EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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Committee on Petitions

9.1.2006

WORKING DOCUMENT

on the fact-finding mission to and Val Susa of 28 and 29 November 2005, under Rule 192(3).

Petitions 949/2003, by Alberto Perino, on behalf of the ‘Habitat’ association, 523/2004, by Darjana Ronconi and 198/2005 by Marco Tomalino, on behalf of the Valle di Susa Association for Public Health Coordination, against the completion of the new Turin-Lyon high-speed/high-capacity rail link

Committee on Petitions

Members of the delegation: Michael Cashman (PSE), head of delegation Carlos José Iturgaiz Angulo (PPE) David Hammerstein Mintz (Verts)

DT\597026EN.doc PE 367.844v01-00 EN EN Introduction

Further to the coordinators' decision of 13 September 2005 to reorganise, by the end of the year, the fact-finding mission in question (which had merely been postponed, after having being originally scheduled for 15-16 February 2005), on 28 September 2005 Mr Libicki (chairman) sent a request to the Bureau, which authorised the mission on 11 October 2005. The aim of the mission was to meet the petitioners and the regional and provincial authorities with a view to obtaining fresh information from a broader range of institutional and technical sources, and to meet the growing expectations of the inhabitants of Val Susa and their elected representatives; those expectations concerned the actual role of Parliament's Committee on Petitions in its relations with the Commission and the relevant national authorities in terms of implementing European laws on environmental protection and preventing health risks in the complex issue of the new Trans-European rail link.

In short, the greatest criticisms concerned: uncertainty over the cost-benefit analysis of the work and the highly controversial refusal to upgrade the existing line; the risk of hydrogeological instability in relation to recent floods; the high level of noise in the rail sections outside tunnels; the presence of asbestos in one of the three tunnels and the difficulty in detecting it at depth through drilling; the similar problem with uranium, which had been found in the main, 53-km tunnel; the dubious technical arrangements for the transport of debris, including hazardous debris; the risks of polluting aquifers and cutting off streams, and the inadequate compensation offered for the loss of value of surrounding property.

The mission's initial programme was later divided into three separate parts/visits, to: a) the head office of the regional government, in the presence of its President, Mercedes Bresso, and the regional and/or provincial environmental and transport councillors; b) the Turin Polytechnic, to meet university lecturers and the petitioners' consultants; and c) to the head office of the 'Comunità montana Bassa Val di Susa', in the presence of its chairman, Antonio Ferrentino, several mayors of the municipalities concerned, and a throng of citizens who had spontaneously convened in order to welcome the delegation. During the mission, the programme of visits to the future construction sites underwent a series of unexpected and radical changes, mostly due to the nocturnal evacuation by the police (between 28 and 29 November) from the barricades of peaceful citizens carrying out a sit-in; this had resulted in heavy restrictions on the freedom of movement of vehicles and people in surrounding areas, adversely affecting local residents above all (see the two delegation press releases of 29 November).

Hearings

The representatives of the Council of the Region and Turin Province (Regional President, Mercedes Bresso and Transport Councillor, Franco Campia), accompanied by a number of regional executives (Vincenzo Coccolo, Aldo Manto and Laura Bruna) jointly confirmed the position of their respective local authorities in favour of the completion of the work. They stressed that the new railway line was essential in order to restore the balance of the modal transport system, which currently saw the predominance of road transport over rail transport in relation to the transit of rolling stock on the Italian side of the northwestern Alps. The recent road accidents in the Mont Blanc and Frejus tunnels had been a warning sign of the increasingly serious risk of saturation of the roads connecting the Italian and French road

PE 367.844v01-00 2/9 DT\597026EN.doc EN networks in the event of a sudden increase in the transit of heavy goods vehicles (HGV), as had occurred in the Frejus tunnel in the summer of 2005. The existing railway line between Turin and Modena dated back to Italian unification and had gradients which were too steep for the transport of HGVs. Nevertheless, as Mr Campia had pointed out, the possibility of upgrading the old line, consisting of one mountain section and one flat section, had been considered in 1994-1995, but had been rejected; even though the steep section – used for both long-distance passenger traffic and international freight – was mostly under-utilised, because of its steep gradient it offered only a limited range of options, such as the broadening of platforms for containers, which could only be temporary solutions at the most. The lower part of the line was also used for local commuter traffic and was therefore almost at saturation point. Furthermore, if the line were to be quadrupled, though this would be technically feasible, it would adversely affect a densely populated area; it would therefore be hugely difficult to govern the impact of the work on the residential area. In this regard, Mrs Bresso said she strongly objected to merging local traffic with long-distance traffic, and favoured the conversion of the lower part of the line for local use. More generally, the President stressed the importance attached by the regional authorities to all environmental issues and the importance of establishing EU financial rules and measures to discourage road transport, thereby encouraging rail transit through the Alps.

From this point of view, the Piedmont region had always tried to involve the local authorities in the decision concerning the location of the new line. An example of this was the constructive contribution given by municipalities of the so-called Gronda (Turin belt) during the drawing up of the preliminary project. In particular, since 2000, regular consultations had been held with the local authorities, which had been successful as far as the Gronda municipalities were concerned, owing to the incorporation of their transport and environmental requirements. Since the last regional elections, the valley municipalities had apparently requested a moratorium of several months, but the government had rejected the request; the Province had thus encouraged the setting up of a technical committee, known as Rivalta, thereby giving the valley and Gronda municipalities adequate technical representation. A technician from the Intergovernmental Committee, in charge of the work, had also been present and had had the task of examining all issues relating to drilling, and in particular to asbestos core sampling. This body had, however, been working on an on-off basis, owing to a number of resignations from both the government and the valley side. In conclusion, Mrs Bresso maintained that the Region and the Province had always encouraged the participation of the local authorities; despite that, there had been a lack of information on the substance and the different stages of the project, to the detriment of the local population, unlike the wide-ranging information on the project given on the French side. The new Council therefore intended to set up a project information centre in the main Turin railway station, while the Province had already set up a museum in Bussoleno devoted to the transalpine railway. The national government, meanwhile, had refused to carry out an environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the final project and had then announced that the adoption procedure would be concluded by the end of 2006. According to Council members, the government would still, however, have to meet with the local authorities to discuss the necessary compensation, in relation to the environment and safeguarding of protected areas as well as compensation for economic and tourism-related damages.

As far as environmental and health aspects were concerned, Vincenzo Coccolo, head of the regional environmental protection agency, ARPA, gave a generally reassuring opinion on the

DT\597026EN.doc 3/9 PE 367.844v01-00 EN possible geological risks, in particular the risks of uranium and asbestos contamination from the mountains in which the railway tunnels were to be built. According to a pamphlet dated 28 November 2005: 'asbestos mineralisation is not widespread, but occurs chiefly, though very irregularly, in faults'; essentially, according to the studies available, there were no vast quantities of asbestos in the rock, but the asbestos found was due to tectonic phenomena. The pamphlet did state, however, that the asbestos issue needed to be looked at carefully, by means of geognostic exploration. As far as noise pollution was concerned, 167 areas in which thresholds were exceeded had been identified on the existing line and provision had been made for a redevelopment plan. More stringent noise limits would however be applied on the new line, which would give the local population a high level of protection. According to the pamphlet (p. 28), the epidemiological aspects in relation to human health, in particular pleural mesothelioma, were no great cause for concern. The conclusions (p. 36) were of a similar tone: 'the crucial environmental issues identified, if correctly managed, will not harm the health of the population in question'; a supervisory body (environmental monitoring centre) should however be set up in order to verify the impact of the work on public health.

Mr Gianfranco Chioccia, lecturer at the Polytechnic and consultant for the 'Comunità montana' gave an up-to-date overview of the chain of events leading to the popular protest ('No TAV') against the high-speed rail project in Val Susa. He outlined the various reasons for the petitions submitted to Parliament and the other non-violent measures that had been taken to express disagreement. The project for the new cross-border rail link had taken shape in the early 1990s, with no form of official publicity by its promoters. The local people involved had reacted to this lack of information by setting up a technical committee – 'Habitat' – with the aim of providing the municipalities of the valley with a group of experts in the various fields relating to the project. Subsequently, since the general state of disinformation on the substance of the project continued, and the necessary conditions for launching an environmental impact assessment with public participation were lacking, a first public demonstration was held (1996). From 1998 to the present day, as many as 37 town councils had adopted decisions opposing the 'forced' implementation of the high-speed rail project (TAV), the most recent being Decision No 30 of 29/9/2005 by the Municipality of . In tandem with the procedure for adopting the preliminary project, public participation in protest marches rejecting the project had grown exponentially, with a record number of protestors (80 000) participating in the general strike in Lower Val Susa on 16 November 2005. The national and regional authorities responsible for approving the preliminary project had shown no willingness to listen to citizens' requests, as demonstrated by the short time frame (two weeks) repeatedly granted in 2003 to the local authorities for the submission of comments. Throughout this time all administrative procedures had been virtually completed (after having been fast-tracked by the agreement between the Government and Region, under Law No 443 of 2001, (legge obiettivo), recognising the environmental compatibility of the project, pushing it forward to the stage of preliminary project and exempting it from environmental impact assessment for the final project - see decision by the CIPE [Interministerial Economic Planning Committee] of 5 December 2003 based on legislative decree 190/02).

The bodies, associations and committees which had objected to the project from the start raised seven key issues. These included: substantial hydrogeological risks; a high level of noise pollution in sections of the new line outside the tunnels; excessive nuisances and harmful emissions from the work, which would last for 15-20 years; proposals to evacuate huge quantities of unacceptable debris; aerosols of asbestos or uranium dust which was

PE 367.844v01-00 4/9 DT\597026EN.doc EN known to be present in several of the mountains in question; the risk of the water supply being reduced, and the ridiculously low financial compensation being offered to homeowners. For these reasons, in March 2005 the town councils had confirmed their opposition to the project, while the company responsible for organising the studies, drilling and preliminary work, LTF, having won the contract for the work, had announced its intention to commence the geognostic explorations and open up the Venaus exploratory tunnel. As far as Venaus was concerned, the dimensions of the perforation (6.3 m in diameter and 11 km long) lent greater credence to the fact that this would eventually be used as the first section of the service tunnel for the future main tunnel and that, as a 'trial' for the final project, it was a way of eluding the EIA. The residents of Lower Val Susa had therefore peacefully defended their position, setting up barricades in the key points where the excavations were due to begin.

Meanwhile, at the Government's instigation, the Rivalta technical committee had been set up. It was charged with swiftly analysing the seven key criticisms of those opposed to the project. In September 2005, talks focused on the hazardous substances contained in the debris, particularly asbestos dust; but as the national authorities were determined to carry out the drilling and excavations as soon as possible, in accordance with the plan forwarded to the European authorities, the talks had since stalled, and other critical issues were not discussed in depth. The committee's work was thus put on hold.

Then came the first act of 'military' occupation on 31 October 2005, involving some 1000 police officers, of the sites marked out for drilling, which had immediate repercussions on residents' freedom of movement around their own homes. This led to the withdrawal from the Rivalta committee of the 'Comunità montana' consultants and to a general strike in the valley on 16 November. The protest did not, however, deter the Italian authorities from arranging further evacuation measures on the Venaus sites, which were to be occupied until 30 November (see reference to 29 November in the mission report).

The key difference of opinion between the parties involved was over whether the work should be done at all – the 'whens' and 'hows' being secondary. Engineer Andrea Debernadi, for example, pointed out that the cost-benefit analysis (costs: €15.2 bn for all rail sections connecting FR and IT; benefits: from €2.7 to €8.9 bn) was hardly encouraging, especially since the profits had been estimated as a best-case scenario, according to the French Ministry of Finance. Some criticisms should surely be considered valid, such as the predicted saturation point of the old line, which could be at least ten years later than the dates set out in the project (i.e. 2035 rather than 2025); other valid criticisms concerned the difficulties in transferring freight and passenger trains from the interconnecting line to the main tunnel, and the heavy increase in traffic at the Turin junction.

The environmental health problems, listed by cancer specialist Edoardo Gays, needed to be taken seriously if it were indeed true that 1) the presence of asbestos in the areas concerned, on Italian territory, in the 23 km tunnel under Mount Musiné had been attested by a geological study commissioned by the Italian Railways and conducted by the University of Siena (some 50% of the 39 outcrops had tested positive); 2) the largest asbestos quarry in Europe, , which was awaiting reclamation, was only 15 km away; 3) the valley was one of the windiest in the western Alps; 4) the data provided in a study by ARPA (2003) on the current mortality rate due to asbestos in the Susa and Cenischia valleys showed that the rate was higher than the national average.

DT\597026EN.doc 5/9 PE 367.844v01-00 EN In the international section, under the Ambin massif, the high-speed rail route through the main tunnel and the 'exploratory tunnel' in Venaus could, moreover, run into radioactive uraniferous sites known to the scientific community. Preventive action would need to be taken by adopting careful measures in the tunnel areas. In relation to these harmful substances, it would therefore be reasonable to demand that the issues of debris transport and disposal be addressed in advance. In this regard, Professor Scavia, from the Polytechnic, pointed out that the 7.5 million cubic metres excavated from the international section (Bruzolo-St Jean de Maurienne) were supposed to be evacuated via a 20 km-long conveyor belt from an altitude of 500 m to a quarry in Col Moncenisio, at an altitude of 2000 m (Carrière du Paradis), which was a hazardous venture from both an environmental and energetic point of view. The 4.2 million cubic metres extracted from the Italian section (from Bruzolo to Settimo T.) would apparently mostly be reused for making concrete, though no alternative form of storage was provided for should recycling prove to be impossible. Another unknown quantity was the location of the asbestos (already identified on the surface) in the heart of the mountain; since it was an irregular, erratic component of the rock, hidden in fragile areas, linear drilling did not seem to be sufficient to reveal its presence at depth. Extra time and costs therefore needed to be factored in immediately, together with special arrangements for evacuating any asbestos which came to light only after initial excavation of the tunnel. As things stood, the EIA on the preliminary project would sidestep all the questions raised by this considerable problem.

On the basis of on-site studies and observations (which had not, however, been reflected in the project), Mr Pavia, a geologist, sketched out a scenario in which water reserves would be impoverished due to the depletion of streams, and underground aquifers polluted due to the karstic nature of certain rocks, not to mention the increased risk of flooding, which had already devastated Val Susa over the past ten years. Further unanswered questions concerned the issue of noise pollution, owing to the physical and meteorological characteristics of the alpine valleys concerned. In this regard, the new line, though mainly running through tunnels, would not be an improvement on the old one in terms of lowering noise, given the technical and financial uncertainties inherent in the operating models put forward for both lines. In the open-air sections (such as the Val Cenischia and the northern Gronda), according to the results of a Polytechnic study on noise peaks caused by the TAV at a distance of 600 m from residential areas, cited by Professor Chiocchia, the new line would, on the contrary, increase noise levels. In this regard, the inspection carried out in the municipality of (Gronda) at the end of the mission revealed that the external section of track would run at a distance of 14 m from apartment blocks inhabited by 180 families (and would involve the demolition of a 17th century farmhouse), with devastating sound effects, comparable to those of an airport runway.

"Why would they want to build a railway with such an uncertain profit yield and such huge problems?" Professor Claudio Cancelli gave a cutting answer to this question, summing up the logic behind the 'technical' opposition to the TAV. Pointing out that the technicians who had drawn up the national transport plan at the end of the 1980s had ruled out high-speed rail, deeming it to be totally inappropriate for , he added: 'If there had been a technical debate on the TAV from the start, if the decision on whether or not to build this line had been a technical, rather than business, issue, the main question to answer would be: "is infrastructure with these characteristics and this volume of traffic compatible with the characteristics of the territory it has to cross"'?

PE 367.844v01-00 6/9 DT\597026EN.doc EN Returning to the document setting out the seven key objections to the TAV, and citing in particular the studies on asbestos and uranium (1971, Agip), the chairman of the 'Comunità montana' of the Lower Val Susa, Antonio Ferrentino, reiterated the community's priority request that immediate action be taken on the underused old line. He also called for discussions to be launched at national level, from which local bodies could no longer be excluded. With regard to Venaus, he maintained that it was absurd to dig a tunnel of the dimensions of a service tunnel without carrying out an environmental impact assessment and against the wishes of the local authorities. He too took the view that the true reason for granting Community funding was to generate economic competition with other tunnels, such as the Swiss St. Gotthard Tunnel. With respect to the exemption of the final project from EIA, it was pointed out that the administrative procedures had already benefited from the simplification inherent in the so-called legge obiettivo ('target law'), in relation to which Community infringement proceedings (under directives 85/337 and 97/11) were pending, further to complaint 2002/5170 by WWF Italy.

As mentioned above, the delegation had to cut short its programme of visits to the future construction sites, limiting them to Seghino, in , near to which a drill had been installed (and to which access to all but military vehicles was prohibited), and Venaus. In the latter village, in the afternoon of 28 November, the delegation visited the barricades, met citizens and local authorities and was handed an appeal for democracy in Val di Susa, bearing hundreds of signatures and protesting against the Community funding of the project and its imposition by the use of military force, resulting in the breach of the rights of the local people. The military occupation of the Venaus site in the early hours of the 29th confirmed the previous day's fears and triggered a raft of statements. One such statement, issued by the delegation, expressed indignation over the affront above all 'to the local population, who were peacefully protesting against the start of the first drilling site', but also over the 'insult to the integrity of the parliamentary delegation'; the statement was released at a press conference at the Susa town hall at the end of a heated public meeting.

Unexpected further developments in this complex affair took place after the mission had ended: in the night of 6 December, force was repeatedly used and road and rail traffic blocked, with episodes of violence against citizens and police officers further to the forced evacuation of the Venaus barricades; then, on 8 December, the protesters attempted to re-occupy the site. Referring to the events of 6 December, the mayors and petitioners sent the Committee on Petitions a fresh appeal for democratic dialogue. Subsequently, on 10 December, the Italian Government decided to hold a meeting, chaired by the State Secretary for Relations with the Prime Minister's Office, Gianni Letta, with the representatives of the Region, Province and Municipality of Turin, together with the chairman of the 'Comunità montana' of the Lower Val Susa, in order to start negotiations. The talks led to the drawing up of a five-point draft agreement, which included, inter alia, the establishment of a monitoring centre to assess the impact of the work on public health, and the postponement of the start of the work on the Venaus tunnel until completion of the relevant environmental impact procedure. Apparently, however, the draft was not signed by the local authorities.

Conclusions of the delegation of the Committee on Petitions

1) Although this assessment might be premature, and somewhat inadvisable, given that the delegation has received no direct information from any of the

DT\597026EN.doc 7/9 PE 367.844v01-00 EN parties involved, no assessment of the latest events and, in particular, no copy of the draft agreement of 10 December 2005, the negotiations launched can only be welcomed as a step forward compared with the previous abnormal situation in the Lower Val Susa, in which the exercise of rights to free movement of people and property had been substantially hindered before, during and immediately after this delegation's mission.

2) The appeals for democracy in Val Susa will be forwarded to the Committee on Civil Liberties, so that it may consider them when drafting its report on fundamental rights in the Union.

Moreover, the delegation:

3) declares that it welcomes a shift of cross-border traffic flows from road to rail, via the new Trans-European Networks (Corridor 5 in the case at issue), providing that the decisions taken respect the environment and cause no damage to human health, in accordance with the rules, principles and criteria set out below;

4) stresses the importance of the principles relating to precaution, prevention of risks to human health and the environment, and the 'polluter pays' principle, which have repercussions not only on the activity of the national authorities but also on the management and monitoring of the use of Community funds by the Commission, irrespective of its specific powers in the area of prevention and/or compensation for damages to human health resulting from the use of asbestos or uranium in the implementation of public works;

5) points out that at each stage of its planning, the trans-European rail link calls for special attention to be paid to environmental protection requirements, which should be included in the framing and implementation of the common transport and trans-European network policy, in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty, incorporated in Decision 884/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Annex III.6 of which makes provision for the Turin-Lyon line);

6) calls on the Commission departments responsible not to confine themselves to approving the work without bothering to ensure that the environment is included in this specific Community action, as if this objective were of no concern to them; in this regard, the Commission should not restrict itself to identifying TENs priorities while giving the national authorities sole responsibility for the choice of route and technical options, since the latter authorities alone could irreversibly harm environmental protection interests and prejudice fundamental rights such as the right to health and property;

7) with regard to the monitoring of the implementation of Directives 85/337 and 97/11 in respect of environmental impact assessment (EIA), the Commission cannot base itself solely on the information given by the petitioners to ascertain whether or not there has been an infringement; from the notices to Members (of 23 March 2004 and 25 June 2005), it would appear that the Commission has expressed no independent opinion on the lawfulness of the failure to carry

PE 367.844v01-00 8/9 DT\597026EN.doc EN out an EIA for the so-called service tunnel in Venaus (prior to 10 December 2005) and, more generally, on the decision not to carry out an EIA for the final project of the work in question; the Commission should therefore clarify whether the reasoned opinion for infringement sent to Italy on 18 October 2005, concerning the so-called legge obiettivo (complaint 2002/5170) – heavily criticised by the petitioners – can also invalidate the approval procedure for the final TAV project; at the same time, the Commission should specify whether, in the case in question, a single transnational EIA procedure could be carried out, in accordance with Community law (as mentioned in paragraph 20 of the preamble to Decision 884/2004/EC);

8) urges the Commission to act with greater transparency and efficiency in its dealings with the Committee on Petitions for the further inquiry relating to the petitions in question, and not to act in a condescending manner towards citizens sending petitions or complaints, in respect of their right to receive prompt and correct information and appropriate responses to their criticisms; in this regard, it would appear that insufficient publicity, or no publicity at all, was given, for example, to the appointment and mandate of acting Commissioner, Ms Loyola di Palacio, to the checking of the fulfilment of the requirements under Regulation 1260/1999 in respect of the granting of Community funding for the TAV project, or to the recent decisions taken by the current Commissioner for Transport, Jacques Barrot, also in the interest of the local people, to ensure the success of the negotiations launched by the Italian Government on 10 December;

9) calls on the Italian authorities at all levels to continue along the path of dialogue and negotiation with the representatives of all local bodies, with a view to reaching an agreement without prejudicing the fundamental rights to health, environment and property of the citizens directly concerned; in particular, calls on the Intergovernmental Committee to send prompt and accurate information on the negotiations and on developments in the procedure.

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