markets have been damaged and in some cases washed regions in collaboration with local authorities. away. Several trade routes have been disrupted, which is likely to lead to an increase in

EUTM - SOMALIA 39 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

International response capacity Affected areas by Tropical Storm Sagar Bilateral support is being provided to the affected populations, including by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE, as well as the government of Djibouti have provided assistance with helicopters for humanitarian aid delivery and to survey isolated districts in Zaylac and Lughaya districts in Awdal (OCHA 23/05/2018).

Information gaps and needs Data on specific sectoral needs is very limited. The severity of shelter damage is largely unknown across most flood affected areas. There is no new data available to indicate the extent health needs have grown following the flooding. Limited information on service provision at site level.

Lessons learned

• Experiences from 2013, earlier and later years illustrate that rights violations and protracted displacement may be triggered by situations of flooding, especially along the fertile riverbanks (OCHA 24/05/2018).

• Populations at risk of being affected by the tropical storm first attempted to salvage whatever property they could before the storm made landfall, delaying their evacuation despite early warnings and preparedness advice aired on radio. Some of Source: OCHA 23/05/2018 the warnings were not adhered to at all. It is also unclear whether the warnings had come too late, giving populations at risk little time to prepare themselves (Radio Ergo 29/05/2018).

EUTM - SOMALIA 40 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Heavy rains and flooding have continued to compound Affected people by region Anticipated scope and scale an already fragile humanitarian situation in the southern and central parts of Somalia, worsening River levels along the Juba and Shabelle are expected to decrease in the coming conditions for communities who recently endured a days. The upper, middle and lower reaches of Shabelle remain under moderate long period of drought (OCHA 25/05/2018). The floods risk of flooding owing to the current high water levels, while along the Juba there have resulted in the destruction of homes, critical is minimal risk of flooding in the forecast period (SWALIM 24/05/2018). The infrastructure, latrines, and the loss of livestock and number of cases of AWD/cholera is expected to increase through June (OCHA crops. There is need for shelter and NFIs, as well as 24/05/2018). Where significant flooding may continue through June, it is WASH assistance. expected that the spatial extent of flooding would increase, and the possibility of replanting crops would decline. The timing of the off-season (recession) Gu production would also be further delayed (FSNAU 24/05/2018). Key priorities +220,000 people displaced

WASH Latrine damage widespread and high risk of water contamination

AWD/Cholera Limitations is active in the affected regions Difficult to accurately assess to what extent the scale and scope of need has changed since the publication of the last ACAPS update on 9 May. Humanitarian Constraints Sources: OCHA 24/05/2018 Heavy rains and flooding have damaged supply routes making access to several key locations possible only by air and by boat. The two main roads connecting Gedo with Mogadishu and Kismayo are inaccessible (OCHA 25/05/2018). Insecurity and capacity limitations also make access to severely affected areas challenging.

EUTM - SOMALIA 41 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018

Crisis impact May, active transmission of AWD/cholera was reported in in , Afgoye in as well as in 13 districts of region (Darkenly, Daynile, Heavy Gu season rains resulted in the drastic increase of water levels in the Shabelle and Hodan, Madina, Waberi, HamarWeine, Hamarjabjab, Heliwa, and Wardigley, Kaaran, Juba River basins, leading to severe flash and river flooding across central and southern Yaqshid, Howlwadag Shangani districts) (Somali Ministry of Health 20/05/2018).The cholera Somalia with Bay (South West State), Gedo (Jubaland), Hiraan and outbreak is expected to spread in the coming weeks due to contamination of water regions being the worst affected (OCHA 24/05/2018). 500,120 people were affected by the sources by flood water. recent floods of whom 214,596 were displaced by riverine flooding; while areas with flash floods have seen 272,436 people affected and 15,004 displaced (OCHA Shelter: Heavy rains and flooding have resulted in the destruction of IDP shelters in South 24/05/2018). has been the most affected in the recent floods in the central West State, Jubaland and Galmudug state, many of which were located in low-lying areas parts of the country, with 305,828 people affected, of whom 145,852 were displaced prone to flooding. Most of the improvised IDP shelters in Banaadir region, which hosts (OCHA 25/05/2018). As of 15 May, a large influx of flood-affected IDPs into Galmudug State approximately 497,000 IDPs, have been destroyed, drastically increasing shelter needs in coming from district in Hirshabelle has put a strain on humanitarian capacity the region (OCHA 24/05/2018). Around 400 families are sleeping outside or under makeshift in Galmudug State. The heavy rains have affected areas already experiencing high levels shelters on the outskirts of Ba’adweyne, 200km south of Galkayo, region, after of vulnerability from drought and conflict. Since the start of the flooding conditions have floods inundated their homes in low-lying areas (Radio Ergo 28/05/2018). worsened in overcrowded Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) settlements as most of the affected areas host large numbers of IDPs. For example, the Banaadir region hosts more Food: Road access to rural villages in Xudur and Tayeeglow districts in region is than 497,000 IDPs - the highest number in the country- while an estimated 246,000 IDPs restricted and supply routes damaged, significantly increasing the cost of food and are in Baidoa (OCHA 25/05/2018). Active transmission of AWD/cholera is currently posing making access to food by flood affected populations difficult. Similar increases in the serious health risks to flood affected populations, particularly in Banaadir region (Somali prices of food and commodities are being experienced in Gedo region due to access Ministry of Health 20/05/2018). constraints (OCHA 25/05/2018).

Sectoral needs Livelihoods: Previously drought-affected populations are in need of assistance to protect their livelihoods, enable local food production, and prevent the adoption of negative WASH: Most people in Beledweyne district in Hiraan region take their water from open coping mechanisms (OCHA 17/05/2018). Nearly 50,000 hectares of cropland has been wells, which have been filled with contaminated floodwater and latrine overflow. With no inundated and 500 metric tons of household grain stores damaged, potentially worsening other choice, families continue to drink from these wells (Relief International 14/05/2018). food consumption gaps and limiting agricultural wage labour opportunities among poor Banaadir region has one of the highest concentrations of IDP settlements where access households in rural and urban areas. In Jubaland, at least 2,000 farmers lost crops that to safe water and proper sanitation was limited prior to the flooding (Somali Ministry of Health were almost ready for harvesting, with additional farming infrastructure such as irrigation 06/05/2018). The heavy rains and flooding in Banaadir have resulted in extensive damage pumps damaged. In Beledweyne, crops as well as food supplies in local shops have been to latrines, increasing the risk of disease outbreaks (OCHA 25/05/2018; OCHA 24/05/2018). In lost due to the floods (OCHA 24/05/2018). Many flood affected populations have lost other Kismayo district in Lower Juba, affected communities especially in Farjano IDP sources of income, as gravel quarries and other business centres were either damaged settlement are using contaminated water from open water sources (Somali Ministry of Health or under flood water (Radio Ergo 28/05/2018). 20/05/2018).

Education: An estimated 10,000 students have no access to education as floods have Health: The destruction of 2,500 latrines and ensuing contamination of water sources in destroyed schools and educational material. Schools in Baidoa are strained due to an Galgadud, Dolow, Dhobley, Baidoa and Afgooye has already led to a surge in water and influx of IDP children, whose families have relocated in search of humanitarian support. vector-borne diseases in areas already grappling with an AWD/cholera outbreak since There is need for the creation of additional learning spaces as well in Agfoye due to the (OCHA 24/05/2018). December 2017 New outbreaks of AWD/Cholera have been reported as increase in IDP children in the area (OCHA 17/05/2018). Schools in Hiraan region are yet to a result of the heavy rains and flooding in the central and south of the country. As of 20th

EUTM - SOMALIA 42 EUTM - SOMALIA 31/05/2018 open, delaying resumption of national examinations halted on 20 May due to the weather Lessons learned conditions (UNAMIS 23/05/2018). Nutrition: Already high malnutrition rates (13.8% GAM and 1.9% SAM) are projected to • Experiences from 2013, earlier and later years illustrate that rights violations and worsen in the coming weeks and months in affected areas because floods are a risk protracted displacement may be triggered by situations of flooding, especially along factor for the outbreak of communicable diseases such as AWD/Cholera and malaria, the fertile riverbanks (OCHA 24/05/2018). which are some of the underlying drivers of malnutrition (OCHA 24/05/2018). • A lack of adequate land registration, as well as the communal nature of land

ownership and dynamics around clan protection, may result in escalations of Humanitarian and operational constraints intercommunal conflict related to livelihoods and land (OCHA 24/05/2018). Health Cluster funding shortfalls continue to hamper the delivery of lifesaving health • Vulnerable communities dependent on subsistence farming are unwilling to depart services to the most vulnerable people, including children and IDPs (OCHA 17/05/2018). from their villages, even when flooded, due to a fear of losing communal land and other assets (OCHA 24/05/2018). Response capacity Affected people by region Local and national response capacity The Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MoHADMA) and authorities in Banaadir, Jubaland and South West State have appealed for urgent humanitarian assistance. A National Flood Committee composed of 22 members from the Government and Civil society to be chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister has been established to coordinate flood response (OCHA 24/05/2018). The Federal Ministry and State level MoH in coordination with Health cluster partners are working to respond to the active outbreaks of disease as a result of the floods as well as prevention measures (Somali Ministry of Health 20/05/2018). Local NGOs are working to provide humanitarian assistance and also educate populations on disease prevention and flood risks (Radio Ergo 28/05/2018). International response capacity UN agencies and INGOs are present providing shelter and NFIs assistance, health, and WASH assistance, particularly to IDPs and other vulnerable communities.

Information gaps and needs

Data on specific sectoral needs is very limited. The severity of shelter damage is largely unknown across most flood affected areas. The extent to which food stocks have been damaged or lost is unknown. Lack of information on service provision at site level UNHCR 14/05/2018 Inadequate information on the needs of previously flood displaced people who have returned to their homes. Sources: OCHA 24/05/2018

EUTM - SOMALIA 43