United Nations FIRST COMMITTEE 918th GENERAL MEETING Tuesday, 3 December 1957, ASSEMBLY at 10.45 a.m. TWELFTH SESSION Official Records NEW YORK

CONTENTS as one of them had explained, it had neither judicial nor disciplinary authority. The report of the Commission Agenda item 59: had not been published, a fact which the French Govern­ The question of Algeria (continued) ...... • 287 ment had not explained. On the other hand, a delegation of the International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices had reported that torture was being Chairman: Mr. Djalal ABDOH (Iran). used to extort confessions and obtain information, and that persons disappeared without explanation. Mr. Lacoste had refused to allow a committee of the French AGENDA ITEM 59 Radical Socialist Party to make an on-the-spot inquiry, undoubtedly for fear that its findings would be similar. The question of Algeria (A/3617 and Add.l) (continued) In a letter explaining his refusal, Mr. Lacoste had 1. Mr. LARAKI (Morocco) pointed out that, by adopting told the four members of the proposed committee that resolution 1012 (XI) on Algeria at the eleventh session he would have to provide several thousand armed para­ by a unanimous vote, which had included the affirma­ troopers for their personal protection. It might well tive votes of the delegations now invoking Article 2, be asked, in the circumstances, how many millions paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, of French soldiers would be required to maintain the the General Assembly had once again demonstrated r~gime which the French wished to impose onAlgeria that it was competent to deal with the question. The against the wishes of the Algerian people. It was clear arguments to the contrary were strangely similar to that the methods used by the French against the Alger­ those which had been heard in the Committee in respect ian nationalists served only to inflame hatred and to of the Tunisian and Moroccan question. Moreover, the provoke retaliation by violence. France was pitting a facts of history and the legal considerations adduced by powerful army equipped with modern weapons against Mr. Pineau, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, a whole people fighting for its freedom. It might in his statement (913th meeting) showing that Algeria succeed in crushing resistance in the cities tempor­ had been part of France since 1848, were far from arily or in reducing the number of overt acts by intimi­ convincing. dation, but it could not prevent the Algerians from continuing a struggle for the principles proclaimed in 2. Since the adoption of resolution 1012 (XI) express­ the French.Constitution. The use of force wasdoomed ing the General Assembly's hope for a peaceful settle­ to failure. ment, the French repression in Algeria had assumed 4. The Algerian war raised sePious problems be­ such proportions as to arouse the indignation of the tween France and Morocco. Apart from the questions whole world. The optimistic forecast of a quick end to which had remained unsettled when the French pro­ the war made by Mr. Robert Lacoste, French Minister tectorate had come to an end-the fixing of Morocco's for Algeria, had proved unfounded. The country was southern frontiers and the presence of the French still in the throes of a fierce struggle against French army in the country-Morocco now was confronted with domination and was far from "returning to normal" a war raging at its very doorstep which threatened to as Mr. Pineau had asserted. Using the slogan of spread and a steady flow of refugees across its "pacification", the French were consolidating their borders. The Algerian conflict weighed heavily on the reign of fear and doing their utmost to prolong and ex­ Moroccan economy. What was even more serious, ~ow­ tend the wat:. They were being forced to call up fresh ever, was that it might eventually involve all of North contingents to deal with the ever-increasing number Africa. The presence and actions of thousands of armed of incidents and clashes which occurred daily. soldiers in Algeria were a clear threat to international 3. The methods used by France in its "pacification" peace and security. of Algeria were contrary to the Universal declaration 5. The Moroccan delegation did not agree that the of Human Rights and the principles of the Charter. He loi-cadre (basic law) which France sought to impose cited the protests of a number of eminent Frenchmen on Algeria would put an end to the conflict. The text against the use o~ .orture and other brutal procedures adopted was less liberal than the original text be­ which, in the view of one witness, were comparable to cause it was an attempt to reconcile the views of the those employed by the Nazis in Germany during the various French political parties rather than to take Second World War. The indignationtheyhadarousedin account of the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian world public opinion was such that, on 6 April 1957, the people. Moreover, under the loi-cadre, Algeria, French Government under Prime Minister Guy Mollet Which was basically a unitary State, WO\).ld be split had established a commission for the protection of up into several regions along ethnic lines, which were human rights in Algeria, the Commission de sauve­ ultimately to constitute a federation. Mr. Gaston garde des droits et des libert~s individuels. However, Defferre, the French minister who had been respon­ certain distinguished members of that Commission sible for the loi-cadre for the French African terri­ had since asked to be relieved oftheirduties because, tories, had stated that the effect of the division of 287 A/C.1/SR.918 288 General Assembly - Twelfth Session - First Committee Algeria would be to pit the various regions against al aspirations, would artificially divide a country which each other so that they would refuse to come together was essentially a single entity, and would impose a in a future federation. France was using the ancient statute arbitrarily. Mr. Pineau had himself explained tactic of "divide and rule". that it was a law laying down certain principles. The 6. While the loi-cadre provided for the establish­ loi-cadre was therefore a legislative act having effect ment of so-called territorial assemblies authorized as from the time of its promulgation. It could not be to deal with local interests, it nowhere defined those successfully implemented because it had been drawn local interests and it removed from the purview of the up without consulting the Algerian people and would be assemblies such matters as justice, police and security applied without their consent. The representatives of ;md electoral laws, reserving them for the exclusive the Algerian people rejected it. The Algerian problem competence of the French Parliament. Indeed, the was not a problem of legislative reform; it was a French Government would retain all political and political issue which could be resolved only by recog­ sovereign powers. The federative council and the nizing the Algerians' right of self-determination. It federative assembly were to assist the Minister for should be candidly recognized that the positions ofthe Algeria and would deal only with questions delegated French Government and the Algerians were diametri­ to them by the territorial assemblies. They would cally opposed: the Algerians were demanding recog­ have no power with respect to the questions reserved nition of their sovereignty and the establishment of for the French Parliament. The Minister for Algeria their own government; the French Government main­ would exercise sole authority in those matters. Thus, tained that France's sovereignty over Algeria could the loi-cadre made it impossible for Algeria to estab­ not be questioned and it attempted, by legislative lish autonomous legislative and executive branches reforms, to strengthen an anachronistic colonial exercising political powers. r6gime, and to maintain it by force of arms. In the circumstances, either the French Government would 7. Mr. Pineau had asserted that the lot-cadre was force its reform on the Algerians and a cease-fire a first step and that it was of an evolutionary nature. would become out of the question or, what was more In reality, it could evolve only by the will of the French likely, it would have to abandon its plan to impose the Parliament through the enactment of laws or as are­ loi-cadre. In the view of the Moroccan delegation, sult of a revision of the French Constitution of October it was only by recognizing Algeria's right to independ­ 1946. Furthermore, the principle of the single electoral ence and by negotiating with the Algerians that the roll had merely been proclaimed; it had not yet been bloodshed could be ended and France's true interests applied. Indeed, it would have been logical to apply it served. when the equality of all the inhabitants of Algeria was proclaimed by the Statute adopted on 20 September 9. The Government of Morocco had consistently 1947, but that Statute had remained without effect. An attempted to bring about the rapprochement which analysis of the draft electoral law showed, moreover, was necessary to a peaceful solution of the Algerian that what the Government was actually offering was not problem. The intensification of the war led it to de­ a single electoral college, but a revival of the old plore even more strongly the incident of October electoral colleges. Finally, it would be seen from the 1956 when the French had captured the Algerian terms of the loi-cadre that French sovereignty would leaders en route for a conference to be held at continue to be exercised at all levels. The Minister Tunis at which proposals were to have been worked for Algeria, appointed by the French Government, out for the consideration of the French Government. would be directly responsible for all government The . Moroccan Government had repeatedly appealed services; he would presJde over the federal govern­ to the· French to enter into negotiations with the ment and appoint the representatives of that govern­ Algerian spokesmen. Most recently, the King of ment throughout the country. The head of each terri­ Morocco and the President of Tunisia had offered torial government would also be appointed by France. their good offices to France and to the leaders of the The territorial assemblies would be represented in National Liberation Front (FLN). It was an offer of the federative assembly only after two years. In mediation intended to facilitate contacts between the four years, negotiations on the loi-cadre could be two parties; the negotiations themselves would be undertaken with the French Parliament, provided the held between the parties directly concerned. The proposals for changes were agreed upon by the terri­ reasons given by France for rejecting the offer were torial assemblies and the federative assembly. The spurious; the truth was that France could not accept veto of a single territorial assembly would be suf­ it because mediation was based on the premise, un­ ficient to nullify the whole process of" evolution" of the acceptable to France, that there were two parties loi-cadre. It had been stated that the territorial concerned in the question. The French continued to assemblies were to provide recognized spokesmen for hold, on the contrary, that the Algerian question was the Algerian voters, but if that were the case they one of domestic jurisdiction and that France alone should be free to negotiate and to present their was competent to resolve it by unilateral action. conditions, and those conditions might conceivably 10. Morocco would continue to support Algeria's include a demand for the complete independence for aspirations for freedom and independence; it was Algeria. However, article 1 oftheloi-cadreprecluded committed to do so by the United Nations Charter, the such conditions by stating expressly that Algeria Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its recog­ was an integral part of France. Consequently, elec­ nition of the right of peoples to self-determination. tions in Algeria as envisaged by the French were not France's insistence that only a cease-fire should be intended to produce genuine spokesmen for the Algerian negotiated was the real obstacle to negotiations. The people with powers to discuss the future government Moroccan delegation appealed to the parties to enter ()f their country. into immediate negotiations. The United Nations 8. The loi-cadre would not help to settle the problem should not disappoint the peoples seeking their free­ of Algeria because it worked againstAlgeria'snation- dom and independence. 918th meeting - 3 December 1957 289 11. Mr. MENA SOLORZANO (Nicaragua) took the gerian liberation movement as the activities of a few view that it might not be as difficult as some speakers scattered groups of terrorists who sought revenge had maintained to find a democratic and equitable against France and he had claimed that the movement solution to the Algerian problem. He deplored the was dying down as a result of the so-called "pacifi­ violence with which. the Algerian nationalists were cation" policy, which in fact was nothing but brute force seeking to make their viewpoint prevail. Those who and naked terror. In reality, however, the Algerian were familiar with French history and political de­ liberation movement was growing rapidly, and the velopment did not doubt France's sincerity and good number of Algerians fighting for their freedom and will in helping Algeria on the road to independence, independence had multiplied threefold during the past as France had helped so many other peoples-Morocco year. and Tunisia, for example-in the past. 19. That movement, supported not only by all peace­ 12. He could not accept the contention that France loving nations, but also by many progressive persons was intransigent and was frustrating the right of self­ in France itself, had been the underlying cause of determination in Algeria. France had had ties with economic difficulties and political crises in France; Algeria for many years, had introduced there its cul­ yet the French Government stubbornly maintained ture, language, education and ideals. As the French its policy. The concentration of French forces in Minister of Foreign Affairs had pointed out, there Algeria not only belied the statement that the liber­ were many persons of European origin in Algeria ation movement had been suppressed, but showed that and many Algerian Moslems living in France. the French Government was determined to continue a bitter colonial war which, while it claimed count­ 13. He did not speak for a c.ountry which possessed less victims, could never restore France's former great armaments, but he did represent the views of a domination. free nation which had practical experience in the principle of "live and let live". It was only natural 20. Moreover, on the pretext of the so-called "right that Algeria should want freedom and that France of pursuit" which had no ba~is in international law, should not wish to see its work destroyed or its France was carrying the war to the territories of Tu­ interests unprotected. It was therefore not possible nisia and Morocco, where many peaceful inhabitants to proceed on a unilateral basis, and negotiations were had already been killed. As the Tunisian representative necessary if a reasonable solution was to be found. had pointed out in letters to the Secretary-General, those frontier violations were deliberate, and consti­ 14. The countries of Latin America remembered and tuted flagrant violations of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the were proud of their Spanish heritage and had recently Charter. The Moroccan Government had lodged a sim­ welcomed Spain in the United Nations. It was therefore ilar protest. The Algerian question had also been the eminently possible that, with the passage of time, a subject of diplomatic negotiations between the French similar feeling would grow up between Algeria anct Government and other Governments and had been dis­ France. The example of India showed that it was cussed at length at the African-Asian Conference held possible for a nation to gain its independence by non­ at Bandung in 1955. Lastly, it was being debated for the violent methods and to l'emain on terms of friendship third time by the General Assembly. There could there­ and co-operation with its former rulers. fore no longer be any doubt that, while in the beginning 15. In his delegation's view, there should be a cease­ it might have been a domestic matter, it had now be­ fire after which negotiations should be started. The re­ come an international problem, and that it was the duty verse procedure would be illogical. France was asking of the United Nations to promote its settlement by only for fair play, and it was for the United Nations to bringing to an end the Algerian war. ensure fair play and give France the chance of proving 21. France's successive governments, which on the its good faith. He was convinced that the Algerian whole maintained the same policy towards Algeria, had nationalists wished to advance their cause rather than tried to give the hnpression, as a sop to French and do any'l:hing to its detriment, and he therefore con­ world public opinion, that they were endeavouring to sidered that it would be desirable to devise a draft bring about a peaceful settlement. However, the draft resolut¥m which would clearly state that the problem law on Algeria's new status, approved by the National could be solved if it was agreed that there would be Assembly on 29 November 1957, was certainly not a a cease-fire first, to be followed by talks. His dele­ step in that direction. As the Tunisian representative gation had full confidence in the good faith of France. had stated (914th meeting), the inadequate reforms em­ 16. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Re­ bodied in it were doomed to failure because they did publics) deplored that, as Mr. Pineau had made plain not provide for equal rights for the indigenous in­ in his statement, the French Government intended to habitants of Algeria. The law had been drafted without continue its attempt to resolve the Algerian question any consultation with Algerian representatives and its by force of arms. That mistaken policy was bound to opening words, proclaiming Algeria to 'be an integral maintain acute tension in the region, and thus create part of the French Republic, showed that it had been a situation constituting a serious threat to interna­ prepared in the interests of French monopolists and tional.peace and security. colonialists and not in those oftheAlgerianpeople. Its experience in Viet-Nam should have shown the French 17. Ignoring the moderate resolution adopted by the Government that a continuation of its policy of re­ General Assembly at its eleventh session, the French pression of the Algerian people would only widen the Government had intensified its military operations in gulf between France and Algeria, a result which would Algeria, and bloodshed and devastation were the be to the dirct advantage of those who pursued their own result; Algerian z:efugees who fled to Tunisia and aims and were doing their best to force France entire­ Morocco alone numbered 300,000. ly out of North Africa and to take over its resources. 18. Mr. Pineau had described the nation-wide Al- 22. After the Second World War, the Arab population 290 General Assembly - Twelfth Session - First CommitteE' of Algeria had sought reform by peaceful ways, but It believed that hostilities in Algeria should cease at it had met with savage resistance on the part of the once and that a peaceful settlement should be found. French administration. It was only natural that the While it was fully aware of the complexities of the Algeri:p1 people, weary of their subject status, had question, it felt that such a settlement would be as followed the example of many other colonial countries much in the interests of France as of Algeria. It and had decided to fight for their national independence. was aware of the special historical ties between the Their struggle was part ofagreathistoricalprocess­ two countries and would welcome a mutually advanta­ the disintegration of colonialism and imperialism. geous agreement between them. It was confident that Since 1945, more than 1,300 million persons had the cessation of the Algerian war and the satisfaction freed themselves from the colonial yoke and had formed of the national aspirations of the Algerian people independent, rapidly developing States. That was the would result in friendly and fruitful relations between process the French Government was vainly attempting France and Algeria and urged the United Nations to to arrest by armed force, justifying its actions by the make every effort to attain that end. absurd allegation that the Algerian liberation move­ ment was not supported by the people, but was inspired 25. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria), recalling his earlier from abroad or by Algerian communists. Attempts by statement (915th meeting) that a just and durable certain representatives in the Committee to equate settlement of the Algerian issue could be based on the that movement with the counter-revolutionary Putsch precedents established in the cases of Morocco and in Hungary were equally absurd. It was plain that the Tunisia, said his delegation continued to believe that French Government was denying the Algerian people such a solution would represent a logical continuation its right of self-determination and refusing peaceful of the policy pursued by France in the case of the other negotiation in the hope of a military victory. After two countries and a logical extension of the settlements three years of war, however, the French Government reached, with French agreement, in those cases. should realize that such a victory was out of the It could not agree with the view of Mr. Giscard question and should seriously consider means of d'Estaing who had said (917th meeting) that no analogy peaceful settlement, taking full account of the interests existed between Algeria and the other two NorthAfri­ of the Algerian people. can countries either in law, in fact or in the prevail­ ing state of mind. 23. The more progressive of the French political leaders were seriously alarmed at the Algerian situa­ 26. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing had argued that Algeria's tion and many of them were demanding the end of the juridical status was different from that of the other two countries because the latter had been protector­ war. Among them was no less a figure than Mr. ates. That was true. But what then was Algeria's Pierre Mend~s-France, head of the Radical Social­ ist Party ·and former Prime Minister, who had advo­ position? It was neither a protectorate nor a colony or Trust Territory, and it was surely not an integral part cated the restoration of civil rights and freedoms in of France, since French legislation had never applied Algeria and negotiations through the intermediary of to Algeria and the legal status of Algerians had always Tunisia and of Moroi(CO and who had strongly crit­ differed from that of Frenchmen. According to the icized the draft law of 29 November. In continuing its French Constitution of 1946, the relationship between unpopular war in Algeria, the French Government was protecting the French monopolists who were interest­ Algeria and France was one of union, but that union ed in the oil and other natural resources recently was neither a voluntary one nor one based on equal discovered in the Sahara. Those resources had rights and duties, since Algerians had never enjoyed aroused the interest of United States monopolies as the same rights as Frenchmen. well, and, under pressure, the French Government in 27. Algeria nad enjoyed full statehood as a national August 1957 had agreed to the creation of a United entity before the French occupation, maintaining States-French oil syndicate for oil prospecting in that international relations in the form of treaties, with area. Forty-five per cent of the syndicate's shares many States. In 1830 the French had landed in Algeria, were owned by two United States companies. The attacked the city of Algiers and, after surrounding French had hoped that the concession would win the his army, had forced the Dey, in whom Algerian United States support of the colonial war in Algeria; sovereignty had been vested, to surrender. The act of but the United States monopolies wanted all the oil, surrender of 5 July 183111 was the only legal instru­ rather than a share, and were therefore doing their ment applying to Algeria. But that document was a best to force the French out of North Mrica. As it military, not a political instrument, and applied to happened, their interests coincided with the military the city of Algiers and some of its suburbs, not to and strategic interests of the United States Govern­ Algeria as a whole. Moreover, under Moslem law, ment, which wanted to establish military bases in which was then applicable in Algeria, the Dey could North African countries now governed by France, not cede sovereignty over the country, nor had he done to be used both against the Socialist countries and so. Thus, although France had entered into treaties against any national liberation movement in Mrica with Tunisia and Morocco and therefore had some and the Near East. Those plans were as contrary to basis, from the strictly juridical point of view, for the interests of the peoples concerned as they were to intervening in their affairs, in the case of Algeria there those of France. The French Government should there­ had been no transfer of sovereignty at all, and the case fore consider the Algerian situation and its possible for Algerian independence was even stronger than that consequences very. seriously indeed. of Tunisia or Morocco. France's status had been and remained that of an occupying Power and its continued 24. The position of the USSR on theAlgerianquestion occupation of the country could establish no legal was clear, and had been explained several times in the United Nations. The USSR held that every people had .!/ Convention entre le Gen~ral en chef de 1'arm~e fran<;aise the right to freedom, independence and self-govern­ et Son Altesse le Dey d'Alger, signed before Algiers on 5 ment and that the Algerian people was no exception. July 1830. 918th meeting - 3 December 1957 291 claim, especially since the Algerian people had never which had been referred to were not difficulties at all ceased to resist it. and that negotiations would solve the other matters still pending between Algeria and France. But in his 28. Leaving law aside, the situation was quite clear. delegation's view the main obstacle to a solution was All three countries shared the same language, people, not the difficulty of finding one, but French reluctance. culture and living conditions; all three had been It seemed that French policy remained based on an occupied by France and subjected to the same French attempt to pacify Algeria in order to impose a uni­ policies of pacification, assimilation and exploitation, lateral solution. But that policy meant a continuation and all shared the problems posed by the presence of of the war. What was necessary was a change in French colonists and the French policy of "divide and France's outlook on the problem. The struggle of the rule" The French had in fact ruled directly in all Algerian people for liberation was a part of the three countries. Thus in all essentials, the actual irreversible movement of national liberation which had situation of the three countries was exactly the same. brought independence to 700 million people during the 29. He was not sure whether the French representa­ last decade alone. It was time for the French people tive's reference to states of mind had been intended to to realize that they must seek co-operation with apply to the state of mind of the French or of the Algeria rather than domination over it. Algerian people. However, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing had argued that the situation in Algeria was differentfrom 34. The loi-cadre, to which Mr. Giscardd'Estainghad that of the other two countries because of the great referred, could not be regarded as a solution to the attachment of the Algerian people to France and their Algerian problem because it was a unilateral French desire to remain under French rule. His delegation action, because it represented no basic change in disagreed completly with that view, for the Algerian French policy and because it in no way affected the people were demonstrating the greatest resistance to fundamentals of the Algerian problem. foreign rule displayed by any people in modern times, 35. The Nicaraguan representative had implied that and it was obvious that the vast majority of them want­ only blameless delegations had the right to attack ed independence. The attachment of the Algerian France. But his delegation had not wish to do so. What people to France was a forced attachment, ensured at the Assembly could and should accomplish at the present by three-quarters of a million troops. The present session was to open ·the eyes of all concerned, repression needed to maintain it was so great that to guide them onto the right path and to ensure that the even the conscience of France and of the French people cumulative effect of past errors was overcome in had turned against French policy there. But if the accordance with the principles of the Charter. His French wished to contest the facts of that repression delegation hoped that France would take that path. and the facts regarding the real feelings ofthe Alger­ Meanwhile, it believed that the United Nations should ian people, they should be prepared, as his ~elegation continue its efforts to convince both France and was·, to accept an international investigation into the Algeria to enter into negotiations in order to settle acts of repression committed in Algeria and the hold­ their differences on the basis of national independence. ing of a plebiscite under United Nations supervision That was the only just and feasible course, and on the question of independence. He asked the French the only one which would redound to the honour delegation if it was prepared to accept those two steps. of France and fulfil the mission of the ·United Na­ 30. The French representative had attempted to read tions. into the statements made by the Tunisian and Syrian 36. Mr. ST. LOT (Haiti) said tha• the question of representatives a difference between their points of Algeria, involving as it did the right of self-deter­ view. But no such difference existed, for in both cases mination, placed his delegation in a most difficult the solution proposed was based on Algerian independ­ position. By tradition it sympathized with those who ence, and the need for negotiations between France claimed freedom and justice; yet it had feelings of and Algeria to settle the problem. The French delega­ gratitude towards France for the part it had played in tion could choose either the Syrian or the Tunisian the history of man's unceasing strife against all that formulation of that solution; it made no difference to threatened to retard his full development. It was iron­ his delegation. ical that France should now be embroiled in an 31. The French representative had also stated that unequal battle for issues which were utterly at vari­ the representative of Syria had expressed the point ance with its cultural heritage, its prestige in the of view of one of the extremist rebel groups. That world of ideas and its great traditions. attempt to differentiate between the groups of rebels in Algeria was out of date and not in conformity with 37. It was perhaps fortunate•J.or the glory of France the facts. The end for which all the rebels were fight­ that it was divided by the Algerian issue.lf cofrsi~ra­ ing was the same. tions of an essentially practical nature hampered the French Government in its search for a just solution, 32. The rights of the French colons in Algeria to the friends of France, together with a large part of remain there, and to enjoy their individual rights the French people, must help to find a·solution worthy regardless of whether they chose French or Algerian of French traditions and likely to ensure their persist­ citizenship, should be safeguarded. They formed about ence. The brilliance of contemporary French culture the same proportion in Algeria as in Tunisia and should have convinced France's present leaders that Morocco, and the solution which had been success­ a State's power and influence did not depend on eco­ fully applied in Morocco and Tunisia could also be nomic factors alone. applied in Algeria. 38. The fundamental disagreement concerned the 33. It had not been his delegation's intention to present French statement that Algeria was an integral part a complete and detailed solution to the Algerian prob­ of France; the French delegation based its argument lem, but merely to indicate that some of the difficulties that the General Assembly was not competent in the 292 General Assembly - Twelfth Session - First Committee matter on that premise - which the Haitian delegation independence. France was just as firm in wishing to did not accept. The Tunisian representative, who was grant a statute which certainly improved the Algerians' the spokesman for the Arab community involved in personal situation but was still far short of the require­ the dispute, had dismissed as a legal fiction the con­ ments of those who demanded immediate independence. tention that Algeria was part of France. Indeed, a For the last four years, Algerian claims had been pre­ glance at the French Constitution, the basic principles sented, not merely as a request, but by force of arms. of the loi-cadre and the attitude of the Press in A threat to international peace and security had metropolitan France, sufficed to show that, even though arisen, and the United Nations could not fail to meet the Algerian people might desire integration into the its responsibilities to prevent such a threat from de­ French community, that desire had not yet become veloping. reality. It was not easy to assimilate any racial group possessing its own civilization, language and religion, 39. His delegation was therefore prepared to support and the 130 years of French presence in Algeria had any draft resolution which respected the principles of not been sufficient to eliminate differences between the Charter and, in particular, the right of self­ the two racial groups which had formed pretexts for determination, and which would bring to Algeria a various kinds of political and legal discrimination. peace based on justice and respect for the rights and It was because of those considerations that an amic­ interests of the parties concerned. able solution was difficult to find. The Algerians, taking their stand on the Charter, demanded immediate The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

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