Policy of the Republic of in the Field oF security: Impact of Internal anD external Factors

Victor Shadurski

Описываются этапы эволюции политики Беларуси в сфере безопасности. Отмечается, что внешняя по- литика Беларуси все больше учитывает национальные интересы, геополитические особенности страны. Осо- бое внимание уделяется анализу влияния украинского кризиса на белорусско-российские отношения, вызванные стремлением Беларуси сохранить конструктивные отношения с новым украинским руководством, стать по- средником в разрешении конфликтных ситуаций. Сделан вывод, что новые инициативы Беларуси в сфере безо- пасности не являются отказом или нарушением союзнических отношений с Россией. Они представляют собой лишь маневр белорусской власти в рамках взятых на себя обязательств. The current publication aims to identify evolution stages of the Belarusian security policy. It has been noted that the foreign policy of Belarus nowadays to a greater extent considers the national interests of Belarus, geopolitical peculiarities of the country. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the Ukrainian crisis impact on the Belarus-Russia relations caused by the Bealrsuain aspirations to preserve constructive relations with new Ukrainian leadership and to become an intermediary in the resettlement of conflict situations. The conclusion is made that new Belarusian initiatives in the security sphere should not be perceived as a refusal or breach in the allied relations with Russia. It is only a maneuver of the Belarusian authorities within the framework of the freedom of action it possesses. Ключевые слова: баланс сил в регионе; нейтральный статус; ОДКБ; политика в сфере безопасности; прин- цип многовекторности; Республика Беларусь. Keywords: balance of power in the region; CSTO; multi-vector principle; neutral status; Republic of Belarus; security policy.

fter the outbreak of the armed conflict in Ukraine by the Supreme Council of the BSSR on July 27, A(February, 2014) the discussion on military and 1990, still within the framework of the USSR. The political security of the country significantly intensi- Declaration proclaimed “full state sovereignty of the fied in various circles of the Belarusian society. This Republic of Belarus as supremacy, independence discussion does not stop, it is gaining new momen- and completeness of state power of the Republic tum. The opinions expressed by politicians, experts within the borders of its territory, the legitimacy of and ordinary Belarusian citizens, can be summarized- its laws, the independence of the Republic in foreign in the following questions: Which countries are the relations.” Art. 10 of the Declaration formulated the natural allies of the young state? And why? What se- task to convert Belarus into a nuclear-free zone and curity threats and challenges does Belarus face? a neutral state [1]. The lack of sustainable unity should be noted Particular attention should be paid to the fact when Belarusians answer the questions formulated that since the adoption of the abovementioned above. The issue of disunity of the Belarusian society, Declaration, the task of “transforming Belarus into a I nternational Relations and Foreign Policy including the defining of geopolitical preferences, neutral state” wasrepeated in all the official political was analyzed by the author in previous publications. and legal documents of the country concerning the Depending on the approach to the Belarusian foreign policy. This contributed to the fact that some security policy four major distinct social groups were Belarusian researchers and experts began talking formed: Belarusian authorities, Belarusians – national about Belarusian neutrality as a realstatus. consensus and compromise supporters, Belorossy Giving the Declaration on State Sovereignty the (proponents of enhanced cooperation with Russia), status of a Constitutional Act on August 25 in 1991 Eurobelarusians (supporters of rapprochement with and the consolidation of an independent status to the European Union) [25]. Belarus in the BSSR Supreme Council “On Ensuring Among the above mentioned groups the security Political and Economic Independence of the policyimplemented by the Belarusian government Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic” gave another attracts the greatest attention and interest. Obviously, impetus to the development of foreign policy activity during 25 years it was not static, in its evolution of the young state [19]. this policy underwent significant changes. The On the basis of legislative acts of the Republic foundation of statesecurity policybegan to be formed of Belarus on its state sovereignty as of October 2, even before the international legal establishment 1991 the Supreme Council adopted a statement “On of Belarusian independence in the late 1980s. The the Principles of Foreign Policy of the Republic starting point of the political and legal framework of Belarus”, which confirmed the young state’s formation of Belarusian foreign and security policy commitment to the UN Charter, the Universal was the Declaration on State Sovereignty, adopted Declaration on Human Rights and international

13 treaties. In addition, the document stated that the Belarusian leaders regarding the security policy Belarusintended to sign the Final Act of the approaches, various estimates of perceived and real Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe threats. (CSCE) and assume its obligations according to the The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the documents within the organization [21]. Republic of Belarus S. Shushkevich explained the After the events that led to the final collapse of refusal to sign the CSTby the fact that the document the USSRin December, 1991, Belarus also adopted contradictedthe Belarusian neutrality policy. It is well other legislative actsthat determined the country’s known that the Head of Parliament and the formal foreign policy. The priorities set in those documents Head of Statesupported the autonomy of Minsk in were the basis of the Belarusian foreign policy during the military decision-making. Taking into account the the period of “parliamentary republic”, and some of country’s geopolitical position he considered it more the provisions did not lose their relevance after the logical for Belarus to participate in the creation of the first presidential elections (1994). Baltic-Black Sea regional cooperation and defense The most significant events in the history of system that called for the creation of a “belt of neutral Belarus that hada direct impact on the security states” in Europe or “sanitary cordon” that separated policy in the first half of the 1990s were, firstly, the NATOcountries and Russia. As for the military the voluntary renunciation from the nuclear alliance with Moscow, S. Shushkevich believed that it weaponsarsenalinherited from the USSR that “could only damage the interests of the country and remainedonBelarusian territory, and secondly, lead even a stronger state to a dead end” [22, p. 28]. delayingthe decision tosign the Collective Security The position of S. Shushkevich was notedly Treaty (CST) by the Republic of Belarus. supportedby the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Regardingthe first event, it should be emphasized Republic of Belarus at that time P. Kravchenko, that in contrast to Ukraine Belarus did not put forward who declared that “Belarus has a very complex and preconditions for thenuclear weapons withdrawal (the unique position in the CIS – on the one hand, as overall capacity ofwhich was on the sixth position in the coordinator of the Commonwealth it should the world) to Russia. Thus, in 1992in accordance strengthen it, and on the other hand, there is a risk with the international agreements the tactical that it will fall under Russia’s dictatorship” [10]. nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Belarus, and The pro-Soviet members of the Supreme by November, 1996 the removal of strategic nuclear Councilof the Republic of Belaruspreferred to see the missiles was finished. By the decisions and actions Belarusian army as part of the CIS Collective Security taken in respect of the weapons placed on its territory System – partially for a smoother transition from the Belarus proved to be a peace-loving country and for Soviet to national defensesystem, as well as due to a whileappearedin the world news. On January 15, the lack of necessary financing and maintenance 1994 the US President Bill Clinton paid a one-day resources for its own armed forces. The major visit toMinsk. Speaking at the National Academy argument of the supporters of the entry into the Post- of Sciences of Belarus to the youth audience, he Soviet System of Collective Security was the opinion described Belarus as a peaceful country. Evaluating that the adherence to the Tashkent Treaty would the decision of Minsk to become a nuclear-free entail the increase of military orders for the domestic country, the US leader mentioned that by this action military and industrial industry. “you deserve the trust and gratitude of the citizens The issue of the Republic’s future military around the world” [8]. policy direction was put on the Belarusian Supreme The fact that the US leader highlyappreciatedthe Council’s agenda. On April 9, 1993 the Supreme decision of the Belarusian authorities is confirmed in Council with 188 votes against 32 voted in favor of the memoirs of the former Prime Minister Vyacheslav the accession to the CIS Collective Security Treaty. Kebich: “I think thatClinton and the US State Did thatdecision of the legislative powermean the Department saw the visit to Belarus as a symbolic act. renouncement of neutrality ideas? For instance, The voluntary renunciation of a young country from Turkmenistan, claiming the neutrality status, decided nuclear weapons possession had no precedent, it was not to sign the Tashkent Treaty. In December 1995, necessary to somehow morally encourage its leaders the neutrality of this Central Asian Republic was and give them security guarantees. On this basis the confirmed by the UN General Assembly. program of stay in Minsk was developed” [see: 11]. The Ukrainian leadership did not sign the It should be noted that the second significant CST because since gaining its independence fact that attracted the attention of politicians and itannouncedthe country’s policy direction towards researchers was the situation around the signing of the European integration. At the same time, we can not Collective Security Treaty (CST) by the Republic of definitely state that Belarus denounced its neutrality Belarus. The document was signed on May 15, 1992 after signing the CST. In our view, the signing of the in Tashkent by the leaders of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Treaty with general obligations did not mean the final Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. choice of Belarus in favor of participation inpolitical Belarus signed it only on December 31, 1993, much and militaryblocs. later than the other post-Soviet states. The main The leaders of all the branches power of the young reason for the delay was the absence of unity among Belarusian state preferred to keep quite acautious

14 policy in the sphere of security. The reasons were creators was to become theConfederation of Belarus the following: the understanding of a weakimpact and Russia. And finally on December 8, 1999 Boris of Minsk on the situation in the region, dependence Yeltsin and signed a Treaty on stronger players, the need to firstly implement establishing the Union State and the Program of adaptation policy. Another characteristic of the Actions of the Russian Federation and the Republic period was the lack of unity in the approaches towards of Belarus on the implementation of the Treaty the main directions of domestic and foreign policy, provisions. These documents providedfor the not only inthe society but also at the level of state establishment of the Union State, which brought institutions. While in the early years of Belarusian together two equal states with a common economic independence, the idea of ​​its indissoluble unity with space, a common customs territory, a common the other post-Soviet countries, and first of all with currency, a common budget and a coordinated Russia, clearly dominated. policy in the fields of international affairs, defense, Up until July, 1994 the centers of foreign policy security [2]. decision-making were the Council of Ministers Although the ambitious plans for the creation represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Union State of Belarus and Russia werenot the Supreme Council of the country, represented by subsequently implemented in full, many initiatives the Commission for Foreign Affairs and External wererealized. Significant results were achieved in the Economic Relations. The rivalry existed around both military cooperation area between the two states. specific and general foreign policy issues. An active Thus, in 2001 the Military Doctrine of the Union rolein the foreign policy debate was played by thethe State was adopted. The defensive nature of the Supreme Council’s deputies that were part of the interstate Union was declared, as well as its focus on opposition faction of the Belarusian Popular Front. the maintenance of strategic stability, creation of the In accordance with the legislation at that time conditions for a lasting and fair peace. the Supreme Council (Parliament) determined the The most large-scale results in the interaction of main foreign policy directions of the Republic of the two states in the field of safety were achieved by Belarus, it could declare war and make peace. Only the establishment of a joint military group and the the Supreme Council could carry out the ratification formation of the Joint Air Defense System (JADS). and denunciation of international treaties of the Thus, the Joint Regional Group (JRG) of Republic of Belarus. Belarusian and Russian troops was created in 2000. Its A completely new stage in the conceptual and members included the Armed Forces of the Republic doctrinal design of domestic and foreign policy, of Belarus and the 20th Army of the Western Military including the field of security started after the election District of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, of A. G. Lukashenko President of the Republic together with the compounds, military units of the of Belarus (July, 1994). Two seemingly distinct central and district subordination. Protecting the approaches were laid as the policy basis: the multi- Western borders of the Union State was declared as vectorprinciple, on the one hand, and the policy of the JRG’s priority. In accordance with the Joint Plan active rapprochement with Russia, on the other. of Actions around 30–40 joint activities of operational For the first time the multi-vector principle with and combat training of different levels and character respect to the Belarusian foreign policy was officially were held annually to ensure the groupfunctioning. announced in the speech of Alexander Lukashenko Thus, in September, 2015 military exercises the

at the first All-Belarusian People’s Assembly “Union Shield – 2015”, which were attended by I nternational Relations and Foreign Policy (October19, 1996). In particular, the Belarusian 8,000 troops from Russia and Belarus with 80 aircraft leader noted: “Taking into account our geopolitical and helicopters involved using up to 400 units of position only multi-vector and balanced foreign equipment, took place in the Baltic Sea at the military policycan be effective. Firstly, it involves maintaining ranges of Leningrad, Pskov and Kaliningrad regions, good relations with the neighboring countries” [20, as well as offshore landfill scale [4]. p. 28]. Belarusian-Russian military exercises, generally, The appeal to the multi-vector principlein the caused a negative reaction in the neighboring middle-second half of the 1990s, in our opinion, was country-members of NATO, as well as among the mainly declarative. Announcing the multi-vector NATO leadership. Regarding the preparations for the principle as an important foreign policy principle was 2017 regular large-scale Belarusian-Russian military inherent in almost all the countries. exercises “West-2017”, there is a heated debatein the On the other hand, after the election of the first Mass Media of Belarus and other countries about the Belarusian President active rapprochement with estimated number of Russian troops and arms, which Russia as the mainforeign policy direction of the are planned to be transferred to Belarus. A number Republic of Belarus became apparent. April 2, 1996 of publications provide information that up to 4162 whenthe Treaty establishing the Commonwealth of wagons with military cargo will arrive from Russia to Belarus and Russia was signed in Moscow, can be Belarus for the exercises [26]. The announcement determined as the starting point of the integration of such an impressive large-scale transfer of military of the two countries. Exactly one year later it was forces causes contradictory, often sensational renamed into the Union, which in the plans of its conclusions and opinions.

15 On February 3, 2009 the Union State Supreme The situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia State Council decided to merge the Russian and was not the only disagreement of Belarusian and Belarusian air defense systems. The partners suggested Russian leadership. that this decision would improve the efficiency of air The above mentioned “bumps” of Belarus-Russia defense by 15–20 %. cooperation were reflected in the official debate, at the The joint Belarusian-Russian activities carried same time they did not have a major impact on the out in the military sphere, demonstrate the desire content of the conceptual documents adopted by the ofBelarusian and Russian leadership to take Belarusian leadership. The only difference was that the specificmeasures to strengthen their security and multi-vectorprinciple was declared more often [24]. create a real counterbalance to NATO’s military Thus, Article 27 of the Law of the Republic capabilities. It is the North Atlantic Alliance that was of Belarus “On the Main Directions of Domestic perceived as the major “opponent” of Belarus in the and Foreign Policy of the Republic of Belarus” sphere of security, even if it was not mentioned in the (November 14, 2005) declared that the foreign policy official documents. objectiveshad to be proportionalto thepotential of the The second half of the 1990s and the first decade state, which had to strive to build good-neighborly of the new millennium was characterized by fierce relations with the neighboring countries and integrate anti-NATO rhetoric of the Belarusian authorities. into the global community [17]. Belarus as well as Russia criticized NATO expansion. Another fundamental document which attempted NATO bombing of Serbian forces (1999) and Kosovo to provide answers to the emerging internal and separation provoked anespecially negative reaction in external challenges is the National Security Belarus. Criticism of the Euro-Atlantic alliance on Conceptof the Republic of Belarus. There were the part of the Belarusian authorities was often even three editions of this documents in the history of the tougher than the Kremlin’s statements. country. The first Concept was adopted in 1995, the Bilateral cooperation in the military sphere was second – in 2001. The current concept, approved complemented by the interaction between Minsk by thePresidential Decree on November 9, 2010 and Moscow in a broader multilateral format. Thus, emphasized, in particular, the need for the country to in 2002 six post-Soviet countries (Russia, Belarus, pursue a consistent and balanced multi-vector foreign Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia)signed policy in order to protect itselffromthe external threats an agreement on the establishment of the Collective to national security. In this document the Republic of Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). According Belarus is viewed as a European country that does to Art. 3 of the Charter of this Organization, “The not belong to any world power center. The Concept purposes of the Organization are to strengthen peace also states that the Belarusian multi-vector foreign and international and regional security and stability and policyis based on a comprehensive cooperation with to ensure the collective defense of the independence, Russia, former states as well as Western territorialintegrity and sovereignty of the member countries, and the EU, in particular. Moreover, the States, in the attainment of which the member States priority is also given to the relations with the countries shall give priority to political measures” [7]. in Asia, Africa and Latin America, namely China, For decades the official Minsk did not give any India, Vietnam, Venezuela and Brazil [10]. reason to doubt its position as the most reliable and In contrast to trade and economic relations the consistent Russian ally. However, in the beginning of disputes between Minsk and Moscow in thepolitical the 2000s some events that revealed a more attentive and military spheres were not systematic. When and careful comprehension of Belarus in terms of its they appeared, they were mainly a reaction to the economic, military and political interests took place. economic debate between the two states. Hence, in Thus, in 2008 against the will of Moscow Belarus did 2009 in response to Russia’s economic sanctions not officially recognize the self-proclaimed states of against some Belarusian products (“milk war”) Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This fact immediately the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko at attracted attention on the part of Russia and the West. the CSTO Summit on June 14, 2009 (Kyrgyzstan) The fact that the official Minsk kept distancefrom the refused to sign the Treaty establishing the Collective Russian-Georgian conflict was “appreciated” by the Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) and was not present US and EU. Belarus was invited to the EU program at their exercises. Although in October, 2009 the “Eastern Partnership”, the exchange of official visits was Belarusian signature was already in the Treaty, intensified. A similar position on the formal recognition however, Minsk’s position caused mixed reviews in of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence was the Russian Media [6]. taken by the rest of the CSTO member states (the A new stage in the geopolitical history of Eastern independence of the self-proclaimed republics was Europe is associated with the Ukrainian crisis, recognized only by four UN member states (Russia, whenit grew into the phase of hostilitiesin Donbass in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru).The interview of February, 2014. The crisis had an impact on Belarus- the Georgian President Saakashvili to the Belarusian Russiarelations, as in the fierce confrontation between television given in July, 2010 during the ongoing Russia and Ukraine, the Belarusian government Georgian-Russian confrontationcaused certain sought to maintain friendly contacts with both irritation on the Russian side. sides. A little more than a month after the victoryof

16 “Maidan” supporters A. Lukashenko held talks with Federation Belarus adopted a new Military Doctrine the Acting Ukrainian President Alexander Turchinov of the Republic of Belarus. Belarusian leader (April, 2014) in Gomel region, and later took part signedits approvalon July 20, 2016. The Doctrine in the inauguration ceremony of the President of states that the geopolitical centers of power seek Ukraine Petr Poroshenko [3]. to expand their strategic zones of influence, which These eventsled to the fact that in the Russian leads to the infringement and block of other states’ Media the politicians and analysts of the neighboring interests provoking tensions and enhancing inter- side more frequently criticized Belarus for “violating” state conflicts.However, despite the increasing Minsk and Moscow’salliance, for “the desire to sit challenges and threats in the region, the Republic on two chairs” for “trying to turn the countryto the of Belarus does not consider any of the States as its West” and etc. enemy. Paragraph 19 of the Doctrine, which states For some time the situation was smoothed by that the Republic of Belarus while maintaining the fact that the conflicting parties chose Minsk as good neighborly and mutually beneficial relations a negotiation platform for the conflict settlement of with the European Union, a partnership with the South-Eastern Ukraine. The talks of the leaders of North Atlantic Treaty Organization is committed the so-called “Norman Quartet”, which took place to building an equitable dialogue, improving in Minsk in February, 2015 received a worldwide transparency and mutual development through coverage. The agreement that was reached promoted strengthening regional security,aroused particular the cessation of large-scale clashes and was called interest among the experts [18]. “Minsk 2”. It became not only the hope for the The new Doctrineadoption has intensified the armed conflictsettlement, but also gave Belarus a new debate whether in practice Belarus is really committed peacekeeping image. to neutrality. Different political orientationexperts The Belarusian government valued this positive joined the discussion on this controversial issue. This fact and became more cautious not only in its foreign was the topic of the scientific conferenceheld in Minsk policy rhetoric, but also in the action planning. in late June, 2016. The conference debate results are Belarus made attempts to mediate in the Russia summarized in the publication of the Ostrogorski and Turkeyconflict. In particular, in Ashgabat in Center “Elements of Neutrality in Belarusian Foreign December, 2015 at the International Conference Policy and National Security Policy” by Siarhei “Neutrality Policy: International Cooperation for Bogdan and Gumer Isaev [5]. The researched focused Peace, Security and Development” A. Lukashenko on theissueswhereBelarusian position was different expressed the desire of Belarus to contribute to the from the Russian one. In my view, on the basis of the restoration of friendly relations between Russia analysis the research authors came to an unreasonable and Turkey [12]. Therefore, in the Belarusian- conclusion. They argue that the policy pursued by the Russian tandem Belarus began to try on the role of Belarusian government from the late 2000s led to the intermediary in the relations between Moscow and emergence of actual neutrality. This course was the its external opponents. result of specific decisions made by the Belarusian Meanwhile, Belarusian-Russian controversieswent leadership on the country’s major foreign policy and to a new level with the beginning of the discussion national security policyissues. about placing the Russian military air basein Belarus. The intensified confrontation between NATO As it became known from the open press, on September and Russiabrought additional tension to the

7, 2015 the Government of the Russian Federation Belarusian-Russian debate on various controversial I nternational Relations and Foreign Policy adopted Decree № 945, which approved the attached issues. Both sides have moved to building up military Draft Agreement between the Russian Federation and forces on their borders, including the border with the Republic of Belarus on establishing a Russian air Belarus. This created a serious threat to the security base on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. The of Belarus, which views regional demilitarization as Draft Agreement was submitted by the Ministry of its vital interest. In this situation the official Minsk Defense of the Russian Federation andhad previously tried to take a non-confrontational stance, which been worked out with “the Belarusian side”. The in one way or another had to be understood by both above mentioned Decree suggested thatthe President conflicting sides. This position was expressed by of the Russian Federation signed the Agreement [9]. Belarusian Foreign Minister during As it became known from the official chronicle, the his visit to Warsaw on October, 10 in 2016: “We do not Belarusian side did not support the Russian initiative, perceive what is happening as a direct military threat considering that the the air base placement in Bobruisk for Belarus, but we consider it a challenge and we are made little sense from the military point of view, butin thinking about the methods to adequately respond to the political area – would causeserious tensions in these events” [15]. the region [13]. The position of the parties was widely In contrast to the moderateposition of the publicized in the Media and continues to be actively Russian leadership Minsk’s peacekeeping initiatives discussed until the present. and evaluation were welcomed by the EU as a In the context of a significant thawing of whole and its individual Member States, especially relations between Belarus, the EU and the US, Poland. During 2016 several senior representatives recent deterioration of relations with the Russian from Warsaw visited Minsk: Polish Foreign Minister

17 Witold Waszczykowski (March 22–23, 2016), Deputy its position in the relations with the neighboring and Prime Minister of Poland, Minister of Economic other countries. Development Mateusz Moravetsky (October, 24). While formulating the security policy the And finally, at the end of a politically saturated year Belarusian authorities take into account the position on December 4–6, 2016 thePolish Senate Marshal of several major social groups that support different, Stanislav Karchevsky paid a working visitto Belarus. sometimes conflicting, geopolitical views. He met with the President of Belarus Alexander Obviously, there is no reason to talk about some Lukashenko and the leaders of both National neutral status of Belarus and even anintention to Assembly Chambers of the Republic of Belarus obtain this status, the rejection of Minsk from its Mikhail Myasnikovich and Vladimir Andreichenko military and allied relations with Russia and its [14]. In the diplomatic language the visit of the obligations under the Collective Security Treaty Polish Sejm’s leader meant the resumption of official Organization. Belarus-Poland contacts at the parliamentary level. 2. The differences that exist between Belarus As it is known, these contacts were officially frozen and Russia, in essence, are not systematic. by the European Union governing bodies’ decision Belarusianactions can only be assessed as a maneuver in September, 1997 [23]. within the freedom of actionsprovided by the As the warming of Belarus – EU, Belarus – obligations undertaken in the official documents. USrelations was progressing the Russian media To a large extent, they were a response to the crisis intensified the information campaign about “Belarus escalation in and around Ukraine. This maneuver repeating the Ukrainian scenario.” Some Internet unreasonably regarded by some Russian experts and portals were especially zealous in these actions. The politicians as a “betrayal of allied commitments.” propaganda campaign that does not reflect the real The campaign unfolded in the Russian Media situation, in practice can cause serious damage to against certain aspects of the Belarusian foreign policy Belarus-Russia cooperation and strengthen the forces poses a serious threat because it uses information that opposeequal and mutually beneficial cooperation warfare methods. The ungrounded conclusions and between Belarus and Russia in both countries. opinions, published materials infringe upon the Thus, on the basis of the information presented national dignity of the Belarusian citizens, and can above a brief summary can be made. mislead many Russians. Conclusions: 3. Belarus can not and does not go beyond the 1. The evolution of the security policy of the existing scope of integration for many reasons, Republic of Belarus becomes more visible as we move including because of its strong economic dependence along the path of its independent existence. In our on Russia. The European Union is not ready and can view, it is becoming more pragmatic and focused on not replace Russia as a major partner in the economic the state interests. To a greater extent the Belarusian or securitysectors. authorities consider the geopolitical features of the It should be emphasized that in the current countryin the political decision-making. However, environment Belarus is not able to go beyond there are no reasons to talk not only about the the allotted freedom of maneuver. It is likely that neutrality status, but also about a clear movement the actionsbeyond the “red line” can cause a towards neutrality of this average in size and potential tough reaction from Russia. Under the present Eastern European country. circumstances there is a clear contradiction The attempt of some political forces in Belarus between how Russia wants to see Belarus how the to make it a neutral state ended up with the signing Belarusian people want to see it. How do these of the Tashkent Pact (1993). The creation of the expectationscorrespond with each other? Union State of Belarus and Russia (1999) led to The situation in Eastern Europe creates the deepening of military cooperation between the uncertainty in the regional security system. For two countries (unified military troops, joint missile Belarus located between the geopolitical centers of defense system). However, in the framework of the power it presents a serious challenge. The question alliance commitmentsBelarus has every right to of geopolitical “surprises” that may occur both in the declare and implement its national interests, to defend short and in the long run is still open.

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