june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7

The Consolidate It is clear that the Taliban movement 11 attacks. Although each of these local is gaining strength, and unless the Taliban groups have their own distinct Control in ’s Tribal government attempts to exploit some of structure and are independent in their Regions the movement’s internal divisions, it is respective areas of control, they are likely that the Taliban’s influence will bound together by pooling financial and By Muhammad Amir Rana encroach further into the settled areas human resources. of the North-West Frontier Province. pakistan’s local taliban have This local support base—held together consolidated their control over the Emergence of the Local Taliban by tribal affinities and ideological Federally Administered Tribal Areas The situation in the tribal areas did associations—allows the Taliban (FATA) and are now extending their not deteriorate overnight. During the leadership to entrench their movement influence toward the settled districts past seven years, the Taliban have into the masses and establish separate of the North-West Frontier Province moved strategically to gain increasing local Taliban cells, thus reducing the (NWFP). More than 50 Taliban control of the region. When al-Qa`ida organizational burden on the central affiliated groups are operating in FATA and Taliban remnants slipped into leadership and creating a strategic and its adjoining areas.1 In the settled Pakistan’s tribal areas after the fall of problem for the Pakistani military districts of the NWFP, 14 Taliban ’s government in 2001, establishment since it is forced to target groups2 are trying to strengthen their its “own” people. The Taliban encourage grip.3 The government’s consecutive “The ‘local’ Taliban different tribes to form their own military operations and peace deals Taliban-affiliated militias. Initially, with the militants have not produced are basically Pakistani groups joining the Taliban were mostly the desired results, and the writ of the militia groups that share from the Wazir sub-tribes, which state is weakening in the tribal areas. made other tribes reluctant to join the Taliban leader , ideological beliefs and Taliban ranks since they feared Wazir whose leadership qualities were once goals with the former domination;6 the Taliban, however, questioned by the Taliban supreme changed their strategy and gave other council,4 has recently not only won the ruling Taliban regime in tribes equal status.7 As a result, now confidence of Mullah Omar, but has Afghanistan.” most tribes in FATA have their own emerged as the unanimous leader of the Taliban-affiliated militia. Taliban in Pakistan. His opponents— both outside and inside Taliban circles— Toward Talibanization fear his increasing influence and are too they already had logistics support bases Until 2004, the main focus of the weak to oppose him. Even the FATA set up in the form of madaaris (religious local Taliban was protecting foreign political administration and tribal elders schools), training camps and Islamic militants, recruitment for the war cannot afford to deny his authority in charity missions. They were also able in Afghanistan, military training North and South . The same to count on sympathies from the local and counter-operations against the situation prevails in other agencies population. To maintain control in these Pakistani government. Baitullah of FATA, where Baitullah Mehsud’s areas, they exploited these sympathies Mehsud began enforcing Taliban-brand allies are enjoying similar powers. and distributed large sums of money Shari`a in South Waziristan in 2004. to establish their networks. When the He punished criminals, which made 1 As many as 40 groups have joined Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani government deployed the him popular among common tribesmen Pakistan (TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud. Other ma- military into the region to stop their who welcomed an enforcement jor groups/leaders still maintaining their independent infiltration, al-Qa`ida and the Taliban mechanism. In his first peace deal with 8 integrity are Lashkar-i-Islami in Khyber Agency, Qari supreme council encouraged Pakistan’s the government in February 2005, he Gul Bahadar in North Waziristan, in South local Taliban elements, with whom received assurances that he would be Waziristan, Dr. Ismail’s group in Bajaur Agency and lo- they had a long affiliation, to establish allowed to enforce Shari`a in the area in 5 cal militants in Dara Adam Khel. their militias. The “local” Taliban exchange for not sending his militants 2 The statistics are based on data collected by the Pak are basically Pakistani militia groups to Afghanistan. Although he did not Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) from field and media that share ideological beliefs and abide by the agreement, it helped the reports. goals with the former ruling Taliban Taliban move forward to establish 3 These groups are operating mainly in Mardan, Kohat, regime in Afghanistan; indeed, many their influence. Other Taliban fighters Dera and Nowshera Districts of the NWFP. of the former regime’s leaders were followed the footsteps of Mehsud and Most of these groups have joined the TTP. Groups in the themselves based in Pakistan before formulated a four-point strategy to gain settled areas of the NWFP are mainly formed by the dif- they took control of Afghanistan. Most control over an area. During the first step ferent jihadist organizations and tribesmen who have of the local Taliban leaders—including of the strategy, they took action against roots in FATA. Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Faqir, Gul 4 After the assassination of Taliban leader Nek Muham- Bahadur, Mullah Nazir, among others— 6 Rana and Gunaratna, Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Paki- mad in 2004, Baitullah took charge as operational com- were affiliated with the central Taliban stani Tribal Areas. mander, but the Taliban supreme council replaced him leadership even before the September 7 The Taliban now share responsibilities among tribes with . For details, see Muhammad to give the impression that all groups are equal under the Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, Al-Qaeda Fights Back: 5 Jamsheed Baghwan, “Interview of Mullah Nazir,” Daily Taliban banner. Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas (: PIPS, 2007). Express, May 13, 2007. 8 Dawn, February 22, 2005. june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 criminals and started collecting taxes These developments have allowed the The TTP has imposed conditions on through donations to speed up their Taliban to maintain influence in the all its affiliated groups to contribute operations. Second, they killed or forced tribal areas. The significant strategic 50% of their income (through taxes and out influential tribal elders, whom they victory that established them as major donations) to a major “jihad fund.” The knew could challenge their authority. players in the region, however, occurred fund is used to sustain Taliban activities Third, they created a parallel judicial after they made a tactical change in in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan.17 system to resolve disputes, dispensing their operations: they began kidnapping According to anonymous sources based quick and decisive justice. Fourth, they security and state officials. Although in South Waziristan, these small groups, suicide attacks on security forces which are mostly operating in Mohmand, played a role in demoralizing security Orakzai, Tank, and other settled “Kidnappings are a major personnel, the kidnapping strategy areas, are becoming involved in criminal factor behind the ongoing elevated the Taliban into a position to activities—especially ransoms, and negotiate with the government on their taxing transport and trade—to achieve peace talks between the own terms and to foster the release of their financial goals. These same government and the arrested militants. Independent sources sources claimed that these groups also estimate that the Taliban kidnapped kidnap and ransom unpopular wealthy Taliban.” more then 1,000 security force personnel tribal elders and businessmen. and state officials during 2007, and in return more than 500 militants were Threat of Infighting released. Kidnappings are a major factor Although Baitullah has emerged as a organized their administration on a behind the ongoing peace talks between powerful Taliban leader, many other non-tribal basis; they appointed trusted the government and the Taliban. local Taliban groups have still not joined men,9 irrespective of whether they the TTP, especially Lashkar-i-Islami in belonged to a local tribe.10 The Taliban’s Expanding Domain Khyber, Mullah Nazir’s tribal militia As the Taliban’s confidence grows, in South Waziristan and Gul Bahadar’s Their strategy eroded the traditional concept they are expanding their territorial militia in North Waziristan. of collective responsibility, which adversely control. Today, they have established affected the political administration. Other strongholds in Bajaur, Waziristan, The TTP is trying to bring these groups actors who could create ideological or Mohmand, Khyber and Orakzai Agencies into its fold and is also threatening them tactical challenges for them were treated in FATA, and in Swat, Dara Adam Khel, of the consequences of refusal. They harshly, especially Non-Governmental Tank, Bannu, Mardan, Lakki Marwat are particularly interested in Khyber Organizations (NGO) and formal and and Dera Ismail Khan in the NWFP. Agency, which is a resourceful area for modern educational institutions. generating funds and is where Mangal Today, these Taliban groups have Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have imposed a ban on NGOs, have targeted provided shelter to small groups, which electronics shops and attacked schools, are working under the command of “As the Taliban’s especially female institutions. During Baitullah Mehsud.15 Mehsud is trying confidence grows, they are January to May 2008, they attacked as to bond all of these groups under the many as 29 schools, of which 17 were loyalty of Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s expanding their territorial educational institutes for girls.11 From supreme leader. Every group that wants control.” 2006 until February 2007, the Taliban to join the TTP must take an oath of killed 61 teachers,12 and 25 local and commitment to Shari`a enforcement and foreign NGOs were forced to halt their loyalty to Mullah Omar.16 Through this operations and return to Islamabad.13 arrangement, Mehsud wins the favor of Bagh, the leader of Lashkar-i-Islami, Twenty-four alleged U.S. and Pakistani the Taliban supreme council on the one has been strengthening his position government spies were killed during the hand, and on the other hand establishes and wants to expand his network and past six months.14 his credibility, making it difficult for influence to all of Khyber and the groups to resist his leadership. His border areas, such as Hangu District 9 Khalid Aziz, “Impact of 9/11 War on Tribal Society,” strategy so far has been successful; he and Orakzai Agency. Anonymous The News, June 1, 2008. is generating revenues in addition to sources claim that the TTP assigned 10 All of the area’s tribes are represented in the Taliban. human resources, the latter of which Haji Namdar, the chief of Amr bil Maroof The Taliban use tribal identity to motivate people, but in he is using to support the insurgency in wa Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue the administrative structure avoid emphasizing tribal Afghanistan. and Prevention of Vice) from Orakzai connections as they consider these differences against Agency to start a campaign to achieve the teachings of Islam. control over the area. To respond to 11 This information is drawn from a PIPS database. The this threat, Mangal Bagh sent a suicide figures were collected from media reports. figures were collected from media reports. 12 Massoud Ansari, “‘Jihad’ Against Female Education,” 15 For more on Tehrik-i-Taliban, see Hassan Abbas, “A 17 NWFP Governor Owais Ahmad Ghani claims that Newsline, March 2007. Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1:2 Baitullah is spending around three billion rupees annu- 13 “Taliban Warned NGOs to Leave or Face Consequenc- (2008). ally on procuring weapons, equipment, vehicles, treating es,” Daily Islam, May 13, 2007. 16 This information is drawn from interviews of sources wounded militants and supporting the families of killed 14 This information is drawn from a PIPS database. The in the tribal areas. militants. See Daily Times, May 30, 2008. june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 bomber to kill Haji Namdar, but Namdar escaped.18 Local sources also argue that if the TTP fails to consolidate control over competing factions, this will encourage other small groups to revolt against it.

Although the Taliban are rapidly increasing control in Pakistan’s tribal areas, it may be the ideal time to exacerbate the group’s internal divisions to defuse or at least weaken their rising power and influence. The government, however, does not look serious in exploiting these rifts and is instead focusing on the strategy of peace deals, which may benefit the Taliban more since these deals allow them to gain guarantees for Shari`a enforcement and for the continuation of the jihad in Afghanistan.

Muhammad Amir Rana is an expert on terrorism and regional strategic issues. He has served in senior positions in prestigious English and newspapers and research institutes. He has authored several books on the phenomenon of Islamic militancy. His book, A to Z of Jihad Organizations in Pakistan, is considered the first serious attempt to unfold the jihadist organizations’ structures, networks, internal affairs, disputes and internal divisions. Currently, he is serving as director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), based in Islamabad, Pakistan. PIPS is an independent, not- for-profit, non-governmental research and advocacy think-tank. An initiative of leading Pakistani scholars, researchers and journalists, PIPS conducts wide-ranging research and analysis of political, social and religious conflicts that have a direct bearing on both national and international security.

18 “Khyber Agency, Suicide Attack in Mosque, 3 Killed, 18 Injured,” Daily Jang, May 2, 2008.