FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Arctic Free Zone

Bachelor Thesis

EKATERINA GONCHAROVA

Supervisor: prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D.

Department of Political Sciences Strategic and Security Studies Brno 2019/2020

ARCTIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE

Bibliografic Record

Author: Ekaterina Goncharova Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of Political Science Title of Thesis: Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Degree Programme: Strategic and Security Studies Supervisor: prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2019/2020 Number of Pages: 64 Keywords: nuclear weapons; nuclear weapon free zone; ; USA; international regimes; proliferation; NATO; Arctic

ARCTIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE

Abstract

This bachelor thesis sets out to identify the possibility of establishing nuclear weapon free zone in Arctic region. First a research of a set of international treaties identifies what is a NWFZ and its varieties followed by the brief history of the concept and review of Antarctic NWFZ which is supposed to be to a certain extent mirrored by Arctic NWFZ. Next part is the theoretical research reviewing the essence of international regime and how it can be applied towards Arctic region. Last part covers the historical circumstances for ANWFZ and official positions of state (US and Russian Federation) as well as non-state actors interested in development in the region.

ARCTIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Bachelor's Thesis concerning the topic of Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno 6 December 2019 Ekaterina Goncharova

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents

List of Terms and Acronyms 5

1 Introduction 6

2 Theoretical background 8

3 Nuclear weapon free zones common provisions 9 3.1 What is a nuclear weapon free zone ...... 9 3.2 The reasons and history of the development of the concept of NWFZs ...... 18 3.3 Antarctic NWFZ ...... 20

4 The perspective of establishment of Arctic international regime 24 4.1 What is an international regime ...... 24 4,2 Perspectives of application of international regime to Arctic region ...... 28 4.2.1 Neorealism ...... 28 4.2.2 Neoliberalism ...... 30

5 Why Arctic should be nuclear-weapon-free 34 5.1 The history of initiative (Gorbachev speech) ...... 34 5.2 Current situation concerning Arctic region (USA vs. Russian Federation) ...... 39 5.3 Canadian Pugwash Group position ...... 44

5 Conclusion 47

Bibliography 51

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Terms and Acronyms

ANWFZ – Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency NNWS – Non-Nuclear Weapon States NPT – The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the Non-Proliferation Treaty NWFZ – Nuclear Weapon Free Zone NWS – Nuclear Weapon States

1 Introduction

The very idea of nuclear or at least the limitation of the use of nuclear weapons appeared simultaneously with nuclear research and development. Disarmament and peace negotiations were going hand in hand with nuclear tests and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Promoting of treaties restricting and limiting territorial use of nuclear weapons has become one of the opportunities for collective disarmament and therefore easing worldwide tensions and fears of possible nuclear war. Establishing of NWFZs, where any activity concerning nuclear weapons is prohibited, has become the culmination of this tendency. This thesis is devoted to the perspective of establishment of NWFZ in Arctic. This region nowadays represents two biggest challenges of the 20th and 21st century, namely nuclear weapons and global climate change (see Buckley 2013: 167). Main research question for the study in hand is: what are the perspectives of establishing NWFZ in Arctic region. There will also be more detailed questions: - how to define NWFZ and Arctic region in general, - what are current approaches to defining legal regime that is supposed to govern ANWFZ. In the first capitol I will analyze common provisions concerning NWFZs, particularly what it is and its principles, what are they for and how the entire concept works. I will also provide some other ways of establishing NWFZs other than by international agreement and differences between seemingly similar concepts of demilitarized zone and NWFZ. Next subcapitol is describing historically first NWFZ established by international agreement, that is zone in Antarctic. I also

consider it important to define similarities and differences between two polar regions. By those who are not experts in this field it is often supposed that these regions are different only geographically and therefore it is not necessary to think over and establish completely different regime, which is however a common misconception. The subject of the second capitol will be the concept of international regimes and the possibilities of its application to NWFZs. I will consider two regimes, particularly those from neorealist and neoliberal points of view and will provide their basic provisions and principles. I will try to prove the standpoint I am adhering to, namely that in Arctic neither regime is going to work as supposed mostly because of relationships between two major Arctic states. The last capitol will be devoted specifically to the situation around the Arctic, to both what happened in the past and is going on nowadays. The first part of the capitol will be the analysis of the progressive idea of the then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the to establish NWFZ in Northern that inter alia symbolized the end of rivalry between two blocs. In the next part I will analyze present-day activity of the and Russia in the Arctic region. This part will show that both states have an enormous interest in this area and take all possible steps to establish their superiority there.

2 Theoretical background

The following thesis is mostly of descriptive character. Substantial part of it is devoted to the description of historical and present-day events and political arguments and statements. This thesis is based on the theory of non-proliferation that is closely related to international relations theories and regimes. It is oriented on particular case study, particularly that of Arctic region. I will compare approaches of different states and how their actions are described in secondary sources in order to make a full picture of the present situation in Arctic. Important methodologic component of the thesis is the analysis of the present-day situation based on the theory of international regimes.

3 Nuclear weapon free zones common provisions

3.1 What is a nuclear weapon free zone

Due to a tremendous destroying potential of nuclear weapons only 5 states in the world are officially permitted to possess it. These are so- called members of nuclear club, who are at the same time permanent members of United Nations Security Council. In order to prevent the horizontal proliferation and to make already existing problems more manageable the rest of the world is trying to limit the geographical scope of the use of nuclear weapon for non-peaceful purposes by establishing NWFZs. According to the Resolution 3472 B (1975) of the United Nations General Assembly a NWFZ is understood as a “zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention”. According to Hanna Newcombe (1980) “a nuclear-free zone can be defined as a world region from which nuclear weapons are totally absent (whether under the control of the nation whose territory it is, or under the control of another nation), and where a system of verification ensures compliance with this agreement by all parties”. From this definition we can highlight NWFZs’ main principles, which are however to be described below in more details. “Total absence” might be described as non-possession, non-deployment, non-manufacture (including delivery systems) and non-use of nuclear weapons (Buckley 2012: 16). System of mutual supervision represented by reliable

instruments to control the implementation of the establishing treaties also needs to be in place. Other authors (see e.g. Hamel-Green 2009, Axworthy and French 2010) describe NWFZ phenomenon mostly through listing its principles and purposes. For this reason I consider the previous definition quite exhaustive and there is no need to introduce similar definitions of the same nature. The member States of the NWFZs are committing themselves to prohibit the research, design, development, testing, acquisition, deployment, and possession of nuclear weapons on their sovereign territories (Agency for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 2018). Moreover there needs to be an international system of verification and control in order to provide the compliance with the provisions of the treaty establishing that particular NWFZ. Nowadays there are 5 NWFZs established1, that cover the whole Southern hemisphere and partly Northern hemisphere; the population of these territories makes approximately 10% of the total global population (Lutz 2012). Nevertheless it does not make them less important concerning worldwide security issues. On the contrary these are the territories of great and often unexplored natural resources, trade routes and natural wealth, which makes them territories of potential conflicts for sources.

1 Hanna Newcombe however includes outer space and seabed and ocean floor in NWFZs. Their particularity lies in the fact that they were never nuclearized to the extent and in the sense we understand it. Outer space and the seabed never had nuclear weapons emplaced in ways now forbidden by both treaties (i.e. in orbit around the Earth, on the Moon or other celestial bodies, or affixed to the seabed or ocean floor); thus, no removal of weapons was involved.

Existing NWFZ treaties share an essential basic goal, namely, the banning of nuclear weapons from explicitly designated regions. This is accomplished by aforementioned prohibiting of the development, possession and testing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices by state parties to the zone, as well as their deployment by other states in the area. All existing zones also determinedly ensure that peaceful uses of nuclear energy remain available for the regions’ development needs which echoes article IV, paragraph 1 of the NPT2. A protocol for the recognized nuclear weapon states is attached to all NWFZ treaties, in which their commitments to the zone are enumerated. This protocol generally includes the obligations to respect the zone and to obstain from use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against zone parties. However, all treaties leave to the discretion of each state party the decision on transit rights, i.e. foreign vessels’ visits to ports and travel through air space and territorial waters3. To ensure compliance with treaty obligations, all zones establish a control system which is based on IAEA Safeguards and additional supporting mechanisms, such as reports, exchange of information and clarifications, to be managed by a designated entity or a body established expressly for this purpose. All NWFZ treaties are in force indefinitely, and none allow reservations (see Müller, Franceschini, Melamud et al: 2016). The undertaking of such a scale needs to be properly regulated by a set of rules and principles. For this purpose the Disarmament Commission in its report of April 30, 1999 recommended a set of

2 Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 3 These principles are described below in more details.

provisions that are to be concerned as guidelines and ruling principles of NWFZs. These principles include: • NWFZs are to be established on the basis of freely negotiated and arrived arrangements among the States of the region concerned. • The initiative to establish a NWFZ should be based only on the decision of the region States and promoted by all the States. • In case of existing consensus concerning the will to establish a NWFZ in a particular region the international community is supposed to support it and provide necessary possible assistance. The role of the United Nations in the matter of supporting States of the region concerned is essential. • The participation of all States of the region concerned in all negotiations is supposed and the arrangements agreed upon are to be arrived on the basis of free will. • The status of NWFZ is to be respected not only by State parties to that particular treaty but also by States outside the region including States whose cooperation and support are essential for the maximum effectiveness of such a zone (nuclear weapon States are meant). • Member states of the NWFZ treaty for the purposes of effective functioning of the zone are free to decide whether to allow visits of foreign ships and aircrafts, their transfer via their territory including airspace and territorial seas, archipelagic waters or straits. At the same time there should be respect for the right of innocent

passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage in straights used for international navigation. This means that should the NWFZ member state assume there is a nuclear device on board of the ship, or aircraft, it is free to prohibit its passage via its territory in order not to violate the treaty. • The nuclear-weapon States are to be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty concerning the establishing a NWFZ. Through signing, ratification of a particular Treaty and relevant protocols they undertake legally binding commitments to the status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty4. • Every treaty establishing the NWFZ should provide for the effective prohibition of the development, manufacturing, control, possession, testing, stationing or transporting by the States parties to the treaty of any type

4 For the purpose of this research it is considered to be suitable to mention one more thing concerning the proliferation and possible use of nuclear weapons. The point is that due to the development of the issue of non- proliferation and especially the NPT Treaty non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) brought claims concerning security assurances from NWS. The issue is mostly the claims of Non-Aligned Movement States and all NNWS in general. There are two major types of security assurances. First is negative security assurances which means a legal bind of NWS not to use nuclear weapons of the threat of use against NNWS. The second is positive security assurances – the obligation of NWS to provide help to NNWS should they be attacked by nuclear weapons. What both types have in common is the demand of NNWS that they should be enshrined in the international law. However none of NWS has acceded to these demands. For this moment the only thing that has been done is unilateral statements concerning non-use of nuclear weapons or threat of its use. All five member states of nuclear club issued their statements providing negative security assurances in 1978 (Závěšický 2005).

of nuclear explosive device for any purpose, and should stipulate that States parties to the treaty do not permit the stationing of any nuclear explosive devices by any other State within the zone. • Every treaty establishing a NWFZ should include statements concerning flexible system of verification of compliance with the commitments made by treaty member states. The means of verification include application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities in the zone. • A NWFZ should not prevent the use of nuclear science and for peaceful purposes and could also promote bilateral, regional, and international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic, scientific, and technological development of the States parties. It is necessary however to distinguish between NWFZs and non- nuclear-weapon states. It is mostly thanks to non-nuclear-weapon states’ diplomatic and collective efforts that have led to moratoria on nuclear testing with many going further to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their regions by making them a NWFZ (see Vestergaard 2014). Although there are only five official nuclear-weapon states in the world and therefore less than 190 non-nuclear-weapon states, the last do not enjoy too much international attention when it comes to nuclear weapons. Nevertheless it is exactly non-nuclear-weapon states that enable the functioning of international non-nuclear regimes and thanks to whom NPT came into being in the first place.

However not all non-nuclear-weapon states are alike. One can never be sure whether the nuclear-weapon-free status is constant or not. For example, some countries live in regions considered nuclear- weapons-free while others live under a transatlantic (NATO) or transpacific (South Korea and Japan) nuclear umbrella. A few have inherited nuclear weapons and then repatriated them (like Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine did in favour of Russian Federation in accordance with Lisbon Protocol to START I Treaty from 1991). Others, like and , have considered the idea of manufacturing their own nuclear arsenal, but eventually decided against it. Around two dozen non-nuclear-weapon states have hosted an ally’s nuclear weapons on their territory; and some still do. Many have nuclear power plants; some are suppliers of nuclear material and technology, and some only engage in nuclear technology for medical purposes, such as Denmark (ibid). It is obvious therefore that there is hardly a state in the Northern hemisphere5 that is not concerned with nuclear industry at all, that is why it is hard to talk about states that are completely free from nuclear impact. One more step the particular territory can undertake to create a nuclear free status is to make amendments to national legislature. The first state to do that was micro-state Palau in the region of Oceania. This vast and relatively sparsely populated area was an attractive final destination for French nuclear tests in the 1960s (Krause 2011). In 1982 Palau proposed a constitutional amendment concerning its

5 Existing NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean (established by Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967), South Pacific (Rarotonga Treaty of 1985), Southeast (Bangkok Treaty of 1995) and Africa (Pelindaba Treaty of 1996) make the whole Southern hemisphere free from nuclear weapons.

nuclear-free status (Palau Constitutional Convention 1979). Other states like Austria (Morris 2015) or Mongolia (NTI 2018) claimed their nuclear-free status without signing any other additional treaties or agreements with other states. Both states proclaimed their nuclear-free status by putting in force a special law that prohibited production, storage, transportation and tests of nuclear weapons. In addition to that Mongolia banned transportation and storage of nuclear waste. New Zealand and the Philippines firstly joined regional international agreement concerning nuclear-weapon-free status and later introduced similar provisions establishing nuclear-free zones on their particular territories. New Zealand legislation now includes a provision prohibiting vessels of any other state from entering its territorial waters in case it has a nuclear energy plant or nuclear weapons on board. It also prohibits landing of aircrafts carrying nuclear weapons. Philippine constitution as well as that of Palau is augmented by a similar article banning all nuclear-related matters: “The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory” (article II, section 8) (The Official Gazette 1987). This way of establishing nuclear-free status is considered by experts and pundits in international relations and security studies to be one of the most effective since the constitution of every democratic state is the basis for further signing of international treaties. The process of amending the constitution, not to mention the revocations of its provisions usually requires demonstration of nation will (Klyubanova 2010). Another term to be taken into consideration is “demilitarized zone”, which in connection with Arctic first appeared in the

aforementioned thesis of Hanna Newcombe in 1980. She compares NWFZs and demilitarized zones and comes to a conclusion that Antarctic was the only example of demilitarized zone to that moment, which meant there were no weapons of any kind, nuclear or conventional; no military personnel, equipment, or bases stationed. Her proposition was to establish a similar zone in Arctic, starting with NWFZ and proceeding to demilitarized one with a stricter legal regime and verification procedures. The overall advantage of regional non-proliferation agreements lies in the possibility of tailoring them according to a region’s specific needs and reality. In a localized, regional context, conditions are theoretically more favourable to the achievement of a comprehensive agreement since the number of actors involved is smaller and the complexity is therefore reduced, compared with negotiations on the global level. A global arrangement, because it must fit a multitude of actors – and therefore necessities and concerns – presents inevitably the lowest common denominator, while in a regional context, a more comprehensive arrangement can be created under favourable circumstances. An arrangement which is specifically moulded for a region’s requirements can include provisions on issues that are of particular relevance for the region, and verification mechanisms, for instance, could be construed with a view to meet the specific confidence-building needs of regional states. A NWFZ is therefore able to enhance the security of states and establish greater confidence in the region, by focusing its provisions on the region’s security requirements and expanding beyond the limited scope of a global regime, or narrowing its

attention to specific matters of concern (Müller, Franceschini, Melamud et al 2016).

3.2 The reasons and history of the development of the concept of NWFZs

De iure the entire process of creation of NWFZ is based on one of the very first resolutions of General Assembly of United Nations adopted in 1946 (United Nations 1946). Namely resolution VIII, article 5 (c) states that the Commission created to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy “shall make specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. In 1968 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty was signed and in 1970 came into force. This measure was vastly supported by almost all world states except for Cuba, India, Pakistan and Israel. The Treaty stated the strategic goal of international society: the destruction of nuclear weapon. From the perspective of regional cooperation the most important and promising article of NNPT is article VII, according to which no statement of the Treaty ”affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories” (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs: 1968). It is important to mention that NWFZs were not mentioned to be direct supplement or the consequence of NNPT. On the contrary their creation was determined by the wish of states in some regions to have mutual insurance arrangements in case of nuclear threat. Regional

agreements regarding establishing of NWFZs basically duplicate the very idea of NNPT. As was mentioned above, at this moment in time there are 5 regional NWFZs, self-declared nuclear-weapon-free state recognized by international community and two nuclear-weapon-free geographical zones.

(United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs: 2019)

The basis of concept of NWFZ is created by the following regional treaties: • Treaty of Tlatelolco 1967 (Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) • Treaty of Rarotonga, signed in 1985, effective from 1986 (South Pacific region)

• Treaty of Bangkok, signed in 1995, effective from 1997 (region of Southeast Asia) • Treaty of Pelindaba, open to signature in 1996, effective from 2009 (African region) • Treaty on a NWFZ in Central Asia, open to signature in 2006, effective from 2009.

3.3 Antarctic nuclear weapon free zone

As it has been already stated above, the considerations concerning nuclear power control and establishment of NWFZ as one of the instruments for that started to evolve simultaneously with the development of nuclear weapons themselves, namely in the 1950’s (Müller, Franceschini, Melamud et al 2016). The key moment for the negotiations has become the establishment of NWFZ in Antarctic by the Antarctic Treaty signed on December 1, 1959 (National Science Foundation 2019). Unfortunately, as it is seen till nowadays, there has been no unanimous consent concerning the establishing of the similar zone on the opposite pole, which however makes sense. Nevertheless the greatest challenge here is the legal regime of both zones. Since they may seem similar to each other, they are quite different and therefore both need different regulation regimes. In order to understand why Antarctic zone has been established and Arctic is still under consideration, it is necessary to compare both regions. First of all it is necessary to understand, what is meant by the geographical term “Arctic”, whereas the demarcation of the Antarctic region is quite obvious. For the analysis in hand, the “Arctic” is comprised by the Arctic Ocean and the territories within the Arctic

Circle (latitude higher than 66°33′46.1 North) (Marsh et al, 2014) which belong to five states, namely Canada, United States of America (U.S.), , Denmark and Russia (Dalaklis, Baxevani & Siousiouras 2016). As for the strategic military importance, Arctic is one of the most significant regions in the world concerning not only security, but also trade. The geographic position of three of Arctic states, Canada, Denmark (through ) and Russia offers an added advantage; apart from belonging to the very exclusive group of arctic states, they are located adjacent to the emerging maritime corridors (ibid.). The characterizations “Arctic Mediterranean” (Henrikson, 1992 in Keskitalo, 2004) or “the industrial Mediterranean of the future” (McGwin, 2013) are very revealing in regards to Arctic expectations. On the condition that the current reduction of ice-coverage continues, ships will have the option of an Arctic route in addition to the traditional maritime corridors through the Indian Ocean – Suez Canal and the Panama Canal (ibid). Moreover Arctic makes the shortest corridor between and Europe, which is to be considered in case of navigation of ships and equipped either for research or military purposes with either conventional or nuclear weapons (see Purver 1984). Antarctic region, on the other hand, is not even a potential field of battle between , no matter whether they are nuclear or not. The Antarctic Treaty states that “it is in the interest of all mankind that shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord. …Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes

only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons” (National Science Foundation 2019). In fact the only permitted activity in the region is that of research and science and all the contracting States of the Treaty should contribute to the environment protection. Thirdly, in terms of indigenous natural resources, both polar areas promise much for the future; however, to date only the Arctic has been exploited on a very large scale (Purver 1984)6. As it was mentioned above, Arctic has been and is now considered of a great military strategic importance in terms of both naval operations and trade. It was exactly geostrategic considerations that in turn made Antarctic important to such a degree that States of the Treaty decided to demilitarize it. In broader geostrategic terms, the ocean passageways between Antarctica and the southern tips of and Africa were considered to be of potentially great military significance in the event of a future world war. And in peacetime the area, precisely because of its lack of habitation, relative isolation, and pristine environmental conditions, was thought to be in some respects

6 The main reason for that is not of technical complexity and challenges, but is of legal nature. According to the Antarctic Treaty and The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty signed on October 4, 1991 “any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited” (Art. 7), which means that operations of industrial scale on the continent, which is most probably very promising as for natural resources, are not allowed. In addition to that the prohibition on mineral resource activities cannot be removed unless a binding legal regime on Antarctic mineral resource activities is in force (Art. 25.5).

ideal for the testing of various weapons systems, including nuclear devices. The successful demilitarization of the Antarctic is typically explained as a byproduct of the desire of scientists throughout the world to preserve the area exclusively for scientific research and co- operation (Purver 1984: 890-891). Nevertheless there is one more explanation that seems to be even more logical and pragmatic. The Antarctic Treaty terminated great territorial disputes among states that claimed their interests in the region. Every state wanted to get some part of the continent under its control, but did not make official claims and at the same time refused to acknowledge those of other competitive states in order not to let them gain influence over the continent. This is why Antarctic is now a neutral territory used for peaceful research only. Moreover this is a demonstration of the fact that states with incompatible strategic interests in one particular sphere are able and eager to cooperate in another.

4 The perspective of establishment of Arctic international regime

4.1 What is an international régime

As it has been analyzed above, Arctic is a region that undergoes substantive changes, both of internal and external character. Due to global warming more and more perspective territories are revealed and therefore more states show their interest in them. Suddenly, and with little advance warning, this once remote region of interest, primarily to indigenous peoples, explorers and scientists, has become a focus of attention on a global scale not only among policy-makers but also among pundits, journalists and authors of popular works on current affairs (Young 2012). This places states and international corporations in front of the challenge: how to make full use of these territories concerning trade shipping, commercial fishing, using its natural resources in general on the one hand and how to create a viable and efficient intergovernmental body that would be in charge of the destiny of Arctic and would be responsible for it on the other. The solution for this dilemma might be a phenomenon of international regime. International regime theory suggests that power is dispersed among many different agents, including states, international organizations, multi-national companies, and so on, that operate as tacit coalitions under similar understandings of procedures and desirable outcomes (Verbeek 2011). The pioneer in this area was John Ruggie, who first introduced the concept of international regimes to international relations theory in 1975. In his thesis he defined

regimes as "a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which have been accepted by a group of states" (see Søndenaa 2008: 20). One of the most comprehensive and acknowledged definitions of international regime was suggested by Stephen Krasner. He defines international regimes as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations (mainly states) converge in a given area” (Pawluszko 2012: 118). Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye provide a very similar definition of the international regime in their book “Power and Interdependence”, where they wrote on “sets of governing arrangements”. More sociological approach was proposed by Oran R. Young, who defined regime as social institution (recognized patterns of behaviour or practice around which expectations converge) governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities. In Young’s opinion crucial fields of interests for regime perspective arise in monetary issues, international trade, use of natural resources, arms control, management of power in international community etc. Young defines regime as a comprehensive feature of the international system, including activities taking place outside boundaries of sovereign states (examples: deep seabed mining, high- seas fishing) or involving impact on interests of several members of international community, such as exchange rates. Current Young’s approach remains state-centered as the formal members and organizers of international regimes are sovereign states, although most

of actions governed by regimes might be taken by private entities (e.g. airlines, banks or fishing companies)7 (ibid). For this thesis the most appropriate and elegant definition of the regime is provided by Haggard and Simmons (1987): international regimes are multilateral agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue area. Regimes define the range of permissible state action by outlining explicit injunctions. Regimes often contain rules which govern or specify their own transformation, but to explain “regime change” per se is to explain why states would agree to modify the codified rights and rules that regulate their behaviour. Regimes are mainly orders constructed by states through the medium of international negotiation. Young (Young 1982: 277) enumerates three types of regime construction: • spontaneous order – informal structures producing results in the absence of high transaction costs, lack of formal restrictions. In terms of international law this order can be compared to customary law; • negotiated order – formal structures accompanied by high transaction costs, limited allocative efficiency; • imposed order – formal or informal order, designed for the benefit of hegemonic powers, frequently leads to inefficient outcomes.

7 State-centered approach is based on realist school of international relations, which considers states as major actors on the international arena. Non-state actors like international corporations and NGOs are considered as players as well, although their role in the process of global decision-making is negligible due to the fact that states are permanent actors whereas NGOs and TNCs might cease to exist.

Obviously international regimes are subject to different kinds of changes, either of intrastate or international nature. Most of theories were built in the world of changing societies; however, they still have an inherent problem with governing the change and its meaning for the people. International regimes appeared as the most effective and elegant approach to provide answers in the field of social-political change at the interstate level of analysis. There are three major theories in the discipline of international relations explaining regimes as international institutions. First is aforementioned realist approach, proponents of which emphasize how power and considerations of relative power position affect the content, and circumscribe the effectiveness and robustness, of international regimes. The second is neoliberal school and the key word for this approach is “cooperation”, which is believed to be beneficial for all participating states and likewise for the creation of, and compliance with, international regimes. Here we can say that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts”. The last approach under consideration is constructivism. Its main thesis is that both the perception of interests and the meaning of power capabilities are dependent on actor’s causal and social knowledge. On the one side are the realists and neoliberals who see action as driven by logic of anticipated consequences (rationality) and prior preferences. On the other side there are constructivists who see action as driven by logic of appropriateness (norms) and sense of identity (see Søndenaa 2008: 20). In the following part of the thesis I am going to analyze only two approaches, specifically (neo)realist and neoliberal.

4.2 Perspective of application of international regime theory to Arctic region

4.2.1 Neorealism

General provision of neorealism theory is that the international system is anarchical, it is a self-help system, and the structure of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Anarchy is a holy grail for realists since it defines main actors’ behaviour. There is no higher authority above nation states which would constrain them or define their policies, which is why they are basically allowed to do what they like and find appropriate in order to fulfill their national interests. Realists tend not to draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government. “Goodness” and “badness” are in this case quite changeable and vague definitions since this characteristic depends on conditions, in which states are functioning in every period of time. Sovereign states are rational self- seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize their own resources against external threats. For realists, the fundamental analytical argument – the basic explanation for the behaviour of states – is the distribution of power in the international system and the place of a given state within that distribution, calculations about power dominate states thinking, and that states compete for power among themselves (Søndenaa 2008: 16).

Classic Morgenthau thesis states that “…the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau 1978: 2). States formulate their security and military policies and strategies on the basis of worst-case assumptions and therefore are aware of what is to be another central concept of realism, that is security dilemma: states are aware of their rivals’ capabilities and try to build up their own ones in order to prevent other states from getting advantage or building up superiority, that is why there is a constant arms race. Surprisingly this is the safest state of affairs since no state will dare to attack another because of the certain response from the rest of the world community. It is in other states’ interest to prevent that particular state from becoming a hegemon. Interestingly Søndenaa supposes that it is exactly the hegemon that the realist theory needs concerning nuclear issues. According to him the hegemon will be a kind of observer who will provide certain rewards in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Concerning Arctic issues I assume realist theory in Søndenaa’s interpretation is not going to work since no state, especially Russia or USA will be willing to be overcome by any other and be conducted what to do. In case Arctic states are going to cooperate I think they will do that on the basis of classic realism, namely choose partners according to the situation. Also I suppose that Nordic states are more willing to cooperate with the US rather than with Russia therefore we can expect a certain coalition of Nordic states (Norway, , Denmark) and the US and Canada on the one hand and Russia and possibly China on the

other. Although China is not an Arctic state at all, it has a commercial interest in the region mostly concerning fishing and transport. 8

4.2.2 Neoliberalism

Liberal tradition is has very much in common with the emergency of modern liberal states. Liberal theory basically states that when the state provides its citizens with individual rights and liberties, government, economy and the population flourish. Liberals also take states as reasonable actors, specifically that they do not make wars against each other (Doyle 1999). The idea of a natural order underpinning human society is the cornerstone of liberal internationalism. For the clearest statement of this-position, we must turn to the Scottish political economist and moral philosopher, Adam Smith. By pursuing their own self-interest, individuals are inadvertently promoting the public good. Although Smith believed that the natural harmony between individual and state did not extend to a harmony between states this is precisely what was emphasized by liberal internationalists in the nineteenth century like Richard Cobden (Baylis, Smith 1999). Neoliberalism appeared in the 1980s and basically recognizes the basic provisions of neorealism: systemic approach, anarchy-based international system, rationality of state actors and using logic during

8 Commercial traffic from China is already transiting the , and billions of dollars are being invested into navigational, search and rescue, and icebreaking capabilities. The route shaves 20 days off the Asia-Europe journey for cargo ships by bypassing the Suez or Panama Canals (Francis 2019).

cooperation. Principles of neoliberalism could be described in the following way: • Actor: Liberal institutionalists take for granted the state as a legitimate representation of society. Although emphasizing the importance of nonstate actors in his early pluralist work, Robert Keohane's understanding of neo-liberal institutionalism admits that non-state actors are subordinate to states. • Structure: Liberals broadly accept the structural condition of anarchy in the international system, but crucially, anarchy does not mean cooperation between states is impossible, as the existence (and proliferation) of international regimes demonstrates. In short, regimes and international institutions can mitigate anarchy by reducing verification costs, reinforcing reciprocity, and making defection from norms easier to punish. • Process: Integration at the regional and global level is increasing. Here the future direction of the European Union is considered to be a vital test case for neo-liberal institutionalism. • Motivation: States will enter into co-operative relations even if another state will gain more from the interaction, in other words, 'absolute gains' are more important for liberal institutionalists than 'relative gains' (emphasized by neorealists) (Baylis, Smith 1999). It is international regimes that make space for international cooperation. The existence of international regimes contains negative consequences of anarchy in some areas of international relations.

Regimes decrease uncertainties by creating rules and mechanisms for enforcing compliance with these rules (Drulák 2003: 78). According to Keohane, international cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preference of others through a process of policy coordination, which is possible only if the relevant and important information is shared among all the members of this particular regime. Therefore the whole success of established regime depends on the degree of trust and cooperation among states and their eagerness to provide each other and international community with veracious and comprehensive data. From a neoliberal view, there has to be a consensus among the majority of the signatory states for the regime to prevail, but once established on this basis, the regime is likely to be quite stable. In the lights of aforementioned events concerning Russian activities in the Arctic it seems improbable that both the US and Russia could make a stable consensus concerning the region of a great potential. As it can be seen neither side (neither Russia nor NATO) does not seem eager to provide other states with relevant and complete information concerning their activities and plans for the territory. Still it might be applied mostly for military affairs. On the other hand most powerful and industrially advanced states agreed on the moratorium on commercial fishing in the Arctic Ocean (Česká televize: 2017). According to Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs ambassador David Balton this is an exceptional example of cooperation, when the problem is solved even before it has truly appeared. Therefore there is a high probability of successful cooperation as for non-military issues that are usually considered slightly less important when it goes about national interests

and national security. As for military cooperation, as it is seen from above, there is still a space for improvement.

5 Why Arctic should be nuclear-weapon-free

5.1 The history of the initiative (Gorbachev speech)

One of the most progressive steps on the way to nuclear-free Arctic was the speech of Mikhail Gorbachev on October 1st 1987 delivered in . Murmansk was one of the most important ports and industrial centers in the USSR; for the study in case it was that more important in connection with its close location to Arctic region and North trade route in general. Since 1997 Murmansk has been included into the list of ports officially authorized to operate with nuclear materials9. Moreover year 1987 meant the 70th anniversary of October Socialist Revolution. Murmansk was therefore chosen as a platform to promote the philosophy of (perestrojka and the policy of ) by means of addressing wide international community (and north European in the first place) with an appeal to radically decrease the level of military confrontation in the north region of the planet (Fokin, Smirnov 2012). Notably this speech was delivered several weeks before signing of the INF Treaty (December 8th 1987) which ended nuclear confrontation

9 January 1997 – Murmansk port is on the list of seaports officially authorized to accept ships and other sea crafts with nuclear energy installations and sources of radiation. October 2003 – Murmansk port is authorized to accept and leave sea crafts which transport nuclear and radioactive materials. February 2011 – Murmansk port is included into the list of state border check points through which nuclear materials and goods containing nuclear materials are coming in and out of the state (Rosmorport n.d.).

between USA and USSR and to a large extent put the end to the Cold War in general. According to Purver (1988) it was the upcoming signing of INF that caused the stimulus for Gorbachev’s speech. The signing of INF Treaty presented both dangers and opportunities from the Soviet point of view. The danger was that NATO would compensate for the loss of its land-based intermediate-range by increasing the deployment of nuclear-armed air- and sea-launched, long-range cruise missiles in and over Northern waters. Indications to this effect were already emerging from Washington and Brussels. At the same time, the Soviets may have hoped that the dismantling of long- and shorter-range INF missiles would provide a stimulus to the old idea of a Nordic NWFZ, since many of the stated Nordic objections to such a zone in the past concerned the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in areas adjacent to the region. One of the most breakthrough suggestions made by the then Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU was the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in . Should it been established, the Soviet Union was ready to take the responsibility to be its guarantor. No doubt it needed considerable common efforts from all Arctic states and, what is more important, from both NATO and USSR. Gorbachev proclaimed the preparedness of the USSR to carry on negotiations with each interested state either on bilateral or multilateral basis. Since the unanimous agreement of all potential participants was (and is) needed, the USSR was ready to discuss all possible problems concerning the creation and administration of nuclear-free zone with representatives of all interested states, should it be necessary. One more quite a radical step was the suggestion to remove submarines equipped with ballistic missiles from the Soviet

Baltic Fleet, which would have followed the unilateral dismantlement of launchers of medium-range missiles in the and the greater part of launchers of such missiles on the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military areas that has already taken place at that time. A considerable number of shorter-range missiles was removed from those districts. The holding of military exercises was restricted in areas close to the borders of Scandinavian countries. Additional opportunities for military detente in the region would have opened up after the conclusion of the agreement on "global double zero" (Gorbachev 1987). Interestingly, Gorbachev referred to nuclear-free zone in Arctic, which is supposed to mean not only the absence of nuclear weapons, bases and storage facilities, but also for instance the prohibition of nuclear-powered ice-breakers, nuclear plants or transfer of goods containing nuclear materials that could have been used for instance for medical purposes. However I consider it hardly possible to imagine that trade ships are prohibited to pass through definite territories since there is no immediate threat or emergency situation in the state the territorial waters belong to. In fact however the point was about the NWFZ. Among other suggestions concerning military sphere the attention should be paid to limitation of naval operations on the northern seas and confidence-building measures (see Atland 2008: 295). Nevertheless these suggestions were perceived with a fraction of mistrustfulness since NATO supposed these measures and suggestions were aimed at ultimate establishment of Soviet dominance in the region by restricting the numbers of NATO vessels (Hayward, 1988: 11).

Mr. Gorbachev paid considerable attention to non-military sphere as well. In his speech he mentioned the need for economic and scientific cooperation as well as cultural and environmental. Since the rest of Arctic states had more developed at their disposal, The Soviets were interested inter alia in cooperating with Western enterprises in the utilization of mineral resources for instance on the Kola Peninsula (see Atland 2008: 301). Last but not least economic cooperation and relations is the first matter states establish or suspend when it goes about improvement or worsening of official interstate relations. In this case this was one of the steps towards Western states in order to show the willingness of the Soviet Union proceed in détente and finally end the Cold War. It is of no doubt that such an impressive speech which was eventually labeled “a revolution in the Soviet approach to Arctic affairs” (Purver 1988: 148) caused immediate response from all interested states of the region concerned. The initial reaction of Western governments to the Murmansk proposals as a whole could be characterized as positive but cautious. The other circumpolar states were quite receptive to the idea of multilateral cooperation in such areas as scientific research and environmental protection. For the most part, they also welcomed the prospect of more intense bilateral co- operation with the USSR in these and other nonmilitary spheres. However, the arms control elements of the speech were treated much more cautiously; indeed, with a good deal of suspicion on the part of NATO members. Although substantial responses were slow in coming, various officials of Western governments provided an initial reaction almost immediately. As in the case of the Nordic NWFZ, the Finns were the most enthusiastic, the Swedes also quite positive, the Nordic

members of NATO more cautious but not entirely hostile, and the USA least enamored of the proposals. Even Washington, however, was reluctant publicly to rule them out of hand (ibid. 149-150).

5.2 Current situation concerning Arctic region (USA vs. Russian Federation)

This part of the thesis is devoted to the actions undertaken by two most powerful and influential actors in the region. Since Cold War both USA and Russian Federation claimed their rights to northern territories, not only because of their geographical location (a substantial part of Russian territory is located north of the 60th parallel of north latitude, which is supposed to be the south border of ANWFZ should it be established). The more important fact for this study and the undisputable evidence of Russian (or more precisely Soviet) determination to be rightful owner of these territories is that first thermonuclear bomb was tested on Novaya Zemlya facility in 1961, which was perceived as an immense threat to international security and was one of the preconditions for the situation that finally culminated into Cuban crisis and signing of several bilateral and multilateral treaties that eventually led to gradual decrease on numbers of nuclear devices and weapons in possession10. Today due to global warming and consequent pack ice melting scientists discover new deposits and fields in Arctic, which inevitably

10 The most prominent treaties of that time are: - Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty, LTBT, signed 1963), - Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty, signed 1967), - Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (signed 1968), - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I, signed 1972), - Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Bab Treaty, TTBT, signed 1974)

causes disputes among Arctic states. For the study in hand the most important issue is how Arctic territories, namely continental shelf, would be divided among respective states (Rotzer 2018).

(Lima Charlie News 2017)

Several states are currently debating about the future of the North Pole which has a symbolical meaning in the first place. However the expansion of its territories in the Arctic Ocean is a question of prestige for Russia, which is the main subject of this part of the thesis. Its renomé does not let it lose its authority due to the loss of the argument with Denmark, which made similar demands concerning the expansion of shelf zones (Lynge 2019). Greenland, an autonomous country owned by Denmark, has the nearest coastline to the North Pole. In 2014, Denmark claimed an area of 345,000 square miles extending from the Greenland border into the limits of Russia’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Russia remains unwilling to concede to the smaller nation (New York Post 2018). Russian Federation is determined to prove that most part of the seabed belongs to it since this territory is a natural extension of Eurasian continental shelf. For this reason Russian polar scientists arranged research expedition to the seabed and took samples of soil in order to prove that Lomonosov range is the extension of Russian coastal territory (see Francis 2019). Competent international institutions however did not agree with his conclusions, which although did not make a major trouble for the Russian side and it keeps on looking for proofs of its rightfulness (Francis 2019). The reason for such a tense struggle for this region is that it takes almost 1,2 mil. square kilometers. In case Russian claims are scientifically proven, the North Pole will be part of its territory as well. Because of global warming Russia will eventually have access to large oil and gas deposits, coal, cobalt, antimonite, diamonds, copper and nickel fields that are still unexplored. The USA, Canada, Denmark,

Norway, Finland and Island make similar claims concerning these fields and the territory in general (Šedivý 2018). Since 2013-2014 (Ministry of the Economic Development of the Russian Federation 2016) Russia expands its presence in Arctic, civilian as well as military. Now there is a legal definition of Arctic territories stated in state decree (Prezident of Russian Federation 2014). Moreover it is actively building military facilities (see figure below). One can witness air force and naval bases; construction of new ice- breakers is on process and all the infrastructure is to be protected by autonomous submarine devices.

(Business Insider 2015)

Moreover Russian Federation is considering imposing restrictions on passage of foreign vessels through the Russian Arctic, as this region is called in the draft of the federal law. By conducting Trident Juncture at the end of October 2018 NATO reacted to Russian actions and made it clear that Arctic region is even more important to the organization than conflict in the Ukraine. During the exercises NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg claimed that NATO responded correspondingly to Russian military presence in the Arctic region and that the Alliance would also extent its presence. Stoltenberg underlined the importance of providing protection for underwater cables connecting American continent with Europe. According to his words their protection was the reason why military exercises included the participation of nuclear submarines and for huge investments into the development of the Navy and air forces (Rotzer 2018). The Kremlin is publicly holding military exercises and building bases in the Arctic region, in its bid to send a message to the rest of the world that it’s willing to do whatever it takes to take ownership of the region. The same year it annexed Crimea, Russia carried out extensive military exercises in the region for the first time since the end of the Cold War. It forms part of Vladimir Putin’s mission to restore Russia to its “great power” status. Prior to the 2018 NATO summit, Chatham House Research Fellow Mathieu Boulegue urged the organization to develop a stronger military presence in the region. According to him, NATO did not have a clear, united strategy for the Arctic or the Black Sea; therefore both regions would face heightened risks as the Kremlin kept on building up its military capabilities (Boulegue 2018). Moreover there is always a risk

of miscalculation and tactical errors. Any unintended incident can spark disastrous military escalation between Kremlin and allies. Russia’s goals concerning Arctic are of geopolitical and strategic character. To save control over Northeast passage or the region natural resources is of great importance for Moscow. Arctic states or states cooperating in the region in general were able to avoid serious conflicts till now, but global warming and consequent ice melting can eventually change the situation. First of all it concerns Northeast Passage which is the shortest sea route between Europe and Asia. Russia concerns it to be national property and enforces the control over it by new rules. Any ship is to request the right to pass 45 days in advance, pay considerable charge a take a Russian guide on board, otherwise there is a threat of being foreclosed or even being sunk by Russian side (Česká televize: 2019). The significance of Arctic region is increasing for the Russian Federation that is why it is concentrating additional forces there. However, according to colonel retired Ari Rautala actions taken by Russian side are not of offensive, but rather of defensive character, since the state is trying to protect its national interests. By demonstration of military presence Russia is trying to preserve its status in the region. The point is not in protecting particular interests, but rather in pure demonstration of power (Kronvall 2016).

5.3 Position of Canadian Pugwash Group

Canadian Pugwash Group is one of the most prominent non-state initiatives established to point out the necessity of denuclearization of Arctic region. The purpose of this initiative is to encourage

commencement of the process leading to an Arctic NWFZ. Members of the group suggest to start negotiation not between nuclear weapon states in the region (Russia and USA), but rather among non-nuclear states. Original statement emerged in 2010. As per the statement main challenges regarding nuclear states are the following: • decrease the role of nuclear weapons in military planning, • ensure that NATO accommodates the possibility of an ANWFZ, • cooperate with the Arctic non-nuclear weapon states – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden – to enable those states to establish a NWFZ in their own territories, • enable removal of Russian Federation and United States nuclear weapons from the Arctic by negotiating a significant, verifiable, nuclear arsenal reduction treaty that would result in strategic parity between Russia and the United States. In turn Arctic non-nuclear states should: • negotiate a NWFZ to be established in their own territories north of the ; include the nuclear weapons states in these negotiations, as a prelude to these states including their own Arctic territories in the ANWFZ • actively promote a step-by-step approach; for example – involving at first the terrestrial territory, followed by negotiations for sea and airspace • ensure that NATO removes any restrictions on a NATO member country that would militate against establishing

the ANWFZ, such as an agreement to station nuclear weapons on their territory in time of war In short the Group claims that establishment of an ANWFZ is a confidence building step toward . The uniqueness of ANWFZ is caused by the fact that to existing NWFZ includes NWS as well as no existing NWFZ covers only parts of the territory of member states.

6 Conclusion

The concept of NWFZs is to be considered of value and importance not only in strategic in security studies. Obviously it is on agenda when it comes to global discussions regarding disarmament and overall reducing of number of nuclear missiles, carriers, fleet, and research stations. This concept is also valid in the field of international studies when it comes to setting up spheres and regions of interest among different states. The concept is undoubtedly is frontrunner in environmental studies especially against the background of climate change discussions, ozone layer thinning and global warming. The main goal of this thesis was to introduce the concept of NWFZs and challenges connected with this worldwide phenomenon. The first capitol of the thesis covered several areas including basic theory regarding the definition and basic principles of NWFZs. The most comprehensive and at the same time simple definition is to my mind that from Hana Newcombe, namely that NWFZ is a world region from which nuclear weapons are totally absent (whether under the control of the nation whose territory it is, or under the control of another nation), and where a system of verification ensures compliance with this agreement by all parties. First part also described mail principles of NWFZs, namely freedom of will and negotiation to be part of the zone; respect from non-member states regarding the status of the region; freedom of every member state banning the nuclear carriers from passing via its territory in case it might have nuclear material; and mandatory consultations with states possessing nuclear weapon since by signing and ratification they take obligations to respect the status of the zone and become its

guarantors. At the same time NWFZ does not prevent the development of science and technology for peaceful and humanity-useful purposes. Next subcapitol was a brief description of what is Antarctic NWFZ and the legal regime of both Arctic and Antarctic regions. For gaining more comprehensive picture it was described in comparison so that one can see similarities and differences and challenges caused by them. The greatest challenge regarding Arctic and the greatest advantage of Antarctic zone is legal statement of the status. This is key factor that stops Arctic from becoming an independent region in terms of possible trade and military tensions. The challenge to solve is to divide Arctic into regions belonging to every Arctic state that will satisfy each of them. Second capitol was of more analytical character and was devoted to the concept of international regime and the possibility of its establishment over Arctic region. International regimes are sets of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which have been accepted by a group of states. Regimes evolve either in spontaneous (in absence of formal rules and regulations), negotiated or imposed (designed to benefit only particular players) order. International regimes are studied from points of view of three different theories of international relations. Neorealist approach makes accent on state-centric structure and concept of relative power. Neoliberal school’s central concept is cooperation and interaction between actors which profits all of them. Third theory is constructivism and its main point is that the actions and perception of opponents’ interests depend on how the actors perceive the situation, on their point of view, standards and knowledge.

From neorealist point of view the central concept is power and national interest. The international order is anarchical that is why states rely only on their own sources and capabilities, therefore long- term cooperation is impossible since states have different goals and means to achieve it. Neoliberalism acknowledges basic provisions of neorealism like systemic approach, anarchy-based international system, rationality of state actors and using logic in international relations. At the same time it recognizes the role of non-state actors (although makes it state- subordinate), the possibility of cooperation among states to reach more global goal that is impossible to be reached by separate state and therefore the integration, both horizontal (among states) and vertical (among state, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations). International regimes make this cooperation possible therefore there is a high probability that Arctic states will finally find the consensus regarding both military and trade spheres in the region. The goal of the last capitol was to answer the question, why Arctic region should be nuclear free. First it briefly described why and the Arctic zone appeared at the end of Cold War and at the time of signing INF Treaty between US and USSR. Moreover the then highest representative of USSR Mikhail Gorbachev suggested to create nuclear- free zone in Northern Europe and proclaimed that USSR was ready to discuss all possible problems concerning the creation and administration of nuclear-free zone with representatives of all interested states along with suggestions of limitation of naval operations inter alia and also measures in non-military sphere which led to a considerable change in the Soviet approach to Arctic affairs.

The last subcapitol was describing the current approaches of two most prominent players in Arctic area, Russian Federation and the USA, and ongoing events. The biggest challenge for both states is dividing the territory which is not only the question of international prestige but which also considers oil fields and trade roots. Since the beginning of 2010s Russia increases its military and civil presence in the region which was eventually confronted by NATO Trident Juncture exercises. The importance of Arctic territories for Russia also lies in the fact that Northeast passage, the shortest route between Europe and Asia, lies on its territory and is considered as Russian property that is why there are so many actions taken, which are although of more defensive character. The concept of NWFZ is overall well elaborated. The practice, in its turn, is far from being perfect. I suppose that Arctic states will finally cooperate and make a reasonable decision regarding the status and the future of Arctic region by making it recognized military and nuclear- free that will be only to overall benefit.

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