Opinionated Opportunity: How Public Opinion Mediates the Representation of Immigrant Origin Groups in Britain and Europe

OPINIONATED OPPORTUNITY: HOW PUBLIC OPINION MEDIATES THE REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANT ORIGIN GROUPS IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities.

2018

Patrick M. English

School of Social Sciences

Table of Contents LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ...... 4 ABSTRACT ...... 6 DECLARATION AND COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ...... 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 8 CHAPTER 1: THESIS OUTLINE AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW ...... 9 Introduction ...... 9 The Concept of Descriptive Representation ...... 11 Political Opportunity – Volatile Cultures versus Stable Structures ...... 15 Public Opinion as a Vital Component of Political Opportunity for Representation ...... 17 Public Opinion: Definitions and Measurement ...... 19 Immigrant Origin, White and Non-White Status as Unique Contentions ...... 21 Research Questions, Framework, and Hypotheses ...... 24 Representation and Public Opinion in Europe and Great Britain ...... 25 Thesis Outline ...... 27 CHAPTER 2: DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS ...... 30 Descriptive Representation ...... 30 Public Opinion ...... 36 The Stimson Dyad-Ratios Approach ...... 38 Independent Variables and Regression Techniques ...... 49 CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC OPINION AND REPRESENTATION ACROSS EUROPE – DOES ANTI-IMMIGRATION SENTIMENT PREVENT OR FACILITATE DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANT ORIGIN GROUPS? ...... 50 Introduction ...... 50 Descriptive Representation of Minority Groups in European Politics ...... 52 Public Opinion within the Framework of Political Opportunity ...... 60 Conception and Measurement of Public Opinion toward Immigration in Europe ...... 63 Public Opinion and Representation: Hypothesising the Relationship ...... 64 Hypothesising Acceptable Difference and Multiple Marginality ...... 65 Controlling for Political Systems, Rights, and Anti-Immigrant Party Institutionalisation ...... 66 Data and Methods ...... 69 Results ...... 78 Conclusions ...... 83 Appendix to Chapter 3 ...... 85 CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRATION AND THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS IN GREAT BRITAIN ...... 87 Introduction ...... 87 A Brief History of Immigration into Great Britain ...... 88 Immigrants and Their Rights in Great Britain ...... 91 Public Opinion on Immigration in Great Britain ...... 96 CHAPTER 5: THE DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM – PLACING MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN A BROADER ‘IMMIGRANT-ORIGIN’ CONTEXT ...... 102 Introduction ...... 102 Political Opportunity for Representation in Great Britain ...... 104

2 The Descriptive Representation of Immigrant Communities in Great Britain: 1992-2015 ...... 108 Representation in Britain’s Devolved Regions ...... 113 Demographics of Britain’s Immigrant Origin MPs ...... 116 Representing Constituencies – Immigrant Origin MPs and Their Seats ...... 123 Representation by Political Party ...... 125 Conclusions ...... 129 CHAPTER 6: VISIBLY RESTRICTED – PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANT ORIGIN COMMUNITIES ACROSS GREAT BRITAIN ...... 132 Introduction ...... 132 Context and Theoretical Outline...... 133 Political Opportunity for Representation ...... 135 Public Opinion Towards Immigration in the British Context: Extensive Regional Divisions ...... 137 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses ...... 138 Data and Measurement ...... 139 Results: Modelling the Relationship ...... 147 Causal Mechanism – Structure of Ethnic Minority Candidacy ...... 149 Conclusion ...... 152 Appendix to Chapter 6 ...... 153 CHAPTER 7: THE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF BRITAIN’S IMMIGRANT ORIGIN COMMUNITIES ...... 157 Introduction ...... 157 Literature Review ...... 159 The Roles of Influence and Responsibility in British Parliament ...... 164 Barriers to Political Representation – Both Nominal and Effective ...... 167 The Effective Descriptive Representation of Britain’s Immigrant Origin Communities...... 169 Effective Descriptive Representation and Public Opinion ...... 173 Individual Level Factors: Seniority, Demographics, and Experience...... 175 Effective Political Representation by Major British Political Parties ...... 180 Conclusions ...... 182 Appendix to Chapter 7 ...... 185 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS ...... 188 Summary of Results and Answering the Research Question and Central Hypothesis ...... 188 Puzzles and Problems Solved ...... 191 Contributions to Research and Literature...... 194 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 197 MAIN APPENDIX – PUBLIC OPINION MEASURES ...... 212 Cross National Public Opinion Measures ...... 212 Great Britain Public Opinion Measure...... 215

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3 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Table 3.1. Generalised linear regression: Public opinion and immigrant representation 79

Table 3.2. Generalised linear regression: Public opinion and white immigrant 80 representation

Table 3.3. Generalised linear regression: Public opinion and non-white immigrant 81 representation

Table A3.1. Descriptive information on GPOP immigration opinion measures 86

Table 5.1. The mirror status of the House of Commons from 1992-2015 110 Table 5.2. Immigrant group representation in the devolved regions 115

Table 5.3. Employment backgrounds and education levels of British MPs from 1992- 117 2015

Table 5.4. Average age and education levels of British MPs from 1992-2015 119

Table 5.5. Immigrant origin MPs and non-white British constituent density 124 Table 6.1. Generalised linear model regression results 148

Table 6.2. Ethnic minority candidates in the South East of England 150

Table 6.3. Ethnic minority candidates in the North West of England 151

Table A6.1. Descriptive and diagnostic information on public opinion measures 153

Table A6.2. Bootstrapped generalised linear model regression results (Ethnic minority 156 immigrant origin MPs)

Table 7.1. Representation of immigrant origin groups in parliamentary roles 171

Table 7.2. Percentage of groups attaining roles of influence and responsibility 172

Table 7.3. Average number of parliaments before MPs access roles 176 Table 7.4. Ordered logistic regression results 179

Table 7.5. Number of effective descriptive representatives by major British political 182 party

Table A7.1. Key Select Committees by parliamentary term 185 Table A7.2. Bootstrap estimation of confidence intervals – ordered logistic regression 187

Table MA.1. Cross-national public opinion sources and coverage 212

Table MA.2. Great Britain public opinion measure question items and factor loadings 215

Figures

Figure 3.1. Structure of immigrant origin status in European communities 54

Figure 3.2. Immigrant origin representation over time across Europe 72

Figure 3.3. White immigrant origin MPs in European parliaments since 1990 73 Figure 3.4. Public opinion toward immigration over time across Europe 76

Figure 3.5. Random Forest robustness check 81

Figure A3.1. Residual plots 85

Figure A3.2. Distribution of dependent variables 86

Figure 4.1. Immigration into the United Kingdom 90

Figure 4.2. Anti-immigrant public opinion in the United Kingdom 98

Figure 4.3. Vote share of anti-immigrant parties in Britain elections since 1983 99

Figure 4.4. Percentages of parliamentarians of immigrant origin in British parliaments 101 from 1992-2015

Figure 5.1. A three-tiered assessment of the representation of immigrant groups in 107 legislative bodies Figure 5.2. Gender diversity of immigrant origin groups in British parliament 122 Figure 5.3. Representation of immigrant origin groups by British political party 126 Figure 5.4. Ethnic minority immigrant origin representation by British political party 127 Figure 5.5. White immigrant origin representation by British political party 128 Figure 6.1. Public Opinion toward immigration at the regional level in Great Britain 140

Figure 6.2 Immigrant origin MP densities across Britain’s regions 143

Figure 6.3. White immigrant origin MP density across Britain’s regions 144

Figure 6.4. Ethnic minority immigrant origin MP density across Britain’s regions 145

Figure A6.1. Residual plots 154

Figure A6.2. Dependent variable distribution plots 155 Figure 7.1. Public opinion and access to roles by immigrant origin group 174

5 ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the impact of public opinion toward immigration on the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups in Britain and in six other European countries. It forms part of the wider Pathways project, which studies the representation of immigrant communities across Europe. This research begins by studying the connection between public opinion and representation at the country level in Europe before then proceeding with an in-depth case study analysis of Great Britain. It uses the theoretical framework of political opportunity to nest changing public opinion alongside a range of institutional, legal, and other social factors which temper opportunity for the political representation of non-native groups. Furthermore, the thesis engages with criticisms of the descriptive representation literature and provides some solutions to improve metrics of descriptive representation. It was hypothesised that as public opinion toward immigration became more hostile, so the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups would be adversely affected. Furthermore, it was expected that visible immigrant origin groups (those who are identifiably from non-native backgrounds) would be impacted to a much greater extent than those who share a great deal of commonality (in terms of race, appearance, and names) to the white majority groups across Europe. The results were mixed. Firstly, the thesis found that rising anti-immigrant hostility at the national level appeared to relate to higher levels of descriptive representation for visible immigrant origin groups, and had little impact on the representation of other immigrant origin communities. Secondly however, analysis of the Great British case at the regional level revealed how increasingly negative public opinion did in fact relate to decreasing descriptive representation for non-white (ethnic minority) immigrant origin groups (though it did not seem to impact their representation in roles of responsibility and influence in parliament). This supported the central hypothesis of the thesis. In short, the evidence in this thesis suggests that in country contexts of higher anti-immigrant public opinion, visible immigrant origin groups are engaged in countermobilisation to defend their interests and claims. However, regional variation in public opinion toward immigration dictates how and where visible non-native groups are able to improve their representation in parliament.

6 DECLARATION AND COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

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7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, my PhD Supervisors Dr Maria Sobolewska and Professor Rob Ford must be thanked enormously for all their time, effort, reading and rereading of drafts, plans, listening to my complaints and woes, and the opportunities they have provided me with to build a successful career. I must also thank and acknowledge the generous funding provided to me by the Economic and Social Research Council, under the Award Number: 1469172. Dr Steven Van Hauwaert and Professor Manlio Cinalli must also be thanked for spending significant amounts of their time and energy mentoring, co-authoring, and collecting data with me for our various endeavours – including elements of this thesis. I could not have completed a PhD thesis without the drive, energy, and self-belief built up in me over many years by my friends and departmental colleagues, my family (Kieran, Michele, Robert, Bob, Wendy, and everyone else), and my fiancée Emma Hughes – who will be the next one in our family to complete a thesis! Without Emma, I would never have thought to even join a PhD programme. Nor indeed would I without the encouragement of my Undergraduate dissertation and eventual MA programme supervisor, Professor Maria Grasso. Between them both they gave me the self- belief, confidence, and determination for a life in academia when I really wasn’t sure at all that I wanted it. And to everyone else who has and who continues to help me along the way, I say a huge thank you. For the most part, my experience as a young scholar and a junior academic to date have been made so much better and easier for the people I have met along the way far – so many people have come in and out of academic life at various points and provided invaluable support and guidance, information, comments and feedback, and help. I feel have grown exponentially as a person as well as a professional with the help and guidance of everyone above, named or not, and I thank hugely for it. I hope that this thesis does them, and myself, justice. Lastly, I would of course like to thank my copy editors for all of their time and their fantastic work in looking over the chapters and picking up all my glaring grammatical errors and nonsensical sentences: Joseph Clark, Jack Bailey, Anna Sanders, Joanna Black, Freddie Larden, Andrew Barclay, and Emma once again.

8 CHAPTER 1: THESIS OUTLINE AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Introduction

The study of the political representation of marginalised and minority groups in modern democracies is of high academic interest and normative importance. A great deal of contemporary research is seeking to establish the extent to which minority and marginalised social groups are represented in modern democratic systems, both now and in the past, and to ascertain the best manner in which to move forward with reducing their periphery statuses and increasing inclusivity. The normative value of this is clear: the more we include and engage previously ‘shut out’ groups into democratic systems worldwide, as full and equal members of the polity, the closer we move to sustained democratic engagement and participation, and increase levels and longevity of democratic legitimacy (Anwar 1986; Banducci et al. 2004; Bird et al. 2010; Mansbridge 1999) – which is currently under threat and challenges of all shapes and sizes. A group which has often found itself excluded from domestic political systems are communities of immigrant origin. Across the continent, immigrants have settled, found employment and livelihoods, and sought to participate in the political system of European nations, but many of them remain underrepresented and unsuccessfully mobilised. The full democratic inclusion of all immigrant origin communities – including first generation immigrants and their descendants, and immigrants from both white and non-white ethnic backgrounds – is as much an essential task as any in the quest to improve contemporary democracy. Though this can prove difficult in contexts where immigrants are disenfranchised and excluded from political systems. Without the ability to do so themselves, they must rely on others within the system to represent them, stand for their interests, and make democracy work for them.

The political representation of immigrant groups is increasingly well covered in extant literature; we know already that in Britain and across Europe, non-white groups continue to be underrepresented in political systems (Audickas & Apostolova 2017; Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Durose et al. 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Wood & Cracknell 2016). However, we knew little about the political representation of white

9 immigrant origin groups, and thus of immigrant origin groups as a combined whole (those from both white and minority ethnic backgrounds). This research, combined with similar studies across Europe conducted as part of the Pathways project1, steps into this knowledge gap. It measures and compares the descriptive political representation of ethnic minority and white immigrant origin groups across first Europe and then in-depth in Great Britain2. By doing so, it not only gives us a complete picture as to the representation of immigrants3 in European democracies, and specifically in Great Britain, but also contributes important knowledge about the nature of both immigrant status and ethnic status as barriers to political representation.

There are two facets, or definitions perhaps, of political representation as it is currently understood in the literature. The first concerns members of social groups ‘standing for’ and representing their communities in a ‘descriptive’ fashion – where representatives ‘reflect’ or ‘mirror’ (marginalised and minority) groups and provide representation as such (Bird 2005; Pitkin 1967; Sobolewska 2013). The second understanding concerns the ‘substantive’ interests of social groups and communities being represented by the political system at large (and not necessarily by ‘descriptive’ representatives) (Bird et al. 2010; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld & Bischof 2013). Questions and debates continue as to the value and indeed the exact meaning (or intention) of each, and on the connections between the two. Could a parliament made up exclusively (or almost exclusively) of white representatives really substantively account for and protect the interests of minority groups? Equally, can we simply assume that just because an elected representative comes from a socially marginalised or ethnic outgroup that they will necessarily either a) claim and politicise their identity, and/or b) represent said group’s interests within their legislature? Though measuring and assessing substantive representation is

1 Details on the project can be found via its website, as well as a list of publications and work package descriptions and guidelines: http://www.pathways.eu The project and its aims are discussed at greater length in the following chapter. 2 Northern Ireland is excluded from the empirical work of this thesis owing to a lack of public opinion data. I did however collect information on Northern Irish MPs since 1992 alongside the British contingent. 3 The Pathways project conceptualises and defines this representation (and representatives) as ‘Citizens of Immigrant Origin’, or ‘CIOs’. However, given the extensive democratic enfranchisement of many non-citizens in Great Britain, which is outlined and discussed in great detail throughout the thesis, this research departs from the wider project and uses the term ‘immigrant origin’ groups or communities. Measurement and criteria remain the same, which are again outlined and discussed later in the thesis, but the implications of the two different framings are purposefully divergent. Further diverges are made between the project and this thesis’ conceptualisation of ‘minority’ groups, which are presented and discussed at later stages.

10 undoubtedly an important task, and there are important assumptions and underpins to the descriptive side of political representation which should not go without question, descriptive representation and not substantive representation is the focus of this thesis. However, there are important criticisms of descriptive representation (particularly in a demographic sense) which are engaged with and discussed later in this research, resulting in a secondary analysis of descriptive representational data which, I argue, can help to address the criticisms raised.

This research focuses on the descriptive representation of non-native outgroups living in European democracies and – using Great Britain as an extensive in-depth case study – looks at the extent to which this is mediated or conditioned by public opinion about immigration. The inclusion of non-native groups into political systems is increasing in Great Britain and indeed across Europe (Bird et al. 2010; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Sobolewska 2013). However, this rise is not uniform across all social groups or across spaces (Geddes 2001; Sobolewska 2013). Some minority ethnic immigrant origin groups are advancing their representation successfully, while others are very much struggling (Audickas & Apostolova 2017; Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Geddes 2001; Sobolewska 2013). Trends in political representation are often understood in terms of political opportunity (structures) (Bird 2005; Geddes 1998; Koopmans 2004; Norris et al. 1992), a framework which can also help us understand trends in representation between socially marginalised groups. This thesis appeals to the political opportunity framework focuses on a crucial – and yet hitherto understudied – element of the empirical picture which explains variation in representation of immigrant origin groups over time: public opinion.

The Concept of Descriptive Representation

Though not herself a great proponent of the concept, Hana Pitkin (1967) provides the most famous and oft-used summary of descriptive representation. Pitkin (1967 p. 60) outlined that in descriptive terms, a truly representative legislature would be one which is “so selected that its composition corresponds accurately to that of the whole nation”. In other words, a given legislative should accurately reflect the overall distribution of social groups and identities within the overall population including (but not limited to): gender, social class, religious and sexual groups, and (in the interest of this research) national and ethnic groups. The concept has been redefined (or perhaps rather rearticulated) and eagerly used (as a measurement of the quality of democracy and a tool to improve democratic legitimacy) frequently since, with a

11 range of authors supporting the argument that representation is of best quality when it is provided by members of a common social group. For example, Mansbridge (1999 p. 629) concluded that representation was of a higher quality when – “Black legislators represent Black constituents, women legislators represent women constituents, and so on”. Writing slightly earlier, the highly influential Norris and Lovenduski (1993 p. 373) articulated the concept rather poetically: “[J]ust as portraits are seen as representative of the sitter, so parliaments are seen as representative if they reflect the composition of the society from which they are drawn”, and also agreed with Mansbridge regarding the normative importance of parliamentary bodies accurately reflecting the demographics of their population. A full literature review on descriptive representation, its proponents, and its critics, is provided in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 7. Underpinning this normative requirement of legislatives is the idea descriptive representatives from each community in a population are the best ones to ‘stand for’ and represent the bespoke interests of said communities. This rests on the idea that there is ‘linked fate’ and ‘common experience’ (Dawson 1994; Gay 2004; Masuoka 2006; Sanchez & Masuoka 2010; Simien 2005) between minority group legislators and minority group constituents, which creates representational bonds of great value. Essentially, people from minority or marginalised backgrounds themselves will best understand the experiences and life journeys of other people from such backgrounds – in a way which could never be understood by those privileged enough not to have experienced this. Thus, if all minority and marginalised communities are ‘stood for’ in a descriptive manner – represented by someone who shares and can truly identify with their experiences – this will ensure that all social groups with a population have a genuine voice – in that it is one which has shared their experience and has links to their communities – and thus stake and representation in the political infrastructure of their country. Furthermore, strong descriptive representation of otherwise marginalised or minority groups creates a sense of belonging and shared identity between said groups and the political system, increasing democratic legitimacy and engagement (Anwar 1986, 2001; Banducci et al. 2004; Mansbridge 1999; Statham 1999).

In this sense, we can understand levels of descriptive representation of minority and marginalised groups (and changing levels of it) as indicators of the inclusivity and openness of the entire political system: political participation, mobilisation, and access to candidacy. Gaining selection as a candidate and election to legislative bodies requires a great deal of political (and social) capital, knowledge and the skills and professionalism to communicate such knowledge, and mobilisation of a (broad) support and networks (Bird 2005; Cairney 2007;

12 Krouwel 1999; Norris & Lovenduski 1993). There are also legal barriers placed in front of immigrants in terms of their political participation, which vary from country to country and depending on the immigrants’ countries of origin. For example, in Britain, vast majority legal residents from ex-colonies are able to vote in all British elections without the requirement of having citizenship. Immigrants from Europe however do not enjoy such rights. Furthermore, no such arrangements on the scale of Britain’s exist in other ex-Empire nations such as France or Germany (see Vincent 2002). If there is a systematic lack of immigrant origin MPs serving in parliaments, we may well conclude that this is because they are being systematically and systemically locked out of participating (or succeeding) in candidacy structures for lack of any (or all) of the above. Strong levels of minority group representation can also be an outcome (or indicative) of a politicised and mobilised minority group, and it is argued that increasing representation for minority groups also in turn drives further participation and engagement (Banducci et al. 2004; Karp & Banducci 1999; Statham 1999)4 and could have big positive impacts on policies designed to help and benefit minority groups (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013). Thus, once again, if we notice a distinct lack of representation for immigrant origin groups, we must therefore worry about what this says for their current and future political participation, mobilisation, and their inclusion in policymaking.

The concept of descriptive representation – particularly that based on ‘demographic’ conceptions of description such as race, gender, or national statuses – is not however without theoretical and empirical contestation. The most popular of such criticisms attacks the assumption that representatives who reflect or mirror certain members of the population will indeed actually act on their behalf once in parliament – or in other words, that more minority representatives will necessarily lead to better policymaking and more interests served for minority groups. Writing in terms of women’s representation, Childs (2006) argued that a simple process of counting the numbers of women present in politics is inadequate in terms of assessing the impact on women’s representation and for women’s interests that said body women MPs, and also the whole political system, have. The connection between being a descriptive representative and being more likely to represent one’s group is, Childs argues, fundamentally flawed. Indeed, Pitkin’s 1957 classic work asserts that descriptive representation does not amount to anything useful unless it is followed by substantive action.

4 Though see Martin (2016) for a counter argument against this, where mobilisation effects are dependent upon specific community arrangements.

13 Scholars of substantive representation therefore, rather than measuring the number of representatives from minority or marginalised groups, instead measure the actions, interventions and delivery by representatives (of not necessarily any demographic or otherwise descriptive connection to constituents who may benefit from them) in policymaking and debates that will actually benefit minority or marginalised groups – or at least represent their interests (see for examples Childs 2006; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld & Bischof 2013).

While it is not in the scope or intention of this thesis to engage in research on substantive representation, there are other avenues around the criticisms presented by the above authors regarding the quality of representation which will give more substantive meaning to assessments of the levels of descriptive representatives for minority and marginalised communities in domestic political systems. In short, there are two sides to the descriptive representational coin which we ought to be considering, which cover both the presence but also the full inclusion of MPs into parliamentary systems. The first is the numerical presence of MPs from minority and marginalised groups – this is the ‘counting’ to which Childs refers. The other side is the level and extent of the inclusion of representatives from minority and marginalised groups into the various elements and structures of the political system itself. Though this does not cover substantive actions, it does go one step beyond ‘counting’ and assesses the extent to which minority and marginalised groups are really included and fully integrated into the political system in terms of being afforded roles of responsibility, influence, and visibility within the parliamentary hierarchy. As has been successfully argued in parts of descriptive representation literature, we should not simply be concerning ourselves with measuring and analysing the extent to which MPs from marginalised and minority groups are there within a political system, but have active and meaningful participation within it (Anwar 1986; Banducci et al. 2004; Bird et al. 2010; Mansbridge 2003). Anwar (1986) articulates this distinction as the difference between ‘nominal’ (numerical presence) and ‘effective’ (inclusion into decision making, organisational and procedural, and leadership positions) representation. Improvements to feelings of legitimacy and attachment toward the political system on the part of minority groups, it is argued, will only come with the ‘full inclusion’ of MPs from minority backgrounds into said system. In short, it is not enough to have minority group MPs present in parliaments, they must be given access to roles of responsibility, power, and influence in order to provide the kind of improvements to the representativeness of political systems which we desire. Therefore, in later sections this thesis also assesses the extent to which immigrant origin MPs are not only present, but afforded access to roles of influence and responsibility within

14 parliament. The main focus does however remain on the demographic representation of parliaments relative to their population. Despite the very valid criticisms of the above literature, there is empirical evidence regarding the impacts on sentiment and feelings of legitimacy toward political systems and in terms of increasing political participation cited above to suggest that more representative – in this perhaps basic, demographic sense – parliaments are a valuable and desirable outcome in and of themselves.

Political Opportunity – Volatile Cultures versus Stable Structures

Political representation on the part of any groups is an outcome of participation and mobilisation into the political system itself by members (or representatives) of said groups. Participation, mobilisation, and representation (particularly for outgroups and socially marginalised groups) are tempered and shaped by a range of exogenous factors; the ability for immigrant communities to effectively mobilise and engage in political systems is greatly dictated by social, economic, political, and institutional factors (or environments) around them. The combination of these factors around a given actor (or group of actors) is often called a ‘political opportunity structure’. Political opportunity structures as a mechanism to explain or predict political change and development were first propelled into the mainstream by Kitschelt (1986). Since then, they have been used to explain the political mobilisation and engagement of immigrant communities across Europe by authors such as Fennema and Tillie (1999), Bird (2005), Koopmans (2004), Statham (1999), Norris et al. (1992) and throughout a special issue convened by Jacobs & Tille (2004). Research into the precise nature and long-term development of these opportunity structures is constantly ongoing. Koopmans (2004) for example shows that increasing opportunities afforded to immigrant communities by local host communities relates positively with increasing proactive participation in political debates on issues concerning them, thus increasing engagement and legitimacy in public policy deliberation, and the stake which immigrant communities have in this. In another study, Statham (1999) argues that aggregate levels of socioeconomic success and religious integration of the various ethnic groups in Britain have very much impacted their ability to organise politically, with communities who have fared better than others in this respect enjoying greater success in terms of their mobilisation (into political organisations) and representation (in terms of elected representatives). He argues that this highlights political opportunity structures which are extending down racial lines to differing degrees, and concludes that strategies and outcomes of minority mobilisation are “best explained by the political opportunities that confront them”

15 (Statham 1999 p. 621). Previous research has also highlighted how opportunities for increasing representation may be limited or increased between ethnic groups due to differences between groups in levels of aggregate political engagement and participation (Modood 1997; Sobolewska 2005, 2009), social class and wealth (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Statham 1999), and social capital (Fennema & Tillie 1999; Kao 2004). Furthermore, the visibility or invisibility of the non-native status of each migrant group – which can open them up to discrimination and identity issues (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2006; Lalonde et al. 1992) – will also impact on opportunities for representation, with more visible groups potentially experiencing more difficulty5. This expectation is discussed later and throughout the thesis in sections on acceptable difference and multiple marginality. Lastly, and as above, depending on their country of residence and country (or region) of origin, immigrant groups have differential patterns of voting rights and paths to citizenship around Europe (Vincent 2002; Weil 2001)6. We can summarise restrictive elements of opportunity as ‘barriers’ to political representation. As above, these barriers may include a lack of social and/or economic capital, lack of financial resources, lack of knowledge on how to participate in the political system, language barriers, (voter) discrimination on the grounds of ‘difference’ or ‘distance’ from the native group (such as via appearance, cultural norms or understandings, and so on), and legal frameworks. The central aim of this research was to establish public opinion as another, as yet under-developed and poorly-connected barrier to minority political participation, which is discussed in detail in further sections.

Despite the dominance of the political opportunity structure approach in the extant literature, an important theoretical contribution made to the field in the 1990s raises doubts about the appropriateness of using political opportunity structures to analyse and predict trends in all social movements – of which political mobilisation of immigrant communities with the aim of achieving greater representation is one. This contribution, made by a few authors (see for examples Gamson & Meyer 1996; Geddes 1998) but not taken up by many since, sought to raise a distinction between political opportunity as a broader theoretical framework where opportunities can be both stable and volatile, and political opportunity in a structural sense, where variation in opportunity is much more stable – this side being what we commonly

5 This refers to such things as skin colour, names, accents and use of language, cultural norms, and so on. 6 This important point is developed much more and with reference to specific country cases in Chapter 3, and also in parts below.

16 describe as political opportunity structures. In other words, that the structural approach is better understood used in conditions where opportunities are more stable and institutionally dictated (for the most part), and a wider sense of political opportunity is best applied when cultural elements are more dominant (Gamson & Meyer 1996; Geddes 1998; Doug McAdam 1996; Meyer & Minkoff 2004). Since this important theoretical contribution was made however, with the exception of Meyer and Minkoff’s 2004 work, the distinction has been largely ignored and sociology and political science has steamed ahead with the application of the political opportunity structures approach to all senses and instances of mobilisation and countermobilisation (as per the authors above).

This is problematic in two senses. Firstly, there is the sense in which the framework of political opportunity structures becomes overextended and over-applied so much so that it essentially becomes meaningless – “the concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movements environment – political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, and policy shifts” (Gamson & Meyer 1996 p. 275). Secondly, viewing all patterns and variances in opportunity as necessarily structural in nature vastly underplays the role in which more volatile cultural, contextual factors play in opportunity creation and restriction. Political opportunity, it is argued, can be widened or restricted in a two-dimensional space; change in the level (or even existence) of opportunity in areas which are mostly stable by nature (dominated by institutional factors) or in areas which are mostly volatile (where the majority of cultural, societal factors exist) (Gamson & Meyer 1996 p. 281; see also Geddes 1998; Doug McAdam 1996). If we are consistently referring to all dynamics of political opportunity change as structural, then as well as overusing the term ‘structural’ we also risk ignoring (or at the very least underestimating) the impact of non-structural factors.

Public Opinion as a Vital Component of Political Opportunity for Representation

One such factor is public opinion. Here, we move to the central theoretical argument of this thesis. Both Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Geddes (1998) suggested that public opinion (named therein as ‘national mood’) ought to have some impact on political opportunity. Geddes (1998 p. 152) proposed this even in terms of the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities,

17 writing that “if the prevailing national mood is hostile [toward ethnic minority participation]… this will place constraints on political opportunity”. Beyond this (and outside of the political opportunity debate) other works have already established political parties as both proactive and reactive agents in the process of increasing descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups, both making conscious efforts to increase representation, but also only doing so when and where it will not cost them in terms of electoral sanctioning. This was most recently articulated by Sobolewska (2013), but has been suggested by other scholars too – with observed sanctioning for increasing diversity in British politics framed in terms of an ‘ethnic penalty’ (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Ford & Goodwin 2010; Norris et al. 1992; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Stegmaier et al. 2013). The argument follows that political parties may hesitate to place ethnic minority candidates in seats with high populations of in-group voters and/or in areas with high hostility toward outgroups, fearing that majority group voters may ‘backlash’ against such a candidate by voting for another party. A classic example is the rise in vote share for the anti-immigrant British National Party in the 2010 elections where minority candidates were fielded by the British Labour Party in majority white areas (Sobolewska 2013). Other ‘backlashes’ in this vain have also been detected by Thrasher et al. (2013, 2015), Fisher et al. (2014), and regularly in Nuffield Election studies appendixes (see for examples Curtice et al. 2010, 2015; Curtice & Fisher 2005). We should expect this restriction of opportunity for ethnic minority candidates to extend to the selection and election of all non-British origin groups (but to varying degrees), fitting with the theoretical suggestions made by Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Geddes (1998) that political opportunities are subject to restriction/opening as ‘national mood’ changes. Indeed, work by Thrasher et al. (2015) uncovered discrimination on the part of voters against candidates with any form of ‘non-British sounding names’ – going beyond traditional penal expectations associated with race. This now broader conception of voter penalisation reaching to non-white British, as well as non-white, communities is further justification for this dissertation examining the descriptive representation (and its relationship to public opinion) for both white immigrants and ethnic minority immigrant origin groups. Finally, Ruedin (2009) also noted a connection between levels of openness toward immigration and representation of minority groups in a large comparative study (see also Ruedin 2013).

While traditional understandings of political opportunities (dominated by the structural framing) surrounding immigrant communities can help to explain variations in why some groups do better than others, and why visibility (of non-native status) still acts as a barrier toward achieving full political descriptive representation, some puzzles are left unsolved,

18 particularly: why are some regions seeing much sharper increases in the number of visible immigrant origin candidates elected, and related why is this largely happening outside of areas with high concentration of visible immigrant communities (Sobolewska 2013)? This is of added interest given that previously this representation had only been established and increasing in areas with high densities of visible migrant groups (Geddes 2001). Given the above theoretical expectations and empirical observations made by previous scholars, this thesis brings in public opinion to explain the questions left unanswered by the current opportunity structure literature, and return to Gamson and Meyer’s distinction between political opportunity and political opportunity structures. One of the central contributions of this thesis is that public opinion – specifically increasingly anti-immigrant public opinion – is a key barrier to the political representation of immigrant groups.

Public Opinion: Definitions and Measurement

At this stage, it is necessary to outline how I conceptualise and measure public opinion throughout this thesis. Public opinion can be broadly defined as the aggregate of individual preferences, attitudes and beliefs regarding a specific issue (Key 1961; Lippmann 1946; Stimson 1991). Across Europe over the last half century, an abundance of distinguished scholars have highlighted a rising tide of anti-immigrant public opinion, activism and discourse in many countries and on many metrics (Bohman & Hjerm 2016; Deangelis 2003; Giugni et al. 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Luedtke 2005; McLaren & Johnson 2007; Semyonov et al. 2006). This has correlated with a rapid mobilisation and increasing electoral success of political parties with strong anti-immigrant positions, exploiting political space left open by mainstream parties to capitalise on public disaffection with immigration (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Cutts et al. 2011; Ford & Goodwin 2014; Koopmans et al. 2005; Van Spanje 2010). While lagging slightly behind developments in the rest of the continent, Great Britain has provided no exception to the rule. Over recent years, anti-immigrant attitudes among the British population have been growing significantly (Ford et al. 2015; Ford & Heath 2014; McLaren & Johnson 2007; Saran 2009) and we have seen a rapid and highly successful mobilisation of a new wave of anti-immigrant parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groups (Ford & Goodwin 2014; Richardson 2014). Their success has been so great such that now anti-immigrant politics are very much present in the political mainstream.

19 However, while we have snippets of information and evidence from electoral contests, public opinion toward immigration is seldom measured in its complete sense – as per the definitions above. This is mostly due to a lack of good quality, reliable trend series data tracking public attitudes on this topic7. Even though immigration has been a hot topic across Western Europe since the early 1980s, the longest cross-national trend of repeated survey items on immigration comes from the European Social Survey, beginning in 2002. So, while it is widely noted by a number of authors using numerous different sources that negativity towards immigrants has been rising across the board, few analyses of anti-immigrant public opinion in Britain have been conducted with the appropriate methodological rigorousness required by a longitudinal analysis. Recent advancements (or perhaps rather applications) in methodology however now allow scholars to circumnavigate this lack of time series data by using a ‘mood measure’ technique developed by Stimson (1991). This method of public opinion measurement is explained and discussed in depth in Chapter 2. This invaluable contribution to research means that recent authors have been able to produce robust, longitudinal measurements of public opinion using only partially overlapping survey data on public policy (Bartle et al. 2010; Stimson et al. 2012), party competence (Green and Jennings 2012), EU integration (Bølstad 2015), and immigration in Britain (Ford et al. 2015; Jennings 2009).

This PhD takes the later work (on immigration) two steps further, by both a) updating it using new data and constructing comparative measurements with six other European countries, and b) breaking the national-level measurements down to create estimates of annual public opinion toward immigration at the regional level in Great Britain. Measuring public opinion toward immigration at the regional level gives us a whole new insight into how communities respond to immigration, and demonstrates how different regions across Britain take entirely different views. It is important to assess these trends at the lowest possible geographical level, in order to take advantage of the localised, community-based contexts of electoral contests and representation that Great Britain, with its majoritarian constituency based electoral system, offers as a case study. The merits of Britain in terms of acting as a case study

7 The ‘most important problem’ question provided by IPSOS-MORI is an exception to this, but this question is not a good measure of public opinion per say on a given issue, but more perhaps the salience of said issue within public opinion. In other words, while such polling items are able to track the prominence of an issue, they are unable to track the direction of public opinion on it. See Wlezien (2005) & Soroka and Wlezien (2010) for full discussions of the limitations of the ‘most important problem’ question approach.

20 for this kind of analysis are discussed at length in Chapter 4. The various regions of the country are already known to differ greatly in terms of electoral behaviour (Electoral Commission 2016; Pattie & Johnston 1995), beliefs and attitudes (Drinkwater et al. 2013; Ford & Goodwin 2010; Ford & Heath 2014), and indeed public opinion and the representation of minority ethnic MPs (Geddes 2001; Sobolewska 2013). Further, Britain’s majoritarian, constituency-based electoral system creates localised election contests where candidate need support from only a small portion of the British public (voters within the constituency) to gain election. This argument (that we ought to analyse public opinion in Britain at the regional level) is developed in much greater detail in Chapter 6. Measuring public opinion in this holistic, inclusive fashion provides this PhD with the means to develop theoretical suggestions made in existing literature that public opinion forms a crucial part of the political opportunity systems surrounding the descriptive representation of minority groups.

Immigrant Origin, White and Non-White Status as Unique Contentions

This thesis primarily analyses the extent to which public opinion impacts the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups. Rather than simply focus on (ethnic) minority or non-white groups, taking a step back and analysing immigrant groups as a whole has a number of specific advantages, expanding beyond the dominant focus in the literature on the representation of minority ethnic communities. This is discussed in detail below, after an overview and justification of the definition of ‘immigrant origin groups’ which this thesis deploys. In line with the wider Pathways project, and its forthcoming publications, in which this thesis was a part, immigrant origin groups comprise of all individuals who either: 1) were born abroad as foreign nationals (1st generation immigrants), or 2) have/had at least one parent of foreign nationality at birth (2nd generation immigrant)8. This definition thus encompasses a much broader group of people than traditional studies of representation might have focused on, by including not only non-visible (white) immigrants, but also the immediate descendants of all immigrants (regardless of ethnicity). Second generation immigrants ought to be considered

8 The ‘foreign nationals’ condition is interpreted stringently, and excludes individuals born abroad but to parents who were both themselves nationals of the country in which they now reside. Though they may have (access to) citizenship of a foreign state through birth right, such individuals are also automatically citizens of their now-host countries at birth. For example, a child born to British parents in South Africa who then consequently moved back to Britain would not be considered of immigrant origin by the terms of this research.

21 and measured as part of the wider immigrant origin group for two reasons. Firstly (and perhaps particularly for non-white immigrant groups) it is not reasonable to expect that the immediate descendants of immigrants will be fully integrated, ‘invisible’ and harmonious with the native population. Though they may be able to overcome some barriers to political participation, mobilisation and representation such as language and some aspects of political knowledge and networks (and indeed in some instances enfranchisement), they are still likely to face disadvantages. They may still be identifiably (by perhaps appearance, cultural norms or expectations, and accent) of non-native origin (and thus open to discrimination on these grounds), may still be (politically and/or economically) under-resourced compared to descendants of natives, and will not have the advantage of a family history of political networks and integration within their host country, which comparable individuals of native origin may have (Jacobs & Tillie 2004; Kao 2004; Morales & Giugni 2016; Solomos 2011). Secondly, some (depending on their length of stay, nationalisation status, and in what country they reside) immigrants are permanently excluded from European political systems, and thus second- generation immigrants may be identified as surrogate representatives for their interests. In other words, when first-generation immigrants may find themselves politically excluded or ‘shut out’, they may look to representatives and/or voters of second-generation immigrant origin to articulate and represent their communities’ interests in the domestic political system.

Further, there are strong reasons to examine the representation of first- and second- generation immigrants of both white and non-white ethnic status in a comparative framework. Literature concerning the representation of ethnic minority (non-white) groups is large and extensive, as is the literature analysing the barriers that ethnic minority (non-white) groups face in accessing and participating in politics and arenas of political power (within the political opportunity frameworks). However, we know comparatively little about the representation of white immigrant origin groups, and what barriers that they do or do not face (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Schönwälder 2013). This is a significant gap in our knowledge which this thesis – as part of the wider Pathways project – is able to fill. There are strong theoretical reasons to analyse the representation of white immigrant groups in a comparative analysis with those of non-white backgrounds. While white, immigrants from European, American, and Australasian nations are still nonetheless non-native groups, and face barriers to political participation and representation (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Brady et al. 1995; Lieberson 1980; Norris & Lovenduski 1995). Such barriers may include (but are not limited to) a lack of political networks and knowledge, discrimination at the ballot box (if they are

22 obviously of non-native origin) and (potential – based on their country of origin) language barriers (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Brady et al. 1995; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Thrasher et al. 2015) and differential rights and access or pathways to citizenship (Howard 2009; Vincent 2002; Weil 2001). Political knowledge, particularly in terms of knowing things about eligibility (of themselves, their families, and their peers) and how to vote or stand for elections, would be an obvious issue for immigrants of all backgrounds, as would legal frameworks excluding immigrants from political participation (at some or all elections). Networks, both in terms of political networks and suitable social networks, are usually developed through a lifetime spent living, working, and participating in the social life within a country, which again would set immigrants of all backgrounds at a disadvantage. Lastly, these barriers are likely to be exasperated if immigrants come originally from a country with a different first language than their host country. Again, these are issues which will affect immigrants of all races and ethnicities – both white and non-white.

Thus, white immigrants are still nonetheless immigrants, and are generally very much at a disadvantage when compared to non-immigrant (native) groups. Of course, being of both immigrant origin and minority ethnic (non-white) background adds further multipliers (or intersections) of marginality and potential grounds for discrimination (Durose et al. 2013; Ford 2011; Turner 2002)9. Expecting that non-white immigrants will face greater challenges than white immigrants if of course natural, but leveraging this in a comparative analysis can give us invaluable insights into the nature of both immigrant origin and ethnic minority (non-white) status as separate barriers. Generally speaking, if we use this comparative approach and identify that (some) barriers that we expect to be in the way of representation for immigrant origin groups appear to be significant reduced (or non-existent) for white immigrants, but very much present for non-white groups, then we may be able to conclude something about the nature of ethnic minority (non-white) status as a barrier to representation, distinct from barriers posed by immigrant origins status generally. For example (and in the context of this thesis), if we find that the descriptive representation of white immigrants is not negatively affected by increasingly hostile public opinion on immigration, but that it does have restrictive consequences for non-white representation, then the conclusion to be drawn from this would be that negative public opinion is a restriction for the political representation of non-white

9 Though see Celis et al. (2014) for a discussion of how ‘multiple marginality’ may actually be ironically beneficial in the context of contemporary candidature selections.

23 immigrant origin groups, but not white ones. Or, put differently, that it is a restriction based on ethnicity of non-natives, rather than their non-native status.

Research Questions, Framework, and Hypotheses

Analysis of the literature above, particularly on political opportunities and the role public opinion might play in them, presents a number of different research questions. Firstly, if we have the theoretical expectation that increasingly hostile public opinion toward immigration will restrict opportunities for the political representation of immigrants, then why is that we appear to see both rising anti-immigrant sentiment but also rising descriptive representation of non-white (immigrant origin) groups across Europe? Does public opinion have any impact on descriptive representation? If so, what kind of descriptive representation does this impact apply to – effective, nominal, or both? The following overall theoretical framework was devised from these questions and considerations, which shaped and guided the analysis which follows throughout the thesis.

The following expectations and central hypothesis were drawn from the above analysis of the literature. Firstly, it was expected that public opinion plays an important role in opening or restricting political opportunity for the descriptive representation – both nominal and effective – of immigrant origin groups. In short, if there is increasingly hostile public opinion toward immigration, then political opportunity for the successful mobilisation and representation of immigrant origin groups becomes more restrictive (and vice versa). There should therefore be noticeably less descriptive representation of immigrant groups in times – and crucially, areas – of higher public hostility toward immigration. For instance, we can expect that parties might avoid fielding candidates in areas where public opinion toward immigrants is worse. Equally, we can expect them to perhaps hold back politicians with visibly non-native backgrounds from high profile roles when the public is displaying increasingly negative views towards immigration. Quite simply, if public opinion toward immigration sours, then we ought to see descriptive representation of immigrants decrease. We can summarise this into a single hypothesis which this thesis set out to test, which is adapted and changed at various points throughout the thesis, adding caveats and conditions and also splitting ‘immigrant origin’ communities up into its white and non-white ethnic components:

24 The political representation of immigrant origin communities will be negatively affected by increasingly hostile public opinion towards immigration.

Representation and Public Opinion in Europe and Great Britain

The study begins by looking at the hypothesis in the wider context of Western and Southern Europe, before making an in-depth case study from Great Britain. The research question is first analysed in seven countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Great Britain. These countries reflect a diverse range of conceptions of immigrant and minority status (Jacobs et al. 2006) and immigration and integration regime histories (Cinalli and Giugni 2013; Koopmans et al. 2005). They also vary greatly in terms of voting rights offered to non-citizens, institutionalisation of anti-immigrant parties, and electoral systems, which becomes important to the analysis as the thesis move on. Generally speaking, immigration is one of the most hotly contested issues in contemporary European politics – particularly in Western Europe (Geddes 2001; Givens & Luedtke 2005; De la Rica et al. 2013; Morales, Pilet, et al. 2015). Europe has had a long history of immigration both into and within the continent (Davidov & Meuleman 2012; Favell 2008; Hooghe et al. 2008; Meuleman et al. 2009). Recent and historical political norms and institutions – such as jus soli (right of the soil, which allows many second generation immigrants to immediately claim citizenship of their European host countries, see Vincent (2002) and Weil (2001) for further information)10 and the Freedom of Movement framework provided by the European Union (which allows passport holders of member states to move and work freely in other member states, see Givens and Leudtke (2004) for further information) – have created fairly favourable conditions for immigrants in certain parts of Europe in terms of their rights to move, live and work and participate politically in new host countries – particularly for European immigrants.

The thesis begins with an overview of the relationship between public opinion and representation at the national level in Europe. It is later argued however that this arena is not

10 Jus soli concerns the right of the children of (legal) immigrants to acquire immediate citizenship of their host country, provided they were born in said host country. The majority of European states employ a restricted interpretation of jus soli whereby it is not enough for the child to simply be born in the country, but for at least one parent to be ‘settled’ or ‘resident’ in the country. Note that this does not require at least one parent to be a citizen (or otherwise naturalised) of their host country, making the principle still relatively open. See further reading as cited in main body of text for further information.

25 the most appropriate in which to test mechanisms we would expect to work better at more localised contexts, and so a case study is made of the British political system to further test the central hypothesis. Even within the fairly open Europe, Great Britain stands out as a country where levels of immigration and the rights and privileges awarded to immigrant communities living within the country is very high. Further, as a country with an especially long history of immigration (Coleman & Rowthorn 2004; Gartner 1960; Spencer 1997), Britain now has a wide range of different immigrant origin communities scattered and dispersed all across its territory – from both white and non-white backgrounds (Christian Dustmann & Fabbri 2005; Phillips 1998). Some, particularly those from white backgrounds and those from later generations, have integrated seamlessly into British society. Others are more obviously (and often proudly) of a minority status, which is a highly politicised and very public issue in Britain (Heath et al. 2013; Saggar 1998; Saggar & Geddes 2000; Statham 1999). As well as a long history of immigration, and a long history of integration and periods of long social harmony between native and (certain) non-native groups in Britain, the country also is a unique case in term of the breadth and range of (particularly political) rights afforded to non-citizens living legally within its borders (Coleman & Rowthorn 2004; Fisher et al. 2014; Hampshire 2013; Heath et al. 2013; Sobolewska 2013; Spencer 1997). The uniqueness of Britain as a case study in terms of its affording of rights and citizenship to immigrants is discussed in depth in Chapter 4.

Most importantly in terms of this research, Britain gives extremely generous political and settlement rights to immigrants from ex-colonial states – countries which after securing independence voluntarily joined the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ which established common goals of promoting democracy and good government, human rights, and economic development, and kept the Queen of the United Kingdom as their official (but constitutionally powerless) Head of State (Hall 1971; McIntyre 1991). Immigrants from Commonwealth countries11 are allowed to vote and stand for election in all elections held in Britain and its constituent nations (providing they are resident there) (Fisher et al. 2014; Karatani 2003). This generosity of political rights goes above and beyond what European Union immigrants are afforded (participation in local and European Parliament votes), and politically empowers many (the majority, in fact) immigrant groups to truly unique levels when compared to other

11 And the Republic of Ireland, which although not a Commonwealth state has a bilateral arrangement with the United Kingdom covering the same rights.

26 countries. As such, there is an enormous constituency of immigrant voters and potential candidates in Britain, creating a much easier and faster route to political power in Britain than most other countries worldwide. Furthermore, Britain employs the principle of jus soli to grant immediate access to full British citizenship for the children of many legal immigrants officially resident in the country at the time of their birth – though this depends on some specifications and technicalities which have changed recently over time, which is discussed more in following chapters. First generation immigrants also have fairly quick access to citizenship themselves, waiting only around half a decade (depending on their initial entry conditions and employment statuses) before being allowed to apply (Vincent 2002; Weil 2001).

As outlined above, immigration itself as a public policy issue has dominated recent political discussion and agendas, and opposition to immigration arguably led to one of the greatest political upheavals in contemporary British politics – the country’s vote to leave the European Union in June 2016. This combination of high issue salience and high political and settlement rights for the majority of immigrants living in the country creates a context where it is ideal between public opinion toward immigration and their representation. Britain provides a context where immigration as a public issue has been highly salient for quite some time, where public opinion toward immigration has been becoming increasingly negative, but also where there have been noticeable improvements in the representation of minority ethnic immigrant groups and where the political and settlement rights afforded to the vast majority of immigrants are very high. Britain is therefore a perfect case study of the relationship between public opinion and the political representation of immigrants.

Thesis Outline

After a data and methods chapter which immediately follows this outline, this thesis presents the results of a European-wide investigation into the connection between public opinion and the political representation of immigrants, placing public opinion at the core of a political opportunity framework for representation and making an extensive case for the first time in Chapter 3. Seven European countries form the sample: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. These countries provide a range of immigration histories, integration regimes, and access to political participation and representation for immigrant origin groups. This chapter, and all which follow, break down immigrant origin groups into two distinct units – those from ethnic minority and those from white ethnic

27 backgrounds. Examining the relationship between public opinion and representation across European countries allows us to explore and account for the impact that different contexts of immigration and citizenship histories and regimes might have on the relationship. The analysis in Chapter 3 finds that there is some limited evidence to suggest that public opinion does play a role in determining opportunity for political representation, but that much more is in fact explained by variance in voting rights afforded to non-citizens.

After the European-wide study, the thesis then makes an in-depth case study from the British data for deeper analysis and investigations of the mechanics underpinning the relationship. Chapter 4 examines the uniqueness of Britain as a case where there is a large and electorally empowered immigrant origin constituency, and where there is also widespread and (now) politically acceptable and mainstream resistance to immigration. Chapter 5 empirically investigates in great detail the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups in Great Britain from the early-1990s to the mid-2010s. Given the size and range of non-native groups now settled and political motivated in Britain, using a three-tiered model and in-depth background analysis of immigrant origin MPs, this chapter is able to compare trends in representation not just between white and non-white immigrant origin groups, but between different ethnic and national groupings within those larger umbrella units. Chapter 5 concludes that white immigrant origin groups have been well represented in British politics for some time, and that while non-white (ethnic minority) groups have been increasing their representation, some national/ethnic sub-groups within this non-white category are still very much struggling. Chapter 6 investigates the central hypothesis at the regional level in Great Britain, finding that while little relationship is observed in Europe as a whole, public opinion has strong explanatory power at a much more localised level – but only for immigrant communities from non-white backgrounds. It concludes that immigrants from non-white origins suffer when publics become increasingly hostile toward immigration at the local level, as parties avoid fielding ethnic minority immigrant origin candidates in winnable seats for fear of an electoral backlash. Immigrants from white backgrounds, by contrast, do not appear to be impacted in this manner. This finding also gives us important information as to the nature of ethnicity as a barrier to representation.

The thesis then in its final empirical chapter, Chapter 7, moves to leverage a further dichotomous distinction in representation, this time between ‘effective’ and ‘nominal’ descriptive representation (Anwar 1986). This chapter investigates the impact that rising anti-

28 immigrant hostility has on the types and frequencies of parliamentary roles of influence and responsibility handed to immigrant origin MPs. Here, the research concludes that in general, once again, white immigrant origin MPs are not impacted while ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs certainly are. Specifically, it finds that political opportunity for ethnic minority MPs in the Labour Party is most restricted by the increasingly hostile climate of public opinion, and that the Conservative Party appear to be paying no notice to it as they continue their programme of image and electoral appeal improvement by sourcing and promoting non-white MPs to top levels (Sobolewska 2013). Finally, a concluding chapter discusses each of the respective chapters’ findings and summarises the theoretical and empirical contributions of this thesis to fields of political representation, public opinion, and political opportunity.

29 CHAPTER 2: DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS

This chapter presents a detailed look at the various methods and data used throughout this thesis. Each of the following empirical chapters will also contain a short data and methods section which will briefly outline the specific data and methods (and their appropriateness) relevant to its respective portion of the research. A significant contribution made by this thesis is the data collection undertaken in order to produce it, which was conducted as part of the Pathways research project. The Pathways project was an international research collaboration across six academic institutions – the University of Leicester, the University of Amsterdam, the University of Bamberg, Sciences Po (Paris), Universitié Catholique de Louvain, and the University of Manchester – investigating the political representation of immigrant origin communities in eight European countries – Greece, Italy, Spain, France, Germany Belgium, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. It aimed to analyse patterns and trends in political representation of immigrants living in Europe, the barriers – both institutional and cultural – to representation, and to explain longitudinal and cross-national variation in each. In terms of its size, ambitions, and scope, the Pathways project is the largest of its kind in the field to date. The project was divided into four work packages, data from two of which were used extensively in this research – Work Packages 1 and 4.

Descriptive Representation

Work Package 1 of the Pathways project12 covered the descriptive representation of immigrants in each country, with information coded on the personal and career backgrounds of thousands of members of the lower chambers of European national parliaments since the 1990s. The Work Package collected data not only for immigrant origin MPs, but for all MPs sitting in each parliament. It did so for two reasons. Firstly, because there was no existing

12 Full information for each Work Package can be found online via http://www.pathways/eu. At the time of writing, the data have not yet been released for public use. The Work Package documentation and guidelines were written by Laura Morales, Lucas Geese, Liza Mugge, Daniela Vintila, Marc van de Wardt, and Daphne van der Pas. The British data were collected and archived with the project by the author, with assistance from a number of research assistance at various points which is highlighted and acknowledged in Chapter 5.

30 dataset listing who was or was not of immigrant origin at the start of the project, so it was necessary to collect at least this personal information for all MPs in order to ascertain which representatives were of immigrant origin. Secondly, collecting the same information for both immigrant origin and non-immigrant origin MPs creates the ability for full scale comparison of the backgrounds and career trajectories of both groups. This was an enormous data collection effort carried out simultaneously by research assistants, associates and PhD students in each of the six institutions. For the British case, this involved me collecting over 300 pieces of information on over 1000 individual MPs (with repeated incumbents bringing this up to over 3000 observations) sitting in each parliament from 1992 to 2015, with assistance provided at various points by research assistants (see Chapter 5 for acknowledgements).

A wide range of variables were collected which covered almost every element of each MPs socio-economic, career, and political backgrounds, as well as their parliamentary careers in each legislative term. A full list of information collected for each MP in each parliament is available on the Pathways project website13. Most importantly, this information included the following variables. Firstly, general socio-demographic information was collected including the year of the MP’s birth, their gender, their highest educational qualification, and their professional occupation previous to becoming an MP. Then, information was collected from which the immigrant origin status of each MP was derived. Namely, the country of birth of the MP and their parents. If this was not available, then ISO aggregated world regions were used14 as an estimate. If even this was not possible, then (as with all variables) ‘not known’ was coded into the database. This was not a frequent occurrence, with ‘not known’ applying to this information in only 4% of cases. Citizenship information was derived from the above – was the MP a citizen of the country at birth in whose parliament they now serve? Were their parents? As outlined in the above chapter, MPs were coded (at a later stage in the analysis) as of immigrant origin if either they or one of their parents were not citizens at birth of the country in which they now resided. If the answer to any of the above was ‘no’ – meaning that they were

13 See outlines of the Work Package via http://pathways.eu/?page_id=3659 14 At the time of writing, the link to the original source for these codes was no longer working. Instead, the author points the reader to an archived version of the region codes via https://github.com/lukes/ISO-3166-Countries- with-Regional-Codes/blob/master/all/all.csv

31 not citizens of their host country – then information was coded on the country (or if not possible, world region) in which they held citizenship at birth.

Information was then collected regarding the potential of each MP to be exposed to discrimination on their grounds of their immigrant status. These were perhaps the most controversial and subjective variables collected as part of the research, with coding guidelines in need of interpretation by individual coders (with specific knowledge and reference to their country contexts). If the MP identifiably of immigrant origin, through their appearance (‘looking’ non-native, perhaps by skin colour or certain facial features not typically associated with the native group), or through their names (having a ‘foreign sounding’ name which voters might pick up on and identify the MP as non-native in origin), then they would be coded as such in a dummy variable (1= identifiably immigrant origin, 0 = not identifiably immigrant origin, -88 for non-immigrant origin MPs). This ensured that we had a variable which we could leverage to assess the impact that visibility of non-native status might have on immigrant origin MPs’ career trajectories and election fates. The following variables were also collected related to potential discrimination. Is or was the MP a native speaker of the official language of the country (at birth)? Did/do they identify as a member of a particular religion, and if so, which one? Did/do they identify with an ethnic minority status, and if so, which one? All of these variables were intended to assess the social ‘distance’ or ‘gap’ between immigrant origin MPs from the native majorities. The British case loses some of its specificity here in order to maximise international comparison through the Pathways project. For starters, the term ‘minority’ was expanded in the project to include national or regional minorities, meaning that MPs who identified closely with being from a non-majority region of the United Kingdom were coded as having such (self-identified) status. Furthermore, given Britain’s extensive immigration history, it is rather difficult (and indeed arguably counterproductive) to assess whether or not an MP has a ‘foreign sounding’ name. This is particularly difficult for North- Western European names of French and German origin, owing to a great mixture of royal families and aristocracy between North-Western European nations over recent centuries. Surnames such as ‘Fabricant’, ‘Primarolo’, ‘Francois’ or indeed ‘Farage’, and first names such as ‘Roberta’ and ‘Heidi’ are undoubtedly non-British in origin, but would the average British voter necessarily connect this to a non-native origin, given the wide variety or names now common to the English language? This is debatable. Indeed, no MPs (or MEP, in the case of Farage) with above names were identified as being of immigrant origin by this research. The

32 Pathways project conceptions of minority group and identifiably non-native statuses thus are perhaps lacking in robustness in the specific British context, but were designed to increase comparability across countries (where these issues and definitions are much more prominent) and so there is great value to this coding scheme when looked at in this light, even if we have to exercise a great deal of caution when interpreting and operationalising these variables in a British specific context.

A further limitation of this data, which is common across all countries in the Pathways project, is that it potentially under-estimates the presence of immigrant origin parliamentarians, and of ethnic or religious statuses. If no information was discernible about an MP’s citizenship background, and there was no reason to suspect that there was an immigrant history in the family (no mention of it in any of the sources outlined below, and no foreign-sounding names in the reported family), then an MP was coded as of British-only origin. Further, if there was a suspicion of immigrant background in the family, but this could not be confirmed, the information was reported as ‘not known’. It is therefore highly likely that some immigrant origin MPs are in fact either coded as being of British-only origin, or (more likely) form part of the 4% who are missing. The same process was used for ethnic and religious identifications – MPs may well self-identify with either, but unless they reported this or it was recorded on one of the sources listed below, this would not have been coded in the database. However, despite its problems the dataset used for this research is the most comprehensive and longitudinally detailed collection of information on British MPs currently in existence, and gives us for the first time a measurement of the presence of immigrant origin (and not just ethnic minority) MPs in British politics from the early 1990s through until 2015.

Further variables were collected on the political and parliamentary careers of MPs. Beside basic information such as (historical) party membership, this included the incumbency status and general political experience of the individual such as years served and times elected as an MP, years served in any other elected capacity (as a local councillor, member of a regional or European parliament), and the highest position within the party that each MP served prior to the beginning of each parliamentary term (such as positions on the executive, a chair, or party (deputy) leadership). Chapter 8 also makes extensive use of these and of the following variables, which covered the career trajectories of MPs while serving in each parliamentary

33 term. These variables included whether or not the MP changed parties during each term (or was removed from their party), whether or not the MP served on a committee (and if so, some descriptive information on what that committee was, whether it dealt with a ‘core’ issue15, and whether or not it dealt with migration issues or issues which would likely touch upon or have ramifications for the flow and integration of immigrants)16. Whether or not the MP served in a governmental position – or rather in the comparative context, membership of the ‘executive’ which in British politics translates to membership of the Cabinet (Dunleavy & Rhodes 1990; Laver & Shepsie 1994; Norton 2013) – were also coded into a bespoke variable. Finally, information was recorded as to whether or not the MP served in any level of ‘leadership’ position. Here, there were again some issues created owing to the comparative demands of the Pathways research project. The first level of leadership roles encompassed all of party whips, junior ministers, party leadership positions, and Shadow Cabinet roles. Evidently, these roles are not of equivalent importance or influence in terms of the British case and efforts were thus made in this PhD to better reflect the structure of importance and responsibility attached to these roles in British parliaments. The second level collated MPs who were involved in some sort of organisational capacity, while the third and fourth levels were exclusively for the Deputies and then Speaker of the House of Commons. Again, these roles and tiers do not reflect the levels of seniority and responsibility within parliament, and efforts were made to restructure this data (and include committee membership as another level) for analysis in Chapter 8 of this thesis. That chapter outlines in more detail the updating and recoding which took place in order to tailor the data more specifically toward the British case.

The above information was collected from a range of online sources, meaning only information which is publically available is included and analysed in the database17. These

15 The concept of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ political issues, and which issues fall into these categories in the context of British politics from 1992-2015, are discussed in Chapter 8. Essentially, the distinction is between issues which would command high positions on the British political agenda, and would register significantly in terms of public interest (see further on this distinction in Bølstad 2014; Green 2007). Core and periphery in this sense is effectively a dichotomous measurement of issue salience (see for examples Bélanger & Meguid 2008; Epstein & Segal 2000; RePass 1971). 16 A list of committees which were considered to have dealt with ‘core’ issues is available in both the Pathways project documentation and in the supplementary files to this thesis – see Chapter 8 for further information. 17 This fact eliminates any ethical concerns about storage, archiving and data protection for the database. Since there is no sensitive information, the data could be stored on password protected laptops and external hard-drives and exchanged on internal and intra-institutional servers without the need for additional protections or best

34 sources included the following. The official House of Commons parliamentary website has an extensive back archive of current and (some) past Members of Parliament. This (more often than not) comprehensively lists MPs’ constituencies, their parliamentary and party careers, and committee memberships. Information was cross-referenced, and, where needed, completed using information from the House of Commons Sessional Returns. This was particularly useful for MPs sitting in earlier parliaments whom have since retired or passed away. Official sources such as these accounted for around half of all the information collected for this project. A second major source of information was the personal websites (and sometimes social media accounts) of MPs past and present. These sources often provided detailed accounts of the political backgrounds of MPs, as well as information on their birth (time and place), and sometimes their ethnic background. Following this, the third most valuable source of information in this data collection were MPs’ parliamentary speeches and questions. In the British House of Commons, questions submitted either in writing or by spoken word in the chamber itself are all recorded, and subsequently collected and published by topic, debate, and also by politician on the website: TheyWorkForYou. The site is run by mySociety18, an independent UK charity concerned with open access to governmental and parliamentary activities and information19. During questions and debates, MPs sometimes referenced personal information such as their birth or ethnic backgrounds, and also those of their parents. This was used as an important tool in determining the national and ethnic backgrounds of MPs. Finally, if there were still gaps in the variables, second-hand sources such as Wikipedia were used (with references followed up). Sometimes the websites of political parties, associations, or groups to which MPs may belong also provided some information relevant to this research, but this was not common.

practices. The Pathways project as a whole, including the UK-specific data collection, coding, and storage, also went through ethnical approval mechanisms at the University of Leicester. 18 https://www.mysociety.org 19 Launched in 2004, TheyWorkForYou takes data from official parliamentary sources to build a record of the activities and a (small) biography of every elected member of Parliament and the British devolved assemblies. More information can be found via https://www.theyworkforyou.com/about/

35 Public Opinion

The second major data collection effort carried out for this PhD and as part of the Pathways project was for Work Package 4.120 – public opinion toward immigration in the eight European countries under study. The full extent and results of this data collection, of which I led and am the first author on the database, is presented in the following chapter, where it is combined with further data which I was involved in collecting as part of the Global Public Opinions project (GPOP)21. GPOP is an international collaboration between public opinion scholars, which is collecting and harmonising public opinion data from high quality surveys around the world, with the aim of producing aggregated, annual measurements of public opinion on a wide range of topics. One of the first topics collected was immigration, and the National Level Immigration Opinions database (Van Hauwaert & English 2017a) contains a large amount of data from 18 individual European countries, including of course those under study in this chapter22. GPOP’s contribution to the data in this research was, as noted above, inclusion of national level sources which plugged the gaps left (particularly in the 1990s) by cross-national studies. Robust, reliable comparative measurements of the long-term evolution of public opinion toward immigration were until recently very hard to come by. Information on the evolution of public opinion on immigration in specific countries did exist (see for British examples Ford et al. 2015; Jennings 2009; for examples in Spain see Morales, Pardos-Prado, et al. 2015; Ros 2017), but comparative analysis was restricted. Mostly, comparative analyses have been temporally limited, single source comparisons between different questions in the same survey series (such as analysis of the European Social Survey by Bohman & Hjerm 2016; Davidov & Meuleman 2012; Sides & Citrin 2007a) which do not reflect the holistic and robust nature of the single-country studies measured above23. As such, the Pathways project sought to collect, harmonise and combine public opinion data on immigration from a range of high

20 Again, see http://pathways.eu/?page_id=3659 for more information and an overview of the Work Package. The guidelines were authored by Maria Sobolewska, Marc van de Wardt, Laura Morales, Steven Van Hauwaert, Patrick English, and Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca. The data collection effort was led and managed by me, and as such my name will be the first name on the database when it is released. 21 See http://www.gpop.eu for further information on the project, though it is discussed in some detail below. 22 The database is available on request through emailing the Principle Investigator at [email protected] mainz.de 23 The comparative advantage of measuring public opinion through maximising the potential number of sources, questions, and issues is discussed at length further below.

36 quality, cross-national comparative sources and to aggregate into a single, annual measurement stretching back into the 1990s. GPOP then expanded this to include the 1980s and also to take into account high quality national level election and social surveys. No commercial polling data was collected in either effort, which makes the contribution distinct from and an improvement on previous efforts.

Work Package 4.1 of the Pathways project thus involved identifying and collecting detailed survey information from cross-national, comparative resources fielded in each of the eight countries. The work package, designed to gather an estimation of the sense in which national publics were hostile toward immigration and thus potentially creating a barrier to representation, collected results from the European Social Survey, the European Values Study, the World Values Study, the International Social Survey, and the Eurobarometer. Information was collected for each country from 1990 to 2015, where possible. The actual time-frames of data collection of course varied by country according to their participation in each of the above surveys. For the purposes of this thesis, Pathways data was topped up (and continually cross- referenced) with data from the Global Public Opinions Project (GPOP). Unfortunately, due to a lack of quality national-level data available in Greece, and Greece’s lack of participation in a significant number of cross-national surveys, it was excluded from the analysis. With the combination of data from these two sources, a total of nearly 1500 individual survey marginals were used in this research, creating an average of over 200 per country. Germany had the highest number of items collected with nearly 350 observations, and Italy the lowest with around 150. The public opinion data used in this research is readily available from GPOP’s website and (for Great Britain) the associated files of this PhD thesis. The regional identifier (large government office region) of the respondent in each survey was used to disaggregate the British responses for the case study analysis, thus creating 18 separate databases. There was one for each of the seven countries: Great Britain; Belgium; France; Germany; the Netherlands; Italy; and Spain. Further, there was a database for each of Britain’s large government office regions: the South West; South East; London; Wales; West Midlands; East Midlands; East of England (or Eastern, or East Anglia); North West; Yorkshire and the Humber; North East, and Scotland.

37 The Stimson Dyad-Ratios Approach

A common problem for survey researchers investigating the evolution of public opinion toward immigration has been the lack of question items which are asked consistently over time and across countries. Though contemporary social surveys across Europe ask a range of questions on immigration (reflected by the number of items collected from European surveys as shown above), questions are seldom repeated (plus, many countries drop in and out of comparative surveys) and as such we are left with a distorted, disconnected patchwork of questions about immigration in Europe and their responses from a range of different sources. The longest running comparative question items on immigration in Europe is offered by the European Social Survey, which spans just 14 years. 14 years is not an insignificant amount of time, but even then, with fieldwork carried out every two years, it is not possible to construct and thus analyse an annual time series of public opinion toward immigration in Europe using this data alone. One could for instance potentially run a factor analysis or principle components analysis on this source, but less than two decades of information (with bi-annual gaps) is not enough for us to consider the longitudinal evolution of public opinion and what moves or shapes it. We can however can deal with this problem and maximise the number of sources we can bring into measurements and estimates of public opinion by using the Stimson (1991) ‘dyad ratios’ approach24. This method is easily able to deal with gaps in survey information and produce a single, annual (or otherwise user-defined aggregation) measurement of public opinion from only partially overlapping, gap-heavy sources.

24 The calculator and documentation are available on http://stimson.web.unc.edu/software/. This thesis made use of the MCalc version of Stimson’s software, which is the Mac OS version of the more popular (and up to date) WCalc. As it stands at the time of writing, a change in the Mac OS programming language since the latest release of MCalc has meant that it is necessary to apply a fix to the download in order for it to run. This fix was discovered by myself while exploring the problem in communication with Professor Stimson. Users will find that after download, current software versions of Mac OS will translate MCalc as a text file when it in fact should be a Terminal app. It is possible to make this change manually using the Terminal app itself. Once the Terminal app is open, users must type the following: chmod +- [FILE PATHWAY] – it is important to specify the pathway correctly. Once this command has been applied, users may exit the Terminal and re-open MCalc, which should then run correctly. Through dissemination of this fix, it has been brought to my attention that particularly older builds of MacBooks (pre-2014) still struggle to open MCalc. I have not as of yet found a fix for earlier build machines.

38 Stimson introduced the approach and the calculator in his most influential and important 1991 monograph. Throughout the book, Stimson argues for and measures what he describes as ‘policy mood’: as a collection and aggregation of individual preferences on a range potential government (in)actions and policies, with overall mood able to move along a space of increasing liberalism versus increasing conservatism. Taking the reader through a number of compelling and interesting arguments, Stimson articulates a common model of public opinion which views it as a spatial concept – much in line with the position that Downs (1957) articulated in his seminal work regarding party space and competition. Understood in this way, public preferences on policy and views on socio-political issues can be conceptualised as aligning somewhere along a width of possible ideological positions (Stimson 1991 p. 21; see also important contributions by Wlezien 1995, 1996). There are different ‘dimensions’25 of space which will attract different sorts of responses (and thus directional labels), but most commonly this is interpreted in the public opinion literature in terms of conservative and liberal positions. For instance, preferences on public spending can be conceptualised generally speaking as being in favour of more restrictive, overall less spending (a conservative position), and being in favour of increased government spending and more intervention (a liberal position). Of course, it is possible to have many degrees of the two positions, and policy preferences are assumed to as “some variation of from the family of unimodal (single-humped) distributions (Stimson 1991 p. 21). Public opinion is, in this sense, a truly mass and aggregated phenomenon. On the same page as above, Stimson states that “individual citizens are presumed to have ideal points, most-preferred choices from large sets of alternatives” which can be “aggregated” to a “public form of distributions of preference”. This sets Stimson (and his followers) apart from traditional conceptions of public opinion. An individual-level analysis of survey responses to a single question about the impact of immigration on the British economy would not qualify as a study of public opinion in this sense. Nor would a longitudinal analysis of the way in which prejudice against different immigrant groups has evolved in Britain. Nor

25 For example, there may be other spatial representations of preferences such as ‘national pride’ or ‘post- materialism’ which will not follow (that is to say, not necessarily correlated with individual positions on) the traditional liberal-conservative spatial concept (see for example Bartle et al. 2014). As another example, recent research of public opinion in Catalonia has investigated the presence of a distinct ‘nationalism’ dimension and public mood (Romero 2016). Jennings (2009) and Ford et al. (2015) conceptualise immigration as being a separate dimension, with preferences distributed along pro- and anti-immigrant space. This research necessarily considers that public opinion toward immigration is a distinct, measurable subject, but does not delve into conceptions on dimensionality in this sense.

39 indeed would evidence that British voters want increasing restrictions on the rules regarding family reunification. Rather, something approaching an aggregated, harmonised look at each of these factors combined and how they have moved over time (if at all) would deliver us a holistic sense of the overall distribution of preferences and beliefs on immigration in Britain. The Stimsonian conception and measurement of public opinion has been adopted by many public opinion scholars since (see for examples Bartle et al. 2010; Chanley 2002; Chanley et al. 2000; Coggins et al. 2012; Enns & Kellstedt 2008; Erikson et al. 2002; Ford et al. 2015; Green & Jennings 2011; Jennings 2009; Stevenson 2001), as has the conception of public opinion dispersing along a Downsian issue space (Enns & Wlezien 2011; Kelly & Enns 2010; Soroka & Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995, 1996).

The underlying methodology the Stimson dyad-ratios approach is explained well already in both of the appendix to Stimson’s 1991 book, and also more recently by Will Jennings (2009 p. 868) and Anthony McGann (2014 pp. 116–7)26. I build on these contributions below, but in the context of this study. I also summarises the criticisms of the method in the extant literature. The major contribution of the dyad-ratios approach, and its main source of contention and criticism, is how it is able to deal with the missing data and blend together different sources and questions into a single, smoothed measurement. Stimson (1991 p. 133) created the dyad-ratios calculator to deal with what he described as the “vexing missing-value issue” in the longitudinal analysis of survey data. Stimson begins by arguing that we ought to consider more about what is not missing and work from there to establish what may be missing. If we measure and consider how public opinion has shifted between two points by measuring the proportion of liberal responses – the liberalism index – at either end, then by inspecting the temporal distance the ratio of change we can make estimations about how public opinion evolved during the ‘missing’ time period:

“If, for example, the liberalism index is higher in some period t than in some previous period t-k, then (excepting the usual problem of sampling errors) we have some basis for believing that period t is more liberal than t-k… Presume we give the final index (at

26 McGann is quite critical of the dyad-ratios approach in his piece, and instead proposes an alternative approach based on Item Response Theory (IRT), which is discussed below.

40 period t) some arbitrary value for, say 100. We then have a basis for delivering a value for t-k. Because we can know the ratio of t to t-k and we have a value for t (100) then

Issuei at t-k must be: Issuei,t-k = 100 * (Issuei,t/Issuei,t-k)” (Stimson 1991 p. 133)

This latter element of the quote covers what is articulated as a ‘dyad-ratio’, where change is calculated and expressed as a ratio between two measured (known) points. This approach allows us to analyse change in the ‘liberalism index’ to two different questions as comparable units. For example, we can measure and compare the dyad-ratio of liberal responses between a question about the impact of immigration on (1) the economy, and (2) culture over two time points. That they may start at different levels at the first time-point, and that they ask about different elements of the immigration issue, is neither here nor there: we are but analysing the ratio change in responses to two questions about the issue of immigration. This is how the approach allows researchers to deal with missing data. Let’s assume that question (1) is asked three times: in 1991, 1994, and 1996. Let’s assume that question (2) is asked four times: in 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1995. Without harmonisation and aggregation, a time series analysis would be impossible. However, if we apply the dyad-ratios approach, we can create a time-series of ratio change running from 1990-1996. In other words, from having two questions with three time-points at different intervals, we have gone to having six consecutive years’ worth of data on public opinion change – what Stimson calls a ‘comparable metric’. We can then harmonise and combine to give an assessment of how public opinion has changed over this time period.

To achieve this, the final stage of Stimson’s calculation applies a process very close to a factor analysis in order to aggregate each individual time series passed into the calculator to an average at user defined time intervals. What Stimson (Stimson 1991 p. 134) describes as the ‘latent mood’ (the underlying trajectory of mass public opinion, unbiased and not skewed by analysis of simply one angle or framing of the topic) is estimated by calculator using an recursively repeating averaging process which is continued “until all issues have contributed to the estimation and information about all time points”. All individual issues are passed into the calculator, but some will ‘weigh’ much more heavily in a final estimation of public opinion on the overall topic depending on their estimated ‘contribution’ (or perhaps connection) to the overall movement of each issue over the same time period in which that issue-series is present.

41 The following formula, adapted from Stimson’s appendix, explains how this process works mathematically, where I = 1, n is all available issues for period t, J = 1, t is all available dyadic comparisons for issue i, b is the base period for the recursive metric generation, and Metricb is the value of the metric for period b.

/00"1 ∑; ∑, 23 29: 39: /00"1 ∗ 6178%&4 !"#$%& ()%*%+* = 24 , *

As Stimson outlines, this formula is principally a fairly standard averaging process but with the added component of calculating a common metric from only measured values, leaving aside missing ones, weighting issues according to their commonality (this is the factor-analysis style component). Forwards and backwards recursions of the estimates are run, which means the change (dyad ratios) in each issue series is estimated use both the end and beginning time- points at the point of departure. The difference in the two calculations (which will be correlated, but not identical) are used to make estimations of the reliability of the measures. The process is “repeated iteratively until the policy mood and communality estimates converge” (McGann 2014 p. 117). The final piece of the puzzle is Stimson’s smoothing algorithm, which begins with the assumption that all survey data inputted will be subject to sampling and measurement errors (which will not be consistent and equal between sources and over time), and thus concerns itself with eliminating ‘random fluctuation’ and reflecting the more evolutionary nature of public opinion (Stimson 1991 p. 135). The smoothing algorithm therefore ‘smooths’ variation in each issue time series to try and remove ‘zig-zag’ changes in the path of the series over time by using a backwards and forwards exponential smoothing algorithm, which Stimson argues will not ‘over fit’ the smoothing but will eliminate enough sampling-error induced variation to produce more accurate measurements of movement in preferences over time. The exponential nature of the algorithm is important, as this is designed so that it will leave highly patterned trend lines unaltered, but smooth random variation. Stimson discusses the advantages and pitfalls of smoothing and his smoothing approach at length in the cited appendix.

Once it has completed its averaging, weighting, and smoothing processes, the calculator produces two outputs. The first is a delimited file with annual (or otherwise user-aggregated

42 interval) measurements of public opinion, and the second is a log file which reports a wide range of descriptive information about said measurement. Included in this log is information on the number of observations, issue series (variables), the time span which the measurement covers, and an Eigenvalue estimate of the reliability of the measurement. Most importantly however is a table which displays the ‘factor loading’ of each issue series (variable). This most vital component of the output informs the user as to the degree to which each issue series (variable) ‘loaded’ in the analysis – the extent to which it is correlated with other items passed into the calculator and (thus drove) the overall measurement of change in public opinion (as defined by all of the issue series passed through the calculator) over the time period in which it covered – the factor loading scores. Factor loading ranges from -1 to 1. The value of these statistics cannot be overstated – not only do they give a measurement as to which questions best capture (and reporting) the latent (or common) public opinion on the researcher’s topic, and the degree of common variance between the inputted variables, but also provide important estimates as to which variables do not associate with public opinion on the researcher’s topic. The standard errors of these estimates are also reported. This output gives a sense as to the nature, robustness, and appropriateness of the output as a measure of public opinion toward the given topic.

It is not clear what should be done with issue series reporting low factor loading scores. Stimson suggests that ‘noise’ is simultaneously useful for capturing the sense in which public opinion is indeed messy and never clear cut (particularly when we reconsider the individual level), but also that too much noise may overwhelm the measurement and thus very much reduce accuracy. It is not at all clear what most researchers do about this problem. Such uncertainties lead to questions about the comparability and replicability of estimates of public opinion using the Stimson method. The extent to which what to do with low-loading items matters is questionable however – logically speaking, the exclusion of a variable with a low factor score is unlikely to move the overall estimate very much. That said, these issues also apply and are of much greater importance at a much earlier stage – the initial input itself. Stimson (1991 p. 39) suggests the “criteria for inclusion of survey marginals are (1) that they be issue preferences, sometimes interpreted loosely, and (2) that they be measured in identical form in more than one year”. Broadly speaking, this means that questions must be directional (offering the ability for respondents to answer in two equally proportioned directions, aligning with the overall issue space) questions which connect (sometimes loosely) to a predetermined

43 (preselected) issue, and that they are repeated at least once over time. The interpretation for this outline can be (and is) wide. It still leaves the possibility that what one researcher may consider related to public opinion toward topic x may be at complete odds with another – particularly when survey information is perhaps a little scarcer, and thus a more liberal (or loose) approach is required. Similarly, views on the degree to which topics are being mixed and blended are also likely to vary between interested parties. Though there is a sense in which the calculator can help resolve these issues in terms of the reported factor scores, this is not at all necessarily the case as completely unrelated questions and issues may still, by sheer fortune or coincidence, align perfectly with the overall weighted average movement of all other issues over the same time period – harking back to the classical ‘correlation does not mean causation’ issue. Lastly, what exactly does ‘identical’ mean? Some interpret this to mean that the same question asked by different survey houses should be treated as non-identical, while others suppose that there is no reason to think this. Others still sit somewhere in the middle, considering items to be identical across administrators only if the survey method (face to face, telephone, mail, and so on) is the same. These are not questions to which there are easy answers. Indeed, they refer to some of the deepest and longest standing epistemological concerns of social science research. The best way to try and avoid, or perhaps rather alleviate, these issues is for full discussions and disclosure on each qualitative decision and judgement made about what goes in and what subsequently comes out of each researcher’s estimation of public opinion, and for constructive and empirically driven criticism and discussion of these choices to follow.

Further, though this method is increasingly popular among public opinion scholars, and Stimson’s contributions highly regarded across the field, the dyad-ratios algorithm itself is certainly not without its problems or critics on a mathematical and methodological level. Two of the most important of such critics are McGann (2014) and Voeten and Brewer (2006). Voeten and Brewer (2006 p. 818) seek to improve on the Stimson model by creating a Bayesian alternative, which they argue is superior as it is able to “obtain a series that is simultaneously smooth and allows for sudden shocks”, whereas the dyad-ratios algorithm “obscures sudden breaks in the data (and, thus, the short term impact of events) or leads to seemingly random zigzagging (when the smoothing option is turned off)”. However, as both Stimson (2017) and even the authors themselves point out, Bayesian approaches to policy mood estimates largely produce very similar results to dyad-ratios. Furthermore, it is recommended and widely agreed

44 that the smoothing algorithm ought to be turned on, as it attempts to reduce sampling error and reflects better the gradual, slow evolutions of public opinion. To argue that this ‘masks’ sudden shocks and breaks in the data is an assumption that such events actually take place in the evolution of public opinion the first place – that there are things which exist which are also being masked – when in fact it is not common to view public opinion as being highly responsive to shocks or liable to sudden change. Further, this also is contrary to how we usually think of public opinion as being an evolving, slow moving phenomenon and may danger researchers into picking up or interpreting movements induced by sampling errors as genuine changes in aggregate preferences.

The critical work by McGann (2014) takes issue with the dyad-ratios method for two principle reasons (with the second also applying to Voeten and Brewer’s model). Firstly, McGann suggests that the mathematical equation used to measure change (the ratio) in Stimson’s model may be inaccurate in terms of measuring scales of change. McGann (2014 p. 117) highlights how a hypothetical “change from 10% answering a question in a left-wing manner to 20% represents the same dyad ratio as a change from 20% to 40%, or from 40% to 80%, and thus by the assumption of the algorithm represents the same change in policy mood”. Essentially therefore, there is no approximation or account of the actual scale in shifting public opinion, if a ratio approach is used. There is therefore a suggestion that accuracy is lost here. Also, McGann argues that there is further issue regarding the limitation of measuring movement when medians and scales harmonise (at the upper bounds) – “If 90% of the population answers a question in a left-wing manner in years when the political centre is around its long-run median, it is not possible for this question to reflect a sharp move to the left. Even if we have 100% to give [sic] the left-wing answer, we only get a ratio of 10:9”. Again, this suggests some potential issue with accuracy, although McGann himself acknowledges that this particular issue is somewhat mitigated by the iterative reweighting of issue series based on commonality, which will favourably select against ‘oddly behaving’ issue series. Secondly, McGann has further issue with the methodology of both the Stimson and Voeten and Brewer approaches, arguing that their linear models “provide no individual-level model of response – it is simply assumed that the aggregate responses react to changes in policy mood in a linear manner” (Ibid). Instead of their linear based approaches, McGann argues that an Item Response Theory (IRT) (Embretson & Reise 2000; Harvey & Hammer 1999; Kean & Reilly 2014; Woods & Baker 1985) approach to estimating aggregate public opinion is much more

45 appropriate, as it is able to track the political centre, and thus give better estimations and calculations of deviance from it, in a way that a dyad-ratios approach simply cannot. As McGann outlines, authors have previously used IRT – a concept borrowed from psychology which attempts to predict the likelihood of respondents selecting a correct response and then analyse deviance from it – to analyse survey response data in the past, as it is a useful way of running a confirmatory factor analysis on non-continuous data (Fraley et al. 2000; Orlando & Reeve 2007). Most of such studies though are on the individual level, and using IRT on aggregate level data is a step which McGann takes himself. This jump to aggregate level, user- defined inputs produces a flaw in the process which Stimson (2017) in response points out (discussed below). Essentially, McGann (2014 p. 123) argues that his IRT model produces a better estimate of public opinion and its change over time, because it produces better estimates of “the central tendency of the distribution of public opinion”, and from this, that “if we assume that the population is normally distributed, we can estimate not only the population mean, but also the standard deviation, which gives us a measure of how polarised public opinion is”. In short, IRT models can provide a more realistic estimate of commonality between issues and changing public opinion by considering the probability of aggregate public opinion taking each value at each time point.

All of that said, the Stimson method of conceptualising and measuring public opinion is still the most sound, robust, and widely applicable approach available to researchers. The criticism outlined by McGann, Voeten and Brewer are all valid (the former perhaps more than the latter), but either not solved satisfactorily, or solved in a manner which introduces further problems. In response and defence of the dyad-ratios approach, Stimson (2017 p. 5) wrote that IRT based approaches (such as that favoured by McGann as above) “requires assumed validity” of items, where “the test designer selects item for their assumed validity”. Dyad-ratios can be applied to any items, Stimson argues, and will select and weight those that share variance, down-weighting and reducing the importance of (or contribution to the overall measure) of items which lack connection (and thus validity) to the overall concept. The IRT method on the other hand cannot do this, and so requires theoretical, a priori judgements on item validity. Thus, while it may provide a more theoretically robust estimation of public opinion, and while McGann may be very much correct in pointing out the flaws that a ratio-based approach to estimating change brings, the IRT approach will exacerbate some of the more fundamental issues regarding selecting questions, issue to topic connections, and low-loading variables.

46 Further, as stated above, the Bayesian approach outlined by Voeten and Brewer does not provide substantially different estimates to the dyad-ratio approach, and assumes a problem which is not necessarily supported by evidence, or indeed theories about the slow moving, evolutionary nature of public opinion. The dyad-ratio approach thus remains a better estimate of public opinion – at least in this aggregated, mass preference sense which Stimson describes.

Using the calculator is easy, providing the user makes the correct decisions and inputs. Firstly, researchers must transform survey results on questions relating to their chosen topic27

27 One of the key requirements, and one key source of concern regarding replicability and consistency of this method, is that researchers must themselves determine which survey questions do indeed ‘cover’ their topic, and thus should be included in calculator. Stimson (1991 p. 136) himself acknowledges and discusses this problem, writing of it being “desirable that the analyst not have too large a role in the outcome by issue selection” but also that “throwing everything [possibly related to the issue] into the pot can overwhelm the measure with unrelated patterns and noise”. Part of the afforded solution is to analyse outputs from the ‘smoothing’ process of the calculator, as described below, in combination with unsmoothed estimates, in order to view discrepancies between assumed and estimated commonalities between issues. However, this still does not address broader conceptual problems about a) what constitutes a topic and an issue within said topic, and b) what questions (or type of questions) should be considered as ‘tapping into’ or ‘measuring’ public opinion on said topic. For instance, say our desired topic on which we wish to measure public opinion on is immigration – as it is in this research. This is a fairly solid concept on the surface, but when we consider how questions about immigration are often asked and framed in (European) surveys, this suddenly becomes very complicated. More often than not, alongside simpler questions such as “Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a bit, kept the same, reduced a bit, or reduced a lot?” (British Election Study), other questions are asked which simultaneously ‘tap into’ and will as such ‘measure’ other topics. For example, the British Social Attitudes survey asks respondents “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is extremely bad and 10 is extremely good, would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain’s economy that migrants come to Britain from other countries?” undoubtedly ‘mixes’ the topic of immigration with conceptions and estimations of the British economy. While the former question is about levels of immigration, the second question concerns its impacts (on another topic). Stimson himself argues that fusions and mixings of topics within questions should be avoided, but given the lack of consistent questions relating only to immigration, this is actually very hard to avoid in this context. Both GPOP and WP 4.1 of the Pathways project collected all identified questions relating to immigration (regardless of combination with other related topic), but for the purposes of this research I chose to be more selective when considering which issues ought to form part of the public opinion measures for the British case study. Where to draw the line on topic mixing and determining which issues fit into which topic is very much a qualitative judgement which will surely result in constant discord and disagreement between independent researchers.

47 into a four-variable database28. Information on the surveys used and questions selected to produce each of the measurements in this research is in part contained in Chapters 3, 4 and 6, and then in full in the Main Appendix. The key variable is the ‘index score’, which is a dichotomous measurement of ‘liberal’ responses as a proportion of all ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ answers (in some cases in Europe this is better articulated in terms of left-wing v right-wing, given the association of liberal positions in this sense as ‘middle ground’, see Stimson et al. (2012) for example). This dichotomous distinction of public opinion follows conceptualising public preferences as being distributed along a Downsian style issue space (with preferences disturbed along a line of possibilities, much like parties and policy in Downs’ 1957 work), which is explained in more detail below. Stimson, and many of his followers, usually focus on the topic of government spending in the US, and conceptualise their policy space in terms of ‘liberalism’ and ‘conservatism’ – as in discussions of the ‘liberalism index above’. Suppose though we are collecting responses to the British Election Study (BES) question regarding the impact of immigration on crime in Britain to be fed into the calculator. The question asks respondents “Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Immigration increases crime rates”. The possible responses are “strongly agree, agree, neither, disagree, strongly disagree”, with additional categories for “Don’t know” and various non-response types. Using the logic of a Downsian issue space, we would code “disagree, strongly disagree” as liberal responses, with “strongly agree, agree” being conservative. Other categories would fall into ‘neutral’ (“neither”) or missing (don’t know and no responses). The ‘liberalism’ index, as above, is then the proportion of liberal responses derived as a function of the total liberal plus conservative responses. When repeated on every iteration of the question, this calculation constructs an issue-series of the proportion of proportion of liberal responses. Once repeated again on all identified questions collected on the researcher’s chosen topic, these issue-series can then be inputted into Stimson’s calculator. So, once the public opinion data was collected and harmonised, it was then turned into a single, aggregated annual measurement of public opinion toward immigration using the Stimson

28 The documentation provided by Stimson on his website covers the exact practical process required to input these series into the calculator. Essentially, the number of observations fed into the calculator will match the number of individual questions, but only four pieces of information are required: a variable name (identifying observations of the same question), the end date of the survey fieldwork, the ‘index score’ (described above), and the number of respondents asked each question.

48 dyadic-ratios calculator at the national level for the seven countries, and regional level in Great Britain.

Independent Variables and Regression Techniques

A number of independent variables are brought into the research at various points when regression analyses are used to test the hypotheses and investigate the data. Mostly, these variables come courtesy of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) national and regional level databases29. Further information comes from data collected as part of the Pathways project Work Package 3, which concerned the institutional and demographic contexts of representation30. Each chapter outlines which data was used and its sources, where applicable. Throughout the empirical sections of this thesis, a mixture of descriptive analysis of graphs and tables and analytical regression analyses are used to investigate the data. This thesis made use of generalised linear regressions throughout, rather than ordinary least squares, and avoided the use of hierarchical models despite the clustered nature of the data (owing to a small number of clustered units). Generalised linear regressions were preferred as the key assumptions of the ordinary least squares approach were not met in any chapter. Firstly, the dependent variable, representation, is proportional in each case and as such, possible outcomes are necessarily restricted and clustered around off-centred means and are not able to pass below zero. This creates a Poisson distribution, however the data is not count data, so Poisson-based regressions were not appropriate. Secondly, the residuals are not normally distributed, which can be seen in the residual plots which are available in the appendixes of each chapter making use of regression analysis.

29 This information, among a wealth of other statistics, can be found at http://stats.oecd.org/# 30 Work Package 3 is divided into three separate research efforts, each of which are made use of in the research: Work Package 3.1 authored by Cornelia Kristen and Diana Schacht, Work Package 3.2 authored by Luis Romero, and Work Package 3.3 authored by Lucas Geese.

49 CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC OPINION AND REPRESENTATION ACROSS EUROPE – DOES ANTI-IMMIGRATION SENTIMENT PREVENT OR FACILITATE DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANT ORIGIN GROUPS?31

Introduction

The thesis now turns to an empirical exploration of the relationship between anti- immigrant public opinion and the political representation of immigrant origin groups at the European level, with data collected at tested in seven countries across Western and Southern Europe. This presents the first test of the central hypothesis across a broad range of contexts regarding immigration history and integration regimes (Cinalli and Giugni 2013; Koopmans et al. 2005) and legal frameworks for non-citizen participation and representation (Howard 2009; Vincent 2002). Across Europe, we see two distinct phenomena both consistently rising in salience – the political representation of immigrant origin groups (in particular those from non- white backgrounds – though they still remain underrepresented) (Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Celis et al. 2014; Durose et al. 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013), and the growth of anti-immigrant public opinion, public discourse, and mobilisation of anti-immigrant parties (Bohman & Hjerm 2016; Dahlström & Sundell 2012; Deangelis 2003; Gibson 2002; Giugni et al. 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Luedtke 2005; McLaren & Johnson 2007; Semyonov et al. 2006; Van Spanje 2010). So, at the same time as we see increasing numbers of non-native and non-European origin parliamentarians across Europe’s democracies, we are also seeing a wave of xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiment, and political representation for those dissatisfied and angry with current immigration regimes across the continent. With both immigrant-origin group representation and anti-immigrant sentiment gaining in size and prevalence in European politics, an important question arises regarding the connection between the two; what exactly is the relationship between the politics of anti-immigration and the representation of immigrant origin groups? Given that in the vast

31 This results and analysis from this chapter are included in a forthcoming book chapter written by Maria Sobolewska, Patrick English, Steven van Hauwaert, Marc van de Wardt, and Laura Morales, in the Oxford University Press Second Edited Volume of the Pathways project findings.

50 majority of cases, non-native candidates will have to appeal to and win over the support of the majority group in order to gain election (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Fisher et al. 2014), how can publics be becoming increasingly anti-immigrant, but also increasingly represented by immigrants? Does anti-immigrant public opinion impact on the political representation of immigrant origin groups in Europe? I seek to address these questions in this chapter.

The central hypothesis of the thesis proposes that anti-immigrant public opinion will restrict the representation of immigrant origin groups, but a counter-mobilisation argument could also be made, and both angles are hypothesised and tested in this chapter. Firstly, in response to rising anti-immigrant sentiment among the electorate, political parties may seek to limit the numbers of immigrant origin politicians going on their ballots that may cost them votes from the disgruntled electorate. It is thus proposed that this will especially affect politicians of visibly immigrant origins and those from groups that trigger greater negative sentiment among the host public. Politicians from backgrounds that are thought to be more ‘acceptably different’, such as those with business or professional careers and degrees from elite universities (Ford 2011; Durose et al 2013), may be less vulnerable to the electoral threat of anti-immigrant sentiments, even if they are visibly of an immigrant background. Secondly, however, negative attitudes towards immigration may serve to mobilise the political claims of immigrants. A highly hostile public may help immigrants of diverse backgrounds to realise their common political interests and, as such, to help them formulate the need to participate in electoral politics of their countries of residence to defend their collective interests (Koopmans et al. 2005; Statham 1999). Anti-immigrant public sentiment may well be indicative of higher levels of politicisation of immigration, which in turn, provide immigrant origin candidates with an opportunity to crystallise into effective and viable political contenders. The chapter also employs the distinction outlined in the previous chapter regarding the ethnic groupings of immigrant origin communities – white (and so much closer to the native European groups in this sense) and non-white (thus with greater social distance from native Europeans in this regard). It hypothesises that, based on these respective degrees of social distance, non-white groups will be hit and restricted much harder by contexts of higher anti-immigrant public opinion.

This chapter uses data collected as part of this thesis and also as part of the wider Pathways project to investigate the nature of the relationship between public opinion toward immigration and the political representation of immigrant origin communities – both white and

51 non-white – testing across seven European countries over a near 30-year time frame. This is the first test of the thesis’ central hypothesis: the political representation of immigrant origin communities will be negatively affected by increasingly hostile public opinion towards immigration. From the central hypothesis, competing hypotheses are formed with differing expectations for this relationship, as outlined above. The chapter concludes that there is some evidence to suggest that public opinion does play a role in determining opportunity for representation at the national level in Europe –in the countermobilisation direction. That said, cross-national variation in representation of immigrant groups is much better explained by variances in electoral systems and voting rights afforded to non-citizens.

Descriptive Representation of Minority Groups in European Politics

Though they remain underrepresented, there are currently record levels of non-white parliamentarians in European democracies. However, there is disparity in this between European nations, with minority representatives still struggling to break through in some cases. In Britain for example, there have been election-on-election rises in the presence of non-white MPs since the late 1980s (Audickas & Apostolova 2017; Sobolewska 2013). Elsewhere in the Netherlands, by the middle of the last decade “more than 10 per cent of those elected to the national parliament were of ‘non-Western’ origin” (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013 p. 564) Similar upward trajectories – though modest – have been seen in other countries such as France and Germany (Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010). All around, we are seemingly seeing a gradually more open and tolerant political system at the top (or elite) level, with parties and governments apparently increasingly happy and able to bring in and integrate non-white politicians into its frameworks. Non-white groups living and working in European states are non-native origin communities (each having a non-native family member somewhere in their recent family history) with visible minority (i.e. they are without a white ethnicity, which is the dominant majority in all European states) backgrounds (Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013). We can then articulate them in a different way: as ‘ethnic minority immigrant origin communities’32. The minority ethnic classification captures their non-white

32 The term ‘ethnic minority’ is not completely comparable across European states. In Britain for example, this definition covers all groups without a white ethnic background. In the Netherlands, for another, there is a sense in which some non-white groups from ex-Dutch colonies are not considered as of minority ethnicity due to their cultural ‘closeness’ to the white Dutch communities, which raises issues about conceptions of ‘cultural distance’

52 appearance, and any discrimination which may be faced through the visibility therefore of their status as of foreign origin to the white native groups of Europe (Ford 2011; Zick et al. 2008). The immigrant origin classification reflects this non-native status, with ethnic minority groups more often than not originating from countries in which non-white ethnic status is very much the majority in places such as Africa, the Caribbean, and Sub-Continental Asia. Ethnic minority immigrant origin groups are well studied in terms of their representation, as we can see from the wealth of literature cited above, but we know comparatively little about the representation of white immigrant origin groups however (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013) – a gap in our knowledge that the Pathways project and this chapter are able to fill. While white (and therefore not an outgroup in terms of having an ethnic minority status), immigrants from European, American, and Australasian nations are still nonetheless non-native groups, and face barriers to political participation and representation (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Brady et al. 1995; Lieberson 1980; Norris & Lovenduski 1995). Thus, we ought to consider and measure the representation of such groups, and by deploying a comparative framework use it to inform us about the barriers to representation created by immigrant and non-white ethnic statuses respectively. This chapter, and indeed the wider thesis, as such nests white immigrant and non- white groups into a wider category of ‘immigrant origin’ communities. Figure 3.1 below visualises this theoretical move. Both ethnic minority and white immigrant origin groups are distinct from native only groups in terms of their immigrant status, but the latter are connected by a shared racial background with the native group.

and ‘realistic threat’ when considering whom should count as a minority and whom should not (see Manevska & Achterberg 2013). However, in a comparative analysis such as this, there is always the need to sacrifice contextual precision in favour of establishing a common measurement. It would be very difficult and raise too many issues of comparability to complete a definition and then measurement of ‘minority groups’ which would account for every possible national discrepancy and nuance. So, while this issue is acknowledged here, it is left aside hereon in.

53 Figure 3.1. Structure of immigrant origin status in European communities

Community

Immigrant Origin Native Only Origin

Ethnic Minority White Immigrant Immigrant Origin Origin

Across the continent, domestic parliaments continue to be dominated by white, native group members (on the right-hand side of Figure 3.1) with immigrants and their descendant (as well as other minority and marginalised social groups such as women, LGBT+ groups, and young people) repeatedly excluded. In Europe, the ‘descriptive representation’ (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1999; Bird et al. 2010) of non-native groups is therefore still being restricted in contemporary democracy – immigrant origin, non-native ethnic groups across the world are still very much politically underrepresented (Banducci et al. 2004; Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Fernandes et al. 2018; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Fisher et al. 2014). The concept of descriptive representation hinges upon the idea that representatives who share a background with a particular minority (and/or marginalised) social group will be better able to understand and connect with said group than a representative from another social group – connecting to ideas of linked fate and group identity (Heyes 2014; Sanchez & Masuoka 2010; Simien 2005). If a particular social group – say Muslim women in Britain – find their interests threatened or potentially infringed upon by some proposed legislation, who could we expect to better articulate and represent their concerns than a female British Muslim MP? How could we expect a white, male Christian MP to represent Muslim better than a Muslim woman? We cannot, realistically. ‘Representatives’ who share backgrounds with particular social groups will be best at ‘representing’ them – in terms of their concerns and interests – in political systems. The quality of representation that a ‘common member’ representative will be able to provide their group is of superior quality to the representation that a non-group member could provide and, as such, in order to protect and engage all possible voices in the democratic process, legislatives and other representative

54 bodies should aim to ‘reflect’ or ‘mirror’ their population as much as is possible (Mansbridge 1999; Norris & Lovenduski 1993; Pitkin 1967; Sobolewska 2013). A properly descriptive legislative, it is argued, would accurately portray the population it serves with levels of representatives from all social, ethnic, national, and all other groups which copy their distributions and presences in the overall population. A descriptively representative chamber would be in some respects a microcosm, or a perfect painting, of society at all its intersections.

Since the concept was most famously articulated by Pitkin in 1967, descriptive political representation has been the focus of a great deal of theoretical, empirical, and critical works, mostly (but not exclusively) in terms of ethnic minority groups and women. Mansbridge (1999) studied both ethnic minority and women’s political representation in the framework of descriptive representation. Mansbridge outlined that there are a number of distinct advantages for disadvantaged social groups. Firstly, Mansbridge argued that increasing descriptive representation was associated with better quality deliberation of group issues and problems, which would result in a ‘crystallisation’ of their demands and interests. Secondly, more descriptive representation made greater attachment to the political system (or polity) on the part of disadvantaged groups. Increasing numbers of representatives for socially disadvantaged groups also creates an increased sense of the “ability to rule” and more of a sense of connection to the decision-making processes that govern them. This sense of increased feelings of legitimacy and attachment toward democracy among disadvantaged, minority and marginalised groups when descriptive representation is higher has been highlighted as a consistent advantage throughout the representational literature (Anwar 1986, 2001; Banducci et al. 2004; Gay 2002), as well as the improvement to political trust associated with higher levels of representation for minority groups (see for example Gay 2002). For another example, Bird (2005) examined the descriptive representation of visible minority groups in France, Denmark, and Canada. Bird’s investigation concerned establishing a comparable, cross- national analysis on the ‘barriers’ to political representation faced by minority groups – and thus explaining why they remain underrepresented in Western democracies but to varying degrees depending on the state itself. Bird argued of the importance of the full inclusion of minority groups into domestic democratic systems on the grounds that it improves the sense of legitimacy and connection with politics among minority groups, but also as a barometer of the quality functioning of the systems themselves. Bird concluded that variations in institutional and legal frameworks regarding access to citizenship were important in terms of the opportunities and ability for minority groups to increase their political representation. Studying

55 the role of gender in descriptive representation, Rosenthal (1995) highlighted that women were more likely to be ‘gender conscious’ than men in their decisions on whether or not to back candidates. That is to say that women would be more likely to express a candidate’s gender as an important factor in vote choice than men. Further, Rosenthal (1995 p. 609) found that “women are far more likely than men to prefer to be represented by someone of the same gender”, providing evidence that women, as a traditionally marginalised group in democratic political systems, identify stronger with potential representatives who share that group status than those who do not. Similar evidence was found in this regard by Fisher et al. (2014) who, when studying the connection between candidate and voter ethnicity in British elections, agreed that in some cases there were significant vote-share advantages for ethnic minority candidates among voters from their own social groups – a full eight points in the case of Pakistani groups. Relatedly, a host of other scholars have found that an increased presence of descriptive representatives for minority groups in an elected body leads to higher participation rates among members of such groups (Griffin & Keane 2006; Karp & Banducci 1999; Pantoja & Segura 2003; Rocha et al. 2010), which again furthers arguments about the advantages that increasing descriptive representation has in terms of improving democratic legitimacy and engagement.

It is therefore often argued that members of minority and marginalised communities are best placed to represent such communities, and that democratic systems should be doing all they can to increase the presence of minority and marginalised group members in legislative bodies, fairly common. The concept of descriptive representation and the requirement of democratic systems to increase the numerical presence of MPs from marginalised and minority background has not though been without its critics. Representational literature still contains a significant strand of research which stays clear of the ‘pictorial’ approach and focuses on the ‘substantive’ framing of representation (see for examples Childs 2006; Lefkofridi et al. 2012; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld & Bischof 2013; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 2005). The substantive approach considers that the representation of minority and marginalised social groups is better measured by looking into the actions and interventions of MPs in legislative debates and votes in their favour. The numerical presence of descriptive representatives they argue does not necessarily lead to any advantages in that prior regard. Most of the criticism from substantive theorists and followers does not take particular issue with the suggestion that, for example, a British Muslim woman would better represent the interests of Muslim women in Britain than a white male Christian would, but only that this is necessary. In other words, they dispute that

56 there is a necessary and active connection between group status, group identity, and thus group representation. Who is to say that just because an MP is a female British Muslim, that she will indeed ‘stand for’ the interests of British Muslim women in the House of Commons? In the context of women’s representation Childs (2006 pp. 7–8) agreed that it would appear ‘reasonable’ to connect descriptive and substantive representation together and argue that “women representatives are more likely to act for women than male representatives”, but also argued that an important difference between ‘sex and gender’ and identities as such underpinned a flawed assumption that increasing numbers of women within a parliamentary body would necessarily lead to better collective representation of the interests of women in British politics. We can easily translate this in terms of minority groups – just because an increasing number of Black MPs may be entering the House of Commons, for example, unless they arrive with political association to their ethnic identity and the intention to represent and forward the interests and views of Britain’s black communities, then what does this ‘increase’ in descriptive representation actually amount to? This is far from a hypothetical suggestion – ethnic minority Conservative MPs have been known to pay little political or social attention to their ethnic backgrounds; Adam Afriyie33, MP for Windsor, for example once described himself as “post-racial”, stating “I don’t see myself as a black man”. Kwasi Kwarteng34, who represents Spelthorne, wrote in 2016 that he feels he “doesn’t need to represent ‘black’ issues” despite media assumptions that he would, and in an interview regarding her status as the first black female Conservative MP, Helen Grant35, Maidstone and The Weald, insisted that she would “never play the race card”.

However, there are plenty of answers to these criticisms within the descriptive representation literature. In short, though it is certainly true that a range of assumptions are being made about the identity, intentions, and roles that MPs from minority and marginalised groups will play in parliament vis-à-vis representing their own groups, and though it is very important to empirically examine and highlight this, it is not true that these problems collapse or remove the benefits and advantages of increasing descriptive representation. Perhaps the

33 London Evening Standard, 8/2/2010: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/adam-afriyie-from-peckham-council- house-to-shadow-minister-6735252.html accessed 2nd January 2018 34 True Africa, 9/9/2016: https://trueafrica.co/article/british-politician-kwasi-kwarteng-on-why-identity-politics- are-undemocratic/ accessed 2nd January 2018 35 Daily Mail, 27/1/2008: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-510647/She-beaten-black---Tory-contender- Helen-Grant-says-shell-play-race-card.html accessed 2nd January 2018

57 most important of these – and the key push back against authors who favour diminishing the importance and analysis of descriptive representation – is the sense of legitimacy and connection to the political system which increasing descriptive representation provides. Most importantly, as discussed above increasing descriptive representation of minority groups is connected to increasing turnout at elections by said groups. Griffin and Keane (2006 p. 1008) for example demonstrate how greater descriptive representatives from African American communities have substantial mobilisation effects in US elections, a finding which they claim, “improves the theoretical link between descriptive representation and political participation by showing that theories need to account for descriptive representation’s conditional effects”. Furthermore, both Gay (2002) and Banducci et al. (2004) found that ethnic minority constituents were much more likely to approve of their representatives and engage with them if the representative was from a minority background themselves. The latter also found evidence that minority voter turnout increases in places where minorities hold office, and stated that their results showed that “enhanced descriptive representation of minorities might produce normative gains” which are “removed” from criticism levelled from the point of view of substantive representation (2004 p. 552). On legitimacy, there is empirical evidence on the individual level which suggests that members of minority and marginalised groups do prefer to be represented by members of their own group (see for examples Fisher et al. 2014; Rosenthal 1995).

Lastly, we must remember that descriptive representation itself also serves as a measurement of the inclusion and enfranchisement of minority and marginalised groups in a political system – and if it is lacking then this is a poignant and important measurement of failure (of legitimacy) on the part of domestic politics (Bird 2005). It is in these conditional (or perhaps indirect) advantages (and uses) – increasing turnout, increasing a sense of legitimacy and belonging to the policy, and serving a measure as to the quality and inclusivity of representative democratic systems – where the concept and impact of descriptive representation is so valuable, and where it can be protected on a theoretical level from substantive-orientated criticism. So, while there may be legitimate concerns with what descriptive representatives actually do once in parliament, and whether or not they truly represent ‘crystallised interests’ and ‘stand up for’ their communities (and thus a need to continually analyse and measure how much substantive representation a system provides), there is no denying the benefits of higher levels of descriptive political representation for minority and marginalised groups to wider society and the political system at large. Thinking

58 about these impacts and the wider, longer-term picture, it is arguably just as important, from the point of view of voters, potential candidates, and party activists alike to see representatives from their group taking positions and having active roles in British politics, as it is for said representatives to actually substantively represent them through speeches in the chambers or the signing of motions. Even if Adam Afriyie, Kwasi Kwarteng, and Helen Grant may not substantively specifically represent black British groups in the House of Commons in a meaningful way36, the far-reaching impacts regarding increasing political participation, engagement, and feelings of legitimacy and validity among black voters that the increasing body of black MPs in Westminster will have is undeniable. That is why it remains crucial to measure and engage with increasing the descriptive representation of minority and marginalised social groups in democratic countries.

Further, no matter which angle or theory of representation one subscribes to, there is a common assumption (or understanding, perhaps) underpinning them all: representation is an instrument, or a tool, to make democracy work (Fernandes et al. 2018). Without it, without some representation of the interests and views of the population at all its intersections, it is impossible to conduct an inclusive and meaningful democratic approach to politics. With this and all of the above arguments in favour of elected bodies being descriptively representative of their populations in mind, the relative (but growing) lack of presence of parliamentarians descriptively representing immigrant origin communities is disturbing. Lack of representation for immigrant origin groups in European parliaments could mean that the interests of non- native groups may be ignored or supressed, and that immigrant groups may struggle to find legitimacy and build a sense of connection with – and indeed trust in (Gay 2002) – the political system of their host nation. Further, it could mean that the political and/or social systems in European democracies are excluding or under-resourcing immigrant groups, thus not allowing them to mobilise and engage with politics; indeed, Bird (2005 p. 435) argued that “the political under-representation of visible minorities can be taken as a proxy for particular dysfunctions within the political and electoral systems of a given country”. So, democratic systems suffer in terms of legitimacy and quality when there is a lack of representatives from minority or

36 And this is not to say that they do not. As this thesis does not study substantive representation, I do not make any claims about the extent to which any of these three MPs have actually substantively represented the interests of black groups in Britain, or the extent to which their parliamentary actions and affairs to date reflect their claims and comments made to the media, presented on the above page.

59 marginalised groups, and it is thus important to determine why it is that representation is being held back (and equally to properly assess the descriptive representation of white immigrant origin groups). We therefore must endeavour to establish why barriers to representation are still in place in 21st century Europe (and indeed what these barriers are). Existing theoretical and empirical accounts which seek to explain the barriers and restrictions that minority and marginalised groups face when seeking to gain representation are discussed below and in the previous chapter, but this thesis seeks to make a major contribution by fully integrating public opinion into that framework.

Public Opinion within the Framework of Political Opportunity

The introductory theoretical chapter outlines in more detail the theoretical arguments as to why we ought to consider public opinion to be a key element of political opportunity for representation, but a summary follows here. The most common explanatory framework for descriptive representation and mobilisation of minority communities is the political opportunity structure perspective (Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010; Fennema & Tillie 1999; Jacobs & Tillie 2004; Koopmans 2004; Norris & Lovenduski 1993). Political opportunity structures, in this sense, account for and summarise the range of exogenous factors that collectively mediate and mitigate a social movement or outcome – that being the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups in the context of this and the above cited research. Bird (2005) applied this framework in her comparative examination of the descriptive representation of minority groups in three Western democracies – a similar research design to that which the Pathways project embarked on, but with a larger scale – and argued that citizenship regimes, institutional factors, and interest constellations interact to shape the representational political opportunity structure. Norris and Lovenduski (1993) focused on British parliamentary candidates and imbalanced in gender, race, and class between them. They argued that the opportunity structure for candidates was restrictive to minority groups, causing problems with underrepresentation further up the chain.

However, as outlined in the first chapter, this thesis considers the structural approach to be too rigid, and returns to the broader scope of ‘political opportunity’ (Gamson & Meyer 1996; Geddes 1998; Doug McAdam 1996; Meyer & Minkoff 2004) in order to sit public opinion and political representation together in a harmonised framework. The advantage of using the wider framework of political opportunity is that it is better able to account for and

60 make sense of ‘less structural’ elements which might enable or restrict political movements or mobilisations, the majority of which sit along a more ‘cultural’ axis which the opportunity structure literature is not sufficiently able to deal with. Public opinion, or ‘public mood’ as it expressed in extant opportunity literature, has already been said to be a part of this cultural, flexible axis of opportunity (Geddes 1998). In terms of representation, political opportunity links together a range of elements into a shape or space which may become more open or more restrictive over time, including historical and demographic backgrounds of immigrants themselves, political system and electoral rules, political parties and other institutional actors, and the general socio-political environment – which can range from integration and citizenship regimes to interests and opinions of wider society (Bird 2005; Geddes 1998; Norris & Lovenduski 1993). It is this last element that is curiously under-researched and poorly linked with the rest of the framework. It is unclear as to why, aside from some theoretical cases (Geddes 1998), the occasional empirical glance (Ruedin 2009, 2013), and some side notes (Bloemraad 2013), the political attitudes and interests of the larger electorate are so rarely properly considered when studying levels and trends in descriptive representation, let alone fully theoretically and empirically integrated into an analytical framework. While there is ample research about general levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and prejudice in the electorate across Europe (Bohman & Hjerm 2016; Fetzer 2000; Ford 2008; Ford et al. 2015; Lahav 2004; Schneider 2008; Sides & Citrin 2007b; Simon & Lynch 1999; Zick et al. 2008), and while there is also a certain amount of literature on the political claims of immigrants and immigrant-origin minorities across Europe (Chabanet & Giugni 2008; Giugni & Passy 2002; Hargreaves 1991; Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans & Statham 1999, 2002; Tiberj & Michon 2013), the connection between representation and the views of the public at large has rarely been examined in any empirical detail. This is certainly due to the lack of suitable public opinion data. The research carried out as part of this thesis is able to provide this, and thus able to integrate public opinion properly into an opportunity framework for political representation.

There is existing empirical evidence to suggest that a relationship between public preferences and opinions and the electoral fortunes of non-native groups does exist, and that we ought to expect public opinion to be an important component of political opportunity for representation. Some, mostly now dated, evidence on candidate selection considers prejudice of the selectorate (Durose et al. 2013; Norris & Lovenduski 1995). Aggregate level evidence points to the fact that non-white candidates may suffer electoral penalties (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Ford & Goodwin 2010; Norris et al. 1992; Norris & Lovenduski 1995;

61 Stegmaier et al. 2013), as do white ‘foreign sounding’ candidates (Thrasher et al. 2015). While in most countries the standing explanation for the success of immigrant-origin politicians has been preferential voting by immigrant origin voters (Bergh & Bjorklund 2011; Manzano & Sanchez 2010; Saggar & Geddes 2000), in many countries evidence suggests that this relationship is no longer sufficient to explain representational gains, thus making the focus on the majority attitudes even more pertinent. The case of Great Britain is particularly interesting as the most recent available analysis showed little preferential ethnic voting over and above partisan behaviour (Fisher et al. 2014) and the two main political parties clearly both moved away from standing immigrant origin candidates in areas with larger immigrant origin electorates (Geddes 2001) to those with fewer (Sobolewska 2013). Furthermore, evidence from local elections in Britain has suggested that even white immigrant candidates (from Europe) are likely to face voter discrimination (Thrasher et al. 2015). Lastly, candidates of all backgrounds have to appeal to (sub-sections of) the majority group in order to successfully gain selection and election to parliament (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Fisher et al. 2014). If the majority group is hostile toward immigration, then attempts at these appeals by immigrant origin candidates (particularly visible ones, or those who make it well known that they are of immigrant background) may be substantially harder than if the majority public were not so negative.

Equally however, it is quite possible that we could view rising descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups as a countermobilisation against rising anti- immigrant sentiment. Political opportunity is often viewed through the lens of movements and balances between them: if we understand rising public hostility toward immigration as one movement which threatens to restrict opportunity, then we can see how the subjects of those restrictions may find it necessary to create a counter-movement – a countermobilisation – in order to try and alleviate this pressure (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996). Migrant mobilisation is often understood as having the direct aim of protecting and advancing the rights and interests of immigrants (Koopmans 2004), and so we should naturally expect increases in migrant mobilisation to occur when their rights and interests are (perceived to be) increasingly threatened. Indeed Statham (1999) argued that poor race relations and anti-minority mobilisation and activity in the 1950s and 60s led to the politicisation, mobilisation, and representation of race politics in the United Kingdom throughout the later decades of the 20th century. Perhaps then we can conceptualise that increasing anti-immigrant public opinion – indicative of a generally increasingly more hostile national atmosphere for immigrants living

62 in their host nations – will result in a countermobilisation into the political community on the part of migrant groups. Thus, there are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to suspect that public opinion does form an important part of the story in explaining both trends (comparatively and longitudinally) and barriers to the political representation of immigrant origin groups – or indeed how it serves to politicise and mobilise the claims and interest of immigrant origin groups.

Conception and Measurement of Public Opinion toward Immigration in Europe

Before proceeding, it is necessary to reiterate from the introductory chapter the conception and measurement of public opinion presented in this chapter and throughout the thesis. Across Europe, increasing representation of non-white groups has correlated with a rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment has been rising over the last few decades (Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Bohman & Hjerm 2016; Deangelis 2003; Durose et al. 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Koopmans et al. 2005; Luedtke 2005; Semyonov et al. 2006), with varying measurements and analysing of survey data concluding that publics becoming increasingly hostile to the record rates of immigration into and within Europe. The picture is not all that uniform or consistent across states, but there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that populations around Europe have been becoming increasingly dissatisfied with and resistant to increasing immigration. Semyonov et al. (2006) for example showed ‘anti-foreigner’ hostility rising consistently across the continent from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Both Meuleman et al. (2009) and Davydov and Meuleman (2012) argued that such rises had continued by the middle of the decade during their comparative analysis of European Social Survey data. Most recently, Bohman and Hjerm (2016) found increasingly negative views about the impact of immigration on European countries with the highest inflows of migrants per annum.

However, there has been little success in terms of conceptualising and measuring public opinion and preferences on immigration in a properly longitudinal, comparative sense. Some extant work elects to analyse comparative data from a single source (such as the above authors using the European Social Survey), whilst others have taken an index-based approach which blends survey data together (such as Semyonov et al. 2006). Others elect to focus on data from national level surveys, examining differences and nuances between question wordings and mentioning of specific immigrant groups (see for examples Ford 2008, 2011; Park et al. 2004;

63 Storm, Sobolewska and Ford 2017). This thesis considers and conceptualises mass public opinion on immigration as a truly mass phenomenon, and follows approaches laid out by Ford et al. (2015) and Jennings (2009) in combining a wide, holistic range of information into a single, annual measurement of public opinion toward immigration. Each of these works sourced and mixed a broad spread of questions and surveys (including commercial polls), the advantage of such a holistic approach being that one can include information on public attitudes toward all kinds of sub-dimensions of immigration – its impact on the national economy and culture, whether laws are strict enough, and so on – and thus one is unlikely to ‘miss’ certain elements or facets of an underlying, latent ‘public mood’ (Stimson 1991). Throughout this thesis, the Stimson mood measure approach is used to estimate public opinion toward immigration at the national and sub-national (later in the case study of Britain) level. Using this technique, a wide range of high-quality survey data on all topics and sub-dimensions on immigration and its impacts are blended into single, annual measurements of public opinion toward immigration in Europe37. The sources and construction of these measurements are discussed in the methods and data section below, but for now the emphasis is on the fact that they do not measure just one facet, or one layer, of opinion about immigration, but tap into and measure the latent, underlying ‘immigration mood’ in each country.

Public Opinion and Representation: Hypothesising the Relationship

Here, I adapt the central hypothesis of the thesis to test the relationship between public opinion and the political representation of immigrant origin groups across Europe with two expectations in mind. One hypothesis focuses on the direction supposed by the central hypothesis, the other simultaneously supposes a countermobilisation effect. Firstly then, I expected that higher levels of anti-immigrant public opinion will be a barrier to representation – perhaps in the form of electoral penalties and voter discrimination, or disincentives for party selection of immigrant origin MPs (see above). Thus, increasingly negative public opinion on immigration will restrict the political opportunity for immigrant origin groups to be selected for and elected to parliamentary positions.

37 Data comes from Pathways Work Package 4.1 and also from the Global Public Opinions Project national level immigration database (Van Hauwaert and English 2017a), see data and methods chapter for further information and citations.

64 H1a: more negative public opinion toward immigration will restrict increases in the political representation of immigrant origin groups.

Secondly, however, negative attitudes towards immigration may serve to mobilise the political claims of immigrants, as explained above. A highly hostile public may help immigrants of diverse backgrounds to realise their common political interests and, as such, to help them formulate the need to participate in electoral politics of their countries of residence to defend their collective interests. As such, anti-immigrant public sentiment may well be indicative of higher levels of politicisation of immigration, which in turn, provides immigrant origin candidates with an opportunity to crystallise into effective and viable political contenders. Simultaneously, I theorised an alternative, contradictory hypothesis:

H1b: more negative public opinion toward immigration will facilitate increases in the political representation of immigrant origin groups.

Both hypotheses are logical, if contradictory. The first is the most intuitive and fits well with the opportunity literature – if publics are more hostile toward immigration, they will surely be less willing to vote for or select and support a candidate of immigrant origin. The second hypothesis however fits much better with the anecdotal and surface-level evidence that we have before us – we currently seem to be witnessing great peaks in both the representation of (non- white) immigrant origin groups and anti-immigrant hostility that the continent has seen to date.

Hypothesising Acceptable Difference and Multiple Marginality

The hypotheses however require greater development. Returning to our previous distinctions between white and non-white immigrant origin groups, we should expect patterns of restriction of opportunity based on increasingly hostile public opinion will be especially pronounced for groups who have greater ‘social distance’ from European natives (in our countries under study). Traditionally, sociologically-orientated literature views social distance – the amount which two social groups do not generally have in common – from native groups as instrumental to the depth and length of discrimination and hostility that an immigrant group is likely to face (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2006; Lalonde et al. 1992; Manevska & Achterberg 2013; Schlueter et al. 2008; Storm et al. 2017). So, immigrants from ‘Western’ (majority white) countries would be much more likely to share commonality with European natives, while those

65 from ‘non-Western’ countries (majority non-white) would be much less likely. For instance, these differences (and thus additions to social distance) might include: skin colour, religious background, cultural practice, language, and so on. Variances in experiences of discrimination based on social distance connects closed to two conceptions rooted more in political science, those being ‘acceptable difference’ and ‘multiple marginality’ (Celis et al. 2014; Durose et al. 2011, 2013; Turner 2002). White immigrants may well be different than the native group in their host country – they are not born in the same country, they may have language differences, and some degree of difference in cultural practices and behaviour – but since immigrants from white-majority countries (such as the Americas, Australasia, and Europe) will mostly share many of the values, experiences, and cultural practices of natives from other white-majority countries, they are very much likely to be viewed as ‘acceptably’ different. Conversely, non- white immigrants are more likely to have different cultural practices, religions, life experiences, and so on which will increase their social distance and thus add further layers of marginality beyond their immigrant origin status. They will on the whole look, sound, and behave much differently than white immigrants arriving in European countries. Thus, we should expect less prejudice to be activated against white immigrants than non-white immigrants, and for public opinion to therefore impact less on the former than the latter. The following was thus also hypothesised:

H2: any observed relationship between public opinion and representation will be greater for non-white immigrant origin groups than white immigrant origin groups.

Controlling for Political Systems, Rights, and Anti-Immigrant Party Institutionalisation

Yet, the expectation of association between public opinion and political representation in a comparative, cross-national sense seemed too simplistic – even after accounting for the variance in experience between white and non-white immigrant groups may face. As previously discussed, Bird (2005) highlighted in her comparative analysis of minority representation in three Western democracies that variations in institutional and citizenship frameworks were important in shaping political opportunity for descriptive representation. This research follows these findings and expands on them. There had to be a sense in which the various differences in political institutions and legal frameworks across Europe might create

66 different conditions for mobilisation and countermobilisation. Or in other words, it was necessary to control for the impact that different levels of enfranchisement of immigrant origin voters and institutionalisation of anti-immigrant mobilisation between European countries might have on the relationship between public opinion and the representation of immigrant origin groups.

Firstly, no matter how anti-immigrant the public may be, this will have little political impact if the political contest in the country in question does not accommodate this political concern. This harks back to the basic theories of political competition in which political parties aggregate political interests into viable political options on the basis of which citizens can express their preferences in elections – if the political competition between parties fails to include an issue, it depresses (although not infinitely as we have seen with the Brexit vote in Britain) political salience and thus electoral impact of the issue (Franklin & Wlezien 1997; Morales, Pardos-Prado, et al. 2015; RePass 1971; Ruedin 2013). Thus, the higher the level of political institutionalisation an issue has, the more likely it is that it will impact on how voters make their choices. By institutionalisation of anti-immigrant sentiment, I mean embeddedness of anti-immigrant parties in the political system. This can be measured primarily by the strength of their parliamentary representation. Once anti-immigrant parties become electorally successful, mainstream parties (i.e. Liberals, Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats) have to come up with an appropriate response (Dahlström & Sundell 2012; Van Spanje 2010). In her seminal work Meguid (2008) distinguishes between three strategies: ignore the issue (dismissive), adopt a more restrictive position (accommodative), or move towards a more multiculturalist position (adversarial). Once an anti-immigrant party is successful, dismissive strategies will backfire and mainstream parties have to change their position. Mainstream parties that are located close to the anti-immigrant party in the policy space have a clear incentive to accommodate. Contrary to Social Democrats, Conservative parties, for instance, have a legacy for being tough on immigration, and hence a positional move towards the anti-immigrant party will likely be perceived as credible by the electorate (Bale et al. 2010). Other studies have emphasised office rather than vote-seeking motivations behind accommodative strategies. Social Democrats, on the other hand, are confronted with a dilemma. So as not to lose their working-class electorate, they should adopt more restrictive positions. Yet, they lack a history for being tough on immigrants, meaning that such a positional U-turn can easily be perceived as lacking credibility by the electorate and foster internal dissent within the party (Bale et al. 2010). As such, case study research has shown that

67 Social Democrats initially refrain from pursuing accommodative strategies; yet, once anti- immigrant parties really became successful many eventually accommodated (Bale et al. 2010; Rydgren 2004). In summary, though incentives and reaction times and speed may differ, generally speaking, anti-immigrant positions and offerings are contagious across the mainstream party space (Dahlström & Sundell 2012; Van Spanje 2010; van de Wardt 2015).

This contagion of mainstream politics with anti-immigrant accommodations is a contention in and of itself for immigrant origin groups, as they find the political mainstream becoming more and more hostile toward them. Furthermore, as a result of accommodative strategies, it may become unviable for mainstream parties to select and stand immigrant-origin candidates for fear of alienating anti-immigrant voters. Additionally, immigrant origin voters may not extend their support to the parties that move to anti-immigrant positions and as a by- product a number of immigrant-origin supporters and activists available to become that party’s candidates and politicians may also dry up. Considering that on the whole mainstream parties are more likely to accommodate than to pursue adversarial strategies in response to powerful anti-immigrant parties, we expect that a more negative public mood towards immigrant will translate into lower levels of immigrant groups representation once anti-immigrant parties pose a viable electoral threat. The analysis therefore controls for the impact that anti-immigrant mobilisation will have on the relationship between public opinion and representation.

Secondly, the effectiveness of any countermobilisation on the part of immigrant origin communities hinges on their electoral power, which of course differs by country (and indeed over time). This is of particular importance in the case of H1b. To measure electoral power, access to voting rights for non-citizens are measured in each country at each election. Countries differ in the ease with which immigrants acquire voting rights. In most countries, full political rights are limited to citizens, and the requirements for obtaining citizenship have been growing steadily more stringent in most of Europe (Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005). However, as previously discussed, there remain some very generous voting rights for non-citizens across Europe, and easy access to citizenship and voting for second-generation immigrants – many of whom are given full citizenship rights at birth providing at least one parent was a legal resident of the country at the time (Vincent 2002; Weil 2001). The country selection (and indeed testing across country contexts) allows for a stern examination of the role in which citizenship and political participation arrangements have in representational frameworks and outcomes. Of our seven studied cases, only Great Britain affords full national voting rights to the majority of its

68 non-citizens: immigrants from former colonies (Commonwealth states plus the Republic of Ireland by bilateral agreement) have access to voting at the national level without having to secure British citizenship. Spain has a number of bilateral relationships with South American states but is yet to ratify them, with only a reciprocal relationship with Norway existing whereby citizens resident in Spain from Norway may vote in their elections (and vice-versa). All other countries in the study are yet to establish any form of cross-national relationships or blanket approval for non-citizens to vote in elections beyond some instances of local enfranchisement (Belgium and the Netherlands) and European Union imposed laws regarding European Parliamentary elections (where all EU citizens resident in the country must be allowed a vote) (see Howard 2009 and Weil 2001 for further information). With that in mind, there are perhaps limited opportunities for immigrants to vote and make an impact in national ballots. That said, as previously pointed out, it is (relatively speaking) very easy for second- generation immigrants to obtain voting rights and to stand as a candidate in national elections across Europe – provided only that at least one of their parent was ‘officially resided’ in their host country at the time of their birth. As is explained in more detail in the introductory chapter, this is down to the principle of jus soli – right of the soil – which although employed with restrictions throughout Europe, does in almost all circumstances mean that settled second generation immigrants are granted citizenship rights in their host countries at birth, and are thus fully democratically enfranchised and able to exercise a vote at national elections as soon as they are of age. This means that while first-generation immigrants may find it difficult in the majority of cases under study, there will be a large constituency of immigrant origin voters in every country. Further, in terms of long-term mechanisms of gaining electoral power, however, it is also important that there are meaningful pathways for immigrant origin candidates to emerge (and thus opportunities for political mobilisation and countermobilisation) – such as through the local level where many immigrants (including first and second generation) are enfranchised across the seven countries in the study. The extent to which immigrants are given voting rights is thus controlled for in the regression analysis.

Data and Methods

This chapter uses two outcome variables: 1) levels of descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups at the national level measured by a percentage of immigrant origin parliamentarians, and within that, 2) the level of immigrant origin parliamentarians from white and non-white backgrounds. Level of anti-immigrant public opinion is our main predictor

69 (independent) variable, with anti-immigrant party institutionalisation, voting rights of non- citizens, and the electoral system also controlled for. All data in this research come from various collection components from the Pathways international research project, aside from the public opinion data that are gathered from the Global Public Opinions project (GPOP)38. To construct the two dependent variables, this research uses the cross-national Pathways project dataset of Members of European Parliaments, which represents a complete population of all national-level representatives elected between the early 1990s39 and 2015 to the lower chambers of seven European countries included in the Pathways project: Belgium, Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Great Britain40. These countries provide a great deal of variation in immigration histories – with historical ‘hotspots’ of immigration such as Germany contrasted against countries without these histories such as Italy – and also approaches to citizenship, voting rights, and integration practices – with the open and generous United Kingdom pitted against the rigidly republican and universalist France (Cinalli and Guigni 2013; Koopmans et al. 2005; Howard 2009; Vincent 2002).

The data were collected through manual coding, and a rich set of variables compile information about each elected legislator, allowing us to identify all those representatives who were of immigrant origin or descent. It further allows us to identify those of ethnic minority immigrant backgrounds versus white immigrant origin backgrounds, through analysis of their country of origin. This database is the most extensive and comparative collection of information on the backgrounds of European MPs in existence. The descriptive representation of immigrant communities in these seven European countries is measured from the database as the proportion of members of each completed national (lower chamber) parliamentary term since 1990 who were identified as being of immigrant origin at the beginning of each respective term (or after each election). This amounted to 39 individual elections, spanning from Germany in 1990 to Spain in 2011. Only MPs elected at the initial ballot were considered (i.e. replacement MPs are excluded), as their numbers are being compared to public opinion in those years. The definition of ‘immigrant origin’ MP is two-faceted: a Member of Parliament (MP)

38 See the data and methods chapter for a full outline of this project and how its data were used in this research. 39 Starting point of the data varies for each according to the year of the parliament elected in each country after the year 1990. 40 See the data and methods chapter for an explanation of the coding process, which was conducted simultaneously by researchers using a common codebook, template, and similar resources and approaches investigating each country.

70 is considered to be of immigrant origin in a given country if a) the MPs were themselves born abroad (but not to parents who were national citizens of their host country), or b) either one of the MP’s parents were born abroad and not national citizens of the given country. This makes our definition of ‘immigrant origin’ two-generational, rather than including only immigrants themselves. What this two-generational approach to conceptualising immigrant communities allows us to do is account for longitudinal, far reaching barriers of immigrant status on a theoretical level, while also including members of said communities who (in the vast majority of cases) will be citizens and voters in their host countries, and from a practical side also expands our data points and thus variation on the dependent variable. 661 MPs from a total of 17,460 elected in each of the seven countries from 1990 – 2011 were identified as of immigrant origin41. Figure 3.2 below plots the representation of immigrant origin groups over time in Europe, with immigrant origin MPs as a proportion of all MPs elected in each contest.

From Figure 3.2 we can see a great deal of variation in the dependent variable both within and between countries. The majority of countries have a general upward trend in terms of immigrant origin group representation – Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Great Britain. Great Britain and the Netherlands provide by far the most representation, with around 12% of all MPs elected to their most recent parliament under study coming from non-native backgrounds. France appears more like a bell curve, with representation rising until around the turn of the millennia, and then dropping again. Immigrant origin groups in Italy and Spain struggle to make any gains at all, with these two countries providing the lowest proportions of immigrant origin parliamentarians over the study period. It is very surprising that Spain, given its high relative population of immigrants (around 12% of its total population toward the end of the study period) provides so few immigrant origin MPs, especially compared to the Netherlands and France, who have half as many immigrants relative to their population (around

41 Each MP has a separate observation for each time they were elected. For instance, if an MP was elected to three parliaments between 2001 and 2010, then they would be included three times in the sample. In short, the same MP but in a different time is considered a separate, not the same, observation. This is necessary in order to connect with changing public opinion – with all MPs including immigrant origin MPs up for election at each context, it is completely logical that we should investigate how the same MPs fare at different points in time with different levels of anti-immigrant public opinion. Thus, when the number or percentage of MPs is reported and discussed, it is important to remember that in actual fact these figures will include some of the same MPs multiple times, and that the proportions are referring to each individual, independent parliament – rather than a unique body of total MPs.

71 4 and 6% respectively) but have many more times the proportion of immigrant origin MPs in their lower chambers over the study period than Spain. Equally, Italy also provides very little representation of immigrant origin groups, but has very similar proportions of its own populations from non-native origins as France42. This would immediately seem to indicate that the actual presence of foreigners in a country seems to have little to do with the representation they manage to achieve in their host country’s parliament.

Figure 3.2. Immigrant Origin representation over time across Europe

Source: Pathways project database from Work Package 1 (including own data collection).

42 Figures for immigrant population are the foreign-born population percentages provided by the OECD online databases, which are available at: http://stats.oecd.org

72 Immigrant origin MPs were then further split into the two categories based on their country of origin – those from white majority and those from non-white majority nations43. This allows for the testing of hypothesis H2. In total, 207 MPs were identified as coming from non-white immigrant origin backgrounds (1.19% of all MPs in the study), and 454 from white immigrant origin background (2.6% of all MPs in the study). Though the representation of non- white groups is well covered in extant literature (Banducci et al. 2004; Bird 2005; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013), until the Pathways project very little was known or discussed about the presence of white immigrants in European parliaments (though cf. Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013).

Figure 3.3. White immigrant origin MPs in European parliaments since 1990

Source: Pathways project database from Work Package 1.

43 An MP from any country in Europe, the Americas, and Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were coded as white. The latter is especially tenuous, given that it is a majority black country, however upon descriptive investigation of all MPs in the study period coming from South Africa, they were all indeed white.

73 Thanks to the Pathways research project, we can for the first time see the extent to which immigrants and their descendants from white backgrounds are faring in terms of gaining election to parliaments in Europe. Figure 3.3 above plots the proportions of MPs from European parliaments identified as coming from white immigrant origin backgrounds. Once again Great Britain is among the leaders in this regard, but France also appears to have had a (relatively) high proportion of its MPs also from white immigrant origin backgrounds over the study period. For Britain, this figure reaches around 6% by 2005 (and in 2010 despite a slight decline), and 5% for France. The Netherlands begins high in the early 1990s but then declines sharply, maintaining at around 3-4% throughout the rest of the period. There is some notable presence of white immigrant origin MPs in Belgium and Germany, and little to speak of again in Spain and Italy, with neither country reaching 2% at any point in the study period.

The key independent variable – public opinion toward immigration – comes from the GPOP public opinion database (Van Hauwaert & English 2017a)44. GPOP collected and collated weighted detailed survey information from cross-national and national level surveys across 18 European countries, from the 1980s (where possible) to 2015. The database is a mixture of survey information from cross-national and national-level surveys fielded in each country over the time period, asking respondents their views on immigration in terms of its levels, its impacts, and the extent of rights and benefits which should be provided to immigrants by the state. So as to maximise comparability, all information from the comparative surveys is retained and put into the measures, and then topped up by national level surveys to cover gaps. Using the Stimson (1991) dyadic-ratios algorithm, which is discussed and explained in great detail in Chapter 2, the projected then generated smoothed, annual public opinion measures on immigration for each country. Stimson’s calculator is able to collect all this survey information, with sometimes tens of observations per year, and harmonise it into single aggregated measurements using a process close to a factor analysis45. The result of running the extensive public opinion data through the Stimson algorithm is reliable, inclusive, and robust yearly value of public hostility toward immigrants across Europe, generated from thousands of questions

44 There is a distinct lack of public opinion data from Northern Ireland, with neither the British Election Study or British Social Attitudes survey fielding there. Furthermore, Northern Ireland is sometimes not included in cross- national surveys. As such, the region is excluded from all empirical analysis throughout this thesis, and the term ‘Great Britain’ is used rather than ‘the United Kingdom’. 45 See the data and methods chapter for a full explanation of what the calculator is and how the measurements are constructed.

74 from many sources. The full list of sources and their coverage can be found in the Main Appendix to the thesis. A one-year lag of this variable is used instead of the yearly value to account for the fact that many surveys are fielded after election times (later in the year) in the countries under study.

Figure 3.4 below shows anti-immigrant public opinion across the seven countries selected for analysis. Higher values indicate more negative public opinion, with 1 being completely anti-immigrant (100% of the population being negative about immigration and its impacts), and 0 being wholly positive. There is a good deal of variation between the individual countries. Four countries see a general rise in anti-immigrant public opinion: Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, and Great Britain. France is the only country in the study that appears to move in a generally more positive direction since the data begins. Negativity does, overall, decline in Germany but there are moments of greatly increased (and then reduced) hostility toward immigration over the period documented. Spain also shows a great deal of variation in aggregate public attitudes, and returns largely to where it began at the first point of measurement. Comparatively, mass attitudes toward immigration also vary between countries in terms of overall levels of negativity. By the end of the study period (and in the lead up to the country’s 2016 referendum on European Union membership), Great Britain stands out as having a very hostile national climate towards immigrants. This is closely followed by Belgium and then the Netherlands and Italy. Public opinion begins very negative in France in the late 1980s, but hostility declines to levels similar to that of Germany and Spain.

75 Figure 3.4. Public opinion toward immigration over time across Europe

Source: Global Public Opinions Project National Level Public Opinion towards Immigration Database (Van Hauwaert & English 2017a). Higher values equal more negative aggregate public opinion. Descriptive statistics on the robustness and construction of the measurements can be found in the Appendix to this chapter.

To test the relationship between levels of representation for immigrant origin groups across Europe, this research used regression models to estimate the change in the proportion of representatives elected at each contest who were identified as immigrant origin as public opinion toward immigration became more negative. The chapter also uses two further predictors to control for simultaneous relationships that may occur, as outlined in the above sections. Levels of anti-immigrant party institutionalisation and voting rights given to non- citizens (non-naturalised immigrants). The institutionalisation of anti-immigrant parties within each country’s national political system at each election time was measured as follows. Information was collected on the number of seats held by radical right parties going into each election (lagged by one election), and the percentage of the vote ascertained by radical right parties at those elections (in the current year). This thus simultaneously measures both the

76 presence of anti-immigrant parties in the electoral system leading up to and around each election in each country, and their level of support at that electoral contest. The dummy variable named ‘Anti-Immigrant Institutionalisation’ was constructed using logical argument. For anti- immigrant party institutionalisation to equal 1 (high institutionalisation) at a given election, the number of seats held had to be 1 or above, and the vote share achieved at said election over 5%. Elections which did not fulfil the criteria were coded as 0 (low or no institutionalisation).

Voting rights were controlled for using information collected by the Pathways project Work Package 3.346. This work package collected information about the voting rights afforded to non-citizens in each country at each election year under analysis. A categorical variable was constructed from this information, with the following values47: 0 – no voting rights afforded to any non-citizens, 1 – some rights for non-citizens in local ballots (or some highly specific national group rights levels beyond this) 2 – voting rights for all non-citizens in local, regional, and European elections, 3 – rights for a significant proportion of non-citizens to vote in all local, regional, European, and national elections, 4 – full voting rights for all non-citizens. This variable mostly varies between countries, but something also within. No election in any country fulfilled the 4th level, with most elections distributed across the first three levels. Indeed, Great Britain is a truly unique case in being the only country to afford voting rights to level 3. This special status is a large part of the reason why the central hypothesis is tested at length in Great Britain alone in following chapters.

This chapter employs generalised linear regressions48 to investigate each of the hypotheses, followed by a second set of ‘regression tree’-based robustness checks. Since we

46 Authored by Lucas Geese 47 This variable is an ordered categorical variable, meaning that each higher value also fulfils the conditions of all previous variables. 48 Generalised linear regressions were used ahead of ordinary least squares, as key assumptions of the ordinary approach were violated. Firstly, the dependent variable is not count data, but is proportional. As such, possible outcomes are necessarily restricted (non-negative), and clustered around off-centred means heaping toward zero, creating a Poisson distribution of sorts. However the nature of the data (in that they are not count data) steered me away from using Poisson-based modelling. Secondly, the residuals of bivariate OLS models between the dependent and key independent variables are not normally distributed. Residual and distribution plots are contained in the Appendix of this chapter. Generalised models with binomial variance functions and probit link functions were thus selected.

77 have a small sample of countries (fewer than 10), and an imbalanced and in turn small number of observations per country (between 4 and 6) I do not use a multi-level model49. Instead, standard errors were clustered around each individual country50. Further, since the analysis is time-series of sort in structure (though not entirely given the gaps in observations and imbalance in the number and length of these gaps between countries) and there are variables which are trending over time (public opinion and immigrant origin representation) it is necessary to control for time. Finally, throughout this thesis significance levels are set at the 10% threshold (p < 0.1). Though the 10% level is not the usual ‘target’ of statistical significance, there is an abundance of literature attesting to the nonsensicality of chasing the arbitrary 5% (p < 0.05) level without any due consideration for what an appropriate level of statistical significance should be – or indeed whether statistical significance is even relevant to one’s analysis. See Ziliak & McCloskey (2008) for an example among a range of research pertaining to the overuse and misinterpretation of statistical significance. In this case, the 10% level is deemed entirely appropriate to report and draw inferences from, as it is in many high quality, leading pieces of research on public opinion, its evolution, and its effects (see for examples Wlezien 1997; Stevenson 2001; Jennings & John 2009; Jennings 2009).

Results

Firstly, from Table 3.1 we can see that model 1 (which in each table reports the relationship between immigrant origin representation and public opinion while only controlling for yearly increments), reports a positive relationship between rising presences of immigrant origin representatives in parliaments across Europe and anti-immigrant public opinion (at the 10% level). This suggests that as public opinion becomes more hostile, this is related to increased levels of representation for immigrant origin groups in Europe. This would support H1b over H1a, reporting a potential counter-mobilisation effect occurring. However, once the controls are introduced in model two, this relationship entirely disappears. Instead, the data

49 See Stegmueller (2013) for discussion on appropriate number of countries for using multilevel models in social science. The recommendation made therein is at least 10 should be included to avoid severe biases in confidence levels, with 15 or 20 being the optimum to reduce this bias to a ‘limited extent’. There is some evidence to suggest the limits should be set even higher than this (see for example Hox 2002). 50 Clustered standard errors can serve as excellent deputies to multilevel specifications when researchers are attempting to account for hierarchical data structures, but are unable to make use of nested regression techniques (see Primo et al. 2007 for example and discussion).

78 suggest that the representation of immigrant origin groups in Europe is much better explained by variations in voting rights. Higher voting rights for non-citizens is significantly positively correlated with increase presences of immigrant origin MPs in European parliaments, at the 10% level.

Table 3.1. Generalised linear regression: Public opinion and immigrant representation

Model 1 Model 2

All IO MPs %

Anti-Imm. Public Opinion 2.18^ [0.22 4.14] 0.83 [-1.07 2.73] Year 0.02*** [0.02 0.03] 0.02** [0.01 0.02] Voting Rights 0.21^ [0.02 0.40]

Anti-Immigrant Party Inst. 0.09 [-0.08 0.26]

Intercept -3.11*** [-4.15 -2.06] -2.68*** [-3.53 -1.82] N-39, Significance placeholders: ^ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, 95% confidence intervals in brackets. IO = Immigrant origin.

We move on to H2 to examine the difference between white and non-white immigrant origin groups. Table 3.2 shows the same tests ran on data on only immigrants from white majority countries – that is to say that rather than testing the relationship between anti- immigrant public opinion and representation of all immigrant origin groups, this model tests it only between public opinion and the presence of white immigrant origin MPs in European legislatives. In this case, there are no statistically significant results to be reported in either the first or second models. The coefficients however are largely consistent in size and direction with those from the models above. The lack of significant results suggests that the representation of white immigrant origin groups has little to do with variation in public opinion, voting rights, or the presence of anti-immigrant parties in domestic political systems. It could also however quite reasonably be the result of the difficulties in estimating regression models with less than 40 observations clustered in seven units, with the need for at least three control variables. The lack of significant here however contrasts with the results below in Table 3.3 which cover the representation of non-white immigrant origin groups in Europe.

79 Table 3.2. Generalised linear regression: Public opinion and white immigrant representation

Model 1 Model 2

White IO MPs %

Anti-Imm. Public Opinion 1.81 [-0.14 3.76] 0.91 [-0.70 2.51] Year 0.01 [-0.01 0.02] 0.01 [-0.01 0.01] Voting Rights 0.13 [-0.08 0.34]

Anti-Immigrant Party Inst. -0.05 [-2.67 0.16]

Intercept -2.62*** [-3.18 -2.06] -2.62*** [-3.18 -2.06] N-39, Significance placeholders: ^ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, 95% confidence intervals in brackets. IO = Immigrant origin.

Table 3.3 shows the tests ran on data concerning the presence of MPs from majority non-white countries. The results reflect those in Table 3.1 more so than the above results regarding white immigrant origin group representation. In the first model, a sizable positive coefficient between public opinion and minority representation is reported but it is not statistically significant. With the addition of the voting rights and anti-immigrant party institutionalisation variables does come two statistically significant results which point strongly towards a mobilisation and countermobilisation story. Firstly, higher voting rights are associated with higher levels of minority group representation (significant at the 5% level). Secondly, higher presences of anti-immigrant party presence are also significantly positively correlated with minority representation. This suggests that, according to the data, minority groups are better represented when given the more favourable conditions of higher voting rights but also the pressure of anti-immigrant party mobilisation. The story could perhaps be that minority groups are making use of contexts of more generous voting rights to ‘push back’ (counter-mobilise) against anti-immigrant mobilisation.

80 Table 3.3. Generalised linear regression: Public opinion and non-white immigrant representation

Model 1 Model 2

Non-White IO MPs %

Anti Imm. Public Opinion 2.18 [-0.39 4.75] 0.33 [-2.29 2.96] Year 0.04*** [0.03 0.05] 0.03** [0.02 0.05] Voting Rights 0.30** [0.11 0.49]

Anti-Immigrant Party Inst. 0.26* [0.04 0.47]

Intercept -3.75*** [-5.32 -2.17] -3.26*** [-4.69 -1.82] N-39, Significance placeholders: ^ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001, 95% confidence intervals in brackets. IO = Immigrant origin.

Due to the low number of observations, a robustness check was run on the results. We do so using a bootstrap technique called ‘random forests’51. Using this method, an ANOVA- regression decision tree bootstraps varying, randomised combinations of independent variables and observations 1501 times across the database, and delivers estimates of each variable’s importance in predicting the dependent variable (Breiman 2001). Accuracy is measured by comparing predicted values from each tree to the actual values as recorded in the dataset. For each independent variable, the model reports a) the mean squared error between the predicted and actual values of the dependent variable from each tree where said variable was omitted, and b) the average increase in ‘node purity’ of each decision tree which inclusion said variable. Simply put, the random forest (among other things) tells us how much the inclusion of a given variable improved the predictions of the dependent variable. We can see that the robustness check consistently confirms the importance of levels of access to voting rights for non-citizens in their host countries in predicting levels of descriptive representation for immigrant origin groups. In each of the three regressions, voting rights come first in terms of both reducing mean squared error and increasing node purity of the estimates produced by the regression trees. The other variables change and trade places across regressions. Generally speaking however the year and public opinion variables seem as important as each other and in turn more important than the anti-immigrant institutionalisation variable.

51 Liaw and Wiener (2015) ‘randomForest’ R package

81 Figure 3.5. Random Forest robustness check

All Immigrant Origin MPs

White Immigrant Origin MPs

Non-White Immigrant Origin MPs

82 Conclusions

This chapter was the first test of the thesis’ central hypothesis: The political representation of immigrant origin communities will be negatively affected by increasingly hostile public opinion towards immigration. The hypothesis was then split into two competing hypotheses, informed by expectations from extant literature on the mobilisation and countermobilisation movements of immigrants in response to rising anti-immigrant hostility. The data examined came from seven European countries with a good variety of public opinion toward immigration, descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups, institutional frameworks, and contexts of anti-immigrant mobilisation. Throughout the analysis, two things became clear. Firstly, the results from this national level study of European countries suggested that there was some small evidence of a relationship between public opinion and representation, in the countermobilisation direction. Secondly, and relatedly, that this observed relationship is outweighed by the importance of variations in voting rights.

Throughout the modelling, the results which came out were much more in line with hypothesis H1b – the countermobilisation effect – in both stages of models. In the analysis of the relationship between public opinion and all immigrant origin group representation the data reported that as public opinion became more hostile, the representation of immigrant origin groups rose. These results suggest that immigrant origin groups may indeed be mobilising and engaging politically in countries where they potentially see their claims and interests becoming limited by increasingly hostile public moods. However, this result was swept aside by the introduction of the control variables in model two. Instead, model 2 reported significant positive relationships between increasing representation and higher voting rights. There were no statistically significant results regarding white immigrant origin group representation, though the coefficients were similarly sized and signed. In terms of immigrants of non-white backgrounds – those with a greater social distance from native Europeans – while once again changing public opinion did not seem to have an impact on political opportunity for descriptive representation, the data suggested that there was in fact a rise in the proportions of immigrant origin candidates gaining election to parliaments associated with both higher voting rights and higher anti-immigrant party institutionalisation. This somewhat, though indirectly, fulfilled H1b in that it shows evidence of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation effects. This also somewhat fulfilled the expectations outlined in H2 – that there would be differential impacts of anti-immigrant public opinion on white and non-white immigrant origin groups. There was

83 more encouraging news for the importance of public opinion in the robustness checks which concluded that it was the joint-second most important variable in terms of predicting outcomes of representation included in the regression analysis.

These findings do not allow us to conclude that anti-immigrant public opinion dictates or explains cross-national variation in the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups in Europe at the national level, and thus in political opportunity for representation. Instead, the findings suggest that variation in voting rights are much more important in this regard, but that public opinion may indeed form an important part of the story – particularly for non-white immigrant origin groups. In all, there are two key takeaways from this chapter that provided encouragement for further investigation of the hypothesis in the form of a case study of the relationship between public opinion and political representation in Great Britain. Firstly, there is some limited evidence that a relationship between public opinion and representation is present. This however at this stage needed much more development and testing in a more context-specific and detailed manner. Secondly, the data suggested that instances of high voting rights for non-citizens and were significantly correlated with better opportunities for representation. Great Britain provides a case of a country with high levels of anti-immigrant public opinion and political representation of immigrant origin groups and high voting rights for non-citizens. Britain is thus an optimum case study in which to delve deeper in for further analysis of what drives changes in the level of descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups within countries longitudinally. Can changing levels of public opinion account for the dynamics of representation? Is there really a countermobilisation effect? The following chapters look into the British case and provide an in-depth case study of the relationship between public opinion and representation.

84 Appendix to Chapter 3

Residual Plots of ordinary least squares linear bivariate regression between representation and public opinion can be seen in Figure A3.1. Plots show that residuals are not normally distributed, and so these models were not deemed appropriate. Figure A3.2 shows that the dependent variables showed a Poisson-style distribution. This combined with the results from the residual plots, and the proportional nature of the dependent variables, informed the decision to use generalised linear models with gamma variance functions and log link functions for the analysis.

Figure A3.1. Residual plots

85 Figure A3.2. Distribution of dependent variables

Table A3.1. Descriptive information on GPOP immigration opinion measures Country Time Period Variance Number of Number of Series Explained Marginals

Belgium 1988-2016 65.0% 179 38 France 1985-2016 57.0% 241 46 Germany 1980-2016 61.7% 300 68 Great Britain 1981-2016 59.6% 219 41 Italy 1988-2015 66.8% 116 23 Netherlands 1988-2015 63.3% 128 30 Spain 1988-2015 54.9% 142 31

See Main Appendix of the thesis for specific sources used to construct these measurements, and GPOP resources for the specific questions and descriptive information about them.

CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRATION AND THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS IN GREAT BRITAIN52

Introduction

Following the results in Chapter 3, this research now turns to investigate the relationship between public opinion and the political representation of immigrants in Great Britain as a case study for in-depth testing of the central hypothesis and further examination of the results to this point. This chapter explains why Britain serves as such an excellent case study in which to carry out this further, in-depth case study, both theoretically and contextually. The British case also serves as an excellent case study based on the empirical findings of the previous chapter, where there was some connection seen between public opinion and representation, but much stronger connections found between the representation of immigrant origin groups and both higher voting rights for non-citizens, and the presence of a majoritarian electoral system. In Great Britain, we have a context where the voting rights for immigrants are among the most generous and open in the world, let alone Europe, and where a longstanding, ever-present majoritarian system is used to elect its Members of Parliament. This, among much else, is discussed in detail below.

Great Britain has always been a hotspot for immigration, with particularly large numbers of non-native communities moving into the country since around the turn of the 20th Century, when Eastern European Jewish and Irish immigrants began arriving in great numbers following relaxation in immigration rules and regulations. Since then, waves of immigrants from ex-colonies in Sub-Continental Asia, Africa and the Caribbean after the Second World War were followed in great numbers once again by Irish and then Eastern European immigrants (as well as other European member states) in the latter parts of the century. Most recently, Britain has attracted large inflows of migrants from predominantly Muslim countries in the

52 Parts of this chapter are included in a forthcoming chapter from Volume 1 of the Pathways project’s Oxford University Press edited volume, by myself and Dr Maria Sobolewksa.

87 Middle East. These most recent waves of immigrants have been met with stern resistance, both politically – with anti-immigrant parties and negative discourse about immigration in the political mainstream well on the rise across the early 21st century – and in terms of public opinion. Despite this, Britain continues to offer one of the most generous packages of rights afforded to immigrants – particularly those from ex-colonial ‘Commonwealth’ countries – in the developed world. Only once in recent history has Britain placed restrictions on such rights, even after which still continue to be open. What’s more, the direct descendants of immigrants born in the country (second-generation immigrants) hold completely identical rights to British origin citizens, with no discrimination. This combination of high levels of immigration (leading to high resident populations of immigrant groups living up and down the country), rising anti- immigrant sentiment, but stubbornly open and generous rights for immigrants and their descendants makes Great Britain an ideal place in which to conduct a study into the impact of public opinion toward immigration on the descriptive representation of outgroups. This chapter outlines in great detail the history of British immigration and British immigration regimes, as well as how British citizenship rules have changed over the past centuries, and which immigrant origin groups have been affected by these changes. It finishes with a summary of recent measurements of British public opinion on immigration and the representation of immigrants in British politics, concluding that Britain is the perfect case study to examine the relationship between the two.

A Brief History of Immigration into Great Britain

Historically speaking, Great Britain has always been a hotspot for immigration, with inflows across the latter half of the twentieth century transforming the isles from a nearly exclusively white society into a multi-racial community by the turn of the millennium (Modood 1994; Saggar 1998; Spencer 1997). Though the start of modern-day immigration is traditionally counted from the first openly anti-immigrant act aimed at increasing Eastern European Jewish immigration from the early twentieth century (Gartner 1960), the arrival of significant numbers of Irish (Glynn 1981) and other immigrants (including non-white groups) predated this (Joppke 1999; Lawton 1959; Spencer 1997; Walvin 1984). Until the 1960s, Irish immigration into the Britain was the man source of non-native inflows into the country, when it was replaced by immigration from non-white majority ex-colonial states (Glynn 1981). The watershed moment for British contemporary immigration history, however, was the arrival of the Empire Windrush ship in 1948 carrying almost 500 Jamaican immigrants. Their arrival

88 marked the beginning of an extensive wave of post-colonial, non-white immigration from the South Indian continent, the Caribbean, and Africa, and this symbolic arrival heralded changed the face of British politics and transformed the nation into a self-professed multicultural country (Brighton 2007; Cinalli & Giugni 2013; Meer & Modood 2009; Modood 1994, 1997). As well as having a wide range of cultural and socio-economic impacts on British society, this “swelling” of non-white immigrants settling in Great Britain has created a high and often geographically concentrated constituency of ethnic minority, non-native origin voters who more often than not take up their electoral rights and become active participants in British politics (Fisher et al. 2014; Geddes 2001; Saggar 1998; Sobolewska 2013).

More recently, immigration has continued to rise as more (and new) immigrant communities arrive and establish themselves in the country. These newer waves of immigration, while still containing a large proportion of immigrants from the post-colonial countries from the South Asian and African continents particularly, contains a much stronger contingent of European migrants, particularly from post-communist Europe (Blanchflower et al. 2007) and Muslim majority countries Asia and the Middle East (Cinalli & Giugni 2013; Croucher 2013). Eastern European immigration started in earnest following the 2003 enlargement of the European Union, when a historic decision by the then prime minister Tony Blair opened the British labour market to all the accession countries – one of only three existing EU member countries to do so. The majority of EU countries, and particularly the large labour markets of Germany and France, chose to impose a transitional period for migrants from accession countries. As a result of this uneven welcome across Europe, many more Central and Eastern European immigrants arrived in Great Britain than forecasted. Figure 4.1 shows estimated migration figures for Great Britain from 1990-2015. The current rates of immigration into Great Britain are among their highest since 2005. The general trend is a steep rise from around 1992 to 2003, with immigration rising almost annually until that point, after which it remains stable until a short decline in 2012, which then recovers back to its earlier peak by 2015.

89 Figure 4.1. Immigration into the United Kingdom

Source: OECD Statistical Database (http://stats.oecd.org/#)

Immigrants from all over the world have continued to arrive and settle in Britain, bringing with them their unique blends of cultures, histories, and ethnicities. Some immigrant origin groups, those coming originally from Africa, Sub-continental Asia, and the Caribbean, form what we often refer to in political and social science literatures as ‘ethnic minority’ groups (Heath et al. 2013; Modood 1997; Nimmi 1991). In the British context, ethnic minority groups are groups with non-British origins (either usually either first, second or sometimes third generation immigrants into the country) and non-white appearance (Karlsen & Nazroo 2002; Nimmi 1991; Owen 1995; Phillips 1998). The non-native, non-majority group status of ethnic minority groups is highly politicised in Great Britain (Heath et al. 2013; Saggar 1998; Saggar & Geddes 2000; Statham 1999), and it is they who are the almost exclusive focus of political representation literature in British politics. The term ‘ethnic minority’ of course encompasses a broad range of non-British, non-white groups, each with their own identities and histories. Non-white immigrants into Great Britain come from a number of different regions and nations, and as they arrived they often remain as distinctive communities, each with their own concerns, interests, geographical concentrations, mobilisations and identifiable representatives – on

90 which there is great disparity between ethnic minority groups (Le Lohe 2004; Modood 1988; Nixon 1998; Phillips 1998; Stegmaier et al. 2013).

The same is true of non-native white groups living in Britain, with communities from Eastern Europe, the Americas, and Ireland all sharing a white ethnic status but holding distinct identities of their own and distinct patterns of political mobilisation. As such, it is pertinent wherever possible to consider the political engagement, experience, and representation of say Irish groups separately to those of Black Caribbean origin, and look at Black African groups as indeed different to Asian communities from Pakistan or Bangladesh. This approach – dividing and studying immigration, politicisation and representation of non-white groups in Britain in as distinct as possible categorisations – is not a new suggestion and has been used before in terms of assessing levels of representation, most noticeably by Le Lohé (2004). In Chapter 5, this thesis employs the same methodology as Le Lohé in order to analyse levels of descriptive representation by major ethnic groupings (as outlined by the Census) in Great Britain. Chapter 5 also discusses in greater length why Great Britain’s ethnic minority communities are most appropriately drawn up into these groupings. Considering representation of national or regional groups is most important to do so in the context of political representation, firstly (as above) because their interests, experiences and claims are not heterogeneous, but also because the rights and privileges awarded to first-generation immigrants in Great Britain are not equal between all immigrants and do in fact vary depending on their country (and continent or region) of origin. There are key distinctions and disparities in the rights afforded to many ethnic minority immigrant origin groups (from Commonwealth states) and many white immigrant origin groups (from non-Commonwealth states).

Immigrants and Their Rights in Great Britain

Comparatively speaking, the United Kingdom53 offers one of the most comprehensive and generous package of rights to new arrivals across the developed world. However, these

53 As pointed out in Chapter 2, due to a lack of public opinion data for the region, Northern Ireland is excluded in the empirical analysis of this PhD. As such, the term Great Britain (which includes England, Wales and Scotland) is most often used in this thesis to describe the geographical territory under study. However, when legal frameworks or histories are discussed, the term United Kingdom (which includes Northern Ireland) may be used if appropriate – when the same laws and regulations cover Northern Ireland as do Great Britain.

91 offerings are not consistent across all immigrant origin groups, with white Europeans actually more disenfranchised, and their legal status increasingly volatile, compared to immigrants arriving to the country from its ex-colonies, for example. Further, attempts have been made throughout the last hundred years to curtail and limit the rights of non-citizens. That said, the constituency of immigrants and immigrant origin voters in Britain is sizable thanks to a long history of immigration and non-citizen-friendly legal frameworks regarding political participation.

At the outset of the First World War, the House of Commons oversaw the introduction of British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914, which granted common status of ‘British Subject’ to all people with connections to Britain and its colonies (Spencer 1997). Britain of course at this time was still very much a world super power, and its Empire stretched to all corners of the globe including Australia, India, Canada, and many more now-sovereign states. British Subject status allowed its holders to move, live and work freely among the British Crown’s various dominions – including Britain itself. In 1948, the British Nationality Act removed this ‘British Subject’ status for ‘self-governing’ dominions and replaced it with separate national citizenships specific to said dominions. However, many of the benefits associated with British Subject status were allowed to continue through the Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies status. Furthermore, active measures were taken to encourage immigration into Britain in the 1940s post-war period. Foreign workers were desperately needed after the damage done to the country’s infrastructure and economy, and the lack of fit, young working-age men after two World Wars, and so Britain sought to entice newcomers with a range of financial, social, and legal entitlements and incentives (Coleman & Rowthorn 2004; Spencer 1997). However, this latest Act needed once again rethinking and replacing as the British Empire began to finally break up, and disintegrate into the network of (primarily) British speaking nations across the globe that we see today. What followed was the establishment of the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’, and a broad continuation of the privileged access to the United Kingdom for immigrants from ex-colonies. Commonwealth states unified ex-British colonies seeking continued economic and political cooperation, and kept the Monarch of the United Kingdom as a unified head of states as well as access to privileges and rights for citizens moving between said states built up during the early 20th Century (Hall 1971; McIntyre 1991). This included highly favourable access to the United Kingdom for immigrants from Commonwealth Nations, as well as equally favourable rights and privileges for immigrants once they had arrived in the country – as well as of course those already resident

92 within the remaining territories of the United Kingdom. As well as being instantly able to settle, work and buy land, immigrants from Britain’s ex-colonies were given full political rights upon their arrival in the country; that is to say, any migrant arriving from a Commonwealth state would, upon being registered at a fixed address, be able to both vote and stand for election at every level of the British political system (Fisher et al. 2014; Karatani 2003; McIntyre 1991). This right does not remain unused, with Fisher et al. (2014 p. 884) highlighting, “[W]ith the exception of some first- generation black Africans from non-Commonwealth countries, members of these groups [ethnic minority groups] are all entitled to vote and, if registered, they tend to vote at similar rates as the white British majority”. Thus, in the context of British elections and ethnic minority immigrants, citizenship (or lack of it) is (generally speaking) absolutely no barrier to participation or representation, and their rights in this regard are more often than not fully exercised.

The situation used to be even more open than it currently stands in 21st century Britain, with multiple acts being passed since those ‘open door’ days in order to attempt to (unsuccessfully) stem the flow of immigrants into Britain (Spencer 1997). The Immigration and Citizenship Act of 1948 restricted the right of ex-colonial immigrants to arrive in the United Kingdom and automatically claim citizenship through ‘British subject’ status, thus also simultaneously introducing a number of controls on the levels of post-colonial migration (which was up until that point largely unrestricted). Further acts of legislation since the 1960s have sought to extend such restrictions (Coleman & Rowthorn 2004; Hampshire 2013). The most important of such efforts was the British Nationality Act of 1981, which made some modifications to the principle of jus soli – introducing the need for at least one parent to be a ‘permanent resident’ of the United Kingdom in order to the British-born child to be able to claim British citizenship. Previous to 2006, this also required said parent to be the father if the parents were not married. The act also removed the ‘right to abode’ (to live in the United Kingdom) from non-citizens – even those from other Commonwealth countries. The result of subsequent restrictions and tightening of definitions has been a closing of the range and depth of rights afforded to immigrants coming into the country, compared with say 50 years ago.

Nonetheless, the majority of the generous political rights afforded to ex-colonial, now- Commonwealth immigrants have remained. However, these offerings are not consistent across all immigrant origin groups, with white Europeans actually more disenfranchised, and their legal status increasingly volatile, compared to immigrants arriving to the country from its ex-

93 colonies, for example. The right for immigrants from ex-colonies to vote and stand in British elections has not been altered, generating a sizable constituency of non-white voters up and down the country (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Geddes 2001; Le Lohe 2004; Sobolewska 2013). This right also of course covers some white immigrants coming from ex-colonial Commonwealth states such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These rights also extend to citizens of the Republic of Ireland, by virtue of a bilateral agreement between the two nations. The picture for other white immigrant origin groups is quite different. Immigrants from the European Union continue to be able to vote in European Parliamentary elections (standard across all member states), but also local (city, district, or country council) elections. However, their lack of rights to vote and stand in national elections without taking British citizenship does create a citizenship-based barrier for the political participation of many white immigrant origin groups. Further, the recent vote to leave the European Union in a nationwide referendum on 23rd June 2016 has created an enormous amount of uncertainty and difficulty regarding access to citizenship (and legal status) for European Union immigrants. That said, as well as the continuation of many generous rights for first generation immigrants, descendants of all immigrants (regardless of country of origin or ethnicity) also continue to enjoy the principle of jus soli, with the children of all immigrants (regardless of their place of origin) afforded full British citizenship at the moment of their birth, if it is in the United Kingdom and at least one of their parents is a legal and settled resident in the country at the time of the child’s birth54.

This right to vote in parliamentary elections afforded to so many immigrant origin groups in Britain, combined with the electoral system that Britain employs to elect its parliament and (simultaneously) government, it what makes the country such a unique case for political mobilisation and representation on the part of immigrant origin groups – especially those whose identity is so politicised in British politics as ethnic minority groups. In British elections, voters participate at the constituency level – that is to say there is no ‘nationwide poll’ in which voters participate, but instead there are multiple ‘districts’ (around 650 at each election55) in which each contest is entirely independent; that is to say, the result of the votes counted in Constituency (or District) A does not impact at all the count and result in

54 There are a few rare exceptions to this rule. The most obvious (and common) of which being the children born to those on diplomatic missions. 55 This has been the official, legislated benchmark since 2001. Prior to this, the total number of constituencies fluctuated with each official boundary review.

94 Constituency (or District) B. The government is chosen as the party with the total number of ‘wins’ across all constituencies – not necessarily connected at all the number of votes (though there has not been a case in British elections in which the party finishing second in the popular vote has actually won more constituencies). This fact makes political mobilisation a little easier, as it is not necessary for all immigrant origin (or ethnic minority) voters to pull together into a nationwide electoral force in order to make a substantial impact, but only for them to mobilise at a much more local level (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Fisher et al. 2014; Geddes 2001; Sobolewska 2013). This is especially important and poignant when combined with the geography of the distribution of Britain’s immigrant origin communities.

Immigrants into Great Britain have dispersed across it to some degree, but their remains a high concentration of non-native (and ethnic minority) communities in major urban areas of the country (Christian Dustmann & Fabbri 2005; Owen 1995; Phillips 1998), creating in some constituencies a majority of ethnic minority, immigrant origin voters. These constituencies are exclusively urban seats in major cities, focused around London, Birmingham, Leicester, and Bradford56. The fact that there are non-native majority constituencies (and indeed constituencies where non-native voters make up a substantial, potentially decisive fraction of the electorate) is extremely important in terms of this research. With each constituency constituting a unique electoral battle, it is therefore possible for ethnic minority voters (very much a minority nationally speaking) to effectively mobilise and vote and become the majority group in a number of electoral contests across the country. Thus, in constituency based majoritarian electoral contests such as Britain’s, opportunities for representation are: a) much more meaningful, as “black representatives” can very much “represent black constituents” in a direct sense (Mansbridge 1999), b) much easier, as minority voters can become the majority in a handful of circumstances, and thus c) tempered by far less barriers to representation (see theoretical chapter) than in non-constituency, majoritarian based systems. In short, in Great Britain we have an example of a country where a) there is a high immigrant origin population, b) many of these immigrants (and all of their direct descendants) have the right to vote in parliamentary elections, c) the majoritarian, constituency based electoral system provides unique opportunities for political mobilisation and representation, but also d) where anti-

56 This information can be seen from constituency level Census data released by the Office for National Statistics, or see Pippa Norris’ constituency databases at: https://sites.google.com/site/pippanorris3/research/data

95 immigrant public opinion and political counter-mobilisation is prevalent and has been increasing across recent decades.

Public Opinion on Immigration in Great Britain

Though the political context in terms of voting rights and the electoral system may be beneficial and advantageous to non-native groups, there has been rising anti-immigrant hostility in Great Britain in recent years, which we would expect to make things more difficult for (particularly non-white immigrants owing to their increased ‘non-native’ visibility) immigrant origin groups. Increasing rates of immigration, and thus the increasing number of immigrant origin voters and representatives in the political system, have been met with growing hostility and resistance in the public sphere, with public opinion toward immigration becoming measurably more negative since at least the 1990s (Ford, Jennings, and Somerville, 2015; English and Van Hauwaert, 2016; Van Hauwaert and English, 2017). Of course, public opinion toward different groups and types of immigrants and ethnic minority groups) has been moving in somewhat different trajectories and at varying speeds (Ford 2008, 2011; Storm et al. 2017). Ford (2008) for example demonstrated how attitudes toward black communities and non-native students were much more positive among the British public than toward Muslims. Authors however who have studied the aggregate, holistic picture of general (or latent) public mood toward immigration (those cited above) have found significant downturns over the last couple of decades. For example, Ford et al. (2015 p. 1395) studied a range of polling and British survey data, and using the Stimson (1991) dyadic-ratios calculator (as this thesis does throughout, see Chapter 2 for an explanation of the methods and data used in this research) concluded that anti- immigrant public opinion by the turn of the 2010s had indeed worsened since the 1990s, but was no higher than it was in the 1980s. This rise in hostility between the 1990s and 2000s concurred with findings presented by Jennings (2009).

Figure 4.2 below shows how anti-immigrant public opinion has changed over time in Great Britain from 1983. This is constructed from the same data as are used in Chapter 3, which improves on the measurement offered by the above works by eliminating commercial polling data and replacing them with high quality cross-national surveys. For this measure, as it is central to the thesis, question items and factor loading scores are reported in the Main Appendix (the number of cases and observations would be much too large to do the same for all countries from Chapter 3, but this information can be accessed from GPOP itself). The factor analysis –

96 which articulates the variables capturing the latent, underlying movements in the overall public opinion measurement – in the Main Appendix does tell an interesting story. It would appear that, according to the data, the underlying immigration mood is much more to do with attitudes toward the immigration of specific regional migrant groups (such as West Indians and South Asians) and the impact of immigration on cultural life in Britain. This perhaps resonates with recent arguments and assertions regarding the symbolic and cultural and social distance elements of immigration threat and anti-immigrant sentiment (see for examples McLaren and Johnson 2007; Croucher 2013; Storm, Sobolewska and Ford 2017) The data presented in Figure 4.2 suggest that British public opinion toward immigrants has worsened significantly across the study period and into the 2010s, rising to levels not seen previously (in the study period). It thus disagrees with Ford et al. (2015) in this respect, but concurs regarding a) the decline in negativity from the 1980s into the 1990s, and b) a subsequent rise into 2000s and 2010s. The scale for this figure sits between 0.5 and 0.8, reflecting the fact that the evolution of public opinion toward immigration in Britain has been slow and steady, rather than showing any dramatic changes.

Increasing public hostility toward immigration and the rising political salience of immigration as a public issue has led to anti-immigrant parties making significant electoral breakthroughs in Britain after the turn of the 21st century – both in terms of their own electoral success and in ‘contaminating’ the political mainstream to some extent with their discourses and policies (Van Spanje, 2010; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin, 2011; Ford and Goodwin, 2014) – and a tangible but limited re-emergence of the racist far-right in British politics. Political parties such as the National Front and the British National Party (BNP) gained a lot of publicity and appeared to gain momentum in the 1970s and 2000s respectively. However, while the BNP enjoyed some success from a racist, anti-immigrant position, it was not to any significant degree beyond them winning two seats at the 2009 European elections. The National Front never made any substantial impact beyond winning a handful of local council seats. Outside of electoral politics, mobilisation and organisation of the British extreme right and their sympathisers led to the again high-profile emergence of extra-parliamentary groups such as Britain First (who since organised into a highly unsuccessful political party) and the English Defence League, who appeared repeatedly in news media and political discussions throughout the 2000s and 2010s (Richardson 2013), despite any substantial levels of support among the wider British population.

97 Figure 4.2. Anti-immigrant public opinion in the United Kingdom

Eigenvalue variance explained: 63%. Scale means: 0.54, standard deviation 0.04. 139 records, 27 issue series. For question items, see Main Appendix. Scale reduced to between 0.5 and 0.857.

Though lacking any real success at Westminster (anti-immigrant parties have never held more than one seat in the House of Commons at any time) and relatively little popularity for extra-parliamentary racist groups, the overall rise of anti-immigrant (including but not exclusively far-right) politics leading up to the 21st century undoubtedly delivered shockwaves and caused substantial panic across the British political spectrum (Cushion et al. 2015; Cutts et al. 2011; Goodwin & Milazzo 2015). Particularly so the meteoric rise (and then fall) of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), who increased their vote share in parliamentary and European elections dramatically over the 21st century, and indeed won (in terms of a plurality of votes and seat) the 2014 European Elections (Ford & Goodwin 2014).

57 The estimation here varies slightly from the line presented in Figure 3.4, as the author excluded some questions pertaining to more specific and contextual questions regarding rights and social interaction with immigrants, which were deemed not to connect closely enough conceptually to mass public preferences on immigration and its impacts. More detail is available in the Main Appendix.

98 Figure 4.3. Vote share of anti-immigrant parties in Britain elections since 1983

Source: Electoral Commission Results of British Elections from 1983 to 2015

In the previous European Elections, UKIP (coming second) and the BNP achieved 22% and 15 of the 72 seats available between them. In the General Election of 2015, UKIP achieved their record vote share, taking votes from both of Britain’s major political parties and finishing in second place in over 100 constituencies up and down the country (Curtice et al. 2010). Figure 4.3 below documents the rising vote share for anti-immigrant parties at parliamentary elections since the 1980s. From Figure 4.3 we can see year on year rises in support for parties offering anti-immigrant positions since 199258. Support for anti-immigrant parties culminates at almost 13% in 2015, when UKIP absorbed votes from all corners (including other anti-immigrant parties) to achieve their highest ever vote share. In this sense, the upward curve from the mid- 1990s onward in Figure 4.2 (British public opinion toward immigration) is very much reflected in rising support for anti-immigrant parties over the same period. Increasing pressure on successive British governments to ‘do something’ about immigration, and the rising and record

58 The list of parties included in this figure is: The United Kingdom Independence Party, the British National Party, the English Democrats, and the National Front.

99 levels of success for UKIP and other anti-immigrant parties before them, ultimately led to a sustained campaign among many politicians and activists across all parties for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union (Brack & Startin 2015; Spiering 2004). The EU, it was argued, was responsible for unchecked and undocumented immigration into the country on such a scale with which it was not able to deal. On 23rd June 2016, this coalition of Eurosceptics were successful, after an EU Membership Referendum called by then Prime Minister David Cameron resulted in the public voting to leave, by a fine margin (Electoral Commission 2016). Though it is not yet clear the extent to which the rights of immigrants from the European Union (including those already in the country as well as those yet to arrive) will be negatively impacted, this was a seismic indicator of widespread public dissatisfaction with the political class and their steadfast, robust openness toward immigration and the rights of non-British citizens living in the country (Goodwin & Heath 2016; Hobolt 2016; Swales 2016). The Brexit vote will almost certainly result in some degree of restrictions being placed on the movement of non-citizens coming into the United Kingdom, and most likely their rights once resident in the country, which would constitute the first major legal change for immigrants coming in Britain since 1981.

Each of these factors – increasingly anti-immigrant publics, more success for anti- immigrant parties and exposure for far-right groups and their discourse, and the success of the Brexit campaign – combine to create a scenario in Britain where, perhaps paradoxically, there is a continued and sustained flow of immigrants coming into the country and enjoying generous rights and privileges, but an increasingly hostile general public and a political class which is, slowly, turning against immigration. Also, as was reported in the previous chapter, Britain has a sizable number of immigrant origin parliamentarians identified since 1992, which has only been rising since then. The data shown in Figure 4.4 demonstrate election on election increases in the proportion of British MPs identified as coming from immigrant origin backgrounds, rising from just under 7% in 1992 to nearly 12% in 2010. This, combined with the above graph on national-level public opinion toward immigration, makes Britain seem on the surface to be a perfect example of the countermobilisation result observed in the previous chapter in action. The following chapter explores the relationship in much greater detail.

100 Figure 4.4. Percentages of parliamentarians of immigrant origin in British parliaments from 1992-2015

If there is a countermobilisation effect of anti-immigrant public opinion on representation, perhaps Great Britain is a classic example of it. Finally, with its majoritarian, constituency based electoral system, generous voting rights for many non-citizens, and concentration of immigrant origin groups into tight communities, British elections provide over 600 unique, individual opportunities for immigrant origin citizens to mobilise and elect representatives at each national contest. In some cases, immigrant origin groups are the majority in a constituency, and perhaps countermobilisation is found in these shielded pockets of resistance to the rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment. But could we also see an effect in the originally hypothesised direction? Will areas of fewer immigrant origin groups, and perhaps higher anti-immigrant sentiment, provide little hope for immigrant origin candidates seeking election? These realities make Great Britain a perfect case study to examine the impact of growing public hostility toward immigration over time on the representation of immigrant origin groups.

101 CHAPTER 5: THE DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM – PLACING MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN A BROADER ‘IMMIGRANT- ORIGIN’ CONTEXT59

Introduction

This chapter presents an in-depth look into the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups in Great Britain, providing a first look at Britain as a case study for the relationship between public opinion and political representation60. The findings in Chapter 3 suggested that there may be a countermobilisation effect in terms of immigrant origin representation, but that comparatively speaking increased representation was better explained by higher voting rights and majoritarian electoral systems. As the previous chapter outlined, Great Britain is a perfect case study to further examine these findings for three reasons: 1) there is a comparatively high level of both descriptive representation for immigrant origin groups and public hostility toward immigration, indicating a classic example of a countermobilisation effect, 2) non-citizens (particularly those from ex-colonial states) are given very generous voting (and general political participation) rights in British elections, meaning that many immigrants and all second generation immigrants are fully enfranchised in the British political system, and 3) the constituency-based majoritarian electoral system used in British elections means that non-British origin candidates and voters need only ‘win over’ a fraction of the overall electorate in order to achieve representation – and indeed in some circumstances (detailed below) they are in fact in the majority of voters. This chapter first examines trends in the representation of immigrant origin groups in Britain, and then, reflecting the great number

59 Parts of this chapter are included in a forthcoming chapter from Volume 1 of the Pathways project’s Oxford University Press edited volume, by myself and Dr Maria Sobolewksa. 60 I would like to thank the following people for assisting in the data collection, without which such in-depth analysis of the British data would not have been possible: Andrew Barclay, Pablo Rodero Sardinero, Jessica Smith, Minna Cowper-Coles, and Mary-Ann Hill. Finally, I would also like to thank the following authors for providing data with which this analysis was in part constructed and cross-referenced: Pippa Norris, John Curtice, Steve Fisher, and Rob Ford.

102 and diversity of non-native origin groups living in Britain today, presents a three-levelled approach to measuring the representativeness of British elected chambers. Levels of representation for immigrant origin groups are examined in the British House of Commons from 1992-2015, and also in Britain’s three regional elected chambers (Scotland, Wales, and London) for one term around 2010. Following this, the chapter explores the changing average demographics of immigrant origin MPs over time, and how this looks in comparison to British- only origin MPs. Finally, the chapter investigates whether or not immigrant origin MPs tend to be elected in seats with high populations of foreigners – thus providing a preliminary examination of the countermobilisation idea. Studying a single country in this manner also allows us to take a closer look at the role that political parties play in the search for greater political representation for minority groups. Throughout the following three chapters, British political parties will be examined in terms of the opportunities they provide to immigrant origin candidates and MPs to serve as representatives to their communities.

In Great Britain, the representativeness of the House of Commons in terms of ethnic minority communities has been the subject of ever intensifying scrutiny and debate over recent electoral cycles, and it is broadly agreed that parliament needs to improve on its representation of non-white British groups (Durose et al. 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Heath et al. 2013; Sobolewska 2013). However, the discussion surrounding representation has been limited largely to non-white immigrant groups, who are given an official ‘ethnic minority’ status, protected by anti-discrimination, law and included in the United Kingdom’s Census. White immigrant groups, coming from Europe, North America, and beyond, do not enjoy similar protection, nor attention. While this may spring from the assumption that they become a part of the white British majority more easily than those who are visibly different by dint of their different skin colour, it is most unhelpful to ignore them. The advantages of examining white immigrant origin representation in a comparative framework with ethnic minority representation are outlined in previous chapters, but also briefly summarised here. Firstly, white immigrant origin groups may still suffer inequality in representation and unknown barriers to entry, which need to be exposed in order to be addressed. Secondly, the investigation of ethnic minority parliamentary under-representation cannot be fully understood when it is not placed in the context of other immigrant origin groups. The existing literature often concluded that under-representation of ethnic minorities is driven strongly by the existence of racial discrimination in the processes of selection and election of minority candidates (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets, 2013). However, it is possible that

103 at least part of this effect could be accounted for by the obstacles created by the process of immigration itself, such as the lack of relevant political networks or knowledge rather than discrimination. Thus, placing ethnic minority representation in a broader context is necessary in order to understand the obstacles facing all immigrant origin groups, as well as minorities themselves. In short, we can tell much more about the nature of both ethnic minority and white immigrant origin statuses as barriers to representation if we use a comparative framework such as the one proposed in this research.

This chapter proposes a further layer, or level, of examination for the British context which can give us even more detail about the nature of ethnic statuses as barrier to representation. Given that Britain has such a high and diverse population of immigrant origin groups living within it, when investigating the representativeness of parliament, we can break down the representation of minority-ethnic immigrant groups into their further, regional or national groups. By comparing representation like this in a three-levelled approach – 1) immigrant origin, 2) non-white or white immigrant origin, and 3) specific immigrant origin group – the approach taken in this research broadens investigations into a) the state of descriptive representation of immigrant communities in Great Britain, b) the ‘barriers of representation’ of ethnic minority communities by comparing their representation with that of white immigrant groups, and, c) with the third level of comparisons, also provides more detail of the situation among specific immigrant groups.

Political Opportunity for Representation in Great Britain

The dominant explanatory framework proposed for ethnic minority representation has been a demand and supply model nested within the political opportunity framework, proposed by Norris and Lovenduski in the 1990s (1993, 1995). It is the demand side that particularly highlights the issue of racial prejudice and discrimination. This rests on two assumptions: that voters discriminate against non-white candidates (Curtice and Fisher 2005; Curtice, Fisher, and Ford 2010; Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets 2013), and that political party selectors discriminate against them, possibly as a result of their belief that these candidates are risky from an electoral point of view (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). The idea that non-white candidates in British elections may be ‘risky’ in this sense is often articulated as an ‘ethnic penalty’, on which there has been a good amount of research (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Ford & Goodwin 2010; Norris et al. 1992; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Stegmaier et al. 2013).

104 The majority of this research has concluded that there is a tangible disadvantage to fielding ethnic minority candidates in British elections – particularly in areas perceived to be high in resistance to immigration. Furthermore, recent evidence in local elections across Britain suggests that this disadvantage may go beyond non-white status, and also impact immigrants who are ‘identifiably foreign’ (Thrasher et al. 2015). That said, it is also asserted by many of the same authors that any ‘ethnic penalty’ these politicians suffer is rather small and usually not enough to decide the election against them if they stand in relatively ‘safe’ seats. However, given that in Britain ethnic minority candidates are more likely than white candidates to be selected for unwinnable seats for their respective parties (Sobolewska 2013), this makes the processes of selection of candidates to winnable seats crucially important. Despite many parties recently increasing their efforts to select a greater proportion of minority candidates altogether, and more of them in safe seats (Sobolewska 2013), the selection process in Great Britain is decentralised, making it more difficult to overcome individual prejudices of local party ‘selectorates’ and impose a centralised strategy to diversify the parties (Krouwel 1999; Matland and Studlar 2004; Hazan and Rahat 2010). As a result of this difficulty – and as a result of Britain’s first-past-the-post, single member districts – ethnic minority candidates have traditionally been selected only for those seats where the population consisted – to a large extent – of ethnic minority voters (Saggar and Geddes 2000; Geddes 2001). Given that the number of such seats is limited, as is the number of seats that are considered truly contested during any given election. This has therefore led to a ghettoization of minority candidates (Saggar and Geddes 2000). Although more recent analysis of the 2010 General Election shows that this trend may be reversing (Sobolewska 2013). Furthermore, this neglects the potential that an ‘ethnic penalty’ is occurring further upstream than on voting day itself – perhaps the real penalty can be seen in the selection processes, with parties avoiding selecting minority candidates in hotly contested seats, and perhaps in areas of high resistance to immigration. Chapter 6 explores this idea in much greater detail.

The research noted above, as with the majority of research into representation of non- native groups, does tend to neglect the representation of white immigrant origin groups, and thus the specific barrier to representation that immigrant status itself provides is under- researched and underdeveloped. As discussed in previous chapters, there are many reasons why immigration itself may pose a barrier to political representation. This aspect of underrepresentation speaks to the supply part of the dominant explanatory framework of political opportunity (Norris and Lovenduski 1995): the lack of supply of suitable candidates

105 from too small a population, not engaged enough and not willing to come forward. The classic account of political participation presents it as a function of access to resources (Brady, Verba, and Lehman Schlozman 1995). Such access and levels of resources (sometimes articulated as ‘social capital’) are known to be, on average, much more limited for immigrants compared to natives, and political participation as such can suffer (Cheong et al. 2007; Jacobs & Tillie 2004; Kao 2004; Morales & Giugni 2016; Solomos 2011). Immigrants can face a number of resource- based problems with or barriers to political participation and engagement. A lack of political knowledge, particularly in terms of eligibility to vote or stand for elections, may be an obvious immigrant-specific obstacle. Knowledge of language and lack of suitable social networks that are usually developed through a lifetime in the country, and an experience of education, work, and living in the same place are likely to affect all immigrants. Finally, the interest in politics in Britain and lack of partisan attachment – again, often developed through the experience of growing up in the nation – may lead all immigrants to be less engaged and thus willing and available to stand as candidates of political office. However, although we know little about how these factors affect white migrant communities, we know they can be an important limiting influence for ethnic minorities despite the closing participation gap (Heath et al. 2013), and there is no reason to think white immigrants will be entirely exempt from them.

However, in Britain there is a wide range and number of ethnic and national groups within the white and ethnic minority categories. Further, given the comparatively high levels of representation in Britain, we can operationalise an approach to measuring political representation for immigrant origin groups which goes even deeper than the binary comparison presented up until this point. This chapter presents a three-levelled framework in which to investigate descriptive representation of immigrant communities in British Parliaments, Assemblies, and Council Chambers. This method of analysis can simultaneously investigate differences between ethnic minority and white migrant groups and among different ethnic minority groups. This is of course in addition to comparing each group to the remainder – white, non-immigrant MPs. This framework is laid out in Figure 5.1, which is an expansion of Figure 3.1.

106 Figure 5.1. A three-tiered assessment of the representation of immigrant groups in legislative bodies

Representative

Native Only Level 1 Immigrant Origin* Origin

Ethnic Minority White Immigrant Level 2 Immigrant Origin Origin

Ethnic Minority White Immigrant Level 3 Group Group

*At least one parent is (or was) an immigrant, which contrasts to native only origin where both parents are native born. On these grounds, third-generation immigrants are considered to be native only origin for the purposes of this research. This means that ethnic minority group MPs as per Level 3 may not encapsulate all ethnic minority MPs in a given legislature, with the possibility existing of an MP being a third-generation ethnic minority immigrant. For the purposes of this research however, which seeks to investigate the nature of non-native and non-ethnic majority group status as a barrier to representation, it is necessary to exclude ethnic minority MPs without a recent immigrant origin history.

The first level considers whether an MP is of immigrant origin or not. If the answer is yes, then on the second level we examine whether they are a member of an ethnic minority group. On the third level, we determine to which specific migrant group an MP belongs – this is done in accordance with the United Kingdom Census’ major ethnic grouping categories61 62. Using the Census categories to measure parliamentary descriptive representation at level three

61 Unfortunately, detailed information on the background of white ethnic groups is not collected in the UK Census. Instead, white ethnicities are divided only between British, Irish, and ‘Other’ ethnic identifications. As such, the detail in which we are able to analyse the representation of white immigrant origin groups at level three is much lower than for ethnic minority groups. 62 United Kingdom Census aggregate data for the years 1991, 2001, and 2011 comes courtesy of the UK Data Service: Office for National Statistics; National Records of Scotland; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency.

107 means that we are able to match it directly to the respective population statistics reported in the Census, which is the approach used by Le Lohé (1998, 2004). This gives us an accurate assessment of how representative Parliament is (and has been) compared to its population. The level three categories for this research are as follows: Black African, Black Caribbean, Asian Indian, Asian Pakistani, Asian Bangladeshi, Asian Chinese, Arab, White Irish, Other White63.

The Descriptive Representation of Immigrant Communities in Great Britain: 1992-2015

Many authors since the classic work by Hana Pitkin (1967) have continued to use the principle that elected chambers should demographically ‘reflect’ or ‘mirror’ their constituents as a measure of how representative (descriptively speaking) said chambers are of their populations (Le Lohe 2004; Mansbridge 1999; Norris & Lovenduski 1993). This thesis continues that tradition, and therefore I use a ‘mirror status’ measurement that compares the proportions of the British population, identifying with each ethnic group directly to the percentage of seats that members from each migrant group both should (in order to achieve mirror status) and do in reality occupy in each parliament from 1992 to 201564. For example, the total figure in the first column of Table 5.1, which presents the findings of the extensive data collection into the backgrounds of every British MP from 1992 through until 2015, indicates that almost 15% of the UK population belonged in 2011 to one of the ethnic categories included in this research.65 Therefore, around 15% of all seats in England, Wales, and Scotland ought to have been occupied by members of these groups after the election, in order for parliament to be considered descriptively representative of the population it serves. This total

63 Though this research design captures many of the immigrant groups present in Britain, there are a number of ethnic groups which are unfortunately excluded from this research. Principally, those of ‘other’ or ‘mixed’ ethnicities are not analysed separately. Representatives from mixed backgrounds are analysed as part of their ‘most ethnic minority’ group. For example, an MP who is mixed Black African and British will be classified as a Black African representative. In terms of Census data, such an approach is not possible in the English and Welsh data as we cannot determine the combination of ‘mixed’ of an individual respondent. These individuals in the Census are therefore not included in the figures provided. 64 This figure is worked out using all seats in Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland) at each election. 65 As mentioned previously, this research includes only the main ethnic groups as categorised by the UK Censuses from 1991-2011. Some other, smaller groups are not included in this calculation, nor are the ‘mixed race’ groups recorded in the English and Welsh census data.

108 is 88 seats. The table also shows the number of seats required for level two and level three (from Figure 5.1) groups to be ‘fully represented,’ by this ‘mirror status’ measurement.

I focus on the 2010-2015 parliament first, as it is the parliament in which a major step up was made in the representation of minority groups (Sobolewska 2013)66. At level one we can see that the percentage of seats occupied by MPs of migrant origin and the number required to be fully descriptive are not far apart (around 85% of seats needed for parliament to be descriptive in terms of the representation of non-native origin groups were filled at this election). However, we can see that this relatively high figure at level one is the result of a large overrepresentation of white immigrant communities at level two, with representatives from this group exceeding the required total and standing at nearly 150%. Ethnic minority immigrant group MPs only make up half of their required total. Moving through level three, we can see that there is further disparity within the aggregated second level groups: the Asian Indian ethnic group, for example, is at a high level of representation (80%), whereas the Asian Pakistani group is very much underrepresented (~20%) despite making up a very similar proportion of the overall British population as their Asian Indian counterparts. There is also a large difference between the levels of representation of Black African and Black Caribbean groups, with the former achieving nearly 75% representation while the latter is represented by just two MPs (a ‘mirror status’ of just 33%). Of all groups, the white Irish community was the most overrepresented in the 2010-2015 Parliament; a total of 16 representatives elected across this parliament meant that they surpassed their ‘mirror’ status benchmark with 250%. The most underrepresented were the Asian Chinese community, with not a single MP elected of Chinese origin during the whole 2010-2015 Parliament (and indeed the study period).

66 Ethnic Minority MP Seema Malhotra was also elected as a replacement MP during this parliament. However, Malhotra is of third-generation immigrant origin (in that her grandparents, not parents, were immigrants to the United Kingdom) and thus does not count as an MP of immigrant origin in our analysis.

109 Table 5.1. The mirror status of the House of Commons from 1992-2015

1992-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 Group Seats Num. of ‘Mirror’ Seats Num. of ‘Mirror’ Seats Num. of ‘Mirror’ Seats Num. of ‘Mirror’ Seats Num. of ‘Mirror’ needed^ Reps. Status* needed^ Reps. Status* needed^ Reps. Status* needed^ Reps. Status* needed^ Reps. Status*

All IO MPs 77 45 58% 79 46 58% 79 53 67% 77 63 82% 88 73 83%

Ethnic Minority 31 6 19% 37 10 27% 37 12 32% 36 15 42% 55 27 49% White 46† 39 85% 42 37 88% 42 41 98% 41 48 117% 33 46 139%

Asian: 2 0 0% 3 0 0% 3 0 0% 3 0 0% 4 1 25% Bangladeshi Asian: Chinese 2 0 0% 3 0 0% 3 0 0% 3 0 0% 3 0 0% Asian: Indian 10 3 30% 12 5 42% 12 7 58% 11 7 64% 15 12 80% Asian: Pakistani 6 0 0% 8 1 13% 8 1 13% 8 3 38% 13 3 23% Black: African 3 1 33% 5 2 40% 5 2 40% 5 2 40% 11 8 73% Black: Caribbean 7 2 29% 6 2 33% 6 2 33% 6 3 50% 6 2 33% Middle Eastern 1 0 0% ------3 1 33% White: Irish 9† 15 166% 8 16 200% 8 15 188% 8 19 238% 6 15 250% White: Other 37† 24 65% 34 21 62% 34 26 77% 33 29 88% 27 31 115% Source: Inferred from 1991 (1992-1997), 2001 (1997-2010), and 2011 (2010-2015) Censuses’ ethnic group categories. IO = immigrant origin. Figures do not account for ethnic groups mentioned in the Census but not included in this research. Middle Eastern category included in the 1991 Census, but then not again until 2011. Non-British White ethnic groups were not included in the Census until 2001. *Rounded to one decimal place. ^ Rounded to the nearest whole seat, on appropriate electoral boundaries at time of election (minus Northern Irish seats) † Estimated based on change in size of ethnic white population and change in foreign born population from 1991 to 2001.

110 From the rest of the data in Table 5.1, we can see a general trend of increasing descriptive representation at level one, and for both major groups at level two, but the pattern regarding level 3 is much more variable. Firstly, the total number of seats occupied by immigrant origin MPs (level 1) clearly increases with each parliament. Thus, representation of immigrant communities in Great Britain has been on a linear rise, from 45 elected representatives in 1992 to 75 in 2010. This linear pattern holds at level two; there is also an increase parliament-on-parliament in the number of seats occupied by both white and ethnic minority groups (except for between the 1992 and 1997 parliaments for white immigrant origin groups, when representation remains static). In short, the data indicate that the House of Commons has been becoming more representative of both ethnic minority and white groups living in Britain since the early 1990s. However, only white immigrant groups have achieved full representation in the study period (in 2001, with 100% almost reached in terms of ‘mirror status’). Ethnic minority immigrant origin groups reach 50% on the ‘mirror status’ calculation by 2010, from a starting point of just 20% in 1992. This over-doubling of representation throughout the study period is much quicker than the rate of growth of white groups, but still much further behind achieving mirror status.

Looking longitudinally at the representation of the specific immigrant groups on level three tells us a great deal about the development of ethnic minority and white immigrant group representation over the last 25 years. In terms of white groups, the white Irish community is consistently overrepresented in each Parliament. The white ‘other’ group only reaches full representation by our measurement in 2010, which is interesting considering that the white Irish group passed this mark much earlier. The over-representation of the white Irish community throughout the study period, according to our measurement, accounts for overall white immigrant group representation at level two, effectively reaching 100% by 2001. By comparison, no ethnic minority group achieved mirror status at any point in the study period, although two groups certainly seem to be moving that way. The Asian Indian group stands out as the most represented of the ethnic minority groups. They began with the highest number of representatives in 1992 and maintained this until the end of the study period, reaching 12 elected MPs in the 2010-2015 Parliament. Asian Indians are also consistently the largest in terms of overall population. Black Africans follow a similar pattern, moving steadily upward from a solitary representative in 1992 toward a score of 73% in mirror status by 2010, with eight MPs identified as of this origin in this Parliament. However, other ethnic minority groups do not follow such trajectories. The Black Caribbean group did not make any advancement

111 from 1992-2015, struggling to break through both in overall numbers and in terms of mirror status aside from a brief rise in 2005-2010. Asian Pakistanis have similarly struggled, unable to push above three MPs at any point, despite becoming the second-largest ethnic minority group in Britain by the 2010-2015 Parliament (according to the Census). Across all parliaments under study, the Asian Chinese community has not seen a single representative elected, and the Asian Bangladeshi and Middle Eastern groups share only a handful of representatives between them. These findings suggest that immigrant communities across Britain are having significantly varied experiences in terms of mobilising and gaining access to the House of Commons.

By 2010-2015, Black Africans have come much closer to ‘mirror status’ than Black Caribbeans, in much the same way that Asian Indians have outstripped their Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Middle Eastern counterparts in this regard. With this in mind, representational barriers therefore appear to be variably placed in front of communities depending on their specific countries/regions of origin, rather than on their ethnic minority status alone (although of course ethnic minority groups as a whole are less well represented than white groups). Exactly why some minority groups do much better than others in terms of political mobilisation and representation, and what the group-specific barriers might be should be the focus of extensive further research. Extant literature does provide some clues however, which this chapter now builds on. For instance, engaging in political participation, mobilisation and representation is known to be an expensive enterprise – both in terms of financial and social costs and requirements (Brady et al. 1995; Norris & Lovenduski 1995). ‘Resourced based’ explanations of minority underrepresentation are already integrated into the political opportunity framework (Geddes 1998). So, perhaps the varying capacities of immigrant origin groups to mobilise successfully and gain representation might be down to imbalances between ethnic minority groups in terms of wealth and social class (Brady et al. 1995; Jacobs & Tillie 2004; Sobolewska 2014; Solomos 2011; Statham 1999). Empirically speaking, we know that many ethnic groups face labour market obstacles, and as such unemployment is higher among ethnic minorities in Britain than among whites (Clark & Drinkwater 2002; Drinkwater et al. 2006; Christian Dustmann & Fabbri 2005), but there is variance between the experience of different ethnic groups in terms of participation and outcomes from labour and indeed housing markets (Phillips 1998, Clark and Drinkwater 2007). Different ethnic minority groups have also dispersed geographically to varying degrees, allowing wider and more varied access to job and housing markets (Neal et al. 2013; Phillips 1998). These factors amount to differing

112 degrees of marginality and exclusion between ethnic minority groups. As per the above literature, some groups – most notably Asian Indians – have been ‘more successful’ in the jobs and housing markets, and now increasingly fill many middle-class roles and niches in terms of employment and geography. Meanwhile other groups – most notably Black Caribbeans – have tended to stay more segregated and concentrated within inner city, often more disadvantaged areas. Perhaps this difference in integration and market experience can explain why Asian Indians have been traditionally much better represented with other Asian groups lagging behind, and why Black Caribbeans have not kept pace with Black Africans67. Perhaps the increasing ‘professionalization’ of representatives (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Cairney 2007; Cowley 2012; Allen 2013; Durose et al. 2013) extends to between and within ethnic minority communities as much as it does in wider British politics.

Representation in Britain’s Devolved Regions

We can also analyse the extent to which the three regional legislative bodies across Great Britain were also representing their populations. This time I analyse just one fully completed term. I picked the sessions beginning around the final completed Westminster parliament in the study (2010-2015) to maximise comparability. The 2008-2012 London Assembly, and the 2007-2011 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly terms were assessed. There is conflicting evidence about whether or not lower-legislative levels are typically better in terms of their representativeness of populations than their national counterparts. Russell, Mackay, and McAllister (2002) find regional assemblies to be better in terms of gender balances, but Thrasher et al. (2013) find local authorities to be much worse than the House of Commons in terms of ethnic diversity. Theoretically, the presence of regional legislative bodies, which also afford non-British citizens permanently residing within each region the right to vote, should provide more opportunities for immigrant groups to mobilise and gain election (Schönwälder 2013). We examine the extent to which regional bodies provide better opportunities (and thus levels) of representation of immigrant groups by comparing representation of immigrant communities both between the four bodies themselves and with their respective, collective districts at the national (parliamentary) level. If the notion that sub-

67 From this point, owing to low numbers for many groups I do not reuse the level categories as per Figure 5.1. Future analysis, when (hopefully) a substantial many more MPs from each group are present in parliament should however re-estimate and re-conduct the following analyses using the level 3 breakdowns.

113 national legislative bodies are more representative is true, then we should see that the four regional parliaments and assemblies more accurately reflect their respective populations than the collective body of MPs from each region in the House of Commons.

Firstly, Table 5.2 shows the proportion of members of each regional legislative body identified as of immigrant origin (and then ethnic minority and white immigrant origin), and compares these figures with the respective percentages from the MPs representing each region at the Westminster level in 2010. Information is also provided on the percentage of the regional populations identifying as foreign born and of ethnic minority status. The London Assembly has by far the highest proportion of immigrant origin representatives, and the highest in terms of the ethnic minority and white majority sub-groups. A full 20% of all representatives elected to the London Assembly in 2008 were identified as being of immigrant origin, and just over 10% were identified as members of ethnic minority immigrant groups. However, while London greatly outstrips the other three bodies in this sense, it is actually furthest from being representative of its foreign and minority group population; according to the 2011 Census, over 40% of London’s population identified with an ethnic minority group, and over 35% were identified as foreign born. The London Assembly is, however, ahead of the body of MPs who returned to Westminster from London at the 2010 election in the same region (just two years after that London Assembly was elected): 17% of MPs from London elected at the 2010 General Election contest were identified as of immigrant origin, and just under 10% of MPs were ethnic minorities. These data suggest that London Assembly members slightly better represent the immigrant population and ethnic minority populations of London than the collective body of House of Commons MPs from London.

The three other bodies in this study display much lower numbers of immigrant origin and ethnic minority members, but are actually much closer to that ‘mirror status’ than London is, given the small ethnic minority populations in the respective regions. In both Wales and Scotland, around 4% of members are identified as of immigrant background. This figure is a fairly close reflection of the percentage of each regional population born abroad, with Wales standing at 5% in 2011 and Scotland at 7%. However, what is true of London in terms of the relationship between immigrant representation at the regional and Westminster level is the reverse for all other regions – the percentage of assembly/parliament members identified as of immigrant origin is lower than that of MPs from the same area. In fact, in Wales the proportion of immigrant origin representatives at Westminster is over twice the proportion of the foreign-

114 born population in that region. The figure for Scotland at the national level is closer still to the overall foreign-born population. In short, these legislative bodies are in fact slightly less representative in terms of overall immigrant populations than the national parliament, but are nonetheless still fairly close. The fact that there seems to be a better chance of representation for immigrant groups in the House of Commons than in the regional bodies for these three areas did not conform to expectations outlined in the literature above.

Table 5.2. Immigrant group representation in the devolved regions London Scotland Wales (2008-2012) (2007-2011) (2007-2011) Regional Immigrant Origin MPs 20.0% 4.6% 3.3% National Immigrant Origin MPs 17.3% 6.8% 12.2% Foreign Born Population 36.7% 7.0% 5.5%

Ethnic Minority Regional MPs 12.0% 0.8% 1.6% Ethnic Minority National MPs 8.0% 1.7% 0.0% Ethnic Minority Population 40.2% 4.0% 4.4% Populations of Foreign Born and Ethnic Minorities from the 2011 Census. National Figures are from corresponding constituencies making up each region in the 2010-2015 Parliament.

In terms of ethnic minority members and populations, however, the picture is actually more like what we would expect, with the exception of Scotland. In Wales, not a single ethnic minority MP was returned to Westminster in 2010, unlike at the regional level where we do find ethnic minority members. However, this is only one member of each body. In Scotland, one Westminster MP was identified as of immigrant and ethnic minority background in the corresponding parliament (2010-2015), and again one member was identified as an ethnic minority in the Scottish Parliament. Regarding how representation at these levels relates to the population of each region, the lower numbers are again much closer to reflecting the status of ethnic minority immigrant group percentages than in London. Therefore, we can say that actually all of the legislative bodies representing Wales and Scotland are fairly close to reflecting their foreign and ethnic minority immigrant populations. Overall, the results from the regional level do suggest the devolved parliaments are perhaps better at representing ethnic

115 minority groups, but only just. However, the national parliament at Westminster remains the leader in terms of reflecting the foreign origin population of Great Britain.

Demographics of Britain’s Immigrant Origin MPs

With immigrant origin MPs identified, a number of questions arose regarding their demographics and backgrounds aside from their national and ethnic statuses. Just who are the immigrant origin MPs in Britain? Are there any patterns regarding their age, gender, political experience, educational and occupational backgrounds, or the constituencies they represent? And what about parties? Do some parties do much better in terms of selecting and putting immigrant origin MPs into parliament? The following sections explored the makeup of Britain’s immigrant origin MPs, and compared their backgrounds to white British MPs for comparison. It also compared between ethnic minority and white immigrant origin groups.

Education and Occupation – Key Measures of Social Class

The professionalization of British politics is well documented, with an ever-increasing number of MPs coming from professional and managerial occupational backgrounds, and university educations (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Cairney 2007; Cowley 2012; Allen 2013; Durose et al. 2013). It has been argued that minority and marginalised group representatives often ‘overcompensate’ in terms of their qualifications and experience compared with other groups – in other words, they have to work harder and be better than majority group members in order to gain selection and election – which helps them pass into and through the ‘closed’ and ‘narrow’ cliques of selection (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Durose et al. 2013). This also ties closely into theories about ‘acceptable difference’ (Durose et al. 2013), whereby minority and marginalised candidates are expected to reflect elements or characteristics of the majority group in order to gain favour. Equally, however, it has been noted that recent conscious efforts to increase the number of non-white MPs in parliament have resulted in the fast tracking of comparatively younger, less experienced minority representatives into the House of Commons (Sobolewska 2013). Table 5.3 shows the percentage entering politics from public sector employment (teaching, healthcare, and so on) and the percentage entering parliament with

116 university degrees of each representative group – immigrant origin, non-immigrant origin, and then ethnic minority and white immigrant origin MPs68.

Table 5.3. Employment backgrounds and education levels of British MPs from 1992-2015 1992-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 Public Sector Non-IO MPs 34.7 41.2 39.2 36.1 30.4 Workers (%) All IO MPs 32.6 42.0 35.3 32.8 29.3

EM IO MPs 60.0 45.5 30.8 31.3 25.9 White IO MPs 28.2 41.0 34.2 33.3 31.3

Education (% Non-IO MPs 70.7 75.7 77.7 80.6 81.9 with Degree) All IO MPs 84.8 90.0 90.7 90.6 90.7

EM IO MPs 83.3 90.9 84.6 87.5 96.3 White IO MPs 85.4 89.7 92.7 91.7 87.5

The results are very interesting, and support theories about the gradual professionalization of political representatives. There is a gradual decline in the proportion of public sector workers from 1997 for both immigrant origin and non-immigrant origin MPs. This is coupled with substantial increases in the proportions of MPs from each group entering parliament with university degrees. More degree holders and fewer public sector workers across the board supports suggestions of the increasingly ‘professional’ and socially homogenised political classes. This analysis is not in-depth enough however to constitute a proper contribution to that literature, as it does not control for covariate effects such as changing party compositions (which in particular might have a lot to do with the rates of public sector

68 Given that the data are not a sample of British MPs, but whole a population, statistical significance is not an appropriate gauge to measure the true meaning of these differences in means and percentages. When we are discussing differences in population statistics, significance makes no sense and it is instead more appropriate to assess the size of differences in relation to the average distributions and overall patterns of change. In other words, statistical significance should be replaced by estimations of the substantive meaning or value of the effect size or differences between means – for discussion on statistical significance and its (in)appropriateness in social sciences, see Johnson (1999); Cowger (1984); McCloskey and Ziliak (1996); Ziliak and McCloskey (2004, 2008).

117 workers) and patterns of incumbency. Nonetheless, it does provide a good demonstration of how the makeup of British parliaments has evolved since the early-1990s. Between the sub- groups of immigrant origin MPs, there are again some interesting differences and trajectories. In terms of education, the percentage of immigrant origin MPs entering parliament holding a degree level qualification (or above) is consistently substantially higher than that of white British MPs. Indeed, a near 15-point gap opens up between the two groups in this regard during the 2001-2005 Parliament, although this had closed to around 8% by 2010-2015. The differences between ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs and non-immigrant origin MPs are large. By the 2010-2015 parliament, 96% of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs held university degrees upon entering parliament, compared with 82% of non-immigrant origin MPs. Such gaps are present throughout the time period, with higher average qualification levels for ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs in each parliament. White immigrant origin MPs are also better educated than their white British counterparts on average. However, while mostly in line with or ahead of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs before 2010, they are overtaken in this final year as the leading group in terms of education rates. In all, the data report that immigrant origin MPs are, on average, substantially better educated than white British MPs throughout the study period. However, this is in the context of blanket rises in the average education rates of each group and the increasing professionalization of British politics from the early-1990s to the mid-2010s.

The data regarding public sector workers again show some interesting trends. From 1997, the proportion of MPs coming from public service backgrounds deteriorates for both non-immigrant origin and immigrant origin MPs, falling from over 40% to around 30% across those four parliaments. The rate of decline is slightly steeper for immigrant origin MPs, but not enormously. Between the sub-groups of immigrant origin MPs, again we see general decline from 1997 onward. Around 45% of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs were in public sector employment previous to taking up positions in parliament in 1997, but this had fallen to just 25% by 2010. Indeed, in the 1992-1997 period this figure was even higher than the next parliament, standing at 60%. Problems with a lack of observations however for this year mean caution should be used when interpreting this figure, but it is safe to say that there has been a very noticeable decline in the proportion of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs moving into Westminster from public service backgrounds over the study period. For white immigrant origin MPs, most interestingly the percentage of public sector workers increases by over 50% between the 1992 and 1997 parliaments, before again declining down to over 30% in 2010-

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2015. Their figures remain higher than those of the ethnic minority group from 2001 onwards, but lower than the white British group. In summary, this looks to be further evidence of an increasingly better educated and more socially upward bulk of immigrant origin MPs from 1992-2015, above and beyond the general upward movement in both over the study period.

Political Experience

Research by Sobolewska (2013) suggested that, on average, newer cohorts of minority group MPs are much less politically experienced than their white British counterparts, as parties ‘rush them in’ to improve their descriptive representation of minority groups. The data displayed in Table 5.4 support this entirely, which shows by immigrant origin group the average ages and percentages of representatives coming into Westminster having previously served in another elected capacity. While the proportions of white British MPs holding previous political experience before entering Westminster remains very stable around the 50% mark from 1997 to 2015, this figure decreases for immigrant origin groups over the same period from around 55% in 1997-2001 to around 40% in 2010-2015.

Table 5.4. Average age and education levels of British MPs from 1992-2015 1992-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 Average Age Non-IO MPs 49.8 49.0 50.3 51.3 50.0 All IO MPs 51.1 48.6 48.1 49.0 47.6

EM IO MPs 46.5 45.6 45.7 46.8 43.1 White IO MPs 51.8 49.5 48.9 49.8 50.1

Experience (% Non-IO MPs 43.8 49.5 50.9 50.4 49.5 Previous Elected All IO MPs 43.5 52.0 51.9 48.4 41.3 Role*) EM IO MPs 66.7 63.6 76.9 62.6 33.3 White IO MPs 39.0 48.7 43.9 43.8 45.8

IO = Immigrant Origin. For this table, replacement MPs are included so as to get an evaluation of the total body of IO MPs in each parliament. Figures rounded to one decimal place. N correspond to Figure 5.1. *This excludes being previously elected to Westminster, as the intention is to capture an MP’s average level of political experience prior to ever serving in the House of Commons. The roles included in this variable are: local councillor, member of a regional devolved administration, or member of the European Parliament.

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The second half of this portion of the table shows that there was a dramatic fall – a near halving – of the percentage of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs entering parliament with experience in previous elected roles under their belt between the last two parliaments. Indeed, the near 80% figure for previous experience among ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs in the 2001-2005 parliament – the highest figure among any group at any time – is cut down by nearly two-thirds by the end of the study period. This is undoubtedly driven by the influx of young, inexperienced ethnic minority MPs from the Conservative Party under David Cameron in 2010 – highlighted previously by Sobolewska (2013). The proportions of white immigrant origin MPs with previous political backgrounds moves slightly upward and then back downward over the study period, finishing higher than in 1992.

This is backed up by the data regarding age. The results of the data collection seen below report that throughout the majority of the study period, immigrant origin MPs were much younger than their non-immigrant origin (white British) counterparts. By 2010, the average age of immigrant origin MPs had fallen to around 47.5 years, with non-immigrant origin MPs’ average age at 50 years. However, this is actually driven by a seven-year gap between the average ages of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs and white British MPs in the 2010-2015 Parliament. Furthermore, the average age of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs declined by nearly three and a half years from 1992 to 2015 – the largest decline of all categories. In contrast, the average age of white immigrant origin MPs was the same as non-immigrant origin MPs by the end of the 2010 parliament, though it declined slightly over the study period.

In summary, on average (after the 1992-1997 parliament) immigrant origin MPs were found to be younger, less politically experienced, and better educated than non-immigrant origin MPs across the study period. They were not found to come from substantially different occupational backgrounds (at least in terms of sector). This was in a context of gradually decreasing numbers of public sector workers, gradually increasing education rates, but stable average ages and levels of political experience across parliament. The differences between ethnic minority and white immigrant origin groups, as well as relative to white British groups, add further detail, and draw out further differences. For instance, ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs were on average far younger and substantially better educated than both their white immigrant origin and non-immigrant origin (white British) counterparts. They were also far less likely to come into politics from public sector jobs, and by the end of the study period had significantly lower levels of political experience than ethnically white MPs – despite having

120 very much led in this regard over the other four parliaments. The exceptionally high rates of degree holders among ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs (and indeed white immigrant origin MPs) suggests that they are having to work much harder and be much better qualified than their majority group counterparts in order to pass for selection and election. White immigrant origin MPs were, on average, of a similar age to white British MPs and had only slightly lower mean levels of previous political experience and shared broadly similar patterns regarding previous public-sector employment. They did however, like ethnic minority MPs, have much higher averages rates of degree holders among their group from parliament to parliament. From this analysis, there is a lot of evidence to be found here in support of claims made by both Sobolewska (2013) regarding the increased ‘fast-tracking’ of younger, less experienced minority MPs into the House of Commons, and by Durose et al. (2013) regarding the ‘acceptable difference’ and ‘overcompensating’ hypotheses. It appears that immigrant origin MPs, particularly those from ethnic minority backgrounds, are increasingly coming from more professionalised but simultaneously less politically experienced backgrounds.

Gender

Ideas about ‘multiple marginality’ and intersections of discrimination suggest that the cross-sectional nature of ethnic minority and female representation makes it substantially harder for female members of ethnic minorities to make progress (Durose et al. 2013; Turner 2002). However, alternative thinking proposes that there is a ‘complementary advantage’ regarding multiple marginality, and suggests that when efforts and structures to increase representation of minority groups exist, having multiple minority characteristics/identities is advantageous for selection success (Celis et al. 2014). Figure 5.2 shows the proportion of immigrant origin and non-immigrant origin MPs (broken down into their level 2 categories) per parliament identified as female. We can see that there is no gender equality achieved in any group over the study period, and with a ‘high bar’ of just under 30%, there is still much to do in this regard.

The data suggest that by 2010, ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs were the most representative group in terms of gender (they also appear to be so in the 1992-1997 parliament, but a low number of observations mean caution should be used when interpreting this particular result). Almost 30% of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs were female in the 2010-2015 Parliament, according to the data. This is not far ahead of a similar proportion of white

121 immigrant origin MPs who were female, but well ahead of the circa 20% of white British MPs. White British MPs begin in 1992 as more gender balanced than white immigrant origin MPs, but white British gender representation fell quickly behind, and from 1997 up until 2010 it was white immigrant origin MPs who were leading in terms of gender representation. The data presented here are very interesting, as they suggest that ethnic minority (and indeed immigrant) status and being female do not combine in the ‘multiple marginality’ fashion in the context of representation. Rather, they perhaps combine in this context to create a ‘complementary advantage’ (Celis et al. 2014). While no parity has yet been reached, the data also suggest that ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs (and perhaps white immigrant origin MPs) may reach a 50/50 gender split before white British MPs.

Figure 5.2. Gender diversity of immigrant origin groups in British parliament

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Representing Constituencies – Immigrant Origin MPs and Their Seats

The chapter now turns to investigate the relationship between (ethnic minority) immigrant status and ethnic diversity in constituencies. Principally, we now move to assess the extent to which white and ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs are representing seats with high presences of immigrant and ethnic minority communities. Previous evidence has suggested that the ghettoization of ethnic minority MPs representing only constituencies with high densities of ethnic minority constituents (Saggar and Geddes 2000; Geddes 2001) has been disappearing in recent electoral cycles (Sobolewska 2013). Here, we provide a comprehensive assessment of this trend over time, and in addition expand the frame to also include white immigrant origin MPs, and seats with high immigrant (foreign born) densities. Table 5.5 shows the percentage of MPs from each of the white British, white immigrant origin, and ethnic minority immigrant origin groups representing constituencies with high densities (more than 25%) of both foreign born and ethnic minority populations.

The results confirm suggestions that while ethnic minority group MPs began representing mostly high ethnic minority density seats (over 80% in 1992), by the 2010-2015 parliament this relationship had very much weakened, with only less than half of all ethnic minority MPs representing high density ethnic minority seats. These findings support Sobolewska’s (2013) suggestion that the ‘ghettoization’ (Geddes 2001) of ethnic minority MPs into high density ethnic seats is becoming a thing of the past, owing to a sharp rise in the number of Conservative Party ethnic minority MPs in the latter years of the study period representing highly white British seats (and mostly in the South East of the country). The percentage of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs representing high foreign-born density seats also declines steadily from again just over 80% in 1992 to just over 63% in 2010.

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Table 5.5. Immigrant origin MPs and non-white British constituent density

High Foreign Born High Ethnic Minority

1992-1997 White British MPs 4.8% (29) 4.0% (24) White IO MPs 4.9% (2) 0% (0) Ethnic Minority IO MPs 83.3% (5) 83.3% (5)

1997-2001 White British MPs 6.7% (40) 7.9% (42) White IO MPs 25.0% (9) 22.2% (8) Ethnic Minority IO MPs 60.0% (6) 70.0% (7)

2001-2005 White British MPs 7.1% (37) 8.2% (43) White IO MPs 21.1% (8) 21.1% (8) Ethnic Minority IO MPs 50.0% (6) 66.7% (8)

2005-2010 White British MPs 6.4% (37) 6.9% (40) White IO MPs 12.5% (6) 16.7% (8) Ethnic Minority IO MPs 43.8% (7) 56.3% (9)

2010-2015 White British MPs 10.3% (59) 13.4% (78) White IO MPs 16.7% (8) 25.0% (12) Ethnic Minority IO MPs 63.0% (10) 48.2% (15) Foreign Born and Ethnic Minority population at the constituency level comes from 1991, 2001. and 2011 Censuses, and calculations were cross-referenced with BBC Elections databases. High constitutes at least a 25% population density. IO = Immigrant Origin. Due to data issues, Scotland is not currently included in the 1997 and 2001 analyses. N in brackets beside each percentage.

Much less clear are the relationships between foreigner seat density and white immigrant origin representation. At the beginning of the study period, almost no white immigrant origin MPs are seated in seats matching either category – just two are identified in seats with high densities of white immigrant origin MPs, and none are identified in seats with high densities of ethnic minorities. By the end of the study period, there were far more in each. In the 2010-2015 parliament, over 15% of white immigrant origin MPs were representing seats with high densities of foreign-born constituents. 25% of white immigrant origin MPs were in seats with high densities of ethnic minorities. However, the percentage of white British MPs in high foreigner and minority density seats has also risen, reflecting the growing presence of

124 foreign born and minority ethnic groups across Britain (and so increasing the total number of constituencies with high presences of each). There is more of a systematic, larger rise in the presence of white immigrant origin MPs in seats with high densities of ethnic minorities over the study period, rising from nothing in 1992 to 25% in 2010-2015. On current trends, we might see a case in the near future where there are as many (proportionally) white immigrant origin MPs in high ethnic minority density seats as there are ethnic minority MPs.

Representation by Political Party

We now move to investigate the representation of Britain’s immigrant origin communities by political party. Political parties are the organizational unit that makes delegation work in parliamentary democracies (Muller 2000), and are often interpreted as the ‘gatekeepers’ of political representation for minority and marginalised social groups (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Caul 1999; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Sobolewska 2013). In this sense, as political parties are the entities in contemporary democracy through which the vast majority of representatives achieve elected positions, they therefore play a vital role in political opportunity for political representation. If immigrant origin groups wish to be better represented in British politics, they must do so by mobilising into political parties and achieving nominations from their party to contest Westminster constituencies. So, if the descriptive political representation of immigrant origin groups in British politics is to increase, British political parties must take an active, and indeed crucial, role in making this happen. This, particularly in terms of ethnic minority representation, is something British political parties are very much aware of and indeed they have been strategically improving their representation of non-white communities in recent electoral cycles (Sobolewska 2013). It is well established that the Labour Party have very much led in terms of representation of ethnic minority groups in Britain (Audickas & Apostolova 2017; Sobolewska 2013). But is this also the case with other, less ethnic minority migrant groups? Exactly how large has this gap in ethnic minority representation been between the two parties, particularly in the early years when overall levels of representation were much lower? How do the other parties of British politics compare on both of these metrics? Are there any changes across time or are trends stable across the study period?

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Figure 5.3 below shows measurements of party representation of immigrants by Britain’s three main political parties from 1992-2015, and aggregated figures for all other parties represented at Westminster during this time. We can see from the figure that the Labour Party maintains a clear lead in terms of immigrant origin representatives throughout most of the study period, but interestingly only since 1997 according to our data. At the beginning of this period, the Conservatives are very similar in terms of the number of immigrant origin MPs sent to the House of Commons. After their defeat in the 1997 election however, they are quickly replaced as the leaders in this regard. A massive drop in immigrant origin MPs of well over 50% between 1992 and 1997 might suggest that Conservative white immigrant origin MPs suffered greatly at the hands of the Labour landslide, but this drop is actually similar to the proportion of seats lost overall by the Conservatives at that election. Thus, immigrant origin Conservative MPs suffered this defeat no worse than their White British counterparts. After this, we can see the real struggle for the Conservative Party to improve on their representativeness before that latest completed parliament (2010-2015). Even then, their numbers of immigrant origin parliamentarians only move just above levels seen in 1992.

Figure 5.3. Representation of immigrant origin groups by British political party

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Figures 5.4 and 5.5 below demonstrate how the representation figures break down at the party level into the ethnic minority and white immigrant origin categories. From Figure 5.4, we can clearly see that the Labour Party have consistently provided the highest proportion of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs in Parliament across the study period, something well established already in the literature. The number of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs elected from the Labour Party has been steadily rising across the twenty-five years under consideration, and they enjoy a significant advantage in this regard over their rivals throughout recent decades. The single biggest rise in overall ethnic minority representation is between the 2005-2010 and 2010-2015 Parliaments, where a big ‘step up’ in the number of ethnic minority MPs is driven by the Conservatives.

Figure 5.4. Ethnic minority immigrant origin representation by British political party

Figure 5.5 shows the same information but for white migrant groups. Here, the findings are of most interest as this has been previously completely unexamined. We can see from the graph that in fact in 1992 the Conservative Party were ahead of the Labour Party in terms of the number of white immigrant origin representatives sent to Parliament. However, with the

127 landslide defeat of the Conservatives at the 1997 election, we see this figure drop off dramatically and the Labour Party overtake them right through until the end of the study period. This finding is very noteworthy, as it suggests that immigrant origin MPs were more likely to be Conservatives during their 1992-1997 government than from the Labour Party, but by the time the Conservatives had returned to government in 2010 (albeit as part of a coalition), this statistic had reversed.

Figure 5.5. White immigrant origin representation by British political party

In fact, the Conservatives returned fewer immigrant origin Members to Parliament in 2010 than in 1992. So, while their representation of ethnic minority immigrant groups improved drastically in the most recent parliaments, white immigrant groups within the Conservative Party have struggled gain in quite such fashion, and by 2015 were still less represented than they were nearly twenty-five years previous. Conversely, defeat in 2010 did

128 not reverse the rising numbers of white immigrant origin MPs seen throughout the study period which began with the Labour landslide of 1997, when the party saw their overall numbers and share of immigrant origin MPs in the House of Commons rise dramatically.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented an assessment of the current state of political representation for immigrant origin groups in Britain. It broke levels of representation down into ethnic minority and white immigrant origin groups, and again by specific national/regional minority groups. The findings suggested that white immigrant origin groups have been better represented in British politics than ethnic minority immigrant origin groups. In short, white immigrant origin groups were able to achieve full ‘mirror status’ representation with the broader British population by the end of the study period. However, ethnic minority immigrant origin groups have made it only halfway to this same mark. Though their representation has been increasing rapidly (particularly over the two latest parliaments), their presence in the House of Commons remains some way off reflecting that of the makeup of the British population. The fact is that white immigrant origin groups appear very successful in terms of gaining selection and election, but that ethnic minority immigrant groups are very much struggling to do so and remain underrepresented. When we think about barriers to representation, the results here suggest that immigrant origin status may not be barrier in itself, but that a minority ethnic status may well be.

This research has also presented the representation of migrant groups at a third level: separate national/regional-origin communities. This not only follows but greatly improves previous attempts to investigate how different ethnic minority communities are faring in terms of their political mobilization and representation (Le Lohé 1998, 2004). It is here where perhaps the most interesting findings lie. For instance, high levels of representation for white immigrant groups are for the most part in our study driven by a substantial relative overrepresentation of the white Irish immigrant group. Second-generation Irish immigrants are doing very well in terms of gaining electoral office, and further research should investigate what it is that makes them so successful compared with other non-British white immigrant origin groups. We may be able to do some speculation on this front. White Irish immigrants will of course share many cultural features with the majority white British population, lending to more favourable chances

129 of gaining their support at the ballot box – a common language, a common religion, similar sounding names (though not in all cases), and so on. Furthermore, they may have benefitted early on from a largely dense geographical concentration (in areas of Liverpool and London), and quick integration into the Labour Party due to their mostly working class, city-dwelling origins.

In terms of representation at this third level down for ethnic minority immigrant origin communities, there is another standout group. Just as the white Irish group make up the majority of the high levels of representation for white immigrant origin groups (at least until 2010), MPs of Asian Indian origin dominate the figures in terms of ethnic minority immigrant origin representation. They consistently score above 50% in terms of their mirror status throughout the study period, and around 50% of all ethnic minority MPs at any point in the study period are identified by this research as being of Indian origin. This makes the Indian- origin community by far the best represented ethnic minority community in Britain. Also, the Black African community saw a huge step-up in terms of its representation in the 2010-2015 Parliament, going from two MPs in 2005-2010. Again, further research should investigate why these two groups are doing so well (comparatively) in terms of mobilising and gaining representation, but we can also speculate that perhaps the strong presence of middle-class and highly educated elite immigrants among these groups may well account for their greater success in achieving representation (Sobolewska 2014).

In contrast to those success stories, Britain’s Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and particularly Chinese communities have struggled greatly to achieve representation. Only one Asian Bangladeshi MP appears in the study period, and Asian Pakistani representation does not surpass 40% in terms of mirror status throughout. The Asian Chinese community has failed to see a single MP elected from their shared background across the entire study period, although one was elected in 2015, after the cut-off date for our data collection (Alan Mak for the Conservative Party). Furthermore, there is a strong contrast between the levels of representation of Black African and Black Caribbean communities. While the Black African group achieved around 75% mirror status representation by the last parliament, the former community finished with just two elected representatives (33% mirror status). These stark contrasts between minority groups are interesting. What does this say about the mobilization and engagement of each of these communities in British politics? Or has it got more to do with

130 their immigration history and class origin in their home countries as suggested by some (Sobolewska 2014) and argued above?

As well as assessing the barriers to representation (and which groups seem to be suffering from them the most), this research also investigated the demographic backgrounds of immigrant origin MPs, representation of immigrant and ethnic minority groups in regional legislative bodies, and the relationship between both immigrant and ethnic minority origin and constituency demographics. The research was able to show that there has been a clear pattern of overcompensation regarding the educational qualifications of ethnic minority and white immigrant origin MPs. However, we also found evidence of increasing ‘fast-tracking’ of ethnic minority MPs with a clear age and experience gap also developing – ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs were in particular likely to be much younger than others, and have less political experience. Finally, this chapter showed that women are actually better represented among MPs of immigrant origin. Again, this is especially the case among ethnic minority immigrant origin women, and if the current trend were to continue, ethnic minority MPs may reach gender parity before their white counterparts (both immigrant and non-immigrant origin). On regional bodies, though they ought to perhaps provide more (accessible) opportunities for representation of minority groups, this research did not actually find that immigrant origin communities (either white or ethnic minority) were substantially better represented in regional legislative bodies than in the House of Commons. Overall, they provided just a slightly better platform for ethnic minority group representation, but not by much. Finally, there was supporting evidence in the data for the suggestion that the ‘ghettoization’ of ethnic minority MPs is increasingly becoming a thing of the past.

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CHAPTER 6: VISIBLY RESTRICTED – PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANT ORIGIN COMMUNITIES ACROSS GREAT BRITAIN

Introduction

This chapter now comes to examine the central hypothesis of the thesis at the regional level in Great Britain, which as has been argued previously (most extensively in Chapter 4) serves as an excellent case study to examine the relationship between public opinion and the political representation of immigrant origin groups. The results from Chapter 3 indicated that, contrary to expectations, there was some limited evidence that both more public opinion and higher anti-immigrant mobilisation produced a countermobilisation effect and were actually associated with increased levels of descriptive representation for (minority) immigrant groups. Further, higher voting rights for non-citizens (non-naturalised immigrants) were also associated with greater levels of representation. Britain, with its context of high voting rights for immigrant origin groups (including many non-citizens), majoritarian constituency-based voting system, and long history of immigration is the perfect nation in which to further examine the relationship between public opinion toward immigration and the descriptive representation of immigrants in politics. Previous chapters of this thesis have shown how public opinion and political representation are two very important and highly developed areas of contemporary political science research, but are also seldom harmonised into a single theoretical or empirical framework. Levels of political representation of immigrant origin groups are as such hardly ever properly connected to public opinion towards immigration. The research presented throughout this thesis aims to bridge the gap, investigating the impact that changing public opinion toward immigration has on the parliamentary descriptive representation of immigrant groups in Great Britain using a political opportunity framework (Geddes 1998; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Gamson and Meyer 1996). Opportunity literature already considers a great deal of potential factors in determining levels of representation, but does not hitherto adequately consider how the interests of the majority group impacts on the representation of such minority groups (Fieldhouse and Sobolewska 2013; Geddes 2001; Fisher et al. 2014). With immigrant candidates needing to appeal to the wider British-native electorate in order to successfully gain election (Fieldhouse and Sobolewska 2013), and the

132 politics of (anti-)immigration taking centre stage in the British party political system (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011), it is apparent that our accounts of political opportunity for the representation of immigrant groups ought to be completed by the full inclusion of public opinion into the framework.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, a short summary of the theoretical and empirical arguments used to connect public opinion and political representation is presented. This is then followed by a discussion of Great Britain as a case study (summarising the extensive arguments presented in Chapter 4), the value and importance of testing the central hypothesis at the regional level, and estimations of regional public opinion toward immigration in Britain. I then test these measurements against changing levels of representation of immigrant groups in a regression analysis, modelling the relationship between public opinion and descriptive representation at the regional level in Britain. The results show that more negative public opinion toward immigration (in the candidate selection year) adversely impacts the descriptive representation of ethnic minority immigrant communities – a result in line with the central hypothesis, but contrary to the findings in Chapter 3. The descriptive representation of white immigrant origin groups is however not impacted. The causal mechanism for this suppression of representation is explored using candidate data, with a preliminary analysis suggesting that ethnic minority non-British origin candidates are increasingly fielded in ‘unwinnable’ seats in areas of high anti-immigrant public opinion.

Context and Theoretical Outline

Great Britain has always been a hotbed of immigration (Cinalli & Giugni 2013; Ford et al. 2015; Joppke 1996; Thränhardt 1995; Walvin 1984), and over the last decade or so immigration has accelerated to reach particularly high levels (Blinder 2012; Ford et al. 2015). Owing to this long tradition of immigration, today Britain has a wide range of different immigrant origin social groups living up and down the country. Some immigrant origin groups remain geographically concentrated, others are more widely dispersed, and some regions and areas across the country have a much larger immigrant population density than others (Clark & Drinkwater 2002; Dustmann et al. 2005; Phillips 1998). Increasingly, British politics has very much concerned itself with the descriptive representation of the country’s non-native and

133 racial minority groups (Sobolewska 2013), and this has been the subject of an increasing amount of academic and non-academic research.

The concept of descriptive representation is most famously articulated in Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) seminal work; descriptive representatives ought to ‘reflect’ or ‘mirror’ their constituents in a physical and experiential sense. The majority of academic work on the political representation of non-British origin groups has focused on the descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Geddes 2001; Stegmaier et al. 2013). Ethnic minority groups are (for the most part)69 communities with non- British origins and non-white (that being the majority ethnic group in Britain) appearance (Karlsen & Nazroo 2002; Nimmi 1991; Owen 1995; Phillips 1998). Work which has investigated their descriptive representation has concluded that: 1) ethnic minority groups have been and continue to be underrepresented (Fieldhouse and Sobolewska 2013; Sobolewska 2013; Durose et al. 2013; Audickas and Apostolova 2017), and 2) this underrepresentation is a direct result (or consequence) of some form(s) of discrimination (Fisher et al. 2014; Durose et al. 2011; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013; Celis et al. 2014). This thesis nests ethnic minority groups within a broader group of social groups with non-British origins – communities of immigrant origin, the other major category of which are white immigrant origin groups. They do not have an ethnic minority status (in that they are ethnically speaking part of the white- majority group in Great Britain) but are nonetheless immigrants (or descend directly from immigrants). Previous scholarship has tended to ignore the representation of such communities, focusing solely instead on ethnic minority representation. This research includes white immigrant origin groups as a vital comparative component between ethnic minority groups – with whom they immigrant origin status – and the white British majority – with whom they share a white ethnic status.

Though both ethnic minority and white immigrant origin communities are social outgroups – on the basis of a shared immigrant status – we have strong reasons to expect the political experiences of and representational barriers against ethnic minority and white

69 Some individuals with long family histories in Britain may consider themselves as ethnic minorities but may not identify with an immigrant group status.

134 immigrant origin groups to differ greatly. Ethnic minority immigrant communities will be open a much higher degree of discrimination on the grounds of having greater difference to the majority (white British) group (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2006; Lalonde et al. 1992). White immigrants from English speaking countries (such as the United States, Australia, Ireland and so on) in particular should be expected to face little discrimination on these grounds, and their immediate descendants should be able to blend in almost seamlessly with the white British majority group. Previous research has indeed suggested that the public deem some immigrant groups, notably those deemed closer to being white British, as ‘more acceptable’ (or ‘acceptably different’) than others (Durose et al. 2013; Ford 2008; Ford 2011; Storm et al. 2017). These groups can avoid many of the barriers associated with out-group status far easier than those deemed ‘less acceptable’. However, white immigrant origin groups are nonetheless still of immigrant origin, and though we expect them to experience much less discrimination than their ethnic minority counterparts, they may well still suffer from the typical barriers associated with immigrant origin status: lack of political networks and knowledge, (comparative) lack of resources, and potential language barriers (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Brady et al. 1995; Norris & Lovenduski 1995). Thus, it is highly advantageous to include and compare the representation of both ethnic minority and white immigrant origin groups, so as to get a better assessment as to the presence and strength of the unique barriers that immigrant (origin) and ethnic minority status respectively bring up.

Political Opportunity for Representation

The factors mentioned above allude to a much wider theoretical framework often used when discussing the representation of social groups. It is argued that the ability of social groups to effectively achieve representation in political systems is dictated by a complex combination of surrounding social, economic, political and institutional factors (or environments) – so named a ‘political opportunity structure’ (Kitschelt 1986; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). The structural approach is most commonly used to explain trends in the representation of minority and marginalised social groups (see for example Bird et al. 2010; Norris et al. 1992). However, an important literary contribution made to the field in the 1990s raised doubts about the appropriateness of using the political opportunity structures approach to analyse and predict trends in all social movements – of which political mobilisation of immigrant communities with the aim of achieving greater representation is one. A distinction was made between

135 political opportunity as a broader theoretical framework where opportunities can be both stable and volatile, and political opportunity in a structural sense, where variation in opportunity is much more stable (McAdam 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Geddes 1998; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Political opportunity, it is argued, can be widened or restricted in a two- dimensional space; change in the level (or even existence) of opportunity in areas which are mostly stable by nature (dominated by institutional factors) or in areas which are mostly volatile (where the majority of cultural, societal factors exist) (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 281; McAdam 1996; see also Geddes 1998). One of such factors on this proposed cultural axis is public opinion (or ‘mood’) (Geddes 1998).

Public opinion is vitally important to consider within the political opportunity for representation framework for a number of reasons. Firstly, and particularly to British politics with its majoritarian constituency based electoral system, immigrant origin candidates will need the support and votes of majority group members around them in order to win electoral contests and gain election (except in a few isolated circumstances) (Fieldhouse and Sobolewska 2013; Geddes 2001; Fisher et al. 2014). Second, aggregate level evidence suggests that there is some form of ‘ethnic penalty’ suffered by minority candidates standing in majority white areas, whereby votes are lost as majority group voters opt for non-minority (or indeed anti- immigrant) candidates instead (Ford and Goodwin 2010; Norris et al. 1992; Stegmaier, Lewis- Beck, and Smets 2013; Fisher et al. 2014). Recent evidence presented by Thrasher et al. (2015) also suggests that “non-British sounding” candidates also typically systematically suffer a voter penalty at local level contests in Britain. Further, political parties have been shown to be aware of and react to potential drawbacks of selecting minority candidates; for instance, parties have traditionally been hesitant to select ethnic minority candidates in hotly contested parliamentary seats, instead more often than not fielding them in either seats which are completely ‘safe’ (in that the party has a healthy majority to defend) or (more likely) seats where they have absolutely no chance of winning, in order to avoid potential ethnic penalty sanctions (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Sobolewska 2013).

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Public Opinion Towards Immigration in the British Context: Extensive Regional Divisions

Throughout a large literature on public attitudes toward immigration in Britain there is a consensus that, in recent years at least, opinion toward immigrants has generally been worsening, and immigration has fast become dominant in terms of public issue salience (Blinder 2012; Ford et al. 2015; Jennings 2009; Saran 2009). Ford et al. (2015, 1395) for example concluded that anti-immigrant public opinion dropped across the 1990s, but rose again through the 2000s to levels not seen since the 1980s. Jennings (2009) also found a deterioration in public opinion toward immigration into the 2000s, as well as highlighting a huge increase in the salience of immigration as a public issue. Harmonisation of public opinion data using the Stimson (1991) dyad-ratios algorithm presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis also very much concur with suggestions that the British public has become more hostile toward immigration than at any point in measured history. Yet, despite apparent increasing public hostility toward outgroups in this sense, the descriptive representation of minority groups has been increasing (Sobolewska 2013; Geddes 2001; Fieldhouse and Sobolewska 2013; Audickas and Apostolova 2017). This creates a puzzle, which placing public opinion in a political opportunity framework and a regional level approach can solve.

The majority of literature assessing trends in attitudes toward outgroups has focused almost exclusively on just two levels: the individual (see for example McLaren 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006; Riek et al. 2006) and the nation state (Bohman & Hjerm 2016; Schlueter & Scheepers 2010; Semyonov et al. 2006). The public opinion literature on the same subjects is also dominated by macro-level studies (see for example Ford et al. 2015). There is however growing evidence that public opinion and attitudes about outgroups varies a great deal at aggregated levels below the nation state, and that regional or municipal differences can tell us a great deal about the underlying mechanics which move and shape shifts and trends (Drinkwater et al. 2013; Hjerm 2009; Schlueter & Scheepers 2010; Schlueter & Wagner 2008). Indeed, the importance of accounting for between-region variations in public opinion now more apparent in Great Britain than anywhere else. Firstly, and most contemporarily, the huge differences between regions in voting patterns during the recent EU membership referendum (Electoral Commission 2016) continues to be a source of immense social and political

137 contention. Regional variations in support for anti-immigrant parties in the United Kingdom have also been consistently discovered and discussed at length (Cutts et al. 2011; Ford et al. 2012; Ford & Goodwin 2014), as well as voting behaviour at large (Johnston & Pattie 2011; Jones et al. 1992) and economic attitudes and assessments (Pattie & Johnston 1995). Lastly, and perhaps most relevantly, recent work by Drinkwater et al. (2013) and Ford and Heath (2014) has found significant difference between regions of the United Kingdom in public attitudes toward minority groups (refugees and immigration respectively). The evidence that Britain continues to be ‘a nation divided’ (Ford & Heath 2014) when it comes to regional variation in public opinion, attitudes, and voting is overwhelming.

There are further good reasons to inspect the regional, rather than macro, level in British politics. The United Kingdom uses a constituency based, first past the post electoral system which by its nature creates localised contests in which minority group representatives need a plurality of votes to win – thus there is the potential for both localised pro-immigrant and anti- immigrant mobilisation (Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Koopmans 2004; Le Lohe 2004; Norris 1997; Saggar & Geddes 2000). As such, it is important that research into how public opinion impacts the election of immigrant origin MPs reflect this localised nature as much as possible (rather than considering national aggregates). The regional level offers an arena which is lower than the national level – and thus able to create a more localised perspective where candidates are impacted by public opinion in their more immediate surroundings – but which is higher than the individual and municipal – and thus we can sensibly talk of some sense of public and of public opinion (which is ostentatiously aggregated).

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

This chapter examines the thesis’ main research question at the regional level in Great Britain, serving as a case study of further analysis given the results in Chapter 3. Does increasing anti-immigrant public opinion hold back the descriptive parliamentary representation of immigrant groups – both ethnic minority and white? Theoretically, the thesis expected that as publics became increasingly anti-immigrant, then political opportunity for immigrant origin representatives to gain election could be limited in two manners: a) political parties would be less likely to field ethnic minority candidates, and/or b) those candidates who were selected would find electorates to be more hostile toward them as immigrants, and thus less likely to vote for them. It also expected that increasingly negative public opinion toward

138 immigration might impact ethnic minority versus white immigrant groups rather differently. The rationale outlined above ought to apply more to ethnic minority immigrant groups, on the grounds of increased visibility increasing their opportunity to experience discrimination. Lastly, it was considered that the regional level was the most appropriate arena in which to examine this relationship. I hypothesised for this chapter that the following relationships would be observed at the regional level in Great Britain:

H1) Increasing anti-immigrant public opinion will relate negatively to the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups.

H2) This relationship will be more prevalent (stronger) for ethnic minority immigrant origin groups.

Data and Measurement

The key independent variable – anti-immigrant public opinion – is estimated using the Stimson (1991) dyadic-ratios calculator on a large dataset of survey data, breaking down the data presented in Chapters 3 and 4 into regional level measurements. Questions about immigration were collected from a variety of high quality surveys, including both cross- national (European Social Survey, European Value Study and the World Values Study) and national-level (British Election Study and British Social Attitudes study) surveys. An individual measurement of public opinion toward immigration from 1990-2015 was created for each large region of Great Britain (in accordance with the NUTS1 specifications)70. This was done by using the region variable in each of the above surveys to split and aggregate respondents to each question into 11 separate regional results which were then coded into

70 The boundaries used are NUTS1 level regions, as outlined by Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview. These regions are used as they are present as variables in all national and cross-national surveys included in this research. It is therefore possible to disaggregate and re- aggregate respondents according to their geographical region. In 1997, there were some slight changes to these boundaries meaning that elements of the ‘North’ region (used up until that point) moved into the ‘North West’ region, and the ‘North East’ region was established. Similarly, there were some slight changes as the ‘East’ region became ‘East of England’. However, these alterations would concern just a few individuals per survey and thus are not expected to impact results.

139 region-specific databases. Regional level time series were created which were then passed into the dyadic ratios calculator, the results of which are displayed in Figure 6.1 below71.

Figure 6.1. Public opinion toward immigration at the regional level in Great Britain

Descriptive and diagnostic information on these regional measurements is included in the Appendix to follow. Items altered somewhat from national level measurement shown in Chapter 4, as outlined in footnote above.

What we can see from Figure 6.1 is a diverse range of trends, with regions showing a good deal of variation between them. The differences very much justify the regional approach to measuring public opinion toward immigration. Immediately, London, the West Midlands, Scotland and the regions across the South stand out as comparatively very low in terms of anti- immigrant public opinion. This supports earlier regional analyses citing London in particular as a region with high tolerance and acceptance for minority groups (Drinkwater et al. 2013; Ford & Heath 2014). This compares to regions in the North – and in particular the North West – where anti-immigrant public opinion begins and finishes high. Wales and the East of England

71 Descriptive and diagnostic information on these measurements can be found in the Appendix.

140 move steadily from an average to a high level of anti-immigrant public opinion. The East midlands declines overall, while the Yorkshire and Humber region moves up slightly. In short, public opinion toward immigration varies significantly at the regional level in Great Britain, with some regions remaining much less anti-immigrant than others – and thus according to the first two hypotheses should be much more open to increasing descriptive representation of immigrant groups.

The dependent variable is the proportion of elected representatives from each of Great Britain’s 11 large regions who were from immigrant origin backgrounds. This is again a simple regional breakdown of the figures presented earlier in the thesis – this time in Chapter 5. Explained briefly: information about the birth place of MPs and of their parents was collected through a variety of sources including web pages, social media, interviews, and parliamentary speeches. This covers both first- and second-generation immigrants. The number of British MPs from 1992 to 2015 identified as of immigrant origin (having at least one parent who was not a citizen of their now-host nation at birth, or not being a citizen of their now host-nation at birth themselves) in each region was then divided by the total number of seats per region at each election, to give a percentage of the seats in each area occupied by citizens of immigrant origin. Immigrant origin MPs are then also classified by visibility (ethnic minority or white), and proportions worked out in the same manner.

The following spatial mapping in Figure 6.2 displays proportions of MPs coming from immigrant backgrounds in each region of Great Britain. Denser colours in each region indicate a higher density of immigrant origin representatives (as a proportion of all representatives elected). At this level, there are clear divisions between regions with a (comparatively) high proportion of parliamentarians identified as of immigrant origin in each parliament, and those with low proportions. London, Wales, and the South East all stay relatively high in this regard from 1992 through until 2015. The West Midlands sees the most rapid growth in terms of immigrant origin MP density, moving from among the lowest at the start of the study period to the second highest (behind London) by the end. The North East, Yorkshire and the Humber, and East Anglia (East of England) see a steadier growth, while both Scotland and the South West remain largely stable (on the low end of the spectrum). Meanwhile, the East Midlands and North Western regions dip slightly in the middle of the study period, but largely recover by the end. As each map fills in with ever darker colours the one before, we can see the gradual

141 increase in the presence of immigrant origin MPs in British parliament noted in the above chapters reflected here.

While Figure 6.2 shows a general inflation of non-native parliamentarians for most regions from the beginning to the end of the study period, the picture is quite different once we move down a level to compare between white and non-white immigrant origin MP presences. Figure 6.3 presents the same information but filtered for only white immigrant origin MPs. Firstly, with just white immigrant origin MPs under the lens we can see the South West, North West, and East Midlands regions falling back in terms of representation from the beginning to the end of the study period – though more so the former than the latter two. The South Eastern, Scottish, London, and Welsh regions are very stable, with the latter two a strong dark grey on every map, indicating high levels of white immigrant origin MP densities at each parliament. The North East, West Midlands, and Yorkshire and the Humber regions however grow strongly in an almost perfectly linear fashion from one parliament to the next.

The trends regarding ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs, displayed in Figure 6.4, are however most diverse and striking. Firstly, we can see that there has not been a single ethnic minority immigrant origin MP elected in Wales during the entire study period. Further, the South West region begins and ends with zero representatives from minority ethnic non-native origins. There is a limited amount of representation provided in Scotland, the North East, Yorkshire and the Humber, and the East Midlands, with non-white immigrant origin candidates clearly struggling to break through there. London, as in both cases previously, begins and remains among the highest in terms of representation for ethnic minority groups. The West Midlands – encompassing the country’s second city and major hub for non-white groups in Birmingham – sees a sustained rise in descriptive representation for ethnic minority groups from 1992 through until 2010. Most interestingly, the South East region remains among the lowest for such representation for most of the study period, but then rises dramatically between 2005 and 2015 to among the highest.

142

Figure 6.2 Immigrant origin MP densities across Britain’s regions

1992-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005

2005-2010 2010-2015

143

Figure 6.3. White immigrant origin MP density across Britain’s regions

1992-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005

2005-2010 2010-2015

144

Figure 6.4. Ethnic minority immigrant origin MP density across Britain’s regions

1992-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005

2005-2010 2010-2015

145

The Appendix to this chapter contains descriptive information on the distribution of the dependent variables and their residuals. From these plots, it was once again (as in Chapter 3) noted how a) the distributions were heaped on off-centred means and bounded between 0 and 1 (the zero boundary being the most important element), and b) the residuals were not normally distributed. Though the regional data are hierarchical in structure, 11 groups are not enough for accurate multilevel modelling (especially when combined with a low number of observations per group, which in the case of this research was just five) (Gelman & Hill 2006; Hox 2002; Stegmueller 2013). Therefore, generalised linear regression models of the binomial family with a probit link function were specified, with standard errors clustered around each individual region to investigate the hypotheses. As in chapter 3, the public opinion variables do trend over time with other variables (this time with many variables) and so it was necessary to account for this trend with a year variable (though in time series analysis this is usually done through including lags of the dependent variable, the non-linear incremental structure of the data here means this is not a time series analysis). Finally, rather than the yearly value of public opinion, the key independent variable is public opinion with a one-year lag. A one-year lag of public opinion compensates for two practical issues with the data: a) much of the surveying for the public opinion data in each year is done after election times, often in summer and autumn as opposed to spring when British elections are traditionally held, and b) candidates are often selected (or at the very least the candidate selection process begins) well in advance of the electoral contest, meaning that including only the yearly variable would miss any potential link to the candidate selection process (handled more often than not the year before the election).

Further variables were collected, and their relationships estimated in the regression. Three additional control variables were included which estimated the effects on levels of representation from immigrant mobilisation abilities and anti-immigrant mobilisation. Firstly, the size the immigrant origin population within each region72 was included, as previous

72 The percentage of each regional population born outside of the UK is taken from two sources: the UK CENSUS (1991, 2001 and 2011) and the Office for National Statistics International Migration Database (2004-2014). Multinomial imputation was used to complete the gaps, using the ‘predict’ function in R’s stats package. Model fits for the imputation ranged from 95% to 99%. Using imputation to cover gaps in independent variables and expand the range of analysis is common and accepted practise in social science (Donders et al. 2006; King et al. 2001; Royston 2004; Schafer & Olsen 1998). This created a longitudinal variable which measured the percentage of people in each region born outside of the UK over the study period. This variable was standardised around its mean in order to aid with the interpretation of coefficients.

146 research has demonstrated how minority MPs tend to represent seats with high densities of minority group members (Geddes 2001; Sobolewska 2013). Secondly, anti-immigrant party institutionalisation was again accounted for, this time in terms of the number of seats won in each region by anti-immigrant political parties at the European Parliamentary Election previous to the General Election year. Success and visibility for anti-immigrant parties at European Elections is much more preferable as a measure of their latent, wider support and presence among electorates (Ford et al. 2012; Ford & Goodwin 2014; Hobolt & Spoon 2012). Lastly, the model also controlled for the presence of regional parliaments, which offer an additional opportunity for representation and thus greater opportunities for immigrant origin mobilisation.

Results: Modelling the Relationship

Table 6.1 below shows the regression results and is broken into three models: the first covers all immigrant origin MPs as one, before models two and three break the figures down into white and ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs respectively. Model 1 (all immigrant origin MPs) reported no statically significant relationship between anti-immigrant public opinion and representation. It did however report a statistically significant positive relationship between higher immigrant populations and higher numbers of immigrant origin MPs at the regional level. There is also a significant relationship between anti-immigrant party presence and immigrant origin representation. The results from this first model thus suggested that while anti-immigrant public opinion has no measureable detrimental impact on representation, higher out-group population and higher anti-immigrant mobilisation related positively to higher immigrant group representation. Model 2 (white immigrant origin MPs) yielded no results of note to the research questions. There was no significant relationship observed between any of the independent variables and the percentage of MPs elected at the regional level from white immigrant origin backgrounds. Once again, the results here suggested that anti-immigrant public opinion had no impact the descriptive representation. However, there are significant positive relationships regarding regional parliaments and anti-immigrant party presence. This suggests that white immigrant origin groups fare better when presented with increased mobilisation opportunities through regional politics, and also push back against anti-immigrant parties at the regional level.

147

Finally, Model 3 (Ethnic Minority MPs) confirmed expectations that the structures surrounding the representation of ethnic minority immigrant origin groups are different to those which impact white immigrant origin groups. This model reported that there is in fact a significant, negative relationship between rising anti-immigrant public opinion and the presence of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs at the regional level. Thus, the data suggests that public opinion toward immigration on a one-year lag is significantly negatively correlated with the descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups. Further, in this model the positive association between higher immigrant populations and representation is again statistically significant. Regarding the hypotheses, H1 and H2 are technically rejected as the only significant relationship observed is between public opinion and representation for ethnic minority immigrant origin groups. However, there is evidence suggesting that anti-immigrant public opinion does indeed constrain political opportunity for ethnic minority immigrant group representation, and these results held up in a Bootstrap robustness check at the 10% level, the details of which can be found in the Appendix to this Chapter.

Table 6.1. Generalised linear model regression results

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 All IO MPs White IO MPs Minority IO MPs Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.

Anti-Immigrant Public Op. -1.19 0.77 -0.59 1.07 -2.02* 1.00

Year 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02

Foreigner Presence 0.09* 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.22** 0.07

Anti-Imm. Party Presence 0.02** 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.01

Regional Parliament 0.20 0.13 0.30^ 0.18 -0.33 0.22

(Intercept) 6.75 15.76 6.75 15.76 -49.92 32.48

Binomial family, identity link. Standard Error adjusted for clusters in 11 regions, 55 observations, 49 residual degrees freedom. Significance placeholders: ^ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p = 0.000. Public opinion variable lagged by 1 year.

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Causal Mechanism – Structure of Ethnic Minority Candidacy

Given that the results did suggest a negative relationship between anti-immigrant public opinion and the representation of ethnic minority immigrant origin groups, further investigation into the causal mechanism behind this relationship was conducted using candidate data. Candidate selection is a pivotal function of parties in the political system (Gallagher & Marsh 1988; Katz & Mair 1995; Norris & Lovenduski 1995), but the networking and race to selection and then election is often referred to as the ‘secret garden’ of politics (Durose et al. 2011, 2013; Gallagher & Marsh 1988; Norris & Lovenduski 1993, 1995). Selection, as a fundamental part in the process of election, is thus tempered by the same kind of barriers and restrictions to political opportunity as winning the vote. Durose et al. (2013 p. 264) found that ‘traditional selection’ pathways were highly restrictive for minority candidates, due to the “dominance of cliques, closed networks, and informal patronage which characterises local politics.” In their study of political recruitment, Norris and Lovenduski (1995 p. 247) investigated “how and why the recruitment process [of British parliamentary candidates] produces a legislative elite which fails to reflect the diversity of British society”, and concluded that there was a gap between the level of resources, security, and networks needed to achieve selection and the amount of such factors available to the average female, ethnic minority, and working-class members. The following analysis thus looked at the extent to which ethnic minority candidates were being shut out in areas with higher anti-immigrant public opinion, using the Pippa Norris candidate data73. Four elections across two regions were investigated as a sample; the North West as a region with high anti-immigrant public opinion and a low percentage of ethnic minority MPs by 2015, and the South East as a region with low anti-immigrant public opinion and a high percentage of ethnic minority MPs by 2015. Both regions had a similar percentage of non- white residents according to the 2001 and 2011 censuses (around 5% and 10% respectively) and had a similar number of constituencies between 1997 and 2010 (between 75 and 85). Since the effect was only noted for ethnic minority representation, it was not necessary to add a measurement of white immigrant origin candidates into the data. The ethnic minority variable included in the database was leveraged to create a measurement of the proportion of candidates

73 This research used the following constituency databases: 2010 version 5.0, and 1992-2005 version 1.3. This data is freely available from Pippa Norris’ website: https://sites.google.com/site/pippanorris3/research/data

149 in the North West and South East regions that were non-white at each election, with the individual figures broken down by party. These are reported in Tables 3 and 4 below.

Table 6.2. Ethnic minority candidates in the South East of England

Election Lab EM Con EM Total EM % Const. EMs Cands in Year Cands Cands Cands EM Cands Unwinnable Seats

1997 1 1 2 2% 1

2001 2 0 2 2% 0

2005 11 2 13 10% 9

2010 8 6 14 13% 4

Source: Pippa Norris Constituency Database, EM Cands = Ethnic Minority Candidates

The last column of each table shows the number of ethnic minority candidates placed in ‘unwinnable’ seats - in this case, very safe seats held by opposition parties which would require a swing of 10% or more to take (i.e. the current incumbent party is 20% or more ahead). Table 6.2 above shows patterns of minority candidacy in the South East. Here we can see a sharp rise in the number and percentage of ethnic minority candidates between 2001 and 2005, which is increased again to 2010. This coincides with both a near doubling of the non-white population, and also with a comparatively low estimation of anti-immigrant public opinion. The 2005 rise is driven by the Labour Party increasing their number of ethnic minority candidates substantially from 2001, while the rise to 2010 is driven by the Conservatives increasing their number threefold. In 2015, a full 14 ethnic minority candidates are identified across the major parties, across around 15% of all constituencies in the region. The picture in the North West, displayed in Table 3, looks remarkably similar, with the number of ethnic minority candidates and the percentage of constituencies with an ethnic minority candidate fielded rising each election, to a peak of 13 and 17% respectively in 2010. These rises are however driven almost exclusively by the Conservative Party, who go from fielding none in 1997 to 10 in 2010. The Labour Party, despite controlling the vast majority of the seats in the North West at each election, only field a total of five ethnic minority candidates over the 18 years.

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Table 6.3. Ethnic minority candidates in the North West of England

Election Lab EM Con EM Total EM % Const. EM Cands in Year Cands Cands Cands EM Cands Unwinnable Seats

1997 0 0 0 0% -

2001 1 3 4 5% 3

2005 1 9 10 13% 9

2010 3 10 13 17% 9

Source: Pippa Norris Constituency Database, EM Cands = Ethnic Minority Candidates

The crucial difference is in the number of ethnic minority candidates fielded in what we would consider ‘unwinnable’ seats. In 2010, only four of the 14 ethnic minority candidates fielded in seats across the South East were placed in seats which we would consider not to be winnable. In the North West, by comparison, nine of the 13 ethnic minority candidates fielded there were fighting in unwinnable contests. A difference is also clear in 2005, with nine from 13 in the South East contesting opposition safe seats, while nine from 10 were doing so in the North West. Then, between 1997 and 2005, only one ethnic minority candidate from three is not fielded in an unwinnable seat in the North West, contrasting to three from four in the South East. The division between these two regions is at least quite clear; though both regions see an increase in the number of ethnic minority candidates selected, and in the percentage of constituencies with ethnic minority candidates contesting, in the more anti-immigrant North West these candidates are continually fielded in the unwinnable seats while in the less anti- immigrant South East increasingly more ethnic minority candidates are fielded in winnable contests. This preliminary investigation suggests that in areas with higher anti-immigrant public opinion, it appears ethnic minority candidates are kept away from winnable contests, and so we see them struggling to break through in these regions. This interpretation ties closely into the strategic element of increasing descriptive representation, articulated best by Sobolewska (2013), which suggests that increasing ethnic minority representation in British politics has been both an electoral strategy, but has also been conducted in a strategic manner.

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Conclusion

This chapter constituted the second major test of the thesis’ central hypothesis; that increasingly hostile public opinion toward immigration would result in restrictions in opportunity for the political representation of immigration origin communities. The results from this case study analysis of Great Britain do suggest that this is indeed the case. Though H1 and H2 were technically rejected (as there was no significant relationship observed for white immigrant groups), the analysis showed that public opinion does have a significant impact on the representation of ethnic minority immigrant origin groups, juxtaposed to no impact on white immigrant origin groups. The preliminary analysis of the candidate data showed that in fact parties were fielding ethnic minority candidates in areas of high anti- immigrant public opinion (in that selection year), but were doing so mostly in seats where the party stood no chance of winning. This contrasted to areas of low anti-immigrant public opinion, where the increasing numbers of ethnic minority candidates were often competing in winnable and party held seats (including safe seats). The results here very much supported the ‘strategic’ interpretation of increasing party and parliamentary diversity. This analysis was however only done on two regions, and future research should look to expand this to all 11 (and improve on the methods offered here). The results from this research demonstrate how public opinion on immigration is indeed a vital component of political opportunity surrounding the descriptive representation of immigrant communities, but only for minority ethnic groups. Further, the divergent trends between ethnic minority and white immigrant groups demonstrate how political opportunity is very different depending on the visibility of that immigrant group status. Results here therefore lend strong support to the ‘acceptable difference’ (Durose et al. 2013) hypothesis; when public opinion toward immigrants get worse, it seems as if white immigrants do not suffer in the same way that non-white immigrants do at the hands of party selectors and electors

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Appendix to Chapter 6

Anti-Immigrant Public Opinion Measures – Diagnostic Information

What follows is diagnostic and descriptive information from the MCalc dyadic ratios calculation which produced each of the 11 anti-immigrant public opinion measures included in this research. For each measure, there were 100 individual marginals, creating 16 time-series across 26 years. Table A.1 below reports the mean values, standard deviation, and percentage variance (Eigenvalue) estimate for each measure.

Table A6.1. Descriptive and diagnostic information on public opinion measures

Region Mean Standard Dev. % Var. Explained

East Midlands 68.3 7.2 45.4

East of England 64.0 7.7 38.7

London 58.4 6.6 46.9

North East 67.8 7.4 44.0

North West 77.5 5.5 31.7

Scotland 59.2 5.3 64.6

South East 58.3 6.5 44.0

South West 62.3 6.2 32.6

Wales 70.6 6.7 47.9

West Midlands 64.0 6.1 51.7

Yorkshire and the Humber 68.3 5.5 64.4

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Figure A6.1. Residuals plots

IO = Immigrant origin. Estimations on linear model between descriptive representation and public opinion.

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Figure A6.2. Dependent variable distribution plots

IO = Immigrant origin.

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Robustness Check – Bootstrap Estimation

A bootstrap estimation on the ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs regression was ran as a robustness check, owing to the small number of observations. The bootstrap results below in Table A6.3 show that the anti-immigrant public opinion finding is robust to the 10% level according to the bootstrapped standard errors.

Table A6.2. Bootstrapped generalised linear model regression results (Ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs)

Coeff. Bootstrap St. Err.

Anti-Immigrant Public Opinion. -2.02^ 1.19

Parliament 0.02^ 0.01

Foreigner Presence 0.22*** 0.04

Anti-Immigrant Party Presence 0.01 0.01

Regional Parliament -0.33** 0.11

55 observations, 48 residual degrees freedom. Bootstrap run with 2000 replications. Significance levels: Significance placeholders: ^ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p = 0.000.

Public opinion variable lagged by 1 year.

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CHAPTER 7: THE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF BRITAIN’S IMMIGRANT ORIGIN COMMUNITIES

Introduction

The final empirical chapter of this thesis investigates the ‘effective’ descriptive representation of Britain’s immigrant origin communities, and the extent to which rising aggregate public hostility toward immigration has impacted it. Research has already established that ethnic minority groups have been and continue to be underrepresented in British politics in terms of their numerical presence (Audickas & Apostolova 2017; Sobolewska 2013), and indeed there has been a great deal of academic work regarding levels of descriptive representation in this ‘counting’ sense (and comparison to population compositions) in British politics (see for just some examples Banducci et al. 2004; Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2010; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Fisher et al. 2014; Rocha et al. 2010; Sobolewska 2013). This PhD has added further longitudinal evidence to patterns of representation, and has also provided a ‘counting’ analysis of the descriptive representation of white immigrant origin groups, concluding that they are not underrepresented in British politics unlike their minority ethnic (non-white) counterparts. This chapter moves beyond measuring descriptive representation only in terms of the extent to which non-white British MPs are present in the House of Commons. It examines the extent to which they are fully integrated into the British political system in terms of being given access to roles of influence and responsibility such as membership of Select Committees, jobs as (Shadow) Ministers and spokespeople, and most importantly (Shadow) Cabinet membership. This measure of ‘effective’ descriptive representation is able to answer some of the very valid outstanding criticisms of descriptive representation metrics in the wider representation literature.

Many studies of representation look at how many representatives there are from minority and marginalised social groups, but scholars taking the ‘substantive’ approach to representation – measuring the actions and interventions of MPs in parliament and the extent

157 to which they are in favour of or in the interests of otherwise politically marginalised groups – contest that ‘counting’ representatives like this is a good measurement of the inclusiveness of political systems (see for examples and discussions Childs 2006; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld & Bischof 2013). Later in this Chapter I contest some of the claims made by substantive theorists in this regard, but here I acknowledge and provide some solutions to their criticisms. So, rather than ‘simply counting the number of representatives’, this thesis does expand on the conception and measurements of descriptive representation to assess the extent to which immigrant origin MPs have been properly and fully included into the British political system. It does so by analysing their career paths and trajectories in the context of rising anti-immigrant public hostility across the last three decades, comparing them to the average career movements and speeds of white British MPs over the same period. It thus analyses the extent to which immigrant origin MPs are not only present in parliament, but active members of it. We have seen in previous chapters how numbers of immigrant origin parliamentarians rising with each election has not been impacted by rising anti-immigrant public opinion, but now we examine whether or not they have been shut out of jobs and positions within parliament as public opinion to immigration has grown (as seen in Chapter 4). Have political opportunities for effective descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups been restricted by an increasingly anti- immigrant general public? Have ethnic minority or white immigrant origin groups suffered differently in this regard (if at all)? How does effective descriptive representation vary between political parties, as well as over time in Great Britain – in other words, who provides the best representation of immigrant origin communities in terms of granting them access to positions of influence and responsibility with the parliamentary and party hierarchies? Lastly, do visibly immigrant origin (in terms of their name or appearance) white MPs fare better or worse than white immigrant origin MPs who ‘blend in’ with their white British colleagues more easily?

This chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, a review is made of the criticisms in parts of the representation literature regarding using descriptive representation as an indicator of the inclusiveness and openness of democratic systems to the interests and concerns of minority and marginalised social groups. Secondly, I then present a theoretical distinction between two types of descriptive representation which can help to address these criticisms: ‘nominal’ – the numerical presence of representatives in parliament – and ‘effective’ – the representation of minorities in formal positions of influence and responsibility within parliament system (Anwar 1986). I argue that this distinction can be leveraged empirically to address some of the criticisms outlined by substantive theorists, and improve how measurements of descriptive

158 representation inform us about the quality and representativeness of democracy. Thirdly, the research then returns to the database of British MPs and assesses the extent to which immigrant origin MPs are given roles of influence and responsibility within parliament once present, and analyses the career trajectories of immigrant origin MPs compared to their white British counterparts.

Literature Review

The concept of descriptive representation (see Banducci et al. 2004; Bird et al. 2010; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Sobolewska 2013) is outlined and discussed in much greater length across the previous chapters of this thesis. Levels of descriptive representation are measured, in their most basic sense, by comparing the proportion of MPs from various minority and marginalised social backgrounds – for instance ethnic minorities, working classes, women, and so on – to the proportion that said social groups or communities occupy in the overall population. If the presence of MPs from a given social group is equal to their presence in the overall population, then the body of MPs would be representative in this descriptive sense. So, in the case of women – as a traditionally politically marginalised group (Caul 1999; Childs 2006; Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Kunovich & Paxton 2005; Rosenthal 1995; Ruedin 2013; Russell et al. 2002; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 2005; Welch & Studlar 1990) – this would mean that a chamber which was 50% female would be considered representative of women in society. For ethnic minorities, one would have to appeal to sources such as national censuses in order to find the bar against which representation would be achieved – for Britain, the latest census in 2011 would suggest that about 12-15% of British MPs should be from ethnic minority backgrounds in order for the House of Commons to be descriptively representative of the country’s non-white communities.

However, in representational literature a number of important scholars raise criticisms of the descriptive approach to measuring the representativeness and inclusiveness of democratic political systems. How can we assume that a 50% female chamber would accurately and properly represent the views and interests of women? Indeed Sarah Childs (2006), writing in terms of women’s representation, argued that simply counting the number of women MPs present in politics is inadequate. It will not, she argues, give an accurate assessment of the impact on women’s representation and women’s interests that a body of MPs would have. Childs argues that this a necessary and fundamental connection between sex and feminist

159 identity – in other words, that each and every female MP heading into the chamber is a feminist, with the intention of actively standing up for gender equality and defending women’s interests and concerns (and equally that every male MP is not a feminist, or not willing or able to support feminist legislation and causes in parliament). This, she quite rightly argues, is rather implausible. Also implausible is the idea of a common experience between women which will create singular, crystallised interests that female representatives can connect to and defend. Instead “women’s differences are likely to mean that women’s experiences in a gendered society will be multiple – differentiated in terms of class, ethnicity, and sexuality at the very least” (Childs 2006 p. 10). So, the assumption that a body of women MPs, regardless of their class, ethnic, sexual and indeed political backgrounds, will necessarily share experiences of life and of society and seek to make common progressive change to reduce gender inequality seems far-fetched. They will each have their own agendas and their own goals, and through their own experiences determine that they ought to pay more or less attention to challenges and inequalities faced by women in society. Through analysis of support for feminist motions in the British House of Commons, Childs (2006 p. 16) finds that there is no clear gender association to be made, and suggests that “In [sic] addition to rejecting the oft-made elision between sex and gender, the elision between women’s bodies and feminist minds should also be rejected”. With this in mind, it seems highly dubious to assert that a higher ‘count’ of women MPs will necessarily lead to a more feminist parliament, and therefore that more women in parliament leads to a parliament which better represents women.

We can employ the exact same logic to studying the representation of ethnic (or racial, as it is sometimes dubbed) minority groups. This is precisely the angle which Saalfeld (2011) and Saalfeld and Bischof (2013) take when investigating the representation of ethnic minority group interests in the House of Commons. Saalfeld and Bischof (2013) argue that the parliamentary behaviour of minority MPs is too often neglected in representation studies, which they find surprising given the implicit assumption of the larger body of work on descriptive representation – that higher levels of descriptive representation will lead to higher levels of substantive representation. Considering the above arguments made by Childs, why indeed should we assume that an ethnic minority MP will necessarily be a champion of minority rights? We do not expect black Conservative Party MPs to speak at Black Lives Matter rallies, so why should we automatically assume that they will engage in raising the interests and concerns of black communities in parliament? As is outlined in Chapter 3, some black British MPs play down or do not politically motivate their minority statuses. As such, it

160 is right that we ought to be critical of the assumption of a necessary connection between increasing descriptive representation and increasing representation of substantive concerns and interests in parliament, and that we avoid using “only one standard by which a legislature can be judged representative” (Norris & Lovenduski 1993 p. 374).

There are two counterarguments which can be made in defence of the study of descriptive representation74. Firstly, though the criticisms are valid and the need to engage with substantive representation is clear, it appears true at least in the case of ethnic minority MPs that the necessary connection does exist – maybe not at the individual level but certainly in the aggregate. In their study, using parliamentary questions as an instrument for representation, Saalfeld and Bischof (2013) examine the extent to which ethnic minority MPs intervene in Commons discussions and debates ‘in favour of’ or ‘representing’ their descriptive communities. In both cases, the study finds that ethnic minority MPs are more likely to ask questions relating to ethnic diversity and equality issues. This, the establishment of confirmation for such a connection, was their aim. Secondly, the substantive representation of interests within parliament is not the only supposed or assumed benefit of increasing descriptive representation. As important is the impact that descriptive representation of minority and marginalised social groups has on generating and galvanizing senses of democratic legitimacy, attachment, and increasing political participation among members of their groups. A number of scholars have argued that a higher presence of minority group members in elected bodies relate to much stronger feeling of attachment to the democratic system on the part of minority groups (Anwar 1986, 2001; Banducci et al. 2004; Mansbridge 1999; Norris & Franklin 1997; Statham 1999). Yes, a House of Commons with ‘more women MPs’ might not necessarily be a more feminist one, but it might just inspire more feminists to get into politics and into parliament, and increase the sense of attachment and belonging to the (traditionally male dominated) political system amongst women in Britain. The exact same can

74 That is not to say that the above authors fundamentally reject or dismiss descriptive representation as unimportant, or would disagree with concerns and efforts to raise the presences of minority and marginalised social groups in parliaments. Rather, the following is a suggestion of how to answer criticisms regarding the meaning and value of the ‘counting representatives’ approach. I argue that it alone can still be an important tool in assessing the representativeness, openness, and inclusivity of elected bodies without a need to constantly assess substantive interventions or question the impact of minority/women’s representatives who do not associate with or politically activate their identities.

161 be said of increasing numbers of ethnic minority groups and the impact that this can have in wider society.

That said, it is clear that we should constantly be looking beyond assessing the mere presence of representatives from minority and marginalised groups, particularly if we are to gauge the extent to which their group interests are indeed being accounted for and included in policy and legislative debates. While it is not in the intention or scope of this thesis to investigate substantive representation, there are improvements we can make to the study of descriptive representation in order so that our measurements mean something more than ‘counting representatives’75. We can appeal to an important and early distinction between two types of descriptive representation which, if leveraged empirically, can help us avoid some of the pitfalls highlighted by the substantive scholars above, and give us a better sense of the inclusion of minority groups and their interests into the political system whilst still using only a ‘counting’ methodology. Previous literature has argued that minority representatives need to not just be present, but also that it is essential for non-white British MPs to be fully integrated into the system by being afforded important and visible (to the public) roles within parliament (Anwar 1986; Banducci et al. 2004; Nixon 1998). This it is argued will help efforts to avoid political alienation and disenfranchisement – which adds to the quality and legitimacy of democratic systems and provides a sustained flow of minority candidates for future selection and election. Articulating this, Anwar (1986 p. 97) wrote that minority groups should sit in parliament “not as nominal, but as effective members who participate actively in the decision- making process”. Here, Anwar presents a distinction between two types of descriptive representation – nominal (covering the selection and election of minority representatives) and effective (the affording of roles of influence and responsibility to MPs once in parliament). A full inclusion of minority group MPs constitutes not only fair representation of minority MPs within the overall body of representatives, but also within the body of MPs given positions

75 This is also not to argue that studying substantive representation is at all unimportant or not of value. It is vital to know the extent to which elected representatives serve their communities, and to assess the extent to which minority and marginalised groups’ interests are included in debates. The inability (or rather the assumption of a necessary connection) on the part of descriptive representation to be able to consider this is indeed a flaw in the design. The proposal here is to adapt – or rather widen – measurements of descriptive representation so as they too can provide some substantive meaning beyond counting on fingers, and tell us something important about representation within elected bodies themselves (as opposed to the well documented effects it has on voters and communities in the wider population, as above).

162 such as committee memberships, Ministerial posts, and Cabinet positions. So, minority MPs must not just simply be present, and able to vote and speak on legislation, but able to make active and meaningful contributions to policy formation and executive decision making. They must also be represented in the parliamentary scrutiny bodies, and play a visible role in agenda setting and leading public discourse on the policy issues of the day. In this sense, effective descriptive representation is much closer to measuring some of the advantages of substantive representation. This bar is a higher quality of political representation than most contemporary studies of descriptive representation demand, but it is not entirely new. The suggestion that we should consider the quality, and not just presence, of representation has been made elsewhere in literature (Banducci et al. 2004; Bird et al. 2010; Mansbridge 2003), but the bulk of contemporary research and discussion about the representation of outgroups in parliamentary democracies, while acknowledging the above issues, do not often do much about it.

This is problematic, and leaves studies of descriptive representation firmly open to criticism even beyond that mentioned and discussed above. Measuring descriptive representation only up until this point (gaining election) suggests that once a party or a democratic system has successfully placed minority group MPs into parliament, that their job in terms of improving the quality of descriptive representation in politics is done. This however cannot be the case. A British political system which selects and seats minority MPs but then does not give them any meaningful, substantive roles within the hierarchy of parliament is not breaking down barriers to representation, but merely moving them within the walls of the House of Commons. Further, if we are to appeal to the above noted advantages of having elected bodies ‘mirror’ or ‘reflect’ their population in terms of it furthering engagement and a sense of legitimacy among minority and marginalised social groups, then surely representatives from these groups need to be playing active, public roles within the system and not shout out and confined only to voting and questioning (Anwar 1986; Banducci et al. 2004; Nixon 1998)? They must be out on television defending or attacking government policy from positions of authority. They must be able to provide scrutiny and lead on debates regarding ethnic and racial equality from influential capacities. They must have equal access to positions of responsibility and public exposure as their white colleagues. Thus, it is imperative that scholars of descriptive representation also consider the diversity of those in positions of power, influence and responsibility within parliament, as well as those who are simply allowed to walk through the Chamber doors. This will also allow us to address some of the concerns raised regarding the quality of representation that descriptive scholars are able to measure and discuss. To date,

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‘effective’ descriptive representation has however largely been overlooked in an empirical sense, mostly owing to a lack of longitudinal data able to harmonise the career paths and immigrant origin backgrounds of British MPs. This research steps into that gap.

This PhD thesis inspects not only the descriptive political representation of ethnic minority groups, but also white immigrant origin groups. The rationale behind this is discussed and explained in detail in earlier chapters, but a brief summary is provided here. Though white non-British-origin groups may not experience discrimination from the white British majority group on racial grounds (as ethnic minority non-native groups do), they are nonetheless of immigrant origin. In this way, they share common ground with ethnic minority groups (and thus difference with white British groups) who are also themselves from foreign-origin backgrounds, and so will be open to discrimination on these grounds. We thus ought to consider that the above barriers to representation will exist for non-ethnic minority immigrant origin groups just as they do ethnic minority groups (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013), though perhaps to different degrees as a result of ‘acceptable difference’ (Durose et al. 2013). We should therefore adapt our theoretical and empirical considerations appropriately when investigating representation and barriers to it. Later, this Chapter also leverages a visibility distinction between white immigrant origin MPs to investigate visible non-native status among white immigrants as a potential barrier to representation. If it is indeed the visibly of ethnic minority groups’ non-native status which has been holding their representation back (as previous chapters has argued) then we can expect that white immigrant origin MPs who are themselves also visibly non-British origin (perhaps through having an obviously non-British sounding name, or distinct south European or Latin American appearance) to perhaps also suffer more compared to white immigrant origin MPs who look, sound and appear very much white British.

The Roles of Influence and Responsibility in British Parliament

To investigate the extent to which immigrant origin groups are fully included in the democratic process in Britain, and provide ‘effective’ descriptive representation, I return to the large database of over 1,000 MPs and investigate the career paths and heights of ethnic minority immigrant origin, white immigrant origin, and white British MPs in comparative fashion. I estimate the extent to which MPs from immigrant origin backgrounds are given effective, meaningful roles within parliament, and whether or not any systematic exclusion varies by

164 parliament, seniority, and political party. Levels of effective descriptive representation are compared against changing public opinion toward immigration to assess the extent to which public mood has tempered political opportunity in this sense. In the House of Commons, it is possible for MPs to be promoted into three distinct categories of roles with responsibility and influence, which constitute three categories (or levels) of effective descriptive representation in this research. The first are Select Committees. Committees are a common means by which MPs can seek to gain influence on policy making, and increase their reputation and standing within parliament (Norton 2013; Nixon 1998). Though without much formal power, parliamentary committees are an important part of legislative organisations across modern democratic systems (Hindmoor et al. 2009; Norton 2013; Saalfeld 2000; Strøm 1998, 2000). In Britain, their roles may be fairly restricted when compared with other post-industrial democracies (Saalfeld 2000), but Select Committees nonetheless have notable functions in terms of developing policy (Hindmoor et al. 2009; Norton 2013), monitoring information acquisition (Saalfeld 2000), and increasing accountability in the democratic process (Saalfeld 2000; Strøm 2000)76. Membership of parliamentary committees is though quite common, owing to their great number, and thus there is disparity in importance and power of committees – and the kudos which comes with membership of them (Norton 2013; Strøm 1998). For example, the activities and findings of the Home Affairs committee are held in much higher regard than those of the Environmental Audit committee (Norton, 2013). We can understand this split in terms of ‘core’ versus ‘periphery’ issues in public policy and discourse (see for example Bølstad 2015), which the various committees deal with. The Home Affairs committee deals ‘core’ issues such as immigration and law and order, the Environmental Audit committee deals with the meeting of and adhering to environmental targets and legislation, which is very much a periphery issue. Of course, core and periphery issues are flexible over time, and thus naturally committees will grow and shrink in importance. To reflect the desires of this research – to investigate effective representation in terms of MPs being granted roles of influence and responsibility – committee membership as the first level of role of influence and responsibility was restricted to membership of committees dealing with core issues77.

76 Other types of committees (including joint committees and sub-committees) were not included because they do not have the same level of importance or influence in terms of legislative function as select committees do (Norton 2013). Audit committees were however included due to the traditional involvement of senior MPs and ability to launch critical enquiries. 77 See Appendix Table A7.1 for list of Committees included as dealing with core issues.

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The second category of influential roles are ‘junior leadership’ positions, which mostly cover party organisation and spokesperson roles. This level includes jobs such as party Whips and Junior Ministers78, and Shadow79 Junior Ministerial positions. These roles are of greater public exposure, with (Shadow) Ministers in particular regularly out in front of the media explaining and defending policies or decisions, and arguably have greater influence within parliament than the aforementioned membership of Select Committees. Ministers and Shadow Ministers are the most prevalent in this group; they have the capacity to change (or at least influence) party policy or messaging, act as the public ‘go-to’ for party positions and lines on policy within their remit, and have constitutional functions in terms of working with their respective governmental departments (Berlinski et al. 2011; Norton 2013; Rose 1987). Governmental Junior Ministers are of course more powerful and have more responsibility here than Shadow Ministers, seeing as they are taking Government policy decisions. Party Whips are the least publicly exposed of the individual units within this category, and have the lowest level of influence in terms of shaping or changing policy. As such they are sometimes overlooked when considering roles of responsibility and influence in Parliament, but they are in fact influential and an important part of the Parliamentary process, with Cox (1992 p. 278) arguing that the “whip organizations of the House of Commons play a central role in the process of ‘party government’”. Whips are responsible for keeping fellow party MPs towing official party lines on votes (when asked to do so by the party leader), and also for ‘pairing off’ their own MPs with the opposition for leave requests, so as not to be at numerical disadvantage for crucial votes (Berlinski et al. 2011; Cox 1992; Norton 2013).

The third category of influential roles is by far the most public and prominent, and arguably the height of a parliamentary career – Cabinet (governmental) and Shadow Cabinet positions. When an MP’s party is invited to form the Government (having won the election or entering coalition with the party which won), they may have the opportunity to serve as

78 Excluded from this category are Personal Parliamentary Secretaries and Under-Secretaries. This is because these roles have near enough no visibility outside of parliament or influence within it. Especially when compared to roles such as spokespersons and shadow cabinet members. Thus, it would not be suitable to consider individuals in these roles as being placed in positions of influence and responsibility by their parties for the purposes of this research. 79 The largest opposition party in the House of Commons is invited to form the Official Opposition, who ‘shadow’ government ministers in order to hold them to account (Norton, 2013).

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Secretary (or Minister) of State for a given governmental department. Occupation of such positions places the MP at the head of governmental departments, and make them the government’s official representative and spokesperson for their respective department’s affairs. They also have responsibilities in terms of liaising with civil servants in policy making and implementation within their respective departments (Rhodes 2011; Rose 1987). Such roles entitle their holders to attend meetings of the Cabinet, which is the supreme arm of the executive in British Politics. Headed by the Prime Minister, Cabinet is responsible for setting the agenda for governing the country (Norton 2013; Rhodes 2011; Rose 1987)80, and these roles are very high profile in terms of exposure to the public. As such, individuals who occupy such positions must be considered by their parties to be among their best in terms of orators and diplomats, and must be within the inner circles of the powers that be within the party (i.e. the Prime Minister and their closest associates) (Berlinski et al. 2011; Norton 2013). As with Ministerial positions, Cabinet posts are also ‘shadowed’ by MPs from the Official Opposition. Though they have no influence on policy making, Shadow Cabinet positions are the highest role that an MP can achieve in this regard whilst in opposition (save for of course, leadership of the party itself), and as such are coded in together with Cabinet positions.

Barriers to Political Representation – Both Nominal and Effective

This research uses and advances the political opportunity framework (Bird 2005; Gamson & Meyer 1996; Geddes 1998; Kitschelt 1986; Norris & Lovenduski 1995), placing the barriers and obstacles that non-native groups face in achieving effective descriptive political representation in this theoretical context. Previous research has already established that ethnic minority groups continue to be underrepresented in British parliament when compared to their presence in the overall British population (Audickas & Apostolova 2017; Sobolewska 2013), and that white British males continue to dominate the vast majority of the positions of power, privilege, and responsibility within parliament – as has been the case for the entire history of British politics (Banducci et al. 2004; Lovenduski 2012; Norris 1985). As such, the nominal descriptive representation of minority groups is already known to be lacking in British parliament. There are many reasons as to why non-white British (and non-male)

80 Though there is great debate about the limits and extents of Cabinet power in British politics, especially when compared (if indeed it is considered in isolation) to Prime Ministerial Power (see Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990) for an overview).

167 groups have struggled to break the dominance of the traditional political class in terms of parliamentary representation, which can each be understood in terms of ‘barriers’ to ‘political opportunity’ (Bird 2005; Gamson & Meyer 1996; Geddes 1998; Kitschelt 1986; Norris et al. 1992). Previous political opportunity literature, mostly using the structural approach, but see Geddes (1998) for an exception, has established how political opportunity for minority and marginalised groups seeking political representation is tempered by a range of barriers: narrow and exclusive networks dominated by the established majority group, selection procedures and criteria which traditionally discriminate against minority groups (pitting them against members of the established majority group), prejudice on the grounds of difference (in favour of the established majority group), comparative lack of political knowledge and experience (see for examples Allen 2013; Durose et al. 2013; Fisher et al. 2014; Gallagher & Marsh 1988; Geddes 1998), and of course public mood (see Geddes 1998). Each of these factors can combine or detach, generally become more ‘open’ or ‘restrictive’, and thus change the shape of political opportunity surrounding minority group representation. In sum, we can consider the traditional range of barriers to representation as components of political opportunity for minority and marginalised groups.

Research by Norris and Lovenduski (1993) and Norris and Franklin (1997) applied these frameworks to the structure and patterns of ethnic minority candidacy in elections, using it to explain the underrepresentation of non-white groups in parliament. They found that barriers to selection for parliamentary contests more often than not depended on candidates’ ability to commit time, resources (both social and financial), and effort into building substantial personal networks and profiles. This naturally discriminates against minorities, working classes, and women, each of whom typically have much less of each of the above than the average middle or upper class white male. Similar findings were outlined by Durose et al. (2011, 2013) in their reports on pathways into politics. They concluded that ‘traditional’ pathways into politics were ‘exclusive’ and ‘discriminatory’ to those outside the usual cliques of political and parliamentary life. Typically, research into representational barriers has focused on opportunity (structures) surrounding the representation of ethnic minority groups (see for example Bird 2005), but recently there have been suggestions that white immigrant groups may also see their opportunities restricted and closed by similar factors (see for example Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013, Thrasher et al. 2015). Further, though little research has been done into the representation of minorities and barriers that they face in terms of selection for parliamentary jobs and roles, we can quite easily and readily apply the same logic as has been

168 established by scholars investigating candidate selection and electoral contests. Selection for parliamentary roles requires a strong network and personal profile, as well as of course loyalty to the particular group of members who are selecting for roles (Norton 2013). It is quite plausible that immigrant origin parliamentarians may not be in the same cliques, networks, and enjoy the same level of profile as the selectors for parliamentary roles – just as they are often excluded for similar reasons by selectors for parliamentary candidacy.

The role of public opinion toward immigration could also be of importance. As the thesis has established – alongside other previous works for example by Ford et al. (2015) and Jennings (2009) – public opinion toward immigration in Britain has been worsening over the last few decades. While this has not been related to a restriction in the aggregate number of immigrant origin parliamentarians entering the House of Commons, Chapter 6 did establish a connection between public opinion toward immigration and patterns of (ethnic minority) immigrant origin candidacy. Therefore, this chapter, as well as establishing longitudinal measurements of effective descriptive political representation for immigrant origin groups in British politics for the first time, also investigates the role that public opinion may have played in tempering opportunity for such representation. Have increasing levels of hostility among the British public toward immigration led to a restriction on the numbers of immigrant origin candidates being given high profile, important, and public-facing roles? Once again, has this effected non-white immigrant origin communities more so than white non-native groups? The analysis which follows examines this in detail.

The Effective Descriptive Representation of Britain’s Immigrant Origin Communities

The dependent variable for this Chapter was the highest (most important) role that each British MP achieved in each parliament in which they sat from 1992 to 2015 (five parliaments in total). The dataset used was the same collected for the analysis of the nominal descriptive representation of British immigrant origin communities, outlined in the above chapters. As part of this data collection effort, information was coded on the types of roles and jobs which MPs were given in each parliament. The dependent variable was constructed by identifying MPs’ holding of roles of influence and responsibility, with their highest role in each parliament

169 represented81: (0) no role in that parliament82, (1) a key committee role, (2) a (Shadow) Junior Minister/Whip role, and (3) a (Shadow) Cabinet role. MPs not belonging to one of the Conservative or Labour Parties were excluded from this section of the analysis, as other parties have not had sufficiently large enough levels of MPs or time in government for meaningful investigation. The base unit of observation is each MP in each parliament, so MPs who have sat in multiple parliaments will have as many observations in the database they served parliamentary terms between 1992 and 2015. A total of 1,370 MPs formed the database, with 3,187 unique observations across five parliaments. Of these, 133 MPs were identified as of immigrant origin. 39 were ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs, and 94 immigrant origin MPs from this time were part of white ethnic groups.

Table 7.1 below displays information regarding the affording of roles to immigrant origin MPs during the study period. Immediately, we can plainly see that in each parliament, for each role, white British MPs have been absolutely dominant. Equally, this research can confirm suggestions that ethnic minority immigrant origin groups have been woefully underrepresented in parliamentary roles over the past twenty-five years (with the high-water mark of representation being 6% of key Committee memberships being handed to ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs in 2010-2015, despite more than double that proportion of the overall British population being of non-white ethnic status). White immigrant origin groups generally enjoy a fair proportion of roles, particularly when considering their size of the overall population (around 5% in each parliament). Only in the 1997-2001 parliament did they not meet this quota. Of all roles, ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs are best represented in key Select Committees. This is the lowest in terms of influence and responsibility. Above this level, representation falls.

81 This information was mostly collected from official House of Commons sources, including the website and sessional returns. MPs’ own websites were also used, as well as some information coming from second-hand sources such as Wikipedia. A full account of the data collection process for this and all other data presented in this PhD is provided in Chapter 2. 82 Of course, it is not entirely true that being a ‘backbencher’ in these terms necessarily equals having no role in parliament. There are other positions outside of the three types of roles mentioned which also wield influence, such as chairs of Backbench Committees or large parliamentary groups such as the 1922 Committee. That said, the vast majority of backbenchers do not have any formal power or influence in this sense.

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Table 7.1. Representation of immigrant origin groups in parliamentary roles Parliament Group White White IO Ethnic Minority British MPs MPs IO MPs

1992-1997 Key Committee Membership 90% 8% 2% Junior Leadership Role 94% 5% 2% (Shadow) Cabinet Role 88% 12% 0%

1997-2001 Key Committee Membership 93% 4% 3% Junior Leadership Role 91% 8% 1% (Shadow) Cabinet Role 95% 5% 0% 2001-2005 Key Committee Membership 91% 5% 4% Junior Leadership Role 93% 6% 1% (Shadow) Cabinet Role 88% 11% 2% 2005-2010 Key Committee Membership 90% 6% 4% Junior Leadership Role 91% 7% 2% (Shadow) Cabinet Role 89% 9% 1% 2010-2015 Key Committee Membership 87% 6% 6% Junior Leadership Role 91% 5% 4% (Shadow) Cabinet Role 84% 13% 4%

IO = immigrant origin.

Ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs have been badly represented in both junior leadership and (Shadow) Cabinet positions, with only 2010-2015 seeing any notable representation for minority groups in these categories. Still, even by this stage in 21st century Britain, there are not even half as many ethnic minorities in Committee, Junior Leadership, or (Shadow) Cabinet roles as there should be to demographically represent the population. These initial insights suggest that there is very much a ceiling regarding parliamentary roles which ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs are struggling to break through. White immigrant origin groups are, on the whole, much better represented in positions of influence and responsibility than ethnic minority politicians have been over the study period. This suggests that immigrant origin status is not the barrier holding back minority groups in this example.

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Table 7.2. Percentage of groups attaining roles of influence and responsibility

Parliament Group No Roles Key Junior Cabinet/ Committee Leadership Shadow n Membership Role Cabinet 1992-1997 White British MPs 55% 16% 20% 9% 595 White IO MPs 46% 22% 15% 17% 41 Ethnic Minority MPs 33% 33% 33% 0% 6 1997-2001 White British MPs 49% 18% 23% 10% 594 White IO MPs 46% 13% 33% 8% 39 Ethnic Minority MPs 54% 27% 18% 0% 11

2001-2005 White British MPs 50% 15% 28% 10% 584 White IO MPs 43% 13% 28% 18% 40 Ethnic Minority MPs 54% 31% 8% 8% 13 2005-2010 White British MPs 42% 17% 30% 12% 563 White IO MPs 45% 15% 28% 15% 47 Ethnic Minority MPs 44% 25% 15% 6% 16 2010-2015 White British MPs 42% 17% 28% 13% 564 White IO MPs 49% 15% 17% 23% 47 Ethnic Minority MPs 37% 26% 26% 11% 27 Table displays the percentage of MPs from each group per parliament being granted each type of role. Each MP is counted only once, and their highest position in the roles rankings is reported. IO = immigrant origin.

Table 7.2 above shows how immigrant origin and white British MPs have been afforded roles of responsibility and influence over the five parliaments, giving us another angle on patterns of representation. In terms of members of each group being awarded no roles at all, ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs are the lowest of the three groups in 2010, but are the highest between 1997 and 2010. White immigrant origin MPs remain largely stable in this regard, while there is a steady decline in the proportion of white British MPs without such roles over the period. Ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs are systematically more likely to have membership of key committees, according to the data. In each parliament, between a quarter and one third of all such MPs are given this role, compared to less than 20% of white British and white immigrant origin MPs (with the exception of 1992-1997 for this group). These figures remain quite stable over time, with the only noticeable drift being a slight decline in the proportion of both white and ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs occupying such positions from the beginning to end of the study period. The proportion of ethnic minority immigrant

172 origin MPs given junior leadership roles begins high declines rapidly across the Labour government years up until 2005 (8%), when a recovery is made in the following parliament (15%) which is sustained through to the 2010-2015 parliament (to around a quarter). These middle years are also the years in which the proportion of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs without roles is highest. This is driven by the influx of new ethnic minority MPs between 1997 and 2010 not being afforded such roles, which are more often than not given out on the basis of seniority (as well as of course loyalty).

This period of low offer of junior leadership roles to minority ethnic MPs coincides with the highest levels of such roles for white immigrant origin MPs – over 33% of this group held a junior leadership role between 1997 and 2001, for example (up from 15% the parliament before). The overall number of white immigrant origin MPs however remains fairly constant until a 20% increase in 2005. White British MPs become steadily more likely to occupy junior leadership roles over the study period. In terms of Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet roles, it is interesting to note how white immigrant origin MPs seemed to enjoy a systematic advantage over the other two groups (apart from during the 1997-2001 sessions). No ethnic minority immigrant origin MP is selected for such a role until 2001, when Paul Boateng was called to serve as Chief Secretary to the Treasury by Tony Blair. Interestingly though, despite their slow start by the 2010-2015 parliament the differences between the proportion of white British MPs and ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs serving in Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet positions is null. White immigrant origin MPs however remain well ahead. A slightly increasing percentage of white British MPs serving in Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet positions is observed, though this is driven by the steadily shrinking number of such MPs within each Parliament.

Effective Descriptive Representation and Public Opinion

This research now moves to look into what might explain these trends in effective descriptive representation, beginning with investigating a potential connection between the levels of representation for each group and public opinion. The central research question of this thesis concerns whether or not changing levels of anti-immigrant public opinion impact negatively on the descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups. Thus, the data on representation in roles is now examined against the public opinion data from earlier chapters. The four graphs which make up Figure 7.1 show how changing public opinion at the national level in Great Britain has corresponded with changing levels of effective political

173 representation for immigrant origin groups – both white and ethnic minority – in British politics (corresponding to Table 7.1 above).

Figure 7.1. Public opinion and access to roles by immigrant origin group

A. British Public Opinion on Immigration B. Key Committee Membership

White IO MPs

Ethnic Minority IO MPs

C. Junior Leadership Roles D. (Shadow) Cabinet Positions

White IO MPs

Ethnic Minority IO MPs Ethnic Minority IO MPs

IO = immigrant origin.

The first graph (A) covers public opinion from the period of 1992-2015, and shows a generally upward trend with some small drops in negativity in the mid-1990s, 2000s, and early 2010s. Overall though it shows the British public becoming increasingly anti-immigrant since the days of the John Major Conservative governments. From the second graph (B) we can see the information regarding committee membership. This is the only instance in which we see parity reached between the two immigrant origin groups, and by the end of the study period the only time that the effective descriptive representation provided by ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs reaches almost 50% of the way in terms of reflecting the overall population (with minority groups making up around 12% of the British population according

174 to the 2011 census). Committee membership does not appear to be impacted by the steady rise of anti-immigrant public opinion. Nor does any type of effective political representation that we can see from Figure 7.1. Though the growing climate of hostility may be contributing to the inability of immigrant origin groups – particularly ethnic minority immigrant origin groups – to break through in terms of accessing Junior Leadership and Shadow Cabinet positions, both white and ethnic minority immigrants end up with more effective descriptive representation in this regard by the end of the study period than at the beginning – or at least no less. This suggests that while public opinion toward immigration may have been growing increasingly hostile over the study period, at best it can be attributed to slowing down the steady rise in effective descriptive representation for Britain’s ethnic minority immigrant origin groups, and has not reversed the fairly strong effective descriptive representation of white non-British groups.

Individual Level Factors: Seniority, Demographics, and Experience

We cannot say from the above analysis that public opinion is holding back immigrant origin MPs from roles of influence and responsibility, and yet representation for immigrant origin groups in parliamentary positions is still low and must be restricted by some other (combination) of means. The thesis sought to investigate further by considering if individual level factors might explain why some groups of MPs found it so difficult to break into top jobs. If access to roles and positions are indeed based on networks, connections, and experience (Durose et al. 2011, 2013; Gallagher & Marsh 1988; Hazan & Rahat 2010; Norris & Lovenduski 1993), then investigating whether or not there are differences in the average seniority (length of service in the Commons) of MPs from each group and MPs serving in roles and positions can potentially give us an insight. As a preliminary investigation of a potential seniority effect, the mean number of parliaments sat in before an MP from each group gets to each level of influence and responsibility was calculated and reported in Table 7.3 below. As the results were calculated per parliament, the exact year in which an MP came into a role is not recorded, only the parliament. Furthermore, only incomers since 1992 can be included in the calculations, as the database does not contain information on committee memberships or ministerial/cabinet/whip positions before the opening of the 1992 parliament.

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Table 7.3. Average number of parliaments before MPs access roles

Group Committee Junior Cabinet/ Shadow Average Age n Member Leadership Cabinet First Role

White British MPs 0.6 0.7 1.5 44.2 717 White IO MPs 0.2 0.6 0.7 45.2 57 Ethnic Minority IO MPs 0.6 0.9 0 42.9 30

IO = immigrant origin.

Table 7.3 suggests that white immigrant origin MPs appear to get access to roles of influence and responsibility much faster than their white British and ethnic minority immigrant origin counterparts – with the exception of (Shadow) Cabinet positions. On average, it takes them less than half a parliament to get into key Select Committees, and just over half a parliament to gain access to junior leadership and (Shadow) Cabinet positions. On average, white British and ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs both waited just over half a parliament to gain access to key committee positions. Ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs had to wait close to a full parliament, on average, before being given a junior leadership role. White British MPs had to wait just over a half. The results surrounding waiting times for Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet posts are the most interesting. White British MPs appear to wait by far the longest – on average 1.5 parliaments. For white immigrant origin MPs, the figure is just over half, while for ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs the data report that those who were promoted to such roles from 1992-2015 (3 individuals) each did so in the same parliament in which they joined the House of Commons83. Interestingly, this apparent fast-tracking occurred only in the latest two parliaments (2005-2010 and 2010-2015). Finally, the average age of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs upon gaining their first role of influence and responsibility (of any kind) is slightly lower than that of their white colleagues – 43 to 44 and 45 respectively. From this table, two conclusions can be drawn: firstly, there is little evidence that a lack of seniority has been holding back ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs from junior leadership positions, but equally that there is evidence that since 2005, they have been fast-tracked into Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet roles. Furthermore, it appears that white immigrant origin MPs suffer no barriers in

83 The nature of the data excludes Paul Boateng, who served as Britain’s first minority ethnic Cabinet minister. Boateng was invited into Cabinet after serving three full parliaments as MP for Brent South. If Boateng were to be included, this would raise the average years to 0.8 – a similar figure to that of the white immigrant origin MPs.

176 terms of gaining access to roles, indicating little difficulty introduced on the part of an immigrant origin background in advancing through parliament84.

The above investigations suggested that ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs were indeed held back from positions of influence and responsibility, and that this had little to do with seniority or public opinion. Regression analysis followed which sought to control for all factors associated with the MPs themselves – their backgrounds, their political experience, their seniority, and so on – in an attempt to establish whether or not ethnic minority immigrant origin status alone was the driving characteristic associated with underrepresentation. Furthermore, a deeper look into visibility of non-native status is also included in the regression. Traditionally, we have only considered visible immigrant origin groups to be those of an ethnic minority. However, there is a substantial constituency of white immigrant origin groups living in Britain from elsewhere in Europe, and some of them have made it to be MPs. Representatives such as Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham, Polish), Siobhain McDonagh (Mitcham and Morden, Irish parentage), and Gloria De Piero (Ashfield, Italian parentage) are all immigrant origin and visibly so, but not on the grounds of race or a minority ethnic status. Instead, their names will make them identifiable to party selectors, voters, and the leadership (when being considered for roles and jobs in parliament) as being of non-native origin. In all, 15 MPs across the study period were identified as ‘visible’ white immigrant origin, appearing a collective total of 39 times in the data85. Could it be that identifiably non-native white immigrant origin MPs are also held back? What could this tell us about the nature of visibility in terms of immigrant origin status, and its impact therefore on descriptive representation? Regression analysis

84 As in Chapter 5, there are no assessments of statistical significance here. This is because a) there is no hypothesis being tested, and b) there is no need to estimate measurements of significance when trying to distinguish between group means for which one has the entire population’s worth of data. All MPs sitting in each parliament from 1992-2015 are included in this ‘sample’ from which averages are being drawn, and the conclusions are, at this point, not being generalised to a wider population beyond this. Therefore, the reporting and discussing of statistical significance is not appropriate (see See Ziliak & McCloskey 2008). 85 Ideally, this research could have used this distinction from the outset when considering the impact of visibility on nominal descriptive political representation. However, as the numbers prior to this footnote indicate, there are simply too few of such representatives to do a meaningful time series analysis in the structure that this research demands. Relatedly, evidence from Thrasher et al. (2015) has suggested that ‘foreign sounding’ white candidates do experience voter discrimination at local elections. Future research with a greater number of visible white immigrant origin MPs over longer periods of time should certainly look into this effect at the parliamentary level in British politics.

177 explored this possibility. An ordered logistic regression was used, as the dependent variable was an ordered categorical. This allows us to see how likely MPs from each group were to have access to roles (and increasingly more powerful roles) compared to the white British majority group of MPs – who serve as the reference category for the immigrant origin status variable (0 = white British only origin, 1 = invisible white immigrant origin, 2 = visible white immigrant origin, 3 = ethnic minority immigrant origin). As well as immigrant origin status, a number of other variables were including in the analysis in three separate stages, designed to measure and construct the structure of political opportunity involved with the progression and maintenance of parliamentary careers, explained well in candidate and career literature (see for examples Allen 2013; Durose et al. 2013; Gallagher & Marsh 1988; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). The first model operationalises just the roles and ethnicity variables, the second introduces socio- demographic variables86, and the final model combines the previous with political career variables87. Table 7.4 below displays the results.88

In model 1, there is only one significant result. Invisible white immigrant origin MPs are significantly more likely to have roles of influence and responsibility than their white British counterparts, according to the data. This is very interesting, raising the suggestion immediately that immigrant origin status itself is not restricting access to power and effective representation. The effects for visible white immigrant origin and ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs are very much in the expected direction (negative), if not significant. These

86 The socio-demographic variables controlled for are: age, gender (dummy, 1 = female), education (dummy, 1 = degree holder), and occupation (ordered categorical, 8 levels of occupation ranging from 1 = manual occupations to 9 = directors, high level managers, politicians, and so on). All information was collected alongside MPs’ places of birth, that of their parents, and their political careers. Sources for this information, as well as for the political variables below, ranged from MPs websites, social media, party literature, speeches, and some second-hand sources such as Wikipedia. 87 The political career variables controlled for are: prior years as an MP, previous party position (ordered categorical, 8 levels of party position prior to election that year, 0 = grassroots activist, 8 = party leader) and whether or not the MP had previously changed his or her party (dummy, 1 = yes). 88 Significance levels are reported, but there must be careful interpretation of the significance testing results as the ‘sample’ of MPs here is in fact the entire population of MPs over the time period. There is still no formal hypothesis testing, but the research does however at this stage through the regression analysis wish to generalise in order to speak about representation, ethnicity, and immigrant status more broadly beyond the population of British MPs from 1992-2015.

178 coefficients suggest some negative relationship between visible immigrant origin status and access to power. The introduction of the socio-demographic variables in model 2 has a noticeable impact on the results. The negative coefficients for visible white immigrant origin MPs and ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs become significant at the 10% and 5% mark respectively. The effect size of being in the invisible white immigrant origin MP group also reduces slightly.

Table 7.4. Ordered logistic regression results

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Invis. White IO 0.49** 0.15 0.39* 0.16 0.51** 0.16 Vis. White IO -0.44 0.33 -0.64^ 0.35 -0.76* 0.35 Ethnic IO -0.11 0.21 -0.61* 0.25 -0.62* 0.24

Age -0.04*** 0.00 -0.07*** 0.01 Gender 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.09 Education 0.43*** 0.09 0.41*** 0.09 Prev. Occupation 0.09* 0.04 0.10** 0.01 Ethnic/National ID 0.23^ 0.12 0.24^ 0.13

Years in Parliament 0.04*** 0.01 Party Position 0.16*** 0.03 Changed Party -1.00** 0.36

/cut1 -1.12 0.09 -3.00 0.24 -3.91 0.28 /cut2 0.93 0.08 -0.85 0.23 -1.72 0.27 /cut3 2.30 0.10 0.56 0.24 -0.26 0.27 Each regression also controls for the progression of each parliament with a categorical parliament variable, split into dummies. Reference category for immigrant status: white British MPs. IO = Immigrant Origin. Robustness checks included running regressions with ordinary and generalised least square models, and bootstrapped estimates of above model on 2000 replications. The results remained entirely consistent, and in fact the confidence intervals moved further away from zero in most cases during bootstrapping (see Table A7.2 in the Appendix to this chapter for the results). Multilevel models not appropriate due to low number of groups. After excluding all MPs with missing information, there were 2857 observations in each model. Significance placeholders: ^ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p = 0.000.

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Also of note are the age, education, and occupation coefficients, which all show significant relationships with access to parliamentary roles. Finally, the introduction of the political career variables in model 3 increases the size of the all immigrant origin status coefficients, with each coefficient statistically significant at the 5% level. The results here suggest that once socio-demographic and political backgrounds are accounted for, there are significantly negative relationships between visible white and ethnic minority immigrant origin status and access to roles of influence and responsibility. There is also however a significantly positive relationship between being an invisible white immigrant origin MP and access to said roles. These findings strongly suggest that visible immigrant origin status – not conditioned on ethnic minority status – is a barrier to power within parliament, and thus to effective descriptive representation for non-native communities.

Effective Political Representation by Major British Political Parties

The final piece of the investigation into effective descriptive representation turned to the political parties themselves to explore potential explanations as to why the data consistently showed that visible immigrant origin status was connected to more restrictive political opportunity for effective descriptive political representation. We already know plenty about how the parties fare in terms of providing descriptive representatives in parliament (nominal representation), but next to nothing is known however about the effective political representation of minority and (especially) white immigrant origin groups in Britain’s two major parties, though it has been the topic of increasing debate. As the ‘gatekeepers’ of representation (Caul 1999; Norris & Lovenduski 1995), it is important to assess how Britain’s major political parties fare in providing effective political representation. Ultimately, parties hold the key to selection for roles of influence and responsibility just as much as they do for candidate selection – with the exception of some types of roles (such as the Speaker of the House or Committee Chairs – both of which are not included as levels of analysis in this research), political parties (and in particular their top leadership group) pick parliamentarians to serve in parliamentary roles of influence and responsibility. We can expect the exclusive and discriminatory frameworks of personal networks and informal patronage to which previous authors have referred when explaining the lack struggles of minority candidates entering politics (see for examples Durose et al. 2011, 2013; Norris and Lovenduski 1993) to also be exist in this context. If minority candidates are shut out by the ‘secret garden of politics’ in

180 terms of selection for parliamentary contests, then perhaps parties are also creating the same kind of informal, exclusive networks inside parliament when it comes to selection for promotion.

Table 7.5 shows the proportions of representatives from ethnic minority and white immigrant origin backgrounds serving in roles of influence and responsibility by major political party. Each MP is represented only once (regardless of parliament), and their highest ever position achieved (across all parliaments sat in) reported. For the Conservatives, the time period is restricted to include only the 2005 and 2010 parliaments, so that the body of minority MPs is at least comparable to that provided by the Labour Party over the study period. We can see from Table 7.5 that overall there are more immigrant origin MPs in such positions from Labour, but the majority of percentages (proportions of roles to both immigrant origin groups by each party) are actually surprisingly similar between the two parties. Across the five parliaments, there are few substantial differences in terms of the proportion of roles being given to immigrant origin MPs by the Labour and Conservative parties. A higher percentage of white immigrant origin MPs were given Junior Leadership and Cabinet roles by Labour, but elsewhere the proportions are almost the same. So, while there are notably more immigrant origin representatives who have served in roles of influence and responsibility coming from the Labour Party (and so there is a lead in terms of effective descriptive representation in this sense), their figures – particularly for ethnic minority immigrant origin groups – are not substantially higher than those of the Conservatives in terms of proportions. There is also no real difference in the proportion of immigrant origin MPs serving in committee roles between the parties. So, despite having a much larger body of immigrant origin and minority ethnic MPs, the Labour Party have not given a higher percentage of their roles to them. A higher body of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs were given the same level of access to roles of influence and responsibility in the Labour Party as a much smaller body were in the Conservatives. This raises an interesting question – could the lack of effective descriptive representation for ethnic minority MPs over the last three decades be explained by closed networks and lack of opportunities for the body of ethnic minority MPs within the Labour Party? If they had provided higher levels of representation for their much larger body of ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs, then aggregate figures of representation for non-white groups in British politics would have been much larger over the study period.

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Table 7.5. Number of effective descriptive representatives by major British political party

Group Key Junior Cabinet/ Committee Leadership Shadow Total Member Cabinet Labour Party White IO MPs 19 (6%) 32 (9%) 18 (11%) 69 Ethnic Minority IO MPs 16 (5%) 11 (3%) 4 (2%) 31

Conservative Party White IO MPs 7 (7%) 3 (3%) 5 (7%) 15 Ethnic Minority IO MPs 3 (3%) 4 (4%) 1 (1%) 8 Percentages are of all MPs given such a role. IO = immigrant origin.

Conclusions

This research sought to investigate how immigrant origin MPs, both ethnic minority and white, fared in terms of effective descriptive representation. This covers the extent to which they are fully included and given meaningful roles and positions within the parliamentary system (Anwar 1986; Banducci et al. 2004; Bird et al. 2010; Mansbridge 2003). It did so in the framework of political opportunity, seeking to establish if opportunity for representation within parliament was tempered by changing public opinion toward immigration. Levels of effective descriptive representation between Britain’s major political parties, who as the gatekeepers of political representation (Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013; Caul 1999; Norris & Lovenduski 1995; Sobolewska 2013) are constantly seeking to improving on their representation of the country’s immigrant communities, were assessed. This research is an important contribution to the discussion and measurement of the political representation of minority groups in British politics, as it considers not only how many representatives of non-British backgrounds we have, but also how political opportunity is shaped for them (and what kind and quality of descriptive representation they are able to provide) once inside the House of Commons.

The research carried out for this chapter found that visible immigrant origin MPs were systematically held back from roles of influence and responsibility inside the House of Commons. Being of ethnic minority or ‘visible’ white immigrant origin backgrounds is

182 associated with much more restrictive political opportunity for getting jobs and positions within the party and parliamentary structures which dominate British politics. The research also looked into how Britain’s two largest political parties compared regarding the effective descriptive representation of Britain’s immigrant origin communities. I found few differences between the two parties in terms of the proportions of their own MPs from immigrant origin backgrounds being given access to roles of influence and responsibility. This is surprising, given the findings regarding the number of both white and ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs coming from the Labour Party. This suggests that political opportunity for immigrant origin MPs in the Labour Party is more restrictive than it is for those in the Conservative Party. It could also be reflective of recent Conservative Party attempts to modernise and improve their image with the electorate – which has involved a large amount of actively and publically increasing the party’s diversity both in parliament and in its top jobs (Sobolewksa 2013).

The main finding from this Chapter however was that identifiable non-native status, whether it be combined with a minority or non-minority ethnic status, systematically holds back effective descriptive representation across the board. An MP from an immigrant background is substantially less likely to move up the parliamentary career ladder than a white British colleague if they are identifiably (either by skin colour or a foreign-sounding name) of non-British origin, according to data mapping the careers of British parliamentarians from 1992 to 2015. This finding, combined with others above noting the connection between visible immigrant origins and lower nominal representation, has important consequences for our understanding of political representation, barriers and access to it, as well as political opportunity. Rather than ethnicity alone acting as a barrier, the results here suggest that any form of identifiably non-native origin status holds representation back. This finding holds despite controlling for a range of alternative factors and explanations which temper representational political opportunity. We must therefore adapt our understanding of visibility in terms of discrimination and barriers to representation, changing our conception of how visibility works in the context of political opportunity to account for restrictions on visible representatives of white, non-native groups.

Regarding public opinion, rising public hostility toward immigration has correlated with a slow rise in the presence of immigrant origin MPs in roles of influence and responsibility. It is clear that public opinion has not caused a tail off or reversal in the trend toward increasing visibility for non-British origin groups at top parliamentary levels, but might

183 it explain parties’ reluctance to select and promote visible immigrant origin MPs? This seems unlikely given the arguments by Sobolewska (2013) regarding the very conscious and public effort by the political powers that be to ‘improve’ their diversity and thus image with the British public. However, it does not seem wholly unlikely that, particularly in more recent climates of great public hostility toward immigration, the visibility of a candidate’s non-British origin status might just hold them back from promotion.

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Appendix to Chapter 7

Table A7.1. Key Select Committees by parliamentary term Parliament Committee Name 2010-2015 Business, Innovation and Skills Committee 2010-2015 Education Committee 2010-2015 Health Committee 2010-2015 Home Affairs Committee 2010-2015 Scottish Affairs Committee 2010-2015 Treasury Committee 2010-2015 Work and Pensions Committee 2010-2015 European Scrutiny Committee 2010-2015 Public Accounts Committee 2005-2010 Business, Innovation, and Skills Committee 2005-2010 Defence Committee 2005-2010 European Scrutiny Committee 2005-2010 Foreign Affairs Committee 2005-2010 Health Committee 2005-2010 Home Affairs Committee 2005-2010 Treasury Committee 2005-2010 Work and Pensions Committee 2005-2010 Business and Enterprise Committee 2005-2010 Education and Skills Committee 2005-2010 Members' Allowances Committee Office of Deputy Prime Minister: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the 2005-2010 Regions Committee 2005-2010 Trade and Industry Committee 2005-2010 Standards and Privileges Committee 2001-2005 Defence Committee 2001-2005 Children, Schools, and Families Committee 2001-2005 European Scrutiny Committee 2001-2005 Foreign Affairs Committee 2001-2005 Health Committee

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2001-2005 Home Affairs Committee 2001-2005 Treasury Committee 2001-2005 Work and Pensions 2001-2005 Constitutional Affairs Committee 2001-2005 Education and Skills Committee 2001-2005 Trade and Industry Committee Office of Deputy Prime Minister: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the 2001-2005 Regions Committee 1997-2001 Children, Schools, and Families Committee 1997-2001 European Scrutiny Committee 1997-2001 Foreign Affairs Committee 1997-2001 Health Committee 1997-2001 Home Affairs Committee 1997-2001 Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 1997-2001 Scottish Affairs Committee 1997-2001 Treasury Committee 1997-2001 Welsh Affairs Committee 1997-2001 Scottish Grand Committee 1997-2001 Northern Ireland Grand Committee 1997-2001 Welsh Grand Committee 1997-2001 Social Security Committee 1997-2001 Education and Employment Committee 1992-1997 Education and Employment Committee 1992-1997 Education Committee 1992-1997 Employment Committee 1992-1997 European Legislation Committee 1992-1997 Health Committee 1992-1997 Home Affairs Committee 1992-1997 Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 1992-1997 Northern Ireland Grand Committee 1992-1997 Social Security Committee 1992-1997 Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1992-1997 Treasury Committee

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Table A7.2. Bootstrap estimation of confidence intervals – ordered logistic regression

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Invisible white IO 0.487** [0.183 0.791] 0.395* [0.075 0.714] 0.505** [0.190 0.820]

Visible white IO -0.440^ [-0.911 0.030] -0.641* [-1.159 -0.122] -0.756** [-1.234 -0.278]

Ethnic minority IO -0.107 [-0.452 0.238] -0.599** [-1.008 -0.190] -0.615** [-1.066 -0.165]

Age -0.040*** [-0.047 -0.033] -0.066*** [-0.077 -0.056]

Gender 0.038 [-0.140 0.215] 0.108 [-0.077 0.292]

Degree 0.426*** [0.260 0.591] 0.410*** [0.243 0.577]

Occupation 0.088* [0.020 0.157] 0.096** [0.023 0.168]

Ethnic/National ID 0.226^ [-0.017 0.469] 0.225^ [-0.021 0.471]

Prior years 0.035*** [0.023 0.048]

Party position 0.163*** [0.097 0.228]

Changed party -0.996** [-1.701 -0.290]

N 2794 2794 2794

N=2794, Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Significance placeholders: ^ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p = 0.001. 1000 replications of each model, seed set at 1.

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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Results and Answering the Research Question and Central Hypothesis

This PhD thesis hypothesised that increasing levels of anti-immigrant public opinion would restrict political opportunity for immigrant origin descriptive representation in Europe. Through extensive data collection and a wide range of analyses, I found some support for the central hypothesis in the case study of Great Britain. The first test conducted at the European- wide level suggested though that the opposite may be true, and that higher levels of anti- immigrant public opinion correlated with higher levels of descriptive representation for non- white immigrant origin groups (for white immigrant origin groups, there was no statistically significant effect). The data suggested that as publics became more hostile, so non-white immigrant groups mobilised and organised into the political system so as to defend their interests and push back against growing anti-immigrant discourse and politics. Bivariate models for white immigrant origin groups (and all immigrant origin groups together as one) also produced the same result, but this was not robust to the addition of controls for electoral systems, voting rights, and anti-immigrant party institutionalisation. However, once the analysis was taken down to the regional level in Great Britain, the effect was seemingly reversed. Here, the data suggested that increasingly hostile public opinion on immigration did in fact relate negatively to the descriptive representation of non-white (ethnic minority) immigrant origin groups. Further investigation into the mechanics of this relationship revealed that it was in fact a party-driven relationship; Britain’s major political parties seemingly avoided selecting minority candidates in winnable constituencies when anti-immigrant public opinion was highest (both temporally and cross-sectionally). The data also suggested that while nominal representation was impacted as above, the effective descriptive representation of non- white and white immigrant origin groups did not appear to be restricted by more hostile public opinion.

The conclusion regarding central hypothesis, that “the political representation of immigrant origin communities will be negatively affected by increasingly hostile public opinion

188 towards immigration”, is somewhat mixed. On the national level, the European analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 indicated that there was some, limited relationship between public opinion and the political representation of immigrant origin groups, but not in the expected direction as outlined in the central hypothesis above. In countries such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France, we saw that representation for minority ethnic immigrants was high across the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, but so was anti-immigrant public opinion relative to countries such as Spain and Italy, where representation was in fact much lower. The countermobilisation idea was still sustained through interpretation of the other coefficients, with higher voting rights and more favourable electoral arrangements correlating with greater immigrant origin electoral success.

In the British case study, which provided a context for high levels of mobilisation opportunity given its very generous and advantageous (for non-citizens and immigrant origin groups at large) voting rights and electoral system, the findings were in fact reversed. The results in Chapter 6 suggested that in fact areas within Britain which displayed higher levels of anti-immigrant public opinion, there was systematically much less representation for ethnic minority immigrant origin group. As with Chapter 3, no significant relationship was observed regarding white immigrant origin groups, suggesting that the ability of white immigrant origin groups to mobilise and achieve representation is not susceptible to changes in public opinion toward immigration. Finally, the thesis found in the last empirical chapter that ethnic minority immigrant origin groups were being systematically held back in terms of their effective descriptive political representation, but that increasing numbers of ethnic minority immigrant origin politicians had been accessing roles of influence and responsibility over time – despite a growing public hostility toward immigration in Britain over the last two decades. Chapter 7 also found that identifiable white immigrant origin politicians appeared to suffer from a lack of access in a similar way to ethnic minority immigrant origin MPs.

Harmonising these findings and making conclusions regarding the central hypothesis is not simple. Firstly, the findings mostly only showed significant evidence of relationships between public opinion and political representation for ethnic minority immigrant origin groups – as the most visible non-natives. However, there was also some evidence that visibly non-native white immigrant origin politicians also find their political opportunity limited in the context of rising public hostility to immigration. This constitutes a necessary adaption to the hypothesis, as it appears that visibility of non-native status is crucial for any relationship to

189 exist between public opinion and representation. Regarding this relationship, on the one hand, national level findings suggest increasingly hostile public opinion toward immigration seems to correlate with higher levels of political representation. However, analysis of public opinion at the regional level in Britain strongly indicated that contexts of greater public angst toward immigration produced much lower levels of nominal descriptive representation, with analysis of the candidate data suggesting that a substantial ‘ethnic sanction’ may be occurring at the candidate selection stage by political parties. How can higher anti-immigrant public sentiment be associated with both better and worse political opportunity for immigrant representation? How can public opinion both act as a barrier and an enabler to descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups? It is clear that contexts of higher institutional opportunity for representation (more generous voting rights, majoritarian systems) correlates strongly, and above all else, with higher levels of representation – particularly for non-white ethnic groups. It is also in these states that we see public opinion toward immigration at its comparative worst. But, as the British case study presented throughout this thesis demonstrates, it is still possible for public opinion to operate as a key element of political opportunity for representation in and of itself. Within Britain, a country with among the highest levels of representation for immigrant origin groups in Europe and most hostile climate of public opinion, certain regions of the country saw far less representation for non-native groups – and particularly non-white immigrant origin groups. These regions were also areas in which public opinion toward immigration was systematically worse than in the rest of the country. So, while the institutional framework of British politics provides a favourable context for the political representation of immigrant origin groups, regional variations in public opinion toward immigration can act as a barrier to representation. An ethnic minority immigrant origin candidate may find themselves better placed to achieve representation within the favourable institutional setting of Great Britain, but if they are contesting or vying for selection in an area of the country where public hostility toward immigration is higher, then they will find their opportunities heavily restricted. In this sense, we can explain how increasingly hostile public opinion toward immigration can appear to be both advantageous and detrimental to the political opportunity for descriptive representation. The former result is a correlation with comparative institutional settings between countries, the latter mediates and drives where representation develops within countries.

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Puzzles and Problems Solved

The central puzzle that this research aimed to solve was how it was that, anecdotally at least, we appeared to see both rising levels of political representation for minority groups in Britain and Europe, but also rising public opposition and hostility toward immigration. While on the one hand it appeared that contexts were becoming more favourable for representation, a hostile general public is not generally considered conducive to greater opportunity and openness for social mobilisation and progression. The thesis employed a range of empirical analyses to test the connection between public opinion and descriptive representation across Europe and in Great Britain. The conclusions, as stated above, solve the puzzle by suggesting that while institutional frameworks might provide greater opportunities for representation at the country-level, at the regional level the findings from the British case suggested that public opinion is acting as a firm barrier to increasing representation for minority groups in areas which are particularly hostile to immigration. So, even in the most favourable of institutional contexts, the views and preferences of the general public have a strong mediating and limiting role in the political representation of immigrant origin groups.

There were many problems regarding a lack of data which needed to be solved in order for the thesis to solve this central research puzzle and come to above conclusions. One of the largest problems that this research sought to address, as part of the wider Pathways project, was a distinct lack of data on the representation of immigrant origin groups in Britain and Europe, and information as to the nature of immigrant status and ethnic minority status as unique barriers to political representation. The descriptive representation data collection carried out for this thesis (with simultaneous efforts conducted by other researchers for the six remaining countries) and subsequent analysis very much solved this problem. There is now a database provided by this PhD research which covers the socio-economic, political, and occupational backgrounds and careers of every Member of Parliament to sit in the House of Commons from 1992 to 2015. From this, measurements of the political representation of Britain’s immigrant origin communities over the past two decades were derived, both at the national and regional level. Not only this, but these figures were disaggregated at the national and regional level into longitudinal measurements of representation for ethnic minority and white immigrant groups separately. At the national level, this was disaggregated further into

191 measurements of representation for distinct ethnic minority and white immigrant origin communities. The separate analysis of levels of representation for ethnic minority and white immigrant origin groups solved the problem regarding the lack of knowledge about the unique barriers to representation faced by immigrants and ethnic minority groups. By positioning ethnic minority and white immigrant groups in a comparative analytical framework, with white immigrants serving as a bridge between white British communities (with whom they share an ethnic-majority status) and ethnic minority groups (with whom they share a non-native background), the research was able to analyse the extent to which white immigrant groups were underrepresented in the same way that extant literature had established ethnic minority groups have been throughout recent parliamentary history. It was thus also able to analyse the impact that public opinion toward immigration had on the representation of ethnic minority and white immigrant origin groups separately, once again in the comparative framework.

The establishment of public opinion toward immigration as an important factor – or ‘barrier’ – in the political representation story was also a key aim of this thesis, with the central hypothesis seeking to test the expectation that higher levels of anti-immigrant public sentiment would negatively impact political representation. To do this, robust, longitudinal measurements of public opinion needed to be collected and analysed and properly theoretically and empirically integrated into the political opportunity framework for political representation. Previous assessments of public opinion toward immigration at the national level in Britain needed updating with new (and improved) data, and disaggregation to the regional level was required to fully investigate the hypotheses. This thesis therefore collected and analysed large amounts of data on public opinion toward immigration at the national and regional levels in Great Britain, and using the Stimson dyad-ratios approach transformed this wealth of information into single, aggregate measures of public opinion toward immigration. Extant literature did contain suggestions that public opinion, or public mood, was an important factor within the ‘cultural’ axis of the political opportunity for representation, but the mechanism was never made clear. Further, empirical attempts to analyse and assess public opinion as a potential barrier to increasing representation for non-native (and non-white) groups did not exist. This thesis provides a substantial, robust analysis of the relationship between public opinion and descriptive representation, and presents strong theoretical and empirical arguments about the nature of this relationship, and the mechanics that drive it. Also, I was able to make clear and

192 consistent arguments regarding placing public opinion on immigration firmly into the political opportunity framework for political representation.

A theoretical problem remained present in the literature since it was raised in the 1990s by a handful of scholars using and developing political opportunity frameworks. Principally, the political opportunity structure framework had become the dominant theoretical leverage in understanding and framing the (descriptive) representation of minority and marginalised social groups. This was problematic in two senses. Firstly, the dominance of the structural approach to explaining all manners of trends and variations in social movements and measurements had stretched to such an extent that it was becoming devoid of all meaning. Secondly, the structural approach, by its name and nature, tends to focus predominantly on institutional and contextual factors which are much more ‘stable’ and ‘slow moving’ than cultural factors such as public opinion. As such, a structural lens is not well able to explain or predict change in movements and measurements in which cultural factors may be more important. Variations based on institutional settings or change might be best explained by a political opportunity structure approach, but when we begin to try and integrate public opinion into the representational political opportunity structure literature, we find it difficult to harmonise and interpret this very human, cultural factor in a structural nature. Returning to and reviving the theoretical distinction between political opportunity structures and political opportunities outlined in the 1990s (and before) allows us an escape from trying to force public opinion into a structural box, and better explain and understand trends in representation owing to the many cultural barriers which are placed in the way of minority and marginalised social groups.

Finally, this thesis sought to address a very valid and ongoing concern regarding the value of ‘counting’ the number of elected officials within parliaments ‘mirroring’ socially marginalised and/or minority groups, and using this as a measurement of the quality and legitimacy of representative democracy. It has been well argued and consistently highlighted how simply having minority group MPs ‘there’ within parliament does little in terms of providing non-majority group communities with real representation, and inspiring future generations of non-British communities to engage with the political system and enter a career in politics. This ‘nominal’ approach to measuring descriptive representation of immigrant origin groups was therefore complimented in the British case study with research into the

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‘effective’ descriptive representation of Britain’s non-native origin groups and communities. This concerned the extent to which immigrant origin and ethnic minority groups were not only present within parliament, but were being given access to roles of influence and responsibility within the parliamentary hierarchy. Chapter 7 therefore mounted an extensive investigation into the levels of access for non-British origin parliamentarians to positions in which they could exercise greater influence within the parliamentary system, and also provide more visible, high profile examples of non-white British MPs serving in British parliament. Furthermore, this chapter included a new way of empirically examining ‘visibility’ of non-native origins, by pulling out ‘identifiably’ immigrant origin white MPs as a separate condition in the regression analysis.

Contributions to Research and Literature

This thesis provides a number of key contributions to existing literature on public opinion toward immigration, the political representation of immigrant and ethnic minority groups, and for political opportunity and representational literatures. It does so by introducing a vast new dataset on the backgrounds of immigrant origin MPs, and on the levels of anti- immigrant public opinion, in Great Britain – this is matched with the same data collected for seven other countries as part of the Pathways research project, which is also used in this research. These datasets provide a huge new resource for further longitudinal investigation into representation and the demographics, social and ethnic backgrounds, and career trajectories of British representatives. Theoretically, it also provides a number of new developments in terms of improving and furthering knowledge and understanding about political opportunity for representation and the barriers placed in front of non-native and non-white groups in achieving higher levels of descriptive representation.

The full integration, and empirical testing, of public opinion into the representational opportunity framework is a key contribution of the research. As such, we now know a great deal more about the barriers that face non-white communities in achieving representation, with evidence presented in this thesis that increasingly hostile public mood on immigration directly negatively impacts opportunity for representation. As highlighted above, this was done within the theoretical framework of political opportunity, as opposed to political opportunity structures, with public opinion forming a crucial part of the ‘flexible, cultural’ axis of

194 opportunity. It had been suggested by previous scholars that public opinion, or public mood, was an important factor in mediating political opportunity for minority group representation. However, this thesis developed these arguments much further and backed them up with extensive empirical analyses of public opinion’s place in the representational opportunity framework and its direct relationship with the descriptive representation of Europe’s immigrant origin communities. This thesis has also has made further contributions through other findings, theoretical framings, and arguments. Most notably so in terms of the ‘ethnic penalty/sanction’ effect. While previous literature had focused on electoral results for indications of ethnic penalties, this thesis examined the impact of higher anti-immigrant public opinion on patterns of candidature in Great Britain. It found suggestions that in regions where anti-immigrant public opinion was highest, British political parties were more often than not selecting minority candidates in ‘unwinnable’ seats, whereas where anti-immigrant public opinion was not so high, minority candidates found themselves fielded much more often in very much winnable contests (including in safe seats). The investigation into this effect is very much preliminary, and should be followed by further research, but the suggestion is nonetheless a good contribution.

Finally, the core research question of the thesis has been answered, and thus a significant improvement regarding our knowledge of the impact that mass public opinion can have on political outcomes has been made. Specifically, this research found that in contexts of higher public hostility toward immigration in the various regions of Great Britain (over time from 1990-2015), levels of descriptive representation for ethnic minority immigrant origin groups is adversely affected. The political representation of white immigrant origin groups – who share a non-native background with ethnic minority groups but share ethnic status with the white British majority – is not impacted in this way, suggesting that ethnic minority, not non-native, status is a barrier to political representation in contexts of higher anti-immigrant public opinion. As above, the initial analysis of candidate data found that this relationship may be being driven by political parties avoiding the selection of minority candidates in ‘winnable’ contests. However, bi-variate research conducted for this thesis also found that in countries where aggregate public opinion on immigration was more hostile, so also the descriptive representation of immigrant origin – both ethnic minority and white – groups was higher. This suggested that when zoomed out, more negative public opinion toward immigration correlates with higher levels of representation for immigrants – a somewhat paradoxical and perhaps contradictory (to the above finding) suggestion. This finding was however not robust the

195 addition of country level controls for institutional and political frameworks. These larger regressions suggested that contexts of higher political rights and majoritarian electoral systems were associated with higher levels of political representation for immigrant origin groups. I conclude that this is consistent with a mobilisation interpretations on the national level, and that non-native communities in contexts where their rights are higher and the political system easier to mobilise into are able to do so much more effectively than in countries without such generous institutional and political contexts. The relationship between public opinion and representation at the national level, though not significant once other variables are introduced, supports the countermobilisation conclusion. These two findings can, despite perhaps suggesting the opposite, by synthesised easily within the theoretical political opportunity framework, and are entirely compatible: national level contexts of better rights and political arrangements for immigrants and their descendants provide higher chances of success for mobilisation and thus greater opportunity for descriptive representation – a countermobilisation against rising anti-immigrant hostility. However, the in-depth case study analysis of Great Britain carried out in this thesis simultaneously concludes that opportunities for ethnic minority immigrant origin groups (as the ‘visible face’ of immigration) are in fact more restricted in regions of greater public resistance to immigration, with political opportunity therefore at the disaggregated level dependent on variation in public opinion. Political parties, it seems, will widen or close opportunities for ethnic minority representation according to whether or not local publics are more hostile or more accepting to immigrants. So, while we may find at the national level that higher anti-immigrant public opinion correlates with higher levels of descriptive representation for immigrant origin groups, within these nations there will be variations in political opportunity at the regional level – with parties more reluctant to potentially face electoral sanction by selecting visible non-native origin candidates in areas of higher public opposition to immigration.

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MAIN APPENDIX – PUBLIC OPINION MEASURES

Cross National Public Opinion Measures

The data used for the cross-national public opinion measures featured in Chapter 3 were a combination of information from comparative and national level surveys, collected, harmonised and analysed as part of my research with the Global Public Opinions Project. The database and associated descriptive information on the question items selected and sources used is available from the project’s principle investigator, Dr Steven Van Hauwaert. Below is a list of sources used to construct the measures, and their coverage points. The original measures were constructed with beginning points (for many countries) in the 1980s. For the purposes of this research, the data were cut off at 1990 but the full list used to calculate the measures is reported below. A full list of every question item would be much too large to include as part of the appendix to this thesis, but as stated above this information is freely available from the project website and its investigators.

Table MA.1. Cross-national public opinion sources and coverage

Survey House Coverage89 Time Points Variables

Cross-National Surveys*

European Social Survey 2002-2015 7 11

European Values Study 1981-2010 4 5

World Values Study 1996-2005 2 1

Eurobarometer 1988-2003 7 9

International Social Survey Project 1995-2013 3 5

European Quality of Life Survey 2012 1 1

LIVEWHAT Survey 2015 1 3

89 The reported years correspond to the reported fieldwork dates of each survey’s metadata. In reality, survey fieldwork dates for international surveys vary from country to country, and national level survey samples are often topped up with later interviews, the timings of which can cross over into the next calendar year.

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National Level Surveys

British Election Study 1983-2016 8 10

British Social Attitudes Study 1983-2015 14 13

Belgian National Election Study 1992-2008 5 14

French Political Barometer 2006-2007 2 2

Regional Survey (FR) 1985-1991 5 2

Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies 1981-2012 10 12

Democracy 2000 (FR) 2000 1 1

Social and Cultural Cleavages Survey (FR) 2013-2016 4 8

Health Ministry Opinion Barometer (FR) 2000-2015 14 2

Political Choices and Values Study (FR) 2013 1 1

French Electoral Survey - CEO 2007-2012 2 4

French Electoral Survey - CeviPof 1995-2007 4 6

German General Social Survey 1980-2013 14 25

German Government Monitor 2015-2016 2 1

German Longitudinal Election Study 2002-2013 8 1

German Government Monitor 2015-2016 2 1

German Political Barometer 1982-2014 4 4

German Political Attitudes Study 1994-2003 3 3

German Post Election Study 1994 1 5

Italian National Election Study 1990-2013 8 7

Spanish National Election Study 1993-2014 14 37

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*List of Exceptions to Cross-national Survey Item Coverage

• The Netherlands did not participate in the LIVEWHAT survey.

• Belgium did not participate in the WVS or the ISSP.

• Great Britain: 1998-2005 with two time points for WVS.

• France: 2003-2013 with two time points for ISSP, 1 time point for WVS in 2006.

• Italy: 2002-2012 with three time points for ESS, one time point in 1995 for the ISSP, one time point in 2005 for WVS.

• The Netherlands: 2006-2012 with two time points for WVS.

• Spain: 1990-2011 with five time points for WVS.

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Great Britain Public Opinion Measure

As it is used extensively throughout the research, and the key findings of the thesis based upon it, the full list of questions selected for the British public opinion measure Chapters 4 is listed below, as well as the factor loading scores.

Table MA.2. Great Britain public opinion measure question items and factor loadings

Cases Loading Question 4 0.971 Do you think Britain should allow more settlement, less settlement, or about the same amount as now by… West Indians

4 0.899 Do you think Britain should allow more settlement, less settlement, or about the same amount as now by… Indians and Pakistanis

5 0.863 Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. PLEASE CROSS ONE BOX IN EACH ROW: Immigrants increase crime rates.

8 0.838 And, using this card, would you say that Britain's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

3 0.796 Do you think Britain should allow more settlement, less settlement, or about the same amount as now by… People from the European Economic Community

4 0.774 Do you think Britain should allow more settlement, less settlement, or about the same amount as now by… Australians and New Zealanders

5 0.704 Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. PLEASE CROSS ONE BOX IN EACH ROW: Immigrants make Britain more open to new ideas and cultures.

5 0.575 Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a bit, kept the same, reduced a bit, or reduced a lot?

7 0.244 How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?

7 -0.290 Now, using this card, to what extent do you think Britain should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most Britain people to come and live here?

7 -0.663 Is Britain made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

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8 -0.749 Would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain's economy that people come to live here from other countries?

5 -0.892 Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. PLEASE CROSS ONE BOX IN EACH ROW: Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Britain

7 -0.895 How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most British people?

5 -0.958 Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. PLEASE CROSS ONE BOX IN EACH ROW: Immigrants generally are good for Britain's economy Includes scores for factors with only more than 2 cases. Cases are annual observations, not a complete total number of each time the question was asked over the study period.

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