Forum Shopping’ - Characterising the Dispute to Facilitate ‘Forum Shopping’

‘Forum Shopping’ - Characterising the Dispute to Facilitate ‘Forum Shopping’

‘It is sophistry to try to conceptualise the dispute as something else. Even if it is possible to characterise the dispute as having other characteristics too, such additional attributes do not dispel the validity of the finding that it fell within the purview of section 186(1)(b). In a judicial system where jurisdiction over causes of action is divided among several fora, it is no surprise that the imposition of what is, for policy reasons, an artificial ring-fencing of types of disputes, will from time to time result in a rubbing-up against the edges. However, where a clear characterisation is possible, it is not sensible to force a different characterisation to facilitate forum shopping.’ [At 20]

[SIBONGILE ZUNGU and PREMIER, PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-NATAL MEC, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, KWAZULU-NATAL (Case no: DA 11/20) [2017] ZALAC ( 16 May 2017)].

Summary

Unfair dismissal – reasonable expectation that a fixed term contract would be renewed - employee seeking to compel a renewal of her contract based on a legitimate expectation premised on a recommendation by a selection panel – employee contending that the refusal to heed to the recommendation of the selection panel amounts to illegality clothing the Labour Court with jurisdiction – Held that this dispute is squarely within the realm of section 186 (1)(b) of the LRA - characterising the dispute as having other characteristics too, does not dispel the validity of the finding that it fell within the purview of section 186(1)(b) - where a clear characterisation is possible, it is not sensible to force a different characterisation to facilitate forum shopping - a claim that a fixed term contract be renewed on the grounds of a legitimate expectation is a species of “dismissal”, as defined in section 186 and is further regulated by section 191 of the LRA to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CCMA. Labour Court’s judgment upheld and appeal dismissed with costs.

Coram: Tlaletsi AJP and Sutherland JA

Background

This matter is an appeal against the order of the Labour Court [LC] that was given on 21 April 2015 dismissing the appellant’s [the employee] urgent application for a final interdict and ancillary relief.

The employee, Dr Sibongile Zungu, was head of Department [HOD] of the Department of Health in Kwa-Zulu Natal[KZN] in terms of a fixed five-year contract from 1 August 2009 to 31 July 2014. Short-term extensions were made prolonging her term of office, the last of which was to expire on 31 March 2015.

A day before it became apparent that there would be no further extension or renewal, the urgent application was launched, on 1 April 2014, the day the Premier wrote to the employee to say he would not renew it.

The aim of the urgent application was to compel a renewal of the fixed-term contract.

The Labour Court Proceedings:

In an ex tempore judgment, the LC did not address the substantive issues raised in the application.

The dismissal was premised on two procedural grounds:

The first: it was held that the LC had no jurisdiction to hear the application because the nature of the dispute between the appellant and the respondents was such that adjudication about such a dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).

The second: no case was made out for urgency nor was a case made out for final interdictory relief.

If the judgment by the LC was confined to urgency it could have been brought again and that aspect was irrelevant insofar as the appeal was concerned.

The critical issues for a decision on appeal; and so it was found by the LAC were the following:

(1) Whether the LC was wrong to hold it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, and if it was wrong on that point?

(2) Was a proper case made out for an interdict?

The requirements for an interdict are: i) a clear right; ii) imminent irreparable harm, and iii) no alternative effective remedy.

[See: Webster v Mitchell 1948(1) Sa 1186 (W)].

The Lac Proceedings

Relief sought: i) Employer interdicted from employing any other person than the employee in the position;

2 ii) Directing employer to employee, the employee in the position following a recommendation made by an independent selection committee; iii) Declaring that the Premier was not entitled to take into account a provisional report prepared by an investigation team following complaints lodged by NEHAWU against the employee.

In short: the employee sought to be appointed as HOD to the exclusion of any other potential candidate. The prayer in (iii) was found to be superfluous, as the other two prayers allow no room for any degree of discretion by the Premier. Nor was the case advanced that, in the alternative, were the Premier entitled to ignore the panel’s recommendation, he would also be obliged to ignore the investigation

The employee in substance sought a declaratory from the LAC as relief.

The allegations relied on to assert a right to a renewal of appointment were set out in the employee’s affidavits.

What is the right relied upon by the appellant/employee?

The employee’s “cause of action” (as persisted with in argument) was be summarised as follows:

8.1. A selection panel recommended her for a renewed appointment for five years which decision binds the Premier.

8.2. The employee had a legitimate expectation of a renewal of her appointment.

In order to substantiate the bald allegation that the Premier was bound by the selection panel’s recommendation, she invoked regulation D5 – D8 of the Public Service Regulations [for the sake of brevity not repeated in this summary].

Of significance was the employee’s contention at 19 of the supplementary affidavit and quoted hereunder:

“Accordingly, the Premier is acting unlawfully in breach of the regulations quoted above. But more importantly, his conduct is in any event susceptible to review by this Court under Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (“PAJA”), in particular, the provisions of Section 6(2)(d) in that his action is materially influenced by an error, alternatively Section 6(2)(e) in that his action was taken for a reason not authorised by the empowering provisions; further alternatively, Section 6(2)(e)(ii) in that his actions was influenced by an ulterior purpose or motive, further alternatively his action was taken in bad faith and/or arbitrarily and/or capriciously as envisaged in Section 6(2)(e)(v) and (vi) and further alternatively because his action is otherwise unlawful and unconstitutional as envisaged in Section 6(2)(i).”

The LAC found “As is apparent from this traverse of the allegations, the appellant’s case shifted over time.”[At 14].

The employee’s case as to why the Labour Court’s judgment was in error was that the cause of action was based on an allegation that the Premier’s unlawful conduct and not, as found by the LC, a dispute contemplated by Section 186(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 - ie a refusal to renew a fixed term contract.

It was contended that the legitimate expectation of a renewal was indeed squarely based on the selection panel’s recommendation which bound the Premier, whose decision to take into account the investigation report, which arose outside of the panel’s assessments, was unlawful.

It was argued, that the above did not support the notion that there was a “dismissal” dispute reserved for the attention of the CCMA, rather it was all about “legality” of the Premier’s conduct.

The LAC edified the doctrine of legitimate expectation, “[27] A legitimate expectation ‘arises where a person responsible for taking a decision has induced in someone who may be affected by the decision, a reasonable expectation that he will receive or attain a benefit or that he will be granted a hearing before the decision is taken'. [See: National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips 2002 (4) SA 60 (W)].

Evaluation of the arguments:

The first exercise conducted by the LAC was to read the allegations in the affidavits and make a determination. The perusal of the allegations contained in the affidavits was not primarily, the form of relief sought, but rather the necessary averments to demonstrate the “cause of action” that determines the “character” of the dispute, although the form of the relief, if it was consonant with the cause of action, would point in the same direction.

The LAC found that the papers disclosed that an employee whose term of employment was about to expire, sought to compel a renewal.

The right to renewal was articulated as a legitimate expectation premised on a recommendation by a selection panel, allegedly binding upon the executive authority vested with the power to make the decision to appoint.

The LAC found that the dispute was squarely within the realm of section 186 (1)(b) of the LRA, as a reading of that text plainly demonstrated.

The Court stated that it ‘is sophistry to try to conceptualise the dispute as something else.’ Even if it was possible to characterise the dispute as having other characteristics too, such additional attributes could not dispel the validity of the finding that it fell within the purview of section 186(1)(b).

‘In a judicial system where jurisdiction over causes of action is divided among several fora, it is no surprise that the imposition of what is, for policy reasons, an artificial ring-fencing of types of disputes, will from time to time result in a rubbing-up against the edges.’

However, where a clear characterisation was possible, it was not sensible to force a different characterisation to facilitate forum shopping. 4

“There can be no serious doubt that the legislation contemplates and requires a claim that a fixed term contract be renewed on the grounds of a legitimate expectation is a species of “dismissal”, as defined in section 186 and is further regulated by section 191 of the LRA to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CCMA.”

As to the scattered contentions advanced on behalf of the employee, the LAC noted that:

(1) The argument about the applicability of PAJA was incorrect, given the “pure” labour relations dimension of the dispute; and

(2) Whether the Premier was indeed bound to the selection panel’s recommendations, was not a point upon which the Court needed to pronounce; a dispute about that issue being subsumed by the broader dispute about a non-renewal of a fixed term contract.

Conclusions:

The decision of the LC to disavow jurisdiction was correct.

Moreover, it was manifest that proof of a clear right necessary for a final interdict was absent.

The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Johann Scheepers

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